Economic Development

Running out of water

Amal Ennabih16 September 202056min12120

Irrigation
Morocco
Water
Water scarcity

Morocco’s water policies for irrigation have ampli ed water scarcity, it’s time to think differently

Morocco’s water policies for irrigation have ampli ed water scarcity, it’s time to think differently

Introduction

In January 2020, King Mohammed VI chaired a work meeting in Marrakech[1] that resulted in a program
adopted by the government of Morocco called “National priority programme to supply drinking water and
irrigation 2020-2027” (programme national prioritaire d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation 2020-
2027) with an investment of 115 billions of Dirhams (approximatively $ 12 billion). Among its objectives, it
included (1) a rise in water supply by building new dams (2) a better management of water demand and water
valuation particularly in agriculture, (3) enhancing the supply of drinking water in rural areas, (4) using recycled
wastewater for greens spaces irrigation and (5) sensitizing and heightening awareness on the importance of
preserving water resources and rationalizing its use.[2]Moreover, following the Royal guidelines as regards the
program for water saving in agriculture, an overall budget of 14,7 billion of Dirhams (approximately $ 1,44
billion) was allocated to the supply of irrigation water, covering 510 000 hectares and bene ting 160 000
people.[3]

Such programs were set as a yet another response to the water scarcity problem Morocco is facing right now,
which is likely to face a major water shortfall in the near future caused by “the expansion in demand of
water”[4] and “the reduction in precipitation induced by climate change.”[5] However, water scarcity in Morocco
is not linked to the increasing demand for water resources by households or the industrial sector (including the
tourism industry), as both consume around 20% of the resources mobilized. In fact, Morocco’s water scarcity
is deeply linked to the way water is used in irrigation, consuming around 80% of Morocco’s water annually.[6]

The agricultural strategy, that is based on a “store and save” water approach for irrigation, was implemented in
a manner that makes farmers more dependent to rainfall and more vulnerable to drought. The increasing use
of technology may have some bene ts, but crucial issues persist. Notably, Morocco is prioritizing irrigation for
exports and, for a water stressed country, exports of its agricultural products implies the export of a part of the
much-needed water. Moreover, the current irrigation policy may have deepened social inequalities. On one
hand, it mostly bene ted big farmers, as the main bene ciaries of water policies are the entrepreneurs, the
business farmers focusing on export-oriented production. On the other hand, the traditional Moroccan farmer
that relies on rainfall and aquifers has not bene ted that much from the modernization of the agricultural
section and have sometimes created even more problem that it was initially, such as in Zagora watermelon
cultivation projects.

This paper aims at to demonstrate that Morocco’s current irrigation policies make Moroccan society
vulnerable to climate change. First, the paper argues that the country, through its hydraulic and agricultural
strategy is actually more and more dependent on rainfall, which seems counterintuitive given the
environmental context. Second, Morocco is actually exporting much needed water by favoring export-oriented
agricultural strategies instead of national food security. Finally, this paper highlights how current water policies
widen social inequalities, especially affecting traditional farmers, albeit invisible, as water access is
complicated for family farmers thereby creating more social inequalities and poverty.

Is Morocco really facing water scarcity?

Water scarcity is de ned as “the lack of access to adequate quantities of water for human and environmental
uses,”[7] the term being used globally to qualify the state of water resources on pressure. In order to measure
its levels, the most common indicator is the “water stress index” conceived by Falkenmark et al. (1989) by
calculating the total water resources available to the population of a country[8]: if the amount of fresh water in
a country is below 1700 m3 per person per year, the country is said to be experiencing water stress ; below
1000 m3 per person per year it is said to be experiencing water scarcity and below 500 m3, absolute water
scarcity. Henceforth, the Economic Social and Environmental Council (CESE) sounded the alarm, on
September 26th 2019, by announcing that Morocco’s water resources were depleted severely as they are
currently estimated at less than 650 m3 per person per year, compared to 2500 m3 in 1960 and should fall
below 500 m3 by 2030. CESE also announced that climate change could cause the disappearance of 80% of
the available water resources in Morocco within the next 25 years.[9]

Another ratio developed by the World Resources Institute through its Aqueduct project,[10] helps better
understand the critical situation the country is in. The baseline water stress ratio estimates the degree to
which freshwater is available as it calculates the total annual freshwater withdrawal for the year relative to
expected annual renewable freshwater supply based on 1950 – 1990 climatic norms. It provides an
assessment of the demand for freshwater from households, industry and irrigated agriculture relative to
freshwater availability in a typical year[11]. In their latest publication[12], Morocco ranked 22d worldwide,
suffering from a high baseline water stress. In other words, with a score of 3.89 out of 5, the demand for
freshwater approaches up to 80% of the annual renewable supply, leading to greater socioeconomic
competition for water and a higher risk of supply disruptions. Projections elaborated in 2015 by the same
institute announced a baseline water stress score of 4,68 by 2040, making Morocco at the 18th place. All in all,
it is Morocco’s water security that is questioned and presented as the main challenge: how to make sure that
water is “effectively, sustainably and equitably managed”?[13]

Since Morocco’s independence, the political display of water and irrigation public policies has driven the image
of a country working towards water and food security. However, one cannot ignore the succession of
emergency plans that continue to be launched to mitigate the catastrophic consequences of droughts. Why
then, as they seek to address the structural consequences of climate change, public authorities persist in
calling for emergency short-term plans? Does the postponement of the design of new water policies taking
into account structural drought represent a refusal to acknowledge the modest results of past and current
policies with respect to water security?

Policy of “Store and Save” water for irrigation: a questionable implementation

Water policies in Morocco follow the objective of increasing water supply through two levers of action: on one
hand through the mobilization of more water, historically through dam building and more recently through
desalination and treated wastewater reuse and on the other hand through saving water with the introduction of
drip irrigation. This rationale of “store and save” water has however shown its limits in the way it was
implemented.
Since its independence, Morocco prioritized the expansion of irrigated areas, which relied on a  dams’ policy
(Politique des barrages) which started o cially in 1967 after a World Bank mission a few years before. The
idea was to push for large-scale irrigation, in order to ght droughts, raise agricultural production and achieve
national food security. Building one dam a year and working to reach a million hectares of irrigated perimeters
by the year 2000 became the nation’s mantra.[14] Forty years later, the country counts 144 large-scale dams
and 255 hill dams,[15] between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000 hectares[16] of irrigated perimeters and yet it still
suffers from water scarcity. Moroccans’ daily life is still rhythmed by alarm bells of “water security elevated
risks,” “State emergency in water management,” “anti-drought emergency plans,” “water stress” and lately of
“water supply emergency plan.” Thus, it is clear that building an important number of hydraulic devices for
water storage and irrigation does not automatically prevent Morocco from water shortage. The
misunderstanding lies in the way we see dams as the unalterable solution to water scarcity.

In the context of climate change and structural drought, a dam cannot be the go-to solution anymore.
Morocco’s circumstances have changed: gone are the predictable succession of rainy and dry seasons on
which Morocco built its water and agricultural policies. Now drought is structural, spanning many years and
rain comes often heavily in short bursts which provokes material and environmental destruction, thus di cult
to store appropriately. As stated before, a dam allows to store water (mostly rainwater and melted snow) in
order to use it all year long and not only during rainy season for irrigation and drinkability.  The fundamental
purpose of a dam is to stave off the effects of seasonality and passing droughts. However, when drought
becomes structural, dams become practically useless due to the lack of rainfall. The lling level of dams
provides important insights in evaluating water availability. For example, 40% of the main large dams surveyed
on June 3rd, 2020 by the General Direction of Water attached to the Ministry of Equipment, Transports,
Logistics and Water have a lling level below 50%.[17] Finally, building dams does not mean automatically
ghting water scarcity: irrigated perimeters still need to be built, dams need to be maintained and preserved
from sedimentation in order to keep their full volume capacity, hydraulic networks need to be built and
maintained too. Unfortunately, it was often reported that many dams needed to be reelevated, that the
establishment of irrigation projects were delayed or ill-equipped, or that hydraulic networks were leaking.[18]
Such ine ciencies in policy implementation makes a conjunction of moments where water is wasted after
storage despite the important investments allocated to such projects.

The issue of e ciency and water wastage constitutes one of the main concerns of water for irrigation policies
on the international and national level. By integrating the National Irrigation Water Saving Program (Programme
National d’Economie d’Eau en Irrigation)[19] as part of the Green Morocco Plan (Plan Maroc Vert) in 2008,
public authorities have shown their willingness to promote drip irrigation, a technology presented as a water
saving device that would help farmers “increase the value of water along the value chain  i.e more production
and more added value per cubic meter of water and in a sustainable way.”[20] To implement such a program,
public authorities have allocated a budget of 37 billions of Dirhams[21] (around $ 3.5 millions) and have
offered a subsidized nancing package covering from 80% up to 100 % of the drip equipment costs.[22]
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the objective was to save up to 826 millions of cubic meters (m3) of
water  per year (514 millions of m3 from large scale public irrigation projects and 312 millions of m3 from
private irrigated areas using groundwater) by converting 550 000 hectares of surface irrigated perimeters.[23]
By 2017, 542 000 hectares were equipped with drip irrigation technology due to the heavy campaign led by
local authorities.[24] Interestingly, as years passed, the saving water discourse has taken a back seat in favor
of productivity and the famous “more crop per drop” injunction.

Between productivity and saving water, public authorities seem to favor productivity. Indeed, the Moroccan
experience showed that in the end, the narrative of modernization and intensi cation of farming practices
remains dominant. It’s been observed that farmers have mainly adopted the technology as it was a mean to
attain a certain social status (image of a modern farmer) and economic gain.[25] As a matter of fact, drip
irrigation was the occasion for farmers to convert their plot into higher valued plants such as onions or
potatoes which demand more water, or extend their perimeter by investing into another plot where to install
drip irrigation and dig consequently more wells. Moreover, practices of over-irrigation in order to achieve
optimal yield were also often observed, putting more pressure on water demands. Interestingly, it is impossible
to evaluate the “water saved” through this technology as there are few water meters installed in the perimeters
and there are no o cial instructions given to farmers to limit their water consumption. As such, Morocco went
from a policy that publicizes “saving water” into a policy that equips in drip irrigation and encourages
intensi cation of agriculture.
In both the “store and save” water strategies, what stands out is the way technology takes over and diverts
from the initial aim of the designed policy. It is important that Morocco centers its water policies on the
practices (being farmers’ or public agents’) and on the evolution of the environmental context, and not
exclusively on the technology, as technology is as effective as what we make of it depending on the context we
use it. There are no automatic bene ts by just installing a dam or drip irrigation. There are other factors that
should be taken into consideration, such a climate change, and authorities should engage more with farmers’
practices through drawing contracts of limited water consumption and constantly monitoring water
consumption for irrigation.

Irrigation for exportation: Exporting the much-needed water?

Since its independence Morocco’s water for irrigation policies were supposed to pave the way for food security
and rural development. To do so, priority was given to agricultural intensi cation, through the implementation
of irrigated perimeters. However, a large part of the production coming from such perimeters is dedicated to
exportation and not to the national market. To better understand the issue at stake, 80% of the usable water
resources (surface water and aquifers)[26] are used to irrigate 15% of Morocco’s “utilized agricultural land”
(surface agricole utile)[27] which contributes up to 75% of the country’s agricultural exports.[28] Hence, the
continuous emergency plans against drought and water shortage. The truth is that the country still relies
heavily on rainfall for its food security, as observed with the impact of this year’s drought on cereals
production[29] (mostly situated in rainfed areas), and is still heavily dependent on importation.[30] The
prioritization of storing water for business development and the Green Morocco Plan (le Plan Maroc Vert) has
only ampli ed this trend.

In 2008, the Green Morocco Plan came as a response to the country’s ambition to develop a modern, high-
added value, high productivity agricultural sector. The policy, designed by a private foreign consultancy rm
(McKinsey Company), has been showcased as the engine towards the transformation of Moroccan agriculture
into a competitive sector “for economic growth and poverty reduction.”[31] To that end, the policy was divided
in two pillars: Pillar 1, which focused on the capitalistic side of the agricultural sector and Pillar 2, targeting
small farmers located in semi-arid and disadvantaged regions. However, the budget allocated to each pillar
highlights the importance given to agricultural exportations as 75 billion dirhams ($7,5 billion) are to be
invested for over 10 years on projects related to Pillar 1.[32] In comparison, investments for Pillar 2 were xed
at 20 billion dirhams ($2 billion). Apart from the inequality in allocation, the announced investments remain
quite ambitious.

Water and agricultural policies are supposed to propose an encompassing model of both rural and economic
development. However, it seems that public authorities gave more emphasis to the latter. It’s been observed
that despite the announcement of an inclusive agricultural plan taking into consideration the duality of the
sector, the focus stayed on the development of an exportation-oriented agriculture through the establishment
of plant chains on high return (and for some, high water consumption) crops such as vegetables, fruits and
olive oil necessitating permanent water for irrigation access.[33] Ten years later, agricultural growth is globally
picking up.[34] Reports show that the average annual growth rate of olive trees production is 7,4%, vegetables
1,2% and citruses 6,3%. In terms of exportations, the average annual growth rate registered for fruits (dry, fresh
or frozen) is of 13,5%, vegetables (fresh or frozen) is of 8,5% and fresh tomatoes is of 5,6%.[35] Meanwhile, the
cereal sector – which Moroccans depend on for food security – remains unstable and highly dependent on
rainfall.[36]

Morocco has built a paradoxically unequal agricultural water model: the water stored through multiple and
expensive hydraulic systems is mostly exported in the form of citruses, other fruits and vegetables (business
rst) while small farmers have to deal with the consequences of lack of rainfall and depleted aquifers.
Moreover, such irrigation policies do not even serve the objective of food security as 90% of the cereal
cultivated areas are rainfed.

Current water policies for irrigation have deepened social inequalities  

In fact, the promotional effects of past and present water and agricultural policies with its catching numbers
(budget, dimensions etc.) not only failed to guarantee food security but also produced winners and losers. So
far, the rst bene ciaries of water policies are the big entrepreneurs, the business farmers focusing on export-
oriented production. One category of farmers is absent in the design of policies, the family farmer,[37] the
traditional Moroccan farmer that relies on rainfall and aquifers to care for his cattle and its plot of land.

By striving to modernize the agriculture sector, Moroccan policymakers designed public policies adapted only
to those who have the means to follow them in their ambition, at the expense of family farmers. Experiences in
Zagora[38] and El Guerdane[39] show how con icts emerge because of the inequalities in water access that
were caused by Green Morocco projects. For instance, in Zagora, watermelon cultivation projects approved by
the Green Moroccan Plan and where drip equipment were subsided has dried up a region that already suffers
from water scarcity[40]. Not only the production of high-water consuming crops in a region at the doors of the
Sahara is questionable, but also the usual mishandling of drip irrigation and the lack of rain push entrepreneurs
to dig deeper into aquifers to get more water. Generally, family farmers do not have the means to take up the
costs of digging deeper wells when they dry up. Aquifers are shared by both categories of farmers, when some
take more, it means that others have less; leaving a population thirsty for water.[41]Hence, the numerous
“protests of thirst” that have taken place in the last few years in the Zagora region have shown that sentiments
of anger, humiliation and injustice are palpable.[42]

Similarly, the mere fact of building a dam and transferring water for the project of El Guerdane in the Souss
region disturbed or stopped the access of water for a certain population who used the water of the Oued
(valley)[43]. Building a dam diverted the course of the water depriving some farmers from it. From there on, the
dam allowed the creation of new irrigated perimeters but deprived some farmers of their water. To put it
bluntly, entrepreneurial farming is depleting the aquifers all within the legal and procedural framework of the
Green Moroccan Plan and leaving family farmers struggling. Such inequality in water access and its social
consequences are not addressed in the structures of the policies implemented so far. And seeing public
authorities approving projects that nancially bene t one speci c social category while endangering the safety
of another, by cutting off their water, creates a legitimate social anger and a real distrust of public authorities. 
And that’s why, in times of dire crises, long drought for example causing cattle dying, drinking water cuts,
social anger etc.., authorities resort to emergency plans.

Conclusion

Morocco’s water management is still rhythmed by water emergency plans for two main reasons. First, its
“store and save” policies seem to be more focused on technical features than on water management and
changes in farmers practices. Second, its water for irrigation policies seem to overlook family farmers whose
livelihood still relies on rainfed land and cattle. This category of population invisible in ordinary times, becomes
apparent in times of crisis, leading to social unrest, which eventually pushes public authorities to action.

The past and current water for irrigation policies have been unbalanced. Rural and economic development
should go hand in hand through an inclusive approach, but so far, in a structural drought and climate change
context, public authorities have favored water exportation at the detriment of family farmers. The policies
implemented only accentuate the state of water scarcity which strikes the vulnerable rst.

More importantly, a situation of scarcity is not set. Climate change results in less rainfall which limits
Morocco’s water storage capacity. But it is important to also understand that water scarcity is constructed on
water demand, the way it is managed and the political, social and economic choices that are made. Hence,
Morocco needs a new water for irrigation policy that gets back to basics. Aside from being a driver for
economic growth, agriculture should also be a driver for social development. The focus should be on
improving food and water security and introducing a more equal access to water, leaving no one behind. To do
so, the following recommendations can be made:

To move towards sustainable inclusive policies that cater also to family farmers by securing their
livelihood (in rainfed areas) from threats of droughts and lack of rainfall. In particular, the following
measures could move towards a concrete solution of this issue:
1. To set up and enforce key water consumption metrics and quota (being for surface water or
aquifers) in order to contain water demands and prevent water grabbing and unequal access;
2. To support nancially and technically rainwaters collection projects launched by farmers;
3. To support farmers into adapting their practices (seeding date, etc.) to climate change;
4. To generalize the inclusion of farmers in the production chains;
5. To raise awareness for the importance of short distribution channels;
 6. To offer training and support to the young generation of farmers in rainfed areas.
To invest on crops adapted to semi-arid and arid climates rather than the water intensive ones;
To continue on investing on alternative water resources such as treated wastewater reuse and
desalination in order to limit Morocco’s dependence on rainfall;
Finally, policymakers have also to focus on the way such technical solutions are implemented and their
social implications, in order to avoid the ine cient use of the resources invested in these policies.

Footnotes

[1] “Le Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau potable et d’irrigation”, Médias24, January 7th, 2020
<https://www.medias24.com/le-roi-mohammed-vi-115-mmdh-pour-le-programme-d-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation-6659.html>

[2] See for reference the following articles: “Lancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et
d’irrigation », Libération, January 15th, 2020 <https://www.libe.ma/Lancement-du-Programme-prioritaire-national-d-
approvisionnement-en-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation_a114762.html> ; « Le Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau
potable et d’irrigation”, Médias24, January 7th, 2020 <https://www.medias24.com/le-roi-mohammed-vi-115-mmdh-pour-le-
programme-d-eau-potable-et-d-irrigation-6659.html> ; “Mohammed VI lance un programme à 115 milliards de dirhams pour l’eau
potable et l’irrigation”, Telquel, January 7th, 2020 <https://telquel.ma/2020/01/08/mohammed-vi-lance-un-programme-a-115-
milliards-de-dirhams-pour-leau-potable-et-lirrigation_1663942>

[3] “Lancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation », Libération, January 15th, 2020
<https://www.libe.ma/Lancement-du-Programme-prioritaire-national-d-approvisionnement-en-eau-potable-et-d-
irrigation_a114762.html> ; Momar Diao, « Economie d’eau dans l’agriculture : Les composantes du plan septennal dévoilées »,
Finances News Hebdo, January 20th, 2020 <https://fnh.ma/article/developpement-durable/economie-d-eau-dans-l-agriculture-les-
composantes-du-plan-septennal-devoilees>

[4] Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key
Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC.

[5] Ibid

[6] See Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key
Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Citing FAO (2018), it states that Morocco allocates between 75% and 87% of its
water resources to irrigation. For simpli cation, we will use the estimate of 80% in our argumentation.

[7] Chris White, “Understanding water scarcity: De nitions and measurements », Global Water Forum, May 7th,
2012<https://globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/understanding-water-scarcity-de nitions-and-measurements/>

[8] Falkenmark, M., J. Lundquist and C. Widstrand (1989), “Macro-scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-scale Approaches: Aspects of
Vulnerability in Semi-arid Development”, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 258-267 cited in Chris White, “Understanding
water scarcity: De nitions and measurements », Global Water Forum, May 7th, 2012
<https://globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/understanding-water-scarcity-de nitions-and-measurements/>

[9] Maïne Alloui, “Le CESE alerte sur la menace de stress hydrique”, Telquel, January 9th, 2020 <https://telquel.ma/2020/01/09/le-
cese-alerte-sur-la-menace-de-stress-hydrique_1652765> ; The Economic, Social and Environmental Council : “Le droit à l’eau et la
sécurité hydrique, gravement menacés par un usage intensif : Le CESE tire la sonnette d’alarme et appelle à entreprendre des
mesures urgentes » (Translation : « The right to water and water security under serious threat from intensive use: The EESC sounds
the alarm and calls for urgent measures to be taken ») ; « Document/ Sécurité hydrique: Le CESE tire encore la sonnette d’alarme »,
L’Economiste, September 26th, 2019

[10] The new aqueduct water risk atlas: what’s new & why does it matter to you? Technical Note, World Resources Institute, August
2019

[11] Ibid

[12] Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face
Extremely High Water Stress » World Resources Institute, August 6th, 2019
 <https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/08/17-countries-home-one-quarter-world-population-face-extremely-high-water-stress>; Aqueduct
Water Risk Atlas, World Resources institute, August 2019 <https://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/aqueduct-30-country-rankings>

[13] Beyond scarcity. Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA development report. World Bank Group. 2018.
Washington, DC

[14] King Hassan II’s speeches in Tangiers, September 18th, 1967 and in Oued El Makhazine, March 14th, 1974 as reported by
Yassine Benargane. « Le 18 septembre 1967, le roi Hassan II lançait le grand projet d’irrigation d’1 million d’hectares », Yabiladi,
January 18th, 2017 <https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/57533/septembre-1967-hassan-lancait-grand.html> and Jean-
Jacques Perrenès. 1993. L’eau et les hommes au Maghreb. Contribution à une politique de l’eau en Méditerranée. Editions Karthala.
Paris.

[15] « Amara: le Maroc compte 144 grands barrages et 13 autres en cours de construction », H24, November 6th, 2018
<https://www.h24info.ma/economie/amara-le-maroc-compte-144-grands-barrages-et-13-autres-en-cours-de-construction/ > ; ALM.
« Barrages : 40 ouvrages construits et 35 en cours ». Aujourd’hui le Maroc. July 31st, 2019.
<http://aujourdhui.ma/economie/barrages-40-ouvrages-construits-et-35-en-cours  ; List of built dams in Morocco from the Water
General Direction attached to the Ministry of Equipment, Transports, Logistics and Water
<http://81.192.10.228/patrimoine/barrages/barrages-existants/  >

[16] Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key
Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC.

[17] Daily situation of the main large dams <http://81.192.10.228/patrimoine/barrages/situation-journaliere-des-principaux-grands-

barrages/ >

[18] « Un milliard d’eau perdu par an » L’Economiste. April 28th, 2004 <https://www.leconomiste.com/article/un-milliard-de-m3-d-eau-
perdu-par >

[19] The program is actually the revamped version of « le Programme National de Subvention à l’Irrigation Localisée » launched in
2002 in the objective to implement drip irrigation in 114 000 ha. See Tanouti & Molle, 2017

[20] Mhamed Belghiti. 2008. « Programme National d’Economie et de Valorisation de l’eau en irrigation ». Ministère de l’Agriculture et
de la pêche maritime

[21] Ibid.

[22] For details on the conditions see : Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la pêche maritime. 2019. Fonds de Dévelopement Agricole.Les
aides nancières de l’État pour la promotion des investissements agricoles.

[23] See François Molle, Oumaima Tanouti. 2017. La micro-irrigation et les ressources en eau au Maroc : un coûteux malentendu.
Alternatives rurales. Maroc ; François Molle. 2017. Con icting policies: agricultural intensi cation vs. water conservation in Morocco.
G-EAU Working Paper/Rapport de RechercheNo.1. Montpellier, France ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte à goutte à
l’économie d’eau : ambition réaliste ou poursuite d’une chimère ? Alternatives rurales. Maroc. ; Saskia van der Kooij, Marcel Kuper et
al. 2017. Re-allocating yet-to be saved water in irrigation modernisation projects : the case of the Bittit irrigation system, Morocco. In
Drip irrigation for agriculture. Untold stories of e ciency, innovation and development. Eds. Jean Vénot et al. Chapter 4. Routledge.
New York, London.

[24] Agence pour le Développpement Agricole. Principales réalisations du Plan Maroc Vert <https://www.ada.gov.ma/fr/principales-
realisations-du-plan-maroc-vert >

Jean-Modeste Kouame. Irrigation : Magriser à la conquête du marché subsaharien. L’économiste. January 28th, 2019.
<https://www.leconomiste.com/article/1039903-irrigation-magriser-la-conquete-du-marche-subsaharien >

[25] See Maya Benouniche’s work on the topic : Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte à goutte à l’économie d’eau : ambition
réaliste ou poursuite d’une chimère ? Alternatives rurales. Maroc ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Making the user visible: analysing
irrigation practices and farmers’ logic to explain actual drip irrigation performance. Irrigation Science. ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014.
Bricolage as innovation: opening the black box of drip irrigation systems. Irrigation and Drainage. 63: 651–658. See also the work of
François Molle and Oumaima Tanouti referred previously.

[26] For further details see : Abou Bekr Seddik EL Gueddari. Economie d’eau d’irrigation au Maroc. Ministry of Agriculture. Rural
Engineering administration ; Abou Bekr Seddik El Gueddari. 2004. Economie d’eau en irrigation au Maroc : acquis et perspectives
d’avenir. Revue Hommes, Terre et Eaux. N° 130. Septembre 2004

[27] Ministry of agriculture irrigation webpage : http://www.agriculture.gov.ma/pages/lirrigation-au-maroc

[28] Ibid.

[29] Abdelaziz Ghouibi. “Campagne céréalière : 30 millions e quintaux à récolter”. L’Economiste. April 24th, 2020.
<https://www.leconomiste.com/article/1061007-campagne-cerealiere-30-millions-de-quintaux-recolter>

[30] “La part du blé dans les importations se maintiendrait à une Moyenne de 63% à l’horizon 2025”. EcoActu. December 29th, 2019
<https://www.ecoactu.ma/la-part-du-ble-dans-les-importations-se-maintiendrait-a-une-moyenne-de-63-a-lhorizon-2025/> ; “Les
retombées de la dépendance alimentaire du Maroc sur son secteur agricole”. AgriMaroc. December 28th, 2019
<https://www.agrimaroc.ma/dependance-alimentaire-agricole-maroc/>

[31] Présentation Générale du Plan Maroc vert. 2009. Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Pêches Maritimes

[32] Ibid.

[33] Akesbi, Najib. 2012. Une nouvelle stratégie pour l’agriculture marocaine:Le «Plan Maroc Vert». New Medit n°2/2012 ; Nicolas
Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal of North
African Studies, 20:4, 622-634

[34] The purpose of the paper is not to analyze the Green Morocco Plan results and its e ciency. The objective is to focus on the
water allocation and its consequences on Moroccan citizens

[35] For more details on the evaluation of Green Morocco Plan see : Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain : tendances
structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de développement. DEPF – Ministère de l’économie et des nances – Juillet 2019

[36] For more details see page 14 of Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain : tendances structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de
développement. DEPF – Ministère de l’économie et des nances – Juillet 2019

[37] Nicolas Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal
of North African Studies, 20:4, 622-634 ; Mostafa Errahj et al. 2017. Etude sur l’agriculture familiale à petite échelle au Proche-Orient
et Afrique du Nord. Pays focus: Maroc. FAO, CIRAD, CIHEAM-IAMM ; see also Najib Akesbi analysis of the Green Morocco Plan

[38] Hassan Bentaleb. “La pastèque déshydratante”. Libération. February 28th, 2019 < https://www.libe.ma/La-pasteque-
deshydratante_a106406.html>

[39] Houdret, A. 2012. The water connection: Irrigationand politics in southern Morocco.Water Alternatives 5(2): 284-303

[40] “Les pastèques seraient la cause de la pénurie d’eau à Zagora”. AgriMaroc. November 11th, 2017
<https://www.agrimaroc.ma/pasteques-penurie-eau-zagora/> ; “La culture de la pastèque interdite à Zagora?”. AgriMaroc. February
17th, 2016  <https://www.agrimaroc.ma/la-culture-de-la-pasteque-interdite-a-zagora/> ; “Crise de l’eau : Zagora, victim du succès de
ses pastèques”. L’Economiste. Decembrer 4th, 2015 <https://www.leconomiste.com/article/981140-crise-de-leau-zagora-victime-du-
succes-de-ses-pasteques>

[41] Sabrina Belhouari. “Pénurie d’eau : Zagora réclame son eau à boire”. L’Economiste. February 28th, 2018
<https://www.leconomiste.com/article/1024647-penurie-d-eau-zagora-reclame>

[42] “Dans le sud marocain, des manifestations de la soif contre les pénuries d’eau”. Le Monde et l’AFP. October 13th, 2017.
<https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/13/dans-le-sud-marocain-des-manifestations-de-la-soif-contre-les-penuries-d-
eau_5200650_3212.html>

[43] Houdret, A. 2012. The water connection: Irrigation and politics in southern Morocco.Water Alternatives 5(2): 284-303

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Amal Ennabih

Amal Ennabih is a PhD candidate in political science at Sciences Po Lyon. Her research focuses on hydro-
agricultural policies in Morocco and Tunisia. For her thesis, she studies the design and implementation of
treated wastewater reuse policies for irrigation and their political and social implications.

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Economic Development

Running out of water

Amal Ennabih16 September 202056min12120