MEANING 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
MEANING  OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AUGUST 25, 2020
INTRODUCTION
Meaning of Administrative law
 embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the administrative operations of government (1987
Administrative Code of the Philippines)
Kinds of Administrative Law
 Statutes setting up administrative authorities
 Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and regulations
of such administrative authorities
 Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities in pursuance of the purposes for which
administrative authorities were created
 Determinations, decisions and orders of such administrative authorities in the settlement of controversies arising
in their particular fields
The Administrative Code of 1987
 replaced the 1917 Administrative Code, which was promulgated when the Philippines was still a colony of the United States. 
 Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, is the basic law governing the organization
and structure of the national government.
Meaning of Public Office
 right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the appointing power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.
Public Office
 The creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for the offices created by the Constitution.
Khan, Jr. v. OMBUDSMAN
 Issue: whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over petitioners
Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for violation of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
 JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER GOCCS IS CONFINED ONLY TO THOSE WITH ORIGINAL
CHARTERS

o Article XI, Section 13(2), 1987 Constitution

 Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
 Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
 Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission
o "with original charter" means "chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations
organized under the Corporation Code." 
o PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general
corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article
XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan
 While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled corporation, after it was
acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and
thus shed-off its private status.
 It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to government
programs and policies on oil a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation.
 It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or government-related functions,
as the marketing arm of PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain
an adequate and stable domestic supply.
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission
 The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 
 From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 

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  The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission.
 Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another
is to attain "policy and program coordination."
o Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
 (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and
attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be
accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the
charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall
reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies
of the attached corporation or agency.
 "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of a public offices is primarily a legislative function.
 In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature
may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
 When in the exigencies of government, it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the
discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become
ex-officio duties of existing offices.
 An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora

 The Civil Service Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16 of
Presidential Decree 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)
 The Civil Service Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16 of
Presidential Decree 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)
 The power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
o This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy.
o A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office
was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
 The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office,19 or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
 Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other
powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Section
20, Book III of E.O. No. 292)
 What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus
and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. 
 reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." (Canonizado v. Aguirre)
 In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.
 Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization-Approved on June 10, 1988“) provides
for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service
employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: 
a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; 
c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit; 

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 d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and
e) where the removal violates the order of separation. (Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656)

Herrera v. NPC
 Issue: Whether or not NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization of the electric
power industry and who received their separation pay under RA No. 9136 are still entitled to receive retirement benefits
under CA No. 186, as amended
 Absent clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the grant of both separation pays and retirement benefits violates the
constitutional proscription on additional compensation.

SEPTEMBER 07, 2020

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Law on Public Officers

 Accountability of Public officers (Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution)
o Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
 Responsibilities of Public Officers and Employees (Article VI, Section 15 of Civil Service Decree of the Philippines
[Presidential Decree No. 807])
o Duties of Public Officers. - Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.

Government is not bound by errors of public officers

 As a rule, the State, as represented by the government, is not estopped by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
 This is especially true when the government’s actions are sovereign in nature.
 Illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State.
 Heirs of Atty. Jose Reyes v. Republic of the Philippines
o Facts:
 Dr. Casiano A. Sandoval and Luz Marquez de Sandoval applied for the registration of title over Cadastral
Lot 7453 Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. opposed the application claiming ownership over a
portion of the property.
 The initial hearing was on March 30, 1962, during which the trial court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except for respondent Republic of the Philippines.
 For nearly 20 years thereafter, nothing more transpired in the case. On March 3, 1981, the heirs of
Sandoval and Marquez, together with the Directors of the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management
Bureau) and the Bureau of Forest Development, submitted a compromise agreement dated February 6,
1981 to the trial court for approval.
 The parties to the agreement were the heirs of Sandoval, represented by their attorney-in-fact Emmanuel
Sandoval, the heirs of Clemencia Parasac, heirs of Liberato Bayaua, Atty. Jose C. Reyes, petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development (with the last two represented by the provincial fiscal7 of Nueva Vizcaya, Justino A.R.
Vigilia).
o Regional Trial Court
 rendered a decision dated March 3, 1981, based on that agreement.
 The land was distributed to the different parties in the following manner:
 Bureau of Lands 1,750 hectares
 Bureau of Forest Development 5,661 hectares
 Heirs of Clemencia Parasac and Liberato Bayaua 1,000 hectares
 Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. 4,000 hectares,
 Heirs of Casiano Sandoval 2,892.5928 hectares.
 Sandoval heirs assigned 892.5928 hectares to Atty. Jose C. Reyes as his attorney’s fees.
 Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
annul the decision of the RTC under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 Petitioners, the heirs of Liberato Bayaua and Clemencia Parasac, and Philippine Cacao Farm Products, Inc.
all filed separate motions to dismiss.
 The Court of Appeals denied these motions and annulled the decision of the RTC.

o Court of Appeals

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  The Court of Appeals decision was based on the following salient points:
a) the adjudication of the lands in question through the compromise agreement was unconstitutional,
the concerned parcels of land being forest lands; the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
it made the award;
b) no evidence was presented by petitioners to prove their ownership, the decision being based
entirely on the compromise agreement, and
c) the petition was not barred by laches or estoppel because the RTC was without jurisdiction to
render the decision based on the compromise agreement; also, the OSG was barred by estoppel
because it did not give its consent to the compromise agreement; neither did it deputize the
provincial fiscal to enter into it.
o Issue:
 Whether or not estoppel applies against the government and if such is the case in the case at hand
o Proper Action:
 When the trial court rendered its decision, the OSG, could have and should have challenged the judgment based
on the compromise agreement, given that the Directors of Lands and Forest Development had greatly
overstepped their authority. After all, it was the OSG alone which was empowered to represent the government
in all land registration and related proceedings

o Error:
 However, rather than perform its legal duty to challenge the judgment, the OSG supposedly walked away from
the problem like a petulant child, even going so far as to say:
xxx xxx xxx
 5. Considering therefore, that the abovementioned officials have decided to act on their own, with counsel other
than the Solicitor General, the latter’s services as counsel in this case is thus superfluous;

o Legal:
 Neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest Development had legal authority to enter into the
compromise agreement which was the only basis for the award.
 After all, it was the OSG alone which was empowered to represent the government in all land registration and
related proceedings

o Error:
 The Directors of Lands and Forest Development had greatly overstepped their authority.
 As a rule, the State, as represented by the government, is not estopped by the mistakes or errors of its officials
or agents. [Collado v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 149 (2002); Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12115,
09 March 2001, 354 SCRA 148; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69138, 19 May 1992, 209
SCRA 90; Republic v. De los Angeles, G.R. No. L-30240, 25 March 1988, 159 SCRA 264; Republic v.
Aquino, 205 Phil. 141 (1983)]
 This is especially true when the government’s actions are sovereign in nature. [Republic v. De los Angeles,
G.R. No. L-30240, 25 March 1988, 159 SCRA 264]
 This Court will never allow unscrupulous government agents, whether retired or incumbent, to bind the
Republic to unconscionable and illegal agreements with questionable characters to the detriment of the national
interest.

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

 A public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions. 
 To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence against it must be clear and
convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.
 Yap v. Lagtapon
o Facts:
 Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental civil suit against [petitioner Yap] for a sum of money.
 Summons was issued and as per return of service of summons dated 4 November 1997 prepared by the
process server of the respondent court in the person of Ray R. Precioso, he served on November 4, 1997 the
summons on [petitioner Yap] who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof, thus, compelling him
to tender the same and left (sic) a copy thereof for her.
 As no answer was filed, [respondent Lagtapon] filed a motion to declare [petitioner Yap] in default dated
16 December 1997. The said motion was granted by the respondent court in an order issued on 12 January
1998 declaring [petitioner Yap] in default and allowing [respondent Lagtapon] to present her evidence ex-
parte on 9 February 1998.
 Accordingly, [respondent Lagtapon] adduced evidence in her favor ex-parte. On 10 February 1998, the
respondent court issued an order admitting the documentary exhibits offered by [respondent Lagtapon].

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  On 12 February 1998, the respondent court rendered the challenged Decision in favor of [respondent
Lagtapon] and against [petitioner Yap]. Under date of 6 March 1998, [respondent Lagtapon] filed a motion
for execution which was favorably acted upon by the respondent court through an order of 21 May 1998.
 The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental issued a notice of sale on execution dated 25
September 2000 setting the auction sale of petitioner's property on 17 October 2000. The property of
petitioner that was put up for execution sale consists of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block 2 of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-91608 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110467 situated at
Herminia Street, Villa Valderranm (sic), Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City.
 On or about 11 October 2000, Joey de la Paz, to whom [petitioner Yap] mortgaged the same property,
informed her that when he asked his secretary to secure a copy of the title covering the property from the
Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City, it was found out that annotated on the title is a notice of embargo
relative to Civil Case No. 97-9991, that a notice of sale on execution had already been issued and that the
said property was scheduled to be sold at auction on 17 October 2000.
 Immediately upon receiving such information, [petitioner Yap] proceeded to the Hall of Justice to verify
the truthfulness thereof. It was only then that she discovered that she was sued by [respondent Lagtapon]
and a judgment by default against her had long been issued.
o Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision on the ground that Summons was not validly
served on her, which thus prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over her person.
o Ruling of the CA
o denied the Petition for Annulment and upheld the validity of the service of Summons on petitioner
Yap.
o held that petitioner Yap's evidence failed to rebut the presumption of regularity, i.e., that she failed to
satisfactorily establish the fact that she was residing elsewhere during the time of the service of
Summons, contrary to what was stated in the Return of Service.
o Appeal by Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
o assailing the Decision dated July 27, 2006 (questioned Decision) and Resolution dated February 23,
2011 issued by the Court of Appeals - Twentieth (20th) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61944,
which denied the Petition for Annulment of Judgment (Petition for Annulment) dated November 8,
2000 and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Yap.

o Issue:
o Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Annulment and ruling that
the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person through service of summons.
o Ruling:
o It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's
official duties and functions. [Gatmaitan v. Gonzales, 525 Phil. 658, 671 (2006)] 
o Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on petitioner Yap
is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process
server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein. 
o Hence, as far as the circumstances attendant to the service of Summons are concerned, the Court has
the right to rely on the factual representation of Precioso that service had indeed been made on
petitioner Yap in person. A contrary rule would reduce the Court to a mere fact-finding tribunal at the
expense of efficiency in the administration of justice, which, as mentioned earlier, is beyond the ambit
of the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition.
o To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence against
it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption
stands deserving of faith and credit.[Guanzon v. Arradaza, 539 Phil. 367, 375 (2006)]
o In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such presumption lay with petitioner Yap. 
o All told, the Court hereby upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision that petitioner Yap'
s evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity
attendant to the Return of Service. Following Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., self-serving assertions made by
an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after
service of Summons. In light of petitioner Yap's failure to rebut such presumption, the Court finds that
the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person, which renders the RTC Decision
valid. Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the subject Petition for Annulment.
o The Court resolves to DENY the instant Petition and AFFIRM in toto the Decision dated July 27, 2006
and Resolution dated February 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals - Twentieth (20th) Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61944.

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Three-fold liability rule
 A basic principle in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions
of a public officer, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently
of the others.
 Ampil v. OMBUDSMAN
o Facts
 On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered
into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be
known as "The Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the
heart of the Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of
construction and development of the condominium building.
 A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling
to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will
vest on ASB only upon full payment of the purchase price.
 Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with
Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Approved
 MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),7 allowing MICO to
assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of
the execution of the MOA, ASB had already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48
purchase price of the realty.
 The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments.
 On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the allotted parking
spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering
the same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity
as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were
originally issued in ASB’s name.
 On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the
CCTs which he had originally issued in ASB’s name.11 Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect
in the second set of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.
 After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote
respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively,
introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of
the ASB Group of Companies.
 Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and
facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s name.
o Case:
 As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
before the Office of the Ombudsman
 Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
a) Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed an offense in
connection with his official duties by allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced by
respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and
b) The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at
the least, gross inexcusable negligence.
c) Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as principals by
inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for falsification of the
CCTs and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
d) Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing
Ampil’s complaint.
e) For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced
by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units.
The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus,
refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the
Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak
something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for
falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the
document speak something false, had not been established.
f) Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict
respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

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 g) On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin
liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a
finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman
reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
h) On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin
liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a
finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman
reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
i) Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the
appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution
absolving Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple
Misconduct.
j) On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin
liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a
finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman
reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
k) Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the
appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution
absolving Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple
Misconduct.
l) Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-
0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L.
Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema
O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
m) Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
n) Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil:
o first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s failure to find probable
cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
the Revised Penal Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices underSections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
o second, raising grievous error of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Ombudsman’s
absolution of Espenesin from administrative liability.
o Issue:
 Whether or not probable cause exists to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
o Ruling:
 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed
through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
 However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining
probable cause:
a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
 basic principle in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful
acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others.
 On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s last ruling that
Espenesin is not administratively liable.
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.

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 o In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest and
established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense
of Simple Misconduct. Thus, a person charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for
Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the
misconduct as grave.
 In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsman’s own finding,
present. Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or
for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. This has already been demonstrated as
discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for established rules on land registration by a
Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the
specified CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s request for the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name
constituted simple error.
o Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
 Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. Xxx
 Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the initial
preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required
by law to be a member of the legal profession, possesses common sense and prudence to ask for documents
on which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the transaction,
smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with the Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it
does registration of property, ought to be properly recorded and documented.
 In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal rules. The penalty for
Grave Misconduct is dismissal from service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service, including government-owned or controlled corporation.
 Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct and we, thus, impose the penalty of
DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement from the service, we order forfeiture of all his
retirement pay and benefits.
Ministerial v. Discretionary Duty
 A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
 If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
 The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
 NAGUILIAN EMISSION CENTER v. RIMANDO
o Facts:
 Respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the
national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business
of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application
for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.
 The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a
contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract
subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the petitioner.
 Petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas
(respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting
mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.
 RTC denied the petition for lack of merit
 The Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax
Declaration No. 002-01197
 Under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has
the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being
conducted on a real property owned by the municipality

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  A mayor’s duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a
mandamus writ
 The Ruling of the CA
 Decision dated 26 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Bauang, La Union, Branch
67, in Special Civil Action Case No. 72-BG, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 Appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for which the business
period was being sought had already lapsed. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the issues involved
in the appeal for academic purposes.
  The factual milieu of the case justifies the issuance of a writ of mandamus
  The tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a
contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit
 Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental
fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 The petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was done in
the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith
 the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of
his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
o Case:
 Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside
Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP NO. 11215
 prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor
of the respondent.

o Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release
the respondent’s business permit
o Ruling:
 A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a
delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. [Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, 531 Phil. 30
(2006)]
 Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor
to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a
municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.
 As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of
certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.

 HEIRS OF VENTURILLO v. QUITAIN

o Facts:
 Sometime in 1942, the Spouses Luciano and Consolacion Venturillo occupied a 678-square meter lot in
Poblacion, Davao City, said lot being public land. The Venturillo couple erected a house on the said
property and begot 11 children, the petitioners herein, during their lifetime.
 In 1974, the Davao City Assessor's Office directed the Venturillos to file a Tax Declaration. They complied
with the said directive and paid the required taxes. The petitioners then continued the renewal of the tax
declarations and paying of taxes.
 Sometime in 2000, Rowena Venturillo-Sucaldito filed a sales application with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the DENR wrote the City Government for its comments
regarding her application. In response, respondent City Engineer sent an inspection team to check out the
property.
 On June 8, 2000, the inspectors submitted a report recommending the approval of Sucaldito's application.
No immediate action, however, was taken by respondent City Engineer on the report.
 On October 4, 2001, respondent City Engineer asked the petitioners to secure a building permit for the
house erected on the lot, after it was shown that said structure had no building permit.
 The petitioners then hired an engineer who prepared the necessary plans and other documents, which were
submitted to the respondent City Engineer.
 On October 27, 2002, the Sanggunian Barangay of Barangay 4-A, Poblacion, Davao City passed a
resolution requesting the Sanggunian Panglungsud of Davao City to declare the portion of the proposed
extension of Mayon St., as "suppressed road."

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  On January 8, 2003, respondent City Engineer sent petitioners a Notice of Order of Removal.
 On February 13, 2003, the Zoning Administrator wrote petitioners that the area they were occupying is a
road right-of-way.

o Case:
 The petitioners herein filed a petition for mandamus with urgent prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction against respondent City Engineer with the RTC of Davao City
 The trial court granted the temporary restraining order prayed for.
 On April 15, 2003, the respondent City Engineer manifested in open court that he was not opposing the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
 The trial court denied the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the SP Civil Case.
 The Heirs of Venturillo allege that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed their
petition for mandamus and denied their prayer for injunction without: (1) ruling on the admissibility of
their admittedly tardy formal offer of exhibits; (2) waiting for respondent City Engineer's comment or
objection to said formal offer; and (3) without waiting for the answer of the City Engineer in the mandamus
case.

oIssue:
 Whether or not the remedy is ministerial.
o Ruling:
 The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. [Carpo v. Chua, G.R. No.
150773, September 30, 2005]
 A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretionary act, is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. [Symaco v. Aquino, 106 Phil. 1130
(1960)]
 The issuance of a building permit may be considered a ministerial duty only when the application and the
plans are in conformity with the requirements of zoning and land use, lines and grades, structural design,
sanitary and sewerage, environmental health, electrical and mechanical safety as well as with other rules
and regulations promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the National Building Code.[Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-21059, July 29, 1968; See also Sec. 303 and 304, Chapter 3 of the
National Building Code of the Philippines]
 In this case, the Heirs of Venturillo complied with all the requirements for the procurement of a building
permit enumerated under the National Building Code, such as the description of the work to be covered by
the permit applied for; description and ownership of the lot on which the proposed work is to be done; the
use or occupancy for which the proposed work is intended; estimated cost of the proposed work; and the
plans and specifications prepared, signed and sealed by a duly licensed engineer. [Sec. 302, National
Building Code]. They also paid the requisite fees for the application
 Having done so, it became incumbent upon respondent City Engineer to issue the building permit applied
for. His refusal to perform an act which the law enjoins him to do, upon the full compliance by the Heirs of
Venturillo of the conditions provided under the law, entitles the latter to the writ of mandamus prayed for.
Security of Tenure
 Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)
 Article III, Section 5 (Definition of Terms)
o Sec. 5. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. (Underscoring supplied)
 Article IX, Section 36 (Discipline)
o Sec. 36. Discipline: General Provisions. - (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
 Administrative Code of 1987 (Section 46)
o No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process.
  Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and
reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal. [Bentain v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89452, June 9,
1992, 209 SCRA 644]
 Yenko v. Gungon
o Facts:

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  Raul Nestor C. Gungon, who holds a professional career service eligibility, was extended a permanent
appointment as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila
 San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F. Yenko issued a Memorandum temporarily reassigning
Gungon to the Public Order and Safety Office (POSO) of the said municipality effective January 8, 1998 in
the exigency of the service. Gungon was directed to report to Mr. Felesmeno Oliquino for further
instruction. When Gungon received the Memorandum, Mr. Oliquino was confined at the San Juan Medical
Center and he passed away on January 9, 1998.
 On January 8, 1998, Gungon, in compliance with the reassignment Memorandum, reported to the POSO.
The officer-in-charge (OIC) of the POSO, Arnulfo Aguilar, issued a Memorandum dated January 8, 1998
requiring Gungon to report as Duty Agent, whose responsibility was "to conduct inspections within the
municipal compound, apprehend any suspicious characters roaming within the vicinity of the municipal
hall and compound," and setting his tour of duty at 12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from Monday to Friday.
 In a letter dated January 9, 1998 to the OIC of the POSO, Gungon protested his reassignment for being
violative of the Administrative Code of 1987, which prohibits reassignment that results in reduction in
rank, status or salary of an employee. Gungon went on sick leave from January 8 to 21, 1998 after filing the
proper application with supporting medical certificate
 On January 20, 1998, Gungon, through counsel, wrote a letter to Municipal Administrator Yenko, objecting
to his reassignment because it amounted to a demotion in rank; it was arbitrary, unwarranted and illegal;
and it violated his constitutional right to security of tenure. Gungon requested the recall of the
Memorandum dated January 7, 1998 and his reinstatement to his position as Local Assessment Operations
Officer III.
 On January 22, 1998, Gungon, whose leave of absence had by then expired, reported back to his office at
the Municipal Assessor’s Office and continued to do so even if he was not given work there.
 On February 13, 1998, Gungon received from Municipal Administrator Yenko a Memorandum, which
called his attention to his failure to report for duty at the POSO since the date of his reassignment. Gungon
was informed that his action was a violation of Civil Service Rules which might constitute a ground for
dismissal from the service.
 In a letter dated February 18, 1998, Gungon replied to Municipal Administrator Yenko’s Memorandum
 The transfer/reassignment is arbitrary, malicious, patently illegal, and palpably constitutes a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) x x x
a) Your charge that I have not reported for work is equally untrue. I have been reporting to the
assessor’s office from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., but my time card has not been signed by my
superior, evidently for fear that he could be administratively dealt with.
 In a Memorandum dated February 23, 1998, then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada informed Gungon that
he was "considered dropped from the rolls because of [his] absence without official leave from x x x
January 22, 1998 up to the present x x x.“
 Appeal to the Civil Service Commission
a) the Municipal Administrator committed abuse of authority amounting to oppression in reassigning
him from the Assessor’s Office, where he was working as Local Assessment Operations Officer
III, to the POSO, where he would be required to work as a security guard, even if the Municipal
Administrator knew that he never had the knowledge, background or training as a security guard.
b) the Municipal Administrator violated the Civil Service Law when he effected the reassignment,
because he knew that such personnel action was meant to demote, humiliate and subject him to
ridicule, risk, harassment and undue injury rather than enhance the so-called "exigency of service."
c) Mayor Estrada approved the illegal transfer by dropping him from the rolls on the pretext that he
was absent from January 22 to February 23, 1998, although his failure to report to the POSO was
based on justifiable, meritorious and valid grounds, thereby rendering the Mayor’s Memorandum
dropping him from the rolls as illegal and void.
d) The CSC dismissed Gungon’s appeal in CSC Resolution No. 982525 dated September 28, 1998.
e) WHEREFORE, the Appeal of Raul Nestor C. Gungon is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the
decision of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, dropping him from
the rolls, is affirmed.
 A reassignment order is generally implemented immediately even if the employee does not agree with it. x
x

11 | P a g e
  The rule is a reassigned employee who does not agree with the order must nevertheless comply until its
implementation is restrained or it is declared to be not in the interest of service or have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
 The CSC held that Gungon’s failure to report for work for more than 30 days was violative of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993, as amended, which provides that "[a]n officer or employee
who is continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be
separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice."

o Case:
 Petition for review of the CSC’s Resolutions with the Court of Appeals.
 He alleged that the CSC erred
a) in not nullifying the reassignment order and order of separation from the service notwithstanding
its finding that as a result thereof, he suffered a reduction in rank;
b) in holding that his failure and refusal to comply with the reassignment order was justified; and
c) in holding that for his failure and refusal to report for duty at the disputed job he was deemed to
have incurred continuous absences.
 Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of Gungon
a) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos.
982525 and 990194 are hereby SET ASIDE and payment of petitioner’s back salaries from
February 23, 1998 up to October 13, 1998 is hereby ORDERED.
 The Court of Appeals
a) Gungon, who occupied the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer III under a permanent
appointment, enjoyed security of tenure, which is guaranteed by the Constitution and Civil Service
Law. His reassignment from Local Assessment Operations Officer III to security guard involved a
reduction in rank and status, which is proscribed under Section 10, Rule 7 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations).
b) His reassignment, which was directed by Municipal Administrator Yenko in the Memorandum
dated January 7, 1998, was void ab initio.
c) Mayor Estrada's Memorandum dated February 13, 1998, which ordered Gungon’s dismissal from
the service, must suffer from the same fatal infirmity.
d) did not grant Gungon’s plea for reinstatement on the ground that Gungon applied for terminal
leave on October 13, 1998, which application was approved. He was paid his terminal leave
benefits in the amount of ₱151,514.39 on November 10, 1998.
e) having voluntarily opted to sever his employment by applying for terminal leave and having
accepted his terminal leave benefits, Gungon should only be awarded back salaries from the date
of his dismissal until the date he applied for terminal leave, which was from February 23, 1998 up
to October 13, 1998.
f) Both parties filed a petition for review on certiorari of the Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The petition of Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada was docketed as
G.R. No. 165450, while that of Gungon was docketed as G.R. No. 165452. The Court resolved to
consolidate both cases in a Resolution dated December 14, 2004.

o Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of Gungon to his former position
as Local Assessment Operations Officer III without loss of seniority rights despite the fact that Gungon
subsequently opted to sever his employment by applying for terminal leave and receiving the equivalent
payments thereon.
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the payment to Gungon of five years back salaries
from the date he was dropped from the rolls on March [1], 1998 despite the undisputed fact that Gungon
did not render any service to the Municipal Government of San Juan from the time he was reassigned to
POSO up to the time he opted to voluntarily sever his employment when he applied for terminal leave.
 Whether or not the appellate court was correct in declaring the reassignment of petitioner and the dropping
of petitioner from the rolls as void ab initio and in setting aside the questioned CSC Resolutions;
 Whether or not the petitioner, who was illegally dismissed, has the vested right to his former position;
hence, the right to be reinstated;

12 | P a g e
  Whether or not the reinstatement of a career government employee who was illegally dismissed, through no
delinquency or misconduct, is discretionary upon the appointing authority as ordered in the decretal portion
of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals.
 Whether or not the Supreme Court, based on the realities of the time and situation, may now change its
principle adopted in the "Mercury Drug Rule" in fixing the amount of back wages at a reasonable level
without qualification and deduction.

o Ruling:
 The Court agrees with the decision of the Court of Appeals that the reassignment of Gungon from the
Municipal Assessor’s Office, where his primary function was that of land appraiser, to the POSO, where he
was required to work as a security guard/duty agent, was void ab initio because it clearly involved a
reduction in rank and status. The CSC affirmed the reduction in rank; petitioners Municipal Administrator
Yenko and Mayor Estrada did not dispute it. Such reassignment is expressly prohibited by Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, under Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter
5, Sec. 26 (7), thus:
a) (7) Reassignment.—An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in
the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salaries.28The above provision is reflected in Section 10, Rule VII of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations:
 Sec. 10. A reassignment is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries and does not
require the issuance of an appointment.
 Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of tenure,
which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases
of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
 Since Gungon’s reassignment order was void ab initio, his alleged failure to report for duty at the POSO,
where he was reassigned, had no legal basis. Gungon could not have incurred absences in the POSO,
because his reassignment was void. Thus, the cause of his separation from the service, which was
unauthorized absences from the post where he was reassigned, was not a valid cause for dismissing him
from the service. It is undisputed that Gungon reported at the Municipal Assessor’s Office after his leave of
absence, instead of the POSO. Under the circumstances, Gungon is considered to have been illegally
dismissed from the service and entitled to reinstatement.
 The Court of Appeals misconstrued CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, series of 1994 when it cited the
Circular as the basis for holding Gungon’s reappointment as "subject to the discretion of the appointing
authority and Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.“
 Accordingly, Item 2 of Section VI of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and other Personnel
Actions (MC No. 38, s. 1993- Dropped from the Rolls), now reads as follows
a) 2. Dropped from the Roll
b) 2.1 . Absence without Approved Leav
o a. An officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave (AWOL)
for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be separated from the service or dropped from
the rolls without prior notice. He shall however be informed of his separation from the
service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be sent to the address
appearing on his 201 files; and
o This shall likewise be without prejudice to the reappointment of the official or employee
to government at the discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service
law, rules and regulations.32
 To reiterate, the italicized paragraph above was used by the Court of Appeals as the basis for subjecting
Gungon’s reinstatement to the discretion of the appointing authority. The basis is misplaced, because what
the provision means is that the separation of an employee from government service through any of the
modes enumerated in the Memorandum Circular, which includes unauthorized absences, shall be without
prejudice to his reappointment in the government service at the discretion of the appointing authority and
subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. Hence, an employee who is validly dismissed due to
unauthorized absences may still be reappointed in the government service, but the reappointment is at the
discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
 In this case, Gungon was not validly dismissed from the service. His reassignment to the POSO, which
involved a reduction in rank and status, was void for being violative of Executive Order No. 292 and the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Hence, Gungon could not have incurred absences in the
office where he was reassigned since the reassignment was void. Consequently, his dismissal for

13 | P a g e
 unauthorized absences in the office where he was reassigned was not valid. Therefore, Memorandum
Circular No. 12, series of 1994, does not apply in the case of Gungon.
 In fine, Gungon is entitled to reinstatement, without qualification, for having been illegally dismissed. A
government official or employee reinstated for having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having
left his office. His position does not become vacant and any new appointment made in order to replace him
is null and void ab initio
 As regards the award of Gungon’s back salaries, it is settled jurisprudence that an illegally terminated civil
service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full
back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement.
 The Court of Appeals correctly held that Gungon’s application for terminal leave and his acceptance of
terminal leave benefits could not be construed as an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement or
indicative of his intent to voluntarily sever his employment with the government, because Gungon had
appealed his case to the CSC and had a pending motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 982525
before he received his terminal leave benefits. Indeed, Gungon’s appeal against his dismissal to the CSC
and, thereafter, to the Court of Appeals, and his petition before this Court – all taken within a span of 11
years – show his desire to be reinstated, not separated from the government service. In this connection, the
Court of Appeals aptly stated that it would have been unjust for petitioner, who was dropped from the rolls
not to claim his terminal leave pay considering that it would take some time for his appeal to be resolved.
Gungon had no permanent employment and had to sustain the needs of his two sons.
 It is settled that a government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose
reinstatement was later ordered is considered as not having left his office, so he is entitled to all the rights
and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held. [City Government of Makati
City, G.R. No. 131392, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 248, 271; Cristobal v. Melchor, No. L-43203,
December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 857; Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 110936, February 4,
1994]

September 15, 2020

OHRA ORA
September 29, 2020
CONTINUATION (LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS)
Luego v. Civil Service Commission
 Facts:
o Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino
Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another
employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment." 
o On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil
Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and,
accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the
Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is
hereby revoked."
o The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. 
 Case:
o The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order and the private
respondent's title.
 Issue:
o Whether or not the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter

 Ruling:
 The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil
Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
 The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was
clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983.  What was
temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell And what made the approval temporary was the
fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee
to the position.

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  The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
 It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law with the
appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine
the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in this case, the
Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential
Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind
of the appointment to be extended. (In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318, 322)
 Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the
position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil
Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws. (In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318, 322,
Villanueva vs. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-41 1; Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA 728, 730-731; Santos vs. Chico, 25
SCRA 343; City of Manila vs. Subido, 17 SCRA 231)
 All the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is
permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an
appointment made by the proper authorities.
 Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
 The Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person
appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.

Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales

 Facts:
o Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy
A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity.
 Case:
o On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why
no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of
official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this was later on captioned as
Administrative Case No. 001.
o After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against
her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable.
o On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee’s recommendation and
dismissed Gonzales.
o Appeal to the Civil Service Commission
 Resolution No. 0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of
insubordination and suspending her for six months.
 This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952.7
o Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that
she had already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated.
o The CSC issued Resolution No. 002245,8which directed Gonzales’ reinstatement.
o Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services
the next day for lack of confidence.
o He then wrote a letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a
confidential employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No. 0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that
the provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature
o The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,11 
o Again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator.
o Clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial
administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice
officials who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity.
Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to
continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position.

15 | P a g e
 o The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service should not jeopardize
Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution.
o As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing.
o Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under
existing laws
o In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr.,
Camarines Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her.
o The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988,13 which ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial
administrator position, or to an equivalent position.
o In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr.,
Camarines Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her.
o The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988,13 which ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial
administrator position, or to an equivalenpetition for review before the CA seeking to nullify the CSC’s Resolution
No. 030008 and Resolution No. 061988.
o The Appellate Court’s Ruling
 supported the CSC’s ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator or to an equivalent position.
o Aquino v. Civil Service Commission
 an appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be
removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the
mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
o The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officer’s removal under Section 46,16 Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative Code (Administrative Code), and noted that lack of confidence was not in
the list.
o Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has the right to
be reinstated with payment of backwages.
o Gonzales’ dismissal was illegal because it was done without due process. The proceedings under Administrative
Case No. 001 cannot be the basis for complying with the requirements of due process because they are separate and
distinct from the proceedings in the present controversy. Thus, Gonzales was illegally terminated when she was
dismissed for lack of confidence, without any hearing, the day after she was reinstated.
o Resolution No. 002245, which modified Governor Pimentel’s decision, has long been final and executory. The
petitioner did not file any petition for reconsideration against Resolution No. 002245, and hence, it is no longer
alterable.
o The petitioner sought a reconsideration17 of the CA’s Decision, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
December 2, 2008t position.
o Petition for review on certiorari
 assailing the Decision2 dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97425, reinstating respondent Beatriz O. Gonzales as the Province of
Camarines Norte’s provincial administrator, or to an equivalent position.
 the provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by
RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160’s
enactment

 Issue:
o Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily
confidential, non-career service position; and
o Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte

 Ruling:
o Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, non-career position.
o We support the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily
confidential, non-career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it.
 First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code (LGC), did not include
a provincial administrator position among the listing of mandatory provincial officials,24 but empowered
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the provincial government.25 RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every

16 | P a g e
 province.26 Thus, the creation of the provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be a
prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
 Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the
qualifications for the provincial administrator position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the
requirement of civil service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with the educational
requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience requirement to five years.28 It also mandated the
additional requirements of residence in the local government concerned, and imposed a good moral
character requirement.
 Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority,
reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential
o To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators’ functions have with the office of the governor,
RA 7160 even made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority.30 This
provision, along with the interrelations between the provincial administrator and governor under Section 480,
renders clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial administrator position primarily confidential under the
non-career service category of the civil service.
o Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power
that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure
o The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on
the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the
nature of the position.
o Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator position and
to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create
public offices is the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society;31 Congress can change the
qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith, these acts would not
violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his
term.32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in
good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
o Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon
 Congress enacted a law modifying the offices in the Board of Dental Examiners. The new law, RA 546,
raised the qualifications for the board members, and provided for a different appointment process. Dr.
Alfonso C. Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were incumbent board members at the time RA 546 took
effect, filed a special civil action for quo warranto against their replacements, arguing that their term of
office under the old law had not yet expired, and neither had they abandoned or been removed from office
for cause. We dismissed their petition, and held that Congress may, by law, terminate the term of a public
office at any time and even while it is occupied by the incumbent. Thus, whether Dr.Salcedo and Dr.
Ignacio were removed for cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial.
o Dimayuga v. Benedicto II 
 the removal of Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent appointee to the Executive Director II position, which
was not part of the career executive service at the time of her appointment. During her incumbency, the
CSC, by authority granted under Presidential Decree No. 1, classified the Executive Director II position to
be within the career executive service. Since Dimayuga was not a career executive service officer, her
initially permanent appointment to the position became temporary; thus, she could be removed from office
at any time
o For purposes of determining whether Gonzales’ termination violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the
position she occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment
at the time she entered government service.
o Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee
o To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers
and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category,
are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after
procedural due process.45 The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily
confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of
the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority
loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from
office; his term merely "expires"46 and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that
results in the termination of employment

17 | P a g e
 o In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor
Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
o Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended or
dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public
office despite a change in the nature of the office held:
 In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’
right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the
situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were
subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was
then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no
longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of
confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or
to any other comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement
to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service

Republic Act No. 6713 (February 20, 1989)

 AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,
GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS
AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
o Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. –
 Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the
discharge and execution of official duties:
a) Commitment to public interest. – public interest over and above personal interest resources and
powers employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically
b) Professionalism. – highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill; utmost
devotion and dedication to duty; endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
c) Justness and sincerity. – true to the people at all times; justness and sincerity not discriminate
respect the rights of others, refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest undue favors on account of their
office
d) Political neutrality. – service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party
affiliation or preference.
e) Responsiveness to the public. – prompt, courteous, and adequate service information of their
policies and procedures in clear and understandable language openness of information, public
consultations and hearings encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions
prevailing in the country
f) Nationalism and patriotism. – loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people use of locally
produced goods, resources and technology appreciation and pride of country and people maintain
and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
g) Commitment to democracy. – democratic way of life and values principle of public
accountability supremacy of civilian authority over the military uphold the Constitution loyalty to
country above loyalty to persons or party
h) Simple living. – modest lives appropriate to their positions and income extravagant or ostentatious
display of wealth
 The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote
1. observance of these standards merit increases for outstanding observance of ethical
standards;
2. continuing research and experimentation positive motivation
 Samson v. Restrivera
o Facts:
 Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission with office at
the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.

18 | P a g e
  Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the
latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System
 Petitioner said that the expenses would reach ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the
initial expenses for the titling of respondent’s land.
 Petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government property.
o Case:
 When petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000, respondent sued her for ESTAFA.
 Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for GRAVE MISCONDUCT or CONDUCT
UNBECOMING A PUBLIC OFFICER against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
 OMBUDSMAN
 guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
 suspended her from office for six months without pay
 failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government
of the benefit of committed service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent
secure a certificate of title over the latter’s land
 Motion for reconsiderationreduced the penalty to three months suspension without pay
 Petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer fell
short of the standard of personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public
officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of
undue patronage
 Court of Appeals (affirmed the OMBUDSMAN)
 The Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter
 Petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer when she demanded and
received the amount of ₱50,000 on the representation that she can secure a title to respondent’s property
and for failing to return the amount
 Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler of undue patronage
o Issue:
1. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over a case involving a private dealing by a government employee or
where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty
2. Grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable despite the dismissal of
the estafa case
3. Grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of mitigating circumstances
o Ruling:
 First Issue:
 Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint against petitioner although the act
complained of involves a private deal between them. (See Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749,
February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 97, 102) 
 Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on
its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper.
 Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure.
 Section 19  of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular.
 Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not
service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify
the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we
 Second Issue:
 It is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she cannot be
found administratively liable.

19 | P a g e
  It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may
continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.
 Petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713
 Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its
implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action (Domingo v. Office of the
Ombudsman)
 Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and
discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill."
 It merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public
servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality,
responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple
living.
 Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the grant of incentives and rewards
to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4.
 The Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to
observe these norms of conduct.
 Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only
acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." 
 Twenty-three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action.
 Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. 
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
 Grave Misconduct; corruption; willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules
o There is grave misconduct because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established
rules in the procurement of supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules. (Roque v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179245, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 660, 675)
o Complicity in the transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple
misconduct only as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable
of gross misconduct. (Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004,
424 SCRA 9, 17)
o Dismissed a complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, and grave
misconduct, since the complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the judge which were
allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (Diomampo v. Alpajora, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1880,
October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 534, 539-540)
o Respondent failed to prove petitioner’s violation of an established and definite rule of action or
unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner
o Petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner
allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation
o For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of CONDUCT
UNBECOMING A PUBLIC OFFICER.
o Respondents therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged
on their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service
Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the subject property were transferred to the sister
of one of the respondents. (Joson v. Macapagal,  A.M. No. P-02-1591, June 21, 2002, 383 SCRA 403,
406-407)
o Unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions
of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.
(Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al.,
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010, p. 22)
o Any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office shall not be countenanced.(Pablejan
v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 562, 569) 

20 | P a g e
 o SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (1987 Constitution)
 SET ASIDE 
o Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
o Decision and Order of the Ombudsman
o ENTER a new judgment finding petitioner GUILTY of CONDUCT UNBECOMING A PUBLIC
OFFICER and impose upon her a FINE of ₱15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman
within five (5) days from finality of this Decision and to return the Php50,000.00
o Mitigating circumstance petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first charge
against her
 Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees
A. Act promptly on letters and requests.
 Fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of
communications sent by the public
 Amended by RA 11032 (Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act of 2018 )
 three (3) working days in the case of simple transactions
 seven (7) working days in the case of complex transactions
 20 working days for transactions that pose danger to public health, public safety, public morals, public
policy, and highly technical application
 reply must contain the action taken on the request.
 Bueno v. OMBUDSMAN
 Records showed that despite Ranchez’s written and verbal requests made between September and
November 2004 in connection with his pending petition for review/reconsideration on his
disqualification on the basis of the subject memoranda and its approval by the NEA Board of
Administrators, petitioners did not respond to his queries or at the very least inform him that as
early as May 27, 2004, the NEA Board of Administrators had already approved the subject
memoranda.
 Notably, Ranchez had invoked the OGCC’s Opinion declaring the subject memoranda to have no
binding force and effect on electric cooperatives which is contrary to petitioner Bueno’s stance
that the said regulations remain valid until declared illegal by a competent court.
 Moreover, despite constant follow ups, Ranchez was not informed as to when the NEA Board of
Administrators will take up or its action on his petition for reconsideration. In any event,
petitioners clearly failed to disclose crucial information sought by Ranchez within fifteen working
days, in violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713.
 Petitioners violated the above mandate and presented no proof whatsoever that they made a
written reply to Ranchez’s requests within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days. This
constituted neglect of duty which cannot be countenanced. (Lim, Jr. v. Judge Magallanes, 548
Phil. 566, 575 (2007).  
 Petitioners should be reminded that as government officials and employees they are expected to
adhere to the standards set by law in the discharge of their official duties, among others,
commitment to public service, professionalism, justness and sincerity and responsiveness to the
public. (Sec. 4 (a), (b), (c), and (e), RA 6713)
 LIGHT OFFENSE
o Penalty : REPRIMAND (First Offense)
o Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
B. Submit annual performance reports
 forty-five (45) working days from the end of the year
 performance report of the agency or office or corporation concerned open and available to the public within
regular office hours
C. Process documents and papers expeditiously completed within a reasonable time
 not more than three (3) signatories therein;
 in the absence of duly authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign for and
in their behalf.
D. Act immediately on the public's personal transaction;
 attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices;
 act promptly and expeditiously

21 | P a g e
 E. Make documents accessible to the public readily available for inspection RA 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012)
o Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions
A. Financial and material interest
 directly or indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
their office.
B. Outside employment and other activities related thereto
1. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law;
2. Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
3. Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending
official transaction with their office
o National Electrification Administration v. Civil Service Commission
 The Supreme Court did not find the designation of NEA personnel to be
violative of Section 7 (b) of RA No. 6713 regarding outside employment by a
public officer and employee, considering that the designation of petitioner's
personnel as Acting General Manager and Project Supervisor of the electric
cooperatives was by virtue of Section 5 (a)(6) of PD No. 269 as amended; thus,
such designation was part of petitioner's exercise of its power of supervision and
control over the electric cooperatives.
o Posada v. SANDIGANBAYAN
 ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty
member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO
PASCUAL DAYCO, being then the Vice-Chancellor of the said university and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Chancellor, while in the performance and
taking advantage of their official and administrative functions, and conspiring
and confederating with and mutually helping each other, give unwarranted
benefits, privilege or advantage to accused POSADAS, when accused DAYCO
appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a Project Director of the lone
project, Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman,
of the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the Chancellor,
U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and payment of
monthly salary of ₱30,000.00 of accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter
with accused POSADAS also receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty
member of U.P. Diliman during this period, and both accused knowing fully
well that the appointment of accused POSADAS was beyond the power or
authority of accused DAYCO as an OIC and likewise violative of the law, rules
and regulations against multiple positions, double compensation and
retroactivity of appointment, thereby causing undue injury to the Government in
the amount of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
(₱360,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the Government
 ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty
member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO
PASCUAL DAYCO, being then the ViceChancellor of the said university and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Chancellor while in the performance and
taking advantage of their official and administrative functions, and conspiring
and confederating with and mutually helping each other engage in the
unauthorized private practice of accused POSADAS’s profession as a
technology manager, when accused DAYCO appointed or designated accused
POSADAS as a consultant to the project, Institutionalization of the Management
of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of the Technology Management Center (TMC)
of the Office of the Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the
disbursement and payment of consultancy fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to
accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter, with respondent POSADAS
also receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman,
and both accused knowing fully well that the appointment to and acceptance of

22 | P a g e
 the position of consultant by respondent POSADAS was without authority from
the latter’s superior(s) or the U.P. Board of Regents, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government service.
 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
Section 7(b) of RA 6713
 Penalties :
o For violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 indeterminate penalty of nine
(9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as maximum,
with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office; jointly and severally indemnify the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (₱336,000.00).
o For violation of Section 7(b) of RA 6713 maximum penalty of five (5)
years and disqualification to hold public office.
 These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
 Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
 officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public, either:
o To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
o To prejudice the public interest.
C. Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
 officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either
1. To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
2. To prejudice the public interest.
D. Solicitation or acceptance of gifts
 directly or indirectly
 any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person
 in the course of their official duties or
 in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office
 Cabaron v. SANDIGANBAYAN
o ARTURO C. CABARON, a public officer, being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of his
public functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with accused BRIGIDA Y.
CABARON, his wife and a private individual, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and
evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously solicit/demand from
one Richter G. Pacifico, mother of Abraham Pacifico, Jr., who have pending cases before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency in consideration for the
consolidation and handling by him of the case entitled "Ohyeen Alesna vs. Abraham Pacifico,
Jr.," for Rape, which is assigned to Provincial Prosecutor Rodolfo Go, with another criminal
case entitled "Abraham Pacifico, Jr. vs. Alvin Alesna," for Frustrated Murder, which is
handled by accused Arturo C. Cabaron, and the giving of a lawyer to defend Abraham
Pacifico, Jr. who bears similar family name with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, in order
that Abraham Pacifico, Jr. can get a favorable Resolution in the above-mentioned cases
o ARTURO C. CABARON and BRIGIDA CABARON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of Violation of Sec. 7(d) R.A. 6713
o imprisonment for TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
o pay the costs
o solidarily liable to Richter Pacifico in the amount of P30,000 as moral damages
o Section 8: Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure
o All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary
workers, file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and

23 | P a g e
 Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
o Contents
a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
b) personal property and acquisition cost;
c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
d) liabilities, and;
e) all business interests and financial connections
o WHEN TO FILE
a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
o Daplas v. Department of Finance
o Facts:
 Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite
sometime in 1968, and had held various posts until she was appointed as the Pasay City Treasurer on
May 19, 1989, with a gross monthly salary of ₱28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints,
petitioner was concurrently holding the position of Officer-in- Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau
of Local Government Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City.
o Case:
o Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman; respondents) for averred violations6 of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019,7 Section 8 (A) of RA
6713,8 Section 2 of RA 1379,9 Article 18310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Executive Order No. (EO)
611 dated March 12, 1986,12 constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement of her assets,
liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs). 
1. failed to declare 
o a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan with Plate No. TBH-238 (Galant sedan) registered under
the name of her late husband with an estimated value of ₱250,000.00; 
o her stock subscription in KEI Realty and Development Corp. (KEI) valued at
₱1,500,000.00 with a total paid up amount of ₱800,000.00; and
o several real properties in Cavite 15 (which had been the subject of a previous
administrative complaint against her that had been dismissed; and 
2. traveled multiple times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast doubt on her real net
worth and actual source of income considering her modest salary.
o For her part, petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and maintained that she
was not totally dependent on her salary to finance the said acquisitions. 
o She alleged that:
1. her late husband purchased the Galant sedan out of his personal money, hence, the same did not form
part of their conjugal properties; 
2. she had already divested her interest in KEI in 1998, along with her husband, but her husband and
children reacquired their respective shares sometime in 2003; and
3. her travels were sponsored by the government or by her relatives abroad
o OMBUDSMAN Ruling
o guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713
o imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties, without prejudice to criminal
prosecution. 
o petitioner committed perjury under Article 183 of the RPC when she failed to declare in her SALNs
for 1997 to 2003 the Galant sedan, and her business interest in KEI in her 1997 SALN, which is
sufficient basis to hold her liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. 
o liable for violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 for her failure to disclose the said assets despite the legal
obligation to do so.
o respondents to have failed to substantiate the charges that: 
 petitioner's numerous foreign travels were indicia of her acquisition of unlawful wealth;

24 | P a g e
  KEI was put up as a subterfuge for petitioner's ill-gotten wealth.
 motion for reconsideration denied
o Court Appeals’ Ruling
o dismissed the petition
o the Ombudsman's ruling was sufficiently supported by substantial evidence
o petitioner's failure to declare all her assets and business interests constituted Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and a violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713
o gave no credence to her defense of good faith considering that she knew of the said assets and gave no
justification for their exclusion in her SALNs
o her resignation from the government service did not render the Ombudsman ruling moot. 33
o Motion for reconsideration denied
o Petition 1 for review on certiorari 
o assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
B. Issue:
 Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Joint Decision of the Ombudsman finding petitioner liable for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposing on her the
corresponding penalties.
C. Ruling:
 The petition is partly meritorious.
 The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution35 in order to promote
transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching
themselves through unlawful means. 36 By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government
official or employee to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets,
liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried
children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters
 Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative
offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.
 Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material
fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration,
appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack
of fairness and straightforwardness. 
 On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior.
 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance
of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is
properly characterized as simple misconduct only.  Most importantly, without a nexus between the act
complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.
 Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and
would normally amount to dishonesty.1âwphi1 It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-
declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty
requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or
employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated
wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she
fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.
 Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the
authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to
disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the
absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.
 Notably, petitioner readily admitted in her Counter-Affidavit her business interest in KEI in 1997,  which
belied any malicious intent to conceal. While concededly, the omission would increase her net worth for
the year 1997, the Court observes that the Ombudsman declared respondent's evidence insufficient to

25 | P a g e
 warrant a finding that petitioner had any unexplained wealth. On the contrary, it found that her children
have the financial capacity to put up KEI. 
 It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus,
in several cases 49 where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court
deemed the same an "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent
to commit a wrong, and having accounted for the source of the "undisclosed wealth," as in this case,
petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for
having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.
 Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public
officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. An act done in good faith, which
constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, as in the present case, is
merely Simple Negligence
 In the same vein, petitioner's failure to declare the Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 stemmed
from the fact that the same was registered in her husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his
personal money. While such bare allegation is not enough to overthrow the presumption that the car was
conjugal, neither is there sufficient showing that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in not disclosing the
same. In fact, the Ombudsman conceded that petitioner's husband was financially capable of purchasing the
car, negating any "unexplained wealth" to warrant petitioner's dismissal due to Dishonesty
 Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the omission to include the
subject properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not amount to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of
showing that such omission had, in some way, hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no
direct relation or connection between the two. 
 Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her SALN.
 Simple Negligence is akin to Simple Neglect of Duty, which is a less grave offense punishable with
suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, for the first offense. Since the
penalty of suspension can no longer be imposed on account of petitioner's resignation, and considering that
she readily admitted her omissions which do not appear to have been attended by any bad faith or
fraudulent intent, the Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to one (1) month and one
(1) day of petitioner's last salary is reasonable and just under the premises.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2014 and the
Resolution dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851 are hereby
SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED finding petitioner Concepcion C.
Daplas GUILTY of SIMPLENEGLIGENCE in accomplishing her Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth for the years 1997 to 2003, and is meted a fine in the amount equivalent to one (1) month and one
(1) day of her last salary.
o PAGC v. Pleyto
A. guilty only of simple negligence
B. penalty of forfeiture of the equivalent of six months of his salary from his retirement benefits
C. Section 9. Divestment A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict
of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his
assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such
assumption.

Republic Act No. 6770 (OMBUDSMAN Act of 1989)

 Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties
o Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.t has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
 Uy v. Sandiganbayan
 Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in
its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the
Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
 Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the following points:

26 | P a g e
 1. The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or equated with the
broader jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
2. The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayan
cases; and
3. The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases before the
Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory and prosecutorial
powers of the Office of the Ombudsman
 Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation and the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light
of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).
 The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
 The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the
Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient
 Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the latter's supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
 The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee
 The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation
and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed
as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such
cases
 Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of
cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the
Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed
by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the
legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of
office
 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.3 Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by
law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants.4 To carry
out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist

27 | P a g e
 him work under his supervision and control.5 The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section
11 (4c) of RA 6770
 Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving
public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the
regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all
criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court
must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to
investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees
  The power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged (Sanchez vs. Demetriou)
 Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman
 "The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive
control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts,
the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the
sense defined (therein). 25 The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of
the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts."
 Supreme Court's ruling that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
 Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties
 Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce
its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer
 Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action
 Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents
 Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3)
and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the
Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public:
provided, further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true
 Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency
 Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation
 Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with
the same penalties provided therein
 Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided
 Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein
 Section 19. Administrative Complaints The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

28 | P a g e
 2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification
 Section 20. Exceptions The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative
act or omission complained of if it believes that:
1. The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
2. The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
3. The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
4. The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
5. The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of
 Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions
o The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary
o OMBUDSMAN v. Court of Appeals and Magbanua
 Facts:
 Respondent was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office in
Bacolod City. On 27 February 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination
of respondent’s cash and account. The examination disclosed a shortage of ₱265,450. Upon
demand, respondent failed to produce the missing amount
 Respondent alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash
Clerk I Monina Baja (Baja). Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as Paymaster, received payroll
funds for distribution to specific offices. In her liquidation report, Baja reflected twice the missing
amount of ₱265,450 representing cash advances for 26 September 1997 under Voucher No. 6205
to the following persons:
1. P. Villamor, et al. ₱ 5,100
2. L. Oyanib, et al. 21,900
3. R. Makila, et al. 74,950
4. M. Abada, et al. 163,500
₱ 265,450
 Case:
 Ombudsman
1. MA. MELLY JAUD MAGBANUA GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY and for
VIOLATIONS OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS
2. MONINA BAJA GUILTY OF DISHONESTY penalty of DISMISSAL from service 
3. (Section 22(b) and (a), respectively, of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292
4. The penalty prescribed under Section 22(c), a lesser offense, is deemed absorbed in a
much graver offense
5. Motion for reconsideration denied
 Court of Appeals
1. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not commit any reversible error in finding
respondent guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent
was an accountable officer. On the other hand, Baja was not officially designated as
Disbursing Officer or Paymaster but was merely assigned to "take charge of the listing of
payrolls and vouchers to be included in the respective cash advances of disbursing
officers." The Court of Appeals sustained petitioner in finding that respondent was
grossly remiss in her obligations as an accountable officer when she allowed Baja to
release payroll funds which formed part of her own cash advance. In addition, respondent
allowed Baja to prepare the necessary disbursement and liquidation reports which
respondent should have prepared herself. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent did
not even review or examine the reports prepared by Baja.
2. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that while petitioner’s findings were correct,
petitioner has no power to impose directly sanctions against government officials and

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 employees who are subject of its investigation. Citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,8 the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner’s power is limited and it may
only recommend, not impose, the appropriate sanctions.
 Issue:
 Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees.
 Ruling
 In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
 [The] provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority.
These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority
to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules
of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate
penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and
necessarily, impose the said penalty
 While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x x
removal, suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the same Section
15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770. The word "or" in Section 15(3) before the phrase "enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" grants the Ombudsman this alternative power
 Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman "disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government," except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the "penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) to twice the amount
malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman x x x."
 Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalty
on public officials or employees. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner has no
power to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees.
 Petition GRANTED.
1. Decision of the Court of Appeals SET ASIDE insofar as it declares that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly impose the penalty of dismissal from service
upon respondent Ma. Melly Jaud Magbanua.
2. REINSTATE the Memorandum of the Office of the Ombudsman Manila which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman Visayas, as well as the
Order which denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
3. Baja was impleaded in the case before the Ombudsman Visayas. Baja denied that
respondent designated her as Paymaster. She also denied that she received the payroll
funds. Baja alleged that her assigned task was only to take charge of the listing of
payrolls and vouchers to be included in the respective cash advances of the disbursing
officers
4. Respondent and Baja failed to appear during the preliminary conference conducted on 26
July 1999. Despite their non-appearance, they were given time to submit their respective
Memoranda or Position Papers before the case was considered submitted for decision
 Section 22. Investigatory Power
o The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment,
if warranted.
o In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman
and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such
private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and
shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities
 Section 23. Formal Investigation

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 oAt its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the
institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be
determined within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any
referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or
employees to whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
 Section 24. Preventives Suspension
o The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him
o The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided
 Section 25. Penalties
o In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be
applied.
o In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one (1) year to dismissal
with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that
mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges
 Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions
o All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory
o A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
 New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
 Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained
o Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
(1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable
o In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court
 Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors
o The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control

OCTOBER 6, 2020
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Administrative agency or body

 Organ of government charged with administering and implementing particular legislation.
Creation
1) Constitutional provision (Art. 9 that created CSC, COMELEC and COA)
2) Legislative enactment (RA 10844 that created DICT)
3) Authority of law (EO 100, s. 1986 that created PIA)
Source
 Aside from the instances in which an administrative agency is created and empowered by a provision of the Constitution, the
source of their powers lies in statutes under which they claim to act. (Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs Central Bank, 58 SCRA 192
[1988])

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  Administrative agencies have only such powers as are expressly granted to them by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. (Guerzon vs CA, 164 SCRA 182 [1988])
Construction
 General language describing the powers and functions of an administrative body may be construed to extend no further than
the specific duties and powers conferred in the same statute.
 In determining whether the admin agency has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light
of:
o The purposes for which it is created; and
o That which is incidentally necessary to a full exposition of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane
to the law. (Matienzon vs Abellera, 162 SCRA 1 [1988])
 Liberal construction is adopted to enable administrative agencies to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose or intent
 Powers should NOT be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
 Official powers cannot be merely assumed by administrative officers, nor can they be created by the courts in the exercise of
their judicial functions.

Express or Implied Powers

 An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. (Azarcon vs Sandiganbayan, 1997)
 Where a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred, by necessary implication. (Angara vs Electoral Commission, 1936)
 Gonzales v. Office of the President
o Facts:
 On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal
Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District
Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery
extortion and physical injury
 A formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR)
 Dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated
"by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged."
 Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution dated October 17, 2008 recommending the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.
 On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication.
 Case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
 DISMISSAL from the Service (Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service), accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service (Section 58, Rule IV
 Motion for Reconsideration on November 5, 2009
 Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009.
 Assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia
on December 14, 2009
 Draft Order for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio on April 5, 2010
 Signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010.
 Endorsed the Order for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez on May 6, 2010
 P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
 Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-
chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo.
 Tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive
sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC
proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.
 Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.

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  By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any
justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The
inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
 By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine
months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the
constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for
reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the right to
avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher
courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.
 The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the
President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the
proper administrative proceedings.
o Case:
 Office of the President
 Formal Charge against petitioner Gonzales
 Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty (Rule XIV, Section
22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service
Laws, rules and regulations)
 Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust
 DISMISSAL from service.
 Office of the OMBUDSMAN
 A complaint dated October 29, 2010 was filed by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P.
Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman charging Emilio A.
Gonzales III for violations of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713,
for "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and also,
with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards
o Issue:
 Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.
 Whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.

o Ruling:
 First Issue:
 The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive.
 While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
 Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section
21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of
the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
 Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and
mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with

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 respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under
specified conditions.
 Assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and
parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and
corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President
from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption
 The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers.42 
 By granting express statutory power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
 The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
 Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.
o As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by
him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when
the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power.
o In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in
the Office of the Ombudsman.
 What is the essence of due process in administrative proceedings?
o Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
o Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
o The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Mere opportunity to
be heard is sufficient. As long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side
and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with
because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
 In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
o Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial
evidence.
o The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law.
 The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless,
failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of
the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal
taken against petitioner Gonzales.
 While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner
Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed
statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There
being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12
of the Internal Rules of the Court.
 Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
 The decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
 Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED 
o with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately,

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 o Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with
the above case against petitioner.
o Only the Office of the President, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved for
the reconsideration of the ruling reinstating Gonzales.
 Second Issue:
o Article XI of the Constitution
 Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and
at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for
the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
 Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to
the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
o This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III unnecessary without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
o Powers of Administrative Agencies
a) Administrative/Executive/Regulatory power
b) Investigatory/Inquisitorial power
c) Rule-making/Quasi-legisaltive power
d) Adjudicatory/Quasi-judicial power
e) Incidental/Determinative Power
f) Administrative/Executive/Regulatory Power
g) Authority to implement or carry out the policy set out in the law or statute
 Alliance for the Family Foundation v. Garin
o Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases 1 (lmbong) where the Court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RH-IRR) as not unconstitutional, save for several provisions which were
declared as violative of the Constitution
o On May 28, 2014, barely two (2) months after the promulgation of the Court's decision in Imbong, the petitioners,
who were among those against the constitutionality of the RH Law, wrote a letter2 addressed to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), inquiring about the steps that the agency might have taken to carry out the decision of the
Court. In reply to this letter, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) assured the petitioners that both the
Department of Health (DOH) and the FDA were taking steps to comply with the decision of the Court and that it
would inform them of any developments. The petitioners claimed that, as of the date of filing, they had not heard
anything anymore from the OSG.
o Controversy began in September 2014, when petitioner Rosie B. Luistro chanced upon the FDA's Notice4
inviting Marketing Authorization Holders (MAH) of fifty (50) contraceptive drugs to apply for
reevaluation/re-certification of their contraceptive products and directed "all concerned to give their written
comments to, said applications on or before October 8, 2014."
o Petitioner Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) believed that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice
fell within the definition of "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the. RH Law because of their "secondary
mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb."
o For said reason, ALFI, through its president, Maria Concepcion S: Noche (Noche), filed its preliminary opposition,
dated October 8, 2014, to all 50 applications with the FDA.
o The same opposition also questioned some twenty-seven (27) other contraceptive drugs and devices that had
existing FDA registrations that were.not subjects of any application for re-evaluation/re-certification.
o On November 24, 2014, ALFI filed its main opposition to all seventy-seven (77) contraceptive drugs.
o On November 27, 2014, notwithstanding the pending opposition of the petitioners to the re-evaluation/re-
certification of these contraceptive products, the FDA issued two (2) certificates bf product registration for the
hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT."
o On March 19, 2015, ALFI wrote another letter to the DOH and the FDA, reiterating its opposition to the
applications for re-evaluation/recertification. It requested, among others, that the agencies shed light on the status
of their earlier opposition and that it schedules hearings and consultations regarding the applications for
reevaluation/re-certification. The petitioners claimed that their requests had remained unanswered.
o Petitioners instituted the subject petition for certiorari
o FDA committed grave abuse of discretion, not only for violating the Court's pronouncements in lmbong, but
also for failing to act on their opposition.
o Due to lack of any procedure, rules and regulations and consultations for re-evaluation/re-certification of
contraceptive drugs and, devices, the FDA had also violated the rudimentary requirements of due process.

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 o Invoking the Court's power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, 13 they seek that the Court
"promulgate rules and/or disapprove (or approve) rules of procedure in order to adequately protect and enforce the
constitutional right to life of the unborn."
o The certificates of product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT," were
issued in haste because they were released just three (3) days after the Senate, Committee on Finance required FDA
certifications for contraceptives as conditions for government funding for family planning commodities.
o In support of their prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
and Mandatory Injunction, the petitioners assert that the actions of the FDA and the DOH violate the right to life of
the unborn and, thus, must be restrained to ensure their protection.
o The Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order (TR0}2 1 enjoining the respondents from: [1]: granting any and
all pending applications for reproductive products and supplies, including contraceptive drugs and devices; and [2]
procuring, selling, distributing, dispensing or administering, advertising, and promoting the hormonal
contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT."
o As to the contention that the subject recourse is improper as it involves the FDA's exercise of its regulatory powers,
suffice it to say that the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o Consequently, the Court dismisses the notion that the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA
in exercise of its regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the Constitution mandates that judicial
power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govemment.
 In Ang Tibay v. CIR, 54 the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative
proceedings, as follows: The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit
evidence in support thereof
 The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
 The decision must have something to support itself
 The evidence must be substantial
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected
 The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision
 The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
o After an assessment of the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the FDA certified, procured and administered such
contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and
without public hearing, despite the constant opposition from the petitioners. From the records, it appears that other
than the notice inviting stakeholders to apply for certification/re-certification of their reproductive health products,
there was no 1 showing that the respondents notified the oppositors and conducted a hearing on the applications and
oppositions submitted.
o Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due process, the
Court is of the view that the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution of the questioned
contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due
process.
o Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in
quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
o WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and Drugs
Administration which is hereby ordered to observe the basic requirements of due process by conducting a hearing,
and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the re-certified, procured and· administered contraceptive dnigs and
devices, including lmplanon and Implanon NXT, and to determine whether they are abortifacients or non-
abortifacients.
 DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the
screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices that will be used
under Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following minimum.
requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) interested parties shall be
allowed to intervene, (c) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic

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 Act No. 10354, as to what constitutes allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, that is,
those which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, (d) in
weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and
preservation of the right to' life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, and (e) the other
requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be
complied with
 DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to
formulate the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and
distribution/ dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
10354 covered by the certification from the Food and Drug Administration that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it will not be. used as an abortifacient
subject to the following minimum due prbcess requirements: (a) publication, notice and hearing,
and (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and regulations or guidelines
shall provide sufficient detail as to the manner py which said product and supply shall be strictly
regulated in order 1 that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in order to sufficiently
safeguard the right to life of the unborn.
o The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the Food and
Drugs Administration should commence to conduct the necessary hearing guided by the cardinal rights of the parties
laid down in CIR v. Ang Tibay.
o Omnibus Motion filed by the respondents, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking partial
reconsideration of the August 24, 2016 Decision (Decision)
o Their actions should be sustained, even if the petitioners were not afforded notice and hearing, because the contested
acts of registering, re-certifying, procuring, and administering contraceptive drugs and devices were all done in the
exercise of its regulatory power, thus, it need not comply with the due process requirements of notice and hearing.
o The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial. 
 Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the
authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. 
 "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof." The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-
legislative power through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a
rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it
and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate
investigation.
 Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself.
 As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: 
one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of
the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.
o On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory
powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions
where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must
exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law."
o To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi-judicial authority, it is also vested with what is known
as determinative powers and functions, classified into the enabling powers and the directing powers. The latter
includes the dispensing, the examining, and the summary powers.
o The enabling powers are those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and
which would be unlawful with government approval.
o The "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers" as defined by the respondents ; and two, they refer to a
subcategory of a quasi-judicial power which requires the compliance with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing
o Respondents’ assertion that as long as the act of the FDA is exercised pursuant to its regulatory power, it need not
comply with the due process requirements of notice and hearing is FLAWED.
o WHEREFORE, the August 24, 2016 Decision is MODIFIED. 
o Food and Drug Administration is ordered to consider the oppositions filed by the petitioners with respect to the
listed drugs, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, based on the standards of the Reproductive Health Law, as

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 construed in lmbong v. Ochoa decide the case within sixty (60) days from the date it will be deemed submitted
for resolution
o Considering that the Executive Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal should be to the OP as provided in Section
9 of R.A. No. 3720
o When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due process, the Court
can come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged acts, whether exercised by the
FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory power
o Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be
impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the
procedural requirements thereof. 
o Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his
property.30 
o Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those
who are called upon to administer it.31
o Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the
former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.
o Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
o Section 5. In all cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
o Investigatory/Inquisitorial Power
o Information gathering as basis to recommend appropriate action by other government agencies
o Ex: Office of the Public Prosecutor; Commission on Human Rights; Office of the Ombudsman; Office of the
President (Revised Administrative Code)
OCTOBER 13, 2020
Continuation of the Powers of the Administrative Agencies
Encinas v. Agustin
 Facts:
o Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija.
o 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed
them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos (₱5,000), they would be relieved from their station at
Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.
o Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and
respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug).
o Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner.
o On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give only two
thousand pesos (₱2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they
failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang
to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.
o Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) for illegal transfer of personnel under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990.
o The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
o Petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice. In Section 46(b)(1), (4) and
(27), Book V, respectively, of the Administrative Code of 1987.
o Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP issued a Resolution dated 05 July 2005, recommending that the
administrative complaint against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
o CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan
City,
o Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint) for violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is

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 "Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They
must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."
The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the above-quoted provision as Section 4(c), but it should be
denoted as Section 4(A)(c).
o Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service.
o Petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum with the CSC main office.
o Respondents were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed two (2) separate administrative Complaints before the
CSCRO on the one hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other.
o Denied by CSC
o No forum-shopping committed by respondents,
o Substantial evidence existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
 Case:
o Rule 43 Petition with the CA denied
 it was not the letter-complaint filed by respondents that commenced the administrative proceedings against
petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint
merely triggered the CSCRO’s fact-finding investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by
the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping
 respondents’ act of simultaneously filing Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did
not constitute forum-shopping. While it was conceded that the two Complaints were founded on the same
set of facts involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based on different causes of action—more
specifically, the BFP Complaint was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint was
for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713
 the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers
o Assailing the Decision issued by the CA affirming the findings of the CSC that Petitioner is administratively liable
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service - offenses proscribed by Section
46(b)(4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987 - and affirmed his
dismissal.
 Issue:
o Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
o Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
 Ruling:
o First Issue:
 Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1. identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions
2. identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts
3. identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case. (Yu vs Lim, G.R. No. 182291, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 172
 Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not
constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the
part of respondents.
 Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered
without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue in the first suit
 In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur:
a. the former judgment must be final;
b. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
c. it must be a judgment on the merits; and
d. there must be between the first and the second actions
i. identity of parties,

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 ii. identity of subject matter, and
iii. identity of cause of action.(Chu v. Sps. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011, 657
SCRA 379)
 A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities
of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when
the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point”. (Cabreza v. Cabreza, G.R. No.
181962, 16 January 2012, 663 SCRA 29)
 In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of
the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for
purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no
rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
 The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.(Heirs of Derla v. Heirs of Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011, 648
SCRA 638)
 Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature,[Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453
Phil. 158 (2003)]  as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.(United
Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, 351 Phil. 244, 260 (1998), Executive Judge Basilia v.
Judge Becamon, 487 Phil. 490 (2004); Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000); Salazar v.
De Leon, G.R. No. 127965, 20 January 2009; National Housing Authority v. Pascual, G.R. No. 158364, 28
November 2007, DOLE Phil., Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30 November 2006)
o Second Issue:
o In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves taking and evaluating evidence determining facts
based upon the evidence presented rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. [Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil 165 (2000)]
o The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and
based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.(Doran v. Executive Judge Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 106)
o The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or
merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the
evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion
and judgment.[Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil. 165 (2000), citing
Ruperto v. Torres [100 Phil. 1098 (1957)]
o The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the
purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public
prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
o The findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case
they are accorded not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it
is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the latter
to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. (Catmon
Sales International Corporation v. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 236)
o This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts. (Raniel v. Jochico, G.R. No.
153413, 02 March 2007, 517 SCRA 221) By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those
matters.(Sps. Ricardo, Jr. v. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 311)
o The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been
committed against the public service. The subsequent desistance by respondents does not free petitioner from
liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust.(Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-
03-1752, 06 October 2008, 567 SCRA 342) 
o A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a public servant of whatever rank cannot be
withdrawn at any time for whatever reason by a complainant, as a withdrawal would be "anathema to
the preservation of the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their government, its agencies and

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 instrumentalities.“[Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 350 Phil. 431
(1998)] Administrative proceedings "should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants
who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein."[Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Reyes-Domingo
v. Morales, 396 Phil. 150 (2000)]
o MALFEASANCE is the commission of an act by a person which he ought not to do (example) Issuance of a
clearance by a person who was bribed with knowledge that the person to whom it is issued has a pending
obligation
o MISFEASANCE is the wrongful exercise of a lawful duty. (example) Dismissal by a judge of a case based on
misapprehension of facts
o NON-FEASANCE is failure to act when action is required – willfully or in neglect (example) Willful refusal
to perform a duty such as to respond to a call for duty by a policeman
o Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.[Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and
Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 203-204]
o Grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.(Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52(A) 3 [Sec. 4 (A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in Civil Service dated 18 November 2011)  
o Dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service
examinations. [Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 58 (Sec. 52 of the Revised
Rules)] 
o Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty
of suspension of six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day to one ( 1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.[Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52 (A) 20 [Sec. 46(8)(8) of
the Revised Rules].
o Guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of dismissal from the service-the penalty corresponding to the
most serious offense-was properly imposed. [[Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
Sec. 55 (Sec. 50 of the Revised Rules)]
Quasi-Legislative/Rule-making Power
 Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation
o Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
o It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
o It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
o It must be reasonable
 Need for Previous Notice and Hearing
 General Rule:
o Administrative rules of GENERAL application do NOT require previous notice and hearing.
 Exception:
o When the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined
at an appropriate investigation.
o If the regulation is in effect a settlement of a controversy between specific parties, it is considered an administrative
adjudication, requiring notice and hearing.
 Requirement of Publication
o Administrative Regulations that MUST be published:
 Administrative regulations of GENERAL application.
 Administrative regulations which are PENAL in nature.
o Administrative regulations that do NOT NEED to be PUBLISHED:
 Interpretative regulations
 Internal rules and regulations governing the personnel of the administrative agency.
 Letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates.  (Tanada v. Tuvera)
 Special Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation with a PENAL sanction
o The law itself must make violation of the administrative regulation punishable.
o The law itself must impose and specify the penalty for the violation of the regulation.
o The regulation must be published.
 Tests of a Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
o COMPLETENESS test

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 
This means that the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so
that when it reaches the delegate, it will have nothing to do but to enforce it
 A statute is COMPLETE when the following are stated:
 Subject of the law
 The manner of its application
 The extent of its operation
o SUFFICIENT STANDARD test
 The law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and specify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
 What is a standard? (Edu v. Ericta)
 It is a criterion laid down by the legislature by which the policy and the purpose of the law may be
carried out.
 It defines the legislative policy, marks its limits, and maps out its boundaries.
 It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
 Examples of standards
o “Public welfare”
o “Necessary in the interest of law and order”
o “Public interest”
o “Justice and equity and substantial merits of the case”
o “Simplicity, economy and efficiency”
o “Adequate and sufficient instruction”
 Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc v. Department of Education
o Facts:
 The Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54,
Series of 2009 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School
Level.
 Sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 and was issued in
response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to
 Officers absconding with contributions and membership fees;
 Non-disclosure of the status of funds and non-submission of financial statements; and misuse of funds.
 Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009
1. The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized:
2. The terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of directors:
3. The cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations
(PTCAs) and of their federations effective school year 2009–2010.
 The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit financial
reports, and turn over all documents to school heads and schools division superintendents
o Case:
 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
 Department of Education’s Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be
nullified for being unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that
 A writ of prohibition permanently enjoining the Department of Education and all persons acting on its
behalf from enforcing the assailed Department Order be issued
 A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued, restraining the
enforcement of the Department Order.
o Issue:
 Whether or not the Department of Education acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009
 Whether or not the issuance of the Department Order was a valid exercise of the Department of Education’s
rule-making powers:
1. Whether or not the Department Order contravenes any of the laws providing for
the creation and organization of parent-teacher associations
2. Whether or not Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public
consultations were (supposedly) held before its adoption, and/or as it was not
published by the Department of Education
 Whether or not the assailed provisions of the Department Order (i.e., Article II (2) and (3), Article IV (1)
(e), and Article X) undermine the organizational independence of parent-teacher associations.

o Ruling:
 The present Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

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  Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the Secretary of Education
pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and pursuant to the purposes for which the
organization of parent-teacher associations is mandated by statute.
 It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure fall under the original jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional
trial courts and the Court of Appeals.
 "[T]his Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari." Indeed, "concurrence [of
jurisdiction] does not allow unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition."
 The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally
viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance
must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate legislation," or the rule-
making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government. In Eastern Shipping
Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 248 Phil. 762 (1988)
 The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or
judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the
case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent,
if not necessary. This has led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
 With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power
of subordinate legislation."
 With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as
the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These
regulations have the force and effect of law.[Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, 248 Phil. 762 (1988)]
 ABAKADA GURO Party List v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246 (2008)
o Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
 In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the sufficient standard test,
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code) requires the filing of rules adopted by
administrative agencies with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Generally, rules filed
with the University of the Philippines Law Center become effective 15 days after filing. Chapter 2
of Book VII of the Administrative Code provides:
 The Education Act of 1982 vested in the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports"[t]he
administration of the education system and . . . the supervision and regulation of educational
institutions.“ Section 70 of the Education Act of 1982 vested rule-making authority in the Minister
of Education who, under Section 55 of the same statute, was the head of the Ministry: Section 70.
Rule-making Authority. – The Minister of Education, Culture and Sports charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations.
 Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides
for the rule-making power of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive
branch of government: SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary. —The Secretary
shall: (4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the

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 offices under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances
shall not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;
o Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power.
 Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel
 Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes
place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises,
unless the law provides otherwise [:]
 notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions;
but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose
rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.(Central
Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel, 150-A Phil. 101-102 (1972), citing Albert v. Public Service
Commission, 120 A. 2d. 346, 350–351)

Quasi-Judicial/Adjudicatory Powers
 Power of administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to apply the
law as they construe it to the facts so found.
 Power/function of administrative agencies to conduct hearings and decide on cases in the duty of carrying out a law.
 Authority to promulgate its own proceeding (rules of procedures), provided they do not violate fundamental rights and the
Constitution. Such rules of procedures shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court [Philippine
Constitution, Article VIII Sec. 5 (5)]
 Not required to adapt formal court rules that govern purely judicial proceedings. However, it is essential for any proceeding
to observe due process. 
 Decision in writing and shall clearly state the facts and legal basis
 Requisites
o Due Process
o Jurisdiction
 Solid Holmes v. Payawal
o Case:
o Complaint was filed by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City
o Defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P
28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P
38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests.
o Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding
certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged
the property in bad faith to a financing company.
o The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by
her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
o Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being
vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957.
o The motion was denied.
o The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree."
o Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
 Defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the
sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid
 P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the
costs of the suit. 
o Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
o The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National
Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential
Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

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  SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices;
b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
 The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional
Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority
 BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in
its Section 19, reading in part as follows:
 SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
a. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
b. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
 This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment
 On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power
conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. “
 Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. (Cooper River Convalescent
Ctr., Inc. v. Dougherty, 356 A. 2d 55, 1975)
NOVEMBER 3, 2020
RULE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN CIVIL SERVICE
2017 Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 2017 Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 1999 Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)
 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) - Rules 1-24 Sections 1-124
 2017 Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
 Resolution No. 1701077, 03 July 2017
 Rules 1-23 Sections 1-125
Who are covered by the Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service?
 Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o The covered agencies of the 2017 RACCS are as follows:
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ITS REGIONAL/FIELD OFFICES;
 AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT;
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS;
 STATE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES;
 LOCAL UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES; and
 GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
What are the two classifications of cases? to be heard under the 2017 RACCS?
 Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o The cases to be heard under the 2017 RACCS are classified into two:
 Disciplinary cases are those involving acts or omissions committed by the respondent or the government
employee; and
 Non-disciplinary cases do not involve a fault or an act or omission or basically non-adversarial.
Does the CSC have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving those who are covered by the RACCS? NO
 Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o The disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction with the Civil Service Commission as to the employees
working for them.
Will anonymous complaints prosper? IT DEPENDS.

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  Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o The law allows the filing of anonymous complaints.
o Still, there are requirements that should be complied with even if the complaint is not verified.
o For instance, the facts alleged in the anonymous complaint must be of public knowledge, or the allegations can be
verified or supported by documentary or direct evidence
What is a PROTEST?
 Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o PROTEST refers to an action filed by a qualified next-in-rank official or employee questioning the issuance of an
appointment in favor of another on the basis of lack of qualifications of the appointee.
Who is a QUALIFIED NEXT-IN-RANK?
 Rule 1 (APPLICABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION)
o QUALIFIED NEXT-IN-RANK refers to an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously
determined to be a next-in-rank to the vacancy and who meets the requirements for appointment thereto as
previously determined by the appointing authority and approved by the Commission.
What is a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
o Rule 4 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
o (SECTION 18) DEFINITION
 A Preliminary Investigation is a mandatory proceeding undertaken to determine whether a prima facie
case exists to warrant the issuance of a formal charge/notice of charge.
 Highlights
o Clarifies the three modes of conducting preliminary investigation such as:
 requiring the submission of counter affidavit or comment and/or other documents from the person
complained of within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint which is sufficient in form and substance;
 ex parte evaluation of the records; or
 clarificatory meeting with the parties to discuss the merits of the case. [Section 19, Rule 4]
 Section 19. How conducted.
o Preliminary investigation may be conducted in any of the following manners:
 requiring the submission of counter affidavit or comment and/or other documents from the person
complained of within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint which is sufficient in form and substance;
 ex-parte evaluation of the records; or
 clarificatory meeting with the parties to discuss the merits of the case.
Is PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION a PENALTY?
 Rule 7 (PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION)
o Section 28. Preventive Suspension, nature. –
 Preventive suspension is not a penalty.
 It is designed merely as a measure of precaution so that the respondent may be removed from the scene of
the alleged misfeasance/malfeasance/nonfeasance while the case is being investigated.
What are the grounds upon which an order of preventive suspension may be issued?
 Rule 7 (PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION)
o Section 29. When Issued; Grounds. – The proper disciplining authority, upon motion or motu proprio, may
issue an order of preventive suspension against the respondent upon issuance of the formal charge or notice
of charge, or immediately thereafter, if:
a. The charge involves:
 Dishonesty;
 Oppression;
 Grave Misconduct;
 Neglect in the Performance of Duty;
 Other offenses punishable by dismissal from the service; or
 Administrative offense committed on its second or third offense and the penalty is dismissal from the
service; and
b. The respondent is in a position to exert undue influence or pressure on the witnesses and/or tamper with
evidence.
o In order for a preventive suspension order to be valid, any of the conditions in Items A and B must be present.
Is there any ALTERNATIVE to preventive suspension?
 Rule 7 (PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION)
 Section 30. Alternative to Preventive Suspension.
o The proper disciplining authority may reassign respondent to another unit of the agency subject to the same periods
as provided in the immediately succeeding section.
 Section 31. Duration of Preventive Suspension. –

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 o maximum period of ninety (90) days in the case of national agencies including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, state universities and colleges (SUCs) or sixty (60) days in the
case of local government units including local universities and colleges (LUCs).
o When the administrative case against respondent under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of preventive suspension, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in
the service unless the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,
in which case, the period of delay shall not be included in the counting of the period of preventive suspension.
 Any period of delay caused by motions filed by the respondent shall be added to the period of preventive suspension.
 Provided, that where the order of preventive suspension is for a period less than the maximum period, the disciplining
authority undertakes to finish the formal investigation within the said period and is precluded from imposing another
preventive suspension.
 Highlights
o Duration of preventive suspension now provides that if the respondent is placed under preventive suspension in
another case, the duration of the second preventive suspension shall simultaneously run with the first preventive
suspension without prejudice to the service of the remaining period of the second preventive suspension. [Section
31, Rule 7]
o Provided, further, that should the respondent be on authorized leave, said preventive suspension shall be deferred or
interrupted until such time that said leave has been fully exhausted. Provided finally that if the respondent is placed
under preventive suspension in another case, the duration of the second preventive suspension shall simultaneously
run with the first preventive suspension without prejudice to the service of the remaining period of the second
preventive suspension.
What is a Preliminary Matter?
 Rule 8 (FORMAL INVESTIGATION)
o Section 38. Preliminary Matters
 At the start of the hearing, the hearing officer shall note the appearances of the parties.
 If, after being apprised of the right to counsel, respondents appear without the aid of a counsel, they shall
be deemed to have waived the right thereto.
May JUDICIAL AFFIDAVITS be used in administrative proceedings? YES
 Highlights
o Includes a provision that Judicial Affidavit Rule may be adopted in place of direct testimonies of witnesses without
prejudice to clarificatory questions that may be asked. [Section 38, Rule 8]
 Section 38. Preliminary Matters
o A sworn statement of the witness properly identified and affirmed shall constitute direct testimony, copy furnished
the other party.
o The use of Judicial Affidavit may also be adopted in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses. The adoption
of the Judicial Affidavit Rule is without prejudice to clarificatory questions that may be asked during the
hearing
NOVEMBER 3, 2020
CONTINUATION RACCS

Rule 10: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES AND PENALTIES

 Section 50. Classification of Offenses
A. GRAVE OFFENSES punishable by DISMISSAL
1. Dishonesty
2. Gross Neglect of Duty
3. Grave Misconduct
4. Being notoriously undesirable
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
6. Falsification of Official Documents
7. Physically or mentally incapacity or disability due to vicious habit
8. Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding non-political office
9. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other value valuable thing in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope of
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded to other persons, or committing acts
punishable under the anti-graft laws
10. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee has business
relations
11. 11. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or anything of
monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by,
or any transaction which may be affected by the function of his office. The propriety or impropriety of the

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 foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the
motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very nature
12. 12. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to The Filipino people
B. LESS GRAVE OFFENSES punishable by 6 months and 1 day to 1 year and DISMISSAL for the second offense
1. Less Serious Dishonesty
2. Oppression
3. Disgraceful and immoral conduct
4. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties
5. Frequent unauthorized absences (Habitual absenteeism)
6. Habitual tardiness in reporting for duty
7. Loafing
8. Refusal to perform official duty
9. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
10. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his
office. Financial and material interest is defined as pecuniary or proprietary interest by which a person will gain
or lose something
11. Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by his office, unless
expressly allowed by law
12. Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or regulation,
provided that such practice will not conflict with his official functions
13. Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason of his office and
not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to
prejudice the public interest
14. Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees for any purpose contrary to morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by
news and communication media for dissemination to the general public
15. Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending transaction
with one’s office unless mandated by law, international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of
the functions of one’s office
1. HIGHLIGHTS
2. Redefined the penalty of demotion (Rule 10, Section 50 (C)
C. The grave offense of Inefficiency and Incompetence in the performance of official duties may be punishable by
Demotion. In this case, the guilty person shall suffer diminution in salary corresponding to the next lower salary grade
with the same salary step. [Section 50(c)]
D. LESS GRAVE OFFENSES punishable by 1 month and 1 day to 6 months (first offense) and DISMISSAL for the second
offense
1. Simple neglect of duty
2. Simple misconduct
3. Discourtesy in the course of official duties
4. Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules of serious nature
5. Insubordination
6. Habitual drunkenness
7. Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference
8. Failure to resign from one’s position in the private business enterprise within 30 days from assumption into
office when conflict of interest arises or failure to divest oneself of one’s shareholdings or interest in private
business enterprise within 60 days from assumption into office when conflict of interest arises
9. Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business interest and
financial connections including those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households
10. Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activity by one holding a non-political office
E. LESS GRAVE OFFENSES punishable by 1 month and 1 day to 6 months (first offense), 6 months and 1 day to 1 year
(second offense) and DISMISSAL for the third offense
1. Simple dishonesty
F. LIGHT OFFENSES punishable by REPRIMAND (first offense), 1 to 30 days (second offense) and DISMISSAL for the
third offense
1. Discourtesy
2. Improper or unauthorized solicitation of contributions from subordinate employees and by teachers or school
officials from school children
3. Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
4. Habitual tardiness
5. Gambling prohibited by law

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 6. Refusal to render overtime service
7. Disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to entering the service
8. Borrowing money by superior officers from subordinate to superior officers
9. Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the government
10. Lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative halls and offices without authority
11. Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private enterprises that are not intended for charitable or public
welfare purposes and even in the latter cases if there is no prior authority
12. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as otherwise provided
in the rules implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public Officials and Employees
13. Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a reasonable time from
preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
14. Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or act promptly and
expeditiously on public transactions
15. Engaging in private practice of one’s profession
16. Pursuit of one’s business, vocation, or profession without the required permission
 RULE 10:
A. The Offense of Sexual Harassment. - The specific acts constituting grave, less grave and light sexual harassment are as
follows:
a. Grave Offenses punishable by dismissal from the service shall include, but are not limited to:
i. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (inner thighs, genitalia, buttocks and breast);
ii. sexual assault;
iii. malicious touching;
iv. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable
working conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant
of benefits or payment of a stipend or allowance; and
v. other analogous cases.
b. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
i. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
ii. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
iii. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or one’s
sexual orientation or used to describe a person;
iv. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
v. other analogous cases
c. Light Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
i. surreptitiously looking at a person’s private part or worn undergarments;
ii. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other similar means,
causing embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised that they are
offensive or embarrassing or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly
embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
iii. malicious leering or ogling;
iv. display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
v. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
vi. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
vii. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
viii. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones; i. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones
causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the receiver; and
ix. other analogous cases.
B. Violations of RA 9485 or the Anti-Red Tape Act (ARTA). - The specific acts constituting grave and light offenses as
well as the corresponding penalties under said law are as follows:
a. Grave Offense
i. Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage.
ii. Penalty - Dismissal and perpetual disqualification from public service.
 May payment of fine take the place of suspension?
o Provides payment of fine in lieu of suspension for those who are already retired or otherwise separated from
government service where the penalty of suspension could not be served anymore which may be sourced from
accumulated leave credits or whatever benefits are due. [Section 52 (1) (d), Rule 10]
o Section 52. Penalty of Fine. – The following are the guidelines for the penalty of fine:
1. The disciplining authority may allow payment of fine in place of suspension if any of the following
circumstances is present:
 When the functions/nature of the office is impressed with national interest such as those involved
in maintenance of peace and order, health and safety, education;

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  When the respondent is actually discharging frontline functions or those directly dealing with the
public and the human resource complement of the office is insufficient to perform such function;
 When the respondent committed the offense without utilizing or abusing the powers of his/her
position or office; or
 When the respondent has already retired or otherwise separated from government service and the
penalty of suspension could not be served anymore, the fine may be sourced from the accumulated
leave credits or whatever benefits due the respondent.
2. The payment of penalty of fine in lieu of suspension shall be available in Grave, Less Grave and Light
Offenses where the penalty imposed is for six (6) months or less at the ratio of one (1) day of suspension
from the service to one (1) day salary fine;
 Provided, that in Grave Offenses where the penalty imposed is six (6) months and one (1) day
suspension in view of the presence of mitigating circumstance, the conversion shall only apply to
the suspension of six (6) months. Nonetheless, the remaining one (1) day suspension is deemed
included therein.
o Emphasizes that mitigating circumstances shall not apply to dismissal from the service which is an indivisible
penalty [Section 53, Rule 10]
 Section 53. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances. –
a) Physical illness;
b) Malice;
c) Time and place of offense;
d) Taking undue advantage of official position;
e) Taking undue advantage of subordinate;
f) Undue disclosure of confidential information;
g) Use of government property in the commission of the offense;
h) Habituality;
i) Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;
j) Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense;
k) First offense;
l) Education;
m) Length of service; or
n) Other analogous circumstances.
 Note: In the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the respondent, otherwise, said
circumstances will not be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. The disciplining authority,
however, in the interest of substantial justice, may take and consider these circumstances motu proprio.
 Section 55. Multiple Offenses
o Penalty for the most serious, the rest aggravating
o Multiple counts – maximum penalty
 Section 56. Duration and Effect of Penalties
o Dismissal
 permanent separation
 criminal and civil liability
o Demotion
 next lower salary grade,
 same step
o Suspension
 a gap in the service
 no monetary benefits
 no leave credits
o Fine
 paid within a period not exceeding one year
Notes: Incorporates the rule that the accessory penalty of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits excludes both terminal leave benefits and
personal shares/contributions to the GSIS (Lledo vs. Lledo, February 9, 2010) or other equivalent retirement benefits system. [Section
57 (a) , Rule 10]
What are the penalties that go with dismissal?
 Section 57. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.
o Dismissal
 cancellation of eligibility
 perpetual disqualification from holding public office,
 bar from taking civil service examinations
 forfeiture of retirement benefits

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Note: Terminal leave benefits and personal contributions to Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Retirement and Benefits
Administration Service (RBAS) or other equivalent retirement benefits system shall not be subject to forfeiture.
o May one who was demoted be promoted?
o Section 57. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. The following rules shall govern in the
imposition of accessory penalties:
 (b) The penalty of demotion shall carry with it disqualification from promotion for one (1) year.
o May one who is suspended be promoted?
o Section 57. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. The following rules shall govern in the
imposition of accessory penalties:
 (c)The penalty of suspension shall carry with it disqualification from promotion corresponding to the
period of suspension.
o May one who is was imposed the penalty of fine be promoted?
o Section 57. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. The following rules shall govern in the
imposition of accessory penalties:
 (d)The penalty of fine shall carry with it disqualification from promotion corresponding to the period the
Respondent is fined
 (e)Reprimand – no accessory penalty
 (f)Warning/Admonition – not a penalty
 Section 58. Effects of Exoneration
a. Fine refunded
b. Demotion – same salary grade and step
c. Suspension – immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, payment of backwages, benefits
d. Dismissal - immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, payment of backwages, benefits
e. Exonerated on appeal – leave credits
Notes: Devotes an entire rule on the payment of backwages. [Rule 14]
Rule 14: PAYMENT OF BACK WAGES AND OTHER SIMILAR BENEFITS
 Section 74. Who are Entitled. –
o The following are entitled to back wages and other similar benefits:
 An illegally dismissed or suspended official or employee who is exonerated/reprimanded and ordered
reinstated in the service; and
 A respondent placed under preventive suspension, whose order of suspension was declared by the
Commission as invalid
 Section 75. What Are Included. –
o Subject to the guidelines provided hereinafter and other existing laws, rules and regulations, the following benefits
are included in the scope of back wages:
a. Salaries from the time the official or employee was illegally dismissed /suspended up to the time
of actual reinstatement;
b. Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) as provided under existing rules;
c. Personnel Economic Relief Allowance/Additional Compensation Allowance (PERA/ACA);
d. Restoration of Leave Credits;
e. Loyalty Award;
f. Anniversary Bonus;
g. 13th , 14th Month Pay and Cash Gift;
h. Uniform/Clothing Allowance;
i. Performance-based Bonus; and
j. Other similar benefits given to regular employees by the agency
 Section 76. Guidelines. – The following are the guidelines on the grant of back wages and other similar benefits to an
illegally dismissed / suspended employee:
a. The payment of back wages should be computed based on the rate of salary grade/job grade/pay level/pay grade of
the respondent at the time of dismissal or suspension including the increases in salary, allowances and other
emoluments that may occur during the period the employee was prevented from rendering service.
b. For entitlement to RATA, subject to existing rules and regulations, the requirement of actual performance of duty to
an illegally dismissed or suspended respondent is dispensed with since it is unreasonable to expect or demand
performance of his/her functions when the circumstances prevent one from doing so.
c. XXX
d. The restoration of leave credits shall be subject to annual deductions of five (5) days forced leave/mandatory leave
as required under the Omnibus Rules on Leave.
e. For purposes of Loyalty award given to all officials/employees in the government who have rendered at least ten
(10) years of continuous and satisfactory service in the government pursuant to CSC MC 6, s. 2002, the period under
which the respondent was illegally dismissed or suspended should not be considered as a gap in the service. The
same should be included in the computation of his/her length of service.

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 f.
Anniversary bonus is given during milestone years. A milestone year refers to the 15th anniversary and every fifth
year thereafter. Respondents who have been illegally dismissed or suspended during the milestone years shall be
entitled to the payment of anniversary bonus.
g. Bonuses based on performance shall be given on the basis of the rating of the employee prior to one’s illegal
dismissal or suspension from the service.
 Section 77. Allowable Deductions.
o The payment of back wages shall be subject to withholding tax, GSIS Premium, Phil-Health and HDMF fund
contributions, and other monthly dues/deductions, if there be any, which is imposed by the agency.
o Payment of 13th/ 14th month pay, Cash Gift, Anniversary Bonus, and other additional bonus given by the agency
which exceeds the ceiling tax exemption shall be subject to withholding tax.
o Highlights
 Includes as penalty for indirect contempt the suspension of one (1) month up to maximum period of six (6)
months aside from a fine of One Thousand Pesos per day for those who will defy CSC decisions, rulings or
orders which may include heads of agencies, whether elective, presidential or non-presidential appointees.
[Section 85, Rule 16]
Rule 16: PROCEDURE FOR CONTEMPT
 Section 82. Contumacious/Contemptuous Acts Punishable
o Any person found guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, decision, resolution, ruling,
summons, subpoena, command or injunction of the Commission may be punished for indirect contempt.
 Section 84. Hearing
o Upon the day set for the hearing, the Commission shall proceed to investigate the indirect contempt case and
consider such comment, answer, defense or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. Failure to attend the
scheduled hearing and to give a satisfactory explanation in writing to the Commission will result in the waiver of the
respondent to be present during the hearing.
 Section 85. Punishment, if found guilty
o If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against the Commission, he/she may be
punished by a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos per day for every act of indirect contempt and/or suspension
for one (1) month up to a maximum period of six (6) months. The finding of guilt for indirect contempt shall not bar
the filing of another indirect contempt case for the same cause if, after serving the first penalty of suspension or fine
or both, the respondent continues to fail/refuse to comply with the Commission’s Order.
 Section 83. How proceedings are commenced
o Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the Commission by an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he/she should not be punished for indirect contempt.
o A motion to cite for indirect contempt may also be filed with the Commission. In both cases, proceedings shall be
conducted at the Office for Legal Affairs, Civil Service Commission. The conduct of proceedings for indirect
contempt cases shall follow, as far as applicable, the procedure required in the conduct of disciplinary investigation
provided under these Rules
o HIGHLIGHTS
 Introduced psychological and developmental interventions as pre-requisites for Dropping from the Rolls.
[Section 4 (x), (i), Rule 1] ; [Section 107, d(1),(2) and b(1) Rule 20]
Rule 20: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS
 Section 107. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls.
o Officers and employees who are absent without approved leave, have unsatisfactory or poor performance, or have
shown to be physically or mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from the rolls within thirty (30)
days from the time a ground therefor arises subject to the following procedures:
A. Absence Without Approved Leave xxx
B. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance
C. Physical Unfitness
D. Mental Disorder
 An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally for an extended period, which may manifest
continuing mental disorder shall be provided necessary human resource and psychological
interventions. If after interventions, continued abnormal behavior/ mental disorder is manifested,
as reported by his or her co-worker or immediate supervisor and confirmed by a licensed
psychiatrist, the officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls.
 If the officer or employee refuses to undergo the necessary human resource and/or psychological
interventions, he or she may be dropped from the rolls based on the report of co-workers or
immediate supervisor and after confirmation by a licensed psychiatrist.
Procedure
 Complaint
o by the disciplining authority (show cause order) or any other person in writing subscribed and sworn to by the
Complainant

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 o Contain
 Full name and address of the Complainant
 Full name and address of the person complained of, his office and position
 Relevant and material facts (acts/omissions)
 Certified true copies of evidence
 Affidavits of witnesses
 Statement/Certificate of non-forum shopping
 Preliminary Investigation (5 days from receipt of Complaint)
o Counter-Affidavit/Comment (5 days)
o Ex-parte evaluation of the records
o Clarificatory Conference
 Purpose : To determine if a prima facie case exists
 Investigation Report (5 days from termination of 20-day investigation)
 Formal Charge (disciplining authority)
o Person complained of now called Respondent
o Contains
 Specification of the charge
 Relevant and material facts
 Certified true copies of documentary evidence
 Sworn statement of witnesses
 Directive to answer the charge in writing, under oath and in not less than three days but not more than 10
days
 Advice to indicate whether a formal trial-type investigation is demanded
 Advice that Respondent may opt to be assisted by counsel
 Notice of Charge (other than the disciplining authority)
o Person complained of now called Respondent
o Contains
 Copy of the Complaint including attachments
 Specification of the Charge
 Statement that a prima facie case exists
 Directive to answer the charge in writing, under oath and in not less than three days but not more than 10
days
 Advice to indicate whether a formal trial-type investigation is demanded
 Advice that Respondent may opt to be assisted by counsel
 Request for lacking documents, if any (10 days from receipt)
 Prohibited Pleadings
o Requests for Clarification
o Bills of Particulars
o Motion to Dismiss
o Motion to Quash
o Motion for Reconsideration
o Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
 Answer (3 to 10 days)
o In writing
o Under oath
o Specific
o Contain
 Material facts
 Applicable laws
 Original or certified copies of documentary evidence
 Sworn statements of witnesses
 Failure to file an answer – waiver, decide based on records
 Preventive Suspension (upon issuance of charge or immediately thereafter)
o Upon motion or motu proprio
o 90/60 days
o Appeal to the Commission within 15 days from receipt of the order
o Executory pending appeal
o No motion for reconsideration
o Temporary restraining order from the CA/SC
o Void on its face (authority, grounds, no formal charge, excess) – immediate reinstatement plus back wages

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 o Invalid (other grounds) – reinstatement, backwages to await the outcome of the c
 Formal Investigation
o Merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously
o Not earlier than 5 days nor later than 10 days after answer of upon expiration of period to answer
o Terminated 30 days from formal charge/notice of charge
o Position papers
o Pre-hearing conference mandatory
o Pre-hearing order
o One postponement only
o Right to counsel
 Formal Investigation Report (15 days)
 Decision (30 days)
o Not appealable except for violation of due process
o Final and executory unless MR is filed
 Reprimand
 Suspension 30 days
 Fine 30-day salary
o Final and executory after the lapse of the period to file MR/appeal
 Suspension for more than 30 days
 Fine more than 30 days salary
 Appeal
NOVEMBER 10, 2020
QUASI-JUDICIAL CASES
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
 Fundamental and Essential Requirements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings (HESSELI)
o Right to a HEARING
o The tribunal must consider the EVIDENCE
o The decision having something to SUPPORT it
o Evidence must be SUBSTANTIAL
o The decision must be rendered on the EVIDENCE presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected
o Independent consideration of the LAW AND FACTS Parties to the proceeding can know the various ISSUES
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered
Besaga v. Acosta
 Facts:
o On 11 February 2003, Petitioner applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514
for a bathing establishment
 Lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly
occupied the land during his lifetime
o On 13 February 2003, Respondents also applied for SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514
 They acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed
by Rogelio Marañon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.  and Digna Matalang Coching (another respondent in this case), also
registered survey claimants
 Case:
o DENR
 DENR Regional Office
 On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner’s SLUP application before the
DENR.
 On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order giving due course to the petitioner’s SLUP
application and rejecting the respondents’ SLUP application.
 Respondent-spouses’ motion for reconsideration denied on July 26, 2004.
 Respondent-spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004
 DENR Secretary
 Respondent spouses filed on August 25,2004, through registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to
the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner’s lawyer and the Office of the
RED.
 The appeal fee was paid on September 10, 2004
 Respondent Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed her appeal
(which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.

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  While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate
of Finality declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for
failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal
 On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
issued the SLUP to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514.
 On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for
Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).
 The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006.
o Respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.
o Rogelio Marañon, the registered survey claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived
and transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent spouses in a duly
notarized Affidavit of Waiver of Rights.
o The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from Arturo Besaga, Jr.
and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered survey claimants, who executed a duly-
notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the said lot.
 Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Petitioner
 DENR Secretary reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held that the
December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because:
o Respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum, instead of a Notice of Appeal
o The Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR Secretary and not with the
RED
o Respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees within the reglementary period.
 Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:
Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. – a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive
order, appeals from the decisions/orders of the DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected
within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of by
the party adversely affected, by filing with the Regional Office which adjudicated the
case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and Office of the
Secretary, and paying the required fees.
 Office of the President
 reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.
 The orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation
prohibiting an appellant to file an appeal memorandum, instead of a notice of appeal, to the
office concerned.
 The appeal memorandum itself serves as a sufficient notice of the party’s intention to elevate the
case to a higher authority.
 In a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR, rather than with the
RED, which practice has not since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal
of the appeal.
 The respondent spouses paid the appeal fees.
 All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the
DENR Secretary.
o found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 but Lot
No. 4741, which is entirely different and distinct from the contested lots.
o gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Marañon
and the Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.
and Digna Matalang Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No countervailing
proof was presented by the petitioner to impugn these affidavits.
 Court of Appeals
 sustained the Office of the President.
 Rules of procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. They are
not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not
to override substantial justice.
 the orders of the RED have not attained finality.
 Supreme Court
 Rule 45
 Petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence
 Respondent spouses failed to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings

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  The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.
 The liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear application in the present case because the
respondents failed to adequately explain their non-compliance therewith.
 Issue:
o Whether or not the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have attained finality because the
respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the
RED.
o Whether or not the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have attained finality because the
respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the
RED.
 Ruling:
o SC DENIED THE PETITION AND AFFIRMED THIS DECISION OF THE CA
 Court of Appeals sustained the Office of the President.
 Rules of procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. They are not to be
applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not to override
substantial justice.
 the orders of the RED have not attained finality.
o We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially served the
purpose of the Notice of Appeal. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a
Notice of Appeal been filed: inform the RED that his order is sought to be appealed to the DENR Secretary.
o Various Cases
 Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista 709 SCRA 276, 281
 CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his brief within the time provided by
the Rules of Court.
 The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek
an extension of time based on a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended.
 SC sustained the CA that liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it
will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of
justice.
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 497 Phil. 738 (2005)
 SC affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for reconsideration pro forma for not
containing a notice of hearing.
 SC held that a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere
scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to
the attention of the presiding judge.
 Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA, 322 Phil. 820 (1996)
 The Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible 15-day period to file a Petition
for Review from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner failed to file the
petition despite the extension.
 SC held that the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in
the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.
 MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, 412 Phil. 614 (2001)
 SC affirmed the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner’s appeal because of its failure to
explain why another mode of service other than personal service was resorted to.
 SC held that an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made to the
other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the requirement that an explanation
be made if personal service of pleadings was not resorted to.
 Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc., 635 Phil. 21 (2010)
 As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule
45. The failure to file the appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an
excuse to use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
o In the foregoing cases, what is the rule on the right to appeal?
 In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party
who avails of such right must comply with the law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.
o What Rules were violated in those cases? Are these cases applicable in the instant case?
 They are not strictly applicable in the present case.

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 How should rules of procedure be construed in administrative cases?
o
 In proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality
o Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 03, 2014
 Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.
 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.
o Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,(G.R. No. 194307,
November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 474, 482)
 (T)he rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its
frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the
primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never
be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. x
x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not
bound by technical rules of procedure.
o What is the limitation on the liberality of procedure in administrative actions?
 The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the
requirements of due process.
o What is the meaning of administrative due process?
 Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial type hearing is not always necessary, and technical
rules of procedure are not strictly applied. (Vivo v. Pagcor, (G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013, 709
SCRA 276, 281 )
 Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained. [Mangubat v. De Castro,
246 Phil. 620 (1998)]
o “Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and
expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due process is violated. The
crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation
disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due
process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.”
o Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The
petitioner subsequently filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the
respondent spouses, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision
o Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard was not
compromised despite the wrong mode of appeal.
o This Court has disregarded late payment of appeal fees at the administrative level in order to render substantial
justice. (Adalim v. Taninas, et al., G.R. No., 198682, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 648)
o Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal
application in order to enhance fair trials and expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative
rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of
disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply these rules in a manner that would give effect
rather than defeat their intended purpose.
Montemayor v. Bundalian
 Facts:
o Unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
o Accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019
o Charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los
Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00
o Alleged that petitioner’s in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts
and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife
o Accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects
o Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:
 a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject
property to petitioner and his wife

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  a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing
petitioner’s sister-in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents
and requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property
 an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled "Beatwatch,"
where it was reported that a low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the
U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to
manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S
o Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of
San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)1 for investigation
o Counter-affidavit
 the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo
 in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the
U.S. about their possible emigration to the States. They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it
would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was
interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a
provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a
real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles
 Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to
support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her
mortgage contract
 Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the
Ombudsman.
 attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing
similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
o PCAGC investigation
 Petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his
counsel
 Private respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained
 repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN),
Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet
 Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record, adduced in evidence the checks
allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California
 PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with copies of petitioner’s SALN from
1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years
o PCAGC Report to the Office of the President
 Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange
rate prevailing in 1993)
 The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to
buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record
 found petitioner’s explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self-serving
 noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and
motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping
 took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking made by his counsel
which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
 concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his
salary, it has been unlawfully acquired
 recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019
o Office of the President
 issued Administrative Order No. 12, ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
government benefits.
 Motion for Reconsideration was denied
o Court of Appeals
 Appeal was dismissed
o Supreme Court
 Petition for review

 Issue:
o Whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC
o Whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence
o Whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the
PCAGC moot and academic

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  Ruling:
o Supreme Court
 The Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioner’s dismissal from service as the complaint and its
supporting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income
in the government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal.
 His liability was proved by substantial evidence.
 Petition is DISMISSED.
o Due process
 Petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due
process when it relied on Bundalian’s unverified letter-complaint
 His counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay
evidence
 PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never
appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein
 The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of
due process are sufficiently met [Umali vs. Guingona, Jr., 305 SCRA 533 (2000); Audion Electric Co., Inc.
vs. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340 (2000)]
 In the case at bar, PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine
residence could not be located. 
 Petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-
examine the complainant
 Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before
it
 duly represented by counsel
 filed his counter-affidavit
 submitted documentary evidence
 attended the hearings
 moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President
 filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals
 His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural
deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement.
 He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation
o Substantial evidence
 lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant at the
investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth
 Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption
may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department
 It is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of
its investigative powers.
 The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and
manner concerning official acts or omissions.
 The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even
anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical
Conduct.
 This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate,
graft and corruption in the service.
 In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[Ocampo vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17 (2000)]
 This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
o Basic principles in administrative investigations
1. The burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
[Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 (1999); Cortez vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 (1998)]
o Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. [Enrique vs. Court of Appeals,
229 SCRA 180 (1994)]

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 2. In reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts
made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
o Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.

3. Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside aside on proof
of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing
court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted
therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned.[Ramos vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 55 SCRA
330 (1974)]
o In the case at bar, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner
entered into with Fajardo.
 did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she testify before it regarding her
ownership of the Burbank property
 The checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have
no evidentiary weight as Fajardo’s mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioner’s non-ownership
of the property.
o In the case at bar, Petitioner’s own evidence contradict his position.
 loan statement showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for
$195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property.
 Three (3) years later petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed donating the Burbank
property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the
property.
o Why the Quit claim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo who allegedly
owned the property was not explained on the record.
o Petitioner’s evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.
o Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence
and due execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with
respect to the acquisition of the Burbank property.
o With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the
property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional
evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Court’s power to do so. He had every
opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
o The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this
review.
 The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers.
 Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the
acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
the Revised Penal Code.
o For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue
of the administrative power and control of the President over him.
o As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
Evangelista v. Jarencio
 Facts:
o Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of
the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
o Functions and responsibilities: 
a. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
b. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and
gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed
wealth.

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 c. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the
acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.
o Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then
Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ...
then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
o Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
and assailed its legality.
 Respondent CFI Judge issued the Order:
o writ of preliminary injunction issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-
finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the
petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Case:
o Supreme Court: Original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
 Issue:
o Whether the Agency, acting through its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-
finding investigations.
 Ruling:
o The disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within
the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
o Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.
o not necessary that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to
one
o enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 
o The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if
the discovered evidence so justifies.
o The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in
order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.
o When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to
inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.
o A subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency; the demand
is not too indefinite; and the information is reasonably relevant. 22
o Does the privilege against self-incrimination extend in administrative investigations?
o The privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar
to adversary proceedings
o Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.
o Since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the
forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in
nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
 Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners 
o The same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly
result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession.
o Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative
charge. 
o He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in
the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines
or to file the corresponding charges. 
o Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of
the privilege would thus be unwise. Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
 On the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88

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 For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force
o
and effect of statutes cannot be collaterally impeached.  Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court
below as to be acceptable for adjudication now.  The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
Guevarra v. COMELEC
 Facts:
o Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract
Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication
of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before said body and which article likewise tended to
degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its
Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the
conduct of elections."
o Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to quash on the
following grounds:
a. no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article
b. Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be applied to the
instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot
boxes.
c. Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply to the
present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the
article in question was published.
d. Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in question was a fair
report
o Commission denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to
investigate and punish petitioner for contempt
 Case:
o Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
 Issue:
o Whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against
petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication
 Ruling:
o The Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose
is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.
o Petition is granted.
o Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case
o The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.
o The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to
take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that
will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73
Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356).
o Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions,
affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X).
o Revised Election Code, Section 5
o SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. — The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have
the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it delegates such power
to any officer.
o power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided therein.
o The Commission on Elections duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections power to
try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections punish for contempt
o The Commission has no power to
o annul an election which might not have been free, orderly and honest (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission
on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851)
o decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election

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 o order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the
election returns (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722)
o order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office
(De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680);
o reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the
electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136).
o The Commission has the power to
o annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863);
o annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-
1834); and
o investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers
(Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722)
o Ministerial Duties
o set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies,
printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors, establishment
of precincts and designation of polling places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters,
o see that all these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections
o see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an orderly manner
o see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill
their duties without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or public official.
o All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive
powers of the Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in
these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must
respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of
voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our mind is completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the
Commission on Elections, October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196)1
o The requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an
imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held
o In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature
o "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In
Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.).
o Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
(People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts
vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810).
Lastimosa v. OMBUDSMAN
 Facts:
o Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed
 criminal complaint for frustrated rape administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo
 Graft investigation officer found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the
dismissal of the complaint.
 After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the
recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court.
 Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of
Danao City
 assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa
 found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. 
 with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, filed an information for acts of lasciviousness against
Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe
 As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
ordered Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be

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 punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 

 criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code
 based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge
Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape
o Administrative case
 order placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under
preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770
 approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
o Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders  in the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence.
 Case:
o Lastimosa filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman and Department of Justice:
a. Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring
to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V.
Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the
Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
b. Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and Cebu
Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why they
should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to
file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
c. The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for
attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office.
d. Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar
and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a
period of six (6) months, without pay.
e. The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional
State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of
Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension
f. Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
 Issue:
o Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
 Ruling:
o Petitioner
 The Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime
involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office.
 The Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under
preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such
refusal.
o Petitioner's contention has no merit.
o The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 
o This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty  It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
o The crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
o In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.

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 o Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him
as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. [§31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770)]
o Under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman - direct, review, approve, reverse or modify §15(g) of the
Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the
Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
o The preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
o Power of the Ombudsman to discipline and to place under preventive suspension
 §21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
 §22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
o The evidence of guilt is strong, and the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; the charges would warrant removal from the service; or the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
o continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension
o Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against
them is not strong as required by §24.
o Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. (Nera v. Garcia)
o Buenaseda v. Flavier
 Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into
account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital
offenses is not required
 Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should
only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court.
 Petitioner is in error.
 She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to
ninety (90) days.
o Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 
 To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act
3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth
the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a
maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public
officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4
of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from
issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted
in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a
presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the
circumstances of the case may warrant.
o Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the
Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay."
o Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.
o Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the
administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question.
o There is simply no basis for this contention.

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 oThe two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the
other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
o Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
o Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
Saunar v. Executive Secretary
 Facts:
o Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
o During his time as Chief of the Anti-Graft Division, Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged
corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President
Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
o President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes included
in his indictment for plunder.
o Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in Zamboanga City.
o he received a subpoena ad testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against
President Estrada
o After securing approval from his immediate supervisor Filomeno Bautista (Bautista), Deputy Director for Regional
Operation Services (DDROS),Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates
o NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No. 005033 informing Saunar that he was relieved
from his duties as regional director for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further
instructions.
o he reported to Bautista who informed Saunar that an investigation was being conducted over his testimony before
the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the investigation
o Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time whenever he would be needed.
o He made himself accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI.
o also attended court hearings whenever required.
o Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requiring him to answer the
allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge
o charge was based on a letter from Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his
failure to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved leave of absence for four (4) months
o On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29 January 2007,
he received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service
o Office of the President Decision
 Guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
 Dismissed him from service
 Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained that he
did not report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility.
 He was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so
 It would have been more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was specifically
assigned to him, for the precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with responsibilities
 Absolved Saunar from allegedly keeping government property during the time he did not report for work,
noting that he was able to account for all the items attributed to him.
o CA Ruling
 Affirmed in toto the OP decision
 Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against him and was given
the opportunity to defend himself
 The absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.
 Guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his being on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for a long
period of time
 Disregarded Saunar's explanation that he stayed in establishments nearby and that he had attended court
hearings from time to time
 CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because public interest was prejudiced when
he continued to receive his salary in spite of his unjustified absences.
 Case:
o Petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 20 October 2008 Decision and the 17 February
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the 19 January 2007 decision of the Office of the
President (OP) dismissing petitioner Carlos R. Saunar (Saunar) from government service.
 Issue:
o Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due process and that
respondents did not violate petitioner's right to security of tenure as guaranteed in the constitution; and

66 | P a g e
 o Whether or not the honorable court of appeals gravely erred and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
findings of respondents that petitioner committed gross neglect of duty, had abandoned his post and went on awol
for his alleged failure to report for work from March 24, 2005 to May 2006.
 Ruling:
o The constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition. 
o It is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the
situation.
o Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations
 eruditely expounded on the concept of due process in administrative proceedings
 The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character
o Re: De Borja and Flores
 There was no denial of due process when the Public Service Commission cancelled the certificate of Jose
de Borja to operate an ice plant without prior notice or hearing because a hearing was conducted after the
applicant filed a motion for reconsideration.
o Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union
 Due process was observed even if the report of the investigating officer was not set for hearing before the
Court of Industrial Relations because during the investigation stage, the parties were given the opportunity
to cross-examine and present their side to the case. It is noteworthy that in both cases due process was
observed because the parties were given the chance for a hearing where they could confront the witnesses
against them.
o Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong
 There is no denial of due process when a party is afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails
to exercise the same
o Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arbqleda)
 Administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings.
 The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as
elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only
for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and
summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.
 While the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the
due process guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity.
 It continued that it is a procedural right that may be invoked by the party.
o It is true that in subsequent cases, the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in
administrative proceedings because the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their respective sides through position papers or pleadings.
o Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown around by
administrative bodies.
o Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free from a strict application of technical rules
of procedure and are given sufficient leeway.
o In the said case, however, nothing was said that the freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to
allow matters which would ordinarily be incompetent or inadmissible in the usual judicial proceedings.
o Administrative bodies have the active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing
itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with administrative due
process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule rather than the exception
o Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
 In illegal dismissal cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when requested by the
employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or
when similar circumstances justify it.
o Jason v. Executive Secretary Torres (Joson)
 Respondent was denied due process after he was deprived of the right to a formal investigation with the
opportunity to face the witnesses against him
 The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of
A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. 
 This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal
investigation would be conducted. 

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  The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded
several rights under the law
o Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis
of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor
in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of
position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating
Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast
but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful
preparation can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying
petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative
disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive
officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from appointive
government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.
o To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement before
administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere
submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the opportunity to examine the
witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out
substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules itself of the administrative body provides
for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should
be acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right or waives the same.
o Gross Neglect of Duty, as an administrative offense, has been jurisprudentially defined. It refers to negligence
characterized by the glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with
respect to other persons who may be affected.
o Saunar’s conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order to be liable for violating
the said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 
o Saunar’s action was not tantamount to inexcusable or gross negligence considering that there was no intention to
abandon his duty as an NBI officer.
o Campol v. Balao-as
 An employee of the civil service who is invalidly dismissed is entitled to the payment of backwages. While
this right is not disputed, there have been variations in our jurisprudence as to the proper fixing of the
amount of backwages that should be awarded in these cases. We take this opportunity to clarify the
doctrine on this matter.
o Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan
 An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and
other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and
just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not
having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.
o Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, in the 2007 case Ramagos v. Metro Cebu Water District, and in the 2010
case Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr.
 Thus, the Decision, in refusing to award backwages from Campol’s dismissal until his actual reinstatement,
must be reversed. There is no legal nor jurisprudential basis for this ruling. An employee of the civil service
who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire
period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his or her position
and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never
truly left the office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the period of time until the employee found a
new employment is not a full recompense for the damage done by the illegal dismissal of an employee.
Worse, it effectivelypunishes an employee for being dismissed without his or her fault. In cases like this,
the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by the constitutional mandate
to protect civil service employees' right to security of tenure. Anything less than this falls short of the
justice due to government employees unfairly removed from office. This is the prevailing doctrine and
should be applied in Campol’s case.
 Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this
amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to
find employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally

68 | P a g e
 dismisses an employee has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had the
illegal act not be done
 We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same right. It is only by imposing
this rule that we will be able to uphold the constitutional right to security of tenure with full force
and effect. Through this, those who possess the power to dismiss employees in the civil service will be
reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority as a breach of an employee's right to security
of tenure will lead to the full application of law and jurisprudence to ensure that the employee is reinstated
and paid complete backwages.
o As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the time he was illegally dismissed until his
reinstatement. In view of his retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such, the back wages
should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his compulsory retirement. In addition, Saunar is
entitled to receive the retirement benefits he should have received if he were not illegally dismissed.
o Petition is GRANTED
o Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar is entitled to full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his retirement
and to receive his retirement benefits.
November 24, 2020
Judicial Review
Administrative Remedies  Judicial Review
REVIEW
 a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction
 act, rule, or decision
 nullified, affirmed, modified
Modes of Judicial Review
 Ordinary court action
 Appeal
 Petition for review
 Petition for writ of certiorari
 Petition for prohibition
 Petition for mandamus
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
 In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. [Lo vs CA, 321 SCRA 190 (1999)]
Exceptions
 Conflicting findings of the administrative agency and the initial fact finding agency
 Findings grounded on speculation, surmises, conjectures
 Inference is mistaken, absurd, impossible
 Grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts
 Findings are contrary to the admissions of parties
 Judgment based on misapprehension of facts
 Fails to notice relevant facts that would warrant a conclusion
 Conflicting findings of facts
 No citation of specific evidence
 Findings based on absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
 If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in
administrative proceedings before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. [Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA, 184 SCRA 426 (1990)]
 General Rule
o Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts.
o Reason
 knowledgeability, experience and expertise acquired by the administrative agencies in their respective
specialized fields
 Exception
o When there is grave abuse of discretion (capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment)
o When the question refers to the validity of the exercise of discretionary power
 Primary jurisdiction claim is originally cognizable in the courts
 Judicial process suspended pending referral of certain issues to the administrative agency
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
 Recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.

69 | P a g e
  Effects
o does not affect the jurisdiction of the court
o will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss
o a defense
 Exceptions
1. When there is violation of due process
2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question [Madrigal vsLecoroz, 191 SCRA 20 (1990), Aquino-Sarmiento
vsMorato, 202 SCRA 515 (1991), Tapalesvs President of UP, 7 SCRA 553 (1963), Ty vstrampe, 250 SCRA 500
(1995), Prudential Bank vsGapultos, 181 SCRA 159 (1990)]
3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
4. [Begosavs Chairman, PVA, 32 SCRA 466 (1970), Azul vs Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50, 62-63 (19690, Brett vs
IAC, 191 SCRA 687 (1990), Continental Marble corpvs NLRC, 161 SCRA 151 (1988)]
5. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned (Vda de Tan vs Veterans Backpay
Commission, 105 Phil 377 (1959)]

6.
When there is irreparable injury [Aquino vsluntok, 184 SCRA 177 (1990), up Board of Regents vsRasul, 200 SCRA
685 (1991)]
7. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the President/Where the rule of qualified political agency applies [Brett vs IAC, 191 SCRA
687 (1990), Kilusang Bayan, et al, vs Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 (1992), Alminevs CA, 177 SCRA 796 (1989)]
8. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies is unreasonable
9. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim [QuisumbingvsGamban, 193 SCRA 520 (1991), Esuertevs CA,
193 SCRA541 (1991)]
10. When the subject matter is a private land in land cases or proceedings
11. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy/When no administrative review is provided
[Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Incvs Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 8 SCRA 794 (1963)]
12. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention [Bueno vs Patanao, 9 SCRA 794
(1963)]
13. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has become moot
14. Failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction/Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
 Non-compliance with either is not jurisdictional.
 The doctrine does not apply where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Rule Rule 43 Rule 45 Rule 65
Appeal by
Mode  Ordinary appeal/Petition for Review Certiorari/Petition for Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition/Mandamus
Review on Certiorari
When filed 15 days 15 days 60 days

Regional Trial Court (RTC), CA, Supreme Court

Where filed Court of Appeals (CA) Supreme Court
(SC)

Questions of fact, law or mixed Questions of law or errors of jurisdiction (grave

Scope Questions of law
questions of fact or law abuse of discretion)

Decisions of the Commission

Elections (COMELEC) and Where an administrative agency or officer does
Excluded  
Commission on Audit (COA) Labor not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power
Cases

There is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and

 
Exhausted all administrative remedies adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
and that a final order or decision has
Conditions been rendered by the administrative
body in the exercise of its quasi-   Exceptions
judicial functions
  1. public welfare and policy

  2. interest of justice

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   3. null and void

  4.  oppressive exercise of judicial authority

Petition for Review
 a mode of appeal from the decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions
 filed with the Court of Appeals
 Section 9 of BP 129
 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
 Appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Petition for Certiorari
 Special civil action seeking to nullify or modify an order or resolution of an administrative body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, which acted without (no authority) or in excess (oversteps) of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
(capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, despotic) amounting to lack of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Mutually exclusive
 The remedies of an ordinary appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. [PRC vs CA, 292
SCRA 155 (1992)]
 Exception
o to prevent irreparable damage and injury
o where there is danger of clear failure of justice
o where an appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment
complained of
Certiorari vs. Appeal
 A petition for certiorari under rule 65 may be treated by the supreme court as an appeal under rule 45 when the interest of
justice so requires, instead of dismissing it on a technicality. [comelec vs ca, 229 scra 178 (1991)]
Petition for Prohibition
 A preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done
 Errors of jurisdiction
Petition for Mandamus
 Proper remedy when there is neglect on the part of a tribunal or officer in the performance of an act, which specifically the
law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right which he is entitled
 Applicant must have a clear legal right to the thing demanded (found or granted by law)
 Unreasonable delay in the performance of the duty, notwithstanding demand to perform it
General Santos City v. Commission on Audit
 Facts:
 Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, An Ordinance Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued
Employees Security (GenSan SERVES)
 Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program.
 "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by
way of early retirement package."
 qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50)
years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of the incentives under the program
 "provides for separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age."
 Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-
IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever
retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.
 eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and one-half (1
1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service in the City Government.9
 Section 6. GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives – Upon availment of early retirement, a qualified employee shall
enjoy the following in addition to the above incentives:
o Cash gift of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the sickly employees;
o Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos City Hospital;
o Annual aid in the maximum amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), if admitted at General Santos City
Hospital; and
o 14 karat gold ring as a token.10
 Commission on Audit’ Regional Office No. XII, Cotabato City, City’s audit team leader, through its supervising auditor, sent
a query on the legality of the ordinance

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  Agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act
 forwarded the matter to Commission’s Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector, for a more authoritative opinion
 Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector
o COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021 on March 25, 2010.
 Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary retirement benefit plan.
 Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, prohibits government agencies
from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time the Government Service
Insurance System charter took effect while those plans already existing when the charter was enacted were
declared abolished.
 The opinion discussed that this prohibition was reiterated in Conte v. Commission on Audit.
 Laraño v. Commission on Audit, on the other hand, ruled that an early retirement program should be by
virtue of a valid reorganization pursuant to law in order to be valid.
 In fine, since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City
Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the absence,
however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary consequence.
o Commission Proper
 letter-reconsideration
 two letters addressed to respondent Commission’s for the reconsideration of COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-
021
 Respondent Commission on Audit treated these letters as an appeal. decision denying the appeal and
affirming COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.
 denied reconsideration

 Case:
o Special Civil Action for Certiorari  grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA for denying the Petitioner
City’s appeal and affirming the Legal Services Sector Opinion making the Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009 illegal.
 Issue:
o Whether or not respondent commission on audit committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered Ordinance
no. 08, series of 2009, in the nature of an early retirement program requiring a law authorizing it for its validity
 Ruling:
o This court has consistently held that findings of administrative agencies are generally respected, unless found
to have been tainted with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion:
o It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
o Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
o It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism. (Veloso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, 656 SCRA 767, 777 [Per J.
Peralta, En Banc], citing Yap v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 154, 174 [Per
J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc]. See also Villanueva v. Commission on Audit, 493 Phil. 887 (2005) [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, En Banc])
o By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. x x x.(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, 530 Phil. 271, 278
[Per J. Puno, En Banc], citing Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 604 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc])
o Yap v. Commission on Audit,33 
 in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to
the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s auditor with respect to disallowing certain
disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely
legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor
of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power
unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.34

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 o Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." Rule 64, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure also provides that "a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided."
o We agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned. We
declare Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.
o The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner city’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series
of 2008, creating change management teams52 as an initial step for its organization development masterplan.
o Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This power is inferred from
Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise
known as the general welfare clause:
o Section 76.Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every local government unit shall design and
implement its own organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into consideration its service requirements
and financial capability, subject to the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission.
o Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
o Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that "any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor or devolution of powers x xx."
o Section 5, paragraph (c) also provides that "the general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the
quality of life for the people in the community." These rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of local
autonomy and the devolution of powers to the local government units.
o Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational structure and staffing pattern" also
implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to
the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level
require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time.
o Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on Audit
 this court declared as valid the ordinance passed by the province granting and releasing hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits to its officials and employees. This court held that Section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 103 requiring the President’s prior approval before the grant of any allowance or
benefit is applicable only to offices under the executive branch. Section 2 does not mention local
government units, thus, the prohibition does not apply to them.
o Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25,
Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991, we declare that the grant and release of
the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were validly
enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan
o Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement incentives provides for benefits that are not computed based on years
of service. They are lump sum amounts and healthcare benefits.
o The purpose of Section 6 is also different from the benefits proscribed in Conte v. Commission on Audit, and the
nature of its benefits must be taken in the context of its rationale. The benefits provided in Section 6 serve its
purpose of inducing petitioner city’s employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early.
Respondent Commission on Audit’s observation that the benefit provided is broader than that provided in Conte v
Commission on Audit fails to take this rationale into consideration. Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan
SERVES were only given to a select few—the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons. Certainly, this negates
the position that the benefits provide for supplementary retirement benefits that augment existing retirement laws.
o Conte v. Commission on Audit
 The purpose behind the proscription found in Section 28, paragraph (b), as amended was to address the
need to prevent the proliferation of inequitous plans.
o x xx Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan
– other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous
proliferation of such plans. x xx. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other

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 government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such
"financial assistance.
o Thus, the cash gift for the sickly employees, lifetime free medical consultation in petitioner city's hospital, and other
similar benefits under Section 6 of the ordinance are valid.
o The proscription under Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, does not apply to
Section 6 of the ordinance.1âwphi1 Consequently, the Commission on Audit acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it declared the entire ordinance void and of no effect.
o WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit decision dated January
20, 2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
Estrellado v. David
 Facts:
o After screening the applicants on January 15, 2004, the LTO-COS-PB recommended to the LTO the appointment of
Hipoilto R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se to the vacant positions of TRO II and AO IV within the LTO Law
Enforcement Service.
o CSC-NCR
 petition to declare the LTO-CO-SPB selection procedure null and void by petitioners Eric N. Estrellado,
TRO 1, and Jossie M. Borja, Records Officer III, who were also applicants for the aforementioned
positions and in their alleged capacities as next-in-rank employees
 alleged, among others, that Hipolito R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se did not meet the requirements for the
positions of TRO II and AO IV.
 referred the petition to the LTO Grievance Committee, which did ‘not find merit in complainants’
grievances’ and dismissed the petition in a Resolution dated August 12, 2004.
o LTO Assistant Secretary
 Petitioners appealed said Resolution
 Order dated September 27, 2004, dismissed the appeal and directed the LTO Grievance Committee to issue
the Certificate of Final Action on Grievance (CFAG), which the latter consequently issued on October 4,
2004.
 appointed Hipolito R. Garboni as TRO II and Roberto S. Se, as AO IV.
o CSC-NCR
 Petitioners re-filed their petition to declare the selection procedure of the LTO-CO-SPB null and void and
to recall the approval of the appointments of Hipolito R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se
 Decision dismissed the petition for lack of merit
 motion for reconsideration denied
 Petitioners re-filed their petition to declare the selection procedure of the LTO-CO-SPB null and void and
to recall the approval of the appointments of Hipolito R. Garboni and Roberto S. Se
 Decision dismissed the petition for lack of merit
 motion for reconsideration denied
o CSC
 Petitioners filed appeal
 dismissed in its Resolution No. 060252 dated February 10, 2006
 Decision dated May 5, 2005 of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR),
Banawe, Quezon City, dismissing their petition to declare null and void the selection procedure conducted
by the LTO-Central Office-Selection and Promotion Board (LTO-COSPB) and to recall the approval of the
appointments of Hipolito R. Gaborni as Transportation Regulation Officer (TRO) II and Roberto S. Se as
Administrative Officer (AO) IV, STANDS
 motion for reconsideration denied in its Resolution No. 060835 dated May 9, 2006
 CSC Resolution No. 06-0252 dated February 10, 2006 dismissing their appeal from the Decision dated
May 5, 2005 of the Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), Banawe, Quezon City,
and affirming the approval of the appointments of Hipolito R. Garborni as Transportation Regulation
Officer (TRO) II and Roberto S. Se, as Administrative Officer (AO) IV, STANDS
o CA
 Petition for review
 that the CSC had erred in sustaining the validity of the selection procedure undertaken by the Land
Transportation Office’s Promotion and Selection Board (LTO-PSB) resulting in the validation of the
appointments of Hipolito R. Gaborni and Roberto S. Se as Transportation Regulation Officer II (TROII)
and Administrative Officer IV (AOIV), respectively
 affirmed CSC Resolution No. 06-0252 dated February 10, 2006 and CSC Resolution No. 06-0835 dated
May 9, 2006, both issued by the CSC, thereby upholding the promotional appointments of respondents
Hipolito R. Gaborni and Roberto S. Se.
 Issue:

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 o Whether or not CA erred and committed serious errors in judgment
o Whether or not in holding that a screening of contending applicants was conducted, when in truth and in fact
screening pre-supposes conduct of examination and interview of applicants
o Whether or not when it held that the appointments of se and Gaborni did not violate the rule on the composition of
PSB and the rule on MPP-SRP
o Whether or not when it failed to consider that the appointments were made one-year after its publication
o Whether or not when it ruled that it cannot pass upon judgement on this issue where according to the CA this factual
issue was not raised in the proceedings before the CSC
 Ruling:
o A reading of CSC MC No. 3, Series of 2001, shows that screening requires no interviews and examinations.
o The screening process is that which each department or agency formulates and administers in accordance with the
law, rules, regulations, and standards set by the CSC. If neither the law nor the implementing rules and regulations
define in specific terms or criteria the particulars of the screening process, then each agency or department is
empowered to formulate its own screening processes subject to the standards and guidelines set by the CSC.
o The CA thus correctly concluded that the appointing authority exercised the right of choice, freely exercising its best
judgment, in determining the best-qualified applicants from those who had the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities.
o The CSC-NCR properly applied the 1990 and 2000 MPP-SRP of the LTO despite the subsequent issuance of CSC
MC No. 3, Series of 2001. The petitioners cannot successfully assail the application of the previous MPPSRP on the
ground that there was no exception established therein. The last sentence of Section 21, supra – All subsequent
amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval by the Civil Service Commission - reveals the contrary.
The phrase All subsequent amendments obviously referred to the new MPPs submitted by the departments and
agencies to the CSC for its approval. What is plainly envisioned is the situation in which the departments and
agencies of the Government that had not submitted and secured the approval of their new MPPs could still apply
their existing MPPs in the interim.
o The CSC’s approval of the LTO’s PSB was not required because CSC MC No. 3, Series of 2001, did not demand
such approval. CSC MC No. 3, Series of 2001, only provided in item 6(a), (b), (c) and (d) for the PSB’s composition
without mentioning any requirement for prior approval.
o CSC MC No. 3, Series of 2001
 The publication of a particular vacant position shall be valid until filled up but not to extend beyond six (6)
months reckoned from the date of the vacant position was published
o It is axiomatic that facts or issues not raised at the administrative level cannot be review for the first time by the
court. The reason for this is clear:
o To allow a litigant to assume a different posture when he comes before the court and challenge the position he had
accepted at the administrative level would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court – which is supposed to
review administrative determinations – would not review but determine and decide for the first time a question not
raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the same reason that underlies the requirement of
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior opportunity to decide
controversies within its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the
lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
o Three-salary grade limitation (CSC Resolution No. 03-0106 dated January 24, 2003)
 Any or all of the following would constitute as a meritorious case, excepted from the 3-salary grade
limitation on promotion and transfer:
 5. The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the candidates’
superior qualifications in regard to:
 Educational achievements
 Highly specialized trainings
 Relevant work experience
 Consistent high performance rating/ranking
o The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to the position aspired for, and
the applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and selection process as determined and conducted by a
department or agency, subject only to the standards and guidelines set by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). This
is in keeping with the ideal of promoting through merit rather than entitlement, and thus ensuring that government
service is rewarded with the best fit.
o Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari
o AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2008
o ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Landbank v. Dalauta
 Facts:

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 o Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City,
with an area of 25.2160 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1624.
o The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as reflected in the Notice of Coverage, dated January 17, 1994,
which Dalauta received on February 7, 1994.
o Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta
rejected such valuation for being too low.
o DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Butuan City
 A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate just compensation for
the subject property.
 In its Resolution, dated December 4, 1995, the PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP in the amount
of ₱192,782.59.
o RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC)
 Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation
 alleged that LBP's valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation of lands covered
by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme.
 Board of Commissioners (Commissioners) recommended that the value of the land be pegged at
₱100,000.00 per hectare.
 With both Dalauta and the DAR objecting to the recommended valuation, the SAC allowed the parties to
adduce evidence to support their respective claims.
o RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC)Decision
 DAR and LBP are directed to pay to:
 Land Owner Mr. Eugenio Dalauta the following:
 Two Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Seven (₱2,639,557.oo)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, as value of the Land;
 One Hundred Thousand (₱100,ooo.oo) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the farmhouse;
 One Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱150,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as reasonable attorney's
fees;
 Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency as litigation expenses;
 The Members of the Board of Commissioners:
 Ten Thousand (P10,ooo.oo) Pesos, Philippine Currency for the Chairman of the Board;
 Seven Thousand Five Hundred (₱7,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency for each of the two (2)
members of the Board;
 LBP filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied
 LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA
1. that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP
valuation had long attained finality;
2. that the SAC erred in taking judicial notice of the Commissioners' Report without conducting a
hearing
3. that the SAC violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing
the just compensation
o The CA Ruling
o The SAC correctly took cognizance of the case, citing LBP v. Wycoco and LBP v. Suntay
o The SAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.
o The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions.
o WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED, and the
assailed Decision dated May 30, 2006 of the RTC, Branch 5, Butuan City, in Civil Case No. 4972, is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: 
o the compensation for the farmhouse (₱100,000.00), as well as the awards for attorney's fees (₱150,000.00)
and litigation expenses (₱50,000.00), are hereby DELETED;
o the members of the Board of Commissioners shall each be paid a commissioner's fee of Three Thousand
Pesos (₱3,000.00) by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines.
o The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respect.
o sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules and
regulations, and in accordance with settled jurisprudence

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 o stated that the courts were not at liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement Section 1
7 of R.A. No. 6657
o disagreed with the SAC's valuation of the farmhouse, which was made of wood and galvanized iron, for it
was inexistent during the taking of the subject land
o disallowed the awards of attorney's fees and litigation expenses for failure of the SAC to state its factual
and legal basis
o sustained the award of Commissioner’s fees with modification to conform with Section 15, Rule 14120 of
the Rules of Court. Considering that the Commissioners worked for a total of fifteen (15) days, the CA
ruled that they were only entitled to a fee of ₱3,000.00 each or a total of ₱9,000.00
 Case:
o Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to review, reverse and set aside the September 18, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01222-MIN, modifying the May 30,
2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Butuan City (RTC), sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
in Civil Case No. 4972 - an action for determination of just compensation
 Issue:
o Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD
Resolution.
o Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject property.
 Ruling:
o Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. The courts, as well as administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions, have their respective jurisdiction as may be granted by law. In connection with
the courts' jurisdiction vis-a-vis jurisdiction of administrative bodies, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction takes into
play.
o The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
o In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB which reads:
o SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). (R.A. No. 6657)
o Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 also vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
o The SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.
o SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act. (R.A. No. 6657)
o Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. V da. De Arieta
o In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an
account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner
disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But
as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP's valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as
an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that
should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated
in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations
o While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the
determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be
placed in limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles such conundrum. Considering that the payment of just
compensation is an obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received
the notice of coverage. The Constitution itself provides for the payment of just compensation in eminent domain
cases. 
o Under Article 1144, such actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.
o Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

77 | P a g e
  Upon a written contract;
 Upon an obligation created by law;
 Upon a judgment. (n)
o In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994.
o He then filed a petition for determination of just compensation on February 28, 2000.
o Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
o Just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-
LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003)). 
o WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DECLARES 
o that the final determination of just compensation is a judicial function
o that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is original and exclusive, not
appellate
o that the action to file judicial determination of just compensation shall be ten (10) years from the time of the taking
o that at the time of the filing of judicial determination, there should be no pending administrative action for the
determination of just compensation
Montoya v. PNP
 Facts:
o Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in
Quezon City
o National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 on 9 September 1998 dropping him
from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course
(LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp BagongDiwa, Taguig
City.
o Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March
1998.
o 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR)
o on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by
the station commander.
o due to the fact that his name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved
o his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off
symptoms of severe body pain
o attached to his Motion a certification simply dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.
o Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director issued on 11
June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044.
o Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings
of his administrative liability.
o The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted from his leave
credits.
o The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent
(P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the
NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision4 on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the police service for
Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20
July 2000.
o Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion
for Reconsideration5 of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP
Chief.
 denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from service
imposed by a PNP regional director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
o RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR)
 Montoya filed on 2 September 2002 an APPEAL of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director
 lack of due process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing
Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense.
 The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his
dismissal from police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into his side
of the controversy.
 Decision granting Montoya’s appeal and ordering his reinstatement

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  The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt. Francisco Don Montenegro, conducted the hearing ex-parte
on the basis only of the Motion for Reconsideration
o Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
 APPEAL by the NCR Regional Director
 assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in the police service on the following
grounds:
 Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the Appellate Board, as
provided by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007
 The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the decision of the NCRPO
dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and executory
 The Board erred in giving backwages despite the "no work, no pay" policy
 Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director.
o Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
 DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director
 beyond the 15-day reglementary period for appeals.
 Neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision to the
DILG.
 the filing of an appeal by "either party" under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 covers only demotion
and dismissal from the service and never exoneration and suspension.
 the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
for the reason that the said decision had already become final and executory.
o Civil Service Commission (CSC)
 The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003 of DILG
Secretary Lina
 Resolution No. 05-1200 which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the
decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG
 set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR
Regional Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service
 Montoya, in particular, was guilty of laches and abandonment of his position.
 the 11 December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoya’s case, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina,
was based on mere affidavits which were not substantiated.
 denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al
o Court of Appeals (Montoya)
 Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction filed by Montoya
 Decision dismissing the Petition
 there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No.
06-1500.
 Motion for Reconsideration denied
 Case:
o Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the
Decision and Resolution  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-
1200 and No. 06-1500, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner Police Officer 2
(PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service
 Issue:
o Whether or not respondent manere failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
o Whether or not manere has the legal personality to appeal the decision exonerating the petitioner.
o Whether or not the right to due process of petitioner was violated.
o Whether or not petitioner delayed in appealing the decision summarily dismissing him.
o Whether or not petitioner deserved to be dismissed from service.
 Ruling:
o Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable to
administrative proceedings.
o Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
o Due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following:

79 | P a g e
 o the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights;
o a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
o a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
o a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
o Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural
requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice
to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
o The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their
jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial
administrative bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process is unqualified by what type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he stands to lose
the same.
o Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990, provides:
 SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP
shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director or by
the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate
Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to
the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the
Regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate Board to act
on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however,
to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
o As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory. 
o A void judgment does not become final and executory and may be challenged at any time.
o A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body) without jurisdiction is null and void;
hence, it can never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or
collaterally. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due process may be regarded as a
"lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."
o Dacoycoy (29 April 1999)
 Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling,
which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. B
 In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes
v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.
o National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,26 citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,27 
 Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that the law allows
appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of
demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the services is the proper
penalty.
 However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent.
o While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision exonerating respondent public officer or
employee from administrative charges, it was Mamauag which specifically required that the government party

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 appealing must be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the
administrative case.
o The pronouncement in Mamauag, that the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the public officer or
employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director.
o Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
 It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to
a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active
combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and
the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. When a judge actively participates
in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial instead.
 The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG
Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges against him and reinstating him to the
service is the PNP as a bureau.
o Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The administrative agency
concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum
o Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is misplaced, for said doctrine does not
find application in the instant case. The doctrine intends to preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial
administrative body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case. Montoya is questioning the supposed
premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the decision of the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to
the Office of the President; obviously, he is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another.
o Furthermore, Montoya’s assertion that DILG Secretary Lina’s decision should have first been appealed to the Office
of the President before the CSC is baseless.
o PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the DILG, which, in turn, is under the
administrative control and supervision of the CSC.
o In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,
 the Court settled that the one and only Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be civilian in character and,
consequently, falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
states:
o Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
o It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that the decision of the Regional Director
imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service is appealable to
the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the DILG Secretary.
o In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, his decision may be appealed to the CSC.
 SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. – The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department [DILG].
o Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law also applies to
administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47
of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of
the PNP) is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department (i.e., DILG)
and finally to the Commission (i.e., CSC).
o WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
o The Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 96022 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
o The Philippine National Police is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police service
without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective
from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.
Cabungcal v. Lorenzo
 Facts:
o Petitioners sought to prohibit respondents from implementing the reorganization of the municipal government of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 s. 2001 of the Sangguniang Bayan. They likewise prayed
for the nullification of said Resolutions.
o Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:
o The assailed acts of respondents are clearly authorized under Section 76 of the Local Government Code of 1991 as
quoted above.

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 o Motion for reconsideration denied
 Issue:
o Whether or not petitioners’ automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper.
o Whether or not the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
 Ruling:
o As a rule, judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. This principle goes
hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance,
controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Courts recognize that administrative agencies
are better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific field of expertise because of their special skills and
technical knowledge. For this reason, a premature invocation of the court’s judicial power is often struck down,
unless it can be shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.
o Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija Resolution No. 27 s. 2001 declaring the reorganization of all offices
of the municipal government
o Resolution was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan via Resolution No. 154 s. 2001.
o Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 80 s. 2001, approving and adopting the proposed new staffing pattern of
the municipal government
o Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the same through Resolution No. 299 s. 2001.
o Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, herein respondent Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a memorandum informing
all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant
and that all employees must file their respective applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved
staffing pattern on or before January 10, 2002. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly created
positions.
o Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, on January 17, 2002, filed with the CA a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order. They alleged that they were permanent employees of the Rural Health Unit of the Municipality of San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, with the corresponding salary grade and date of employment
o Petitioners’ recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not with the Court of Appeals
o Section 2 (1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution provide that:
 Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
 Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate
all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual
report on its personnel programs.
o Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, states that:
 Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to
it.
o Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
o Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction
over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
o The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to
give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort
to the courts.18 This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions,19 viz:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

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 10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
o The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus and
prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be
availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the
ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief
o The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus and
prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be
availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the
ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief
o Petition is DENIED. The March 20, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition and its October
6, 2003 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED but on the ground that petitioners failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them.

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