The Kriegsmarine and The Aircraft Carrier: The Design and Operational Purpose of The

455974
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WIH19410.1177/0968344512455974War in HistoryFaulkner
Article
War in History
19(4) 492–516
The Kriegsmarine and the © The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
Aircraft Carrier: The Design sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0968344512455974
and Operational Purpose of the wih.sagepub.com
Graf Zeppelin, 1933–1940
Marcus Faulkner
King's College London, UK
Abstract
While the Kriegsmarine’s only aircraft carrier, the uncompleted Graf Zeppelin, has
attracted considerable interest over the decades, this has been limited to technical
histories of the vessel. This article explores the origins of the programme and what
the German navy believed it needed such vessels for. It examines the design process
and the proposed method of operational employment, and seeks to place them in an
international context. To date, German efforts have been considered in isolation from
the wider developments in aircraft carrier technology during the interwar period. When
these are taken into account a more balanced view of the German enterprise emerges.
Keywords
Aircraft carrier, Kriegsmarine, Third Reich, Luftwaffe, innovation, naval aviation
The Second World War is widely seen as a transitory phase in the evolution of naval
power when the era of the battleship ended and that of the aircraft carrier began.1
I am grateful to Andrew Lambert, Joe Maiolo, and Jeffrey Michaels for their constructive thoughts on numerous
earlier versions, and to Roger Arditti, Quintin van Zyl, and Len Barnett for keeping the final draft on course.
1 Paul Kennedy, ‘HMS Dreadnought and the Tides of History’, pp. 231–4, in Robert J. Blyth,
Andrew Lambert and Jan Rüger, The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2011); Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its
Influence on World Events, vol. II, 1946–2006 (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2008); Norman
Friedman, Carrier Air Power (Greenwich: Conway Maritime, 1981).
Corresponding author:
Marcus Faulkner, Teaching Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College London, London, WC2R
2LS, United Kingdom
Email: marcus.s.faulkner@kcl.ac.uk
Downloaded from wih.sagepub.com at University of Sydney on May 4, 2015

Faulkner 493
Dominance of the skies became a prerequisite to the control of the oceans. Germany’s
failure to develop an effective naval air arm ultimately prevented it from disrupting
Allied maritime communications. The causes were the animosity between Großadmiral
Erich Raeder and Reichsmarschall Herman Göring, and the inter-service rivalry between
the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe for control of German maritime aviation.2 The failure to
complete Germany’s only aircraft carrier, the Graf Zeppelin, is a crucial, yet misunder-
stood, component of this question, despite having had numerous technical histories
devoted to it.3 The technical aspects are well understood because one of the vessel’s
architects left a comprehensive account to which subsequent histories have added
details.4 Timothy Mulligan, in reference to the battleship Bismarck, has remarked that
authors ‘often treat their subjects in isolation from the factors that influence their concep-
tion, design and operational use’.5 This apt critique is even more appropriate in the Graf
Zeppelin’s case, in which the background, concept of operational employment, and
development process remain unknown.
The omission stems from the tendency of the historians who produced authoritative
accounts of the German navy’s political and strategic evolution during the interwar
period to ignore, or dismiss as insignificant, the carrier’s role.6 This was understanda-
ble given that their object in the 1960s and 1970s was a critical examination of naval
policy, and they saw failure to complete a carrier as another manifestation of the
fundamental problems that underpinned German naval rearmament. Following this
2 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben (Beltheim-Schnellbach: Bublies, 2009), pp. 312–22; James
S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 1997), pp. 109–12, 263–6; Soenke Neitzel, Der Einsatz der
deutschen Luftwaffe über dem Atlantik und der Nordsee 1939–1945 (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe,
1995), pp. 1–18; Adam Classen, Hitler’s Northern War: The Luftwaffe’s Ill-Fated Campaign,
1940–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2001), pp. 147–50, 158–60.
3 The most authoritative are Ulrich Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger Graf Zeppelin
(Herford: Koehlers, 2002); Mike J. Whitley, German Capital Ships of World War Two (London:
Cassell, 2001), pp. 63–72; Siegfried Breyer, Flugzeugträger ‘Graf Zeppelin’, Marine-Arsenal
Special Bd. 1 (Wölfersheim-Berstadt: Podzun-Pallas, 1994); Richard Wagner and Manfred
Wilske, Flugzeugträger Graf Zeppelin (Villingen-Schwenningen: Neckar, 2007); Polmar,
Aircraft Carriers, pp. 413–21.
4 Wilhelm Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger: Sein Wesen und Sein Werden von 1911 bis zur
Gegenwart (München: J.F. Lehmanns, 1968).
5 Timothy P. Mulligan, ‘Ship-of-the-Line or Atlantic Raider? Battleship Bismarck between
Design Limitations and Naval Strategy’, Journal of Military History LXIX (2005), p. 1015.
6 Carl-Axel Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien: Der Kampf für einen maritimen
Operationsplan (Lund: Gleerup, 1965); Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung
1935–1945, 3 Bd. (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1972); Rolf Güth, Die Marine des
Deutschen Reiches 1919–1939 (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1972); Jost Dülffer, Weimar,
Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920 bis 1939 (Düsseldorf: Droste,
1973); Werner Rahn, Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919–1928 (München: Bernard
& Graefe, 1976); Gerhard Schreiber, Revisionismus und Weltmachtstreben: Marineführung
und deutsch-italienische Beziehungen 1919 bis 1944 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1978); Wilhelm Deist,
The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 70–85.

494 War in History 19(4)
lead, historians have assumed that prestige rather than operational concerns drove the
navy’s interest.7 While prestige was important, it is an insufficient explanation as to
why considerable resources were devoted to this endeavour. The purpose of this article
is to bridge the divide between the existing literature on the Third Reich’s naval policy
and the technical literature devoted to the naval platforms themselves. An examination
of the Graf Zeppelin’s development is also useful in understanding the evolution of
maritime air power in general and the aircraft carrier in particular. As the latter repre-
sented the apex of military technology in the pre-atomic era, it has often been used as
a case in works on the process of military revolution and on the factors influencing
innovation.8
German efforts need to be placed in an international context because there were
many similarities with the projects of other nations, which in turn implies a far
greater degree of German understanding than historians have suggested. Also there
were differences that serve as a reminder that technological progress does not follow
a linear path, but is dependent on factors unique to a place and time. This article will
begin by exploring the origins of the German programme and what the navy believed
it needed carriers for. It will then analyse how the navy approached the design and
conceived its operational employment. Finally, it will briefly consider the British
reaction, as this serves as a good contemporary indicator of how German efforts
were perceived.
In an era of rapid technological change the principal naval powers were experiment-
ing with carrier sizes and configurations, and there were major debates surrounding
their capabilities and operational employment.9 The British had pioneered the develop-
ment of carrier aviation and maintained the largest force throughout the interwar
period.10 Both the Americans and Japanese benefited from British assistance in carrier
design and, in the case of the latter, the development of naval aviation. This facilitated
the process and, although quantifying such impact is difficult, it has been suggested that
7 Keith Bird, Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Reich (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006);
Corum, Luftwaffe, p. 179.
8 Thomas C. Hone et al., American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999); William M. McBride, Technological Change
and the United States Navy, 1865–1945 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2000); Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive
Technologies (London: Routledge, 2004); Geoffrey Till, ‘Maritime Air power in the Interwar
Period: The Information Dimension’, Journal of Strategic Studies XXVII (2004), pp. 298–
323. More is known about the far less developed Italian carrier: see Robert Mallett, The
Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 59–62,
102–3, 111–12.
9 Carrier size is roughly defined as: small (10,000t), medium (15,000–20,000t), or large (over
20,000t).
10 Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy: A Historical Survey (London: Jane’s, 1979);
D.K. Brown, Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development, 1923–1945 (London:
Chatham, 2006), pp. 40–56; Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the
Ships and Their Aircraft (London: Conway, 1988).

Faulkner 495
British knowledge saved the Americans two years of development.11 After building an
experimental carrier, the Americans converted two battlecruisers into large carriers, but
the subsequent five purpose-built vessels of the 1930s oscillated between medium and
large types before a two-year pause on further construction was taken to evaluate each
type’s suitability.12 The Japanese followed a similar path except that their purpose-built
carriers were composed of a wider mix of light, medium, and large vessels.13
Concurrently, cruiser-carrier hybrids attracted interest, as they seemed to offer the pos-
sibility of simultaneously augmenting cruiser and aircraft numbers available for fleet
operations.14 In practice the idea was flawed as the fragile aircraft and aviation facilities
could easily be damaged in combat by both enemy fire and the blast effect from the ves-
sels’ guns. The British abandoned the concept after an initial trial, while in America the
idea was intensively debated in military-political circles and had powerful supporters,
so that it was not until 1934 that the idea was abandoned.15 Only the Japanese and
Swedish navies operated a small number of cruiser-seaplane carriers, although the idea
re-emerged in the early stages of the war.16
I. The Origins of the German Carrier Programme

The development of German maritime aviation began shortly before the First World War
and focused on airships to provide long-range reconnaissance for the fleet.17 From
11 Larrie D. Ferreiro, ‘Goodall in America: The Exchange Engineer as Vector in International

Technology Transfer’, Comparative Technology Transfer and Society IV (2006), p. 189;
J. Ferris, ‘A British “Unofficial” Aviation Mission and Japanese Naval Developments, 1919–
1929’, Journal of Strategic Studies V (1982), pp. 416–39. The French received British support,
but made little progress: Hone et al., American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, p.
87; Till, Air Power, p. 63.
12 Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911–1929 (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974); Joel R. Davidson, The Unsinkable Fleet: The Politics of US
Navy Expansion in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
13 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 299–352;
Peattie, Sunburst, pp. 52–76; Kathrin Milanovich, ‘Hosho: The First Aircraft Carrier of the
Imperial Japanese Navy’, in John Jordan, ed., Warship, 2008 (London: Conway, 2008).
14 Ernest Andrade, ‘The Ship that Never Was: The Flying-Deck Cruiser’, Military Affairs
XXXII (1968), pp. 132–40; Alan D. Zimm, ‘The U.S.N.’s Flight Deck Cruiser’, Warship
International III (1979); R.D. Layman and Stephen McLaughlin, The Hybrid Warship: The
Amalgamation of Big Guns and Aircraft (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991); John
T. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated
the Japanese Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 101–24.
15 Attaché report Washington (E430611), The National Archives [TNA], Kew, GFM 33/2537.
16 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 244–5; Mike Whitley, Kreuzer im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart:
Motorbuch, 1997), pp. 235–6; Brown, Nelson to Vanguard, p. 57; Friedman, British Carrier, p. 218.
17 Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship
Division, 1912–18 (Atglen: Schiffer, 2004); Holger H. Herwig, ‘Luxury’ Fleet: The Imperial
German Navy, 1888–1918 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 84–5, 214–17.

initially very modest capabilities, by 1917 a large and well-equipped naval air arm
allowed the Germans to achieve air superiority in the lower North and Baltic seas.18 A
small number of vessels were converted into seaplane tenders, but plans to convert a
liner into a carrier had advanced little by late 1918, and none of this work had an impact
on development in the 1930s.19 The navy recognized that the rapid advances in aviation
technology had profound consequences for naval operations, and in 1916 it had opposed
the creation of an independent air force to ensure control of maritime aviation.20 The
Treaty of Versailles banned Germany from maintaining military aviation and thus, by
extension, from developing carriers. Faced with internal unrest, political instability, and
the poor financial state of the Weimar Republic, the navy had neither the opportunity nor
the resources to invest heavily in maritime aviation. When funds for clandestine naval
rearmament became available following the January 1923 Ruhr crisis, a significant pro-
portion was devoted to the development of an embryonic naval air arm in conjunction
with industry and civilian aviation.21 Given the severe political and financial constraints,
the idea of acquiring carriers was not contemplated, although there was limited civilian
interest.22
In 1928 the authorization of funds by the Reichstag for the Panzerschiff Deutschland
was an important development for the navy and allowed it to begin conceiving a long-
term building programme. The new commander-in-chief, Admiral Erich Raeder, made
the first reference to a carrier in a memorandum drafted in January 1929 for the defence
minister, General Wilhelm Groener, on the ideal composition of the fleet once it was
freed from Versailles treaty constraints.23 Raeder argued for at least one carrier along
with a sizeable naval air arm, but, owing to political considerations, references to a car-
rier were omitted from the Schiffbauersatzplan approved by the Reichstag in the spring
of 1931. Internally the carrier, referred to as a 10,000 t Flugdeckkreuzer, remained part of
future planning, and in 1931 maritime aviation was integrated into fleet manoeuvres.24
18 John H. Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press, 1982), pp. 31–3, 52–4, 87–9, 117–18; R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World
War (London: Chatham, 1996), pp. 39–41, 57–9, 68–72, 106–7.
19 Erich Gröner, Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815–1945, Bd. 1 (München: Bernard & Graefe,
1982), p. 98.
20 Horst Boog, ‘Das Problem der Selbstständigkeit der Luftstreitkräfte in Deutschland 1908–
1945’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XLII (1988), p. 35; Morrow, German Air Power,
p. 69.
21 Kapt.z.S. Schüssler, ‘Der Kampf der Marine gagen Versailles 1919–1935 (OKM 1937)’,
International Military Tribunal XXXIV (Nuremberg, 1949); Bernd Remmele, ‘Die mari-
time Geheimrüstung unter Kapitän z.S. Lohmann’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen LVI
(1997), pp. 340–1; US Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘German Naval Air Arm’ (1947), in
David Isby, ed., The Luftwaffe and the War at Sea, 1939–1945 (London: Chatham, 2005);
Rahn, Reichsmarine, pp. 221–2.
22 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, pp. 5–9.
23 Rahn, Reichsmarine, p. 193, quoting from ML/A II G.Kds. 105/29, now contained in Bundes
Archiv-Militär Archiv [BA-MA], Freiburg im Breisgau, RM 20/986.
24 Rahn, Reichsmarine, pp. 244, 193; Güth, Die Marine, p. 141.

Faulkner 497
By the autumn of 1932 a more ambitious rearmament plan was adopted as a result of a
changing international climate and to assist industry during the recession.25 The naval
segment of the Umbauplan foresaw the creation of a naval air arm in 1934 and, although
details remained vague, the completion of a carrier by 1938.26
The National Socialist accession to power in January 1933 progressively loosened polit-
ical constraints and provided more resources for naval rearmament. Adolf Hitler initially
limited the politically contentious aspects of the programme, submarines, aviation, and
larger Panzerschiffe, so as not to jeopardize a political agreement with Britain. In Raeder’s
first personal conversation with Hitler in April, he emphasized the naval role in securing
the Baltic and protecting German trade in the North Sea, underlining the importance of
aviation and carrier vessels.27 The first carrier specification, drafted that summer, expected
construction to begin in 1937. It foresaw a modest 10,000 t vessel carrying 25 to 30 aircraft,
capable of 32 kt and an endurance of 3000 nm at 20 kt. The need to gather information on
foreign carrier programmes was understood as a fundamental prerequisite to prevent later
delays.28 Within a month of this first specification Raeder indicated that a carrier might be
ordered as early as 1935.
By late 1933 the operational role of the carrier had become defined. In the 1920s the
small, obsolete German fleet was limited to a defensive strategy in the Baltic against a
potential Franco-Polish alliance. The naval leadership was not content with this role, and
argued that a more offensive strategy was needed in the North Sea and beyond to protect
overseas commerce vital to the German economy. With Panzerschiffe combining the fire-
power of a capital ship with the speed and endurance of a cruiser, Germany could menace
French trade throughout the Atlantic. These warships could tie down a large French force
in commerce protection by spreading uncertainty. The shift towards an Atlantic-centric
strategy evolved gradually between 1929 and 1934, while the operational scheme for a
war against France was first explored in 1932.29 Reconnaissance was vitally important as
Panzerschiff operations required tactical surprise to engage commercial shipping and
evade superior enemy forces such as the Dunkerque-class battlecruisers then under
construction. Existing German light cruisers and torpedo boats lacked the endurance, sus-
tained speed, and, in the case of the latter, sea-keeping ability to operate with the
Panzerschiffe in the Atlantic.30 Only four destroyers, then under construction, were
thought to be Atlantic capable.
Maritime aviation offered a solution, and there was extensive collaboration with civil-
ian airlines in the development of long-range flying, oceanic navigation, and radio
25 Dülffer, Weimar, pp. 229–33.

26 Entwurf einer Denkschrift über den Flottenaufbau 1926–1939, p. 8, BA-MA, RM 8/1491.
27 Dülffer, Weimar, p. 246; Michael Salewski, ‘Marineleitung und politische Führung
1931–1935’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen X (1971), pp. 65–81.
28 A IIIa 2229/33 GKdos 8. Juni 1933, BA-MA, RM 21/223.
29 Rahn, Reichsmarine, pp. 85–246; Schreiber, Revisionismus, pp. 31–64; Gemzell, Raeder, pp.
32–41, 37.
30 Mike J. Whitely, Deutsche Kreuzer im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2001), pp.
18–30; Siegfried Breyer and Gerhard Koop, Von der Emden zur Tirpitz: Die Schlachtschiffe,
Linienschiffe, Panzerschiffe, Kreuzer und Flugzeugträger der deutschen Marine 1920-1945
(Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 1997), pp. 26–38.

communications.31 However, land-based aircraft operating from Germany lacked the

range to operate beyond the North Sea.32 Only naval aviation could operate over the
ocean, but the few seaplanes carried by the Panzerschiffe were limited to operating in
good weather. A carrier’s far larger air group could operate in poorer conditions, offering
a substantial increase in capability, and the navy was willing to concede cruiser tonnage
to build carriers, should it be allowed to join the London Treaty. The shift from a battle
line to raiding groups required more smaller carriers rather than one or two large ones.
To operate with the Panzerschiffe they needed to have considerable endurance (12,000 nm
at 20 kt) and be capable of sustained high speed for air operations. They also needed the
equivalent armament and protection to ward off destroyer attacks.33
In March 1934 a new Schiffbauersatzplan was drafted that, alongside a core of
eight Panzerschiffe, included three 15,000 t carriers, two for active service and one in
reserve.34 The shift from small- to medium-sized carriers, transforming the vessels
from escorts into capital ships, had numerous causes. First consultations with the
Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), had established that a longer flight deck was
needed to operate future aircraft.35 The perceived weakness of carriers, with some
officers referring to them as ‘petrol boxes’, also caused considerable concern.36 The
Washington Treaty stipulated that aircraft carriers, vessels of over 10,000 t designed
specifically and exclusively for the purpose of carrying aircraft, were permitted to
carry 15 cm guns, and made an extra provision allowing the two American battle-
cruiser conversions to mount four twin 20.3 cm turrets.37 The Germans saw this as an
indicator that the Americans believed carriers to be capable of surface action.38 The
31 Gemzell, Raeder, p. 36; Public Record Office, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force,
1933–1945 (Richmond, Surrey: Public Record Office, 2001), p. 12; Schüssler, ‘Der Kampf’.
32 In 1934 British and French maritime aviation was considered able to operate out to between
250 and 300km from the coast: Mar. Nr 420 London 3. Juli 1934, TNA, GFM 33/3070.
Innovation in aircraft design increased capability: by 1936 the British anticipated German
maritime aviation operating out to 450km. See Joseph Maiolo, ‘The Knockout Blow against
the Import System: Admiralty Expectations of Nazi Germany’s Naval Strategy, 1934–9’,
Historical Research LXXII (1999), pp. 202–28.
33 1273/33 A I 28.12.33 an CdML ‘Bau eines Flugzeugträgers’, BA-MA, RM 20/1032.
34 A IVa 1205/34 Gkds 26.3.1934, BA-MA, RM 20/994.
35 A IVa 1196/34 13.4.34 Besprechungsniederschrift über Vortrag beim CdML 19.3.34, BA-MA,
RM 20/994, also contained in A IVa 1196/34 13.4.1934, BA-MA, RM 21/222. The meeting
summary records that the only information available at the time on carriers came from Weyers
and Jane’s. Hadeler states that the majority of naval personnel acquainted with aviation matters
had by this stage been transferred to the Luftwaffe: Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, pp. 49, 66.
36 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, Bd. 1, p. 30. This was owing to the volatile nature
of aviation gasoline: Friedman, Carrier Air Power, p. 10. Many British and American officers
expressed similar views: for example, Admiral Herbert Richmond in 1938 characterized carri-
ers as being ‘costly and weak’. See Barry B. Hunt, Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Herbert Richmond
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), p. 221.
37 Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922, Articles IX and X and Chapter II, Part 4,
Definitions.
38 The first reference to a carrier contains only two details, displacement and armament, 20.3 cm
guns. The American influence is clear. Rahn, Reichsmarine, p. 193.

Faulkner 499
severe German numerical inferiority meant that the fighting potential of every war-
ship needed to be maximized and prompted Raeder to demand a heavier gun battery
for the carriers. As a general rule, the larger a carrier the more stable a platform it
provides for operations. Thus the shift towards an Atlantic role also required a larger
hull for greater stability.39
In the late spring Raeder ordered that the first carrier be added to the 1935 con-
struction plan, alongside a further Panzerschiff and two heavy cruisers. Admiral Otto
Groos, outgoing head of the Marinekommandoamt, proposed that detailed design
work commence in anticipation of actual construction beginning in October 1935.40
As there were sufficient indicators to believe that Germany would be released from
existing limitations, Raeder directed that planning be based on the navy growing to
a third of the size of the Royal Navy.41 This would allow 45,000 t for three carriers.
All staff meetings dealing with the carriers stressed the need to acquire information
on suitable designs and operational deployments by foreign navies.42 Initially the
discussions were restricted to a very small circle of staff officers.43 The small num-
bers of architects and engineers in the navy’s technical offices were already over-
whelmed with design work before the expansion envisaged by the 1932 Umbauplan
exacerbated the situation. Further acceleration of the pace of naval rearmament
required an increase in naval staff and that private shipyards be more closely inte-
grated into the planning process.44 It was nearly a year after the first specification
was produced that a naval architect was appointed to work on the carrier. Wilhelm
Hadeler quickly concluded that the navy lacked the necessary information, and as
1934 progressed the Marineleitung was seriously concerned that the lack of informa-
tion would cause delays to the programme.45
Although naval intelligence gathered and analysed foreign press reports and tech-
nical journals for information, it obtained little substantive material on carriers.46 This
was partly because the major powers released little information into the public
domain, but mainly the problem was one of not having good access to relevant foreign
source material. Until 1933 there were no German naval attachés abroad, and material
obtained, such as press photographs of the Lexington and Saratoga, had little actual value.47
39 Ist für die Atlantikkriegführung der Flugzeugträger oder Flugdeckkreuzer vorzuziehen?,

BA-MA, RM 20/946.
40 A IVa 1703/34 4. Mai 1934, BA-MA, RM 20/994.
41 Salewski, ‘Marineleitung’, pp. 65–81.
42 A IIIa 2476/33 7.7.33 ‘Neubau von Kreuzern’, BA-MA, RM 20/994.
43 A IIIa 2229/33 GKdos 8. Juni 1933, BA-MA, RM 21/223.
44 A IIIa 2476/33 GKdos 7. Juli 1933, BA-MA, RM 20/994.
45 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 58. His work began in April 1934; thus no substantive design
work commenced until the summer of 1934. A II 4034/34 12.10.34 Angaben über Fremde
Flugzeugträger, p. 36, BA-MA, RM 20/1622.
46 Articles were published in the navy’s technical intelligence digest, Material für die
Konstruktion von Kriegsschiffe, vols. 1–14, BA-MA, RM 8/1500–1514.
47 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 61. Some of the original material thus came from the
Technische Hochschule Berlin.

The Treaty of Versailles did not forbid attachés, but a combination of domestic poli-
tics and economic constraints prevented their secondment.48 When attachés were
posted overseas from 1933 the general information available to the navy increased
considerably.
Kapt.z.S. Erwin Waßner, the attaché to Britain, received a detailed list of questions
on British carriers and maritime aviation; visiting a carrier was considered far more
important than inspecting a battleship or modern cruiser.49 In February 1934 Admiral
Gerald Dickens, the Director of Naval Intelligence, had offered Waßner a tour of a car-
rier; perhaps unsurprisingly this never materialized. Inspecting foreign warships was a
highly political gesture and one that generally required some reciprocal action, yet the
Germans were going to great lengths to conceal items of most interest to the British,
such as the Panzerschiffe and the stockpiling of submarine components. Raeder’s over-
riding priority was an agreement with Britain over German naval rearmament, and
approaching the Royal Navy for information on aircraft and ships that Germany was not
allowed to possess was simply out of the question.
Given the sensitivity of the relationship with the British, Berlin exercised considerable
control over Waßner’s dealings, and, when in March 1935 he saw an opportunity to ask
the Admiralty for information on the Fleet Air Arm, he was ordered not to proceed.50
Instead, he relied on press reports and informal conversations. Thus his reports remained
limited, although they did confirm that there was considerable debate within the Royal
Navy on the utility and design of carriers.51 The fact that the British had converted, recon-
verted, and built carriers of differing displacements was seen as an indication of British
uncertainty.52 In 1935 the First Sea lord, Admiral Ernie Chatfield, told Waßner that the
British would focus on 15,000 t carriers as this was the best compromise between size and
handling abilities.53 In contrast, Dickens was a strong advocate of the hybrid concept.54
Throughout the 1930s German civilian naval officials would travel to Britain to attend the
‘Navy Weeks’ to gather technical information, and in August 1935 Heinrich Ohlerich,
Hadeler’s superior and principal designer of the carrier, went to Portsmouth when it
48 Manfred Kehrig, Die Wiedereinrichtung des deutschen militärischen Attachedienstes nach

dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1919–1933) (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1966).
49 Deutsche Botschaft (London) Der Marineattaché No. 53 13.2.34, BA-MA, RM 11/1.
50 Mar No. 161 6.3.35, BA-MA, RM 7/2349.
51 Mar No. 262 11.4.35 Neuorganisation der Fleet Air Arm, BA-MA, RM 7/2349; for details
on FAA material collected over a wider period, see BA-MA, RM 12 II 5, Fleet Air Arm
Korrespondenz (33–9). The navy wanted this information for its confrontation with the
Luftwaffe over the control of maritime aviation: US Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘German
Naval Air Arm’, p. 32.
52 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 54.
53 Mar. No. 18.6.1935, BA-MA, RM 12 II/54. It is highly likely that Chatfield was trying to
mislead Waßner. Only a year before he advocated the 22,000 t carrier as the best compro-
mise between size and capability: ‘Preparation of the 1935 Naval Conference’, Chatfield/
Vansittart, 23 March 1934, TNA, FO 371/18736; PD04780/34 19/11.1934, TNA, ADM
116/3373. For an overview of the British debate see Till, Air Power, p. 67.
54 M.Att 1820 2 Dez 34, TNA, GFM 33/3070.

Faulkner 501
became known that Furious would be open to the public.55 On another occasion German
observers viewed Courageous when she visited Copenhagen in 1937.56
Although the German and American armies forged close links between 1929 and 1934,
the navy never created corresponding links with the US Navy.57 The naval attaché in
Washington was able to visit an American cruiser in early 1934, but he never seriously
considered approaching the Americans to view one of their carriers.58 Open-source material
on American naval policy and press reports on fleet manoeuvres were easily obtained, but
this information could not answer detailed technical and operational questions.59 In 1938
German military intelligence managed to obtain some undisclosed information on the
carrier Wasp.60 What if any impact this had is unclear. This only left the Japanese, but little
was known about the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carriers.
The subsequent interaction between the German and Japanese navies throughout
1935, involving a bilateral technology transfer, has been examined in some detail as part
of the relationship between the future Axis partners. Although well known, the episode
has been somewhat misunderstood from the perspective of the German carrier pro-
gramme. One group of diplomatic historians has been critical of the navy’s seeming lack
of interest in the transfer process, singling out the construction department for criti-
cism.61 Conversely, technical historians have assumed that, because information was
obtained from the Japanese, it must have been influential on the design of the Graf
Zeppelin. As will be shown, both positions need to be qualified, and Japanese assistance,
though useful, was not a major factor.
In 1934 German-Japanese naval relations were limited, but at the end of the year a
Luftwaffe officer, Oberstleutnant Joachim Coeler, a First World War naval aviator more
recently involved in the clandestine maritime aviation programme, travelled to Tokyo.62
The naval attaché, Kapt.z.S. Paul Wenneker, managed to persuade the Japanese to grant
access to facilities before the details of a reciprocal Japanese attaché in Germany were
arranged. Coeler and Wenneker viewed the carrier Akagi but, although the trip was
55 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 78; Breyer and Koop, Von der Emden, p. 130.
56 [Unmarked collection on British carriers], BA-MA, RM 7/3288.
57 Kehrig, Die Wiedereinrichtung, pp. 86–8; Thomas Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S.
Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2002), pp. 74–6, 88–9.
58 [Attaché report on the New Orleans] 22.5.34, BA-MA, RM 20/1593.
59 Bericht 15 14. September 1934, ‘Marineflugwesen’, detailed a demonstration by Admiral
Reeves’s carrier squadron in front of American politicians off the Virginian coast. Other
reports covered designs and aircraft procurement: TNA, GFM 33/2537.
60 B Nr. 11082 geh. KN, BA-MA, RM 7/3228. Later information on the Yorktown was obtained
in an exchange with Japanese intelligence: John W.M. Chapman, ‘Tricycle Recycled:
Collaboration among the Secret Intelligence Services of the Axis States’, Intelligence and
National Security VII (1992), pp. 268–99.
61 Hans-Joachim Krug et al., Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War
II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 97–112, 134, 294; John P. Fox, Germany
and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1938 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 104–7.
62 Schüssler, ‘Der Kampf’; Güth, Die Marine, p. 141; Corum, Luftwaffe, pp. 340–1.

judged a success, no information on operational use was gained, nor could Wenneker
obtain any subsequently.63 One month later the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin offered
the RLM the opportunity for a German engineer to study carrier design in Japan for up
to a year in exchange for the plans of a modern dive-bomber.64 The RLM was interested,
but the navy was less so, despite the need for information, because it suspected duplicity
on the part of the Japanese as they sought a maximum return for minimum effort.65
However, Admiral Günther Guse, the new chief of the Marinekommandoamt,
wanted to send an officer to gain experience of flight operations and tactical handling
of carriers.66 This was vital to understanding the operational capabilities and the devel-
opment of equipment. The key question was how rapidly aircraft could be launched
and recovered.67 As the object of another trip was to obtain operational information,
the construction department did not believe it was necessary to send an engineer, but
the RLM wanted to send an officer to study Japanese seaplanes. The negotiations
became protracted as Japanese demands increased. A Japanese naval delegation had
been allowed to visit German installations and the Panzerschiff Admiral Scheer as part
of the January agreement, and the navy was prepared to provide further information on
the Scheer’s fire-control system in return for carrier information. The Germans recog-
nized the limits of information hitherto received. Rear Admiral Karl Witzell, the head
of the weapons department, felt that the Akagi had been specially prepared to yield as
little as possible to inspection.68
By the summer the process had stalled, but then, in return for a larger package encom-
passing aircraft designs, information on submarine propulsion, fire-control systems, and
torpedo technology, the Japanese became willing to give the Germans access to, and
technical data on, their carriers.69 Two officers and a naval architect could visit Japan for
three months. Berlin wanted to dispatch the delegation as soon as possible lest the
Japanese autumn manoeuvres were used as an excuse to limit access.70 For three months
the Germans were given schematics and technical manuals and access to facilities and
the Akagi. The officers were allowed to undertake carrier launches, something their
Japanese hosts were initially reluctant to grant, in spite of their having been part of the
agreement.71 Throughout the process the RLM was supportive of the navy’s efforts and
even agreed to export aviation technology, which it had always been unwilling to do
63 Bericht des Oberstleutnants Coeler über seine Berufsbelehrungsreise nach Japan 1934, p. 53,
BA-MA, RM 7/2349. For Wenneker’s report, see B. Nr. G.73 14. Februar 1935, BA-MA, RM
11/68; B. Nr. G101 26.4.35 Flugzeugtraegerfragen, BA-MA, RM 11/69.
64 M I 54/35 Gkdos 14.2.35, p. 54, BA-MA, RM 7/2349.
65 B. Nr. G 71 2.2.1935, BA-MA, RM 11/68.
66 M I 54/35 Gkdos 14.2.35, p. 54, BA-MA, RM 7/2349.
67 A I 1938/35 Gkdos to RLM(ZA), p. 58, BA-MA, RM 7/2349. This is reinforced by Wenneker’s
correspondence quoted in Fox, Germany, p. 104.
68 LA 1245/35 geh.Kdos A I, Ic 8.5.35, BA-MA, RM 7/2349.
69 Dirksen 6. Juli 1935, TNA, GFM 33/2457.
70 Der Reichsminister der Luftfahrt Z.A. Attaché Gr. Nr. 15047/35/2 12.7.35, BA-MA, RM
7/2349.
71 Berichterstattung der Deutschen Japan-Kommission, 9.9.–23.12.1935, BA-MA, RM 20/1628.

Faulkner 503
despite industrial lobbying. From 1936 onwards a small number of Ju 86 bombers and Ju
87 dive-bombers were sold to Japan as part of the exchange.72
II. The Design

The Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 1935 entitled Germany to a fleet 35 per cent the
size of the British one and to construct carriers.73 This was slightly more favourable than
the basis of previous planning and increased the carrier allocation from 45,000 t to
47,250 t.74 Once the British provided details of their warships it became apparent that the
British carrier displacement had been overestimated, and so in fact only 38,500 t were
available. Although the Germans generously underestimated their warships’ displace-
ments to circumvent treaty restrictions, this reclassifying, coupled with the escalating
displacement of the carrier design, ruled out three carriers. Raeder advocated completing
a 15,000 t carrier and then using the remaining allocation to complete the largest possible
vessel (approximately 23,000 t) as this would ensure at least one Atlantic-capable vessel.
Another possibility was to construct smaller carriers and use the remaining tonnage for a
light cruiser. Neither option appealed to the naval staff, as operational requirements
necessitated two Atlantic-capable carriers, and thus it was decided in September to con-
struct two 19,250 t vessels and, using the increased displacement, to install machinery
capable of 35 kt and augment the armour scheme.75 To overcome the stability problems
that deck turrets might cause in the Atlantic, the 15 cm guns were moved into casemates
along the hull, but as these had a restricted field of fire the battery was doubled to 16
guns.76 The anti-aircraft armament was also doubled.
The design process occurred at a transitional phase in aircraft development. Biplane
fighters, in use until the mid-1930s, could be launched from the hangar deck over the
bow, but new, higher-performance monoplane aircraft could not. The question was
whether the carriers were to have such a flying-off deck below the flight deck, modelled
on the original configuration of the British Courageous. The desire to lay down a carrier
72 In parallel, but unconnected with this, the Imperial Japanese Army dispatched an aviation mis-
sion to tour Luftwaffe facilities: Hans-Joachim Braun, ‘Technologietransfer im Flugzeugbau
zwischen Deutschland und Japan 1936–1945’, in Josef Kreiner and Regine Mathias, eds,
Deutschland-Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990), pp. 326, 331–2; Osamu
Tagaya, ‘The Imperial Japanese Air Forces’, in Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, Why Air
Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).
73 Jost Dülffer, ‘Das Deutsch-Englische Flottenabkommen vom 18. Juni 1935’, Marine
Rundschau LXIX (1972), pp. 641–59; J.A. Maiolo, ‘The Admiralty and the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935’, Diplomacy and Statecraft X (1999), pp. 87–126.
74 Although Wilhelm Treue states the Marine planned with 48,000t: Treue, Flottenaufbau, p. 8,
BA-MA, RM 8/1491.
75 BNr. A IVa 2739/35 G.Kdos. 31. August 1935, BA-MA, RM 20/994.
76 Ibid., 4 September supplement: Briefing to Raeder. This was a substantial increase in fire-
power, more than German light cruisers carried. Whitley, Deutsche Kreuzer, pp. 18–35, 63–5,
197–8. See also Kapt.z.S. Ciliax, Die militärpolitische und seestrategische Lage Deutschlands,
BA-MA, RM 8/1491.

at the earliest possible point meant that this was the most pressing question in the sum-
mer of 1935, and the Japan delegation was asked to send its findings back to Germany
on a regular basis.77 At the end of its tour the delegation recommended a 20,000 t carrier
as offering the best compromise between ship handling, platform stability, and embarked
air-group size. A flight deck 250 m long and 27 m wide would enable concurrent launches
and landings, and provide a deck park for 50 aircraft. Two or three catapults and three
lifts to the hangar deck would ensure a reasonable tempo of operations. The Japanese did
not recommend the adoption of a flying-off deck and, after the delegation left, the Akagi
had hers removed.78
Two carriers were officially ordered on 16 November 1935. The contract for
Flugzeugträger A was awarded to Deutsche Werke Kiel (DWK) and it was laid down on
28 December 1936. This was only 20 days after the Gneisenau had been launched from
the same slipway.79 The completion date was set for June 1940. The September 19,250 t
scheme was a modern carrier that blended British, American, and Japanese approaches,
and the navy believed that its design was vindicated by similar characteristics in other
carriers then under construction.80 The carrier would be capable of 35 kt, have an endur-
ance of 9000 nm at 20 kt, a crew of 1720, and embark an air group of four squadrons, 40
aircraft housed on two hangar decks and operating from a 250 m flight deck. The choice
of a larger carrier also stemmed from some good analysis of foreign carrier programmes
that showed the seemingly attractive proposition of a light carrier to be flawed. The tiny
Japanese Ryujo had prompted the small carrier scheme of 1933. Further research showed
that the ship became useable only after extensive reconstruction and that Soryu and
Hiryu, under construction in 1934–6, were designated at 10,050 t, but were planned as
17,000–20,000 t carriers.81 The 1934 15,000 t scheme looked towards the American
Ranger that seemed to offer the ideal combination of a large air group and a small, pur-
pose-built hull. By late 1934 the Germans were aware that the design was classed a
failure in America and that the next carriers were increased to 20,000 t vessels.82
How much influence the Japanese information had is disputed. Kapt.z.S. Werner
Fuchs considered it useful, while Hadeler, who was involved in the design from the out-
set, was less impressed.83 Apart from settling the issue of the flying-off deck, little
77 Br.Nr. 174gg 4. Dezember 1935, Vorbericht der Flugzeugträgerkommission, BA-MA, RM

11/69.
78 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 314–15.
79 Breyer and Koop, Von der Emden, pp. 130–4. B was not laid down until 1938.
80 Werner Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegschiffbau von 1939 bis 1945’, Wehrtechnische Monatshefte
– Zeitschrift für Wehrtechnik. Wehrindustrie und Wehrwirtschaft LVI (1959), pp. 60–70.
These were neat figures designed to fit the treaty agreements. Hadeler states internally 22,000
t was envisaged and that this would inevitably increase. Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 64.
81 Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, p. 68; Br.Nr. 179 12.12.1935, Flugzeugträger, BA-MA, RM
11/71; Deutsche Botschaft (Tokio) Der Marineattaché B. Nr. 277 3.2.1937, Schiffbaupolitik,
BA-MA, RM 11/73.
82 Washington, 1934, TNA, GFM 33/2537.
83 Fuchs headed the Ausbildungsabteilung that drafted the technical specifications of warships.
‘Schiffbauplan und Neubautypen’, Kapt.z.S. Fuchs (May 1936), BA-MA, RM 20/1808;
Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegschiffbau’; Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 54.

Faulkner 505
Japanese influence may be detected, and it was not instrumental in shaping the design.
The navy had looked to Japan primarily for operational and tactical information, but
there is no evidence that any substantive insights were gained.84 Hadeler asserts the dom-
inant British influence, manifesting itself most obviously in the incorporation and layout
of the island. The navy saw an island improving the ships’ handling, facilitating the
direction of deck operations, albeit restricting the available space, and providing more
space for air defence armament and fire control. It was known that the Americans too had
rejected a complete flat-top design for the Ranger.85
However, the navy undertook extensive wind tunnel and water-tank model testing to
independently evaluate such aspects as airflow over the deck and ship handling.86 A
Japanese lift arrangement was adopted, but two catapults were installed following British
and American practice.87 It was understood that the operating environments of the Pacific
and Atlantic were dissimilar and required different designs.88 The intention was to keep
the aircraft predominantly below deck, owing to the varying climates in which the carrier
would operate.89
The failure to complete a carrier was the result of a number of factors, but needs to
be considered in the context of the rapid expansion of German rearmament that stretched
the industrial and manpower resources of the Reich. The 1934 Schiffbauerstazplan
already exceeded the ability of German yards to deliver ships within the anticipated
time frames. By 1935 the navy accepted that a saturation point had been reached, which
was delaying further orders.90 Following the austere Weimar era the sector lacked the
capacity and skilled workers for a rapid expansion. The shortage of steel and other
materials, and the complexity of new-generation warships, compounded the problem.
Orders again ceased in March 1937 when average delays of a year were expected, and
by December these had increased to two years.91 Of the 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 2 car-
riers, 15 destroyers, 18 torpedo boats, and 36 submarines ordered by 1935, only 2 bat-
tleships, 1 cruiser, 14 destroyers, and 21 submarines were in service by September
1939. Work on the Bismarck, Tirpitz, and Prinz Eugen consumed 17.7 million man-
hours after September 1939.92 None of the programmes were supposed to be ready for
1939; the completion date of the 1934 Schiffbauerstazplan was 1950. In May 1938
Hitler informed Raeder that he would not need the fleet until the mid-1940s.93
84 Fox, Germany, pp. 104, 364.

86 Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger, pp. 42–6.
87 Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, vol. II, pp. 416. Comparison shows little resemblance between
Japanese and German carriers. See sketches in Whitely, German Capital Ships; Polmar,
Aircraft Carriers; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun.
88 Br. Nr. 174gg 4. Dezember 1935, BA-MA, RM 11/69.
89 Theoretical Principles Underlying the German Scheme, Ministerialdirektor Werner [British
translation of captured Italian documents], TNA, ADM 1/19137.
90 Deist, Wehrmacht, p. 82; Dülffer, Weimar, p. 315.
91 Dülffer, Weimar, pp. 455, 568.
92 Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegsschiffbau’, p. 68.
93 Treue, Flottenaufbau, p. 12, BA-MA, RM 8/1491.

Given the complexity of carriers it is not surprising that the Graf Zeppelin was pro-
jected to be one of the most delayed. The British, Americans, and Japanese experienced
delays with all their carriers, despite methodical approaches and experimental vessels.
The desire to order the carrier at the earliest opportunity meant that many of the details
relating to carrier-specific equipment had not been finalized.94
It has been pointed out that the original design team on Ark Royal was ‘tiny’ at five,
but against this the initial German single-man approach was minute.95 DWK asked for
detailed information months before the contract was awarded, and established a separate
design office for the project.96 Given the number of good technical histories it is not
proposed to examine this aspect in detail, but a few points are worth making.
Internationally there were debates about the nature of a carrier’s armament as, until
the introduction of higher-performance monoplane aircraft, a carrier air wing remained a
comparatively weak instrument. Carriers generally had medium-calibre guns to ensure
against surprise cruiser or destroyer attacks. In the USN the carriers were employed
independently of the battle line, owing to their considerably higher speeds, and there was
strong pressure not only to retain the 8 inch batteries in Lexington and Saratoga, but also
to give new carriers a robust gun armament.97 In Germany the idea that a carrier might
be able to engage in gunnery action had receded by the late 1930s, and the emphasis was
placed instead on speed and the anti-aircraft armament. Operational requirements
demanded speed, endurance, and lighter machinery to reduce overall displacement, and
so created a considerable problem. While Panzerschiffe utilized highly efficient diesels,
the carrier’s size and high-speed requirement necessitated another solution.98 It was
decided to equip the vessel with the most powerful machinery ever installed on any war-
ship, based primarily on as yet untried high-pressure steam turbines. It was understood
that the size of the power plant, its complexity, the need to adopt a new four-shaft con-
figuration, and the length of the hull were all likely to have implications for the handling
of the ship.99 Delays in assembling and installing the machinery were inevitable.
The navy’s focus on qualitative superiority to counter its numerical inferiority resulted
in long delays, as experimental technology was readied for operational employment. As
it was a completely new type, much of the equipment for the carrier needed developing.
Examples included complex armoured lifts or Voith-Schneider vertical screw propellers
fitted into the hull to improve manoeuvrability in harbours and at low speed.100
Considerable effort went into the ship’s active and passive defences to counter the
94 Zu M153/37 G.Kds [undated, probably late 1938], BA-MA, RM 6/60.

95 Brown, Nelson to Vanguard, p. 47.
96 Letter from Deutsche Werke Kiel 9.4.35, BA-MA, RM 21/224; Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger,
pp. 71–2.
97 Till, Air Power, p. 67; Friedman, British Carrier, pp. 10–11; Thomas Wildenberg, Destined
for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. 63.
98 Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegsschiffbau’, p. 61.
99 ‘Schiffbauplan und Neubautypen’, BA-MA, RM 20/1808; Scot MacDonald, Evolution of
Aircraft Carriers (Washington, DC: United States Navy, 1964), pp. 61–3.
100 Whitley, German Capital Ships, p. 67; Breyer and Koop, Von der Emden, pp. 131–2.

Faulkner 507
land-based air threat in European waters. Asbestos–steel fire-curtains were fitted

throughout the hangars, as were automatic sprinkler systems and inert gas suppression
systems for confined spaces and fuel lines.101 The anti-aircraft battery was large, com-
posed of 105, 88, and 37 mm guns to be controlled by new fire-control units then under
development.102 A complex catapult system was devised to rapidly launch the fighters,
eight aircraft in under four minutes, regardless of weather conditions.103 Later it was
planned to equip the carrier with extensive radar, fighter-control, and signals intelli-
gence-gathering equipment to support operations.104
III. The Concept of Operations

The January 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact allowed the navy to focus on
Atlantic operations against France. That spring the Marinekommandoamt conducted a
war game utilizing the forces envisaged in the 1932 Umbauplan to examine the options
for employing raiding groups. Two Panzerschiffe, a carrier, and heavy cruisers would
operate against troop transports and embarkation ports in the eastern Atlantic between
Cape St Vincent and North Africa, while other forces conducted commerce warfare
throughout the Atlantic. In such a scenario naval aviation was deemed essential as a car-
rier could undertake reconnaissance and attack enemy shipping over wide distances.105
Only carrier aircraft could strike the Atlantic ports, as German land-based bombers
lacked sufficient range. However, such operations were inherently risky owing to the
influence of weather on air operations and exposure to French land-based aviation.106
This audacious scheme remained the basis of German operational planning throughout
the 1930s. It has to be acknowledged that the navy made questionable assumptions about
the political context and the availability and suitability of its warships; however, the
focus here is only on the role envisaged for the carrier.
In 1934 there were indications that the French wanted two 12,000 t carriers, but by
mid-1935 intelligence showed that the focus had shifted to new battleships to counter the
Panzerschiff threat and the Italians in the Mediterranean.107 Intelligence also indicated
that the French did not anticipate the Germans ever having more than a handful of sea-
planes to support Atlantic operations. Thus with a carrier the German navy would enjoy
air superiority outside coastal regions and on the fringes of the French empire. The

102 John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War Two (London: Conway, 2007), p. 227.
103 Lecture by Lt. Cdr. Popp, TNA, ADM 1/19137. Popp was the wartime Luftwaffe carrier
liaison officer.
104 Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger, p. 87.
105 Akte II – 29 Kommandoamtskriegspiel 1934 Heft g: Schlußbesprechung, BA-MA, RM
20/952.
106 Moeglichkeiten fuer Luftangriffe gegen, BA-MA, RM 20/946.
107 B Nr. M Att 139, TNA, GFM 30/3070; Reynolds M. Salerno, ‘Multilateral Strategy and
Diplomacy: The Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Mediterranean Crisis, 1935–1936’,
Journal of Strategic Studies XVII (1994), pp. 58–9; Peter Jackson, ‘Naval Policy and National
Strategy in France, 1935–1937’, Journal of Strategic Studies XXIII (2000), pp. 130–59.

emphasis on reconnaissance should not be seen as a doctrinal limitation as is sometimes

suggested108 but judged in the light of First World War experiences, when on numerous
occasions German forces were caught in tactically unfavourable conditions. All warships
down to cruisers were initially designed to carry as many seaplanes as possible, but tech-
nical issues forced reductions.109
Most operational understanding of carrier employment derived from signals intelli-
gence observation of the British.110 Despite the British limiting the use of radio commu-
nications to the detriment of air operations to prevent such compromise, the navy’s
B-Dienst provided a steady stream of useful information.111 This began in 1934 with the
observation of British Home and Mediterranean Fleet exercises in the West Indies that
simulated a land-based power attacking one dependent on seaborne commerce.112 In
1935 the B-Dienst was specifically asked to examine whether carriers could be employed
to protect commerce (and by extension disrupt it) and if aviation could substitute for
surface vessels as escorts to capital ships.113 This issue was raised by the 1934 war game.
While there were limits on how much could be derived from signals intelligence, the
importance of naval aviation in reconnaissance, strike, and anti-submarine roles was
clear from evaluating British operations.114 Signals intelligence could provide insights
into the composition of the air groups embarked on British carriers, as well as the effects
of bad weather on flight operations.115
In early 1937 Raeder presented to Hitler and other senior Reich officials the concept of
combined capital–carrier groups operating against supply lines as the basis of naval plan-
ning.116 The scheme against France incrementally expanded the area of operations until by
108 Public Record Office, Rise and Fall, p. 46; Isby, Luftwaffe, p. 23.
109 In the case of the Bismarck this went from six to four. Mulligan, ‘Ship-of-the-Line’, p. 1024.
For the heavy cruisers, see I Abt. Skl I L 1972/38 g.K. 12.10.38, BA-MA, RM 7/2383.
110 Kapt.z.S. Mösel, B-Dienst head (1932–4), was later responsible for collecting and develop-
ing naval air tactics; see BA-MA, RM 7/1975. The Americans similarly used sigint to gain
an understanding of Japanese carrier operations: Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War, pp. 67,
74–5.
111 Hone et al., American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, pp. 117–19; Marcus
Faulkner, ‘The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst
before the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security XXV (2010), pp. 521–46.
112 CdML Nr. A IIIb 146 geh 8.1.1934, p. 98, BA-MA, RM 20/2078.
113 Gedanken über den Einsatz von Flugzeugträgern, pp. 162–76, BA-MA, RM 7/2361. This
document, based on sigint, is the most comprehensive remaining on carrier operations. In
another exercise French naval aviation was specifically targeted over a two-week period in
September 1938: Vortrag 3.SKL.B vor Kriegsspielteilnehmern in Oberhof (3/39), BA-MA,
RM 6/58.
114 A III 700/35 geh p. 76, BA-MA, RM 20/2079; Hood/Queen Elizabeth battle group, BA-MA,
RM 20/2090. This was a major RN exercise designed to investigate trade defence problems
with particular reference to fast commerce raiders: Ex Z.L., TNA, ADM 186/157.
115 OKM A IIIb B-Meldungen 1. 1937 p. 15, BA-MA, RM 20/1914; CB 1469/37 Exercises and
Operations 1937, p. 18, TNA, ADM 186/158.
116 Grundsätzliche Gedanken der Seekriegsführung, Vortrag Ob.d.M. 3. Feb 1937, BA-MA, RM
8/1491.

Faulkner 509
the winter 1937/8 war game it encompassed the entire north Atlantic. The centrepieces
were two battle groups composed of battleships and carriers that would protect German
trade and engage French capital ships. The Panzerschiffe were detached to operate along-
side submarines, and auxiliary cruisers against French commerce and military shipping in
the Mediterranean. Naval aviation would contribute considerably to the diversionary
effect it was anticipated such operations would have on the French, as the exercise
included a carrier strike on Casablanca that was hoped would cause the French to operate
defensively.117 The magazines held sufficient ordnance for the air wing to conduct sus-
tained operations, and eight weeks’ worth of provisions for the crew were to be carried.118
The vulnerability issue remained a serious concern. Signals intelligence revealed that the
British never operated without destroyer screens, and the war game had shown the need
for such protection against submarines.119 The fact that there were no German destroyers
suited to Atlantic operations therefore had implications for their future designs. As with
that for the carrier, those for destroyers were plagued by problems of balancing speed,
endurance, firepower, and protection.120
This planning exercise was the last in which France was considered the primary
opponent. With Hitler’s May 1938 order to consider also the British as opponents, the
navy faced the insoluble problem of having to deal with the vastly superior Royal Navy.
In response Raeder tasked Guse to set up a committee to examine which ships were best
suited to the new strategic environment. The subsequent debate is often portrayed as one
between the conventional balanced fleet and one tailored to prosecuting commerce war-
fare against Britain with cruisers, as advocated by Helmuth Heye, at the time responsible
for operational plans.121 The assertion that the committee had no interest in carriers,
which did not feature prominently in either model, is an oversimplification.122 By
October 1938 the Planungsausschuss doubted that the carrier could be used in the
Atlantic owing to the problems with the high-pressure steam propulsion and wanted
work suspended.123 The problem was not carrier-specific, and in fact most of the larger
warships under construction were deemed unfit for Atlantic warfare.124 Heye saw the
117 Schlussbesprechung des Kriegsspieles – B – des OKM 37/38, BA-MA, RM 20/1115.

119 Allgemeine taktische und operative Fragen, BA-MA, RM 7/2358; Kriegsspiel 1938A
Unterlagen, BA-MA, RM 20/1093, final assessment discusses carrier policy. The RN did
operate carriers without destroyer escorts, but with cruisers as anti-raider units; however, in
exercises cruisers were often substituted by destroyers, which explains German assumptions.
See CB 1469/37, Exercises and Operations, TNA, ADM 186/158.
120 B.Nr. A IVa 4389/37 Gkdos ‘Entwürfe für Zerstörer 37 und Kreuzerneubauten’, BA-MA, RM
7/1218.
121 An examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this article; however, aspects of
this are covered by Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, Bd. 1, pp. 65–82; Schreiber,
Revisionismus, pp. 131–62; Dülffer, Weimar, pp. 434–543. For a good summary, see Mulligan,
‘Ship-of-the-Line’.
122 See, for example, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, Bd. 1, p. 43.
123 Allgemeines Marineamt BZ 7108/38 geh 22.10.38 Flugzeugträger B, BA-MA, RM 7/1201.
124 Mulligan, ‘Ship-of-the-Line’, p. 1037.

potential of naval aviation in commerce warfare and, although he had reservations about
carriers, he was not categorically opposed. He was critical of the carrier’s now large size
as it would represent a substantial blow if lost in combat.125 In commerce warfare, as now
envisaged, smaller carriers would be better. Here was an example of how a fleet tailored
to counter the French was not necessarily appropriate to deal with the British.
The argument that the navy generally had little interest in carriers and considered
such vessels weak implies that one of the largest German engineering projects was
initiated without any identifiable patrons or belief in its utility. Despite the Reich’s
aptitude for bureaucratic inefficiency and factional infighting, such an explanation is
unconvincing. In fact the carrier project was given considerable resources, which
makes it difficult to see the project as a sideshow or paper project. There were only
three slipways for capital ship construction; two were occupied by battleships and one
by the carrier.126 By the end of 1939 around 70 million Reichsmarks had been spent on
the carrier. In addition, the machinery for the second vessel had been delivered, new
airbases constructed, and a large new dry dock was planned.127 By comparison, the
construction costs of the Bismarck amounted to about 71.6 million RM, while the com-
plete price came to 196.8 million RM, given the expense of the armament and such
equipment as fire-control systems.128 Accepting the propulsion issue, and the general
delays caused by steel and manpower shortages, construction of the carrier does not
seem to have posed any major obstacles. In early 1939 further assistance from the
Japanese was turned down.129 The Graf Zeppelin was launched on 8 December 1938 at
a huge ceremony attended by many of the Reich’s military-political elite. This first
phase of construction had proceeded as planned without any problems, unlike the
battleships that were delayed.130
The outgoing fleet commander, Admiral Rolf Carls, responding to Heye’s first draft
in September 1938, saw oceanic raiding groups centred on battlecruisers and carriers as
the means to attack British commerce.131 Undeniably the naval leadership was battle-
ship-minded, but in the United States too a similar view persisted until the 1940s. In
American and British pre-war exercises carriers were regularly declared sunk, to demon-
strate their vulnerability. Raeder’s characterization of the limits and capabilities of air-
craft in 1937 (endurance, payload, weather dependency, and legal constraints) was a
125 This is based on the final version of the Heye Denkschrift as reproduced in Salewski, Die
deutsche Seekriesleitung, Bd. 3, pp. 50–3. This was a slight revision from his earlier draft
(see Mulligan, ‘Ship-of-the-Line’, pp. 1038–9), but in his post-war interrogation Heye took a
similar position: TNA, ADM 223/690.
126 Treue, Flottenaufbau, p. 8, BA-MA, RM 8/1241.
127 Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger, p. 70; Richard Lakowski, Reichs- und Kriegsmarine
1919–1945 (Königswinter: Siegler, 2006), p. 22; Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegschiffbau’, p. 61.
128 Andreas Meyhoff, Blohm & Voss im ‘Dritten Reich’: eine Hamburger Grosswerft zwischen
Geschäft und Politik (Hamburg: Hans Christians, 2001), p. 141.
129 Der General d.L.w.b.Ob.d.M 1090/39 Ia 19.6.39, BA-MA, RM 7/1975.
130 Treue Denkschrift, p. 74, BA-MA, RM 8/1491; Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger,
pp. 42, 67–9.
131 Mulligan, ‘Ship-of-the-Line’, p. 1038.

Faulkner 511
conservative, but largely realistic, assessment of the existing capabilities. Although he

saw aircraft primarily as reconnaissance platforms, he acknowledged their strike poten-
tial and considered aviation crucial to naval operations.
In late 1938 the operations department prioritized carriers behind battleships, sub-
marines, and new battlecruisers.132 This made sense, given that the first carrier had
only just been launched. Otto Ciliax had warned of the risks of embarking on the car-
rier programme without sufficient time for experimentation.133 The fact that the Z-Plan,
the culmination of the autumn deliberations, included ‘only’ four carriers should not be
taken to mean the naval leadership dismissed the utility of the carrier. Presumably the
four were intended as the core of the oceanic raiding groups; rather than a plan, this
was simply a gargantuan wish list. Internationally also most pre-war plans focused on
battleships. More important was the experience of the winter 1938 war game in which
the practicalities of warfare against Britain were examined, the results of which sug-
gested that carriers would be crucial. The Home Fleet, with its two carriers, could
continuously patrol the North Sea exits, but with five carriers the British could cover
the entire Atlantic between Greenland and Scotland. In an ocean carrier-versus-carrier
clash Graf Zeppelin might prevail, but during the breakout phase into the north Atlantic
it would have to deal with land-based aircraft, which underlines the importance of its
defences.134
IV. The British Perception

Historians examining British reactions to German naval rearmament have ignored the
implications of a German carrier for British maritime commerce and communications
when, in fact, the Admiralty perceived them with great concern.135 Briefly examining
the British position provides a good contemporary barometer with which to gauge
German efforts. German interest in maritime aviation had been noted since 1929 when
rumours of clandestine flying activities emerged, but, when Britain and France formally
protested, the Reichswehrministerium denied the existence of an air arm.136 Later,
although German officers never mentioned carriers in official conversations, they
132 Treue Denkschrift, p. 17, BA-MA, RM 8/1491. In March 1937 Guse had ruled out further
carriers until 1940 to allow problems to be addressed: Guse 9.3.37, BA-MA, RM 20/1810.
133 Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, Bd. 1, 30. Ciliax occupied various staff posts
between 1932 and 1936, including heading the operations department from September 1934.
He worked closely with Groos and almost certainly was one of the carriers’ advocates.
134 Kriegsspiel des Flottenkommandos/Studie ‘Der Nordessschauplatz’, BA-MA, RM 20/1117.
135 Wesley K. Wark, ‘Baltic Myths and Submarine Bogeys: British Naval Intelligence and
Nazi Germany, 1933–1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies VI (1983), pp. 66–81; Andrew
Lambert, ‘Seapower, 1939–1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the
Atlantic’, Journal of Strategic Studies XVII (1994), pp. 86–107; Maiolo, ‘Knockout Blow’,
pp. 202–28.
136 C685/657/18 – Rumbold – Naval Attache Report 1929, TNA, FO 371/14370; US Office of
Naval Intelligence, ‘German Naval Air Arm’, p. 25.

unofficially indicated that they saw aircraft as essential.137 In 1934 the Admiralty felt it
would be impossible to prevent the Germans from constructing a carrier if Germany
entered a naval agreement.138 It was assumed the Germans would seek to build a carrier
to the largest possible design. In the event of an Anglo-German conflict at least two, if
not three, carriers would be needed in home waters to ensure a decisive superiority over
the probably larger German vessel.139 British naval intelligence believed the Germans
wanted two carriers and would be able to construct them within three years, with one
being completed in 1939 and the other in 1942.140 When the naval attaché in Berlin
examined the issue in February 1935, he reported that it was evident that the Germans
had been keenly studying foreign carrier development and that there seemed to be a
preference for a medium-sized vessel rather than a larger 22,000 t carrier.141 If Germany
were authorized to construct up to a third of the British tonnage, this would entitle them
to 42,000 t and equate to at least three medium carriers.
By 1936 the British believed that the German carriers would be far larger and more
effective, and displace over 20,000 t.142 Aircraft, owing to their superior speed and num-
bers, were considered a far greater threat to maritime communications than submarines.143
As long as Germany was limited to maritime aviation the threat would be limited to the
North Sea.144 The seaplanes carried by warships were not seen as significantly enhancing
German capabilities. Carriers would greatly increase the difficulty of trade protection as,
with air support, surface raiders could cover more ocean and operate further from focal or
assembly points, also in poorer conditions. Thus, this combination constituted the worst-
case scenario.145 The Japanese showed how effectively carriers could operate against
commerce off the Indian coast in April 1942.146
In the Admiralty there was a sense that the Germans would inevitably acquire carriers,
and planning was conducted on this basis. For example, in March 1938 an exercise was
held at sea to examine how large convoys could be protected against combined attacks
by warships, submarines, and aircraft. The Red force was composed of battleships Nelson
and Rodney simulating fast battleships, with the carrier Courageous and submarines
137 Waßner never referred to plans to develop carriers. Note Phipps, ‘Germany and Disarmament’,
1/12/33, TNA, ADM 116/2890. Kapitän.z.See Carls to the British naval attaché, C7995/211/18,
22 September 1932, TNA, FO 371/15940. The fact that Wennker later told the British assistant
naval attaché in Tokyo that the Marine had no interest in carriers in April 1936 was most likely
to mislead the British; Fox, Germany, p. 104.
138 PD 04586/34, Limitation of German Naval Armaments 29.6.34, TNA, ADM 116/3373.
139 PD 04756/34, The Employment of Aircraft Carriers in a War against Germany 6/12/1934,
TNA, ADM 1/27413.
140 PD 04754/34 12.12.1934, Germany’s Naval Forces – 1939 and 1942, TNA, ADM 116/3373.
141 C1536/206/8, 26 February 1935, MG to Phipps, TNA, FO 371/18860.
142 German Naval Strategy revised intelligence 1936–7, TNA, ADM 178/137.
143 Lambert, ‘Seapower’, pp. 93–4; Maiolo, ‘Knockout Blow’, p. 213; Courses of Action Open
to Germany Plans Division 20.3.35, TNA, ADM 1/27413.
144 Naval Appreciation (1937) of War with Germany, 1939 (volume 1), TNA, ADM 199/2365.
145 C.B. 01764(39), Protection of Shipping at Sea, 1939, TNA, ADM 199/3.
146 David Brown, Carrier Operations in World War II (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2009), p. 136.

Faulkner 513
closely resembling the German threat. The results were not encouraging, as the convoys
and Blue forces incurred heavy loses.147 Although intelligence had allowed the British to
gain a reasonable insight into German submarine and warship construction, nothing was
known about the Graf Zeppelin.148 In the German press, reports of naval construction
were heavily censored and, even after the launch of the carrier, little information reached
the public domain.149
From September 1939 surface raiders caused havoc to Allied maritime communi-
cations through physical destruction and delays caused by the need to reroute and
escort transatlantic convoys.150 After the destruction of the Graf Spee in December
1939 the Admiralty was very concerned about the prospect of more and larger German
vessels coming into service, and in January 1940 the director of plans concluded that
it was ‘the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin which is likely to provide our most disagree-
able problem’. A German carrier in the Atlantic would make it hard to hide convoys
and would allow raiders to evade Allied hunting groups. Hence the Admiralty wanted
to sink the Graf Zeppelin before its shortly anticipated completion.151 As the RAF
then lacked the capability to engage warships effectively, and because a continuous
submarine presence off Kiel could not be maintained for lack of a suitable base in the
Baltic, the Admiralty considered a carrier air strike or utilizing Swordfish aircraft
with new long-range fuel tanks operating from Britain.152
The German occupation of Denmark, Norway, and France in 1940 negated some of
the carrier’s utility, as maritime air power could be projected from new airbases deep
into the Atlantic. The wartime development of the Graf Zeppelin only requires brief
attention to explain why work ceased. By September 1939 the carrier was 85 per cent
complete, most machinery had been installed, and initially work continued unaffected.
The prioritization of submarines and the completion of the other surface vessels slowed
down construction, but Raeder consented to the completion owing to the ship’s utility
in commerce warfare.153 Only on 28 April 1940, after the completion of the first phase
of the invasion of Norway, Operation Weserübung, did Raeder order a halt.154 The stated
147 Ex Z.P. Serial 8, 14–15 March 1938, TNA, ADM 186/159.

148 Wark, ‘Baltic Myths’; Joseph Maiolo, ‘Deception and Intelligence Failure: Anglo-German
Preparations for U-Boat Warfare in the 1930s’, Journal of Strategic Studies XXII (1999), pp.
56–76.
149 Walter Schwengler, ‘Marine und Offentlichkeit 1919–1939’, Militärgeschichtliche
Mitteilungen XLVI (1989), p. 47.
150 James P. Levy, The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet in World War II (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), pp. 35–49; Eric Grove, Price of Disobedience (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2001).
151 ‘Actions to be taken against Bismarck’, 28th Jan 1940, TNA, ADM 1/10617.
152 Methods of Attack on German Ships Bismarck and Graf Zeppelin, Meeting 27th March
(1940), TNA, ADM 1/10617. Preparations were under way by May: see DofP and DNI com-
ments within ADM 1/10617.
153 Werner Rahn and Gerhard Schreiber, eds., Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945,
76 Bd. (Herford: Mittler, 1988–97), henceforth SKL KTB with date; 2. Okt 1939, Lagevortrag
des Ob.d.M vor Hitler 10. Okt 1939.
154 SKL KTB, 28 April 1940.

reason was a lack of gunnery equipment, which would have delayed the completion by
a further 10 months after the vessel itself was finished. The carrier’s original fire-con-
trol equipment had been supplied to the Soviet Union as part of the material exchange
agreed upon in 1939.155 The 15 cm guns were needed for coastal defence in Norway and
there was a considerable shortage of anti-aircraft armament, and the carrier lacked
almost all its battery.156 More generally the repairs necessary to many warships involved
in Weserübung, and the need that summer to provide flotilla craft and coastal defences
for the vast newly occupied coastline, added a further drain on resources.157
However, the problem was political rather than technical, and stemmed from the
increasingly bitter feuding between the navy and Luftwaffe. After the war naval officers
blamed Luftwaffe intransigence over the development and allocation of naval aircraft as
a key factor in the navy’s decision not to prioritize the carrier’s completion.158 This issue
cannot be fully explored here but should be alluded to, since one factor throughout the
design process had been the lack of information regarding future carrier aircraft.159 When
the RLM took over the development and procurement of aircraft in 1933 it devoted little
attention to naval aviation.160 This probably proved fortuitous as eventually navalized
versions of Me 109 fighters and Ju 87 dive-bombers were adopted, both of which out-
classed British equivalents. However, the development of the multi-purpose Fi 167
stalled.
Between 1934 and 1939 a debate developed between the navy and Luftwaffe over
which service had jurisdiction over which aircraft and which missions. In February 1939
an agreement was reached whereby the Luftwaffe would equip and place under naval
operational command 9 long-range, 18 general-purpose reconnaissance, and 12 carrier
squadrons. However, cooperation throughout the first six months of the war was poor,
with the Luftwaffe furnishing little useful support to the navy, the latter being wholly
reliant on the small number of seaplanes it directly controlled.161 Finally, in April 1940,
Göring, who had spoken at the launch of the Graf Zeppelin and considered the carrier to
be part of his domain, ordered that the Luftwaffe squadrons earmarked for naval use be
reduced in size by up to a quarter. In its final form the air group was to consist of 10 Bf
109 T fighters, 13 Ju 87 T dive-bombers, and 20 Fi 167s. Much of the naval air wing was
operational in 1940. The dive-bomber squadrons had been used over Poland, while the
fighter squadrons were being formed and would be deployed in the air defence of
155 Lagevortrag des Ob.d.M vor Hitler, 29. April 1940.

156 Israel, Einziger deutscher Flugzeugträger, pp. 94–7. Material shortages were a serious prob-
lem. In May 1941 the Bismarck only made ready by stripping other ships of equipment:
Timothy Mulligan, ‘Bismarck: Not Ready for Action?’, Naval History XV (2001).
157 Klaus Maier et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 2 (Stuttgart: DVA,
1979), p. 346.
158 Fuchs, ‘Der deutsche Kriegschiffbau’, p. 61.
160 Francis L. Marshall, Messerschmitt Bf 109 T: die Jäger der Graf Zeppelin (Gilching: Marshall,
2002); Berndt Wenzel, ‘The German Carrier Planes’, Warship International XLV (2009), pp.
213–19.
161 Neitzel, Der Einsatz, pp. 29–48.

Faulkner 515
Norway. The navy thought it unacceptable that naval aviation had been under-resourced
and, faced with losing operational control of the aircraft, saw little point in prioritizing
the carrier.
The value of British carriers off Norway and in the Mediterranean was shown
throughout 1940 and 1941. They proved resilient against overwhelming Luftwaffe
attacks, prompting Göring to offer bounties to pilots who inflicted damage on them.162
During Rheinübung British naval aviation functioned in the manner that both sides had
envisaged before the war and, in its immediate aftermath, the Seekriegsleitung
acknowledged the importance of a carrier to any Atlantic operations by the surface
fleet.163 In fact discussions about completing the Graf Zeppelin had already been held
in the autumn of 1940, and the issue gained importance when Hitler increasingly
became interested in carriers after Rheinübung.164 In addition to the completion of one
carrier, the conversion of cruisers and civilian vessels into light carriers was envis-
aged.165 By 1942 the surface fleet was concentrated in Norway to undertake operations
against Allied convoys to the Soviet Union. It was believed that carriers would greatly
enhance the navy’s ability to interdict these supplies.166 Despite the increased interest
it is unlikely any vessel could have been brought into service during the war. As long
as the war in the east continued, the navy would not receive a greater share of the
Reich’s resources. Resources made available for naval construction were concentrated
on U-boat construction.
Drawing conclusions about whether a German carrier could have been commis-
sioned is necessarily difficult, but, when the project is seen in the context of what the
navy wanted to achieve and international carrier development, a more balanced pic-
ture emerges than hitherto portrayed. In principle it would have been possible.
However, the time frame for a fully worked-up carrier and air group had been consid-
erably underestimated. The theoretical aspects of the project were mastered remark-
ably well in a short time, and the design demonstrates a reasonably good degree of
understanding of contemporary carrier development. While war games and plans
alone are insufficient evidence, they too show a reasonably good understanding of the
operational value of naval aviation. The practical side is more problematic. While the
vessel might have been completed in a similar time frame to the Bismarck or Tirpitz,
it would, like all the large combatants, have suffered propulsion problems.167 The
navy did well in developing carrier-specific equipment. For example, the arrester
162 General Ulrich Kessler, ‘The Role of the Luftwaffe and the Campaign in Norway’, in Isby,
Luftwaffe, p. 218.
163 Lagevortrag des Ob.d.M vor Hitler 29. 6 Juni 1941; SKL KTB, 7 Juni 1941; Lagevortrag des
Ob.d.M vor Hitler 29. 11 Juli 1941.
164 For a concise overview of all SKL KTB references to carriers, see Israel, Einziger deutscher
Flugzeugträger, pp. 153–62.
165 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, pp. 113–15; Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, pp. 416–20.
166 For Hitler’s view, see Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespraeche im Fuehrerhauptquartier
1941–1942 (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1965), p. 373.
167 See the Voß Denkschrift and correspondence, Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung, Bd. 3,
pp. 168–88.

system functioned very well, with few accidents in the thousands of landings con-
ducted at shore establishments.168
Yet a carrier is more than the sum of its constituent components, and constructing a
fleet carrier without an experimental vessel to test technologies and procedures was a
mistake. The Graf Zeppelin was conceived to conduct simultaneous launch and recovery
operations and, while this was possible theoretically, as the Americans established, it was
near impossible in reality. Practical experience with the whole system was imperative.
Perhaps, though, it is just as important to recognize that the British believed the Germans
were capable of bringing a carrier into service; in fact they felt that the Germans would
be considerably more effective than the French had been.169 Aviation could be hugely
destructive in commerce warfare, and the British went to great lengths to ensure that a
German carrier did not complicate the trade-protection issue. In April 1942 British intel-
ligence expected that the Graf Zeppelin was six months away from operational deploy-
ment.170 On the night of 27/8 August 1942 a force of Lancaster bombers, armed with
newly developed Capital Ship Bombs, was dispatched to Gdynia to sink the carrier.171
Small carriers would have been sufficient and could have been developed quicker, as the
British themselves knew. The navy’s problem was that it had over-thought and over-
engineered the issue by seeking, in its first attempt, to produce a perfect fleet carrier,
rather than one suited to its operational requirements.

169 A 6246/22/45, 12 July 1934, TNA, FO 371/18736.
170 Meeting with Russian Naval Officer, 14.4.42, TNA, ADM 223/289. Interestingly German
naval intelligence was aware of the over-optimistic British reporting on the completion of the
Graf Zeppelin: SKL KTB, 11 November 1941.
171 This was the longest-range bombing mission yet attempted, but haze prevented the targeting
of the carrier. Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An
Operational Reference Book, 1939–1945 (London: Viking, 1985), p. 303.

The Kriegsmarine and The Aircraft Carrier: The Design and Operational Purpose of The

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455974

Graf Zeppelin, 1933–1940

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I. The Origins of the German Carrier Programme

11 Larrie D. Ferreiro, ‘Goodall in America: The Exchange Engineer as Vector in International

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25 Dülffer, Weimar, pp. 229–33.

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communications.31 However, land-based aircraft operating from Germany lacked the

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39 Ist für die Atlantikkriegführung der Flugzeugträger oder Flugdeckkreuzer vorzuziehen?,

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48 Manfred Kehrig, Die Wiedereinrichtung des deutschen militärischen Attachedienstes nach

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II. The Design

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77 Br.Nr. 174gg 4. Dezember 1935, Vorbericht der Flugzeugträgerkommission, BA-MA, RM

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84 Fox, Germany, pp. 104, 364.

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94 Zu M153/37 G.Kds [undated, probably late 1938], BA-MA, RM 6/60.

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land-based air threat in European waters. Asbestos–steel fire-curtains were fitted

III. The Concept of Operations

101 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 91.

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emphasis on reconnaissance should not be seen as a doctrinal limitation as is sometimes

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117 Schlussbesprechung des Kriegsspieles – B – des OKM 37/38, BA-MA, RM 20/1115.

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conservative, but largely realistic, assessment of the existing capabilities. Although he

IV. The British Perception

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147 Ex Z.P. Serial 8, 14–15 March 1938, TNA, ADM 186/159.

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155 Lagevortrag des Ob.d.M vor Hitler, 29. April 1940.

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168 Hadeler, Der Flugzeugträger, p. 86.

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