Attitudes Toward Pay Differentials: Comparing the US to Other Nations

"Fair" Inequality?
Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative

Perspective
Author(s): Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding
Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 2006), pp. 450-473
Published by: American Sociological Association
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"Fair"Inequality?AttitudestowardPay
Differentials:The United Statesin
ComparativePerspective
Lars Osberg TimothySmeeding
Dalhousie University SyracuseUniversity
Are American attitudes towardeconomic inequality diferent from those in other countries?
One traditionin sociology suggests American "exceptionalism,"while another arguesfor
convergence across nations in social norms, such as attitudes toward inequality.This
article uses International Social SurveyProgram (ISSP) microdata to compare attitudes in
differentcountries toward what individuals in specific occupations "do earn " and what
they "shouldearn,"and to distinguish value preferencesfor more egalitarian outcomes
from other confounding attitudes and perceptions. The authors suggest a methodfor
summarizingindividualpreferencesfor the leveling of earnings and use kernel density
estimates to describe and compare the distributionof individualpreferences over time and
cross-nationally. Theyfind that subjective estimates of inequality in pay diverge
substantiallyfrom actual data, and that althoughAmericans do not, on the average, have
differentpreferencesfor aggregate (in)equality,there is evidencefor:
1. Less awareness concerning the extent of inequalityat the top of the income distributionin
America
2. More polarizationin attitudesamongAmericans
3. Similarpreferencesfor "levelingdown" at the top of the earnings distributionin the United
States, but also
4. Less concernfor reducingdifferentialsat the bottomof the distribution.
Are American attitudes toward economic alized nations, and that federal and state gov-
inequality different from those found else- ernments in the U.S. do less to reduce the
where, and if so, in what ways? It is widely rec- inequalityof economic outcomes than do the
ognized that economic inequality in the United governmentsof other countries.' One hypoth-
States is greater than in other affluent industri- esis is that this is what Americanswant - that
Americans have different attitudes toward
inequalityandredistribution thando the citizens
Directcorrespondenceto LarsOsberg,Department of other countries, and that government
of Economics,DalhousieUniversity,6214 University
(in)actionthereforereflects the preferencesof
Avenue, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada (Lars.
Osberg@dal.ca). Supported by the Russell Sage the electorate.2 However, Kelley and Evans
Foundation.The authorsthank the ASR editor and (1993), Kerr (1983), Kluegel, Mason, and
anonymousrefereesfor theircomments.Participants
at the Russell Sage Workshopson InequalityMarch
21, 2003 and May 21, 2004; the seminars at Yale, 1 For a detailed discussion see Osberg,
Harvard,and SyracuseUniversities;andChristopher Smeeding, and Schwabish (2004), Smeeding
Jencks,StephenJenkins,Leslie McCall,JohnMyles, (2005), and the referencestherein.Firster and
Shelley Phipps,Jeff Racine, and JohnRoemerhave d'Ercole (2005) provide recent international
notablyimprovedthe article.The authorsalso thank comparisonsof inequality.
Kim Desmond, Lihui Zhang, ZhouranZhou, Laura 2 In the economics literature, Alesina and
Turner,KimTran,AndreaJohnson,Nan Geng, Mary Angeletos(2005),Alesina,DiTella,andMacCulloch
Santy, Kati Foley, and Lynn Lethbridge for their (2001),AlesinaandLaFerrara (2001),Benabouand
excellent work with the dataand manuscript. Tirole(forthcoming),Glaeser(2005), and Piketty
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW,
2006, VOL.71 (JUme:45o-473)

ATTITUDESTOWARD ECONOMICINEQUALITY 451
Wegener (1995a), and Wilensky (2002) are lic opinion,we find littleevidenceforAmerican
among those who have arguedthe alternative exceptionalismin averageattitudes.
hypothesis:thatAmericansarenot particularly However,"inequality"can be interpretedin
different from the citizens of other affluent terms of income ratios or income shares.
industrializednations in social preferencesfor Individuals' value-based attitudes toward
economic equity and the reductionof econom- inequality (i.e., how much inequality respon-
ic inequality.If so, then the explanationfor dif- dents think would be "fair") also are condi-
ferences in economic, social, and policy tioned on theirpersonalcognitive estimates of
outcomes may perhapsbe found in American the extentof inequality(i.e., how muchinequal-
attitudestowardgovernmentas an agentof dis- ity individualsbelieve actuallyexists).This arti-
tributionalchange or in differencesin the insti- cle begins, therefore, by discussing the
tutionalstructureof Americanpolitics. But the conceptualizationof "inequality."It arguesthat
prior question is whether, or how, American the batteryof ISSP questions on what individ-
attitudestowardeconomicinequalitydifferfrom uals in specific occupations"doearn"andwhat
attitudeselsewhere. they "shouldearn"offer a particularlyfocused
An internationalcomparison of American way of distinguishingbetweenindividualvalue
attitudes toward economic inequality faces, preferencesfor more egalitarianoutcomes and
however,three importantchallenges: other confounding attitudes and perceptions.
Averageattitudestowardaggregateinequality,
1. Distinguishing attitudestowardinequality of eco-
nomicoutcomesfrombeliefsaboutprocessequi- as summarizedby the Gini index of "should
ty orinequalityof opportunity earn"inequality from the ISSP data, indicate
2. Clarifying whatrespondents mayunderstand the that the United States is not particularlydiffer-
meaningof "economicinequality" to be ent from other nations. To find differences
3. Summarizing thedistributionof attitudestoward between the United States and othernations in
economicinequalityin thepopulation. attitudes toward inequality of pay one must
Historically,discussionof"Americanexcep- therefore probe deeper and examine both atti-
tionalism"(e.g. Lipset, 1996) often has empha- tudes toward inequalityin differentpartsof the
sized a presumed American belief in the income distributionand the range of individu-
ideology of mobility and opportunity,a refrain als' attitudes toward inequality.
thatrecentlyhas been reiteratedby a numberof Because a seemingly simple summaryterm
such as "inequality"melds togetherperceptions
authorsin economics(e.g., BenabouandTirole,
of income differencesbetween the top and the
forthcoming).This article startsby reviewing
middle of the income distribution, attitudes
brieflysome of the sociology literatureon these
towardthe gap betweenthe middle classes and
topics and by examining simple summarysta-
the poor, andpreferencesfor a generalleveling
tistics on Americanattitudestowardinequality
of pay, this article disaggregates inequality
of outcomes and the evidence for a presumed
across the distribution. It examines average
greaterAmerican belief in the prevalence of
nationalperceptionsof the maximumandmin-
equalityof opportunity.Using the International
imum thatpeople "shouldearn"and "do earn"
Social SurveyProgram(ISSP)3surveysof pub-
andfinds some evidencethatAmericanrespon-
(1995)havediscussed possibledifferencesinattitudes dents are, on average, particularly likely to
towardinequalityin the UnitedStates,oftenin the underestimatethe extent of top-end inequality.
contextof presumeddifferencesin attitudestoward Furthermore,people disagree-sometimes
economicmobility. Thisliterature
typicallymakesno quitevehemently-about inequality.The ongo-
referenceto theInternational SocialJusticeProject ing political debateson inequalitywithin coun-
orothersociologicalresearchthatdirectlyexamines triesprovidedirectevidenceof heterogeneityin
attitudes. Forexample,KelleyandEvans(1993)and
attitudes toward inequality. However, these
Kluegelet al. (1995b)cannotbe foundin thebibli-
ographyof anyof theaforementioned papers. internaldisagreementsareobscuredwhen inter-
3 Since 1983 the InternationalSocial Survey national comparisonsrely on averageor medi-
Program (ISSP)hascoordinated thedesignof cross- an scores to summarize cross-national
nationalsurveyscoveringa varietyof socialscience differences.This article thereforeuses kernel
topics.Fulldetailsareavailableathttp://www.gesis. densitymethodsto describegraphicallythe dis-
org/en/data_service/issp/. tributionof individualpreferencesfor equality

452 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
in differentcountries,andshows thatan impor- hasproducedsignificantsocialistor social dem-

tant difference between the United States and ocratic parties that have had the reductionof
other countries is the bimodal distributionof socioeconomicinequalitiesas theirmajorobjec-
Americanpreferencesfor leveling. tive. Why has the United Statesbeen different?
Although it is hard to find supportfor the Authors such as Lipset (1996) and, earlier,
hypothesis of systematically different prefer- Lipset and Bendix (1959) have arguedthatthe
ences, on the average,for aggregate(in)equal- differencelies in distinctivelyAmericanbeliefs
ity in the United States,there is evidence for about,andthe realityof, greatersocioeconom-
1. Greater underestimationof the size of top-end ic mobility.Belief in the promiseof futuresuc-
incomedifferencesin theUnitedStates cess, eitherfor oneself or one's children,is said
2. Morepolarization in attitudesamongAmericans to dominateanydiscontentwithpresentinequal-
(whichis consistent
withrecentUnitedStates'vot- ities, to a uniquely American degree. Many
ingbehaviorandopinionpolling) political scientists concur (e.g., Iversen and
3. Similarpreferencesfor "levelingdown"at the Soskice, 2005), and Esping-Andersen(1990)
topof theearningsdistribution
(asin othercoun- has documentedthe enduringdifferencesin the
tries),but welfare state regimes of advanced capitalist
4. Lessconcernfor "levelingup"at the bottomof nations.
thedistributionthanin othernations.
However,the United States is not alone in
These findings areconsistentwithAmerican thinking of itself as "a special case."
trendsin political and social polarization,and Comparativehistorianshave noted thatnation-
may have significant practical implications. al myths,in essentiallyeverycountry,arealmost
Glaeser,Ponzetto,and Shapiro(2004) are rep- alwaysbasedon some presumptionof "unique-
resentativeof a recentpolitical economy liter- ness," and they also have noted that presumed
aturewhich arguesthat "strategicextremism" nationalvirtues may bear little relationto sta-
by political actors (who must compete both in tistical evidence.4A functionalistperspective
effectivemobilizationof theirown base of sup- (e.g. Parsons, 1960) would arguethatthere are
port and in attractingsupportfrom their oppo- strongreasonsto expect that affluentcapitalist
nents) may produce polarization in policy societies will have fundamentallysimilar atti-
positionsandattitudes.Althoughthe samemedi- tudes towardauthority,inheritedprivilege, and
an or average attitudinalscore could be pro- economic inequality,given the common struc-
duced in a society with a tightly compacted tural imperativesof a marketeconomy and a
unimodaldistributionof attitudes,or one with democraticpolity,togetherwith commonpres-
a polarizedor bimodaldistributionof attitudes, sures from technological change, increasing
political dynamicsare likely to be quite differ- trade,andthe globalizationof economicandcul-
ent in these two situations.Majorityrule in a tural life. Inkeles (1998), Kerr (1983), and
bimodal society means that the polity will be Wilensky (2002) have arguedfrom the sociol-
governed by whatever extreme can (perhaps ogy side thatthere is a convergenceof welfare
temporarily)tempt the medianvoter to its side states, includingattitudesand values.
(Iversenand Soskice, 2005). The articlethere- Furthermore,thereis generalagreementthat
fore closes with a discussionof the implications the United States is not, in fact, a particularly
of a change in distributionof attitudesfor eco- mobile society. Sociologists have a long histo-
nomic inequalityin the United States. ry of comparativestudies investigatingsocial
class and occupational mobility (e.g., Breen
EXCEPTIONALISMOR CONVERGENCE and Jonsson 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe
IN ATTITUDESTOWARD INEQUALITY? 1985, 1992, 2002; Grusky and Hauser, 1984)
which conclude that whetherincome or occu-
The intellectualbackgroundforthis articleis the
long-standing debate about the "exceptional-
ism" of the United States as compared with 4See,forexample,
thereviewessayson"American
otheraffluent,capitalistcountries.Popularand Exceptionalism"
inwhichNelles(1997),Koschmann
scholarly writers have, for at least 125 years, (1997)andNolan(1997)compare Lipset'sclaimsfor
wondered why the political process in every AmericanexceptionalismwithCanadian, Japanese,
affluentcapitalistnationexcepttheUnitedStates andGermanassertionsof culturaluniqueness.

pationare used as an index of social status,the tries either "agree" or "strongly agree" with
United Statesis not an exceptionallyfluid soci- this statement (there was particularlystrong
ety, as compared with other nations (see agreement in the transitioneconomies of the
Bjdrklundand Jiintti2000, for both economic formerSovietBloc). Althoughthe UnitedStates
and sociological perspectives).As Janttiet al. had a higher percentage that "strongly dis-
(2005:2) have recently concluded, "the socio- agreed"with the statementthan in most other
logical approaches,such as thatbased on class nations,this representedonly 3.2 percentof the
mobility,suggest thatthe United States is fair- respondents.Indeed,in all countries,there are
ly unexceptional(EriksonandGoldthorpe1992, extremelyfew people who "stronglydisagree"
2002). The economics literature,based on cor- with this statement.One message of Table 1 is,
relationor regressioncoefficients, suggeststhat therefore,the ubiquityof a generalizedprefer-
the United States may, indeed,be exceptional, ence for "greaterequality."Although respon-
not in having moremobility,but in having less dents in some countries are notably more
(Solon 2002), a finding that our results with emphatic in saying they "stronglyagree" that
respect to intergenerationalearnings mobility income differences are too large (e.g., France
support."Miles Corak(2004:9) similarlycon- with 60.3 percent), several countries had less
cludedthat"theUnitedStatesandBritainappear emphatic preferences for equality than the
to standout as the least mobile societies among United States (25 percent ), for example,
those rich countries under study. The Nordic Australia(17.8 percent)and Germany(20.5 ).5
countries and Canada seem to be the most Do the datasupporta distinctionbetweenan
mobile societies.Germanyresemblesthe United "old Europe"(which may emphasize greater
States and the United Kingdom more closely equalizationof outcomes because of a greater
thanit does the othercountries."Finally,Entorf belief thatthereis inequalityof opportunity)and
and Minoiu (2004), Eriksonet al. (2005), and a "newAmerica"(whichmaybelievethatequal-
Woessmann(2004) have examined education- ity of opportunityexists, so equalizationof out-
al opportunitiesfor childrenfromdifferentfam- comes is less imperative)?Whenrespondentsin
ily backgroundsin westernEuropeancountries, differentcountrieswere asked what character-
the United Kingdom, and the United States. istics werenecessaryto "getaheadin life,"their
Woessman(2004:22)concludedthat"theresults perceptions of "equality of opportunity"can
of this paperaregenerallyin line with the broad perhaps be gauged partly by whether they
patternof the existing cross-countryevidence thought"knowingthe rightpeople"was impor-
on intergenerationalearnings mobility, which tant.Codedresponsesrangedfrom 1 (essential)
found that the United States and the United to 5 (not importantat all). On this item, the
Kingdomappearto be relativelyimmobilesoci- United States' 1999 score (2.58) was at the
eties." "fairly necessary" end of the spectrum.
All this evidence on actual comparisonsof "Knowing the right people" was seen in the
intergenerationalsocioeconomicmobility does United States as slightly less essential than in
not precludethe possibilitythatbeliefs in future Canada (2.55), similar to the view in the
mobility might preempt discontent with cur- Philippines(2.58), but consideredto be slight-
rentinequality,althoughit might seem to make ly more essential than in France (2.62) or the
it less likely. But the crucial prior question is
United Kingdom (2.65). American attitudes
whetheror not Americansactuallydiffer from
averaged2.65 in 1992 and 2.61 in 1987. That
other nationalities in their attitudes toward
is, "knowingthe rightpeople" became seen as
inequality.
even more "essential" over this period.
A seemingly straightforward way to find out
Interestingly,in their subjectiveperceptionof
whetherpeople in differentcountrieshave dif-
greater barriers to mobility than in Western
ferent attitudestowardeconomic inequalityis
Europe,Americanrespondentswere in agree-
to askthemdirectly.Table1 reportsthe respons-
mentwith recentliteratureon intergenerational
es in 27 countriesto the ISSP 1999 surveymod-
ule on Social Inequalitywhen individualswere
askedthe seemingly simple question:"In(your 5 The 1992and 1987 ISSPsurveyscoverfewer
country),are income differencestoo large?"It countries,
butwiththesameconclusion.SeeOsberg
is noteworthythat clear majoritiesin all coun- andSmeeding(2006).

454 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Table 1. Attitudesto Inequality:Are IncomeDifferencesTooLarge?(1999)
Strongly NeitherAgree Strongly

Country Agree Agree Nor Disagree Disagree Disagree Total
Bulgaria 84.0 12.8 1.4 .8 1.0 100
Portugal 82.3 13.8 1.7 1.4 .9 100
Russia 79.5 16.0 2.2 1.2 1.1 100
Slovakia 73.9 19.8 4.6 1.2 .6 100
Hungary 67.2 25.9 3.5 3.1 .4 100
CzechRepublic 60.3 27.5 6.0 4.2 2.1 100
France 60.3 27.2 7.4 4.5 .7 100
Latvia 57.2 39.5 1.8 1.3 .2 100
Israel 53.9 36.0 3.9 5.5 .8 100
Slovenia 49.7 41.3 4.8 3.6 .6 100
Poland 46.8 42.3 6.2 3.9 .8 100
GermanyEast 45.0 48.6 4.4 2.0 - 100
Chile 42.8 49.4 3.4 4.4 .1 100
Austria 40.4 45.8 9.1 4.7 - 100
Japan 38.6 30.5 18.3 7.5 5.0 100
Spain 35.9 53.4 7.4 3.1 .3 100
GreatBritain 31.7 50.6 11.6 5.4 .6 100
New Zealand 29.4 43.8 13.5 11.8 1.6 100
Sweden 29.2 41.9 18.1 8.4 2.4 100
Canada 28.1 42.5 15.7 11.2 2.6 100
UnitedStates 25.0 41.2 21.5 9.2 3.2 100
Norway 22.4 50.1 13.8 12.0 1.8 100
Philippines 22.3 43.1 16.9 14.6 3.3 100
GermanyWest 20.5 55.2 14.3 9.1 .9 100
Australia 17.8 53.1 17.1 11.6 .4 100
NorthIreland 17.4 52.1 21.4 8.4 .7 100
Cyprus 12.2 53.4 21.8 12.5 .1 100
Source:ISSP 1999
income mobility (see references in Section 1 ferences in income are necessary for [R coun-
earlier).6 try's]prosperity." A cell value such as 2.5 on the
Table 2 also probes rationalizations for "benefitsthe rich"questioncan be readas say-
inequality. Columns 2 and 3 report the popula- ing that,on the average,a country'spopulation
tion average responses on a scale ranging from is aboutevenly split between"agree"and "nei-
1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) for ther agree nor disagree."This particularques-
respondents' evaluation of statements such as tion is a fairlystronglywordeditemthatmaytap
"inequality continues to exist because it bene- into latent class antagonisms,particularlythe
fits the rich and the powerful" and "large dif- perceptionof capitalismas a rigged game and
"unfairness"as the underlyingexplanationfor
inequality.Apparently,many people buy this
6 Inresponsesto an item in the 1992and 1987 ISSP idea, at least somewhat,in all the countriessur-
asking whether "having well-educated parents"is veyed. For 1999, the average responses of
importantfor getting aheadin life, the averagescore Americans (2.64) are bracketed by those of
in the United States(2.72, 2.76) and Italy(2.78, 2.8) Hungarians(2.58) and Filipinos (2.67).7
were similarlysituatedin the rangebetween 2 (very
important)and 3 (fairlyimportant),ascribingsome-
whatmore importanceto well-educatedparentsthan
in Germany(2.99, 2.8) or Austria (2.95, 2.69). In 7The1999U.S.surveyis anoutlier,takennearthe
1992, Canadiansaveraged2.97 on this item, where- peakof thestockmarketandinformation technolo-
as Swedes averaged3.16 and Norwegiansaveraged gy bubblesandat a timewhenunemployment was
3.48 (i.e., significantlycloserto "notvery important" at its lowestlevelfora generation.
Thecomparable
[4]). This item was not asked in 1999. 1992valuefortheUnitedStates"benefitstherich"

Table2. OpinionsaboutInequality(1999)
Knowingthe rightpeople- Inequalitycontinuesto exist Largeincomedifferences
how importantis thatfor becauseit benefitsthe rich arenecessaryfor a
gettingaheadin life?a andpowerful.b a country'sprosperity.b
Cyprus 1.90 2.56 3.87
Slovakia 2.01 2.20 4.18
Poland 2.06 2.09 3.35
Austria 2.09 2.21 3.76
Bulgaria 2.16 2.01 4.12
Israel 2.18 2.40 3.34
GermanyEast 2.19 1.98 3.49
Russia 2.22 1.93 4.05
Spain 2.27 2.09 3.33
Slovenia 2.32 2.13 3.61
Latvia 2.34 2.03 3.76
Chile 2.41 2.12 2.91
GermanyWest 2.41 2.23 3.22
Portugal 2.41 1.83 3.59
Sweden 2.45 2.42 3.41
CzechRepublic 2.46 2.36 3.70
Canada 2.55 2.38 3.65
Philippines 2.58 2.67 2.62
UnitedStates 2.58 2.64 3.19
France 2.62 1.91 3.74
GreatBritain 2.65 2.42 3.48
Hungary 2.67 2.58 3.93
Australia 2.73 2.35 3.33
New Zealand 2.77 2.45 3.54
NorthIreland 2.80 2.50 3.45
Norway 2.83 2.29 3.50
Japan 3.21 2.08 3.30
Source:The International Social SurveyProgramme.
a Codedas: 1 (essential)to 5 (not importantat all).
b Codedas 1 (stronglyagree)to 5 (stronglydisagree).
Objectively,as Burtless and Jencks (2003) try's]prosperity."An averageresponse such as

and Osberg,Smeeding, and Schwabish(2004) 3.19 can be read as equivalent to about one
noted, there is no good evidence that more fifth of Americans being on the "disagree" end
inequality produces more of any good thing, of the range between "neither agree nor dis-
especially economic and social prosperity.
agree" (3) and "disagree" (4). It is notable that
However,political trends depend on the sub-
jective assessmentsby citizens of the rationale in 1999 the differences between the United
for inequality. Presumably, even if greater States (3.19) and West Germany (3.22) were
inequality is undesirablein itself, one might minimal.8(In both the United States and the
acceptit as a "necessaryevil,"a pricethatmust United Kingdom there was a noticeable trend
be paid if society as a whole desires prosperi- over time toward greater percentages of the
ty. Do the citizens of moderncapitalistnations, population disagreeing with this "instrumen-
on the average, buy into this rationale for
tal" rationalefor inequality.)
inequality?Column 3 of Table2 reportsaver-
age responsesto the item proposingthat"large
differencesin incomearenecessaryfor [R coun- 8 With relatively large sample sizes, country dif-
ferences in means generallypass a test of statistical
significance, even if the empiricaldifference is not
item was 2.51. It remainsto be seen whether 1999 is large (i.e., one often can be statistically sure of a
a blip or a true structuralbreak. socially insignificantdifference).

456 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
As Osberg and Smeeding (2006) have doc- Some people may have an idea of minimum
umentedin greaterdetail, the ISSP asks about adequacyin ajust society,thatis, a lowerbound
attitudestowardsocial inequalityin a number (Y*min) on incomes, or what Smith
of overlappingways. The key point is that the (1776[1961]:339) referredto as "those things
United States is not a clear outlierwhen mean which the established rules of decency have
responsesarecomparedacrossnations(see also renderednecessaryto the lowestrankof people."
Kelley and Evans 1993; Kluegel et al. 1995a; Equation2 expresses this idea.
Suhrcke 2001:8; and Svallfors 1997). When Y.A > Y* mi (2)
Americansand Europeansare askedwhethera
good education, ambition, natural ability, or Furthermore,some individualsmay havethe
hardworkenablean individualto "getaheadin idea that it would be socially excessive if any
life," evidence of an attitudinal difference individual'sactualincomeexceededsome upper
between the averagerespondentin the United bound (Y*max),as expressedin Equation3.
Statesandthose in othernationsis hardto find. YiA < Y*max
(3)
If it were true that Americans tolerate more
inequality of outcomes because they believe A just society could therefore be summa-
there is more equality of opportunity in the rized as one thatsatisfies Equations1 to 3, and
United States,then one would expect to find a thatcan thereforebe describedin graphicterms
tendencyforAmericansto ascribemore impor- as havinga distributionof earningsresembling
the 45-degree line in Figure 1. Up to this point,
tance to personal characteristicsfor "getting
the vocabularydoes not exclude any of the pos-
ahead"than is the case elsewhere. But, on the
siblebelief sets aboutan ethicallyacceptabledis-
average,other countriesare sometimes higher
tributionof earnings.The beliefs of a complete
and sometimes lower thanthe United States in
egalitariancan, for example,be summarizedas
the importance their citizens ascribe, on the
constrainingEquations2 and 3 such that
average,to individualpersonalcharacteristics.
Y'max = Y*min, in which case the line col-
lapses to a single point, and there is a single
CONCEPTUALAMBIGUITIESIN THE answer to the twin questions "What should I
MEANING OF "INEQUALITY" receive?"and"Whatshouldotherpeople get?"
Alternatively,some people might believe that
However,althoughtheremay not be much dif-
there should be no upper limit on ethically
ferencein averageresponsesto summativeques-
acceptableincomes. If so, Equation3 loses any
tions, what do survey respondentsmean to say empirical content because Y*max is infinitely
when they answer general questions about large.Alternatively,if one thinks there should
"inequality"or the fairness of "income differ- be no lower limit to earnings,that amountsto
ences"? specifying, in the terms of Equation 2, that
One way to fix ideas about attitudestoward Y* = 0
mm
inequalityof outcomes is to suppose, by con- In the ISSP data, very few people say they
trast,thatan individualbelieved he or she lived believe in completely equal earnings.10Aside
in a just society.9 In this case, such a person from such complete egalitarianism,all belief
would believe thatthe actualearnings(YiA)of systems about ethically acceptable earnings
all persons(bothhim- or herselfpersonallyand inequality share the propertythat if a person
all other individuals) are equal to what they believes he or she lives in a just society, and if
should earn (Yi*). Equation1 summarizesthe that person is asked to estimate the relation-
idea thatpeople shouldearnwhatthey do earn. shipbetweenwhatotherpeople "doearn"(YiA)
Yi* = YiA (1)
10Theratiosof egalitarians to respondents
in the
1987,1992,and1999SocialInequality wavesof the
9 A huge and fascinatingliteratureon procedural ISSPin theUnitedStateswere,respectively, 7/1165,
justice (e.g., Molm, Takahashi,and Peterson,2003) 6/1132,and2/988.Amongthe35,656respondents in
invariablyfinds that "processmatters"for fairness all surveysin all countries,only212 (0.59percent)
judgments. But in this article, we focus on the per- repliedthatall individualsshouldhave the same
ceived equity of outcomes. wage.

"Should Earn" Y'
Y 'max Y*=YA
Y min
Yv Yj Y "Do Earn" YA
Figure 1. "FairPay"andActualEarnings
andwhatthey "shouldearn"(Yi*), a regression is systematic inequity in earnings can be thought

of the form of Equation 4 would yield the result of as the belief that some people get "too much"
thatbo = 0 and bi = 1. (YiA > Yi*) while others get "too little" (YiA <
Yi*). In graphic terms, such a perception of
Yi* = bo + bl YiA (4)
inequity can be represented as the line de in
As it happens (see later), some people appear Figure 1, whose slope (bl < 1) can be taken as
to believe, at least approximately, that the earn- indicative of an individual's desire for "leveling"
ings distribution is fair (i.e., there is a fraction of the earnings distribution, within their view of
of the population whose personal estimates the acceptable range of incomes.12
imply bo = 0 and b1 = 1)11,and in Figure 1, the In the remainder of this article, we adopt the
45-degree line expresses this general idea that convention of referring to bl as an estimate of
"should earn" equals "do earn" (YiA= Yi*).
However, in all countries, many people do not
share this belief. An individual's belief that there
12Note that the line segment de is drawnwith a
positive interceptbo. If some people get "too much"
while othersget "too little,"one must expect bo > 0
11This couldbe becauseindividualsrationalizethe andb1< 1. Jasso(1978, 1980) expressedthe "justice
current reality of their society ("what is ought to evaluation"(JE) of an outcome as JE = In (actual
be") or because reality fits their prior social justice earnings/justearnings)which, in termsof the current
values ("whatought to be is"). For currentpurpos- discussion, implicitlyassumes thatbo= 0 andb1< 1
es, we do not needto distinguishbetweenreasonswhy and implies that"just"incomes are always less than
bl = 1. Note that this article focuses on the individ- actual incomes. The "Jasso ratio" is equal to the
uals' evaluationof the fairnessof the distributionof antilog of bl underthe assumptionthat bo = 0. See
economicrewardsamongothersanddoes not address Alwin 1987; Shepelak and Alwin (1986); Alwin
the determinantsof any personaldissatisfactionthat (1987);WegenerandSteinmann,( 1995:156);Younts
individualsmay have with their own rewards. and Mueller (2001.

individual"preferencesfor leveling,"which can effect to a given belief system, or whetherthat

be estimated,for any given person, across that set of taxes and transfersis feasible.13
person's responses identifying "should earn" When survey respondents use the term
pay (Yi*) and "do earn"pay (YiA)in a set of "inequality,"they might mean to describe the
occupations. However, Equations 2 to 4 also incomeratiosof individuals,or theymightmean
can be read as indicating that three numbers the incomeshares of groupsin a population.So
are needed to express the degree of a person's far,this section of the articlehas been examin-
egalitarianpreferences: ing "economicinequality"in the sense of"dif-
ferences between individuals in economic
1. Theethicalfloortominimum earnings
(i.e.,Y*min)
2. The ethicalceilingto maximumearnings(i.e., outcomes."
Y*max) However, if individuals are to evaluate
3. Thedesireddegreeof levelingrelativeto thecur- inequalityin the "distributionof income shares
rentincomedistribution,among"acceptable" within a population"sense, they must estimate
incomes(i.e.,bl). both income ratios and how manypeople have
A person with a belief system summarized particular levels of income (i.e., they must esti-
graphicallyby line segmentde would perceive mate f[y], the relative frequency of different
thatsomeone at incomeY1 "shouldearn"more levels of income). A good deal of evidence
than he or she "does earn" (i.e., Yi* > YA, exists to show that survey respondentsdo not
which implies a gap between actual and fair accurately estimate the proportion of the pop-
incomes for people at the bottom of the distri- ulation with particularincomes. For example,
bution with an actual income such as Y1A). Kluegel et al. (1995a:201) have reportedthat
Graphically,because"shouldearn"is morethan subjectiveestimates of the perceived frequen-
"doesearn"the line de is plottedas lying above cy of "middleclass"incomesdependheavilyon
the 45-degree line at thatpoint. the respondent'sown socioeconomic position.
In Figure 1, one can call income level Yj the Evans and Kelley (2004) also noted that there
"justdesserts"income because "should earn" is a tendency for survey respondentsto place
equals "do earn" income (Yj* = YjA). themselves "in the middle"of the income dis-
Graphically,the line de intersectsthe 45-degree tribution. The problem for empirical work is
line (which expresses the general idea that that asking people about their attitudestoward
"shouldearn"equals "do earn")at incomeYj. income shares implicitly requiresrespondents
to estimateboth income ratios and the relative
If the relationshipbetween"shouldearn"(Yi*)
and "do earn"(YiA) is linear,as in Equation4, size of populationgroups,whereasasking only
the point of intersection,or the "justdesserts" about theirattitudestowardincomeratiosmakes
income,canbe calculatedas equalto bd/(1- bl). much smallerinformationaldemands.14
On the otherhand,in Figure 1, an individual In this regard,a fascinatingseriesof questions
making more than YjA (i.e., at an earnings level in the ISSP roundsof 1999, 1992, and 1987 dis-
such as Y2A) is someone who, according to
belief systemde, earns"toomuch"income(Y2*
< Y2A).Graphically,because "should earn"is 13Note thatthe politicalandethicalattitudesof
less than "do earn" at income level Y2A,the individuals
areonlyina veryvaguesenseconstrained
line de lies below the 45-degree line. In practi- by actualbudgetaryfeasibility,andthata different
cal terms, income level Y2Aalso could be seen belief system, as representedby differentvalues of
as a social problemof excess thatmight possi- bo andbi, mayidentifydifferingincomelevels as
bly be solved by taxation. defining"deprivation" or excessiverewards(see
However,the question of how much society Section1 of theOnlineSupplement ontheASRWeb
should tax or spend, in aggregate, cannot be site: http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2006/
toc051.html.)
addressedby Figure 1, because it contains no
14In general,ifyi is a person'sincome, and if the
informationaboutthe percentageof the popu-
person'scharacteristicsare describedby a vectorXi,
lation that is at each level of actual income. andthereturnsto thosecharacteristics
aresumma-
Withoutinformationas to the populationden- rizedinthevectorp withtheunexplained
component
sity ofYiA, one cannot know what the income ui, where E(ui ) = 0, then one can write individual
shares of rich and poor are, or what aggregate income asyi = Xi + ui . The frequencydistribution
volume of taxes andtransfersis requiredto give f(y) and any inequality statistics calculated from it

tinguished between subjective empirical esti- been in all threewaves of the ISSP (notablythe
mates of inequalityand the ethical evaluations United States,the United Kingdom, Germany,
that people may have of those perceptions. and Australia), but others have been more
Respondentswere first asked to estimatewhat episodic.
salariespeople in variousjobs do actuallyearn, Generalquestionsaboutinequalitycan min-
then what persons in each occupation should gle empiricalbeliefs regardingthe magnitudeof
earn. In contrastto the large literaturethathas incomeratios,the frequencydensityof incomes,
analyzedthe statisticaldata to measureobjec- andthe processesthatdetermineincome levels,
tive trends in income inequality, these data as well as ethicalevaluationsof bothprocessand
enableexaminationof the issuesthatactuallyare outcomes. In a general discussion of inequali-
morerelevantto individualbehavior,namely,the ty, participantsmake implicit empirical esti-
subjective estimates that individuals have of mates of the importanceof capital income for
income inequalityandthe subjectiveevaluation "therich"andthe processesthatgeneratedmar-
of this perceiveddegreeof inequalityrelativeto ket income (e.g., discriminationor the extentof
an individual'sown normsof "fair"income dif- inheritedwealth).They implicitlyguess the size
ferentials. and frequencyof transferpayments, and they
In the 1999 ISSP questions aboutwhat spe- mingle these estimates with their attitudes
cific jobs do pay and what they shouldpay,the towardinequalityof outcome and opportunity.
jobs consideredincludedthose of skilledfactory Survey respondents' subjective awareness of
worker,doctorin generalpractice,chairmanof the size and distributionof income sources is
a largenationalcompany,lawyer,shopassistant, subject to great empirical errors, and there is
owner/managerof a large factory,judge in the much controversyin the ethical evaluationof
country'shighest court, unskilled worker,and income-generatingprocesses.
federalcabinetminister.15 These classifications A key advantageof using the "doearn/should
are similarto those containedin the sociologi- earn" question format is that many of these
cal "class"literatureon occupationsandsocioe- confounding issues are held constant at the
conomic status,most recentlyfromEriksonand respondent level. In the ISSP data, attitudes
Goldthorpe(2002) andEriksonet al. (2005), but towardwhatspecific occupations"shouldearn"
taken earlier from Erikson and Goldethorpe can be conditioned on what the individual
(1985) andHauserandWarren(1997), andlater believes they "doearn"so thatindividualerrors
fromRose andPevalin(2003). The occupations in estimating actual earnings can be directly
considered in 1992 also included owner of a controlled for. Moreover,the "do earn/should
small shop and farmworker,whereasthe 1987 earn"ISSPquestionsareclearlyrestrictedto dif-
questionnairealso inquiredaboutcity bus driv- ferences in labor market earnings of specific
er, secretary,bricklayer,andbankclerk(butnot occupations,therebyavoidingthe complex set
shopassistantor lawyer).Severalcountrieshave of issues surroundingthe importanceand eval-
uationof differentincomesources.Respondents
are not asked to consider any vignettes detail-
ing complexities of household size, multiple
(e.g., the coefficient of variationor the Gini or Theil earners, or other factors affecting household
indices) dependonf(Xi), P, and ui, but inequalityin composition or "need"for income. The ISSP
the "averageincome ratiobetweentypes of persons" questionsarephrasedin terms of occupational
sense is only about P. earnings-the foundationof sociological"class"
15Respondentsalso were asked aboutthe income measurementas seen in Erikson et al. (2005)
from their own occupations,but in this article, we and Rose and Pevalin(2003)-and there is lit-
exclude these databecause our focus is on attitudes tle reason for respondents to systematically
towardinequalityin society, not perceivedpersonal
impute a different age, race, disability status,
injustice.We experimentedwith using or not using
number of household members, or aggregate
the data on what judges and cabinet ministers "do
earn" and "should earn" because we worried that income of otherhousehold membersto any of
these responses may mingle individual attitudes the occupations listed. Hence, the "do
towardgovernmentwith preferencesfor leveling in earn/shouldearn"questions are not confound-
occupationalrewards,but in practice, it makes no ed by concern with the adequacyor excess of
detectabledifference. householdconsumptionpossibilities drivenby

numberof household members,disability sta- amonga rangeof occupationsdivergesfromhis

tus, age, race, or the like. The implied context or her own estimateof "fair"inequalitywithin
for each occupationis full-timeearnings,which this range of comparableoccupations.
abstractsfrom the differences in income pro- Table3 presentsthe results for twenty seven
ducedby variationsin laborsupply,unemploy- nations, and Figure 2 plots the averagevalues
ment, or the numberof earnersin a family.The of GiniE and GiniA by country.The first col-
ISSPdatathusenableus to stripawaymanycon- umn of Table3 shows that the averagepercep-
foundingvariablesto see whetherwe find evi- tion of earningsinequalityin the United States
dence for "American exceptionalism" in was not very different from that in Australia,
attitudestoward inequality,or evidence for a New Zealand, Canada, or Germany, despite
broadlysimilarvalue base in affluentindustri- very substantial real differences in earnings
alized marketeconomies. inequality in these nations (Gottschalk and
One approachto the "do earn"and "should Smeeding, 1997, 2000). Indeed, the average
earn"data is to use the Gini index to summa- subjectiveperceptionof earningsinequalityin
rize each ISSP respondent'sattitudes toward the United States was below the averageof all
inequality in pay. Specifically, in this article countries.
we calculateboth (1) the respondent'sestimate In Column2, countriesarecomparedin terms
of the actualdegreeof pay inequalityamongthe of the averagesubjectiveperceptionof inequal-
listed occupations (as summarized here by ity in whatpeople"shouldearn."In all countries,
GiniA, the Gini index of inequality16of the some level of earningsinequalityis acceptedas
respondent'sestimates of "do earn" income) ethically justifiable, but there is a substantial
and (2) the respondent'sperception of "fair" range from the most egalitarian attitudes
inequalityin earnings(as summarizedby GiniE, (Slovakia at 0.19 and Norway at 0.21) to the
the Gini index of inequalityacross what occu- least egalitarian attitudes (Chile at 0.47 and
pations "should earn"). Because the occupa- Philippinesat 0.46). The United States is right
tions enumeratedin the ISSP questions are a in the middle, with an averagelevel of "should
subset of all occupations,because we have no earn" inequality at about 0.35, very close to
informationon the respondent'sestimateof the the Europeanand all nations averageof 0.34.
frequency of each occupation in the popula- Column3 of the tableis the one thatarguably
tion, and because inequalityof earningswith- has the most direct implicationsfor the politi-
in eachoccupationis not addressed,GiniAis not cal process because it presentsthe averagedis-
an estimate of actual inequality in the labor crepancy between perceived actual and
marketas a whole. Rather,GiniA is a summa- perceivedfair outcomes, that is, the average
ry estimateof perceivedpay inequalityamong (acrosspersons) of the ratiobetween each per-
a broad range of internationallycomparable son's estimates of "should earn" inequality
occupations. Hence, the ratio between GiniE (GiniE) and "do earn" inequality (GiniA). In
andGiniAis, for each respondent,an indication everycountry,in everyyear,the averagerespon-
of how much the respondent'sown personal dentthinksthereshouldbe less inequalitythan
estimateof the actualdegreeof inequalityin pay he or she thinks actually exists. The average
"should earn"to "do earn"inequalityratio is
always substantiallyless than 1. As Column 3
the implicitassump- indicates,in 1999the average"tension"between
16In doingthiscalculation,
tionis anequalnumberof peopleineachoccupation, perceivedfairearningsinequality(i.e., "should
whichclearlyis not whatanyrespondentactually earn"inequality)andperceivedactual"doearn"
believesis empirically
true,butdoesstandardizerel- inequality was about 0.75. For the average
ativepopulationweightsfor occupationsacrossall Americanrespondent,"shouldearn"inequali-
respondents. Othersummaryindices(e.g., coeffi- ty was a bit closer to "do earn"inequalitythan
cientof variation,
TheilIndex)of both"shouldearn"
in most other nations (at 0.82), because "do
and"do earn"inequalityalso havebeen calculat-
ed-with verymuchthesameimplications-butto earn"inequalitywas estimatedto be lowerthan
conservespace,arenotreported here.Szirmai(1991) elsewhere.
usedDutchdatato calculatethepercentagedifference Figure2 depicts the data in anotherway, by
in the TheilIndexof "shouldearn"and"doearn" plotting the relationship, across countries,
inequalityas anindexof "tendency to equalize." between averageperceptionsof "fairinequali-

ATTITUDES
TOWARDECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 461
Table3. ActualandEthicalInequality- Gini 1999
AverageGiniIndex AverageGiniIndex
of SalariesPeople of SalariesPeople AverageRatioof
"Do Earn"(GiniA) "ShouldEarn"(GiniE) GiniE/GiniA
Russia .66 .39 .61
Chile .60 .47 .79
Poland .58 .44 .77
Latvia .58 .41 .70
Hungary .56 .37 .67
CzechRepublic .53 .39 .76
France* .52 .38 .74
Philippines .49 .46 .97
GreatBritain .49 .36 .73
Slovenia .47 .34 .74
Japan .46 .37 .81
Israel .45 .36 .80
Canada .45 .33 .76
Portugal .45 .33 .73
UnitedStates .43 .35 .82
New Zealand .43 .32 .76
GermanyEast .43 .32 .74
NorthIreland .42 .32 .76
Australia .42 .31 .74
Bulgaria .42 .28 .68
GermanyWest .41 .34 .82
Austria .41 .32 .78
Cyprus .40 .33 .82
Sweden .35 .22 .65
Spain* .34 .22 .65
Norway .30 .21 .73
Slovakia .25 .19 .82
Average- All Nations .46 .34 .75
Averageof Europe .47 .34 .74
Source:International Social SurveyProgramme.
Note:Respondentswereaskedwhatsalariespeoplein variousjobs do actuallymakeandwhatthey shouldmake.
(SpainandFrancereported"netincome"but othernationsaskedfor "BeforeTax"salary)Jobsconsidered
includedskilledfactoryworker,doctorin generalpractice,chairmanof a largenationalcompany,lawyer,shop
assistant,owner/manager of a largefactory,judge in the country'shighestcourt,unskilledworkerandfederal
cabinetminister.Gini Indiceswerecalculatedfor eachrespondentif theyansweredmorethansevenjobs in both
the 'do earn'and 'shouldearn'categories,andif thejobs answeredin the 'do earn'andthe 'shouldearn'cate-
gorieswerethe same.
ty"inwhatoccupations "shouldearn"andaver- 2 doesclearlyindicatethattheUnitedStatesis

age perceptions of "actual inequality"in what not an outlier,at least in averageresponses.
occupations "do earn." As the regressionline Thereis, therefore,littlebasisin theISSPdata
indicates,there is a strong correlation(R2 = foranargument thatAmericans are,ontheaver-
0.78).At the margin,whenaverageperceived age, more or less tolerantof earningsinequal-
actual inequality is higher, average "fair" ity than the citizens of other countries.17
inequalityis higherby abouttwothirds(0.674)
as much.Becausea cross-sectional correlation
17This
cannotshowcausation,Figure2 cannotshow similarity in attitudes toward earnings
whetherhabituation to higheractualinequality inequality occurs in the context of substantially
levelsof socialtransfers
differing andpublicexpen-
produceshighernormsof inequality, orwhether ditures(see Osberg,Smeeding,and Schwabish2004;
less ethical aversionto inequalityproduces Schwabishet al. forthcoming).If the issue in evalu-
greateractualinequality. Nevertheless,Figure ating inequality is "inequality in consumption

50
* Chile
45
* Philippines
* Poland
* Latvia
40
* Czech * Russia
Japan France
Hungary
USA * Israel UK
35 Germany Cnada Slovenia
Inequality *Portugal
1999
Austria * *New Zealand
ISSP30 ustrlia
Ethical * Bulgaria
GiniE
25
Average
Spain * Sweden
Norway
20 Slovokia
y = 0.674x + 2.9738
R2= 0.7795
15
10
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
GiniA ISSP 1999
Average"Actual"Inequality
Figure 2. "Actual"and"Ethical"Inequality
However,Figure2 presentsa highly aggregat- rence across countries on which occupations

ed pictureof attitudes,in two senses:(1) the atti- "should earn" the most and which the least,19
tudes about the inequality of all individuals and the list of occupations contains an example
within each country are averaged and (2) from both the very top (chairman of a large
"inequality"is summarizedby a single num- national company) and the very bottom
ber- the Gini index.
(unskilled worker) of the earnings distribution.
But is it inequalities at the top or at the bottom
PROBING DEEPER:IS IT INEQUALITY that people care about the most? In this article,
AT THE TOP OR AT THE BOTTOM Equation 2 expresses the idea that individuals
THAT MATTERSMOST? may believe in a minimum "should earn"
Calculation of a single summarymeasure of
inequality (such as the Gini index) does not
show directly whether individualsare, on the income inequality(such as the Gini ratio, the Theil
average,moreacceptingof inequalitiesat thetop Index, or the coefficient of variation)often produce
or at the bottom of the distribution.18In the ambiguous internationalrankingswhen frequency
distributionsof income differ such that the Lorenz
ISSP data,there is a broadmeasureof concur-
curvesof the cumulativedistributioncross.Therefore,
it is essentialto specify which partof the distribution
is of primaryconcern.It is "inequality"in this sense
possibilities,"
thena highercommon"socialwage" of the unequal shares of income in a population
impliesrelativelylessimportance
formarketincome which is the focus of much of the economics litera-
asa sourceof effectiveconsumption,
anargument that ture,particularlythat cited in Footnote2.
wouldhavepredicted lessemphasison inequalityof 19Wehave comparedacrosscountriesthe "should
earningsin the Scandinaviancountries. earn"and"doearn"occupationalrankings,which are
18Atkinson(1970) noted that comparisonsof essentially the same in the countriesexamined (see
inequalityinincomesharesusingdifferent indicesof also Kelley and Evans 1993).

income (Y*min),whereas Equation 3 describes tribution)show that both the 1992 and 1999
the maximum "should earn" income (Y*max) dataput the United Statesalmost exactly in the
estimatedby each respondent. middle of the nations surveyed.However,eth-
To examine the full range of "fairinequali- ical values areconditionedon what individuals
ty" in pay, the first four columns of Table 4 believe to be the actual inequalityof earnings.
presentdataon the maximum/minimum "should Even if the averageAmericanis not exception-
earn"ratioin 1999 ISSP datafor affluent,con- al in what the maximum/meanratioshould be,
tinuouslycapitalistcountries.Columnsfive to he or she differs from individuals in other
eight present the maximum/meanratio as an nationsin the degree to which he or she under-
estimate of aversionto excess at the top. That estimatestop-end earnings.
is, for each respondent,it comparesthe respon- Becausethe ISSP dataidentifyspecific occu-
dent's estimate of maximum "should earn" pations, respondents' subjective estimates of
income(Y*max) expressedas a ratioof the mean what occupations"do earn"can be compared
"do earn"income thathe or she estimates.The with objectivedataon actualearnings.Although
lastfourcolumnsattemptto get at dislikeof dep- the objective data show a much larger, and
rivation at the bottom by presenting the widening, gap between average earnings and
mean/minimum ratio (i.e., the ratio of each executive compensation in the United States
respondent's average estimate of "do earn" than is characteristicin other countries, sub-
income to their estimate of minimum "should jective (mis)perceptionsof "do earn"inequal-
earn" income [Y*min]).As indicators of the cen- ity are greaterin the United States,a fact likely
tral tendency of the distribution of attitudes to mute pressurefor distributionalchange.
toward each issue, Table 4 presents both the Table 5 indicates that the actual earnings
mean andthe medianattitude,calculatedacross ratio between production workers and chief
all respondentsin each country.20 executive officers (CEOs) varies between
In the 1999 data, there are big differences approximately20:1 and45:1, a ratiofar greater
betweencountriesin the overallrangeof accept- than the subjective"do earn"estimates. In all
ableoutcomes(e.g., the medianFrenchresponse countries, the average "do earn" estimate for
for the maximum/minimumratio was about manufacturingworkersis remarkablyclose to
three times the median Norwegian maxi- actualdata.21However,the subjectiveestimates
mum/minimumratio). However, these differ- of CEO compensation are well below objec-
ences are driven largely by differing attitudes tive data. The degree of CEO compensation
towardinequality at the bottom. Indeed, it is misestimatevarieswidely acrosscountries,with
remarkablehow small the cross-nationaldif- the averageAmerican respondentparticularly
ferences are in ethically acceptable income likely to underestimateCEO pay.
ratiosat the top (in 1999, the medianSpaniard's How much do respondentsthinkincome dif-
maximum/mean ratio was lowest, at 1.556, ferences shouldbe compressed?The ISSP data
whereasthe medianFrenchratiowas largest,at show a generalconsensusof opinion,bothwith-
2.166). A look at median attitudesshows that in and across nations, on the rankhierarchyof
cross-nationaldifferencesaremost apparentat occupationsin both"doearn"and"shouldearn"
the bottom of the distribution,where the range income. However,althoughindividualsgener-
is from 3.487 in Franceto 1.667 in Norway.
Again, in these data on attitudestowardthe
rangeof inequality,thereis little supportfor the
hypothesis of "Americanexceptionalism" in 21Somediscrepancy mightbe expectedbecause
values. The medianand mean maximum/mean the Bureauof LaborStatistics(BLS)dataare for
"shouldearn"ratios(i.e., the "averageperson's" "production"workersinmanufacturing, whereasthe
toleranceof inequalityat the top end of the dis- ISSPasksabout"skilled" workersinmanufacturing.
Bothcorrespond to the"working class"occupations
foundin Eriksonet al. (2005)andRoseandPevalin
(2003).Fordistributionof subjective
estimatesof the
20TableS1 presentsthecomparable1992results objectiveCEO/worker "do earn"pay ratioin the
andTableS2 presentsthe 1987datain the Online UnitedStates,the UnitedKingdom,Canada,and
Supplement,Section2 (ASRWebsite:http://www2. Germany, see Figure S2 (Section 2, Online
asanet.org/joumals/asr/2006/toc051
.html). Supplement,ASRWebsite).

464 AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
5 1 2 3 4 6 9 10 8 11 7 12 14 15 13
Rank
Median
Country1 2 4 3 5 6 7 8 11 9 10 12 13 14 15
Ratio Mean
Mean/Min 3.13.53.33.23.23.02.92.92.92.82.92.71.81.71.9 3.62.4

Median
4.54.44.14.14.03.63.53.53.33.53.33.02.11.91.8
Mean 4.63.1
4 1 2 6 7 11 9 10 3 8 5 12 13 14 15
Median
Rank
Individuals) 3 1 2 5 6 10 8 9 4 11 7 12 13 14 15
Country
Mean
(All Ratio
Rankings
Max/Mean 2.02.22.12.02.01.91.91.92.11.92.01.81.61.61.6 2.22.7
and Median
2.32.32.32.22.12.02.02.02.22.02.11.91.71.61.6 2.43.0
Medians Mean
Means,
1999 3 1 2 2 2 5 7 6 4 7 4 9 10 12 11
Rank
Median
Countries:
Country1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Ratio Mean
Across
Max/Min 6.57.56.76.76.75.65.35.66.05.36.05.02.92.62.8
Ratios 8.06.7
Median
Earn"
12.3
11.6 10.29.78.18.18.07.87.77.66.14.03.23.1
10.9 12.6
11.1minimum.
Mean
"Should =
Min
Median
and
1992
1987maximum;
Mean =
4. KingdomIreland States
States
Max
1999a Zealand
Table Japan
France
Canada
United
USA
North Israel
Austria
New Sweden
Portugal
Germany SpainUnited
Australia
Norway United
Note:

Ratio
Pay
8.37.317.512.24.89.46.6 return.
Estimated
CEO/Worker New share-price

Estimates
BBC
(US$) f
Earn" three-year
Worker
1999
"Do
firms'
ISSP,
Skilled30,16115,307 24,408
20,55624,383
24,202
27,695 their
Average person
from Manufacturing by
in per
Estimated
Subjective worked
e companies
CEO Hours
biggest
(www.pbs.org/now/politics/workhours.h
141,987
218,601 116,439
259,313
292,715 158,165
250,422 150
Annual
Estimated
Compensation 5);Canada
(2001). in
Canada's
of (Table
News person
Workers
per
(www.galtglobalreview.corn/world/world-ceosalaries.
BBC
44 33 32 31 21 21 17 from
Ratio
Production CEO/Worker worked
Review compensation
Pay and
and Galt CEO Hours
Actual
Production The
(US$) (1999)
of
Officers Annual
Pay2001 d BBC; Average
Review
and Worker from
Executive corporation".
Scorecard:
19,582
29,39116,699
22,654
21,192
23,436 Global
26,465 (www.nationalpost.com/nationalpostbusiness/archi
Chief Manufacturing Sweden
Manufacturing, Gait
& CEO
of Production
in national
in The
Compensation factory".
annual large a
France
from a in
CEO
EarningsWorkers of
Actual worker
Australia, (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/Fore
Magazine's
Estimated 649,137
542,622
711,403
442,188
481,651
461,738for chairman
Compensation
1,305,012
Compensation "skilled
and data Source:"thea
CEO Businessof of
CEO
Pay:
Actual a
Post
Total
The b a of earnings
earnings
Statesb b c compensation
5. National
a ISSP,
ISSP,
CEO
Average TheManufacturing
In In
Table Country
United UKSweden
Australia
France Canada a b (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1456723.stm);
Germany C d (www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/oiea
247D44F89560).
e f

ally agreethat,for example,a doctordoes make Norwegian"). Still, in every country (includ-
more money than a skilled worker,and should ing these two), there is an ongoing political
makemoremoney,thereis a lot of disagreement debate about income distributionand poverty.
abouthow muchmore.The differencesbetween These debates are fairly direct evidence that
individuals in their assessments of the desir- people do not all agree, within nations, about
able degreeof "leveling"can be estimatedfrom inequality,andthatthe "median/average nation-
the ISSP microdata.Because each individual al attitude"can be a somewhatmisleadingcon-
respondentreportedhis or her personal esti- cept, one that is particularly misleading if
mate of "should earn" (Yi*) and "do earn" (YiA) attitudestowardinequalityarehighlypolarized.
income for a numberof occupations,these data If a regression of the form Yi* = b0 + b1 YiA
can be used to estimate,for each respondent,a is estimated on each respondent'sdata, those
simple linearregressionfollowing the specifi- people who think the existing distributionof
cation of Equation4 in Section 1 (i.e., we esti- earnings is fair will report Yi* = YiA (i.e.,
mate a regression of the form Yi* = bo + bi "shouldearn"= "do earn"),implying that for
YiA). The ratio between "should earn" (Yi*) thembl = 1. To the extentthatrespondentssup-
and "do earn"(YiA)income for occupationis, portthe statusquo, therewill thustend to be an
at the margin, capturedby the bl coefficient, accumulationat bl = 1 of the bl estimates of
which is taken here as an individual'sprefer- these "statusquo"respondents.However,peo-
ences for the leveling of pay. Formost people, ple who disagreewiththe fairnessof currentpay
bl is less than 1, because most respondents inequalities,and who thinkthat income differ-
thinkthatsome leveling is desirable.However, ences are "too large"will report"shouldearn"
attitudestoward inequality are bounded (i.e., pay rateswhich implybl < 1. The more strong-
when bl = 1) by the attitudethatno leveling at ly a respondentdisagrees with the fairness of
all is desirable,becausesome respondentsreport currentincome differences,the more leveling
that "shouldearn"equals "do earn." the respondentwill prefer,andthe lowerwill be
If one thoughtthere was less egalitarianism that respondent'simplied value of bl. But all
(in the sense of a desire for a leveling of earn- these disagreementsamong people are hidden
ings) in averageAmericanvalues than in other if only the average or median attitudeis con-
countries,then one might expect to observe a sidered.
systematicallyhigher averagebl coefficient in To assess how the distributionof disagree-
the United States than elsewhere, but that is mentaboutleveling(i.e., bl) variesacrosscoun-
not the implicationof comparingthe mean and tries, a picturemay be wortha thousandwords.
median "leveling" coefficient (b1) estimated Figure 3 presents a graph showing the distri-
from the ISSP data.In the 1987 and 1999 data butionof preferencesfor leveling in the United
for the countrieslisted in Table4, the median States in 1987, 1992, and 1999. It portraysthe
andmeanb1coefficientin the UnitedStateswas percentageof the populationat eachvalueof the
above the mean for all country years except bl coefficient, as drawnusing kernel density
1992, when it was below the mean.The average methods,which offer a way to smooth the his-
rankof the UnitedStates(overall threesurveys) togram frequency of the population at each
was 16thfor the medianb1coefficient and 13th valueof the bi coefficient.22Itsvaluelies in pre-
for the mean b1 coefficient, which are very sentinga pictureof attitudesthatconveysmuch
close to the middleof our set of 33 nationalsur- more informationthan summarystatistics.
veys. In particular,Figure3 indicatesthata notable
featureof Americanattitudesis theirbimodal-
ity. In all 3 yearsthereis a clear spike at bi = 1,
THE DISTRIBUTIONOF
as well as a substantialnumberof respondents
DISAGREEMENTSABOUT EQUALITY
clusteringaroundapproximatelybi = 0.5 (i.e.,
Up to this point, nationalpreferencesand atti- the United States is a society with both a sig-
tudestowardinequalityhavebeen summarized nificantly large group in favor of substantially
in termsof a measureindicatingthe centralten-
dency of the distribution of attitudes within
each nation (e.g., in terms of the attitudesheld 22 See Greene(2002) or http://genstat.co.uk/
by the "average American" or the "median doc/8doc/html/stats/KemelDensityEstimation.htm.

moreequalitythannow exists and a largegroup Figure 4 puts the United States, the United
that agrees with the status quo). Over time, Kingdom,France,Norway,and Canadaon the
there appearsto have been a migrationof atti- same graph.It is limitedto a five-countrycom-
tudes among Americans, with a somewhat parisonbecauseadditionalcountriesarehardto
increased tendency to respond that "what is distinguishvisually,but its basic story also can
should be" (i.e., bl = 1) in the distributionof be told with the data of othernations. If a pic-
earnings. ture of "social cohesion" in attitudes toward
1.4
1.2 --U.S. 1987

U.S. 1992
-U.S. 1999
1
0.8
0.6
Relative Frequency
0.4
0.2
-0.5-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
"ShouldEarn"/ "DoEarn"SlopeCoefficient
Figure 3. The Distribution of Preferences for Leveling in the United States, 1987-1999
1.4
SU.S.
1.2
U.K.
-Canada
1
Norway
0.8 France
0.6-
0.4- Frequency
Relative
0.2
-0.5-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
"ShouldEarn"/ "Do Earn"Slope Coefficient
Figure 4. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and France 1999: Distribution of Should Earn/Do
Earn Slope Coefficient (Betas): Both Sexes

inequalitycould be painted,it probablywould In Figure5, the modalvalue of the U.S. max-

resemble Figure 4 for Norway.23Whereasthe imum/mean ratio is lower and significantly
United States kernel density estimatespaint a more concentratedthan in similarkernel den-
picture of polarized attitudes,the Norwegian sity graphsfor 1992 and 1987, but in whatever
pictureis one of broadconsensus.As otherdata yearone chooses to analyze,the modalvalue of
also haveindicated,Norwegians,on the average, ethical attitudestowardfair "top-end"inequal-
arein favorof reducingstill furthertheiralready ity is at a level that is vastly differentfrom the
relativelysmall incomegaps. Figure4 indicates actualpay ratiosreportedin Table5. In contrast,
that there is a very strong convergencein atti- Americanattitudestowardinequalityat the bot-
tudes arounda value of aboutb1 = 0.66. tom end have become more diffuse over time.
The United States (with strongpolarization) However,in both figures, the relativeunanim-
and Norway (with consensus) are poles of a ity of Norwegianopinion comes throughvery
continuum,with Canada(not entirelyAmerican strongly. The modal values of the maxi-
in attitudes),the United Kingdom(not entirely mum/meanratio and the mean/minimumratio
Europeanin values), and France(not as unan- of "shouldearn"incomesbotharesmall,andthe
imouslyegalitarianas Scandinavia)being inter- distributionis tightly compacted.As Figure 5
mediate cases. All five countrieshave a large indicates, Canadian and American attitudes
numberof people who are"levelers."In all five towardinequalityat the top end are very simi-
countriesthereare some who believe "do earn" lar,and thereis a concentrationof opinion that
equals "shouldearn"(i. e. bl = 1). The "excep- the maximum/meanratioshouldbe a little less
tional"aspectof the United Statesis thatit con- than 2:1. United Kingdom and Frenchrespon-
tains a much largergroupclearlysatisfied with dents have a somewhat greater dispersion in
the status quo than many other countries.The theiracceptanceof top-endinequality.In North
slight tendency for a bump at bi = 1 observed America, however, there still is a noticeable
in France, the United Kingdom, Canada,and social consensus on the maximum level of
Norwayis replacedby a clearlybimodaldistri- income someone "shouldearn."
bution in the United States. This bimodality On the other hand, Figure 6 indicates that
amongAmericansis apparentamongboth men therewas no consensusin the UnitedKingdom,
and women, with some convergencearoundan Canada,France,or the United Stateson relative
acceptanceof the statusquo, indicatinglittle or minimumearningsin 1999.25By contrast,the
no leveling desired (0.9 < bi < 1), and with consensus on a social minimum in Norway is
anotherconvergence of attitudesaround sub- quite striking,which presumablymakes it sig-
stantial desired leveling (bl = approximately nificantlyeasierto mobilizepoliticalsupportfor
0.5). antipovertypolicies.
Although the b1 coefficient may capturean At this point, it is naturalto ask why coun-
overallpreferencefor leveling,withinthe range tries differ in the distributionof their attitudes.
of "acceptable"incomes, it does not directly This articlehas arguedthatpeoplemayhavedis-
address the issue of the ethically permissible tinct attitudes toward an ethically acceptable
rangeof earnings,or whetherthereis morecon- social minimum,towarda "fair"income max-
cern with cappingexcessive rewardsat the top imum, and towardthe leveling of differentials
of the distributionor limitingdeprivationat the within thatrange, and that each set of attitudes
bottom.Figures4a and4b thereforepresentthe may have a distinctexplanation.In considering
distribution of attitudes in the United States eachspecificissue (e.g., attitudestowardincome
and elsewhere toward the maximum/mean24
and mean/minimum"shouldearn"ratios.
comparethedistribution
of U.S.attitudestowardthe
mean/minimum andmaximum/mean ratioovertime
23Norwegiansstandoutforsocialconsensusand in 1987, 1992, and 1999, see Figures S3 and S4
trustin the social capitalliterature(see Helliwell (Section4, OnlineSupplement,Section2, ASRWeb
2003:25)andforegalitarian andpro-welfare stateatti- site).
tudes(Svallfors1997:295). 25KelleyandEvans(1993)concluded, using1987
24One gets the sameresultif attitudestoward ISSPdata,thatcross-national
differencesin attitudes
wage differentials are examined between named wereprimarilyaboutappropriateincomedifferences
occupations, such as CEO and skilled worker.To atthetopend,butopinionsclearlyhavechanged.

1.2
U.S.
1.0 --U.K.
Canada
0.8 Norway
France
0.6
S0.4 Frequency
Relative
0.2
0.0
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0
"Should Earn"Max/ "Do Earn"Mean Ratio
Figure 5. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and France 1999: Distribution of "Should Earn"
Max/"Do Earn"Mean (Max/Mean) Ratio: Both Sexes
1.2
-U.S.
1.0 -----U.K.
Canada
Norway
o0.8
France
0.6
0.4 Frequency
Relative
0.2
0.0
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0
"Do Earn" Mean / "Should Earn" Min Ratio

Figure 6. UnitedStates,UnitedKingdom,Canada,Norway,andFrance1999:Distributionof"Do Earn"
Mean/"Should Earn"Min(Mean/Min)Ratio:Both Sexes
leveling, as portrayedin Figure4), many econ- the distributionof individuals'attitudesdiffers

omists and sociologists have been trained to across countriesis thatthereare cross-country
think"ina regressionperspective"(i.e., to exam- differences in the influence of personal char-
ine the partialcorrelationof "explanatory" vari- acteristics(e.g., gender, age, or education)on
ables with the dependentvariableof interest, attitudes.An alternativeexplanationfor cross-
controllingfor the influenceof othervariables). country attitudinaldifferences may be differ-
In this perspective, one possible reason why ences across countries in the frequency of

attributes(e.g., fundamentalist Protestantism26). ferent" about American values, as compared

Moreover,a household characteristicsuch as with Europeanattitudes,and that less redistri-
income may vary across countriesin both dis- bution is, essentially,whatAmericanswant.
tributionand impacton attitudes,andthe struc- We questionthe assertionthatAmericansin
tural form of estimating equationsmay differ general are uniquely satisfied with economic
acrosscountries.As well, it is plausibleto won- inequality.On the average,Americans do not
der whether some individual characteristics stand out as particularlydifferent from other
(e.g., political party or subjectiveclass identi- countriesin general attitudestowardinequali-
fication) should be used as controlsor consid- ty or in the "shouldearn/doearn"comparisons,
ered to be endogenouslydetermined. but comparisonsof medians or means hide an
Explaining internationaldifferences in the importantpart of the story.The United States
distributionof attitudesis thereforea fascinat- appearsto be a countrywith much more polar-
ing and complex area for further research. izationof attitudestowardincome leveling than
Initial analyses suggest, if a common estimat- is commonelsewhere,and increasinglyso over
ing equation linking personal characteristics time. The bimodality of American attitudes
and attitudestowardleveling is presumed,that towardincome leveling is particularlystriking.
the influence of standardvariablessuch as age, Kluegel et al. (1995a:206) have arguedthat
education,income, or genderon leveling pref- it is commonforindividualsto havea "splitcon-
erences (bl) differs across countries.Although sciousness"abouteconomicinequality,because
Americanwomen are significantly more egal- the same person often will report supportfor
itarianthanAmericanmen, genderdifferences egalitarian principles (such as distribution
in the determinants of b1 in other countries according to need) and inegalitarianattitudes
tend to be statisticallyinsignificant. Similarly, (such as the moraldepravityof the poor).They
in most countries(includingthe United States), notethatthis "presentsa fertilegroundfor fram-
bothage andeducationarestatisticallyinsignif- ing effects as political actorscompete to make
icant as determinantsofbl, but not in all coun- salient eitherthe social explanationsof pover-
tries. Although higher-income households in ty andwealthin supportof redistributionor the
several countries (e.g., Canada, France, individualexplanationsto motivateopposition
Norway) preferless leveling, family income is to the welfare state."
not statisticallysignificant as a determinantof This article has arguedthat there is a trend
bl in either the United States or the United overtime forAmericanattitudestowardinequal-
Kingdom. However, much more needs to be ity at the top end of the income distributionto
done to explain individuals' attitudes toward become less tolerantof inequality,even as at the
inequality. bottom end they have become more accepting
of inequality.The United Statesis not very dif-
CONCLUSION ferent from other countries in its aversion to
wide differencesin incomebetweenthe middle
The United Stateshas more income inequality class andthe very affluent.Whenit comes to dif-
thanotherdevelopedcountries,but government ferencesbetweenthe middle andthe bottomof
does less aboutit (Osberget al. 2004; Smeeding, the income distribution,however,both France
2005). In partialresponseto the "missingredis- and the Anglo-Americancountrieshave a sim-
tribution"of Americanpublic policy, an influ- ilarly diffuse set of attitudes,which contrasts
entialliteraturehas argued,at least since Lipset with the strongconcern for a social minimum
andBendix (1959), thatthereis something"dif-
in Scandinavia(see JiinttiandDanziger,2000),
and which may help to explain international
differencesin publicpolicy and averagepover-
26The1998ISSPaskedrespondents whetherthey ty rates.
agreedthat"theBibleis theactualwordof Godand
Ourprincipalfindingscan be summarizedas
it is to be takenliterally,wordfor word."In their
responses,30.1%of Americans agreed,ascompared follows:
to 9.3%of WestGermans, 6.1%ofAustralians,9.6% 1. Theempirical trendtowardwideningactualearn-
of Canadians, 4.7%of Swedesand5.1 %of UKres- ings andincomedifferentialsat the top of the
idents.A further49.2%of Americansbelievedthe UnitedStatesincomedistribution is notreflect-
Bibleto be "theinspiredwordof God." ed in subjectiveestimates,whichunderestimate

top-endinequalitymore thanis commonin other "FairnessandRedistribution."AmericanEconomic

countries. Review95:960-80.
2. There appearsto be less concern over time for a Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara. 2001.
"social minimum"in the United States than in "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of
comparablenations. Opportunities." WorkingPaperNo. 8267, National
3. Public attitudesagainstexcessive wage differen- Bureauof Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.
tials at the top end may have hardened in the Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert
United States (at least up to 1999). MacCulloch. 2001. "Inequalityand Happiness:
4. Thereis a strong,and increasing,polarizationof Are Europeans and Americans Different?"
attitudestoward income leveling in the United Working Paper No. 8198, National Bureau of
States. Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.
Alwin, Duane F. 1987. "Distributive Justice and
Although it is hard to specify exactly the Satisfactionwith MaterialWell-Being."American
long-termimplicationsforpoliticaleconomyof Sociological Review 52:83-95.
a polarizationof attitudesand a widening dis- Atkinson,Anthony B. 1970. "On the Measurement
crepancybetween public perceptionsof actual of Inequality." Journal of Economic Theory
and "fair" top-end inequality, this does not 2:244-63.
sound like a likely recipe for social or political B6nabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. Forthcoming.
stability. Under majority rule in a two-party "Beliefin a JustWorldandRedistributivePolitics."
QuarterlyJournal of Economics.
system, one mode of the distributionmay con-
Bjirklund, Anders and Markus Jintti. 2000.
trolthe leversof redistributivepolicy for a time, "IntergenerationalMobility of Socioeconomic
but the underlying polarization of attitudes Statusin Comparative Perspective."
NordicJournal
implies thatthereis a substantialgulf in desired of Political Economy26:3-32.
publicpolicies,andthata relativelysmallmigra- Breen,RichardandJanO. Jonsson.2005. "Inequality
tion of voters may suffice to tip the balance of Opportunity in Comparative Perspective"
betweentwo very differentconceptionsof "fair" AnnualReview of Sociology 31:223-43.
inequality. Burtless, Gary and Christopher Jencks. 2003.
"AmericanInequalityand Its Consequences."Pp.
Lars Osberg currentlyis the McCullochProfessor 61-108 in Agendafor theNation, editedby Henry
ofEconomics, and UniversityResearchProfessor at Aaron, James M. Lindsay, and Pietro Nivola.
Dalhousie University,Canada. His undergraduate Washington,DC: Brookings Institute.
educationwas at Queen's University,Kingston,and Corak, Miles, ed. 2004. Generational Income
the London School of Economics and Political Mobility in North America and Europe.
Science. After serving as a CUSO volunteer in Cambridge:UK CambridgeUniversityPress.
Tanzania,he earned his Ph.D.from YaleUniversity. Entorf, Horst and Nicoleta Minoiu. 2004. "PISA
His majorfields of research interest have been the Results: What a Difference Immigration Law
extent,causes, and implicationsofpoverty and eco- Makes."IZADiscussion PaperNo. 1021, Institut
nomic inequality. His most recent book is The zur ZukunstderArbeit (IZA), Bonn, Germany.
Economic Implicationsof Social Cohesion (edited, Erikson,RobertandJohnH. Goldthorpe.1985. "Are
2003). He was Presidentof the CanadianEconomics AmericanRates of Social Mobility Exceptionally
Association in 1999-2000 and currentlyis Review High?New Evidence on an Old Issue."European
Editorfor the Review of Income and Wealth. Sociological Review 1:1-22.
-. 1992. TheConstantFlux:A Studyof Class
TimothyM. Smeeding is the Maxwell Professor of Mobilityin IndustrialSocieties. Oxford,England:
PublicPolicy,andProfessorofEconomicsandPublic ClarendonPress.
Administration,at the Maxwell School of Syracuse -. 2002. "Intergenerational Inequality: A
University.He is directorof the Maxwell Centerfor Sociological Perspective."Journal of Economic
Policy Research and of the LuxembourgIncome Perspectives 16:31-44.
Study Project, which he co-founded in 1983. His Erikson, Robert, John H. Goldthorpe, Michelle
researchfocuses on nationaland cross-nationalcom- Jackson, Meir Yaish, and D. R. Cox. 2005. "On
parisons of incomeand wealthinequalityandpover- Class Differentials in EducationalAttainment."
ty among vulnerable groups, including low-wage Proceedings of theNationalAcademy of Sciences
workers,children,the aged, and the disabled. 102:9730-733.
Esping-Andersen,Gasta. 1990. TheThreeWorldsof
WelfareCapitalism.Cambridge,UK: PolityPress.
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Attitudes Toward Pay Differentials: Comparing the US to Other Nations

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Attitudes Toward Pay Differentials: Comparing the US to Other Nations

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"Fair" Inequality?

Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative

This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:07:46 AM

This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:07:46 AM

This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:07:46 AM

in differentcountries,andshows thatan impor- hasproducedsignificantsocialistor social dem-

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This content downloaded on Tue, 8 Jan 2013 08:07:46 AM

Table 1. Attitudesto Inequality:Are IncomeDifferencesTooLarge?(1999)

Strongly NeitherAgree Strongly

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Objectively,as Burtless and Jencks (2003) try's]prosperity."An averageresponse such as

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"Should Earn" Y'

andwhatthey "shouldearn"(Yi*), a regression is systematic inequity in earnings can be thought

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individual"preferencesfor leveling,"which can effect to a given belief system, or whetherthat

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numberof household members,disability sta- amonga rangeof occupationsdivergesfromhis

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Table3. ActualandEthicalInequality- Gini 1999

ty"inwhatoccupations "shouldearn"andaver- 2 doesclearlyindicatethattheUnitedStatesis

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However,Figure2 presentsa highly aggregat- rence across countries on which occupations

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Mean/Min 3.13.53.33.23.23.02.92.92.92.82.92.71.81.71.9 3.62.4

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CEO/Worker New share-price

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1.2 --U.S. 1987

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inequalitycould be painted,it probablywould In Figure5, the modalvalue of the U.S. max-

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"Should Earn"Max/ "Do Earn"Mean Ratio

"Do Earn" Mean / "Should Earn" Min Ratio

leveling, as portrayedin Figure4), many econ- the distributionof individuals'attitudesdiffers

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attributes(e.g., fundamentalist Protestantism26). ferent" about American values, as compared

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top-endinequalitymore thanis commonin other "FairnessandRedistribution."AmericanEconomic

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Nations."InternationalJournalofPublic Opinion Kingdom, and the United States."Memorandum

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"Social Values for Equality and Preferencesfor edition,editedby EdwinCannan.Reprint,London,

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