Article 14 Aggravating Circumstances

ARTICLE 14 – AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 214757
PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee
vs
TIRSO SIBBU, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the January 6, 2014 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04127 which affirmed
with modification the May 15, 2009 Decision2 of Branch 11, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City finding Tirso Sibbu (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder in Criminal Case No.
11722 and of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and
11724.
In Criminal Case No. 11722, appellant, together with Benny Barid
(Benny) and John Does was charged with attempted murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth,
Municipality of Marcos, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously shot BRYAN JULIAN y VILLANUEVA, twice but
missed, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder
directly by overt act'>, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the said crime, by reason of some
cause independent of his will, that is, accused are poor shooters, to
the damage and prejudice of the above-named victim.
That the crime was committed [in] the dwelling x x x of the
victim at nighttime and disguise was employed, with accused
Sibbu wearing a bonnet on his face.3
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, and except for the
names of the victims and the location of their gunshot wounds,
appellant together with Benny and John Does, was charged with
murder in three similarly worded Informations 4 allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of December 2004, in Brgy. Elizabeth,
Municipality of Marcos, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and treachery, did then and t11ere willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously shot [Trisha May Julian y Villanueva, Ofelia
Julian y Bagudan, and Warlito Julian y Agustin], inflicting upon
[her/him] gunshot wounds, which caused [her/his] instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the above-named
victim.
That the crime was committed in the dwelling x x x of the victim at
nighttime and disguise was employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a
bonnet on his face.
During arraignment held on July 22, 2005, appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him. After pre-trial was conducted, trial
on the merits followed. On May 31, 2008, appellant's co-accused
Benny was arrested. However, his trial was held separately
considering that the trial with respect to the Appellant was also
almost finished with the prosecution already presenting rebuttal
evidence.5
Version of the Prosecution
Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
11722 and a common witness to all the cases, testified that between
6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his three-year
old daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case
No. 11721; his mother Ofelia Julian (Ofelia), the victim in Criminal
Case No. 11723; and his father, Warlito Julian (Warlito), the victim
in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents' house
in Barangay Elizabeth, Marcos, llocos Norte when he saw from a
distance of about five meters a person in camouflage unifo1m
with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet
over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he
tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to
see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there
were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan
recognized the armed man as the appellant.6 Brian also saw two
men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from
the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his
family. Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and
Warlito.
Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito
Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming out of the bathroom. Bryan then
proceeded to the pigpen at the back of the house to hide.
Another prosecution witness, Eddie Bayudan (Eddie), testified that
on December 6, 2004, he was by a well near his house when he
heard gunshots coming from the house of Warlito and Ofelia. When
he turned towards the direction of the gunshot5, he saw a man
about five meters away wearing a black bonnet and a long-sleeved
camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw another
man crouching on the ground whom he recognized as the accused
Benny. Eddie went inside his house for his and his family's safety.
Afterwards, he heard Bryan shouting for help. When he went out to
investigate, he saw the dead bodies of Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha.
Warlito Jr. also testified that he heard gunshots coming from outside
their house. When he went out of the bathroom, Bryan told him that
appellant gunned down their parents and his niece. In his cross-
examination, Warlito, Jr. claimed to have seen the appellant shooting
at the porch of their house.7
Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad (P/Supt. Lusad), chief of
the provincial intelligence and investigation branch of Ilocos Norte,
testified that at 7:00 a.m. of December 7, 2004, he conducted an
investigation and an ocular inspection at the crime scene. He found
bloodstains on the floor of the porch, the cadavers of the victims laid
side by side in the sala, and bullet holes in the cemented portion at
the front of the house below the window gril1.8 During his interview
with Bryan, the latter pointed to appellant as the gunman.9
SPOl Eugenio Navarro (SPOl Navarro) also testified that he went to
the crime scene together with Senior Police Inspector Arnold Dada,
P02 Danny Ballesteros, and SPO1 Lester Daoang, where they found
13 spent shells and slugs of a caliber .30 carbine. Police
Superintendent Philip Camti Pucay who conducted the ballistic
examination confirmed that the recovered shells and slugs were
fired from a caliber .30 carbine.
Version of the Defense
The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant's
father-in-law, Eladio Ruiz (Eladio), testified that on December 6,
2004, appellant did not leave their house because they had a
visitor, Elpidio Alay (Elpidio); moreover, appellant tended to his
child. Eladio stated that the distance between his house and
Warlito's is approximately two kilometers and that it would take an
hour to negotiate the distance by foot.10
Eufrecina Ruiz (Eufrecina), mother-in-law of the appellant, also
testified that appellant had been living with th.em for two years
before he was arrested.11 She narrated that on December 6, 2004,
appellant did not leave their house the whole night as he was
tending to his sick child. She also claimed that they had a visitor who
delivered firewood. Eufrecina alleged that appellant did not own any
firearm and that he did not know Benny.
Elpidio testified that on December 6, 2004, he went to the house of
Eladio to deliver a wooden divider.12 He arrived at around 6:00 p.m.
and left at 7:00 a.m. the following day. Elpidio stated that the
appellant did not leave the house that night and that appellant was
inside the house when he heard explosions.
Appellant denied the charges against him. He testified that on
December 6, 2004, he never left the house of his in-laws because he
was taking care of his sick son. He claimed to have heard the
explosions but thought that those were sounds of firecrackers since
it was nearing Christmas.13 Appellant denied having any
misunderstanding with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan and
Benny personally, or possessing camouflage clothing.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 15, 2009, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Case Nos.
11721, 11723, and 11724, and of attempted murder in Criminal
Case No. 11722. The RTC gave credence to Bryan's positive
identification of appellant as the person who shot at him and killed
his daughter, mother and father. On the other hand, the RTC found
appellant's defense of denial and alibi weak.
The dispositive part of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 11721, accused TIRSO SIBBU is hereby
declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
declared GUILTY BEYOND REASONfJ3LE DOUBT of the crime of
attempted murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum.
PERPETUA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Ofelia Juliany Bayudan the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil
exemplary damages; and
PERPETIJA. Further, he is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Warlito Juliany Agustin the [amounts] of ₱50,000.00 as civil
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723 and 11724, accused TISO SIBBU
is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha Mae Julian y Villanueva;
Ofelia Julian y Bayudan; and Warlito Julian y Agustin the amount of
₱55,602.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 6, 2014, the CA aft1rmed the RTC's Decision with
modification as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 15, 2009, issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Laoag City in Criminal Case Nos.
11721, 11722, 11723 and 11724, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11721, appellant Tirso Sibbu is hereby
declared Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha May
Julian y Villanueva the [amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid;
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia Juliany
Bayudan the [amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with
interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the finality of this
judgment until folly paid; and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.Further, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia
Juliany Bayudan the [amounts] of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% percent from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Dissatisfied with the CA's Decision, appellant elevated his case to
this Court. On February 9, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution
requiring the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs.
However, the appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since
he had exhaustively discussed his arguments before the CA. The
Office of the Solicitor General also manifested that there was no
longer any need to file a supplemental brief since the appellant did
not raise any new issue in his appeal before this Court.16
Issues
The main issue raised in the Appellant's Brief concerns Bryan's
identification of the appellant as the assailant. The appellant
contends that the trial court erred in (1) giving undue credence to
the testimony of the alleged eyewitness Bryan; and (2) in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged because the
prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor.17 Further, appellant argues that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of
disguise were not sufficiently established.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
We uphold the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA,
that Bryan positively identified appellant as the person who shot at
him and killed Warlito, Ofelia, and Trisha. We have consistently
ruled that factual findings of trial comts, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are entitled to respect and generally should not
be disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were
overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case.
After due consideration of the records of the case and the evidence
adduced, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in their
appreciation of the facts and evidence.
We find that Bryan was able to identify the appellant as the assailant
in the shooting incident; there is no reason to doubt his positive
testimony. As aptly observed by the RTC, Bryan's narration of how
he was able to recognize the appellant was credible
and convincing, to wit:
q You said somebody [shot] at you, your father, your mother, and
your daughter while you were at the azotea of the house of your
father on December 6, 2004. Did you see the person who shot at you,
your father, your mother, and your daughter?
a Yes, ma'am.
xxxx
q How far was [the gunman] when you saw him at the west side? a
Around five (5) meters away, ma'am.
q What was his position at the time you first saw him?
a He was at this position, ma'am. (Witness is showing as if a gun was
slung on his neck) Then I told my family, ''Somebody would shoot
us, let us all run and hide," and then he shot [at] me twice, ma'am.
xxxx
q How about [his] face x x x, can you x x x describe [it] to us?
a When be came near us he fixed his bonnet which covered one eye
only that is why I recognized him; and even though his face was
covered with [a] bonnet, I could still recognize him because I usually
mingled with him, ma'arn.
xxxx
q You said you were able to recognize his face because you were
familiar with him. Who was that person whom you recognized?
A Tirso Sibbu, ma'am.
Q If this Tirso Sibbu is inside the courtroom today, would you be
able to recognize him?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Kindly look around the courtroom and point to us if he is inside
the courtroom?
A (Witness is pointing to a man wearing a black T-shirt with blue
denim pants who when asked his name answered Tirso Sibbu)
Q You said you were able to recognize the face of this man Tirso
Sibbu because you are familiar with him? Can you tell us why you
were familiar with him? What were the circumstances where you
mingled with him?
A He was a jueteng collector and he came to our place three (3)
times a day to get the bets, ma' am.
xxxx
q Considering, Mr. Witness, that it was already x x x 6:30 [to] 7:00 in
the evening, how were you able to see the face of Tirso Sibbo?
A There was a light in front of the azotea, ma'am.
q What was the light in your azotea you are referring to?
a Christmas lights that were not blinking, ma'am.18
xxxx
q Now, Mr. Witness, how far [was the accused when you first
noticed his presence]?
a More or less 5 meters, sir.
xxxx
q By the way, that was the first time [you noticed the presence of]
the accused. Was that in the same place you saw him fire his gun?
a He came nearer, sir.
xxxx
q Now, Mr. Witness, [how did you recognize the accused]?
a He fixed his bonnet [his] face was partly covered, sir.
q x x x That bonnet x x x covered the face, is that correct?
a Only one eye was covered so he fixed it sir.
q And the whole face was covered except one eye, is that what you
want to impress the Honorable Court?
a The hole that was meant for his left eye went at his right eye so he
stretched the bonnet and his face was uncovered that is why I
recognized him, sir.
q You said that his face was uncovered, are you referring, to the
whole face that was uncovered?
a Because of the stretching, the eyes and the nose were uncovered,
sir.19
From Bryan's testimony above, it is clear that he was only five
meters away from the appellant when the shooting incident
happened. While the appellant was seen wearing a bonnet over his
head, Bryan was able to get a glimpse of appellant's face when the
latter fixed his bonnet. In addition, Christmas lights hanging from
the roof of the porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to
identify the appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the
appellant's built, height, and body movements. As correctly pointed
out by the CA:
It is equally of common knowledge that the eyes readily [adjust] to
the surrounding darkness even if one stands in a lighted area, and
the distance of five meters is not an impossible or improbable way
as to preclude identification.1âwphi1
Besides, Bryan’s identification did not solely rely on facial
recognition but also from appellant's body built and height, and the
way he walked and moved, all proper standards of identification as
corroborated in the testimony of an experienced police officer and
PMA graduate Police Superintendent Benjamin M. Lusad, chief of the
provincial intelligence and investigation unit of Ilocos Norte.20
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the RTC and the
CA were correct in holding that Bryan positively identified the
appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia,
and Trisha.
Appellant also questions the RTC's appreciation of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, dwelling. and use of disguise.
Citing People v. Catbagan,21 appellant argues that "[t]reachery
cannot be considered when there is no evidence that the accused
had resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of the killing;
or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation,
calculation, or reflection."
We disagree. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying
circumstance in the instant case.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make."22
The case of Catbagan has an entirely different factual context with
the case at bar. In Catbagan, the accused was a police officer who
investigated reported gunshots during an election gun ban in
the residence of one of the victims. Prior to the
shooting, Catbagan had no intention of killing anyone. It just so
happened that during a heated exchange, Cc1thagan drew his
firearm and shot the victims. In this case however, before the
shooting incident, appellant was seen with a gun slung over his
neck and a bonnet covered his face to conceal his identity. It is
clear that appellant's purpose is to hmm and kill his victims.
In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of
the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at
the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending
attack. In addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a
defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and
his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the
residence of the victims. Appellant, in particular, wore camouflage
uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his
family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to
scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time Bryan
became aware of appellant's presence, the latter was already in the
vicinity of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed deliberate
means to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his
victims with minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other
conclusion than that the appellant's attack was treacherous.
With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the trial
court correctly held:
In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house
when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was
outside the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against
Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:
xxxx
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into
account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside
the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should have
actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the
offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own
house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without x x x.23
The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan testified that the
appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting
incident There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a
bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially
since Bryan and appellant live ir1 the same barangay and are
familiar with each other.24
As for the defense put up by the appellant that he was inside the
house of his in-laws during the shooting, the Court is unconvinced
by his denial and alibi.1avvphi1 Aside from being the weakest of all
defenses, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time the
shooting incident happened. We have consistently 1uled that ''for
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place when the crime was committed,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and
convincing evidence."25
In this case, the crime was committed in the residence of the victims
which is located within the same barangay where appellant resides.
In fact, appellant's father-in-law testified that the distance
between the crime scene and his house is "more or less 1
kilometer,"26 or two kilometers as he later amended and that
said distance could be traversed in one hour by foot.27 Verily,
appellant's alibi must fail for failure to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity
at the time of its commission.
The Court also upholds appellant's conviction for attempted murder.
Appellant commenced the commission of murder through overt acts
such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not
perfom1 all the acts of execution which should produce murder by
reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts
of execution to kill Bryan, Appellant is therefore guilty of attempted
murder, Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the
brunt of appellant's firearm.
All told, appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder
considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery and one count
of attempted murder. Since two aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the crime
of murder, appellant should be sentenced to death in accordance
with Article 6328 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 24829 of
the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Thus under Article 63, the higher penalty should
be imposed. However, because of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
prohibited.1âwphi1 The law provides that in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed with no
eligibility for parole. Accordingly5 appellant should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility forparole in lieu of
the death penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, 11724.
In People v. Jugueta,30 the Court held that:
x x x [F]or crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of
the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to
the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the
amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱l00,0000.00 as
moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or
the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of
₱l00,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil
indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of
qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall
be fixed at ₱100,000.00. x x x
xxxx
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate
damages in certain cases. x x x Under Article 2424 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that
the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss allthough the exact
amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the
amount to be awarded as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00.
xxxx
In summary:
1. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional
Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of R. A 9364:
a. Civil indemnity-₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages –₱l00,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity-₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages –₱50,000.00
Hence, in Criminal Case Nos. 11721, 11723, and 11724 where the
appellant was convicted of murder, the crime being attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and by the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and disguise, we further modify the
awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
to ₱100,000.00 each for each case. Moreover, since the award of
actual damages in the amount of ₱55,602.00 pertained to all three
cases, the same should be modified to ₱50,000,00 for each case.
In Criminal Case No. 11722 for attempted murder, the RTC as
affirmed by the CA imposed the penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years as prision mayor as
maximum.
In People v. Jugueta,31 the Court en banc held as follows:
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is
death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, prescribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder,
the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one
ordinary aggrawating circumstance the penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period, Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from two (10)
years and one (l) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods,
or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the
Indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (l)
day of prission correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4)
counts of attempted murder. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing, the proper imposable penalty for attempted
murder, and considering the attendant aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and disguise, is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one
(l) day of prision mayor, as maximum. In addition, appellant is liable
to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at
₱50,000.00 each. Finally, these monetary awards shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the January 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04127 is AFFIRMED with FURTHER
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Trisha
May Julian y Villanueva the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00, as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with
interest at the ro1te of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Ofelia
Julian y Bayudan the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
eligibility for parole. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of
Warlito Julian, Sr. y Agustin the amounts of ₱l00,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted 1nurdcr and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, he is
ordered to pay Bryan Julian y Villanueva civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary dams.gos each in the amount of
₱50,000.00, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 238120, February 12, 2020
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RICO
DELA PEÑA,* ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
INTING, J.:
Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim
while the latter is asleep and unable to defend himself. Absolutely, a
sleeping victim is not in a position to defend himself, take flight or
otherwise avoid the assault, thus ensuring that the crime is
successfully executed without any risk to the attacker.1
The Court is now asked to decide on Appeal2 the Decision3 dated

October 30, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02163, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated October 28, 2015
ofBranch 45, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bais City, in Criminal Case
No. 11-94-MY, finding Rico Dela Peñ a (accused-appellant) guilty of
the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
The case arose from an Information5 charging accused-appellant

with the crime of Murder committed as follows:
That on or about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 14, 2006
, at Barangay Samak, Mabinay, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just
motive, with treachery, and with intent to kill his brother in law,
OLIPIO GOMEZ AMAHIT, assault, attack, and stab said Olipio Gomez
Amahit with a "pinuti", thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab
wounds on his body, which directly caused the death of said Olipio
Gomez Amahit, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the

qualifying circumstance of treachery, and aggravated by
relationship under Article 15 of the RPC, the accused being the
brother in law of the victim.6
The antecedents as culled from the CA Decision and records of the

case are summarized as follows:
Ernie D. Amahit (Ernie), son of the victim Olipio G. Amahit (Olipio),

testified that in the afternoon of December 14, 2006, he went to
their nipa hut after tending to their carabaos. When he was a few
meters away, he saw accused-appellant enter the nipa hut where his
father was sleeping. Olipio was lying face down when accused-
appellant stabbed him at the back with a bolo locally known
as "pinuti." He heard his father shout for help while he watched
accused-appellant stab the former several times. Accused-appellant
then threatened to kill Ernie prompting him to run towards home to
tell his mother about the incident.7
For his part, accused-appellant alleged that at around 5:30 p.m. of

December 14, 2006, while he was walking on the road on his way
home, Olipio called and motioned him to come near him. Olipio then
told accused-appellant about the banana plants that were uprooted.
Accused appellant inquired as to the reason for Olipio's action, but
the latter simply told him not to get angry otherwise he would kill
him. When accused-appellant answered "no," Olipio pulled out
his bolo and thrust it towards him. They wrestied for the bolo and
when accused-appellant got hold of it, he stabbed Olipio. He
narrated that Olipio was first hit in the stomach but when they
continued to grapple with each other, he continued to stab the latter.
Thereafter, accused-appellant went to the house of his cousin.8
On October 28, 2015, the RTC rendered a Judgment9 finding

accused-appellant guilty of Murder. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having ably
proven the guilt of accused RICO DE LA PEÑ A for the crime of
MURDER beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the law, and
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P20,000.00 as
actual damages, and P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
SO PROMULGATED IN OPEN COURT this 28th day of October, 2015

at Bais City, Philippines.10
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Ernie who actually saw
appellant stab his father with a pinuti several times at his back while
the latter was sleeping lying face down on the floor. According to the
RTC, it is an act of treachery to the highest form when one attacks a
person who was sleeping. It gives no chance to the victim to defend
himself thereby ensuring the evil motive of killing the victim.11
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC:

WHEREFORE, the 28 October 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 45, Bais City in Criminal Case No. 11-94-MY
finding accused-appellant RICO DE LA PEÑ A, guilty of Murder is
AFFIRMED. With respect to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed upon him, accused-appellant shall be ineligible
for parole pursuant to RA No. 9346. The accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA concluded that the physical evidence presented including

the location of the stab wounds contradict accused-appellant's claim
that Olipio was the unlawful aggressor. The depth and seriousness
of the wounds suffered by the victim prove that the stabbing blows
were not inflicted by accused-appellant as a matter of defense but
more to be taken as acts of aggression towards Olipio.13
Hence, this appeal.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues
submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the CA committed no
error in concluding that accused-appellant is indeed guilty of the
crime of Murder. The issues and matters before the Court are the
same issues raised in the CA, there being no supplemental briefs
filed. They were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon by
the CA.
First, it has been held that when the issue involves matters like
credibility of witnesses, the calibration of their testimonies as well
as the assessment of the probative weight thereof, findings of the
trial court and its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the
trial court has the unique opportunity to closely monitor the
demeanor of witnesses during the trial and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth.14 There being no showing
that the RTC misconstrued or misapprehended any relevant fact in
this case, the Court gives full respect to its findings and conclusion,
which were sustained on appeal by the CA, supporting accused-
appellant's conviction for Murder.
Second, credence is accorded to the testimony of Ernie, who

positively identified accused-appellant as the one who stabbed his
father. The alleged inconsistency between Ernie's affidavit and his
testimony in open court does not affect his credibility as it does not
detract from the fact that he saw and identified accused-appellant as
the assailant of his father. Verily, a sworn statement or an affidavit
does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of
the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements taken ex
parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given
in open court.15
Third, by invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense,

accused-appellant thus admits committing the acts constituting the
crime for which he was charged and the burden of proof is on him to
establish, by clear and convincing proof, that (1) there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.16
The prosecution's material witness, Ernie, clearly described how

accused-appellant stabbed his father to death. He recalled:
PROS.
YBANEZ:
xxxx
While approaching the said nipa hut was there any
Q:
unusual incident that you observe or witness?
A: Yes.
Q: What is that unusual incident?
A: He stabbed my father.
When you say he stabbed your father, who
Q:
stabbed your father?
A: Referring to Rico.
Q: May we know the family name of this Rico?
A: Dela Peña.
Q: Is he inside this courtroom?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you please point to him.
(Witness pointing to a person who when asked of his
A:
name answered Rico Dela Peñ a).
How far were you when you see this Rico Dela Peñ a
Q:
stabbed you. father?
A: Just near.
xxxx
And, when this Rico Dela Peña stabbed your
Q: father where was your father situated and what
was he doing?
A: My father was asleep during that time.
Q: Where was he sleeping?
A: Inside the nipa hut.
And, what was the position of your father while
Q:
he was sleeping?
A: He was lying face down.
xxxx
Can you recall how many times this Rico Dela
Q:
Peña stabbed your father?
A: Many times.
xxxx
And, what weapon did Rico Dela Peñ a use in
Q:
stabbing your father?
A: A long bolo locally known as "pinuti".
The first time that your father was stabbed by Rico
Q:
[,] what happened to your father?
A: My father shouted.
And, can you remember what was the shout of your
Q:
father?
A: He shouted for help.
And, what did you do after seeing that your father
Q:
was stabbed by Rico?
A: I was just watching.
You said a while ago that your father was stabbed by
Q:
Rico many times. After that what happened if any?
A: He said that he will include us.
Q: After hearing this, what did you do?
A: We ran away.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
This narration was corroborated by the result of the Post-Mortem

Examination18 showing that Olipio sustained several wounds on his
back, to wit:
>
Location Findings
Five inches long, diagonal anterior ribs
open to four inches long, heart and other
Right upper chest.
internal organs can be seen through the
wound.
Along anterior
axillary line or three Two inches long, vertical, deep and
inches below the penetrating.
nipple.
Anterior side of the Cutting up to subcutaneous tissue.
right forearm.
Five inches long with one inch abrasion tail,
widely gasping, width about two inches,
Below right scapula
posterior ribs open to two inches long, deep
and penetrating.
Above left iliac crest
Four inches long, vertical, deep, large
along posterior
intestine partly herniated.
axillary line.
V-shaped wound on
the posterior side of Cutting tissue up to muscles.
left thumb.
One inch below
Four inches long, deep reaching muscles.
shoulder blade.
Along right posterior
One inch long, superficial.
axillary line.
Posterior side of Horizontal, two inches long, reaching
Right forearm. muscles and tendon.
Posterior side of ¾ inch long diagonal, cutting up to
hand. subcutaneous tissue.
The nature, character, location and extent of these wounds belie

accused-appellant's claim that Olipio attacked him with a bolo; and it
was in self-defense that after wrestling the bolo from the victim,
accused-appellant used it against the latter. The appearances of the
wounds on the victim's heart, his internal organs and large intestine
contradict accused-appellant's defense that he had only hit Olipio
twice in the stomach and that after the second blow, both of them
fell and rolled on the ground which caused the wounds at the back.19
Assuming that Olipio was the aggressor, it is nevertheless apparent

that at the time he was killed, the danger to accused-appellant had
already ceased. Notably, even after taking full control of the bolo, he
attacked the victim several times and stabbed him to death. Settled
is the rule that when the unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.20
Both the RTC and the CA properly ruled that treachery qualified the
killing to murder.
In People v. Clariño,21 the Court discussed that the lower court

correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery since the victim
was asleep at the time of the assault.22 Accordingly, the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor of an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself and thereby insuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor.23
Similarly, in People v. Caritativo,24 accused-appellant was found

guilty of the crime of murder for the death of Expidito Mariano. In
affirming the conviction of accused-appellant, the Court stressed
that treachery attended the killing of the victim as the latter was
attacked while he was asleep. A sleeping victim is not in a position to
defend himself, take flight or avoid the assault, thus ensuri ng that
the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the latter.
In this case, Ernie categorically stated that his father was sleeping
inside the nipa hut when accused-appellant stabbed him using
a "pinuti". Olipio was lying on his stomach, with his face down,
and it was in that position that he was killed by accused-
appellant. Under such circumstance, there is no doubt that he
was not in a position to put up any form of defense against his
assailant.25
Lastly, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,

the Information is sufficient if it contains:
1. the full name of the accused,
2, the designation of the offense given by the statute,
3. the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
4. the name of the offended party,
5. the approximate date, as well as the
6. place of the offense. To the Court's mind, the Information herein

complied with these conditions since the qualifying circumstance of
"treachery" was specifically alleged in the Information. In fact, it
bears emphasis that accused-appellant never claimed that he was
deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges
against him due to the insufficiency of the Information.
In People v. Galido,26 it was held that the failure to allege the element
of force and intimidation in an information for rape is not a fatal
omission that would deprive the accused of the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him. While the
information failed to allege this element, the complaint stated the
ultimate facts which constitute the offense. Since the complaint
forms part of the records and is furnished the accused, the latter
may still suitably prepare his defense and answer the criminal
charges hurled against him.27
Furthermore, in People v. Candaza (Candaza),28 the Court declared

that an information which lacks the essential allegations may still
sustain a conviction if the accused fails to object to its sufficiency
during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein.29 Section 9 of Rule 117 of the same
Rules reads:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. —
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of section 3 of this Rule.
More recently, in People v. Solar (Solar),30 the Court found that the

accused-appellant has waived his right to question the defects in the
Information filed against him. It observed that the accused-appellant
did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information
through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He
also voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and
proceeded with the trial. As such, he is deemed to have waived any
of the waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed
lack of particularity in the description of the attendant
circumstances. Simply put, the accused-appellant is deemed to have
understood the acts imputed against him by the Information and the
appellate court erred in modifying his conviction in the way that it
did when he had effectively waived the right to question his
conviction on that ground.
In accused-appellant's case, the defense not only failed to question

the sufficiency of the Information at any time during the pendency
of the case before the RTC, it even allowed the prosecution to
present competent evidence, proving the elements of treachery in
the commission of the offense. At this point, as in Candaza and Solar,
herein accused-appellant is deemed to have waived any objections
against the sufficiency of the Information.31
As to the penalty imposed, the RTC and CA were both correct in

imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with the
accessory penalty provided by law, instead of death considering that
the latter penalty has been suspended by Republic Act No. (RA)
9346. As to the award of damages, the modifications made by the CA
already conform to the latest jurisprudence on the matter. People v.
Jugueta holds:32
In summary:
I. For those crimes like Murder, Panicide, Serious intentional

Mutilation. Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion

perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity - P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00
Thus, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty

imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua, the civil
indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages in
view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example.33 In the
present case, other than treachery which was used to qualify the
killing, the special aggravating circumstance of relationship was
specifically alleged in the information and the accused-appellant did
not deny that he is the victim's brother-in-law, a relative by affinity
within the second civil degree.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

Decision dated October 30, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 02163 finding accused-appellant Rico Dela Peñ a guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020 ]

ROEL C. CASILAC, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 18, 2017, and the
Resolution2 dated March 8, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01977. The
assailed Decision affirmed with modifications the Decision3 dated
July 25, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 26 of Argao,
Cebu, while the assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
1.On June 23, 2009, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Ramil
Navarez (Ramil) and his younger brother Ryn Loui Navarez (Ryn
Loui), were about to go home to Sayao, Sibonga, Cebu, on board a
motorcycle.
2. On the curved portion of the road, Ramil saw his cousin,

petitioner Roel Casilac (Roel) standing on the right side of the
road.
3. Meanwhile, Agripino Casilac (Agripino), the father of Roel,

was positioned on the left side of the road together with
Tarciano Cirunay, Jr. (Cirunay) at the center. Each of them was
carrying a firearm and began shooting at Ramil and Ryn Loui.
4. Ramil was hit on the left arm, and the motorcycle fell to the
ground. He immediately stood up and shouted to his brother, "Run
Ian." Ryn Loui then stood up and ran, but the continuous firing
of the said armed men hit him on the different parts of his body
causing him to fall on the ground for the second time. On the
other hand, Ramil ran towards Barangay Banlot to ask for help,
but Roel, Agripino and Cirunay continued to chase and shoot
him. Fortunately, he was not hit. He was brought to the Deiparine
Medical Clinic at Sibonga, Cebu, and subsequently, to the Vicente
Sotto Medical Center (VSMC) in Cebu City where he was confined for
fourteen (14) days. As the police officers responded to the shooting
incident at Barangay Sayao, they saw the lifeless body of Ryn Loui
with gunshot wounds.
On July 17, 2009, an Information for Murder was filed against the
petitioner Roel C. Casilac, Agripino and Cirunay before the RTC of
Argao, Cebu, which reads as follows:
That on the 23rd day of June 2009, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
more or less, at Brgy. Sayao, Sibonga, Cebu and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Roel
C. Casilac[,] armed with a .45 caliber pistol, Agripino D. Casilac,
armed with a KG 9 assault pistol, and Tarciano Cirunay Jr.[,] armed
with a .45 caliber pistol, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping with intent to kill through treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shoot several times RYN LOUI C.
NAVAREZ, hitting the latter in different parts of his body which
caused his death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Another Information for Frustrated Murder against the petitioner
Roel C. Casilac, Agripino and Cirunay was filed on the same date
before the RTC of Argao, Cebu, which reads as follows:
That on the 23rd day of June 2009, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
more or less, at Brgy. Sayao, Sibonga, Cebu and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-nan1ed accused,
armed with a .45 caliber pistol, a KG 9 assault pistol and a .45 caliber
pistol, respectively, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping with one another, with intent to kill with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, shoot several times RAMIL C. NAVAREZ hitting and
seriously injuring the latter's left arm, thus[,] performing all the acts
of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence[,] but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of their will, that is, by timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The prosecution presented a total of four (4) witnesses, namely, PO3
Antonio S. Sanchez, Ramil Navarez, Dr. Fe Lynn R. Tampon and Dr.
Alex Martin C. Mediano.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed a different version. According
to him, on June 23, 2009, while he and his cousin Cirunay were
gathering grass for their cows at the land belonging to his parents,
he saw Ryn Loui driving a motorcyle with his elder brother Ramil
riding at the back, going uphill. At the time they passed by, Ramil
shot him causing him to drop to the ground, even if he was not hit.
He was able to run together with Cirunay and asked the latter to
give him the gun Cirunay was carrying. Cirunay gave him the gun
and fled. Petitioner was left alone and continued to cut grass. Again,
he saw Ryn Loui and Ramil come back, still holding their firearms
and in the act of aiming it at him. Using Cirunay's gun, petitioner
shot them and hit Ryn Loui, causing the latter to fall to the ground,
while Ramil ran away. Thereafter, the petitioner went home to
Barangay Sayao where he was advised by his father to surrender.
The defense presented a total of three (3) witnesses, namely: the
petitioner, Tarciano Cirunay, Jr. and Daisy Cirunay.
Both criminal cases were consolidated. The RTC found Roel Casilac
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and serious
physical injuries. On the other hand, Cirunay was acquitted in both
charges of murder and frustrated murder for failure of the
prosecution to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered,
as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. AR-4143, accused Roel C. Casilac is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by
treachery, and the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Ryn
Loui Navarez the following: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. AR-4144, accused Roel C. Casilac is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious
Physical Injuries in Article 263, Item No. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, in lieu of Frustrated Murder, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer a penalty of imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of Arresto
Mayor[,] as minimum[,] to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS
of Prision Correccional[,] as maximum.
For failure of the prosecution to establish proof beyond reasonable
doubt, Accused Tarciano Cirunay, Jr. is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case
No. 4143 and in Criminal Case No. AR-4144.
Accused Roel C. Casilac, being a detention prisoner, shall be credited
full time of his preventive imprisonment which shall be deducted
from the penalty imposed.
The Jail Warden of the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation
Center is hereby directed to release accused Tarciano Cirunay, Jr.,
unless for any other cause or causes that he shall continue to be
detained.
SO ORDERED.6
On August 20, 2014, petitioner filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration7 praying for his acquittal by reason of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, or a downgrade of the charge from
murder to homicide, for failure of the prosecution to prove
treachery and evident premeditation. On October 27, 2014, the said
motion was denied for lack of merit. This prompted Casilac to file a
Notice of Appeal8 on November 21, 2014.
The appeal filed before the CA raised the following issues and that
the court a quo erred: (1) in finding that the petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and serious
physical injuries, taking into consideration that he has successfully
proven all the elements of complete self-defense; (2) in considering
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, even if the prosecution
failed to prove the same with the degree required by law; and (3) in
failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in imposing the sentence against him.
On July 18, 2017, the CA affirmed, with modifications, the ruling of
the RTC, the dispositive portion which provides:
1. In Criminal Case No. AR-4143 for Murder, the award of moral and
exemplary damages is increased to Php75,000.00 each. Temperate
damages in the amount of Php50,000.00 are also awarded to Ryn
Loui Navarez's heirs.
2. In Criminal Case No. AR-4144, accused-appellant is
declared GUILTY of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries only
and is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer a penalty of one (1) month
and one (1) day to two (2) months of arresto mayor.
3. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.9
On August 14, 2017, the petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration10 of the CA's Decision. On November 7, 2017, on
the other hand, respondent filed a Comment11 on petitioner's
Appellant's Partial Motion for Reconsideration. On March 8, 2018,
the CA denied the said Motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the present Petition.
The petitioner relied on the following grounds:
I. THE ASSAILED DECISION ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE
ACCUSED GUILTY [OF] THE CRIME OF MURDER AND LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF SELF[-]DEFENSE SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN BY THE
ACCUSED.
II. THE ASSAILED DECISION LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN IT
CONSIDERED THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN
THE DEATH OF RYN, DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PRESENCE OF
CONTRARY EVIDENCE.
III. GRANTING FOR ARGUMENT'S SAKE THAT PETITIONER'S CLAIM
OF SELF-DEFENSE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN THE INSTANT CASE,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER
PETITIONER'S VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.12
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in finding him guilty of Murder
and Less Serious Physical Injuries, despite the presence of all the
elements of self-defense. Further, he argues that the CA erred in
considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the death of
Ryn Loui, contrary to the evidence. He also claims that assuming
that the CA was correct in ruling that self-defense is not justified, the
CA still erred in refusing to consider petitioner's voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment13 dated
October 17, 2018, argues that the CA was correct in convicting the
petitioner of the crime of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries.
It also avers that contrary to the petitioner's allegation, the CA
considered his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance
during the review of his conviction for Serious Physical Injuries in
Criminal Case No. AR-4144, in determining the imposable penalty
for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries. However, the said
mitigating circumstance is not applicable for the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. AR-4143, a penalty punishable by reclusion
perpetua, an indivisible penalty.
The Petition lacks merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.14 The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
Guided by this consideration, the Court affirms the petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. AR-4143, with modification as to the
crime committed in Criminal Case No. AR-4144. The Court has
carefully examined the records of this case and found that there
were substantial facts that both the RTC and the CA had overlooked
and which, after having been considered, has affected the outcome
of the case, as will be discussed hereunder.
With respect to Criminal Case No. AR-4143, the crime of murder is
defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
2. With evident premeditation;
xxx
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following
elements must be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.15
In the instant case, the prosecution has clearly established that: (1)
Ryn Loui was shot and found by the police lifeless at the crime scene
in Barangay Sayao, Sibonga, Cebu; (2) it was the petitioner that shot
and killed him; (3) Ryn Loui's killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery as testified by Ramil and as proven by the
prosecution; and (4) the killing of Ryn Loui was neither parricide
nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is
that, the attack is deliberate and without warning, and done in a
swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed
by him.16
The above-mentioned elements are present in this case. First, at the
time of the attack Ryn Loui and Ramil were not in the position to
defend themselves. On board their motorcycle, they were not aware
of any kind of risk or threat to their lives until they reached the
curved portion of the road when they saw the petitioner. They were
rendered defenseless at the time when the petitioner surprisingly
fired successive shots at them while they were driving and
traversing the road. Second, the petitioner consciously adopted an
attack that was deliberate, swift and sudden. To be exact, the
petitioner did an "ambush" when he made a surprise attack upon
Ryn Loui and Ramil from a concealed position, which is the curved
portion of the road. Hence, the RTC and the CA were correct in
determining that the crime committed was murder under Article
248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
Undoubtedly, the person who authored the death of Ryn Loui was
the petitioner. The only matter left to determine is whether the
justifying circumstance of self-defense is present to exonerate
petitioner from the crime of Murder.
Considering that self-defense is an affirmative allegation, and totally
exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled
that when it is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused
to prove it by credible, clear and convincing evidence. The accused
claiming self defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence, or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.17
The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. To successfully invoke self-defense, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means
to resist the attack.18
The elements of self-defense are not present in the instant case.
While all three elements must concur, first and foremost self-
defense relies on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua
non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense; if
there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-
defense will have no basis.19
In the present case, the alleged act of Ryn Loui and Ramil of shooting
the petitioner while the latter was gathering grass was not proven
by competent evidence. The petitioner failed to prove that the
victims were armed during the incident. In addition, no empty slugs
were recovered from the place where the victims allegedly shot the
petitioner. With this lacking, the conclusion is, there is no unlawful
aggression.
Assuming without admitting that the petitioner was fired at by
Ramil, the claim of self-defense still fails. It is contrary to common
experience that the petitioner continued gathering grass and
remained in the area despite the shooting. He could have easily fled
for his safety and report the incident to the police authorities.
Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self preservation at
the time when he chose to be aggressive and maintain his ground
armed with a gun waiting for Ryn Loui and Ramil to come back, all
of which took place when the alleged unlawful aggression had
already ceased.
Considering that unlawful aggression was not proven by the
petitioner, self-defense cannot be considered a justifying
circumstance.1a₩phi1 Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly found
appellant guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. AR-4143.
However, in Criminal Case No. AR-4144, the Court finds that the
crime committed was attempted murder and not less serious
physical injuries.
As discussed above, the elements of the crime of murder are: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3)
that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
On the other hand, the third paragraph, Article 6 of the RPC provides
that:
xxxx
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
(1) the offender commences the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts;
(2) he does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
(3) the offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous

desistance; and (
4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or

accident other than his spontaneous desistance.
With respect to attempted or frustrated murder, the principal and
essential element thereof is the intent on the part of the assailant to
take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor. Intent to kill is a specific intent
that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a
general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of
a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by
the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. The following factors are considered to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely:
(1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the
victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately
after the killing of the victim; and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused.20
In the present case, the prosecution has established petitioner's
intent to kill Ryn Loui. The Court also finds such intent to be present
with respect to Ramil. In this regard, it is hard to reconcile that there
is an intent to kill Ryn Loui while there is none when it comes to
Ramil considering that petitioner commenced the commission of the
felony directly through overt acts by treacherously shooting both
the victims while they were on board the same motorcycle. In
particular, with respect to Ramil, after he was shot by petitioner in
the arm, the latter 's intent to consummate the crime was shown by
the fact that he continued to chase Ramil and fire at him. However,
the petitioner was not able to perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of murder as the wound inflicted
upon Ramil was not fatal and the latter was able to run away from
the petitioner. From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner also
intended to kill Ramil and that all the elements of attempted murder
are present.
Meanwhile, voluntary surrender must be considered in the instant
case for the reduction of penalty. Its requisites, as a mitigating
circumstance, are that:
(1) the accused has not been actually arrested;
(2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary.
Voluntary surrender is a circumstance that reduces the penalty for
the offense. Its requisites as a mitigating circumstance are, that: (1)
the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
(3) the surrender is voluntary.21
The petitioner was able to prove all the requisites of voluntary
surrender. The claim of petitioner that he voluntarily presented
himself to the Sibonga Police Station, upon the persuasion of his
father and the arrangement made by his sister, was not
controverted by the prosecution. It is clear that there was a
manifestation on the part of the petitioner to freely submit himself
to the police authorities for the killing of Ryn Loui.
As to the penalty, Article 248 of the RPC provides that the penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.1a₩phi1 Article 63(3) of
the RPC provides that "[w]hen the commission of the act is attended
by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied." In the present
case, considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender was found to be present, and in the absence of any
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the RTC correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to attempted murder, applying
Article 51,22 in relation to the second paragraph, Article 6123 of the
same Code, the penalty is two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, which is prision mayor.24 Since the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is present, the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the minimum period of prision
mayor which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,25 the minimum penalty
shall be taken from any of the periods of the penalty next lower in
degree which is prision correccional. Thus, the penalty of two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, would
be appropriate.
As to the civil liability of petitioner for the murder of Ryn Loui, since
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua by reason of the presence
of the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
CA correctly awarded to the heirs of Ryn Loui the additional
amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. With respect to the
attempted murder of Ramil, petitioner must pay him P25,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. These awards are in consonance with this
Court's ruling in the controlling case of People v. Jugueta.26
In line with jurisprudence,27 interest of 6% per annum shall be
charged on all the monetary awards herein, computed from the date
of the finality of this decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The July 18, 2017
Decision and March 8, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in in
CA G.R. CR HC No. 01977 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. AR-4143, petitioner Roel C. Casilac is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
is ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Ryn Loui Navarez the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages.
In Criminal Case No. AR-4144, petitioner Casilac is
found GUILTY of ATTEMPTED MURDER and is meted the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. He is further ORDERED to pay the
victim Ramil Navarez the amounts of P25,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191759, March 02, 2020
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. GERALD
MORENO Y TAZON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:
On appeal is the August 27, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03204, affirming the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, Manila in Criminal Case No.
01-197519 which found appellant Gerald Moreno y Tazon
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Information3 alleged:
That on or about the 16th day of November 2001, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, said accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously x x x at about 2:15 a.m., with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one CECIL MIJARES Y
LEOCADIO by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon on
his body, thereby inflicting upon said CECIL MIJARES Y LEOCADIO
mortal stab wounds at the back and chest which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
1. On November 16, 2001, at around 2:15 in the morning, Adelriza

Mijares ("Adelriza") was awakened from her sleep when a hard
object hit her head.
2. When she turned on the lights, a man, wearing khaki shorts

and white t-shirt, leap on their bed and repeatedly stabbed her
husband, Cecil Mijares ("Mijares"), on the leg and chest.
3. Mijares was able to kick the man out of the room and even close
the door. Immediately thereafter, Mijares collapsed and fell on the
floor.
4. Adelriza shouted for help and their neighbor, Virgie

Perey ("Virgie"), came to their rescue. Virgie sought assistance from
their neighbors, Noli Corrales and Michael Buenaflor, in bringing
Mijares to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
5. Unfortunately, Mijares died while undergoing treatment.4
6. Senior Police Officer 1 Raul Olavario ("SPO1 Olavario") and

other police officers from the Western Police District, Homicide
Division, arrived at the PGH after receiving a report about a stabbing
incident in their area of jurisdiction.
7. SPO1 Olavario interviewed Adelriza and conducted a physical

examination of the cadaver. He observed multiple stab wounds on
different parts of Mijares' body, particularly at the front and at the
back. After the examination, SPO1 Olavario asked Adelriza to
accompany them to the crime scene.
8. Upon arrival, the police officers discovered that four pieces of

glass jalousies at the front window of Adelriza's house were
removed and the window screen was broken. They likewise saw
bloodstains on the floor where Mijares collapsed.5
9. The police officers and Adelriza proceeded to the police station

where Adelriza executed a Sworn Statement6 dated November 16,
2001.
10. At this point, Adelriza still did not know the name of her
husband's killer but she vividly remembered his face after
having witnessed the stabbing.
11. A police cartographer prepared a sketch of the suspect based on

Adelriza's description.7
12. In the afternoon of the same day, the police received a call
from Virgie informing them that appellant, who fitted the
description of the suspect, was in the vicinity of his house.
13. According to Virgie, she heard rumors that appellant was

responsible for the killing of Mijares.8
14. Acting on Virgie's tip, SPO1 Olavario invited appellant to the

police station for an interview regarding the killing that transpired
to which appellant acceded.9 The police officers then summoned
Adelriza to the police station. Upon her arrival, she positively
identified appellant as the person who stabbed her husband. It was
only at this point that she learned of Moreno's name.10
SPO1 Olavario thus arrested appellant and informed him of his

constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent
counsel of his choice. Appellant however did not respond. Hence,
SPO1 Olavario merely asked for his name and then prepared the
Crime Report, Booking and Arrest Sheet and Referral to Inquest.11
The defense vehemently denied the version of the prosecution and

interposed that at the time of the incident, appellant was sleeping at
his house on Diamante St., Sta. Ana, Manila where his mother, father,
siblings and son likewise lived. He was awakened by a loud noise
and when he inquired about it from his father, he was told that there
was a robbery in the vicinity. He then went out of their gate where
their neighbor, Junior Santos, told him to get a taxicab. When it
arrived, he assisted his neighbors to carry Mijares into the taxicab to
be brought to the hospital. Thereafter, he went back to sleep and
was only awakened at around 11:00 in the morning when armed
police officers were already inside his room. The police officers
invited him to the police station for an investigation and he
voluntarily went with them.12
Appellant insisted that he never knew Mijares and he saw the victim
for the first time when he assisted in carrying him to the taxicab.
During the time of the incident, he was wearing a gray t-shirt and
black pants contrary to Adelriza's description of the clothes of her
husband's killer. However, he could not impute any reason as to
why Adelriza would ever testify against him.13
Victoria Moreno ("Victoria"), appellant's mother, and Crispulo

Moreno III ("Crispulo"), his brother, corroborated appellant's
whereabouts.14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Appellant pleaded "not guilty."15 After trial, the RTC rendered a

Decision16 finding appellant guilty of Murder, treachery having
attended the attack. The trial court disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused Gerald Moreno y Tazon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced
to Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to pay [the] heirs of Cecil
Mijares the following amounts: PHP75,000.00 as indemnity for his
death; PHP603,288.00 as unearned income; PHP31,500.00 as
actual damages; PHP50,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's
fees; and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.17
The trial court rejected appellant's defenses of alibi and denial; his

alleged lack of motive in committing the crime; his arguments that
the uncorroborated testimony of Adelriza was insufficient to convict
him; and that his identification outside a police line-up was
irregular. Ultimately, the RTC ratiocinated that the clear, positive
and credible testimony of Adelriza that appellant was the culprit
sufficiently removed any reasonable doubt on his guilt.
Undeterred, appellant appealed his conviction before the CA.18 The

appellate court, finding no reversible error, upheld the trial court's
Decision. The CA held that the lone, positive and credible testimony
of the eyewitness was sufficient to support appellant's
conviction.19 Any inconsistencies in the testimony of Adelriza did not
destroy the strength of her testimony. The appellate court stressed
that there is no rule requiring for a police-line up in the
identification of offenders and that the same is not indispensable for
the proper and fair identification of offenders.20 The CA also held
that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the
face of the positive identification by a credible witness. Moreover,
appellant's alibi was inherently weak as he failed to prove that it
was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene
of the crime. The appellate court disregarded the argument that he
was illegally arrested because the objection was not raised before
arraignment and was deemed waived. In sum, the CA did not depart
from the trial court's ruling. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court's Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the 25 August 2006
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 53) in
Criminal Case No. 01-197519 finding accused-appellant Gerald
Tazon Moreno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.21
Aggrieved, appellant brought the case before Us, raising the same
arguments he had at the CA.
Issue
Appellant raised the sole error: The trial court has committed a
serious reversible error when it pronounced the guilt of the
appellant on the supposition that the quantum of proof
constitutionally required to sustain a conviction was proven.22
THE COURT'S RULING
The appeal has no merit.
Positive testimony despite minor

inconsistencies prevails over the defenses of
denial and alibi
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the positive
testimony of the prosecution's witness prevailed over his defense
of alibi. He alleges that contrary to the conclusion of the trial court,
his defense was not at all an alibi to account his whereabouts, rather
it was an attestation of his plain denial of the crime charged.23 He
asserts that there were inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the
uncorroborated testimony of the eyewitness that tarnished its
veracity and diminished its probative value to prove his guilt.24
The arguments of the appellant deserve scant consideration.
Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive

testimony. A categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth
prevails over a bare denial25 which can easily be fabricated and is
inherently unreliable.26 For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove that he was at some other place at the time of
the commission of the crime and it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. These
requirements of time and place must be strictly met.27
Appellant asserts that he was asleep at the time of the commission

of the crime. He insists that he has never met Mijares before and just
saw him for the first time when he assisted in getting a taxicab so he
may be rushed to the hospital. However, in the same breath,
appellant himself admitted that only a wall separated his house and
the crime scene.28 Such admission negated physical impossibility of
him being at the crime scene,29 making his alibi simply unbelievable.
While the testimonies of his mother, Victoria, and his brother,
Crispulo, supposedly corroborated his claim that he was in a
different place when the stabbing took place,30 such testimonies did
not bolster appellant's defenses of alibi and denial.
This Court has consistently assigned less probative weight to a

defense of alibi when it is corroborated by relatives. For
corroboration to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by
disinterested witnesses.31 Evidently, Victoria and Crispulo were not
disinterested witnesses both being appellant's relatives. Their
testimonies are rendered suspect because the former's relationship
to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for
his sake.32 Hence, by all accounts, appellant failed to meet the
requirements for his defense of alibi to prosper.
Concerning the supposed inconsistencies and contradictory

statements in the eyewitness' testimony in open court,33 this Court
finds them immaterial and did not diminish appellant's guilt.
The inconsistencies in Adelriza's and SPO1 Olavario's testimonies on

the number of persons present when she identified the appellant,
Adelriza stated that the appellant was the only person present,
while SPO1 Olavario maintained that there were other people
present,34 referred to a minor detail which did not diminish the
probative value of the testimonies at issue. After all, it is well-settled
that immaterial and insignificant details did not discredit a
testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the
very act of the perpetrator. As long as the testimonies of the
witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness.35 Here, it remains that Adelriza was able to
categorically identify the appellant as the very culprit of the crime.
Moreover, courts cannot expect the testimonies of the witnesses to

be impeccable.36 In People v. Givera,37 the Court explained that minor
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies actually tend to
strengthen the credibility of the witness because they discount the
possibility of them being rehearsed, viz.:
In any event, these discrepancies are minor and insignificant and do
not detract from the substance of her testimony. This Court has time
and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair
the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their
testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility
because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed
testimony.38 (Underscoring supplied)
Appellant also points out that his physical appearance varies from
the description given by Adelriza of her husband's assailant. He
argues that such contradictory observation proves the unreliability
of Adelriza's testimony and provides reasonable doubt on his guilt.39
The arguments of appellant fail to impress Us.
This Court has consistently ruled that witnesses frequently

concentrate on the facial features and movements of the accused.
Victims of violence tend to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the
crime is being committed and not unduly concentrate on extraneous
factors and physical attributes unless they are striking.40 The
appellate court correctly pointed out that any difference between
Adelriza's description of the victim's assailant and that of appellant's
actual appearance, particularly as to height, was inconsequential
because she cannot be expected to give an accurate estimate of his
height. We thus adhere to the finding of the appellate court that
Adelriza's immediate description of the assailant matched squarely
with the actual appearance of appellant.41
Ultimately, Adelriza's positive, categorical and consistent

identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
prevails over the rehashed defenses of denial and alibi by the
appellant.
Police line-up, conduct of arrest and rights

of the accused in custodial investigations
Appellant likewise questions the legality of his identification and

arrest and the conduct of custodial investigation. He alleges that the
procedure was irregular and that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to have a counsel present.42
The arguments do not hold water.
A police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair

identification of offenders. The important consideration is for the
victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the
malefactors.43
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,44 this Court explained the procedure for

out-of-court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identifications in this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought
face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz[.]:
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the

identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.45
Applying the totality of circumstances test, We find appellant's out-

of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall,
Adelriza after being awakened when a hard object hit her head and
after she switched on the lights inside the room, had a clear and
direct view of the attack on her husband and the perpetrator.
Moreover, she described with certainty the assailant to the police
cartographer barely hours from the time of the incident, which
description matched the facial features of the appellant, whom she
subsequently identified as the assailant. In other words, the interval
between the time she witnessed the crime and her identification of
the appellant, was merely a matter of hours, leaving no room for her
recollection to be tainted.
Verily, it was Adelriza's own description that led to the

apprehension of the appellant. There was no evidence on record
indicating any hint of a suggestion from the police officer who
presented the appellant to Adelriza. Hence, the identification of the
appellant as the culprit of the crime stands.
About the legality of appellant's arrest, it bears stressing that

questions on arrest shall be made before arraignment and failure to
object to the illegality of arrest constitutes a waiver on the part of
the accused. It is settled that any objection to the manner of arrest
must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.46 Here, the records clearly show that
the objection was only raised on appeal.47
The Court ruled in People v. Kulais and Samson:48

[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the
manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the
information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. x
x x49 (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that appellant's arrest was irregular, still, it is not a

jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the
person arrested submits to arraignment without objection.50
There was no violation of appellant's right to counsel during
custodial investigation. The records show that appellant was
informed of his constitutional rights when he was arrested. Since he
chose to remain silent, he was not interrogated and no statement or
evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence
presented in court that was supposedly obtained from him during
custodial investigation.51
Crime committed and Proper indemnities
We agree that treachery attended the attack on Mijares. There

is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure
its execution, without risk to himself/herself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 52 In order for the
qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the
following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means,
method, or manner of execution that would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim,
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender.53 The essence of treachery is
a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.54
Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home

amply demonstrates treachery in the commission of the crime.
Mijares had no inkling of the impending attack that night; or any
peril to his person as he felt secured in his home. Mijares was not
able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and pushed
the appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of
treachery. In People v. Baltazar,55 We ruled that treachery must
still be appreciated even if the victim was able to retaliate as a
result of his reflexes, so long as he did not have the opportunity
to repel the initial assault, viz.:
Although appellant contends that there were defensive wounds
on his arms, these do not show that the victim was able to put
up an effective defense. This Court finds these wounds to be
merely the result of a reflex action on the victim's part, in a vain
attempt to avoid the thrusts of the knife.
Apropos to this is the case of People v. Go-od, where even the

fact that a victim was able to stab one of his assailants was held
as not negating the presence of treachery:
The fact that the victim was able to grab one of the bolos after
he had already been hit and used the same to stab one of his
assailants does not negate the presence of treachery in the
commission of the crime. The characteristic and unmistakable
manifestation of treachery is the deliberate and unexpected
attack on the victim without any warning and without giving
him the opportunity to defend or repel the initial assault, x x x
Ygot stabbed Nestor Go-od after he himself had already been
wounded by the attack which as we have already mentioned was so
sudden and unexpected that it did not give Aladino Ygot an
opportunity to offer an effective defense nor to repel the initial
attack.56 (Emphasis Ours)
Further, We find that the appellant consciously and deliberately

adopted the particular means, methods or form of attack in order to
ensure the execution of the crime. He stabbed Mijares several times
so that he would not be a risk to himself. He lodged a bladed weapon
on the victim's chest and back.57 Indeed, the attack on Mijares was
treacherous thereby qualifying the killing to murder.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, awarded P75,000.00 as civil

indemnity, P603,288.00 as unearned income, P31,500.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.58
It is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime,

the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.59
In People v. Jugueta,60 this Court held that for crimes like murder

where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the nature and
amount of damages that may be awarded are: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, among others.61
Pursuant to Jugueta, We sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil

indemnity but increase the moral damages from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. In addition, an award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P75,000.00 is proper.
However, in lieu of actual damages, We award temperate damages

in the amount of P50,000.00. The settled rule is that when the
amount of actual damages proven by receipts during the trial is less
than the sum allowed by the court as temperate damages,62 the
award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, which is of a
lesser amount, is justified. Conversely, if the amount of actual
damages proven exceeds P50,000.00, then temperate damages may
no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts
presented during trial should instead be granted. The rationale for
this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's
heirs, who tried and succeeded in presenting receipts and other
evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is
less than that given as temperate damages to those who were not
able to present any evidence at all.63
In the present case, Mijares' heirs were able to prove, and were
awarded, actual damages in the amount of P31,500.00.64 Since,
prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of P50,000.00 as
temperate damages in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, this Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to
Mijares' heirs, in lieu of actual damages.
Considering too that Mijares' heirs spent for attorney's fees to

prosecute the case against the appellant, the award of P50,000.00 is
sustained.65 Article 2208 of the Civil Code66 enumerates the legal
grounds warranting the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, and this case qualifies since exemplary damages are
awarded and the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees be recovered.67
Anent unearned income, the RTC awarded P603,288.00 without

elaborating on its basis. To determine the compensable amount of
lost earnings, We consider (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived (life expectancy); and (2) the rate
of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is
computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 — age at death])
adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second
factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net
earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living
and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily
computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the
formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (gross

annual income — reasonable and necessary living expenses)].68
Here, it was sufficiently established that the victim, at the time of his
death, was 32 years old and was employed as a bookkeeper at the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. with a monthly basic
salary of P7,182.00 or P86,184.00 in a year.69 We thus apply the
formula for loss of income capacity in this wise:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income -

living expenses]
= 2/3 [80-age of the victim at time of death] x [gross annual income

- 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-32 years] x [P86,184.00- P43,092.00]
= 2(48) x P43,092.00
3
= 32 x P43,092.00
= P1,378,944.00
We are thus impelled to modify the award of unearned income from

to P603,288.00 to P1,378,944.00.
Finally, all damages awarded shall earn six percent (6%) interest
per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full
payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The August 27,

2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03204
finding appellant Gerald Moreno y Tazon guilty of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, thus:
1) Moral damages is hereby increased from P50,000.00 to

P75,000.00;
2) Unearned income due to loss of income capacity is hereby

increased from P603,288.00 to P1,378,944.00;
3) Actual damages in the amount of P31,500.00 is deleted;
4) Temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded in

lieu of actual damages;
5) Exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 is likewise
awarded.
All damages awarded shall then earn six percent (6%) interest
per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROMEO
ASENIERO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from the assailed Decision2 dated October 30,
2014 (Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Nineteenth (19th ) Division
(CA), in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01422, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated April 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Hilongos, Leyte (RTC), in Criminal Case No. H-1263, finding
herein accused-appellant Romeo Aseniero (Romeo) guilty of the
crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Accused Romeo was charged for the crime of Murder under the
following Information:
"That on or about the 24th day of August 2003, in the Municipality of
Bato, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate
intent to kill employing treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack[,] stab
DOMINADOR RANES with a long bolo which the accused had
provided himself for the purpose[,] thereby causing and inflicting
upon the victim multiple stabbed [sic] and hacked [sic] wounds on
the different parts of his body causing the immediate death of
Dominador Ranes."4
Upon arraignment, Romeo pleaded not guilty.5
The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the CA, is as

follows:
1.Roel Pilo, 19 years of age, married and a resident of Domagocdoc,
Bato, Leyte is the first witness for the prosecution.
2. He testified that he is a friend of the victim, Dominador Reyes. He

knew the accused Romeo Aseniero because the latter lived in a
neighboring barangay.
3. On August 23, 2003, at approximately 4:00 in the afternoon, he
was at Barangay Imelda, Bato, Leyte to attend a fiesta
celebration. He was accompanied by his friend Jimmy Garong.
4. At about 7:00 in the evening, they went to the barangay hall

to see the operator of the sound system, who was their close
friend.
5. At about 2:00 in the morning, he went to the dancing hall located

inside the plaza, just 10 meters from the barangay hall. He saw
Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn Gomez and Mira Pagay
occupying one table.
6. At about 5:00 in the morning, he left the dancing hall together

with the group of Dominador Ranes.
7. On their way home, they passed by a road in Brgy. Imelda,

Bato, Leyte.
8. Since the road was too narrow, they did not walk side by side.
Mira Pagay trailed first, followed by Mario Pelago, then Roel,
and behind him were Dominador Ranes and Analyn Gomez.
9. Suddenly, he heard Dominador say "Aray" (Ouch!).
10. At that instant, he saw Dominador run past him followed by

the accused Romeo Aseniero, who was carrying a long bolo.
11. More or less four (4) meters from where he was, Dominador
stumbled, with his back on the ground.
12. The accused caught up with the victim and hacked him multiple
times.
13. Prior to the stabbing, Roel Pilo did not notice that the accused
was around.
14. He recalled that on both sides of the narrow trail, there were a
lot of plants such as bamboo and coconut trees. He was so shocked
by the incident that he just stood there and watched. He asked
the accused why he stabbed the victim, to which the accused
replied that he was jealous. At the trial, Roel identified the murder
weapon (long bolo) used in [the] killing of the victim.
On cross-examination, Roel Pilo admitted that it was only during the

fiesta celebration that he met the accused. At the place where the
incident occurred, the grasses were short such that any person on
both sides of the narrow trail can readily be seen. He also admitted
that since the victim was walking behind him, he did not know if it
was the accused who assaulted the victim first.
The second witness for the prosecution is Analyn Gomez, single, 24

years of age, and a resident of Brgy. Domagocdoc, Bato, Leyte. She
testified that the victim was her current boyfriend at the time of the
incident and that the suspect was her former boyfriend. On August
23, 2003, she went to Brgy. Imelda to attend the fiesta celebration.
She stayed at the house of a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman and at
about 11:30 in the evening, she went to the dance hall, together with
Mira Bagay, Dominador Ranes, Lita Reyes and Gleen Reyes. At the
dance hall, [s]he saw the accused Romeo Aseniero and his
companions.
Analyn and her group went out of the dance hall at about 5:00 in the
morning. On their way home to Brgy. Domagocdoc, they passed
upon a narrow road. She was walking behind Dominador on th[e]
trail when Romeo Aseniero suddenly came from behind her and
stabbed Dominador in the back with a bolo. Dominador tried to run
but stumbled down twenty-five (25) feet from where he was
stabbed. The accused was able to catch up with the victim and he
continued to stab the latter several times. She shouted "No!" but the
accused continued hacking the victim and even chopped off the
latter's feet. The rest of the group ran away while she hid herself
behind a coffee tree, as the accused was looking for her. She then ran
towards the house of the barangay chairman of Brgy. Domagocdoc
where she reported the incident. She narrated that the reason why
Romeo killed Dominador is jealousy. She also identified the bolo
used in killing the victim.
Upon clarificatory questioning by the judge, Analyn revealed that

just one month after her break-up with the accused, she started a
relationship with the victim. And that based on her observations, the
accused was uneasy with her new love affair.
On cross-examination, she propounded that the reason why she

broke up with the accused was because the latter courted her
cousin. She admitted that on both sides of the narrow trail are cliffs.
Before the accused stabbed the victim, the former pushed her aside
but she did not fall down the cliff as there was a rock on the side of
the trail. She shouted but it was already too late as Dominador
was already stabbed in the back. During the stabbing incident, the
rest of the group ran away except for Roel Pilo. She also admitted
that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairman.
The prosecution's third witness is Dr. Provo Quijano, 34 years of

age, a resident of Brgy. Bagumbayan, Bato, Leyte, and the Municipal
Health Officer of Bato, Leyte. At the trial, he identified the medical
certificate which he issued in connection with the death of
Dominador Ranes. Since the counsel for the defense admitted the
due execution of the medical certificate, Dr. Quijano merely
identified the said certificate and no longer testified as to the
circumstances surrounding the death of the victim.6
The version of the defense, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:

The first witness for the defense is Loreto Gomez Papa, 42 years of
age, married, a tuba gatherer and a resident of Brgy. Marcelo, Bato,
Leyte. He testified that he knows the accused as they are neighbors
and childhood playmates. On August 23, 2003, he was at Brgy.
Imelda, Bato, Leyte attending the barrio fiesta. He was with his
cousins, namely, Julie and Bobby Papas. They stayed at the house of
their friend and went to the dance hall at about 10:00 in the evening.
He noticed that the accused and Analyn Gomez were inside the
dance hall, occupying different tables with their respective groups.
At about 5:00 in the morning, he left the dance hall together with his
two cousins and the accused, Romeo Aseniero. Analyn and her
group were walking ahead of them at a distance of about ten (10)
arms-length. Analyn Gomez and the accused were still sweethearts
and have not broken up yet, but they were quarreling at that time.
When the accused saw Analyn, he tried to go after her and her
companion. He told the accused to just leave them alone but the
latter did not heed his advice. When the accused approached
Analyn, he was kicked by Dominador. Instantly, Dominador
unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in turn, unsheathed his bolo.
Loreto feared that a bloody fight was forthcoming so he ran
way. His other companions also took off. Later that day, he
received word that the companion of Analyn died.
On cross-examination, he admitted that Analyn Gomez and her
group left the dance hall ahead of their group, but the accused
followed them. Romeo Aseniero caught up with Analyn and her
group. He was jealous and he wanted to confront Analyn. Loreto
admitted that until the time the accused and the victim unsheathed
their weapons, no altercation occurred.
The second witness for the defense is Gregorio Pol, 49 years of age,
married, a tuba gatherer, and a resident of Brgy. Marcelo, Bato,
Leyte. He testified that he knew the accused because the latter lives
near their barangay. In the early morning of August 24, 2003, he was
walking behind Alin (Analyn) Gomez and accused, along with other
persons. Dominador was following the group of the accused.
Suddenly, Dominador kicked the accused and stabbed him with a
knife. The accused then leaned back, unsheathed his bolo and
stabbed Dominador. Gregorio immediately ran away and did not
know what happened next after the accused stabbed the victim.
On cross-examination, Gregorio admitted that while Analyn and

Dominador were walking side by side, the accused trailed behind
them and was walking fast. On re-direct, he clarified that he saw the
victim stab the accused in the chest.
The third witness for the defense is SPO3 Wilfreda Vargas, 48 years
of age, married, a police officer assigned at Matalom, Leyte, and a
resident of Brgy. Tinago, Bato, Leyte. He testified that in the early
morning of August 24, 2003, the accused, accompanied by one
person, surrendered at the police station of Matalom. He personally
received the accused and caused the recording of the incident in the
police blotter.
The accused did not testify in his own behalf.7

Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated April27, 2010, the RTC found Romeo guilty of
Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused ROMEO ASENIERO
is found GUILTY of MURDER under the Revised Penal Code as
amended beyond reasonable doubt and [is] hereby sentenced
to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA. And to
indemnify the heirs of Dominador Ranes the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), and to pay the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim.9 The
victim was suddenly and unexpectedly hacked from behind by the
accused.10 It further ruled that the testimonies of the defense
witnesses are incomplete and unconvincing.11 Lastly, it held that
although the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities, such mitigating circumstance cannot be applied to lower
an indivisible penalty.12
Aggrieved, Romeo appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision dated October 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the
conviction by the RTC:
WHEREFORE, the April 27, 2010 Decision rendered by f he Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Hilongos, Leyte finding accused--
appellant Romeo Aseniero guilty of murder
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of his civil liability. Accused-
appellant is ORDERED to pay to the Heirs of Dominador Ranes the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, interest on all the damages herein awarded at
the legal rate of 6% from the date of the incident to the finality of the
judgment and 12% from the finality hereof until fully paid, and to
pay costs.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.13
The CA held that the accused's attack on the victim was
treacherously carried out.14 At the time of the attack, the victim was
just walking with his girlfriend and companions when he was
suddenly hacked from behind by the accused.15 It further held that
the testimony of Analyn Gomez (Analyn), the victim's girlfriend, is
credible and sufficient as it is corroborated by the other witnesses in
some material points.16 Lastly, it held that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.17
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming Romeo's conviction for Murder

despite the fact that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for
Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally

accorded great weight; except when it appears on the record that
the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied
some significant fact or circumstance which if considered, would
have altered the result.18 This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal
cases where the whole case is thrown open for review on issues of
both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which
were not raised by the parties as errors.19 The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.20
After a careful review and scrutiny of the records, the Court affirms
the conviction of Romeo, but only for the crime of Homicide, instead
of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven in the killing of the victim.
Treachery not established beyond reasonable doubt

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was present, thereby making
Romeo liable for Murder instead of Homicide.
On the other hand, Romeo posits that the RTC misappreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. He argues that the prosecution
failed to prove that treachery was employed in the killing of the
victim.21 The fact that the attack was sudden per se does not bespeak
the circumstance of alevosia.22 He further argues that it was the
victim who first assaulted him by kicking him.23 This was the
substance of Loreto Gomez Papa's (Loreto) testimony, which was
corroborated by Gregorio Pol (Gregorio).24
On this issue, the Court rules in favor of Romeo.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes

against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
the offended party might make.25 To qualify an offense, the following
conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods
or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant.26 The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself.27
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the
elements of treachery in the killing of the victim.
To start, based on the testimonies of the two defense witnesses the

attack was preceded by an altercation between Romeo and the
victim.28 Both Loreto and Gregorio testified that it was the victim
who first assaulted the accused.29 This should prevail over the
testimony of the prosecution witness, Analyn, that Romeo
immediately stabbed the victim, more so considering that Analyn's
testimony is uncorroborated by the other prosecution witness, Roel
Pilo (Roel), who testified that he did not see how the attack began s
he was walking in front of the victim.30
There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation

between the accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned of
an impending attack by either of them. Thus, in one case, the Court
held, "[t]here is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a
heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or
when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the
former."31
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or

unexpected as it was the victim who first attacked the former. Even
assuming that the version of the events as narrated by Analyn is to
be considered, she also narrated that she was pushed by the accused
prior to his attack on the victim.32 Thus, this event should have made
the victim aware that there was an impending attack on him. In
addition, the victim was able to defend himself from the initial
stabbing act as he had his own weapon and was able to run away
from the accused.33 The only reason why he was not able to escape
was because he stumbled down and the accused caught up with
him.34 In another case, the Court ruled that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim
was forewarned of the impending attack and he could have in fact
escaped had he not stumbled.35
Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender properly

appreciated
For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the

accused, the following requisites must be established: first, the
accused has not been actually arrested; second, the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent;
and third, the surrender is voluntary.36 The said requisites were
sufficiently proven by the defense.
SPO3 Wilfredo Vargas testified that the accused voluntarily

surrendered at the Matalom Police Station on August 24,
2003.37 This was corroborated by Analyn who admitted that indeed
Romeo immediately surrendered to the authorities after the
incident.38 Roel likewise testified that he accompanied the accused
to the police station.39 Thus, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.
Proper penalty and award of damages
Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of

treachery, the crime is Homicide and not Murder. Under Article 249
of the RPC, any person found guilty of homicide shall be meted the
penalty of reclusion temporal, a penalty which contains three (3)
periods.40 Given that Romeo voluntarily surrendered, Article 64(2)
states that when only a mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its
minimum period.41 Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, while the minimum penalty shall be prision mayor in any of
its periods.42 Thus, he is to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
ears and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.43
Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,44 the

damages awarded in the questioned Decision are hereby modified to
civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages of
P50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is

hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court DECLARES accused-
appellant Romeo Aseniero GUILTY of HOMICIDE, with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, for which he is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186541 February 1, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICENTE VILBAR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 which modified the
Judgment2 promulgated on August 6, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 35, of Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No. 5876-0.
The RTC originally found accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for treacherously
stabbing with a knife the deceased Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert), but
the Court of Appeals subsequently held accused-appellant liable
only for the lesser crime of homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant with the crime of
murder reads:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2000, at around 7:00 o’clock in
the evening, at the public market, this city, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit, with treachery, evident premeditation
and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab, hit and wound the victim herein GUILBERT
PATRICIO, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend himself,
thereby inflicting upon said Guilbert Patricio mortal wound which
caused his death. Post Mortem Examination Report is hereto
attached.
In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659, Ormoc City, June 13, 2000.3
1. When accused-appellant was arraigned on July 31, 2000, he
pleaded not guilty to the criminal charge against him.4
2. During the pre-trial conference, the parties already admitted

that Guilbert was stabbed at the Public Market of Ormoc City on
May 5, 2000 at around seven o’clock in the evening, and that
immediately before the incident, accused-appellant was at the
same place having a drinking spree with a certain Arcadio
Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However, accused-
appellant denied that it was he who stabbed Guilbert Patricio.5 Trial
then ensued.
3. The prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza

Patricio (Maria Liza),6 the widow of the deceased, and Pedro
Luzon (Pedro),7 an eyewitness at the scene. The defense offered
the testimonies of accused-appellant8 himself and Cerilo Pelos
(Cerilo),9 another eyewitness. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled
Pedro to the witness stand.10
Below is a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for both

sides:
1.Maria Liza testified that in the evening of May 5, 2000, she
was watching her child and at the same time attending to their
store located in the Ormoc City public market.
2. It was a small store with open space for tables for drinking
being shared by other adjacent stores. At around 7:00 o’clock in
the evening, her husband, Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert) arrived
from work. He was met by their child whom he then carried in
his arms.
3. Moments later, Guilbert noticed a man urinating at one of

the tables in front of their store.
4. The man urinating was among those engaged in a drinking spree

in a nearby store. It appears that the accused was with the same
group, seated about two meters away.
5. Guilbert immediately admonished the man urinating but the latter

paid no attention and continued relieving himself.
6. Guilbert then put down his child when the accused rose from his
seat, approached Guilbert, drew out a knife and stabbed him below
his breast. The accused, as well as his companions, scampered away
while Guilbert called for help saying "I’m stabbed." At that time, she
was getting her child from Guilbert and about two feet away from
the accused. She easily recognized the accused because he would
sometimes drink at their store. Guilbert was immediately brought
to the hospital where he later expired 11:35 of the same
evening. She declared that for Guilbert’s medical and
hospitalization expenses, the family spent about ₱3,000.00. As
for the wake and burial expenses, she could no longer estimate
the amount because of her sadness.
A. . Pedro, an eyewitness at the scene, corroborated Maria Liza’s

testimonial account of the events.
b. On that night, he was drinking together with a companion in

Maria Liza’s store.
c. He recalled Guilbert admonishing a person urinating in one

of the tables fronting the store. Thereafter, he saw the accused
pass by him, approach Guilbert and then without warning, stab
the latter.
d. The accused then ran away and left. Together with his drinking
companion, they rushed Guilbert to the hospital.
e. Pedro asserted that the area’s illumination was "intense" because

of the big white lamp and that he was certain that it was the accused
who attacked Guilbert.
i. . Denial was the accused’s main plea in exculpating himself of

the charge that he killed Guilbert. He claimed that in the evening
of May 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the public market (new
building) to collect receivables out of the sale of meat. Afterwards,
they took a short cut passing through the public market where they
chanced upon his wife’s acquaintances who were engaged in a
drinking spree while singing videoke. Among them were Dodong
Danieles (Dodong for brevity) and his younger brother. They
invited him (the accused) and his wife to join them. While they
were drinking, Dodong had an altercation with Guilbert that
stemmed from the latter’s admonition of Dodong’s younger brother
who had earlier urinated at the Patricio’s store premises. Suddenly,
Dodong assaulted Guilbert and stabbed him. Fearing that he
might be implicated in the incident, the accused fled and went to the
house of his parents-in-law. Thereafter, he went back to the market
for his wife who was no longer there. When he learned that the
victim was brought to the Ormoc District Hospital, he went there to
verify the victim’s condition. He was able to talk with the mother
and the wife of Guilbert as well as the police. He was thereafter
invited to the precinct so that the police can get his statement. The
next day, the parents of Dodong Danieles came to his parents-in-
law’s house to persuade him not to help the victim’s family. He
declined. Half a month later, he was arrested and charged for the
death of Guilbert Patricio.
The defense also presented one Cerilo Pelos ("Cerilo") who claimed
to have personally witnessed the stabbing incident because he was
also drinking in the public market on that fateful night. He insisted
that Guilbert was stabbed by someone wearing a black shirt, whose
identity he later on learned to be Dodong Danieles.11
On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of murder and decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the Court finds the
accused Vicente Vilbar alias Dikit GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder as charged, and hereby sentences him to
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered] to pay the
offended party the sum of ₱75,000.00 as indemnity, the sum of
₱3,000.00 as medical expenses, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his period of detention shall be credited
to him in full if he abides by the term for convicted prisoners,
otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.12
The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly elevated to us for our
review, but in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,13 we
issued a Resolution14 dated December 1, 2004 referring the case to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorney’s
Office, 15 and plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor
General,16 filed their Briefs on August 15, 2006 and April 30, 2007,
respectively. The Court of Appeals made the following
determination of the issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review, accused (now accused-appellant) seeks the
reversal of his conviction for the crime of murder or in the
alternative, the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime of
homicide. He argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to
the inconsistent, irreconcilable, and incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) the exact number of persons
drinking with accused-appellant in the adjacent store;
(2) what Maria Liza was doing at the exact time of stabbing; and
(3) the accused-appellant’s reaction after he stabbed the victim.
Moreover, accused-appellant argues that if he was indeed the
culprit, why did he approach Guilbert’s family in the hospital
immediately after the stabbing incident? Granting without admitting
that a crime of murder was committed, accused-appellant insists
that he could only be held guilty of homicide for it was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt that treachery and evident premeditation
existed. He specifically directs our attention to the following details:
(1) there was a heated argument between the victim and a member
or members of his group; (2) the stabbing happened in a spur of the
moment; and (3) the victim then was not completely defenseless.
Meanwhile, the OSG stresses that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are minor and
inconsequential given the positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the assailant. As to accused-appellant’s contention that
he is innocent because he even went to the hospital and conferred
with Guilbert’s relatives immediately after the stabbing incident, the
OSG maintains that such actuation is not a conclusive proof of
innocence.
The issues for resolution are first, the assessment of credibility of
the prosecution witnesses; and second, the propriety of conviction
of the accused-appellant for murder.17
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on February 14, 2008, in
which it accorded great respect to the assessment by the RTC of the
credibility of the witnesses. The inconsistencies and inaccuracies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are relatively trivial,
minor, and do not impeach their credibility. The positive
identification and categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert
prevail over accused-appellant’s self-serving denial. However, the
appellate court did not find that treachery attended the stabbing of
Guilbert and, thus, downgraded the crime to homicide. It also
reduced the award of civil indemnity. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals decision sentenced accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 1 August 2001 Decision appealed from finding
accused-appellant VICENTE VILBAR @ "Dikit" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds the
accused appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight years and one
day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen years and
eight months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He is also
ordered to pay the heirs of Guilbert Patricio the amounts of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
and Php3,000.00 as actual damages.18
Accused-appellant now comes before us on final appeal.
In our Resolution19 dated April 15, 2009, we gave the parties the
opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs, but the
parties manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments
before the Court of Appeals.20
After a scrutiny of the records of the case, we find that the submitted
evidence and prevailing jurisprudence duly support the findings and
conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
Evidence in this case chiefly consists of testimonial evidence. Both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave credence and weight to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Case laws mandate that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue,
the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies
of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that
when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court."21 There is
no compelling reason for us to depart from the general rule in this
case.
Prosecution witnesses Maria Liza and Pedro both positively and
categorically identified accused-appellant as the one who stabbed
Guilbert.
Maria Liza vividly recounted her traumatic moment as follows:
Q: Mrs. Patricio, do you know the accused in this case in the person
of Vicente Vilbar alias "Dikit?"
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He used to go there for drinking in our store.
Q: How long have you known this person?
A: About three (3) months.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Patricio, can you recall where were you in the evening at
about 7:00 o’clock of May 5, 2000?
A: I was at the store.
Q: Where?
A: In the market.
Q: What were you doing in the store?
A: I was watching after my, attending to my child there.
Q: How old was the child?
A: Two (2) years old.
Q: When you were attending to your child at this particular time,
what happened?
A: My child saw my husband arriving.
Q: What happened after your child saw your husband arrived at the
store you were tending?
A: He met him.
Q: And what did your husband do when he was met by your child?
A: He cradled the child.
Q: What happened after that?
A: So at 7:00 o’clock that evening there was somebody urinated and
my husband told that someone not to urinate that place because that
was a table.
Q: Do you know who was this someone admonished by your
husband not to urinate because that was a table?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know where did he come from?
A: They were drinking.
Q: Do you know who was his companion while they were drinking?
A: No, only that Vicente Vilbar.
Q: From where he came from or from where he was drinking in the
group of persons together with the accused Vicente Vilbar, how far
was the place wherein they were drinking to where he urinated
from where the group was drinking?
A: Just near.
Q: When you said near, can you estimate the distance?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness estimated a distance at about 2 meters.
xxxx
Q: What was the reaction of the person urinating when your
husband told him not to urinate?
A: He continue urinating.
Q: What was the reaction of your husband when he did not heed to
the advice not to urinate?
A: He put down the child, this Vicente Vilbar rose.
Q: Rose from where?
A: From the table.
Q: And what happened?
A: Without any word stabbed my husband.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your husband, this Vicente Vilbar?
A: Knife.
Q: Do you know, were you able to see where he kept the knife which
he used in stabbing your husband?
A: From his waist.
Q: When the said Vicente Vilbar delivered the stabbed thrust to your
husband, was your husband hit?
A: He was hit.
Q: On what part of his body was your husband hit?
A: Just below the breast.
xxxx
Q: Below the left nipple?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after your husband was hit below the left nipple?
A: Vicente Vilbar ran away and my husband told me to call for some
help and he said, "I’m stab."
xxxx
Q: By the way, how far were you to your husband Guilbert Patricio
when he was stabbed?
A: I was behind Vicente Vilbar.
Q: When you said you were behind, how far from Vicente Vilbar?
A: Just near, sir, from my husband next was the one who urinated,
next Vicente Vilbar and I was behind.22 (Emphases supplied.)
Pedro corroborated Maria Liza’s testimony, recalling the same
sequence of events the night of May 5, 2000, viz:
Q: Who was the companion of Guilbert when he arrived in the
vicinity?
A: He was alone.
Q: So what happened after his arrival?
A: When he arrived he was with his child.
Q: And what did he do with the child?
A: He carried his child in his arms.
Q: And then what happened after he carried his child?
A: There was someone who [urinated] somewhere behind us and he
was admonished by this Guilbert Patricio by saying, "Bay, don’t
urinate there it would somehow create a bad smell and considering
that this is a drinking area."
Q: Who was that person who relieved himself just nearby?
A: I did not know.
Q: Whose group was he coming from?
A: From Vicente Vilbar’s companion.
Q: Did that person who was admonished accede to the request of
Guilbert Patricio not to relieve just nearby?
A: He just did not do something, he just relieved.
Q: So that person who was admonished in fact urinated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so what happened?
A: I saw this Vicente Vilbar stood up and pass behind me and went
to Guilbert Patricio and just immediately stabbed him.
Q: What was the weapon used in stabbing?
A: It seems like a knife (and the witness demonstrated to the Court
the length of the weapon at about 10 inches with the width of about
2 inches).
Q: When this stabbing incident took place, was it in front of you or
was it behind?
A: In front of me but I was facing his back.
xxxx
Q: Will you please point to us a part of your body that he was hit by
the stab thrust?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness demonstrated below his left nipple and the witness was
pointing to the position below his left nipple.
xxxx
Q: At the time of that incident which was on the evening of May 5,
2000, did you already know that the person whom you just pointed
earlier was Vicente Vilbar?
A: I did not know about his complete name but I know of him as
"Dikit" as alias and his face.
xxxx
Q: Under what circumstance that you learned of his name?
A: Because I ask the victim himself, that Guilbert Patricio by saying,
"Who was that person who stabbed you Dong?," and then he said
"He is known to be Dikit and his real name is Vicente Vilbar."
Q: Prior to the incident, have you seen this Dikit or Vicente Vilbar?
A: Yes, because after we had our tuba drinking spree in that same
day they were there also.
Q: Would you recall how many times you have seen Vicente Vilbar
prior to the incident?
A: I could not just count how many times but what I’m sure is we
know him.
Q: Could it be more than five (5) times?
A: It could be.23 (Emphases supplied.)
The RTC, assessing the aforequoted testimonies, declared:
Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she was
just behind him when he stabbed her husband who was facing the
accused. There was proper illumination of the place x x x and her
testimony was not destroyed in the cross-examination. Her
testimony is positive and spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in
her demeanor and flow of testimony that would indicate some
contradiction or incredibility.
The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of
Maria Liza Patricio. x x x.24
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro,25 these
being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act
constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the
assailant. Also, these minor contradictions were expected from said
witnesses as they differ in their impressions of the incident and
vantage point in relation to the victim and the accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being present at the scene
and time of the commission of the crime but asserted that one
Dodong Danieles was the perpetrator thereof. Yet, the RTC was
unconvinced by the version of events as testified to by accused-
appellant himself and Cerilo, because:
In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he
talked unintelligibly. His testimony is not credible and perceived to
be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with him at the time
of the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he
have to leave the place and his wife and go to the house of his
parents-in-law rather than their house? The accused should have
presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in that regard, and
also his parents-in-law so the latter can testify regarding the alleged
visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong Danieles who came to
their place when the accused was also there days after the incident,
telling him not to help the family of the victim.
The accused’s witness, Cerilo Pelos, is the farthest of the expected
witnesses for the defense. He and the accused were not
acquaintances and they only came to know each other in prison
where Pelos is also detained for another charge. x x x. The testimony
of the witness is hazy and full of generalities, even the way he
speaks, the Court notes some inconsistency in his voice and
incoherence in his testimony.26
A closer perusal of the testimony of accused-appellant’s
corroborating witness, Cerilo, reveals just how incoherent and
elusive he was in giving particular details about the stabbing
incident:
Q: Now, while you were there, what happened?
A: When I arrived there, I arrived with this people having a drinking
spree and I myself went to the other table near this people and this
quite thin or slim guy was standing in front of them and one of these
people who were having drinking spree seemed to relieve himself
not to the C.R. but beside the store.
Q: Now, you said a while ago that there were four (4) companions of
the accused. Now, tell us, were all of the four (4) people that you are
referring to that exclude the accused?
A: There were four (4) of them including the accused, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there was somebody from the group who
relieved himself, is that right?
A: Yes, sir, urinated.
Q: And what happened when he urinated?
A: He was confronted by that slim guy because he did not urinate in
the C.R. but just beside the store.
Q: And what happened when the confrontation took place?
A: They exchanged words and after that th[e] slim guy left the one
who urinated because it seemed that they were having an argument.
Q: And then, what happened after that?
A: The one who confronted left and this accused stood up went to
this slim guy and talked to him.
Q: This slim guy you are referring to is the person who urinated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q; And so what happened with that meeting between the accused
and the slim guy that you are referring to?
A: They were still and they were talking, sir.
Q: Were you able to hear what they were talking about?
A: No, sir, because the place was quite cacophonic.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: They were still talking when the one who urinated went back to
the table.
Q: And what happened after this person who urinated went back to
the table?
A: They conversed with the one wearing black and after the
conversation he stood up and went to the slim guy.
Q: Who stood up?
A: The one named Dodong, the one who was in black and the one
who stabbed.
Q: So, you said that this one wearing black approached the slim guy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: So then, he stabbed him and the one he stabbed ran away,
because he was hit.
Q: How about the accused, where was the accused then when the
man in black stabbed the slim guy?
A: There, and they were still convering (sic) with each other with the
slim guy, sir.
Q: And what did he do after the man in black stabbed the slim [g]uy?
A: He ran away passing by the Apollo and (while the witness was
demonstrating by pressing his hand to his chest) that he was hit.
Q: How about you, what did you do after that?
A: When the commotion of the people subsided, I asked from the
people around there about the name of the man in black and after
getting the name of the said person, I called up the Police Precinct I
to inform them about the incident.
xxxx
Q: Now, this person whom you said who stabbed the victim, did you
meet him before?
A: Not yet, sir.
xxxx
Q: As such a police asset, did you endeavor to know the personalities
who were involved in that stabbing incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you get name?
A: I only got one name only the name of that guy in black, sir.
Q: Why, did you interview the man in black?
A: I asked from those who were there hanging out if ever they know
that person.
Q: Did you not follow the assailant after the stabbing incident?
A: No sir, because after I asked about his name from the bystanders,
I immediately called up.27 (Emphases supplied.)
Cerilo failed to mention what weapon was used to stab Guilbert
or describe the manner Guilbert was stabbed. Cerilo also
appeared to have mixed-up the personalities in his narration. He
first identified the "slim guy" to be Guilbert who reprimanded the
person who urinated, but he subsequently referred to the "slim guy"
as the person who urinated. Moreover, Cerilo’s identification of the
purported assailant of Guilbert as a certain "Dodong" is highly
unreliable, given that Cerilo admitted that he learned of said
assailant’s name from an unidentified spectator of the stabbing
incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert to death
on the night of May 5, 2000 was already established beyond
reasonable doubt. The next question is what crime for which
accused-appellant should be held liable: murder as held by the RTC
or homicide as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty
only of homicide in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,28 we ruled that
treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was
sudden and unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was not established. Surveying the leading decisions on
this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
the offended party might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must
establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was
casual and the attack was done impulsively, there is no treachery
even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been aptly
observed the accused could not have made preparations for the
attack, . . .; and the means, method and form thereof could not
therefore have been thought of by the accused, because the attack
was impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness
of the attack. . . . In point is the following pronouncement we
made in People v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the
fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does
not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the
purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a
sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . ."
In People v. Bautista, it was held:
". . . The circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to
the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia
necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear that
the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate
the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery
cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the
commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult
for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. . . ."
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the
prosecution has not proven that the killing was committed with
treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim from
behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated
argument. Accused-appellant, filled with anger and rage,
apparently had no time to reflect on his actions.1âwphi1 It was
not shown that he consciously adopted the mode of attacking
the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to
himself. Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of
homicide only.29
Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the
instant case merely showed that accused-appellant attacked
Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove that
accused-appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. As
aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the
surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is,
the open area, the presence of the victim’s families and the
attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-
appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to
him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the
victim. Yet, accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a
public market at 7:00 o’clock in the evening. The place was well-
lighted and teeming with people. He was indifferent to the presence
of the victim’s family or of the other people who could easily identify
him and point him out as the assailant. He showed no concern that
the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate in behalf of
the victim. In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively
done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or extreme
annoyance. There are no indications that accused-appellant
deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and place. Thus,
we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant, who at that
time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted brashly and
impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim. Treachery just cannot
be appreciated.30
Lastly, we review the penalty and damages imposed by the Court of
Appeals upon accused-appellant.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal.31 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of
the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view
of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the
maximum of the sentence should be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months; and that the minimum should be within the
range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment
from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
is in order.
As to the award of damages to Guilbert’s heirs, we affirm the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. Medical and burial expenses were indisputably incurred
by Guilbert’s heirs but the exact amounts thereof were not duly
proven. So in lieu of actual damages, we award Guilbert’s heirs
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. Article 2224 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty."32
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar
is found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE, for which he is
SENTENCED to imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Guilbert Patricio the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 232493, June 19, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. CESAR
VILLAMOR CORPIN @ "BAY" ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated January 27, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07635 which affirmed
the Decision3 promulgated on June 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 201, Las Piñ as City
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 10-0718, finding herein accused-
appellant Cesar Villamor Corpin @ "Bay" (Corpin) guilty of the crime
of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Corpin was charged for the crime of Murder under the following
Information:cralawred
"That on or about the 1st day of September, 2010, in the City of Las
Piñ as, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and swiftly hack one PAULO MENDOZA PINEDA, with
a butcher's knife on his face, giving the latter no opportunity to
defend himself, thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and
mortal wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."4
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Upon arraignment, Corpin pleaded not guilty to the charge.
follows:cralawred
x x x [T]he prosecution presented Marilyn Pineda, Helen Raymundo,
Dr. Ethel Punzalan, Marlon Ramos, Christopher Opalda Quides, and
SPO2 Aristotle Raquion as witnesses.
xxxx
Helen Raymundo (Raymundo for brevity) testified that: at around
2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of September 1, 2010, while she was
tending to her vegetable stall in Las Piñ as Public Market, she saw
Kuya Bay, herein accused-appellant Corpin, kill Kuya Paulo;
accused-appellant Corpin sold pork in the public market while Paulo
was a chicken vendor; their stalls were situated at the back of each
other and had the same entrance and exit; prior to the hacking
incident, accused-appellant Corpin and Paulo were always joking at
each other; Paulo often said "Ang baho" which made accused-
appellant Corpin frown as he thought he was the one being alluded
to; there was no provocation on the part of Paulo at the time the
hacking incident happened; accused-appellant Corpin and the victim
were not facing each other and the latter was in no position to
defend himself; she was one (1) meter away from them; after
accused-appellant Corpin hacked Paulo, the victim was able to get a
knife but the former embraced him; at that juncture, one of the meat
vendors, Kuya Kris, arrived and pushed accused-appellant Corpin
away from Paulo; and, Paulo ran away for about three (3) meters
and fell down in front of the canteen, in front of Raymundo's stall.
Raymundo identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay she executed.
Dr. Ethel Punzalan (Dr. Punzalan for brevity) testified that: on
September 1, 2010, she was at home when the resident doctor at
Las Piñ as Doctors' Hospital called her to attend to a patient named
Paulo Pineda; she rushed to the hospital because she was told that
the patient was continuously bleeding; due to the profuse bleeding,
Paulo developed hypovolemic shock; they tried to give him blood
transfusion but before they could do so, the patient expired; their
hospital issued a Medical Certificate stating that the patient was
admitted with a hacking wound in the maxillary zygomatic area and
that his blood pressure was 60/40; the maxillary zygomatic area is
from the cheekbone to the neck; Dr. Funtila took a picture of the
patient when he was in the hospital; at that time, Dr. Punzalan was
beside the patient; the Medical Certificate was signed by the
resident physician, Dr. Michael Galope; and, it is questionable
whether the patient could have survived the hacking wound because
of the trauma on the major blood vessels, and also because it is very
hard to get blood for transfusion.
Marlon Ramos (Ramos for brevity) testified that: he knows both
accused-appellant Corpin and Paulo as he is also a pork and chicken
vendor in Las Piñ as Public Market, employed by a certain Manny
Pareja; at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of September 1, 2010,
he was sleeping after having worked early in the morning; it was
their rest time as they would start selling again at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon; Paulo, the victim, woke him up and asked for his help to
carry a tray of chicken; he helped the victim carry the yellow
Magnolia tray which was about ten (10) kilos and as wide as the
stenographer's table; they were facing each other while they carried
the tray of chicken; when they put the tray down, accused-
appellant Corpin came from behind the victim and hacked him
in his right jaw; at that time, Ramos was very near Paulo as they
were just in front of each other; accused-appellant Corpin
hacked Paulo with a butcher's knife used in chopping pork; the
knife has a rectangular shape and as long as a ruler; it is long and
wide; when he was hacked, the victim said to accused-appellant
Corpin, "Bay, bakit mo ako tinaga"; accusedappellant Corpin did
not answer; and, Marlon was in front of them at the time of the
hacking but he ran away as he was shocked and afraid.
Christopher Opalda Quides (Quides for brevity) testified that: he
knows accused-appellant Corpin being his co-meat vendor in Las
Piñ as Public Market, while the victim, Paulo Pineda, was
his kumpare; the victim was the godfather of his youngest child
although accused-appellant Corpin is also his friend; at around 2:30
o'clock in the afternoon of September 1, 2010, he was in his stall
when accused-appellant Corpin suddenly hacked Paulo who was
"walang kamalay-malay"; he was about two (2) to three (3) meters
away from the place where the hacking happened; he told Paulo to
run away, then he called the guards; Paulo ran away then fell down
near the canteen; the victim was able to board a tricycle and went to
the Las Piñ as District Hospital; and, the security guards arrived as
they were just near the crime scene. 5
The Version of the defense, as summarized by the CA, is as
follows:cralawred
Accused-appellant Cesar Villamor Corpin testified that: he hacked
the victim but it was unintentional; he knew Paulo Pineda because
every afternoon they would sell meat side by side at the Las Piñ as
Public Market, located in Zapote near the flyover; he had known
Paulo for quite a long time, since the market opened in 2003; they
knew each other and sometimes they exchanged stories; every
morning, Paulo sold meat in the middle of the market, and
transfer[r]ed to the back of accused-appellant Corpin's stall in
the afternoon; accused-appellant Corpin's stall is just one (1)
meter away from Paulo's; at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
September 1, 2010, accused-appellant Corpin was chopping liempo
for display in his stall; while he was chopping liempo, his vision
suddenly darkened ("biglang dumilim ang paningin ko"); this always
happens to him every three (3) months, even at home, but in the
market it happened only once; he was not aware that he hacked
Paulo who was at his back; he remembered that Paulo embraced
him and asked for help; he did not see Paulo but he heard his voice;
the victim said, "Nataga mo ako bay"; when accused-appellant
Corpin regained his senses, he saw blood and realized that he
indeed hacked Paulo; accused-appellant Corpin told Paulo that he
would bring him to the hospital and that he would surrender to the
police afterwards; accused-appellant Corpin helped the victim walk
outside the market but when they reached the eatery, Paulo pushed
him away; he went back to his stall and waited for his consciousness
to regain; Paulo used to badmouth him ("sinisiraan") everyday
but he just ignored him as he was suffering from highblood;
Paulo always mocked him by saying "Ang baho" everytime he
passed by; accused-appellant Corpin would smell himself and
he did not stink; and, the mockery happened in the past four
(4) months prior to the incident but accused-appellant Corpin
just kept silent as he did not want any trouble.6
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision7 promulgated on June 24, 2015, the RTC found Corpin
guilty of Murder, to wit:cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds the
accused CESAR VILLAMOR CORPIN @ "BAY" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and [is] hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
Paulo Pineda x x x the following amount:cralawred
1. Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. Php 51,673.76 as actual damages;
3. Php 50,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. Php 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC ruled that all the elements of Murder were established by
the prosecution.9 It further ruled that treachery attended the
commission of the crime.10 The prosecution witnesses' account of
what transpired from the inception of the attack, as well as the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, was factual
and convincing.11 It is clear that the attack was sudden and the
victim had no opportunity to defend himself.12
Aggrieved, Corpin appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the Decision13 dated January 27, 2017, the CA affirmed the
conviction by the RTC with modifications:cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated June 16, 2015 of the RTC, Branch 201,
Las Piñ as City in Criminal Case No. 10-0718 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Cesar Villamor
Corpin is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, and is ordered to pay the
heirs of Paulo Mendoza Pineda the amounts of: (1) Php 75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (2) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (3) Php
75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) Php 51,673.76 as actual
damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA ruled that the RTC committed no reversible error in
convicting Corpin of the crime of Murder.15 It further ruled that the
killing of Paulo was attended by treachery.16 The allegation that the
victim uttered "Ang baho" moments before the hacking incident
does not negate the treacherous character of the attack.17 Also,
contrary to Corpin's contention, the hacking was not done on
impulse, but deliberately and with murderous intent.18 Moreover,
the fact that the victim was unsuspecting of any attack is bolstered
by the coherent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that his
back was turned when Corpin suddenly hacked him from behind.19
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Whether the CA erred in affirming Corpin's conviction for Murder.
The Court's Ruling
have altered the result.20 This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal
cases where the whole case is thrown open for review on issues of
both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which
were not raised by the parties as errors.21 The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.22
the conviction of Corpin, but only for the crime of Homicide, instead
of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven in the killing of Paulo.
Treachery was not established by clear and convincing evidence
Seeking the reduction of his criminal liability to Homicide, Corpin
admits that he indeed killed Paulo, but contends that said killing was
not attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.23 He
argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he consciously
adopted the particular mode of attack he employed to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.24
The Court finds merit in Corpin's argument.
The fact that Corpin killed the victim is undisputed as said act was
admitted by Corpin himself.25 However, the Court is not convinced
that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
It is established that qualifying circumstances must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.26 Thus, for Corpin to be
convicted of Murder, the prosecution must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the killing of Paulo was qualified
by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
the offended party might make.27 To qualify an offense, the following
conditions must exist:
(1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 28
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an

aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.29
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be
present.30 It is not enough that the attack was "sudden",
"unexpected," and "without any warning or
provocation."31 There must also be a showing that the offender
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of
treachery:cralawred
First, although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was
hacked from behind, the prosecution did not prove that Corpin
deliberately chose the particular mode of attack he used to ensure
the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself. As
testified by the witnesses of the prosecution, the incident happened
in a public market where there were numerous other people,
including the witnesses, who could have offered their help. In a
similar case, the Court held that when aid is easily available to the
victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that there
were several eyewitnesses to the incident, no treachery could be
appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted the
particular means he used to insure the facilitation of the crime, he
could have chosen another place or time.32 Moreover, after he was
attacked by Corpin, Paulo was able to run away and escape,33 which
shows that the victim had the opportunity to defend himself.
Second, Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim.
As testified by the prosecution witnesses and Corpin himself, he and
Paulo have been working as meat vendors in the same public market
for several years.34 In addition, the weapon he used to kill the
victim was a butcher's knife that he regularly used for his work.
In this connection, the Court ruled in another case that the fact
that the victim and the accused were already within the same
vicinity when the attack happened and that the accused did not
deliberately choose the particular weapon he used to kill the
victim as he merely picked it up from within his reach is proof
that there is no treachery involved.35
All told, based on the first and second circumstances
abovementioned, Corpin's decision to attack the victim was more of
sudden impulse than a planned decision. The prosecution failed to
prove the elements of treachery. Thus, Corpin can only be held
guilty of the crime of Homicide.
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
crime is therefore Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for
Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Corpin should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty
next lower in degree to that provided in Article 249 of the RPC) and
whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in
its medium period. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance proven in the present case, the penalty should be
applied in its medium period of fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months.
Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty will be selected from the above range, with the minimum
penalty being selected from the range of the penalty one degree
lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor (six [6] years
and one [1] day to twelve [12] years). Hence, the indeterminate
sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be as it is hereby
imposed.36
P50,000.00 each.
appellant Cesar Villamor Corpin @ "Bay" GUILTY of HOMICIDE,
for which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Paulo Mendoza Pineda the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ANGEL
GURO Y COMBO ALIAS "JASON," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated October 3, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Second Division in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07721,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated September 2, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 (RTC), in Crim.
Case No. 2007-9546-MK, finding herein accused-appellant Angel
Guro (Guro) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Guro was charged with Murder of Jesus Sangcap, Jr. (Jesus). The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about (the) 12th day of February 2007, in the City of
Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a knife, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and (sic) attack,
assault and stab one JESUS SANGCAP, JR. y SUNGAHID, by stabbing
the latter twice on his back while the latter was sprawled on the
ground, thereby inflicting upon him fatal injuries which caused his
death soon thereafter, the said killing having been attended by the
qualifying circumstances (sic) of treachery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Guro pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Version of the Prosecution5
The prosecution presented Jefferson Sangcap (Jefferson),

Joemarie6 Sangcap (Joemarie), Police Chief Inspector Felimon
Porciuncula (PCI Porciuncula) and Jocelyn Loardo (Loardo).
Jefferson, the first witness for the prosecution, is the son of

Jesus. He testified that while at their home in Cubao, in the early
evening of February 12, 2007, his father received a call from one
Venus de los Santos, Jefferson's cousin. According to Jesus, a group
of male persons were waiting for Joemarie, Jesus' brother, in
Marikina City. Jefferson, by invitation of his father, went to
Marikina City. They arrived at Joemarie's school at 9:00 in the
evening on board their respective motorbikes. Joemarie rode with
Jefferson.
While they were on their way home, more particularly at the
intersection of CM. Recto and del Pilar Streets, Parang, Marikina
City, Joemarie saw the group composed of around five persons
waiting for him at the computer shop. Joemarie wanted to talk to
them. Joemari, Jefferson and Jesus alighted from their respective
motorbikes and approached the group. When they reached the
group, Jefferson asked a certain Yayi what their group's problem
was with his uncle Joemarie. Yayi stood up together with one of the
members of the group and without saying any word, pushed him in
the chest. Jefferson fell to the gutter. When he was about to stand up,
he saw his father kneeling and was about to stand when a group of
persons lifted a chair and threw the same at his father. His father
was hit and fell to the floor. He saw three persons continue to maul
his father. At that time, he was about 15 meters away from his
father who had fallen to his right side. While these persons
were mauling his father, the latter was just kneeling with his
hands on the ground. Suddenly, a male person arrived from the
direction of the church and stabbed his father twice at the back.
The members of the group who stabbed and mauled his father then
fled together.
During the hearing, the person who stabbed his father was
identified as Guro. Jefferson admitted that at the time of the incident,
he did not know the identity of Guro and that he came to know the
name of the latter only from his uncle Joemarie.
Joemarie, the second witness for the prosecution, is the

youngest brother of the victim. He testified that there was this
cult/fraternity with whom he had a previous encounter, just three
days prior to the stabbing incident of Jesus. He said that this group,
composed of Yayi, Niki and Lucky, had a "trip" (nakursunadahan) on
him wherein he was boxed on his right ear and eventually mauled
by these persons. He said that this group was known at their school
for being notorious in creating trouble. He further stated that he did
not even know the reason why he was boxed by these persons.
Thereafter, he reported the incident to the guidance counselor, who,
in turn, requested for the police to guard the gate of the school. He
also reported the incident to the barangay which blottered the
incident.
Joemarie further testified that on February 12, 2007, he was

informed by his classmate that the group he previously
encountered was waiting for him. He immediately texted
Jefferson and asked the latter to fetch him because the group might
have another "trip" on him. At around 8:30 in the evening, his
brother Jesus and Jefferson arrived. He then rode the motorbike of
Jefferson and his brother then followed them on his own motorbike.
When they reached the corner of CM. Recto Street, after the church,
he saw the group playing at the arcade. He recognized them because
of the previous incident. This time, Jerry and Guro were also with
the group. Joemari, Jefferson and Jesus approached the group and
after a little conversation with Yayi, the latter pushed Jefferson who
fell to the ground. The other members of the group were standing
side by side. When Joemarie was about to help his nephew, Yayi ran
after him and boxed him. He was hit very slightly by Yayi and the
latter ran away. He saw his nephew standing up. He also saw Niki
was about to hit his brother with a long bench. His brother moved
back and was able to evade the chair and fell to the gutter. He was in
front of them and was about five steps away. When his brother was
about to stand, Guro jumped on top his brother and stabbed him
twice in the back and ran away.
PCI Porciuncula, Medico Legal Officer and Chief of the Northern

Police District (NPD) Crime Laboratory of Caloocan City, testified
that he conducted the examination of Jesus' body. His report
mentioned that the wound sustained by Jesus was caused by a knife
and that the culprit came from the back of the victim.
The last witness for the prosecution was Loardo who was presented
to establish the expenses incurred as a result of the death of the
victim.7 When she was presented, the prosecution and defense
merely stipulated that as a result of the death of the victim, expenses
were incurred in the amount of P20,222.00 for the burial and
interment as shown by the Statement of Accounts issued by Loyola
Memorial Park and P5,000.00 for the expenses during the wake of
the victim.
Version of the Defense8
The lone witness for the defense was Guro. He testified that on
February 12, 2007 at around 8:45 in the evening, he was at the
corner of CM. Recto Street, Parang, Marikina City together with
Jomar, Chay and Gabriel to buy burgers and shakes. While waiting
for their orders, two motorbikes arrived and parked in front of
them. There were three persons on board these motorbikes and one
of them was Joemarie. He admitted knowing Joemarie because he
had a previous altercation ("girian") with him. The "girian" incident
happened sometime in January and happened only once.
When the three alighted from their motorbikes, they
approached his friends who were inside a video shop beside
the burger stand. Niki, Yayi and Jerry were at the video shop
and according to Guro, it seemed that Joemarie did not notice
him at the burger stand. Jefferson then inquired about the name of
one of his friends, and when the latter answered that he was Yayi,
Jefferson suddenly hit the face of Yayi. He noticed that these three
persons were attacking his friends because two of them were
carrying 2x2 coco lumber wood and the other was carrying a
lead pipe. When he tried to pacify them, Jefferson hit him in his
shoulder using the piece of wood. His friends then entered the video
shop and they carried a bench in order to block the attack made by
the three. He was holding the bench together with Yayi and Nikki.
Jerry was looking for something that he could throw at Joemarie's
group while Jomar, Chay and Gabriel went out to ask help from their
friends at the billiard hall. Their friends from the billiard hall
comprised of less than 10, arrived carrying billiard sticks.
Thereafter, there was a commotion and he, together with Yayi, Nikki
and Jerry, was able to get out from the video shop. They threw
stones at Joemarie, Jefferson and Jesus. When they were
retreating, he saw one of the companions of Joemarie fall down
and according to his companions, a certain Peping stabbed that
person.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found Guro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder. It

held that there being treachery in Guro's sudden and unexpected
attack, the killing was qualified to Murder. The dispositive portion of
the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused ANGEL GURO y
COMBO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code qualified by treachery. And there being no mitigating
and aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, said
accused is hereby sentenced reclusion perpetua and is ordered to
pay the heirs of Jesus Sangcap Jr., the sums of:
a.] P 25,222.00 representing actual damages; and
b.] P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity
The period during which the herein accused was in detention during
the pendency of this case shall be credited to him in full provided
that he agree [s] to abide by and comply with the rules and
regulations of the Metro Manila District Jail, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig City.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA
The CA dismissed the appeal. The CA held that there is no question

that Guro killed Jesus. It also found that the RTC was correct in
ruling that there was treachery as Guro attacked Jesus in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner and that Jesus was completely
deprived of a real chance to defend himself. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated 02 September 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 272 in Criminal Case No. 2007-9546-MK,
finding accused-appellant Angel Guro y Combo alias "Jason" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and awarding actual damages
in the amount of Php25,222.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
in that the amount of civil indemnity is hereby increased to
Php75,000.00. In addition, accused appellant Angel Guro y Combo
alias "Jason" is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Jesus Sangcap,
Jr. the amount of Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and 6% interest per annum on all damages,
from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of

Guro but for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present in the killing
of Jesus.
Guro's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Guro asserts that the RTC erred in giving weight and credence to the
testimonies of Jefferson and Joemarie as their testimonies were
allegedly inconsistent and improbable, and that Joemarie is a biased
witness. In a number of cases, the Court held that when the issues
involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.11 This is
so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth.12 Hence, it is a settled rule that
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial
court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result
of the case.13 The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA.14
In the present case, both the RTC and C A found the testimonies of
the victims straightforward and worthy of belief. Jefferson and
Joemarie clearly and convincingly testified regarding what they
witnessed when Guro jumped on Jesus, stabbed him twice on the
back, and ran away. These testimonies were sufficient to establish
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion, i.e., it was Guro who inflicted the injuries on Jesus which
caused his death. To be certain, the witnesses were in unison in
identifying Guro as the offender.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA's findings that the alleged
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies referred merely to
minor and inconsequential details, which did not at all affect the
substance of their testimonies, much less impair their credibility.
Discordance in the testimonies of witnesses on minor matters
heighten their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not
coached or rehearsed, especially where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant.15
There is also no merit to Guro's allegation that Joemarie was a

biased witness. A witness is said to be biased when his relation to
the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to
pervert the truth, or to state what is false.16 While Guro claimed that
the prior disagreement between Joemarie and Yayi's group could
have given rise to an improper motive on the part of Joemarie to
testify against him, it must be stressed that the persons identified by
Joemarie with whom he had a previous encounter were Yayi, Niki
and Lucky.17 In fact, Joemarie did not mention Guro as one of the
persons he had previously encountered prior to the incident.18
As to Guro's allegation that the illumination and condition of

visibility on the area, the distance of the eyewitnesses to the victim,
and the suddenness of the attack, as well as the immediate flight of
the assailant, cast doubt on the alleged positive identification of
witnesses, it must be stressed that these circumstances were raised
for the first time on appeal. Guro had all the opportunity to cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses as to these circumstances during
trial, but this he did not do. Objection to evidence cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an
objection.19 Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal.20
Furthermore, Guro merely interposed the defense of denial. He

denied that it was him who had stabbed Jesus, and adverted to a
certain Peping, as the assailant. However, aside from such bare
allegation, Guro did not adduce any evidence to corroborate such
claim and establish that a certain Peping actually stabbed
Jesus.21 Meanwhile, as stated earlier, prosecution witnesses
Jefferson and Joemarie positively identified Guro in open court as
the person who stabbed Jesus.22
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without

any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving weight in law.23 It is established in jurisprudence that
denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of
the accused; more so where the defense did not present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for accused to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of the its commission.24 Denial
is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.25
In the case at bar, it was clearly established that Guro was in the
area when the victim was stabbed. Further, his admission that he
went into hiding in San Mateo, Rizal despite having knowledge that
people were looking for him because he was the one who killed the
victim is also an indication of guilt.26 Generally, flight, in the absence
of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an
inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person
would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend
himself and assert his innocence.27 Guro, despite having knowledge
that the authorities were already looking for him and that a case had
already been filed against him, still chose to hide.28 If it were true
that a certain Peping stabbed the victim, Guro could have easily
appeared before the police to clear his name and pinpoint the
purported true offender, but this he did not do.29
The prosecution failed to prove treachery.

the offended party might make.30 To appreciate treachery as a
qualifying offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the
criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.31 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself.32
The RTC and CA erred when they ruled that treachery was present.
The prosecution was unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought
the victim for the purpose of killing him. Well settled is the rule that
the circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be
proven as indubitably as the crime itself.33 There must be a showing,
first and foremost, that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution
of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without
risk to himself.34
As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, only the following

were established: (a) a commotion was caused when Yayi pushed
Jefferson; (b) Jesus was being mauled by a group of persons; and (c)
Guro stabbed Jesus twice at the back. Considering the foregoing, it
was not proven that Guro deliberately and consciously employed
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to
ensure that Jesus could not defend himself. Indeed, it does not
always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it
should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with
treachery.35 The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the
result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from
the commotion between the two groups, rather than from a
deliberated act of the will. As a matter of fact, it must be emphasized
that the target of Guro's group was Joemarie and not Jesus. It was
just unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged up on.
Based on the foregoing, it is not possible to appreciate treachery
against Guro.
As the Court held in People v. Santos,36 "[t]reachery, just like any

other element of the crime committed, must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its existence
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for
granted from a mere statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there
must be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack
or assault is said to be 'sudden.'"37 Stated differently, mere
suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does not
positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to
insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any
risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might
offer.38 Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.39
Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of

treachery, the crime is Homicide and not Murder. Under Article 249
of the RPC, any person found guilty of Homicide shall be meted the
penalty of reclusion temporal, a penalty which contains three (3)
periods.40 Thus, the appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.41

P50,000.00 each.

appellant ANGEL GURO y COMBO GUILTY of HOMICIDE, for which
he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jesus Sangcap, Jr.
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary
awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.
ARNALDO ENRIQUEZ, JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated November 9, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08261, which affirmed
the Decision3 dated October 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 105, Quezon City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. Q-07-144720,
finding herein accused-appellant Arnalda Enriquez, Jr. (Enriquez)
guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
Enriquez was charged with the crime of Murder under the following
Information:
That on or about the 30th day of December 2006, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with the
qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery[,] did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of
FLORENCIO DELA CRUZ y DFLA CRUZ by then and there stabbing
the latter with a bladed weapon on the neck, thorax and different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Enriquez pleaded not guilty.

follows:
On December 30, 2006, at around 9:30 in the evening, Luisa and
her daughter, Jessica, were in their house watching the
television when they heard someone moaning at a nearby
house. As they peeped out of the window, they saw a bloodied
Dela Cruz corning out of his house and upon reaching the door
got stabbed in the back by Enriquez with a bread knife. Dela
Cruz managed to ask for help from his uncle's house before
collapsing. He was then brought to the hospital but was
unfortunately pronounced dead on arrival caused by multiple stab
wounds in the neck and thorax.
On the same date, at around 10:30 in the evening, Barangay Security

Development Officer Obar received a call about a killing incident in
Carreon Village. He went to the reported place and upon arrival, he
saw a person being mauled and learned from an unnamed woman
[that said person is] the one involved in the killing. He arrested this
person whom he later identified as Enriquez. After bringing him to
the barangay, Obar returned to the place and recovered a knife.
Meanwhile, Enriquez was transferred to Camp Karingat.5
The version of the defense, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:

On December 30, 2006, Enriquez and his two children went to the
house of Dela Cruz. He left the house between 9 o'clock and 10
o'clock in the evening. On the same day, he was brought to Camp
Karingal because he was being suspected of killing Dela Cruz. He
was informed by his wife of Dela Cruz' death. He told his wife that he
could not have killed him because he was on duty as security guard
at that time.6
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision7 dated October 25, 2015, the
RTC convicted Enriquez of the crime of Murder. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNALDO ENRIQUEZ JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Florencio Dela Cruz the sum of Php75,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity; and the award of Php50,000.00 as moral damages with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the
damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC ruled that the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by
Enriquez deserve scant consideration.9 It further ruled that there is
no suggestion that the prosecution's witnesses, Luisa Tolentino
(Luisa) and Jessica Tolentino (Jessica), had some ill motive to testify
falsely against Enriquez.10 Lastly, it ruled that treachery attended the
commission of the crime as the victim was suddenly stabbed from
behind by Enriquez.11 Thus, the victim had no chance to defend
himself or repel the assault against him.12
Aggrieved, Enriquez appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA
On appeal, in its Decision13 dated November 9, 2017, the CA affirmed

the conviction by the RTC with modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the
October 25, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105,
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-07-144720
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of damages as
follows:
1. civil indemnity in the amount of PhP 75,000.00;
2. moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000.00;
3. exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 75,000.00;
4. temperate damages in the amount of PhP 50,000.00
5. interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of Murder.15 It further ruled that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight
of their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.16 Lastly, it ruled that treachery attended the
commission of the crime.17
Hence, this appeal.

Issues
Whether the CA erred in affirming Enriquez's conviction for Murder.

The Court's Ruling

have altered the result.18
This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case

is thrown open for review on issues of both fact and law, and the
court may even consider issues which were not raised by the parties
as errors.19 The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law.20
the conviction of Enriquez, but only for the crime of Homicide,
instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not proven in the killing of Dela Cruz.
Treachery was not established by

clear and convincing evidence
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was present thereby making
Enriquez liable for Murder instead of Homicide. The CA held:
We likewise sustain the RTC's finding of treachery. The unarmed
DelaCruz was attacked from behind in a sudden and unexpected
manner, thus completely depriving him of the chance to defend
himself. x x x21
It is established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.22 Thus, for Enriquez to
be convicted of Murder, the prosecution must not only establish that
he killed Dela Cruz; it must also be proven that the killing of Dela
Cruz was attended by treachery.
In a catena of cases,23 the Court has consistently held that treachery

cannot be appreciated where the prosecution only proved the
events after the attack happened, but not the manner of how the
attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's
death unfolded. In treachery, there must be clear and convincing
evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it
developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in
which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established
from suppositions drawn only from circumstances prior to the very
moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing
with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where
the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault.24
In the instant case, the evidence presented by the prosecution only

proved the events after the initial attack had already happened. The
prosecution witnesses, Luisa and Jessica, did not see the manner of
how the attack commenced or how the acts which resulted in the
victim's death unfolded as the attack started inside the house of the
victim. They merely saw Dela Cruz, already bloodied, coming
out of his house.25 It was only at this point that they saw
Enriquez stab the victim again with a bread knife. 26 Thus, what
happened inside the house is unknown to the prosecution
witnesses.
Moreover, the finding of the trial court, sustained by the CA, that
treachery was present proceeds only from the fact that the
witnesses saw Enriquez stab the already bloodied victim from
behind as he was about to exit his house.

the offended party might make.27
To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the

assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the
criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.28 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself.29
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present.30

It is not enough that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and
"without any warning or provocation."31 There must also be a
showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime
which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to
himself.
However, the abovementioned elements of treachery were not

proven by clear and convincing evidence in the case at bar. As Luisa
and Jessica were only able to witness the events that transpired
after the initial attack inside the house, it was not established
whether Enriquez deliberately or consciously employed the
particular method he used so as to deprive the victim any
opportunity to defend himself. Even more telling is the fact that the
victim was able to escape from Enriquez and even ask for help from
his uncle's house before collapsing.32
In view of the foregoing, Enriquez should only be liable for the crime
of Homicide.
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the

crime is therefore Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for
Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor with a range
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Thus, Enriquez shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)

years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
Finally, in view of the downgrading of the crime to Homicide, the
Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta33 directs that the damages
awarded in the questioned Decision should be, as it is, hereby
modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages
of P50,000.00 each.

appellant ARNALDO ENRIQUEZ, JR. GUlLTY of HOMICIDE, for
which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Florencio Dela
Cruz the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,
and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168169 February 24, 2010

vs.
ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNERO, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78 of Malolos,
Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-M-2000, convicting herein appellants
Alberto Tabarnero (Alberto) and Gary Tabarnero (Gary) of the
crime of Murder.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to the house of the
deceased Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto), where he the former used to
reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane),
Ernesto’s stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation
during which the latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death.
The versions of the prosecution and the defense would later diverge
as regards the presence of other persons atin the scene and other
circumstances concerning Ernesto’s death.
On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with
the crime of Murder in an Information which read:
That on or about the 23rd day of October, 1999, in the municipality
of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
armed with bladed instrument and with intent to kill one Ernesto
Canatoy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said bladed instrument
the said Ernesto Canatoy, hitting the latter on the different parts of
his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death.3
On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were
issued by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.4
On April 22, 2021, Gary surrendered to Barangay Tanod Edilberto
Alarma.5 When he was arraigned Oon April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. 6 During this time, Alberto
remained at large.
On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was conducted. Therein,
Gary admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act
of self-defense. Thus, pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, an invertedreverse trial ensued.
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony
in June 2001, testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997
to 1999, as he and Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane is the
daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife7 of Ernesto. However, Gary left
the house shortly before the October 23, 1999 incident because of a
misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly stopped
the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant at
that time.
On October 23, 1999, Gary was still allegedly in his house in Longos,
Malolos, Bulacan at around 11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard
Ulilian; his father, co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his
brother, Jeffrey. Overcome with emotion over being separated from
Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernesto’s house, but was not able to
enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead
shouted his pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done
wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane up, and
voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to
marry her. When he Gary was about to leave, the gate opened
and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto
was aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with
his hands, causing his left index finger to be broken. Gary
embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary
felt that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back.
Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed weapon and
stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he
did so.8
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded,
"saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako" three times. Gary was stunned,
and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming.
Alberto asked Gary, "anak, ano ang nangyari?" To which Gary
responded "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning," referring to
Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, ran, since they were afraidallegedly
out of fear.9
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary
claims that it was he and Ernesto who had a fight, and that he
had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.10
Gary’s sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that she was a childhood
friend of Mary Jane. Gemarie attested that Mary Jane was Gary’s
girlfriend from 1995 to 1999. Sometime in 1999, however, Gary and
Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other. During that
time, Gary was always sad and appeared catatonicdumbfounded,
sometimes mentioning Mary Jane’s name and crying.11
On the night of the incident on October 23, 1999, Gemarie observed
that Gary was crying and seemed perplexed. Gary told Gemarie that
he was going to Ernesto’s house to talk to Ernesto about Mary Jane.
Gary was crying and dumbfounded at that time. Gary allegedly did
not bring anything with him when he went to Ernesto’s house.12
In the meantime, on August 5, 2001, Alberto was apprehended.13 On
August 20, 2001, he pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge.14 However,
while Alberto’s defense is denial and not self-defense like Gary’s, the
court decided to proceed with the reverseinverted trial, as it had
already started that way.15
Next on the witness stand was Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), who was
a barangay tanod of Longos, Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000.
Alarma testified that while he was in a meeting at around 4:00 p.m.
on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to
surrender to him. Gary told him that he was responsible for the
"incident [that] happened at Daang Riles." Together with his co-
fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the
Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was entered in the
blotter report.16
Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as
leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders, was 45 years old at the time of
his testimony in September 2001. He testified that on October 23,
1999, at the time when of the incident, he was living in Norzagaray,
Bulacan. On October 23, 1999, however, ,he went to visit his
children, Gary and Gemarie, in Barangay Longos, Malolos, Bulacan.
Before going to sleep at 11:00 p.m., he realized that Gary was not in
the place where he would usually sleep. He went downstairs,
thinking that Gary was just urinating. He waited for five minutes;
when Gary did not show up, he proceeded to Daang Bakal, where
Gary had many friends. He walked for about 10 minutes. About
Four400 hundred meters from where the site of the incident,
happened, he saw Gary and asked him what happened and why
he was in a hurry, to which Gary replied: "Wag na kayong
magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya Erning."
Alberto and Gary ran in different directions. Alberto passed
through the railways and exited in front of the capitol
compound to wait for a jeepney going to Sta. Maria, his route
toward his home in Norzagaray.17
Alberto claims that he had no knowledge of the accusation that
he conspired with Gary in killing Ernesto. It was three months
after the incident that he came to know that he was being
charged for a crime. At this time, he was already residing in
Hensonville Plaza, Angeles City, Pampanga, where he was assigned
when his engineer, Efren Cruz, got secured a project in said place.18
During Cross-examinationed, Alberto repeated that he did not
return to Gary’s house after the incident. He said that it did not
occur to him to call inform the authorities about the killing of
Ernesto. Later, Alberto learned from his sibling, whom he talked to
by phone, that Gary had already surrendered. He did not consider
surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name,
nobody would work to support his family. He said that he had no
previous misunderstanding with Ernesto.19
Answering questions from the court, Alberto stated that he
immediately went home to Norzagaray because he was afraid to be
implicated in the stabbing of Ernesto. It did not occur to him to stay
and help Gary because he did not know where Gary proceeded after
they ran away. The next time he saw Gary was three months after
the incident, when Gary went to Norzagaray.20
The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito
Acibar (Emerito). Emerito, the brother of Mary Jane,21 was inside
their house in Daang Bakal, Longos, Malolos, Bulacan with his
brother and his stepfather, Ernesto, at around eleven o’clock on the
night of the incident on October 23, 1999. He heard somebody
calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a "kalabog,"
followed by Ernesto’s plea asking for help. Emerito was about to
go outside, but, while he was already at the door of their one-
room22 house, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning
"Kulit" and another person, while Gary and Alberto were
stabbing Ernesto with a fan knivesfe. Emerito lost count of the
number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but each inflicted
more than one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito
shouted for help. The four assailants left when somebody
arrived, allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to
the Bulacan Provincial Hospital.23
On cross-examination, Emerito statedconfirmed that Gary and Mary
Jane used to reside in Ernesto’s house. On the date of the incident,
however, Gary had already left the house, while Mary Jane had
moved to Abra with Teresita (the mother of Emerito and Mary Jane).
According to Emerito, his family did not know that Mary Jane and
Gary had a relationship because they treated Gary like a member of
the family. Ernesto got mad when because his wife, Teresita, found
out about Gary and Mary Jane’s relationship. On the night of the
incident, at past 11:00 p.m., Emerito was fixing his things inside
their houseat past 11:00 p.m., when he heard someone calling from
for themoutside, but was not sure if it was Gary. Emerito neither
saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor the fight between Ernesto and
Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which happened seven to eight
meters away from the doorway where he was standing him. He was
sure that there were four assailants, two of whom went to a bridge 8
to 10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a yellow XLT-
type car.24
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Ronnie Morales of the Malolos
Philippine National Police testified that he was on duty at the police
station on the night of October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito
reported at the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2
Morales and Emerito proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital,
where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak
due to multiple injuries. While in the presence of thetwo doctors on
duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto
answered that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and
Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.25
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified that it was already 1:00 a.m.
of the following day when he and Emerito proceeded to the hospital.
As they went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2 Morales
that he witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that
Emerito did not tell him who the suspects were when Emerito
reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to the
hospital, considering that the victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto
was not able to affix his signature on the Sinumpaang
Salaysay26 because he could no longer talk after the fourth question.
Answering questions from the court, SPO2 Morales further stated
that he could not remember talking to Emerito on their way to the
hospital, since they were in a hurry.27
The government physician at the Bulacan Provincial Hospital who
prepared Ernesto’s death certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad, clarified
that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999. However, considering the
admission by the defense of the fact of death, the cause thereof, and
the execution of the death certificate, the prosecution did not
proceed to solicit these facts fromno longer questioned Dr. Trinidad
on these matters.28
Teresita’s testimony was likewise dispensed with, in light of the
admission by the defense that she was the common-law wife of
Ernesto, and that she incurred ₱55,600.00 in expenses in relation to
Ernesto’s death.29
On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary
and Alberto of the crime of murder. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds
accused Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay private complainant Teresita Acibar the amount of ₱55,600.000
(sic) as actual damages[,] ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Ernesto Canatoy[,] ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of
suit.30
Gary and Alberto appealed to this Court. After the parties had filed
their respective briefs, this Court, in People v. Mateo,31 modified the
Rules of Court in so far as it provides for direct appeals from the RTC
to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Pursuant thereto, this Court
referred32 the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027.
On April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with
modification as regards exemplary damages, disposing of the case in
the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 78 dated 29 August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 is awarded because of the presence of treachery.33
From the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court anew
when Gary and Alberto filed a Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2005. 34 In
its Resolution on August 1, 2005, this Court required both parties to
submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both
parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they had
earlier filed with this Court.
Gary and Alberto, in their brief filed in this Court before the referral
of the case to the Court of Appeals, assigned the following errors to
the RTC:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT GARY TABARNERO
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE
CULPABLE, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY35
The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part of Gary
cannot be considered
The requisites for self-defense are:
1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and
3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel
aggression.36
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that
all of the above three elements are present in the case at bar. There
was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when the
latter delivered the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the
defense, the means Gary used to defend himself was reasonable, and
the shouting shouted professions of his feelings forabout Mary Jane
could not be considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make
the unlawful aggression.
The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the
defense to prove the alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own
testimony. Citing Casitas v. People,37 the Court of Appeals held that
the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to
kill, and not merely an intent to defend himself. The number of
wounds also negates the claim that the means used by Gary to
defend himself was reasonable.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Unlawful aggression is an
indispensable requirement of self-defense of self-defense.38 As ruled
by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to prove the
alleged unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is
insufficient and self-serving. The alleged sudden appearance of
Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment Gary
decided to leave seems to this Court to be all too convenient,
considering that there was no one around to witness the start of the
fight.
The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, found Gary’s account concerning the alleged unlawful
aggression on the part of Ernesto to be unconvincing. Factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in this case, are binding onto this Court and are entitled
to great respect.39 It also bears to emphasize that by invoking self-
defense, Gary, in effect, admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon
him the burden of evidence to prove the elements of the said
justifying circumstance.40 A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent
and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.41
The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified
to avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he would
nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating
circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites
necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the
respective cases are not attendant.
We disagree. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non,
without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete.42 There is incomplete self-defense when the element of
unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other
two essential requisites for self-defense.43 Having failed to prove the
indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance, regardless even assuming of the
presence of the other two elements of self-defense.
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
The first assignment of error presents another issue for the
consideration of this Court. The defense argues that Gary’s yielding
to Alarma should be credited as a mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the defense
on this point. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed, and held
that the delay of six months44 before surrendering negates
spontaneity,45 a requisite for voluntary surrender to be considered
mitigating.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
may be credited to the accused, the following requisites should be
present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the
surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be
spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he
wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him.46
In People v. Barcimo, Jr.,47 the pending warrant for the arrest of the
accused and the latter’s surrender more than one year after the
incident were considered by the Court as damaging to the plea that
voluntary surrender be considered a mitigating circumstance. Thus:
The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the
following requisites must be proven, namely:
(1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
(2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must
be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges
his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance. In People v. Viernes [G.R. No. 136733-35,
13 December 20010], we held that going to the police station to
clear one’s name does not show any intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after
more than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to
disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither
shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to
save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred
in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there
was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not
be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The records show that Gary surrendered on April 22, 2001.48 The
commitment order commanding that he be detained was issued on
April 24, 2001.49 The surrender was made almost one year and six
months from the October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one
year and one month from the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him on March 27, 2000.50 We, therefore, rule that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited
to Gary.
Alberto is a principal by direct participation in the killing of Ernesto
In insisting upon Alberto’s innocence, the defense claims that there
was no conspiracy between him and his son, Gary. The defense
asserts that Alberto just happened to be near the scene of the crime
as he was looking for his son, whom he saw only after the
altercation.
The basis of Alberto’s conviction, however, is not solely
conspiracy. A review of the proven facts shows that conspiracy
need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case, since
Alberto was categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito,
as one of the assailants who actively and directly participated
in the killing of Ernesto:
Q Those 2 persons whom you saw and who stabbed your stepfather
in the evening of October 23, 1999, if theyb are now in court, will
you be able to identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you please point to those 2 persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to
the name of Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing
incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
xxxx
COURT (TO THE WITNESS):
Q How many times did you see Gary stabbed your father?
A I cannot count how many stabs Gary made.
PROS. SANTIAGO:
Q Was it many times or just once?
A I cannot count but more than 1.
Q How about Alberto Tabarnero, how many times did you see him
stabbing your stepfather?
A I cannot count also but he was the last one who stabbed my
stepfather.51
Having actually participated in the stabbing of Ernesto, it was
adequately proven that Alberto is a principal by direct participation.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself,
Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2 Morales, that it was "the father and
son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan" who
stabbed him.52 While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his
statement is considered admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person,
made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a
realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence
-- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may
be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be
inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or
other relevant circumstances."53
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his
death within the next 48 hours. At the time he uttered his statement
accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already
very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and
write towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the
highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death
would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the
point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.54 It
is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his
body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon
every remaining strength he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
The killing of Ernesto is qualified by treachery
Emerito had testified that he saw Ernesto being held by two
persons, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing him with fan knives
with a fan knife:
Q When you said "lalabas po sana," what do you mean by that?
A I am at the door and saw what happened.
Q What did you see?
A I saw my stepfather being held by two persons and being stabbed.
Q Will you describe the appearance of your stepfather and the 2
persons whom according to you were stabbing your stepfather at
that time?
A My stepfather is "lupaypay" and he was being stabbed.
Q When you said "lupaypay," will you describe to this Honorable
Court his position and appearance?
A When I saw my stepfather he was about to fall on the ground.
Q Could you describe their appearance?
A They were helping each other in stabbing my grandfather. (sic)
Q Those two persons whom you saw and who stabbed your
stepfather in the evening of October 23, 1999 if they are now in
Court, will you be able to identify them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please point to those 2 persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons who, when asked answered to
the name of Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto Tabarnero in that stabbing
incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed last my stepfather.
Q What about Gary, what is his position?
A He was helping in the stabbing.
xxxx
Q What kind of weapon or instrument were used by Gary and
Alberto?
A Fan knife, sir.
Q Both of them were armed by a knife?
A Yes, sir.55
From said testimony, it seems uncertain whether Emerito saw the
very first stabbing being thrust. Thus, the defense asseverates that
since Emerito failed to see how the attack commenced, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be considered, citing
People v. Amamangpang,56 People v. Icalla,57 and People v.
Sambulan.58 In said three cases, this Court held that treachery
cannot be appreciated as the lone eyewitness did not see the
commencement of the assault.
Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
the offended party might make.
The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply
demonstrated by the restraint upon Ernesto, which effectively
rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less
evade, the assault.59
We agree with the Solicitor General.
In the cases cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able
to observe any means, method or form in the execution of the killing
which rendered the victim defenseless. In Amamangpang, the first
thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on the
bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck by
the accused. In Icalla, the witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing
from the scene of the crime with a knife in his hand. In Sambulan,
the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with a bolo.
Since, in these cases, there was no restraint upon the victims or any
other circumstance which would have rendered them defenseless,
the Court ruled that it should look into the commencement of the
attack in order to determine whether the same was done swiftly and
unexpectedly. However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an
attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness of the
victim can be ensured.
In People v. Montejo,60 the prosecution witnesses testified that after
challenging the victim to a fight, the accused stabbed the victim in
the chest while he was held in the arms by the accused and a
companion. Not requiring a swift and unexpected commencement to
the attack, the Court held:
Thus, there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a
defenseless situation, as when he was being held by the others while
he was being stabbed, as the accomplishment of the accused's
purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the
victim may offer [People v. Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May 29,
1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v. Lunar, G.R. No. L-15579, May 29, 1972,
45 SCRA 119.] In the instant case, it has been established that the
accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the chest while his
companions held both of the victim's arms.
In People v. Alvarado,61 the accused and his companions shouted to
the victim: "Lumabas ka kalbo, kung matapang ka." When the victim
went out of the house, the accused’s companions held the victim’s
hands while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling which
should have warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact
that the accused’s companions held the hands of the victim while the
accused stabbed him was considered by this Court to constitute
alevosia.
We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by
treachery. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that
treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to
murder. Despite being alleged in the Information, this circumstance
was not considered in the trial court as the same is already absorbed
in treachery. The act of the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two
persons were holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of
excessive force out of proportion to the defense available in to the
person attacked. In People v. Gemoya,62 we held:
Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission
of the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When
four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this
case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that
excessive force was purposely sought and employed. (Emphasis
ours.)
In all, there is no doubt that the offense committed by the accused is
murder.
The award of damages should be modified to include civil indemnity
ex delito
In the Decision of the RTC convicting Gary and Alberto, it awarded
the amount of ₱55,600.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of Ernesto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and an unidentified amount as costs of suit.63 The Court of Appeals
modified the RTC Decision by awarding an additional amount of
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of the presence of
treachery.64
The Solicitor General claims that the award of ₱55,600.00 in actual
damages is not proper, considering the lack of receipts supporting
the same. However, we held in People v. Torio65 that:
Ordinarily, receipts should support claims of actual damages, but
where the defense does not contest the claim, it should be granted.
Accordingly, there being no objection raised by the defense on Alma
Paulo’s lack of receipts to support her other claims, all the amounts
testified to are accepted. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Teresita Acibar’s testimony was dispensed with
on account of the admission by the defense that she incurred
₱55,600.00 in relation to the death of Ernesto.66 This admission by
the defense is even more binding to it than a failure on its part to
object to the testimony. We therefore sustain the award of actual
damages by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General likewise alleges that a civil indemnity ex delito
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 should be awarded. Article 220667 of
the Civil Code authorizes the award of civil indemnity for death
caused by a crime. The award of said civil indemnity is mandatory,
and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.68 However, current jurisprudence
have already increased the award of civil indemnity ex delicto to
₱75,000.00.69 We, therefore, award this amount to the heirs of
Ernesto.1awph!1
Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. An aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 223070 of the Civil Code.71
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that appellants Alberto and Gary Tabarnero are
further ordered to pay the heirs of Ernesto Canatoy the amount of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
REYNALDO PIGAR Y AMBAYANAN @ "JERRY"* AND REYNALDO
PIGAR Y CODILLA @ "LAWLAW," ACCUSED-APPELLANTS,
ROY PIGAR Y AMBAYANAN @ "BIROY," BUENAVENTURA PIGAR
Y AMBAYANAN @ "MOKMOK" (DECEASED), WELFREDO PIGAR Y
CODILLA @ "DAKO," VICTOR COLASITO @ "NONOY," JORLY
COLASITO, WARAY COLASITO, JOEBERT COLASITO @
"GIMONG," DODO COLASITO @ "REX," AND TWO JOHN
DOES,ACCUSED.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This appeal seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated February 26, 2019
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02483, affirming the
conviction of appellants Reynaldo Pigar y Ambayanan alias "Jerry"
and Reynaldo Pigar y Codilla alias "Lawlaw" for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and requiring
them each to pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
Antecedents
Accused-appellants Reynaldo Pigar y Ambayanan alias "Jerry" and
Reynaldo Pigar y Codilla alias "Lawlaw," along with Roy Pigar y
Ambayanan @ "Biroy," Buenaventura Pigar y Ambayanan @
"Mokmok" (Deceased), Welfredo Pigar y Codilla @ "Dako," Victor
Colasito @ "Nonoy," Jorly Colasito, Waray Colasito, Joebert Colasito
@ "Gimong," Dodo Colasito @ "Rex," and two John Does were
charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz.:
That on or about the 17th day of August 2009 in the Municipality of
Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, armed with
bladed weapons and bamboo poles with sharp pointed edges locally
known as "Bangkaw", with treachery, evident premeditation,
[abuse] (of) superior strength, employing means to weaken the
defense and means to insure or afford impunity, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, [strike],
stab and hack to death Feliciano S. Garces, Sr. inflicting upon the
latter fatal wounds which caused his direct death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Only Buenaventura "Mokmok" Pigar and appellants Reynaldo
"Jerry" Pigar and Reynaldo Pigar "Lawlaw" Codilla got arrested.
When arraigned, all three (3) pleaded not guilty.3 Pending trial,
"Mokmok" passed away. Hence, the charge against him was
dismissed.4 Trial, nonetheless, proceeded as for "Jerry" and
"Lawlaw."
Version of the Prosecution5
On August 17, 2009, around 6 o'clock in the evening, on his way
home, Edgardo Garces, son of the victim, saw his co-worker Rogelio
Tañ ala and Roy Pigar quarrelling. Edgardo tried to pacify them. Roy
resented it and threw a stone at Edgardo. In retaliation, the latter
delivered a fist blow but the former dodged it. This time, a certain
Gagante pacified Roy and Edgardo. After the incident, Edgardo
rushed home to warn his family because he was afraid that Roy
(who was then drunk) would take revenge.
At that time, Edgardo's sister, Marietta Garces, was tending her kids
inside their home. Edgardo and Marietta were children of Feliciano,
Sr. who was then sleeping in his room. When Edgardo came in, he
immediately instructed Marietta and the kids to transfer to their hut
just across the street. Then, Edgardo left again to seek help from
their uncle.
While Marietta was inside the hut, she saw Roy, with two (2) others,
arrive on board a motorcycle. Roy stopped in front of their house
and threw stones. Their father got roused from his sleep, stepped
out, and shouted at Roy and his companions. One (1) of the
neighbors witnessed the brewing confrontation and advised
Feliciano, Sr. to let it go since Roy and his companions were
drunk. Soon, ten (10) men arrived and surrounded the house,
the men included appellants "Jerry" and "Lawlaw." Feliciano,
Sr. then ran back inside the house, but some of the men ran
after him.
As they caught up with him inside the house, they hacked him with
bolos and a bamboo spear, locally known as bangkaw. He ran out of
the house only to be met by the other men who repeatedly hacked
and poked him with their own bolos and bangkaws. At this point,
Edgardo arrived. A gun shot then was heard. Thereupon, Roy
signaled his companions to leave the place and everyone heeded.
Feliciano, Sr. was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead
on arrival. At the time of the incident, Feliciano, Sr. was a thin fifty-
two (52) year old man who moved slowly.
Municipal Health Officer Doctor Bibiana O. Cardente examined
Feliciano, Sr.'s body. She found seventeen (17) stab wounds in his
body. Five (5) were fatal, including a wound that damaged Feliciano,
Sr.'s brain tissues.
Version of the Defense6
On August 17, 2009, Jerry and his companions passed by Feliciano,
Sr.'s house, where they saw the latter standing along the road.
Feliciano, Sr. suddenly hacked "Jerry" with a weapon. "Jerry"
sustained wounds in his right elbow and in the right side of his head.
Jerry got hold of Feliciano, Sr.'s weapon and used it on the latter.
While "Jerry" was striking Feliciano, Sr., his companions helped by
hitting Feliciano, Sr. with pieces of wood. "Jerry" hacked Feliciano,
Sr. around seventeen (17) times and killed the latter as a result.
On cross, "Jerry" admitted that he purposely went to Feliciano, Sr.'s
house with intent of killing Edgardo who had a misunderstanding
with his older brother Roy. Jerry, though, testified that "Lawlaw"
and "Mokmok" did not perpetrate the incident. They were included
in the complaint only because Feliciano, Sr.'s family members were
angry.
"Lawlaw" corroborated Jerry's claim. He reiterated that he had no
participation in the killing. At the time of the incident, he was
allegedly working in the bakery.
Ruling of the Trial Court
By Judgment7 dated February 10, 2017, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)-Branch 36, Carigara, Leyte pronounced appellants guilty of
murder, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered,
finding the two (2) accused Reynaldo Pigar y Ambayanan @
"Jerry" and Reynaldo Pigar y Codilla @ "Lawlaw", GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of conspiring in the killing of the victim [Feliciano
S. Garces, Sr.]. There being the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and one ordinary aggravating circumstance of
domicile proven by the prosecution without any mitigating
circumstance to counter the same, both accused afore-named are
hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
These two accused are also ORDERED to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Heirs of Feliciano S. Garces, Sr. the amounts
of Php100,000.00 for civil indemnity ex delict(o); Php100,000.00 for
moral damages; Php100,000.00 for exemplary damages;
and Php50,000.00 for temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed through its assailed
Decision dated February 26, 2019.9 It imposed six percent (6%)
annual interest on all monetary awards.
The Present Appeal
Appellants now seek affirmative relief from the Court and pray
anew for their acquittal.
Issue
Did the Court Appeals err in affirming appellants' conviction for
murder?
Ruling
Appellants faulted the Court of Appeals for affirming their
conviction despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, specifically on: (a) the participation of
"Lawlaw" in the brutal killing of Feliciano, Sr.; (b) how long the
incident lasted; and (c) where exactly did the attack of Feliciano, Sr.
began. It was also purportedly unclear whether Marietta had
actually seen the incident from the hut where she was at that time.
Too, it was allegedly contrary to human experience that Marietta,
despite seeing her father being stabbed to death, did nothing to help
the latter.10
Appellants further faulted both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals for appreciating abuse of superior strength in addition to
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. It is settled that when
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
simply absorbed in the latter.11
Lastly, appellants claim that denial and alibi are not always
undeserving of credit for there are times when the accused has no
other possible defense but denial.12
The Court affirms with modification.
Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA
7659)13 provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.14
There is no question here regarding the presence of the first (1st)
and fourth (4th) elements. The victim died of multiple stab wounds
as testified to by examining Doctor Bibiana O. Cardente. There is
also no evidence showing that Feliciano, Sr. and appellants are
related by affinity or consanguinity. Hence, the killing is not
parricide.
Appellants, nonetheless, deny the existence of the second (2nd) and
third (3rd) elements.1a₩phi1 They claim that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are incredible, illogical, and grossly
inconsistent with human experience, hence, should not have been
given credence.
The Court disagrees.
When the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue, due deference and
respect shall be given to the trial court's factual findings, its
calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of their probative
weight, and its conclusions based on such factual findings, absent
any showing that it had overlooked circumstances that would have
affected the final outcome of the case. This rule finds an even more
stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals,15 as in this case. People v. Collamat, et
al.16 elucidates:
In cases where the issue rests on the credibility of witnesses, as in
this case, it is important to emphasize the well-settled rule that
"appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made
by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination."
We explained in Reyes, v. Court of Appeals that the findings of the
trial court will not be overturned absent any clear showing that it
had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance that could have altered the
outcome of the case, viz.:
Also, the issue hinges on credibility of witnesses. We have
consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or
innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
court are given the highest degree of respect. These findings will not
be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear
showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could very well affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial
court that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs or their scant or full
realization of their oaths. It had the better opportunity to observe
the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grueling examination. Inconsistencies or
contradictions in the testimony of the victim do not affect the
veracity of the testimony if the inconsistencies do not pertain to
material points. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
Here, prosecution witnesses Marietta and Edgardo consistently and
positively identified appellants and their companions as the ones
who simultaneously stabbed their father to death. To repeat, the
trial court's factual findings as to the credibility of the witnesses are
to be accorded the greatest respect. More so when these factual
findings carry - the full concurrence of the Court of Appeals, as in
this case.
Be that as it may, the alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies
pertaining to how long the incident took place and where exactly the
attack on the victim began all refer to minor details which do not
impair or change the fact that appellants attacked their father and
stabbed him to death.
In People v. Pulgo,17 the Court reiterates that inconsistencies on
minor details do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant. Such inconsistencies reinforce rather
than weaken credibility. What is vital is that the witnesses were
unwavering and consistent in identifying appellants as their father's
assailant.
Finally, on Marietta's supposed failure to lend succor to her father
who was being attacked, suffice it to state that there could be no
hard and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior
when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying,
occurrence, as in this case. Witnesses of startling occurrences
react differently depending upon their situation and state of
mind, and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. The workings of the human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react
differently to shocking stimulus - some may shout, some may faint,
and others may be plunged into insensibility.18
As for the participation of "Lawlaw" in the killing of the victim,
surely, Marietta and Edgardo's positive identification of "Lawlaw" as
one of those who alternated in beating up and stabbing their father,
again, prevails over the denial and alibi of "Lawlaw." Although
"Jerry" sought to exculpate him of any participation in the killing,
the strength and reliability of Marietta and Edgardo's eyewitness
accounts remain in place, nay, unshaken.
Be that as it may, denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, as in this case, is a negative and self-serving defense. It
carries scant, if not nil, evidentiary value. It cannot prevail over the
consistent and categorical declarations of credible witnesses on
affirmative matters.19 Too, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the
time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused-appellant's
presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold
water.20 Here, "Lawlaw" claims to have been working in the bakery
at the time of the incident. Aside from being an unsubstantiated
claim, it was not shown that it was physically impossible for
"Lawlaw" to be at the situs criminis. Notably, the alleged bakery is
also located at the same barangay where Feliciano, Sr.'s house is
located.
In any case, it does not really matter whether "Lawlaw" actually
caused one or more of the fatal or not so fatal wounds sustained by
Feliciano, Sr. Notably, appellants and their co-accused were charged
to have conspired with each other in killing Feliciano, Sr. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. People v. Lababo21 is
apropos, viz.:
Here, it was established that Wenefredo and FFF were present at the
scene of the crime, both wielding a bolo. However, it was also
established that their alleged participation thereat did not go
beyond being present and holding said weapons. As a matter of fact,
both the victims only sustained gunshot wounds. The question now
is this: Is Wenefredo and FFF's mere presence at the scene of the
crime, while armed with bolos, sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that they conspired with Benito to commit the
crimes imputed against them?
We rule in the affirmative.
x x x x x x x x x
To Our mind, their overt act of staying in close proximity while
Benito executes the crime served no other purpose than to lend
moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent
the successful perpetration thereof. We are sufficiently convinced
that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and
increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all
wielding lethal weapons.
Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the
crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same
extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing
to prevent the commission of the crime. Under the circumstances,
there is no evidence to support a conclusion that they have nothing
to do with the killing. We are, therefore, convinced that indeed, the
three conspired to commit the crimes charged. (Emphasis supplied)
Attendant Circumstances
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming
a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime.22
The inequality of forces in this case is beyond doubt. Feliciano, Sr.
was a thin 52-year-old man who was slow moving according to his
daughter. Nonetheless, appellants attacked Feliciano, Sr. with nine
(9) persons. The number alone shows the inequality of strength
between the victim and the aggressors. This, coupled with the fact
that Feliciano, Sr. was already a frail man, supports the finding of
abuse of superior strength. This circumstance qualifies the killing of
Feliciano, Sr. into murder.23
As for treachery, appellants are mistaken in claiming that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals appreciated this circumstance over
and above the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The Court
of Appeals actually said it was incorrect for appellants to point that
the circumstance of abuse of superior strength was deemed
absorbed in treachery because, in the first place, the RTC did not
even appreciate treachery as an attendant circumstance here.24
In any event, we find that treachery, indeed, did not attend the
victim's killing. Records show that before Feliciano, Sr. got killed,
Roy visited his house first and already tried to hack him but missed.
Thereafter, Roy sped off on board his motorcycle. At that time,
Feliciano, Sr. was already deemed to have known of Roy's intention
to harm him and it was not remote at all that Roy would intend to
return soon to finish his business with the victim. For this reason,
Feliciano, Sr. could have already prepared to defend himself should
Roy indeed return to harm him anew.
In People v. Moreno,25 the Court emphasized that the essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden
blow. As discussed, Feliciano, Sr. was no longer an unsuspecting
victim when Roy came back with eight (8) companions and together
fatally injured him.
Going now to the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is in consonance with the constitutional rights of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to
fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the
trial. Hence, even if the prosecution has duly proven the
presence of any of these circumstances, the Court cannot
appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the
Information,26 as in here, viz.:
That on or about the 17th day of August 2009 in the Municipality of
Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, armed with
bladed weapons and bamboo poles with sharp pointed edges locally
known as "Bangkaw", with treachery, evident premeditation,
[abuse] (of) superior strength, employing means to weaken the
defense and means to insure or afford impunity, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, [strike], stab and
hack to death Feliciano S. Garces, Sr. inflicting upon the latter fatal
wounds which caused his direct death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.27
Indeed, that the killing happened in the victim's dwelling was not
alleged in the Information.1avvph!1 Hence, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals cannot appreciate dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance.
Penalty
Article 248 of the RPC provides for the penalty:
Here, without the additional aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
appellants must be meted with the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua only, not death, in accordance with Article 63 of the
RPC.28 Per Administrative Matter No. 15-08-02-SC,29 the term
"without eligibility for parole" need not be specified.
On the monetary awards, People v. Jugueta30 pronounced:
1. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional
Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim
x x x x x x x x x
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00
Jugueta31 and People v. Gervero32 ordered, as well, "when no
documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in
court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded." In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the
appellants are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
02483 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Reynaldo Pigar y Ambayanan alias "Jerry" and Reynaldo
Pigar y Codilla alias "Lawlaw" are GUILTY of Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. They are each sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. They are fu1iher ordered to PAY the heirs of Feliciano S.
Garces, Sr. the following monetary awards:
(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P75,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
All monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per
annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206381

vs.
DANIEL MATIBAG y DE VILLA @ "DANI" or "DANILO", Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant
Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ "Dani" or "Danilo" (Matibag) assailing
the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
13941, finding Matibag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder.
The Facts
In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was
charged with the crime of Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 o’clock [sic] in the
evening at Iron Street, Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang
Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a
Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial No. 3191M9, a deadly
weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus
Duhan, while the latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting
him and causing gunshot wounds at his head and chest, which
directly resulted to the victim’s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm is attendant in the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After
the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.7
1. The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of
March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came
from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners’
association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street
in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag confronted
Duhan, and asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?"
2. Duhan replied "wala," and without warning, Matibag delivered a

fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him to teeter
backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who
fell face-first on the pavement.
3. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him several
more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, a member of the Philippine National
Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on record that he
arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S.
Vertido who conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the
latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head and chest which led to
his death.8
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at
the despedida party of his neighbor when Duhan arrived together
with the other officers of the homeowners’ association. Wanting to
settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan and
extended his hand as a gesture of reconciliation. However, Duhan
pushed it away and said, "putang ina mo, ang yabang mo," thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull
something from his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan
was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot
Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. Matibag went to see his police
friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to turn himself in, but the latter was
unavailable at the time. As Matibag headed back home, he was
stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the
shooting incident. He then readily admitted his involvement.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as
charged, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of Duhan the amounts of
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages,
59,000.00 as actual damages, and 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.11
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag’s claim of self-defense
as he failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression on Duhan’s
part, finding that: (a) Duhan’s words and actions prior to Matibag’s
attack could not be considered as a real threat against him; (b) no
firearm was recovered from the victim; (c) Matibag’s account that
Duhan was about to pull something from his waist, which thus led
him to believe that he was about to be shot, remained
uncorroborated; and (d) the number of gunshot wounds Duhan
sustained contradicts the plea of self-defense.12
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery since the attack was sudden, unprovoked,
and without any warning on the victim who was unarmed and in a
defenseless position.13 Likewise, the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was appreciated since a
firearm was used in the commission of a crime and, hence,
considered unlicensed.14
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibag’s
conviction in toto.17
The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that: (a) treachery attended
the killing of Duhan as the attack on him was sudden;18 and (b) an
unlicensed firearm was used in committing the crime, which is
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.19
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld the conviction of Matibag for Murder.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing
principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual
findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of
weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and
that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The Court
has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate
from the RTC and CA’s factual findings. There is no indication that
the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court
on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by
both parties.20
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points
of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to
warrant a conviction, the prosecution must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and
(d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.21
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. In People v.
Tan,22 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out
treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if
the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had
no time to prepare for his or her defense.25
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who
was armed with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any
provocation, punched and shot him on the chest.26 Although the
attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it
was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself,
adding too that he was unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that
a heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn
Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant.28 The
deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his
disposition preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly
pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to effect such
dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he
confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a
loaded handgun.29 Based on these findings, the Court concludes that
treachery was correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-
defense. Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect,
admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated
him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to
show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following
circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person resorting to self-defense.30
Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful
aggression. It is well-settled that there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of
aggression justifies a claim of self- defense.32 For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely
a threatening or intimidating attitude, 33 as against the one
claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted
Duhan negates unlawful aggression in the sense above-discussed. As
mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless.
On the other hand, Matibag’s version that he saw Duhan pull
something from his waist (which thereby impelled his reaction),
remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from
the victim.34 Hence, by these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of
unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense
cannot be sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds
Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery,
as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in
the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of penalty.
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as amended by Republic Act
No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in
the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special
aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. –
x x x.
xxxx
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term
"unlicensed firearm" has already been expanded as follows:37
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term
unlicensed firearm shall include:
1. firearms with expired license; or
2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of
the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use
thereof was unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is
equally appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a
result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is
reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346,38 stands proper.
To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39
Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of
Murder, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards:
(a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need
of evidence other than the commission of the crime;40 (b) actual or
compensatory damages to the extent proved,41 or temperate
damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be provided with certainty;42 (c) moral
damages;43 and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.44
In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of
100,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of 100,000.00 are
awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime and Duhan’s death. Considering further
that the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages
in the sum of 100,000.00 is also granted.45
The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be
deleted as the records do not show that the prosecution was able to
prove the amount actually expended.1âwphi1 In lieu thereof,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fullyonpaid is imposed all monetary awards.47
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September
13, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding
accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ "Dani" or
"Danilo" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and ordering him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus
Duhan the amounts of Pl 00,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl 00,000.00
as moral damages, Pl 00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, all with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality ofjudgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, v. ERIC VARGAS Y
JAGUARIN AND GINA BAGACINA, ACCUSED, ERIC VARGAS Y
JAGUARIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 15 November 2016 Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07331, which affirmed with
modification the Judgment2 dated 5 February 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-
9351, finding appellant Eric Vargas y Jaguarin (Vargas) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
On 2 August 2010, Vargas and a certain "Jane Doe" were charged as

follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July 2010 at around 8:30 in the
evening, in Zone 3, Barangay San Jose Pangaraon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation employing means to insure or afford impunity, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shot Miguel Belen y Abala, with the use of unlicensed Caliber 45,
hitting him on the different parts of his body, thus, inflicting mortal
wounds, which was the proximate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be
proven in Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On 12 August 2010, an Amended Information was filed to substitute
"Jane Doe" with Gina Bagacina (Bagacina). A warrant of arrest was
issued against Bagacina on 13 August 2010, but to this date, she
remains at large. Upon arraignment, Vargas entered a plea of not
guilty.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On or about 8:30 in the evening of 9 July 2010, Miguel A. Belen

(Belen), a volunteer field reporter of Radio Station DWEB was riding
home aboard his motorcycle along the barangay road in Zone 3,
Barangay San Jose Pangaraon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, when he was
shot by a woman who was riding a black motorcycle driven by a
man.
At around 8:55 of the same evening, the Nabua Municipal Police

Station received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing
them that a shooting incident happened. Police officers were
immediately dispatched and upon cursory investigation of the
scene, it was found that at around 8:30 in the evening, Belen was
riding his red motorcycle when he was shot several times by an
unidentified gunman. Belen was rushed to the Doñ a Josefa Hospital
in Iriga City for treatment.
On 10 July 2010, SPO2 Romeo Benito Apolinar B. Hugo (SPO2 Hugo),
Chief Investigator of. the Nabua Municipal Police Station, was
directed to conduct an investigation at the Dona Josefa Hospital
where Belen was confined. However, SPO2 Hugo found Belen to be
physically indisposed for verbal communication, given that he was
then being treated with his mortal wounds and was intubated due to
damage to his lungs.
On 13 July 2010, SPO2 Hugo returned to the hospital with SPO3

Henry Dino (SPO3 Dino), who brought two volumes of the rogue
gallery of Iriga City for possible identification of the victim's
assailants. On this day, Belen appeared to be aware and in full
possession of his mental faculties but remained unable to engage in
verbal communication due to his injuries. As Belen's wife and
daughter were communicating with Belen through writing, SPO2
Hugo explained to his wife that he would be propounding questions
to Belen and then he would annotate his response based on the
hand or head gestures made by Belen. Congressman Salvio Fortuno,
who belonged to the same political party as the victim, was also
there to aid with the questioning.
SPO2 Hugo asked several questions and the victim's actual method
of response - through nodding or shaking his head or other hand
gestures - was annotated in the sworn statement that was later on
prepared to reflect his testimony. Belen was able to identify
Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle after being shown the
second volume of the rogue gallery brought by SPO3 Dino.
While SPO3 Dino was flipping the pages, Belen gestured and pointed
to Vargas, and motioned that Vargas was the driver of the
motorcycle in the shooting incident. As for the actual shooter, Belen
confirmed that his assailant was a woman - nodding his head yes
when asked if the shooter was a woman - and Belen was able to
describe her general description by checking the characteristics
written down by SPO2 Hugo in a piece of paper. Belen also wrote the
woman's height as 5'2" in the same piece of paper after much visible
effort.
The transcription of the interview was confirmed by Belen, to whom

it was read before he affixed his thumbmark thereto. It was also
witnessed by his wife, who confirmed that Belen was giving his
assent thereto, and later on signified that she witnessed the same by
affixing her signature on the same document. Belen's affidavit was
certified by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio V. Ramos, after
personally confirming with the victim the veracity of the contents of
the same. This Sworn Statement was later offered as evidence
during the trial.
From the confinement until 21 July 2010, Dr. Godofredo Belmonte,

Belen's attending physician, noted that Belen's condition was
improving. However, on 21 July 2010, Belen suffered considerable
physical deterioration, requiring further surgery to be conducted.
On 29 July 2010, Belen succumbed to his injuries and passed away.
Dr. James Belgira (Dr. Belgira), the medico-legal officer of the PNP,
examined Belen post-mortem and in his medico-legal report, found
that Belen suffered from significant gunshot wounds, some of which
were found to have entry points at his back, probably shot while
Belen was lying on the ground, and were sustained through
intermittent - rather than successive -gunshots. Dr. Belgira opined
that, given the location of the shots and the position of the victim as
he was being shot, there was manifest intent to kill and that
treachery attended the shooting.
For his defense, Vargas denied the charge against him and
interposed alibi as his defense. He alleged that it was impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime as he has never been to Nabua,
Camarines Sur in all his life and that at the time of the incident, he
was having a drinking session with his uncle Arnulfo Abinal in San
Nicolas, Iriga City, not far from the game fowl farm where he works.
They were later joined by Jeffrey Manaog and Sheila Castanares.
Vargas further alleged that he woke up at about 5:00 a.m. the
following day and reported for work at the chicken farm.
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Judgment dated 5 February 2015, the RTC found Vargas guilty

of the crime of Murder, penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Eric J. Vargas GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Death of the victim having occurred due to the crime, Maryjane A.

Belen, the widow of the victim is entitled to moral damages of PhP
50,000 and PhP 100,000.00 in exemplary damages.
There being no receipts presented as to the actual expenses

incurred by the family of the victim, no actual or compensatory
damages can be awarded. However, jurisprudence allows the award
of temperate damages considering that, as records show, the victim
underwent medical treatment before his demise. For this, the court
awards the widow of the victim the amount of PhP75,000.00 as
temperate damages.
All monetary awards shall earn an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to clearly establish
that Belen was shot several times, and despite the medical attention
received, he nonetheless died. The RTC also found that the killing of
Belen was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, and thus the crime committed was
murder. Moreover, the RTC found that Belen, through his sworn
statement, positively identified Vargas as the driver of the
motorcycle of the shooting incident, and that Belen's statement
against his assailant, while not a dying declaration, was credible and
spontaneous, and was admissible as part of res gestae.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision dated 15 November 2016, the CA affirmed, with

modification, the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the
Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
[Judgment] dated February 5, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga City, Branch 6, finding accused-appellant Eric Vargas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION. ACCORDINGLY, appellant is
hereby ordered to indemnify the family of the victim Miguel Belen
the following damages which shall bear interest at the rate of six per
cent (6%) per annum until fully paid, namely:
1. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Moral
Damages;
2. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Civil
Indemnity;
3. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Exemplary
Damages; and
4. Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as Temperate
Damages.
In all other respects, the herein appealed [Judgment] of the RTC of
Iriga City, Branch 60, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA found that the sworn statement of Belen, identifying Vargas
as the driver of the motorcycle of the shooting incident, is
admissible as part of res gestae, even if the statement was made in a
question-and-answer format, three (3) days after the shooting
incident. The CA held that the statement was still made under the
influence of a startling event, given that Belen had to undergo
extensive surgery immediately after the incident. The CA held that
the RTC correctly admitted the Sworn Statement of Belen, and as the
admissibility of specific statements is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court, such determination of admissibility is
conclusive upon appeal, especially if there is no clear abuse of
discretion.
The CA also found that the killing of Belen was attended by

treachery and evident premeditation, qualifying the crime as
murder. Conspiracy between Vargas and Bagacina was also duly
proven by the prosecution, as they were convincingly shown to have
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of killing Belen. The
conspiracy was manifest as Vargas was the driver of the motorcycle
which Bagacina, the shooter, rode at the time of the commission of
the crime. The motorcycle driven by Vargas was also the means by
which he and Bagacina fled the scene.
The CA modified the amount of damages awarded to the family of

Belen, but affirmed the decision of the RTC finding that the
prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
Vargas.
The Issue
The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA

erred in finding Vargas guilty of the crime of Murder under the RPC.
The Ruling of the Court
We find the appeal to be without merit.
For a successful prosecution of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC,

the following elements must be proven: (1) a person was killed; (2)
the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the
killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.6 In this case, we find that
the prosecution sufficiently proved each element beyond reasonable
doubt.
The first and fourth elements are not contested by Vargas. The death
of Belen has been established by the Medico-Legal Certificate dated
14 July 2010, Belen's Certificate of Death, and the testimony of Dr.
Belgira. Moreover, there is no allegation that Vargas and Belen are
related. Thus, the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. Vargas
only questions the finding of the lower courts as to the second and
third elements - whether Vargas was positively identified, by
admissible and credible evidence, as the person in conspiracy with
the woman who shot Belen, and whether the killing of Belen was
qualified by the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation.
In particular, Vargas argues that the statements of Belen in his

Sworn Statement cannot be admitted as part of res gestae because
the statement was given three (3) days after the shooting incident.
We disagree.
In this case, we find that the Sworn Statement of Belen was correctly
admitted by the lower courts as part of res gestae to positively
identify Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle where the female
who shot Belen was riding.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules." However, there are
exceptions to the hearsay rule, one of which is res gestae, found in
Section 42 of Rule 130, which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may
be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites are
present: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.7
In this case, we find that all the requisites are present. The shooting
incident is a startling occurrence, and the statements of Belen, which
concern the shooting incident as he was identifying his assailants,
were given before he had time to contrive or devise a false
statement. The mere fact that it took Belen three (3) days before he
was able to give his statement does not remove such statement as
part of res gestae.
There are two tests in applying the res gestae rule to determine

whether or not statements should be admissible as part of res
gestae: (1) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself;
and (2) the evidence clearly negates any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony.8 To ascertain whether the evidence
negates fabrication, spontaneity of the statements must be
determined.
Res gestae comprehends a situation which presents a startling or

unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and
instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are
made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or
deliberate design in the formulation of their content.9 As long as the
statements were made voluntarily and spontaneously so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the occurrence,
although not precisely concurrent in point of time, such must be
admissible as part of res gestae, if the statements were made under
circumstances which exclude the idea of design or
deliberation.10 While there is no hard and fast rule, this Court has
considered a number of factors to determine spontaneity. In People
v. Estibal, the Court held:
By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence
against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. x x x.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may
be determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed
between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the
making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is
made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is
given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events
between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and
(5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself,
xxx.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the test mentioned, we find that the Sworn Statement of
Belen is admissible in evidence as part of res gestae, as the
statements made by Belen, the victim of the startling occurrence,
refer to the circumstances of the shooting incident - particularly the
actual perpetrators of the crime. We find that these statements were
made spontaneously considering the circumstances under which
they were made. Immediately after the shooting incident, Belen had
to undergo extensive surgery for the gunshot wounds he sustained.
He was unable to talk and had difficulty in breathing, but he
managed to convey his answers to the questions propounded to him
through writing and moving his head and hands. During the three
(3) days that intervened the shooting incident and when the
statements were made, Belen had no time to deliberately fabricate a
story. He was in the hospital, receiving treatment for his numerous
wounds, fighting for his life. He could not even speak or
communicate verbally because of the intubation in his lungs. Given
this situation, it is clear that he had no time to contrive a false
statement against Vargas or Bagacina.
Belen positively identified Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle of

the shooting incident. SPO2 Hugo corroborated this statement, and
testified as to how Belen identified Vargas as the driver of the
motorcycle in the shooting incident. SPO2 Hugo testified that when
Belen was shown the rogue gallery, he saw Belen shake his head to
signify that he did not recognize the pictures in the particular page
shown to him. After going through the first volume, SPO2 Hugo
testified that SPO3 Dino also clarified with Belen that he did not
recognize anyone from the first volume of the rogue gallery. SPO2
Hugo continued his testimony by stating that while looking at the
second volume, he saw Belen wave his hand to SPO3 Dino who was
flipping the pages, signaling him to go back to the previous page.
SPO2 Hugo then saw Belen point to one of the pictures in that
particular page. When SPO2 Hugo, while pointing to one of the
pictures, asked him "Amo adi?" (Is this the one?), Belen nodded.
Belen pointed to the person in the photograph and made a motion of
wiping his face, and then acted by his hands of a motion of driving a
motorcycle. When SPO2 Hugo asked if the person he was pointing to
was the driver of the motorcycle of the shooting incident, Belen
nodded, still making the gesture of driving a motorcycle. When a
copy of a picture was shown during trial, SPO2 Hugo testified that it
was the very same picture referred to by Belen in his Sworn
Statement, which was the photograph of Vargas. Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that despite not being able to communicate
verbally, Belen had positively identified Vargas as the driver of the
motorcycle which his female assailant was riding.
Moreover, we find that the lower courts did not err in giving weight
to these statements, especially given Vargas' weak defenses of
denial and alibi. Vargas' claim that he was having a drinking session
when the incident happened cannot prevail over the positive
identification presented by the prosecution.
To be able to validly use the defense of alibi, two requirements must

be met: (1) that the accused was not present at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, and (2) that it was physically
impossible for him to be there at the time.12 Therefore, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the offense was committed; it must
likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.13 In
this case, Vargas' statement is self-serving and unreliable, especially
as it remains unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. It is well-settled
that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter.14
Vargas further argues that the courts gravely erred in finding that
there was conspiracy between him and the female assailant in the
shooting incident.
We disagree.
Based on the records, the lower courts were correct in finding that
Vargas was in conspiracy with the female assailant of Belen.
Conspiracy is present when there is unity in purpose and
intention in the commission of a crime — it does not require a
previous plan or agreement to commit assault as it is sufficient that
at the time of such aggression, all the accused manifested by their
acts a common intent or desire to attack.15 Given that Belen's
shooter was riding the motorcycle driven by Vargas, which was the
same motorcycle used to flee the scene of the shooting incident, it is
clear that Vargas and the female assailant had a common purpose
against Belen. Their acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts
indicate a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.16 By driving the motorcycle which carried the person
who shot Belen, there was clearly a conspiracy, a common intent
and purpose, to kill Belen.
Finally, we address the argument of Vargas that the lower courts

erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation.
As to the finding of treachery, we find that the lower courts did not
err in finding that the killing of Belen was attended by treachery.
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
conclusively as the killing itself.17 Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of
the RPC, two conditions must necessarily occur before treachery
or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (1) the
employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would
insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means,
methods, or manner of execution.18
In this case, the lower courts were correct in finding that both
requisites were present - Belen was unsuspecting and unaware of
the threat to his life, when he was shot several times, inflicting upon
him mortal wounds. The suddenness of the attack shows that Belen,
who was unarmed, had no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover,
the wounds sustained by Belen show that treachery attended his
killing. The following findings of the trial court support the finding
of treachery: (1) the gun was fired not in succession but
intermittently, meaning that there was sufficient time for the
assailant to have observed the condition of Belen after each and
every fire; (2) the quantity of bullets indicates the intent of the
assailant to kill the victim; and (3) the locations of the wounds - with
two coming from the back - show that it is possible that Belen was
already lying down when the shots were fired.19 The combination of
the six (6) gunshot wounds was found to be fatal and life-
threatening, according to Dr. Belgira, who examined Belen post
mortem. Dr. Belgira opined that given the locations of the gunshot
wounds and the position of the victim as he was being shot,
treachery attended the shooting.
However, as to the finding of evident premeditation, we find that the

prosecution failed to prove the elements of evident premeditation.
Similar to treachery, evident premeditation must be clearly proven,
established beyond reasonable doubt and based on external acts
that are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate
deliberate planning.20 The prosecution must prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, each element of evident premeditation as follows:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.21 Absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was
hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.22
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence as to

when the plan to kill Belen was determined by Vargas and the
female assailant. The essence of the circumstance of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act be preceded
by calm thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.23 To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must
appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior
to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the
result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent
attempt.24 In this case, there was no showing as to whether or not
sufficient time had passed from the determination to carry out their
criminal plan until the execution of such plan. Thus, evident
premeditation cannot qualify the killing of Belen.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the lower courts were correct
in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua based on Article 248 of
the RPC. However, there is a need to modify the amount of
indemnity awarded as the circumstance of evident premeditation
should no longer be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. The CA awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and P75,000.00 as temperate damages. However, as
evident premeditation was not attendant in the killing of Belen, this
will no longer be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance
which would have meted the penalty of death, which in turn would
have justified the amounts awarded by the CA. In light of People v.
Jugueta,25 we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. As no
evidence was presented as to the medical treatment, burial and
funeral expenses, we also award P50,000.00 as temperate damages,
in accordance with People v. Jugueta.26 All damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 15 November 2016

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07331
affirming the Judgment dated 5 February 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-9351
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages is reduced to P75,000.00
each. The award of temperate damages is also reduced to
P50,000.00. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all
damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

Article 14 Aggravating Circumstances

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Article 14 Aggravating Circumstances

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ARTICLE 14 – AGGRAVATING

The Court is now asked to decide on Appeal2 the Decision3 dated

The case arose from an Information5 charging accused-appellant

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the

The antecedents as culled from the CA Decision and records of the

Ernie D. Amahit (Ernie), son of the victim Olipio G. Amahit (Olipio),

For his part, accused-appellant alleged that at around 5:30 p.m. of

On October 28, 2015, the RTC rendered a Judgment9 finding

SO PROMULGATED IN OPEN COURT this 28th day of October, 2015

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC:

With costs against accused-appellant.

The CA concluded that the physical evidence presented including

Hence, this appeal.

Second, credence is accorded to the testimony of Ernie, who

Third, by invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense,

The prosecution's material witness, Ernie, clearly described how

This narration was corroborated by the result of the Post-Mortem

The nature, character, location and extent of these wounds belie

Assuming that Olipio was the aggressor, it is nevertheless apparent

In People v. Clariño,21 the Court discussed that the lower court

Similarly, in People v. Caritativo,24 accused-appellant was found

Lastly, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,

1. the full name of the accused,

2, the designation of the offense given by the statute,

3. the acts or omissions constituting the offense,

4. the name of the offended party,

5. the approximate date, as well as the

6. place of the offense. To the Court's mind, the Information herein

Furthermore, in People v. Candaza (Candaza),28 the Court declared

More recently, in People v. Solar (Solar),30 the Court found that the

In accused-appellant's case, the defense not only failed to question

As to the penalty imposed, the RTC and CA were both correct in

I. For those crimes like Murder, Panicide, Serious intentional

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion

Thus, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

[ G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020 ]

2. On the curved portion of the road, Ramil saw his cousin,

3. Meanwhile, Agripino Casilac (Agripino), the father of Roel,

(3) the offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous

4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or

1. On November 16, 2001, at around 2:15 in the morning, Adelriza

2. When she turned on the lights, a man, wearing khaki shorts

4. Adelriza shouted for help and their neighbor, Virgie

5. Unfortunately, Mijares died while undergoing treatment.4

6. Senior Police Officer 1 Raul Olavario ("SPO1 Olavario") and

7. SPO1 Olavario interviewed Adelriza and conducted a physical

8. Upon arrival, the police officers discovered that four pieces of

9. The police officers and Adelriza proceeded to the police station

11. A police cartographer prepared a sketch of the suspect based on

13. According to Virgie, she heard rumors that appellant was

14. Acting on Virgie's tip, SPO1 Olavario invited appellant to the

SPO1 Olavario thus arrested appellant and informed him of his

Version of the Defense

The defense vehemently denied the version of the prosecution and

Victoria Moreno ("Victoria"), appellant's mother, and Crispulo

Appellant pleaded "not guilty."15 After trial, the RTC rendered a

Cost against the accused.

The trial court rejected appellant's defenses of alibi and denial; his

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Undeterred, appellant appealed his conviction before the CA.18 The

The appeal has no merit.

Positive testimony despite minor

The arguments of the appellant deserve scant consideration.