G.R. No.
86890 January 21, 1994 The deceased, Catherine Acosta, a 13 year old girl, daughter of
LEANDRO CARILLO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anesthetist, seeks review of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 1988, which
affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of
simple negligence resulting in homicide, for the death of his
thirteen (13) year old patient Catherine Acosta. The trial court had
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period (four [4] months' imprisonment), as well as to pay the heirs of
his patient an indemnity of P30,000.00 for her death, P10,000.00 as
reimbursement for actual expenses incurred, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs of the suit.1
The information filed against petitioner and his co-accused, the
surgeon Dr. Emilio Madrid, alleged the following:
That on or about the 31st of May 1981, in the municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding with one
another, without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid
injury to person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously operate, in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner and
neglected to exercise their respective medical knowhow and tasks
and/or departed from the recognized standard in their treatment,
diagnosis of the condition, and operation of the patient, one Catherine
Acosta, 13 years old, which negligence caused the death of the said
Catherine Acosta.2
Petitioner and Dr. Emilio Madrid entered pleas of not guilty at
arraignment and the case proceeded to trail with Judge Job B.
Madayag presiding.3
The prosecution presented as its principal evidence the testimony of
four (4) witnesses, namely: 1) Yolanda Acosta, Catherine's mother,
who was able to observe the conduct of the accused outside the
operating theater before, during and after the appendectomy procedure
carried out on her daughter; 4 2) Domingo Acosta, Catherine's father,
who corroborated some parts of his wife’s testimony;5 3) Dr. Horacio
Buendia, an expert witness who described before the trial court the
relationship between a surgeon and an anesthetist in the course of a
surgical operation, as well as define the likelihood of cardiac arrest as
a post operative complication; 6 and 4) Dr. Nieto Salvador, an expert
witness who analyzed and explained the significance of the results of
the pathological study and autopsy conducted on Catherine's body by
one Dr. Alberto Reyes.7
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense was granted leave
to file a demurrer to the evidence. 8 After failing to file the demurrer
within the reglementary period, Judge Manuel Yuzon, who had in the
meantime taken over as presiding judge of the sala where this case was
pending, denied the defense motion for extension of time to file
demurrer and declared the case submitted for decision. 9
On 19 September 1985, the trial court promulgated its decision
convicting both the accused of the crime charged. 10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction,
and specified that the civil liability of the two (2) accused was solidary
in nature. 11
Petitioner Dr. Carillo alone filed the present Petition for Review with
the Court, seeking reversal of his conviction, or in the alternative, the
grant of a new trial. Dr. Madrid did not try to appeal further the Court
of Appeals Decision. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction became
final insofar as the accused surgeon Dr. Madrid is concerned.
The facts of the case as established by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
spouses Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained to her father at
about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 1981 of pains in the
lower part of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to Dr. Elva
Peña. Dra. Peña called for Dr. Emilio Madrid and the latter examined
Catherine Acosta. According to Dr. Madrid, his findings might be
appendicitis. Then Dr. Peña told Catherine's parents to bring the child
to the hospital in Baclaran so that the child will be observed.
At the Baclaran General Hospital, a nurse took blood sample form the
child. The findings became known at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and the child was scheduled for operation at 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. The operation took place at 5:45 p.m. because Dr.
Madrid arrived only at that time.
When brought inside the operating room, the child was feeling
very well and they did not subject the child to ECG
(electrocardiogram) and
X-ray.
The appellant Dr. Emilio Madrid, a surgeon, operated on
Catherine. He was assisted by appellant, Dr. Leandro Carillo, an
anesthesiologists.
During the operation, while Yolanda Acosta, Catherine's mother, was
staying outside the operating room, she "noticed something very
unfamiliar." The three nurses who assisted in the operation were going
in and out of the operating room, they were not carrying anything, but
in going out of the operating room, they were already holding
something.
Yolanda asked one of the nurses if she could enter the operating room
but she was refused.
At around 6:30 p.m., Dr. Emilio Madrid went outside the operating
room and Yolanda Acosta was allowed to enter the first door.
The appendicitis (sic) was shown to them by Dr. Madrid, because,
according to Dr. Madrid, they might be wondering because he was
going to install drainage near the operating (sic) portion of the child.
When asked, the doctor told them the child was already out of danger
but the operation was not yet finished.
It has also been established that the deceased was not weighed
before the administration of anesthesia on her.
The operation was finished at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and when the
child was brought out from the operating room, she was observed to be
shivering (nanginginig); her heart beat was not normal; she was asleep
and did not wake up; she was pale; and as if she had difficulty in
breathing and Dr. Emilio Madrid suggested that she placed under
oxygen tank; that oxygen was administered to the child when she was
already in the room.
Witness Yolanda Acosta further testified that shortly before the child
was transferred from the operating room to her room, she (witness)
was requested by the anesthesiologist to go home and get a blanket.
A portion of Yolanda Acosta's testimony on what happened when she
returned to the hospital are reproduced hereunder as follows:
Q What happened afterward?
A When I arrived in the hospital, my child was being transferred to her
bed.
Q What else happened?
Q I noticed that the heartbeat of my daughter was not normal. And I
noticed that her hospital gown is rising up and down.
Q What transpired after that?
A I asked Dr. Madrid why it was like that, that the heartbeat of my
daughter is not normal.
Q And did the doctor make any reply?
A The doctor said because of the lesion of the child.
Q What else happened?
A After they have revived the heartbeat of the child, Dr. Carillo and
Dr. Madrid left.
Q Now do you remember what time was it when Dr. Carillo stepped
out?
A Only a minute after they have transferred the child to the bed.
Q What happened later on after Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid stepped
out of the hospital?
A After 15 or 30 minutes has lapsed at about 7:15 or 7:30, the child
had developed convulsion and stiffening of the body.
Q When you observed convulsion and stiffening of the body, did you
do anything?
A We requested the nurse who was attending to her to call for a
doctor.
Q And the nurse who was attending to the patient called for a doctor?
A They called for Dra. Peña, their family physician.
Q What transpired afterwards?
A What Dra. Peña did was call for Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist.
Q Did this doctor arrived?
A Yes.
Q What transpired after the doctor arrived?
A They examined the child.
Q After they examined the child, did they inform you of the result of
the examination?
A The cardiologist was the one whom informed us after he stepped out
of the room when we followed him. The doctor told us that she
suffered severe infection which went up to her head.
Q After you were informed of the result of his examination, what
transpired next?
A According to them, they will do their best for the child and that they
will call for Dr. Carillo.
Q Did Dr. Carillo arrived?
A At around 10:30 in the evening.
Q Did Dr. Carillo do anything when he arrived on 31 May 1981?
A When he arrived, he noticed that there were two small bottles and
big bottles of dextrose which were hanging above the bed of the child.
Then he said, "What is this? Christmas tree or what?" He told us that
one bottle of dextrose be removed. And the big one will remain.
Q What happened after that?
A After that we talked to Dr. Carillo and asked him how did this
happen to the child.
Q What did Dr. Carillo reply (sic) to you?
A He answered "that is nothing, the child will regain consciousness
and if the child will not regain consciousness, I will resign (sic) as a
doctor."12
(Emphasis supplied)
When Catherine remained unconscious until noontime the next
day, a neurologist examined her and she was diagnosed as
comatose. 13 Three (3) days later, Catherine died without regaining
consciousness.14
CA: The Court of Appeals held that: Catherine had suffered from
an overdose of, or an adverse reaction to, anesthesia, particularly
the arbitrary administration of Nubain, a pain killer, without
benefit of prior weighing of the patient's body mass, which weight
determines the dosage of Nubain which can safely be given to a
patient. 15 The Court of Appeals held that this condition triggered off a
heart attack as a post-operative complication, depriving Catherine's
brain of oxygen, leading to the brain's hemorrhage. 16 The Court of
Appeals identified such cardiac arrest as the immediate cause of
Catherine's death. 17
The Court of Appeals found criminal negligence on the part of
petitioner Dr. Carillo and his co-accused Dr. Madrid, holding that both
had failed to observe the required standard of diligence in the
examination of Catherine prior to the actual administration of
anesthesia; 18 that it was "a bit rash" on the part of the accused Dr.
Carillo "to have administered Nubain without first weighing
Catherine"; 19 and that it was an act of negligence on the part of both
doctors when, (a) they failed to monitor Catherine's heartbeat after the
operation and (b) they left the hospital immediately after reviving
Catherine's heartbeat, depriving the latter
of immediate and expert medical assistance when she suffered a heart
attack approximately fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes later. 20
Since neither petitioner nor his co-accused presented evidence in their
own behalf, the present Petition seeks to question the soundness of the
factual conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals, upon which the
affirmance of petitioner's conviction was based.
Close examination of the instant Petition for Review shows that
petitioner's main arguments are two-fold:
(1) the Court of Appeals "completely brushed aside" and
"misapprehended" Catherine's death certificate and biopsy report
which allegedly showed that the cause of death was a ruptured
appendix, which led to blood poisoning, 21 rather than faulty
anesthetic treatment;
and (2) there was no direct evidence of record showing that Nubain
was administered to Catherine either during the appendectomy
procedure or after such operation. 22
ISSUES:
(1) The first is whether the Court of Appeals so drastically
"misapprehended" the relevant, operative facts in this case as to
compel this Court to examine and resolve question(s) of fact which
would have a decisive significance for the disposition of the case. The
rule is too firmly settled to require much documentation that only
questions of law may be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari, subject to certain well-known exceptions. 23
(2) The second issue is whether or not the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals adequately support the conclusion that petitioner Dr.
Carillo was, along with Dr. Madrid, guilty of simple negligence which
resulted in homicide. Our review of the record leads us to an
affirmative answer. 
COURT:
After careful scrutiny of petitioner's contentions before us and the
record of this case, we do not believe that petitioner has shown
"misapprehension of facts" on the part of the Court of Appeals which
would require this Court to overturn the judgment reached by the
former.
Petitioner’s contention:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding
that an overdose of, or an allergic reaction to, the anesthetic drug
Nubain had led to the death of Catherine Acosta and that the true cause
of Catherine's death was that set out in the death certificate of
Catherine: "Septicemia (or blood poisoning) due to perforated
appendix with peritonitis." 24 The concept of causation in general, and
the cause of death in human beings in particular, are complex and
difficult notions. What is fairly clear is that death, understood as a
physical condition involving cessation of vital signs in the brain and
heart, is preceded by a series of physiological events, any one of which
events can, with equal cogency, be described as a "cause of death".
The Court of Appeals found that an overdose of, or an adverse
reaction to, Nubain, an anesthetic or pain-killing drug the
appropriate dose of which depends on the body weight or mass of
the patient, had generated or triggered off cardiac arrest, which in
turn led to lack of oxygen in Catherine's brain, which then
brought about hemorrhaging in the brain. Vital activity in the brain
thereupon ceased. The medical evidence presented at the trial was
quite consistent with the findings of the Court of Appeals which
concluded that cardiac arrest was the cause of Catherine's death. 25
For his part, petitioner insists that cardiac arrest is not the only cause
of oxygen-starvation of the brain, that septicemia with peritonitis or
severe infection which had "gone up to the head" of Catherine was an
equally efficient cause of deprivation of the brain of oxygen and hence
of brain hemorrhage. The medical testimony of the expert witnesses
for the prosecution on which petitioner relies is also consistent with
petitioner's theory that septicemia with peritonitis was, or at least could
have been, the cause of Catherine's death. 26
Indeed, it appears to the Court that there was no medical proof
submitted to the trial court to show that one or the other "cause"
was necessarily an exclusive cause of death in the case of Catherine
Acosta; that an overdose or allergic reaction to Nubain could not have
combined with septicemia and peritonitis in bringing about Catherine's
death.
What is of critical importance for present purposes is not so much
the identification of the "true cause" or "real cause" of
Catherine's death but rather the set of circumstances which both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals found constituted simple
(as distinguished from reckless) negligence on the part of the two
accused Dr. Madrid and Dr. Carillo leading to the death of
Catherine.
When the patient was wheeled out of the operating room after
completion of surgery, she manifested signs of medical instability (i.e.,
shivering, paleness, irregular breathing and weak heart beat). 27 She
was not brought to a properly equipped recovery room, or intensive
care until which the hospital lacked. 28 Such facilities and their
professional staffs, of which an anesthetist is commonly a part, are
essential for providing close observation and patient care while a post-
surgery patient is recovering from the effects of anesthesia and while
the normal protective mechanisms are still dull or obtunded. 29 Instead,
the patient was merely brought to her assigned hospital bed and was
provided oxygen on the instructions of Dr. Madrid then "revived" her
heartbeat. 30 Both doctors then left their patient and the hospital;
approximately fifteen minutes later, she suffered convulsions and
cardiac arrest. 31
The conduct of Dr. Madrid and of the petitioner constituted inadequate
care of their patient in view of her vulnerable condition. Both doctors
failed to appreciate the serious condition of their patient whose adverse
physical signs were quite manifest right after surgery. And after
reviving her heartbeat, both doctors failed to monitor their patient
closely or extend further medical care to her; such conduct was
especially necessary in view of the inadequate, post-operative facilities
of the hospital. We do not, of course, seek to hold petitioner
responsible for the inadequate facilities of the Baclaran General
Hospital. We consider, however, that the inadequate nature of those
facilities did impose a somewhat higher standard of professional
diligence upon the accused surgeon and anesthetist personally
than would have been called for in a modern fully-equipped
hospital.
While Dr. Madrid and a cardiologist were containing the patient's
convulsions, and after the latter had diagnosed that infection had
reached the patient's head, these two (2) apparently after consultation,
decided to call-in the petitioner. 32 There is here a strong implication
that the patient's post-operative condition must have been considered
by the two (2) doctors as in some way related to the anesthetic
treatment she had received from the petitioner either during or after the
surgical procedure.
Once summoned, petitioner anesthesiologist could not be readily
found. When he finally appeared at 10:30 in the evening, he was
evidently in a bad temper, commenting critically on the dextrose
bottles before ordering their removal. 33 This circumstance indicated he
was not disposed to attend to this unexpected call, in violation of the
canons of his profession that as a physician, he should serve the
interest of his patient "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
always his best talent and skill." 34 Indeed, when petitioner finally saw
his patient, he offered the unprofessional bluster to the parents of
Catherine that he would resign if the patient will not regain
consciousness. 35 The canons of medical ethics require a physician to
"attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously." He should
secure for them all possible benefits that may depend upon his
professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the
physician's failure to fulfill his obligation to his patient is, in most
cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is
"discreditable and inexcusable". 36
Nubain was an experimental drug for anesthesia and post-operative
pain and the medical literature required that a patient be weighed first
before it is administered and warned that there was no (or inadequate)
experience relating to the administration thereof to a patient less that
eighteen (18) ears of age. 37 Yet, the doctor's order sheet (Exhibit "C")
did not contain this precaution but instead directed a reader to apply
the drug only when warranted by the circumstances. 38 During the offer
of Exhibit "C" by the prosecution, Dr. Madrid admitted that this
prescription, which was unsigned, was made in his own
handwriting. 39 It must be observed that the instruction was open-ended
in that some other individual still had to determine if circumstances
existed warranting administration of the drug to the patient. The
document thus indicated the abdication of medical responsibility on an
extremely critical matter. Since petitioner anesthesiologist
entered subsequent prescriptions or orders in the same order sheet,
which were signed by him, at 7:15 p.m. on the same evening of 31
May 1981, he was in a position to appreciate the dangers inherent in
the prior prescription, which was within his (petitioner's) area of
specialization, and to order measures to correct this anomaly and
protect his patient's well-being. So far as the condition of the evidence
shows, he failed to do so. In sum, only a low level of diligence was
exhibited by petitioner and Dr. Madrid in the prescription of
medication for their patient.
As noted earlier, petitioner relied heavily in this proceeding on the
testimony on cross-examination of the expert witnesses for the
prosecution to show that blood poisoning resulting from a ruptured
appendix could also be responsible for the patient's death.
No suggestion has been made that the rupture of the patient's
occurred prior to surgery. After her blood sample was examined,
the patient was merely diagnosed as a case of appendicitis, without
further elaboration.  No intensive preoperative preparations, like the
immediate administration of antibiotics, was thereafter undertaken on
the patient. This is a standard procedure for patients who are, after
being diagnosed, suspected of suffering from a perforated appendix
and consequent peritonitis. 41 The mother also testified that petitioner
anesthesiologist merely injected a drug, "pre-anesthesia" intended to
put the patient to sleep, into the container of fluids being administered
to her daughter intravenously at her room, prior to surgery. 42 We note
further that the surgeon Dr. Madrid was forty-five minutes late in
arriving at the operating theater. 43 Considering that delay in treatment
of appendicitis increases the morbidity of the patient, 44 Dr. Madrid's
conduct can only be explained by a pre-operative diagnosis on his part
that the condition of appendicitis was not yet attended by
complications (i.e., a ruptured appendix and peritonitis).
The above circumstances do strongly indicate that the rupture of
the patient's appendix occurred during the appendectomy
procedure, that is, at a time and place — the operating room —
where the two (2) accused were in full control of the situation and
could determine decisively what needed to be done in respect of
the patient. 45 This circumstance must be considered in
conjunction with other related circumstances which the
prosecution had proven: that the patient was ambulatory when
brought to the operating room; 46 that she left the operating room
two (2) hours later in obviously serious condition; and that an
appendectomy accompanied or followed by sustained antibiotic
treatment is a fairly common and generally accepted medical
procedure for dealing with ruptured appendix and peritonitis, 47 a
fact of which judicial note may be taken.
Catherine Acosta and her death three (3) days later, leads the
Court to the conclusion, with moral certainty, that petitioner
and Dr. Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in
homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
November 1988 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject only to the
modification that the indemnity for the death of Catherine Acosta is
hereby increased to P50,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence. 58
SO ORDERED.

As early as in People v. Vistan, 48 the Court defined simple

negligence, penalized under what is now Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, as "a mere lack of prevision in a situation where
either the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not
openly visible." Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the
offense of simple negligence is the failure to exercise the diligence
necessitated or called for the situation which was not immediately
life-destructive but which culminated, in the present case, in the
death of a human being three (3) days later. Such failure to exercise
the necessary degree of care and diligence is a negative ingredient of
the offense charged. The rule in such cases is that while the
prosecution must prove the negative ingredient of the offense, it
needs only to present the best evidence procurable under the
circumstances, in order to shift the burden of disproving or
countering the proof of the negative ingredient to the accused,
provided that such initial evidence establishes at least on a prima
facie basis the guilt of the accused. 49 This rule is particularly
applicable where the negative ingredient of the offense is of such a
nature or character as, under the circumstances, to be specially within
the knowledge or control of the accused. 50 In the instant case, the
Court is bound to observe that the events which occurred during
the surgical procedure (including whether or not Nubain had in
fact been administered as an anesthesia immediately before or
during the surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and
control of Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid. It was, therefore,
incumbent upon the two (2) accused to overturn the prima
facie case which the prosecution had established, by reciting the
measures which they had actually taken to prevent or to counter
the obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was
evident right after surgery. This they failed or refused to do so.

Still another circumstance of which account must be taken is that both

petitioner and Dr. Madrid failed to inform the parents of their minor
patient of the nature of her illness, or to explain to them either during
the surgery (if feasible) or at any time after the surgery, the events
which comprised the dramatic deterioration of her condition
immediately after surgery as compared with her pre-surgery condition.
To give a truthful explanation to the parents was a duty imposed upon
them by the canons of their profession. 51 Petitioner should have
explained to Catherine's parents the actual circumstances surrounding
Catherine's death, how, in other words, a simple appendectomy
procedure upon an ambulatory patient could have led to such fatal
consequences.

By way of resume, in the case at bar, we consider that the chain of

circumstances above noted, namely:

(1) the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the

serious post-surgery condition of their patient and to monitor
her condition and provide close patient care to her;
(2) the summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist after
the patient's heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was
completed;
(3) the low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in
failing to correct Dr. Madrid's prescription of Nubain for post-
operative pain;
(4) the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to
inform the parents of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after
surgery, in disregard of the requirements of the Code of Medical
Ethics; and
(5) the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in
fact exercised the necessary and appropriate degree of care and
diligence to prevent the sudden decline in the condition of

G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru
Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico
C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum
of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision
was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of
Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of
the judgment below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy
Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there
were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the
road, one following the other about two to three meters from each
other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place
where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming
from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby encroached
the lane of the car driven by the accused (nagcounterflow). To
avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant
swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the
Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to
move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The
pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front,
the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and the truck
sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the
old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately
brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced)
dead on arrival.2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed
against petitioner in view of the above incident. She entered a plea
of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the
City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal
of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on
September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on
the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced
by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of
eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The
Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. After the
prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
TC: finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of-
offense charged.
CA: the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide thru simple imprudence
and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3)
months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the
heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of
errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a
car travelling directly towards her, she should have stepped on the
brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have
also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of
a pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of
Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to
indemnify the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00.4
COURT:
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take
precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule.
"Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner
not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in
Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw
the car going in the opposite direction followed by another
which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should
not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but
should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she
would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the
time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the
street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem
reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not
take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react
to the situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested
course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze
the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and
to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the
prosecution with respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the
parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend
to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the
consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light
without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the
prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the
police 8 stating::
And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan
na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay
aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya
naman biglang pagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at
ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang
nasabing aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we
cannot but deem its veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus, under
the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate
court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in
the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of
the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act
with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The
danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her
very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only
enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was
driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the
"emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case
at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal
negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim,
who by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively and
clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner
HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by
the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25366             March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
          Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence), overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy.
          Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
          The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca
Company on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur Highway in the
municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his
negligence — and recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck
and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging
said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers.
Six of the latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical
attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with serious
bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days;
while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
          A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on
December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the
information in the case now before us, for serious physical
injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.
          When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First
Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground
that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the
Justice of the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the motion and
the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to secure reconsideration,
the accused appealed to this Court.
Issue:
          WON the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
COURT: YES
          We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not
dismissing the information for "serious physical injuries and damage
to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's
previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
          Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions. This has been the
constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this
Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
          Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as           WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the
the result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the
were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution
for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518,
March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal
Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information of
damage to property through reckless imprudence based on the same
negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996,
dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless
imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was
declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical injuries
arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted
in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases
cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various
offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of
differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.

          As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho

Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to say:1äwphï1.ñët

          Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males

diversos, como el hecho culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de
imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal Supremo.
De acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella
y causa lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos
delitos de lesiones y uno de daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo
delito culposo.

          The said author cites in support of the text the following

decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).

          8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.

          Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y

ademas se ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno
solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos enorden a la
responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo
acto imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de
daños, como todos son consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe
penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932.

          The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case
of People vs. Diaz, supra:

          ... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was

the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

          In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the

exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace
(now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.

G.R. No. L-30269 July 19, 1982
EPITACIO BUERANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus with Plate
No. 22-900 which collided with the Mabuhay Bakery delivery
panel bearing Plate No. T-13016 driven by Hipolito Vismonte and
owned by Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal on September 20, 1957.
On December 3, 1957, the Chief of Police of Tanay, filed with the
Municipal Judge of that municipality Criminal Case No. 251 against
herein petitioner for the crime of "Slight and Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence." In said Criminal Case No.
251, the complaint alleged, among other things, "causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and
operated by him (petitioner) to collide with the delivery truck of
Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu alias Mariano of Tanay,
Rizal, bearing Plate No. T-13016, the result of which the right front
side of the said truck (Mabuhay Bakery) was greatly damaged and the
driver, Hipolito Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely,
Bonifacio Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias Martin, suffered physical
injuries on the different parts of the body which required medical
attention as follows:
Hipolito Vismonte—five (5) days
Bonifacio Virtudazo—ten (10) days
Sy Tian alias Martin—one (1) month
LC: On February 6, 1958, after trial, petitioner was found guilty of
slight and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and sentenced "to suffer imprisonment from one (1)
month and one (1) day to two (2) months and to pay the cost of the
suit." He appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
where the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7772.
CFI: affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court and sentenced
petitioner to suffer four months of Arresto Mayor and to pay the costs.
In the meantime, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed
against herein petitioner Criminal Case No. 7965 in the Court of
First Instance charging him with the Crime of Damage to property
through reckless imprudence. He filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of double jeopardy in that because he has been previously
convicted of the offense charged, referring to the judgment of
conviction by the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance.
Opposition was filed by the Provincial Fiscal contending that the crime
for which petitioner was convicted was for less serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, whereas the second case was for
damages to property through reckless imprudence which are distinct
offenses. In support thereof, he cited the case of People vs. Estipona,
70 Phil. 513, which held that the two (2) offenses are entirely distinct
from one another, punishable under two (2) different provisions of the
code and that more evidence are necessary to sustain the complaint for
injuries than those submitted in the case for damage.
CFI: denied the motion to quash and, after trial, found petitioner
guilty in Criminal Case No. 7965 of the crime of damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
CA: sustained the Court of First Instance and sentenced herein
petitioner "to pay a fine of P4,387.00 which is double the amount of
damages suffered by the delivery truck with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; to indemnify the offended party, the owner of
the delivery truck in the amount of P2,193.50, representing the amount
of damages suffered by the said delivery truck, and to pay the costs."
The Court of Appeals held that there was no double jeopardy because
—
... First. Neither in the JP Court nor in the CFI on appeal was the
appellant convicted or acquitted of the offense of Damage to Property
Thru Reckless Imprudence or the case against him for that offense
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. Second. The JP Court which found him guilty of Slight and
Less Serious Physical injuries was not a court of competent
jurisdiction to try the offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless
Imprudence involving P2,193.50 because the imposable penalty may
be three times the aforesaid amount. Third Appellant could not have
validly pleaded before the JP Court to the said offense of Damage to
Property Thru Reckless Imprudence. Fourth The offense of Damage
to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence was alleged in the Information
in Criminal Case No. 7965 (the second case) does not include and is
not necessarily included in the first charge of Slight and Less Serious
Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, as alleged in the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 7722, the continuation of
Criminal Case 251; and Fifth: Appellant was never tried at all in the JP
Court of Tanay in Criminal Case No. 7722 for the crime of Damage to
Property Thru Reckless Imprudence.
We have read the case of People vs. Jose Belga, 53 O.G. (10) 3081,
May 31, 1957, cited by appellant, and are of the opinion that the basic
reason relied therein is not found in the case at bar, first because there
were three (3) cases filed in that case, to wit, Criminal Case No. 88,
Reckless Imprudence with Physical Injury; Criminal Case No. 95,
Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence, and Criminal Case
No. 96, for Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, and
accused Jose Belga was acquitted in the first case No. 88, after due
trial charging both physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence. In the case at bar, the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence arising out of the collision has not
been passed upon or dealt with in both Criminal Case No. 251, JP
Court of Tanay, and in Criminal Case No. 7722 of the CFI, whereas
Criminal Case No. 7965, the present case, is solely for damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. In fact, appellant could not have
been convicted of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence
under the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 7722, the first case,
for it charges only the offense of Less Serious Physical Injury Thru
Reckless Imprudence. Obvious is the fact that no case for damage to
property thru reckless imprudence was tried in which appellant could
be convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. Furthermore, under
Sec. 9 of Revised Rule 117, in order for jeopardy to be available as
bar, the second offense, Criminal Case No. 7965, must necessarily
include or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
case, Criminal Case No. 7722. Considering that the decision of the JP
in Criminal Case No. 251 was vacated and the information filed by the
Fiscal in Criminal Case 7722 (the continuation of Criminal Case 251)
charges only the offense of Less Serious Physical Injuries, it is evident
that the first offense does not include the second,nor the second, the
first.
COURT:
This view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, held that —
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can
not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxx xxx xxx
... the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant
in second jeopardy for the same offense.
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner's
plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding
petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted
into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must
perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to
property—not death—and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated
with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from
the same mishap."
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. CA-
G.R. No. 05123-CR is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of
the offense charged therein.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court,
San Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction seeks to set aside the Order dated 9 September
1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines,
plaintiff vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying petitioner's
Motion to Transfer said case to the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for trial on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property, through reckless
imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo truck which had collided
with a Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted
in the death of one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other
people. The Amended Complaint against petitioner read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the
MacArthur Highway, barrio San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck
bearing plate No. V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully
drive and operate the same in a negligent, imprudent and careless
manner, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations,
and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to
person and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
imprudence and carelessness, the said truck driven and operated by
him bumped and hit a Volkswagen car bearing plate no. E 604
Filipinos 1977, then driven by Antonio M. Concepcion, as a result of
which one of the occupants of the said car, Victoriana Miranda
Concepcion died in the said accident, and the other occupants namely:
Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili, Renee Ann Capili and
Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious physical injuries, and the said
car suffered damages in the amount of P18,000.00, belonging to
Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After
arraignment, respondent Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16
September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6
September 1977 a " Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of
First Instance for Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over the
case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was
that the amended criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen
car involved in the accident had suffered damages amounting to
P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime with which he was charged would carry a fine
in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three (3) times
the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00 or P54,000.00).
Petitioner urged in his Motion that because under Section 87 (e) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic Act No. 296 as
amended), the respondent Municipal Court of the Provincial Capital
of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses punishable by a
fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred to the
Court of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Postpone the trial of the case relying on the same grounds
set out in his Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of First
Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the
respondent Municipal judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977
denying the Motion to transfer the Case to the Court of First
Instance and set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal
Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of
the respondent court to try the criminal case against petitioner on the
merits.
ISSUE:
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent
Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the
criminal case against petitioner.
COURT: Respondent Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide,
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property,
resulting from reckless imprudence. Under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, in a prosecution for a complex crime constituted by
two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the
most serious crime is to be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. In the present case, one might, as respondent
Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the
offenses comprising the complex crime here involved. One is likely to
do so through eyes which are culturally conditioned and so is likely to
assume, as did respondent Municipal Judge, that the most serious
offense of which petitioner is accused is homicide through reckless
imprudence. Under paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, should he be found guilty
of homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
automobile law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendants shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner
before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such
Municipal Court in the capital of the Province of Pampanga had
jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000. 00 or both. The applicable
provision was the fourth paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act
No. 296 as amended which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and
judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six
years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the
absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the
province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of
homicide through reckless imprudence and damage to property
through reckless imprudence were correct, the respondent Municipal
Judge would have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal
charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of
offenses is determined by the seriousness of the penalties attached by
the law to the several offenses. It was noted earlier that the imposable
penalty in case of homicide through reckless imprudence
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., a
correctional penalty in the scale of penalties set up in Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the penalty for damage to
property through reckless imprudence is provided for in the third
paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as
follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of paid
damages to three-times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than P25.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty
(i.e., if it exceeds P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is
P200.00 or more but does not exceed P6,000.00). The offense so
penalized with a fine may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable fine
is afflictive in nature) or a less grave felony (i.e., if the imposable fine
is merely correctional). 1 In the instant case, the maximum fine
which may be imposed upon petitioner is P54,000.00 (3 x
P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the
scheme of the Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty
imposable for homicide through reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense
carries with it an afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive
offenses carry with them only a correctional or even a light penalty.
Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged
with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and
most serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the
complex crime. A complex crime must be prosecuted integrally, as it
were, and not split into its component offenses and the latter made the
subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts.
This is the thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal
with a criminal information against one Domingo Mejia before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, charging him with the crime of
damage to property in the sum of P654.22 and with less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, committed, in one
single act. There, the respondent Court of First Instance dismissed the
criminal information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code was only arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods which was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited
attention to the fact that the fine which could be imposed by the
respondent court on account of the damage to property through
reckless imprudence was a sum ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66
(P654.22 x 3) which amount was beyond the jurisdiction of a
Municipal Court to impose as fine. In setting aside the order of
dismissal by the respondent Court of First Instance and remanding the
case to the trial court further proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code] simply
means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there, should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split
into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to
property, for both the injuries and the damage committed were caused
by one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a
complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is clear
that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the
municipal court and within that of the court of first
instance. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take
cognizance of the case must be determined, not by the penalty for the
physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to property
through reckless imprudence need not be a lighter offense than less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the
maximum fine (P1,962.66) imposable upon the accused in
the Angeles case was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
Manila to impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles.
In Villanueva, the accused was charged before the Justice of Peace
Court of Batangas, Batangas with the crime of serious and less serious
physical injuries, with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
through reckless imprudence. The Justice of Peace Court subsequently
declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the
same to the Court of First Instance. The latter court then declared itself
similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime charged in the
information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver offense of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was only arresto
mayor in its, maximum and medium periods which penalty, even if
applied in its maximum degree (in view of the complex -nature of the
crime), would remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace
Court. Upon appeal by the prosecution, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction over the complex crime there involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the
rule laid down by us in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151
(1954)],, wherein we held that.—
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly
have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from appellant's
imprudence were the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and
less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property
through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of
the peace court. The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty
of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd
results. Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among
the various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory that crimes
cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more serious than those
triable injustice of the peace or municipal courts.
property resulting from the reckless imprudence. 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently
in effect, we would have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal
case against petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they should have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00,
and the maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through
reckless imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge
involved falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and
consequently within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9
September 1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 26 September
1977 is hereby made PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before
the respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal
of Pampanga will have to file a new information against petitioner in
the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution

may not be able to prove all the supposed offenses constituting the
complex crime charge. Were we to hold that it is the justice of the
Peace court that has jurisdiction in this case, if later the
prosecution should fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the
case and establish only the damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without jurisdiction
to impose the fine for the damage to property committed, since
such fine can not be less than the amount of the damage. Again, it
is to avoid this further absurdity that we must hold that the
jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this case.

The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an

inferior court on the one hand and the Regional Trial Court on the
other, in respect of complex crimes involving reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, was
summarized by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v. Malabanan: 6

It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of

Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March 30,1954 (40
O.G. 18 supp.), in imposing the corresponding penalty, to the
quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries
and damage to property, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
should be applied. However, there may be cases, as the one at
bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical injuries charged
would come within the jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the
peace court while the fine, for the damage to property, would fall on
the Court of First Instance. As the information cannot be split into
two, one for damages and another for the physical injuries, the
jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case must be
determined not by the corresponding penalty for the physical
injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was
driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her
van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result,
complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his
car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant
filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's
Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919)
charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information
read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco
Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw
bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless,
careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic
laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing
by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to
bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven
and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to
P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the
aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto
Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for
a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
then ensued.
RTC: rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi offense
of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight
physical injuries," and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to
pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen
Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs. 4
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant
suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the
resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but
imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight
Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited
in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car
repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for
extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex
Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However,
respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner
to file her brief. 6
CA: affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new
issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE
REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED
AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO
BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION,
IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
x x x           x x x          x x x
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON
GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised
on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED
JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED
MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN
EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR
IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE
WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A
PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO
MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT
TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR
COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A
SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL
RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below
misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as
authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People
v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty
for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the
courts below should have pronounced that there were two
separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence
with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with
damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime.
Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty
of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok v.
Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and
slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating
fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the
negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and
damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which,
therefore, constituted a complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses,
both imposable in their maximum period and computed or added
together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as
imposed by the lower courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only
by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two
months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January
1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision
occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it
prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was
already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in
relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's
motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that
light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the
wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto
menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight
physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on
summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of
limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should
have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto
mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably
with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which frowns upon splitting of
crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex"
reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to
property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of
reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need
for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the
Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for
slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took
cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the
higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to
thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v.
Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the
crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing
of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident,
pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed
gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to
the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance
on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there
validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with
physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two
separate informations were filed — one for slight and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this
case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two
informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos
v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was
proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence
with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v.
Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide,
which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given
retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the
first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses
in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
RULING:
I. The Proper Penalty
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six
months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by
respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot
subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period is the proper penalty.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the
penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period,
with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical
injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the
penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal
to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article
365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the
penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless
imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only.
What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides
for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month
and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted
a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of
P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been
malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and
the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher
than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the
penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that
provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of
Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree,
which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in
its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months.
Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could
be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of
4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of
Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein
provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without
regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise
by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is
performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill. 26
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of
the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00,
or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the
Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated
scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower
than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to
property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light
felony as claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony,
should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied?
Article 48 provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or
more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.
However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where
one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a
light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no
complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate
or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the
light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex
crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate
offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001;
See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as
a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and
the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that
the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage,
the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate
offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to
raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict
the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose
on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over
"all offenses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by
the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by
law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court
has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed
in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized
with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to
6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto
mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal
courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the
latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it
is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention
was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under
that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional
ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those
penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto
menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within
the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of
MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor
was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the
duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in
two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave
felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already
prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in
question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive
period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for
preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v.
Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with
the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant
case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a
prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the
latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that
what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance;
thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods
of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run."
Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only
when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.
Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding;
what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing
of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised
Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings
in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap
and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot,
therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge
decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is
SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed
therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919. G.R. No. L-36957 September 28, 1984

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED. ANICETO IBABAO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
No pronouncement as to costs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SO ORDERED MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court

of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 12784-CR, increasing the penalty
imposed on petitioner in People of the Philippines vs. Aniceto
Ibabao, for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence, for his failure to
lend aid to the victim.

Before the City Court of Davao, in Criminal Case No. 3091C,

petitioner was charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
The Information did not allege that the accused had failed to lend
on the spot to the injured person such help as was in his hands to
give.

Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Jose

Patalinghog, Jr., a bystander, who testified that on April 30, 1967, at
about 11:00 p.m., while he was at Bankerohan terminal, he clearly
saw an owner-type jeep bump a person; that the said jeep did not
stop; that upon request of a security guard, he gave chase, wrote down
the plate No. 57675, overtook it, and recognized the driver as the
petitioner, and thereafter reported the incident to the Matina Police
Sub-Station.

For his part, petitioner presented two witnesses in support of his

defense of alibi.

After trial, the City Court rendered a verdict of conviction thus:

In the case at bar, there appears no cogent or sufficient reason for the
accused not to lend aid on the spot to the fatally injured victim of the
accident. As such, applying the foregoing provisions the next penalty
next higher in degree is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period shall be followed. Furthermore, the heirs of the
deceased are lawfully entitled to indemnity and moral damages.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the herein accused is hereby pronounced guilty

beyond rational doubt of the offense charged. And applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to
undergo a prison term of from one year eight months and twenty days
of prision correccional as minimum to four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs, with
accessories prescribed by law.

Said accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the

deceased in the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), plus moral
damages in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. 1

CA: modified the aforecited Decision by increasing the penalty as

follows:

However, we notice that the decision a quo only awards the amount of

P6,000.00 as indemnity. Following the doctrine laid down in the cases
of People vs. Pantoja, L-19793, October 11, 1968 and People vs.
Ompad, et al. L-23513, January 31, 1969, the same should be
increased to P12,000. 00.

The imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium and

maximum periods (Article 365, Revised Penal Code). Considering
that appellant failed to stop and give aid to the victim, the penalty
should be one degree higher which is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods (R.A. 1790). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional
as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor. The P2,000.00 moral damages is hereby eliminated
considering that the same is already included in the P12,000.00
indemnity. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(Republic Act No. 5465).
WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed at appellant's Costs. 2
Before us now, petitioner has interposed this appeal by certiorari
praying for the modification of the penalty. Subsequently, he filed a
Motion for New Trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence,
particularly, the recantation by prosecution eyewitness Jose
Patalinghog.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the failure of petitioner to lend aid to his
victim justifies the imposition of the penalty next higher in degree to
that provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 365, as amended, of the
Revised Penal Code even though such circumstance was not alleged in
the Information; and
2) whether or not Patalinghog's affidavit of recantation is "newly
discovered evidence" warranting new trial.
COURT:
The pertinent provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, reads:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-
four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed, in the period which they may deem proper
to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give. (As amended
by Rep. Act No. 1790).
Petitioner submits that the last paragraph of the aforequoted Article
365 is not applicable to offenses under paragraph "2" of the same
Article because of the opening statement that "the provisions contained
in this article shall not be applicable implying that paragraph "2" is in a
class by itself and is not affected by the rest of the provisions of the
same Article
The argument is flawed. The proviso that "the provisions contained in
this article shall not be applicable" clearly refers to the preceding
paragraphs. Paragraphs "1" and "2" are exceptions to the application of
the said preceding paragraphs under the circumstances mentioned. The
last paragraph on failure to lend aid on the spot necessarily
applies to all situations envisioned in the said Article whenever
there is an injured party.
We find merit in petitioner's contention, however, that the
increased penalty is inapplicable to him because the failure to give
aid to the injured on the spot has not been alleged in the
Information. So far as we have been able to ascertain, this question
has not been definitely passed upon by this Court. But, we agree with
the then Court of Appeals when it ruled in People vs. Beduya  3 that
"the failure to render assistance, constitutes a qualifying
circumstances because the presence thereof raises the penalty by
one degree (like treachery which qualifies homicide to murder). The
same must be alleged in the information to apprise the defendant
of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which
even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if
proved at the trial without objection.
We are neither inclined to consider such failure to lend assistance as a
generic aggravating circumstance that would justify the imposition of
the penalty in its maximum period, since it is not an aggravating
circumstance listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Coming now to the Affidavit of recantation of Jose Patalinghog, Jr.,
suffice it to state that at this stage of the proceeding, the same cannot
be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial. In
the first place, the Affidavit was thought of only after this petition was
initially denied for lack of merit. Secondly, as has been the consistent
ruling of this Court recantations should be taken with great caution.
The reason is that if new trial should be granted at such instance where
an interested party succeeds in inducing some of the witnesses to vary
their testimony outside of court after trial, there would be no end to
every litigation. 4 As held in People vs. Saliling, et al.,  5
Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously
testified in court will not be countenanced for the purpose of securing
a new trial. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one
reason or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery
and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Recanted
testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability
that it may later be repudiated. So courts are wary or reluctant to allow
a new trial based on retracted testimony.
WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed by respondent Appellate Court is
hereby modified and petitioner-accused is hereby sentenced, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code
as mandated by Article 365 of the same Code, to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day, also of prision correccional as maximum; to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93475             June 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano
Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by
Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to
Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.1
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against
petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, being then the driver and
person in charge of an Owner Jeep Toyota bearing Plate No. NCC-313
UV Pilipinas '85, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and precautions to
avoid damage to property and injuries to persond (sic), did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and opefate
(sic) said Owner Jeep in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent
manner, as a result of which said motor vehicle being then driven and
operated by him, hit and bumped a tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate
No. NA-6575 MC Pilipinas '85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra
and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing damage to the Suzuki
tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the driver
and the passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained physical
injuries which required medical attendance as stated opposite their
respective names to wit:
1. Ernesto Reyes — More than thirty (30) days
2. Paulino Gonzal — More than thirty (30) days
3. Patricio Quitalig — Less than nine (9) days
and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the
same period of time.
which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
64294 and assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and (b) an Information for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's victim reading as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, being the driver of an
owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pil. '85 which hit and
bumped a motorized tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85 driven
by Ernesto Reyes and as a consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and
Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic)
them and failed (sic) to help or render assistance to them, without
justifiable reason.
which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig (Branch 71) and was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2793.
MTC: rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the
petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of
six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs.
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the appeal as Criminal Case No.
70648.
In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig. He entered a plea of not guilty.2
RTC: Petitioner’s appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was decided on
31 July 1989. The court affirmed with modification the decision
appealed from. The modification consisted merely in the reduction of
the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months.3
Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals on 31 August 1989 a petition for its review, docketed as C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 07351, assigning therein the following alleged errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT "THE TRICYCLE
DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP
DRIVEN BY THE PETITIONER."
II
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG.
METRO MANILA, THAT THE PETITIONER, "LOSING
PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO WOULD
INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED,
PERHAPS INSTINCTIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY,
APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER THE ENORMITY OF HIS
MISDEMEANOR AND THUS DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD
ASSISTANCE TO HIS FALLEN VICTIMS."
III
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT, "AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE
DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO
DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID COURT GIVING
CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES" FOR NOT
BEING (SIC) SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND
CLEARLY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
IV
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ABANDONMENT
UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF TWO (2)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO
PAY THE COSTS.
V
THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
NULL AND VOID ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PASIG AND ALL THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.4
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in
its Decision promulgated on 9 November 1989.5 Pertinently, it ruled:
We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art.
275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the
evidence allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver,
who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the import of
the provision. The provision punishes the failure to help or render
assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or
injured. Accidental means that which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design and which is unexpected,
unusual and unforeseen (Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary, 1972 ed., p.
7 citing De La Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17 SCRA 559).
Consequently, it is enough to show that petitioner accidentally injured
the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render them
assistance. There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and
that it was his negligence that caused the injury. If the factor of
criminal negligence is involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
will come into play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides that "the
penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured party such help as may be in his bands to give." Petitioner was
charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 not under Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he strongly urged
for reconsideration because:
x x x           x x x          x x x
. . . We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be penalized
twice for an "accident" and another for "recklessness", both of which
arose from the same act. We submit that there could not be a valid
charge under Article 275, when, as in the case at bar, there is already a
pending charge for reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is our view that the charge under Article 275
presupposes that there is no other charge for reckless imprudence.
having been denied in the Resolution of 17 May 1990, 6 petitioner filed
the instant petition.7
ISSUE:
Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article
275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for
prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he
has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously
charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
with multiple physical injuries" under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code?8
COURT:
Accused’s contention: He maintains the negative view and supports it
with the argument that "[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular
collision, one could not be indicted in two separate informations at
the same time based on "accident" and "recklessness', for there is a
world of difference between "reckless imprudence" and
"accidentally'." As expanded by him:
. . . since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence
pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila . . . which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under
Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment . . . for having allegedly failed "to
help or render assistance to another whom he
has accidentally wounded or injured".9
In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required respondents to
comment on the petition.
In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, putting the
issue squarely, thus:
. . . whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under
Article 275 of the same Code.
answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in
effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually
invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to
directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately
obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the
two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise
squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so
would have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and
convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case
No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before
the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction
in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in
the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for
double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned
in the previous case.11 In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised
Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez,12 We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A
simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.13
In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-
machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed.
Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to
dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A
simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a
person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for
separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. The second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for
Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter
Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against
Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa.
Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.14
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is
neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein
penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree.
The last paragraph of the Article specifically provides:
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in hand to give.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the
information. The information against petitioner in this case does
not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to
another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an
offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code which
reads:
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
x x x           x x x          x x x
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom
he has accidentally wounded or injured.
The foregoing distinctions satisfy the guidelines We made in People
vs. Relova, et al.,15 wherein We held:
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The
identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity:
the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense"
where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense
is an attempt to commit the first or a registration thereof. Thus, for the
constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to
prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle
barred the filing of the two informations against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is DENIED without
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195671               January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision2 dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated January
26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-
MIN, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 31, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10 (RTC)
in Criminal Case No. 9832-99, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga
(Rogelio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio
Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy.
Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc 5 of the same
municipality, to bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito,
Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito 6 (Cherry), to school.7 While
they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper
lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land
Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane
from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his
motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane
but the Land Cruiser remained.8 In order to avoid collision,
Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser
suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-
on with the motorcycle.9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were
thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land
Cruiser,10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of
the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, 11 causing injuries to
their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, 12 and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were
traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help
and placed the victims together13 on the rightmost side of the road
facing Brgy. Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land
Cruiser.15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his
two (2) sisters to cater to the victims. 16 Eventually, he chanced upon
Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his
store, and informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting
the incident to the police and getting his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas
proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s
assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform
Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had
transpired.18 Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency
Hospital of Maramag where they were treated. 19 Operations were
performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter
eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was
confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one
(1) month, or until July 26, 1997. 20 All the expenses were shouldered
by Clemencia.21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an
Information22 charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property "with the aggravating circumstance that
accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help
that was in his hands to give” before the RTC. Upon
arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.25
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser
on his proper lane along the descending curving road towards the
direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about 70
meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf
racing towards the curve from the opposite direction. 26 Dionesio, Sr.
was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s
lane while Rolf was on his proper lane. 27 Undecided which side of the
road to take to avoid collision, Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but
the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped into it. 28 As a
result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the
roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the
side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned
beneath the land Cruiser. 29 With the use of a jack handle and the
assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato,
who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and
the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded
the victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe
hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have defective brakes, so he
asked other persons to secure another vehicle instead. 30
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the RTC
found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC. 32
It held that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the
road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of
Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Considering further that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the
victims,33 the RTC sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the
following civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the
death of Dionesio, Sr.; (b) ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the
mental anguish suffered by the family; (c) ₱200,000.00 for the medical
expenses incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the
wake and the burial; (e) ₱30,000.00 for the damaged motorcycle; (f)
₱60,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity; and (g) ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration 35 which was partly granted
in a Resolution36 dated February 22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, with
the same civil liabilities. The RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding
Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the victims, concluding that
the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath
the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who
owned the same.37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision38 dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated
the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the
original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of
prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil
liabilities,39 hence, this petition. The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld Rogelio’s conviction in accordance with the RTC’s
July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 40 of the RPC, consists
in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of
a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for
the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has
been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which
injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others
involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger
to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of
precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that
Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the
proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr.
and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the
road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards
Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards
the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact
of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent
behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care
in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the
highway.43 Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver
slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably
anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite
direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other
circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a
curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence. 44 Consequently, the Court
finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast
speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve
where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable,
aswell as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting
therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the
proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the
CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the
limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his
hands to give." Based on case law, the obligation under this
paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the
offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the
time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b)
requires adequate proof.45
It is well to point out that the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision found
that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims46 and, thus,
imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree.However, upon
Rogelio’s motion, the RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion,
holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of
Dionesio,Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the
absence of showing who owned the same and, accordingly,
reduced the penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA
which affirmed Rogelio’s conviction based on the RTC’s July 31,
2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies
presented by the prosecution and the defense on this
matter. Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that the
victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were
transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle,48 the Court is inclined to
sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the victims,
but when he started the engine with the intention to go to the
hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no brakes. 49 Hence, in
imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying
circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC
should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 50 of
the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case,
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use
of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case,
the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, 51 the minimum of said penalty should be
taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a
need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus,
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of
prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of
prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of
"moral damages" in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of
Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking, denominated as one for the
payment of "civil indemnity" as they were not awarded under the
parameters of the Civil Code relevant thereto, 52 but was one "given
without need of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the
crime and proof of [the accused’s] responsibility for it."53 This is a
palpable legal error which the Court should correct if only for
terminological propriety. With the private complainant not herein
impleaded, the rest of the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision with respect
to the civil liabilities awarded should remain undisturbed. Note that, in
line with existing jurisprudence, interest atthe rate of six percent (6)
per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.54
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 18, 2009 and the Resolution dated January 26, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding
petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code are hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum; and
(b) The award of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in
favor of his heirs is denominated as "civil indemnity," instead
of"moral damages."
(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated October
22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding
Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of public
documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the
felony of falsification of public document, penalized under Article
171(4) of the RPC, in an Information,4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Malabon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio M.
Sevilla, a public officer, being then a member of the [S]angguniang
[P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor
thereof, taking advantage of his official position and committing the
offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth
of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form
212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document,
which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City
Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no
criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused
fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97,
entitled “People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and
Artemio Sevilla”, for Assault Upon An Agent Of A Person In
Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon
City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5chanrobleslaw
Upon arraignment, Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty.  Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term
as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration
in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). 6  That in answer to the question
of whether there is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla
marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer despite the
pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent
of a person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Malabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint,
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed against
Sevilla.  In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty
and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the
service.  In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7 the Court, in the Resolution dated
June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman
as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the
box corresponding to the “no” answer vis-à-vis the question on
whether he has any pending criminal case.  However, he averred
that he did not intend to falsify his PDS.   He claimed that it was
Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually
prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an office
yet, he just stayed in his house.  At around two o’clock in the
afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish
his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of
Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed
Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which
he filed with the personnel office.  After the PDS was filled up and
delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the
same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he
failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any
pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the
“no” answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres
(Torres), a former City Councilor.  Torres testified that Sevilla was not
yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001;
that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the
typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office.  him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional
Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of
Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, 8 the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found
GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless
Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence of any modifying
circumstances the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which
it could arise do[es] not appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9chanrobleslaw
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in
his PDS, which is a public document, and that, in so doing, he took
advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor.  That
being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to
prepare, accomplish and submit the same.  Further, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to
disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case against him.  commission of a crime.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to
establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public
documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be
convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) 10 of
the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS.  However, considering that Sevilla’s
PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false
entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article
36511 of the RPC.  Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the “no” box to the question on whether
there was a pending criminal case against him was not the only defect
in his PDS.  As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman
in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 in the PDS, accused
answered that he had not been a candidate in any local election
(except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served as
councilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998.  Notwithstanding the
negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to
question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to
1998.  Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless
shows that the preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that
accused did not act with malicious intent to falsify the document in
question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of
narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon.  The
reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data therein makes
him criminally liable for his act.  Accused is a government officer,
who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a
councilor of the same city.  Thus, he should have been more mindful
of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the said public
document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convicted of Falsification of Public
Document through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and penalized in
Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code. x x x.12
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan
in its Resolution13 dated October 22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
Sevilla’ contention: Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the
felony of falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence.  He claims that the Information that was filed against
felony, i.e. falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of
the RPC.  Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the
RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be
violated.
Issue
WON Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the
charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation
of the felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate.  The
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished
under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a
public document.  However, the Sandiganbayan designated the
felony committed as “falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence.”  The foregoing designation implies that
reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality
of committing it.  Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.  As early as the middle
of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that “reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x” on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
“reckless imprudence” is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent.  There are crimes
that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc.  In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses.  It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology.  In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of
felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed.  Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.  For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety.  But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum,
to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes. (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes
is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person
or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court
clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence “is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology.  In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible.  Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as
‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the
strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to
property’.”
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense
without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and
bar in strict adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by
Sevilla, the Court now weighs the merit of the instant appeal.  Sevilla’s
appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged
in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the
prosecution.  The rules on variance between allegation and proof are
laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4.  Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. –
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
Sec. 5.  When an offense includes or is included in another. – An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.  And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a
defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged
against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information
charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was
able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents.  Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved
then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of
falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the
foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of
the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason
that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of
falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his
part.  Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a wilful
crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x,
but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense, in our Penal
Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can
be had under an information exclusively charging the commission
of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. 
Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting
the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks in
question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to
take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the
real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do.  In other words,
the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but
which turned out to be not willful but negligent.  This is a case
covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by
this Tribunal.19 (Emphasis ours)chanrobleslaw
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged
the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is
untenable.  To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the
willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the
greater offense.  As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public
documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is
instructive.  In Sarep, the petitioner therein falsified his appointment
paper which he filed with the CSC.  An Information was then filed
against him for falsification of public document.  Nevertheless, the
Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused
therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of
injuring some person.  The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan’s
disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit
of the circumstance that he did not maliciously pervert the truth with
the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil.
341).  Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his
having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer
(Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were
sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only
be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs.
Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs.
Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal
negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle way between a
wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a
felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may
entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability.  It is the duty of
everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order
that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from
acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p.
1884).  What is penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although
such mental attitude might have produced several effects or
consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24,
1966).21chanrobleslaw
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless
imprudence resulting in falsification of public document is punishable
by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period.  In this case, taking into account the pertinent
provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan
correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four (4) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and
twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the

appeal is DISMISSED.  The Decision dated February 26, 2009 and
the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.