2019FHAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 9 (3): 514–528

ARTICLE

Deception in practice
Hunting and bullfighting entanglements in southern Spain
Santiago M. C R U Z A D A , Esteban R U I Z -B A L L E S T E R O S , and Alberto DEL
CAMPO T E J E D O R , Universidad Pablo de Olavide

Deception is a recurrent strategy deployed in the relations between human beings, between humans and animals, and even be-
tween animals, and is normally analyzed from a perspective that emphasizes its discursive nature and certain of its ontological,
epistemological and axiological effects. According to this orthodox view, deception falsifies, distorts, and conceals reality; it thus
equates to a lie and is consequently devalued by it. An analysis of two ethnographic contexts of human–animal relations in south-
ern Spain—partridge hunting and bullfighting—allows us to go beyond such a univocal and simple notion of deception. Through
our analysis we wish to problematize and reconceptualize that notion, in a way that considers it as a practice and even as a re-
source; as a form of knowledge that fosters interaction and the generation of singular frameworks of experience, in which reality,
the product of that deception, is lived—paradoxically—in terms of truth.
Keywords: Deception, human–animal relations, southern Spain, hunting, bullfighting, practice

Everyday life is filled with moments in which we deceive
or are deceived. These instances include more or less rit-
ualized interactions that in theory conceal the true nature
of a situation—for example answering “fine” to the ques-
tion “how are you?” when in actual fact we are not feeling
so well (Sacks 1975)—to contexts in which deception
constitutes a more fundamental transgression of trust be-
tween people, for example in cases of infidelity (Scott
2012). In other instances, however, such as is the case with
Father Christmas, deception can also act as an incentive
within certain relationships (family ones, for example), fa-
cilitating the exchange of gifts in a kind of game that in-
volves a simulacrum, a recognized social convention, as
well as surprise. As Kant signaled ([1793] 1995: 73), de-
ception is present in our lives and acts at different levels.
Yet, depending on the perspective from which it is ap-
proached and the particular situations within which it
operates, deception can present different and even con-
tradictory facets and appraisals.
The emergence of deception as a topic of interest in
the social sciences and humanities dates to the mid-
twentieth century (Ekman 1985), particularly in studies
on communication and linguistics, law, and research
into human psychology and behavior (see, for example,
Radin 1956; Bok 1978; Pelton 1980; Bowyer 1982;
Barnes 1994; Besnier 1994; Kashy and DePaulo 1996;
or, more recently, McDonald 2009; Fainzang 2016;
McGranahan 2017; Govindrajan 2018). Far from being
understood as an intrinsic part of a relational process,
deception has been mostly considered through an “ob-
jectivist lens” (Del Campo Tejedor 2017): in epistemic
terms, deception falsifies, distorts, and conceals reality;
hence, ontologically, it is assimilated into a non-reality,
a falsehood, a fiction that is equated with lying and, as
such, becomes axiologically devalued and condemned.
In this article we will attempt to broaden this perspec-
tive, proposing an analysis that considers deception as a
catalyst for interactions in which novel frameworks of
experience (Goffman 1972, 1974) and even social reali-
ties are generated (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In order
to achieve this, we first summarize the ways in which de-
ception has been approached as an object of study by an-
thropology and related disciplines. While this allows us
to consider the importance of deception in everyday life,

HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory. Volume 9, number 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/706804

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515
it also highlights how as an analytical category deception
is currently at a dead end, from which it cannot escape
unless some of its assumptions are reconsidered.
Our article then seeks to illustrate how a shift in focus
can contribute to the understanding of deception. We do
this by drawing on two different contexts of human–
animal “entanglement” (Raffles 2002) in southern Spain:
the use of live decoys for hunting partridges and bull-
fighting. Both of these highly relevant cultural practices
show a number of important dimensions of deception.
We will attempt to show how deception constitutes a de-
fining component of the relationship between hunters
and partridges or between bullfighters and bulls and a
central element in how experience is framed, thus urging
us to go beyond a conventional interactionist analysis.
More specifically, our empirical approach contributes
to a growing body of anthropological research dedicated
to the analysis of interspecies relations (Locke and Müns-
ter 2015; Benson et al. 2017), undertaking, ethnographi-
cally, to take a non-anthropocentric approach that raises
animals to the status of active agents in interactions and
recognizes that they possess a certain degree of subjec-
tivity (Boddice 2011; Anderson et al. 2014; Marvin
and McHugh 2018). However, the interest in the con-
ception of deception proposed here lies in the fact that
it could also be employed to analyze human relations
in a more complex way. In this respect, we argue for
the need to retrain the anthropological gaze on decep-
tion from a phenomenological-interactionist perspec-
tive that re-examines relations between truth and lies,
reality and fiction, and other such antagonistic pairings
that shade prevailing understanding of deception. Ulti-
mately, our paper proposes a new problematization of
an old issue, and is focused on the reconceptualization
of deception, anchoring it to practices, interactions and
frameworks of experience.
The importance of deception in social life
In a recent book, James Suzman indicates that mockery
among Ju/’hoansi, a group of bushmen hunter-gatherers
from the Kalahari Desert, serves as mechanism that
helps safeguard intra-group equality. When, for exam-
ple, a Ju/’hoansi successfully hunts a particularly large
prey, the rest of the group laughs at him and derides
the outcome of his hunted game, undermining the im-
portance of his deed (Suzman 2017: 144).1 Negation—
1. Richard B. Lee (1969) has already documented the im-
portance of the joke and deception among these hunter-
DECEPTION IN PRACTICE
through mockery—of reality is accepted by the hunter,
who in an act of deception and simulacrum with him-
self and with others, recognizes that his catch is not ac-
tually that important or impressive.
In the everyday life of these hunter-gatherers, mock-
ery, self-deception, and simulacrum have a marked func-
tionality that helps maintain group cohesion. Similarly,
some anthropologists have looked at the role played by
deception in social life in other contexts, including that
of the trickster, a figure commonly found in myths and
story-telling (Canonici 1995: 6–11). The meaning of this
personalized archetype has been an important subject of
discussion in the literature, and often produces different
kinds of interpretation (Abrams and Sutton-Smith 1977:
29–30).2
Deception has also been studied in the context of in-
dividual behavior. Blum (2005: 290–91), for example,
in her analysis of deception and truth in China, consid-
ers that all societies struggle between deception and the
desideratum of honesty. In southern Spain, our study
area, deception and lies have been linked to the up-
holding of honor and prestige and to the avoidance of
shame, even suggesting that this combination consti-
tutes a single and shared pattern within the Mediterra-
nean context (Gilmore 1987). It is within this region
that Du Boulay (1976) identified seven types of decep-
tion and lies, subsequently restructured by Pilch (1992:
129–30).
Deception, moreover, is neither strictly contemporary
as a concern, nor is it circumscribed to social functional-
ity or individual behavior. It has been discussed recur-
rently in different periods of Western history within the
fields of philosophy or epistemology (see Denyer 1990),
gatherers of the Kalahari with his famous story of the ox
bought by the anthropologist for Christmas in gratitude
to the Bushmen, an act before which they were indignant,
discrediting the purchase, and joking about the qualities of
the ox. Lee, after his initial bewilderment and sadness,
wrote: “I had a growing feeling that something important
had happened in my relationship with the Bushmen and
that the clue lay in the meaning of the joke” (1969: 61).
2. Two examples of this are the interpretation given by
Evans-Pritchard (1967: 29) in the case of the Zande, pre-
senting the trickster as an inept member of society who
regularly engages in socially unacceptable behavior, and
the interpretation of Douglas (1966) or Basso (1987) who,
following a Lévi-Straussian reading, sees the trickster as a
culturally sophisticated individual whose disordered behav-
ior acts as a sort of mediator in the resolution of conflicts.
 Santiago M. CRUZADA, Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS, and Alberto
ideology or religion (see Pilch 1992), and morality (see
Machiavelli [1513] 1950; Lieberman 1977). The general
basis for these three historic visions—which are still pre-
dominant in the West—places deception within a dichot-
omous framework that respectively sets the real against
the unreal, truth against lie, morality against immorality
(Scott 2012: 275).
Deception is also present in the animal world and has
provided a focus of interest for some sociobiologists, zool-
ogists, and ethologists (see the book edited by Mitchell
and Thompson 1986, which sets out many instances in
which animals deceive). The study of deception among
animals has shown that it is profoundly linked to life
in general and is not exclusive to the human domain.
Trivers (2013: 21) argues: “Deception is a very deep fea-
ture of life. It occurs at all levels—from gene to cell to in-
dividual to group—and it seems, by any and all means,
necessary.” However, as signaled by Bruggeman (2015:
244), although human deception might be rooted in sex-
ual selection or in other situations entailing opposing in-
terests among our human forebears—circumstances that
are similar to those that cause deception in non-human
life—in Homo sapiens it develops to a much larger extent
through the possibilities offered by language. From this
point on, hence, deception took on another dimension,
and cannot be thought of in purely biological terms. This
perspective, however, runs the risk of reducing deception
to the purely symbolic, even though human and non-
human beings are involved, thus decoupling it from the
broader life (Kohn 2007) in which this might take place.
For example, some authors have taken an interest in
analyzing deception in relationships between humans
and animals, as in the case of the hunting practices of
indigenous groups, or in the cosmological relations be-
tween humans, animals, and divinities. Using a per-
spectivist approach, Willerslev argues that the success
of reindeer and moose hunting in Siberia depends on
the capacity of the hunters to adopt the perspective of
their prey and present themselves as harmless mates
(2004: 638, 646). If this deception does not work, hunt-
ers are obliged to resort to other ruses, even if these are
frowned upon by the animal’s master-spirits. In cases
where the mythological ideal of hunting is not achieved
(Willerslev, Vitebsky, and Alekseyev 2015: 14), the act of
hunting then becomes subject to an appraisal of the kind
of deception used and whether it is acceptable or not,
thus making it a consequence of certain perfectly human
meanings, symbols, and values.
In all of the above cases, the act of deception is a prop-
erty inherent to life itself and not exclusively circum-
DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR 516
scribed to the human domain. Nevertheless, in analyzing
the consequences of deception, the latter has frequently
been removed from the interactions of which it is a part,
blurring the frameworks of experience that deception
helps to establish. In their analysis of the functionality
of deception in stories and in everyday life, in tales and
practices of hunting, in relationships between animals,
and in individual behaviors, most authors tend to focus
on why deception occurs, or what reasons lie behind it.
How deception takes shape, through which resources
and mediations, however, is analyzed far less frequently
and constitutes, in our view, an important and under-
examined aspect.
On the other hand, there is a prevalent tendency to de-
value deception, on the basis that it does not allow reality
to be captured, or that it creates false realities, or because
it goes against the values of honesty, sincerity, and rigor
to represent reality accurately. Hence, deception is fre-
quently taken to be synonymous with lying and consid-
ered within the sphere of representation, discourse, or
ideology (some exceptions can be found in Blum 2005
or Scott 2012). In general, the way in which both con-
cepts are presented in the literature suggests that both lies
and deception operate once the meeting between inter-
locutors has concluded. This means that its conse-
quences can only be studied a posteriori, within the do-
main of human evaluations and representations.
In our view this shortcoming develops out of the fact
that one of the key characteristics of deception has been
ignored, or at least undervalued: deception acts within
the domain of practice and thus contains a pragmatic el-
ement. Whereas lying falsifies reality, deception attempts
to construct a falsified reality, that is to say, a reality that
would not be possible without the mediation of decep-
tion, but which acquires the ontological status of reality,
serves epistemically to know aspects that would other-
wise remain obscured, and is valued in ways that are
not only purely instrumental.
In line with Bailey (1991), who argued that decep-
tion has multiple uses and provides the basis for partic-
ular interactions, we think it necessary to consider how,
through the means of deception, certain interactions
and frameworks of experience are constructed. This
in turn invites us to: expand our analytical framework
and reconceptualize the very notion of deception as an
expressive action that stimulates interaction; as well as
to put animals at the heart of anthropological concerns
(Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 545–46), questioning,
in our case, their status in Western contexts (Digard
2012; Cruzada 2017).
517
Entanglements through deception
in southern Spain
In southern Spain, an area with singularities that are
repeated in other parts of the Mediterranean (Gilmore
1982), deception is not experienced as it is customarily
presented in the literature. Far from being considered
an element opposed to reality, truth, and morality, de-
ception is taken popularly as a resource of ingenuity,
skill, and intelligence—one that is not only accepted
socially but also valued in the artistic field (Bourdieu
1991). Deception is, therefore, “mastery revealed,” which
is used strategically “over” the different levels of every-
day life (Argenti-Pillen 2007: 323), in other words, a meth-
odological process of action, a tactic (De Certeau 1985),
a licit ploy.3
Partridge hunting using decoys and bullfighting con-
stitute two paradigmatic practices in southern Spain: each
has a unique social importance and is deeply rooted in the
culture of the region. They both exemplify the manner in
which deception fosters a particular framework of expe-
rience out of which a unique type of relationship between
humans and animals emerges. To draw in a shy, elusive,
and swift animal such as the partridge in order to hunt it,
by knowing how to interpret its song, or to take on, using
artistry, a beast that, with a simple movement of its head,
could kill you, is only achieved through certain proce-
dures that revolve around deception, since deception acts
effectively in situations “that do not lend themselves to
precise measurement, to exact calculation, or rigorous
reasoning” (Detienne and Vernant 1988: 11, our transla-
tion). The deception in these practices is not concealed; it
can be seen by the human observer, but not by the animal.
Indeed, the fact that, in these practices, deception ends in
the death of the animal not only shows that such decep-
tion acquires meaning as a trigger for relations, but also
that its interactive properties disappear when they are
known by the deceived subject. Understanding the logic
of deception involves participating in worlds that con-
struct the categories of reality, fiction, and lies differently.
Considering deception as an aspect of the interaction
between human beings and animals is, however, a risky
epistemological option, even if it provides the best exam-
3. Deception, in this regard, could be compared to the Greek
concept of mētis, which refers to “astuteness, foresight,
simulation, flexibility of spirit, the ability to get away from
problems, vigilant attention, a sense of opportunity, di-
verse abilities, and experience gained over a long period
of time” (Detienne and Vernant 1988: 11, our translation).
DECEPTION IN PRACTICE
ple to question the anthropocentrism with which decep-
tion has been tackled. Historically, the social sciences
have been strongly resistant towards treating animals as
an “authentic social actor” in “authentic social interac-
tions” (Sanders 2007: 320–1). Jakob von Uexküll (1982)
signaled that beings relate to each other based on their
corresponding surrounding worlds (Umwelt), as different
realities are shaped in which each being expresses differ-
ent types of dispositions, motivations, subjectivity, and
perceptual and bodily intentions. Even if it is questionable
whether animals are capable of using symbols that are
shared with human beings, or that they possess a certain
type of “mind,” the fact that humans—through their in-
teractions with them—attribute certain faculties to them
suggests the need for an interactionist perspective (Arluke
and Sanders 1996; Alger and Alger 1999), an expression
of certain capacities that, just as between humans, emerge
during joint action (Sanders 2007: 327–8). As Goode
pointed out (2007: 143), however, the shared understand-
ing of symbols and the capacity of participants to have a
valid understanding of each other’s perspectives are not
necessary conditions for interaction (Irvine 2004: 3; Gal-
lagher 2016: 153). Animals are actors insofar as they are
clearly involved with human beings in activities through
which they become, contextually, intentional beings
(Guillo 2015: 121).
The way in which a relationship is formed through de-
ception between hunters and partridges, or between bull-
fighters and bulls, then, should not be analyzed indepen-
dently of those face-to-face communicative processes
where deception acts as mediation, nor outside of the
framework of experience that is generated under the prin-
cipal leitmotiv of deception. However, hunters and bull-
fighters need to recognize and select certain elements in
relation to which animals show intentionality or agency.
Hence, looking into the “subjectivity of the species”
(Lestel 2010: 8) of each animal does not only entail de-
privileging the hegemony of human perception as the
main path to knowledge of the world (Le Breton 2007:
31–49), but also implies taking animals as subjects that
also construct realities that are at one and the same time
material and semiotic.
“Reclamo” partridge hunting
The use of a tame, caged partridge as a live decoy to
hunt wild partridges (Alectoris rufa) constitutes one
of the most deeply rooted and unique hunting modal-
ities in the Mediterranean region. As all hunters know,
this practice, through which hunters take advantage of
 Santiago M. CRUZADA, Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS, and Alberto
the bird’s behavior during its breeding cycle, is cen-
tered around several acts and kinds of deceit (engaño).
Between January and February, the social behavior of
wild partridges undergoes an important change. Par-
tridges, which until then have been living in groups,
splinter off as individuals and begin to “embark on a
fierce battle to mate” (Pequeño 1939: 9, our translation).
The monogamous pair that formed the group the previ-
ous year is the first to separate from it, followed by their
offspring who begin to pair up with mates as they reach
sexual maturity (Vargas et al. 2012: 714). The recently
formed pairs seek to avoid being disturbed, choosing
and retreating to a territory where they “become strong”
(se hacen fuertes), as many hunters say. Once separated
in this way, the females are mounted daily, developing
their eggs over a period of two to three months. The en-
tire period of time between pairing up and egg laying is
referred to by hunters as celo.
During celo partridges become highly territorial and
very possessive over their mates. Knowing this and with
the aim of provoking the wild partridges, hunters pur-
posely introduce a caged, tame, partridge, known as
reclamo (live decoy), within their suspected territory. Be-
fore they can do this, however, hunters must induce, “cul-
tivate” in their own words, the state of celo in the reclamo
partridge as, according to them, captive birds do not
spontaneously achieve the necessary sexual state. In order
for the captive bird to enter the state of celo, hunters care-
fully manipulate the biological cycle and environment of
the caged animal to match that of their wild relatives.
During the summer the birds are placed in a special kind
of cage with humid earth (terrero), in order to stimulate
the molting of feathers. Then, at the start of the autumn,
the birds are moved to a different metal cage, fed on a par-
ticular kind of cereal-based diet and exposed to the sun in
such a way as to induce the state of celo. According to
hunters, the success of the hunt with reclamo depends
on the proper management of their biology through the
use of a sophisticated system that entails the use of differ-
ent cages, foods, and exposure to the sun.4
4. The hunters individualize each animal, they “talk” to
them, they “spoil” them, and they give them a name.
The reclamo, on the other hand, also does so by “recog-
nizing” its owner when he sees or hears him, something
that it demonstrates with its song and its agitated move-
ments. According to the hunters, through daily trans-
species communication with the bird, “mutual confi-
dence” emerges that is required for this type of hunting.
DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR 518
Once the reclamo, always a male, is ready, hunters in-
troduce the live-decoy into the territory of a wild par-
tridge pair in celo. In his own state of celo, the reclamo
calls out from his cage, provoking the pair of wild par-
tridges who, according to the hunters, “understand” that
their space and their “romance” are being threatened,
and thus immediately move in to confront the intruder.
According to the hunters, this in itself constitutes the first
stage of deception, insofar as it attempts to construe a fic-
titious reality, though one that is at once “not at all sus-
picious,” to the pair of wild birds. The event is well illus-
trated in the following ethnographic vignette about a
local hunter, Manolo, and his decoy partridge, Pardo.5
It is six thirty in the morning, on a Saturday in early Feb-
ruary, when we meet the hunter in the countryside near
the village. The scent of spring is in the air, Manolo says,
a sign that conditions are ideal for hunting. After a short
conversation we head out towards a house where he
keeps five cages with partridges for the reclamo. Upon
seeing us approach, one of them, Pardo, calls out softly,
in a way hunters refer to as curicheo-bajo.6 Pardo is six
years old, or as his owner remarks, cinco celos (five
“breeding cycles”), and is thus one of the most experi-
enced birds in his ganadería (livestock herd). Lifting
the cage off its wall hook, the hunter places a custom-
cut green cloth over the cage, thus placing the bird in
the dark. We then put the cage and its stand in the boot
of the car and drive off to the hunting site.
Once there we climb a small hill, sparsely covered in
vegetation. Manolo assures us that partridges seek the
early morning sun in order to “have breakfast.” As nov-
elist and hunter Miguel Delibes notes, the partridge is “a
ritual animal, with clear preferences, almost manic, and
it is natural that those who live close to them end up dis-
covering, and internalizing, their routines and habits”
(1973: 95, our translation). It is precisely there where
5. The ethnographic fieldwork from which this account is ex-
tracted was carried out in Segura de León (Extremadura re-
gion, southwestern Spain), between 2014 and 2018, as part
of the Funding for University Teacher Training (FPU
2013) provided by Spain’s Department of Education, Cul-
ture and Sport.
6. Derek Goodwin (1953: 582) refers to this as “the contact
notes,” which are “soft, quiet clucks with a liquid mellow
tone. Could perhaps be written ‘tlook’ or ‘tuc’ but subject
to much variation. Uttered frequently by birds . . . when
in covey. Very soft and often almost ‘twittering’ in qual-
ity and not easily distinguishable from low-intensity var-
iants of other notes . . . Appear to be an expression of
sociability.”
519
he had previously set up the hide, with a small hole for
the barrel of his gun. Twenty paces away, he places the
two-meter metal stand, with the cage hanging. At day-
break he removes the cloth and the bird starts to sing,
calling out for a dawn encounter with the wild birds.
Pardo emits a reclamo por alto (“rally call,” Goodwin
1953: 582), interspersed with periods of silence, listening
for a reply. This at least is how hunters interpret what
happens.7 The caged bird bursts into the idyll of his
country fellow birds provoking “love and war” in equal
measure given that while the male is dueling, “the fe-
male, with more tender purpose, also draws near—the
seductive love-note entices” (Chapman and Buck 1910:
329). Indeed, within minutes both the male and female
arrive, responding to the call of the “intruder.” The
hunter and his trained partridge, tricksters, fooled the
wild partridges, provoking an encounter.
Endowed with the reclamo, the partridge hunter inserts
himself in, and draws upon, the biosemiotics of the
wild partridge in order to deceive and hunt it. Know-
ing “the myriad forms of communication and significa-
tion observable both within and between living systems
[and concerning himself with] the study of representa-
tion, meaning, sense, and the biological significance of
sign processes” (Favareau 2010: v), enables the hunter,
with the aid of the tamed and caged bird, to carry out
the hunt. The biological cycle, behavior, diet, habits,
and the different calls of the wild partridge are all fun-
damental aspects that must be known in order to de-
ceive them. Likewise, the proper manipulation of the
caged bird is necessary in order to make his celo con-
verge with that of wild partridges.
The attraction, difficulty, and legitimacy of this mo-
dality of hunting is based on the obscure and compli-
cated knowledge of the animal and its behavior. As an in-
formant once assured me, “if one does not know what
the partridge does when it wakes, what it eats, where it
moves, when it breeds, its different calls and a thousand
other things, it will be difficult for you to encounter them
in the field.” A human hunter, therefore, is obliged to
adopt many of the ways of the animal (Marvin 2006:
24) and to penetrate its world in order to deceive it.
From within the hide, in silence, we watched the wild
pair arrive to defend their territory and their bond, and
the deception unfolds into a duel of calls. Such a situation
7. Partridges have many different calls, and knowing them
all—why and when they are used—requires years of ex-
perience. The hunters we worked with identified between
four and twelve different types.
DECEPTION IN PRACTICE
might resemble what Erving Goffman refers to as an “in-
teractive encounter,” a situation that emerges “when per-
sons are in one another’s immediate physical presence”
(1972: 17). Such a one-to-one interactive disposition,
which he called “the interaction order” (Goffman 1983:
2), is modeled by individual conduct wherein sometimes
we say what we think is true while other times, in con-
trast, we play a role such as that of a theatre.8 Having pro-
voked the deceitful encounter, the tamed partridge must
execute it by adopting, according to the hunters, a ficti-
tious role in front of the wild partridges, within which
the reclamo “manipulates at will,” “selecting” certain calls
from its total “repertoire.”
According to Manolo, Pardo, the caged partridge, met
the couple calmly and in a collected manner, thus ex-
pressing the attributes of a good reclamo (Muñoz Seca
1964: 209). The male wild partridge entered the fight
with his neck stretched out, exposing his metallic blue
chest and dragging his wings, intensifying his display af-
ter each round of the back-and-forth calling. The female
watched the fight attentively from a few meters away.
According to the hunter, Pardo called out in a particu-
lar way, curichear (“steam-engine call,” Goodwin 1953:
584); that is, he presented himself to the wild pair or,
to use Goffman’s terms, he “ratified” the interaction or-
der (Goffman 1972: 18). He also called out to the female
in a particular way, titear (“food call,” Goodwin 1953:
583), meaning (always according to Manolo) that he
wanted to have her believe that he was “trustworthy”
(de fiar), as this is the call females use to signal the feeding
of her chicks. Lastly, the tamed partridge used another
call, piñonear (“coition-intention note,” Goodwin 1953);
that is—Manolo said—“blew some kisses” (tiró besitos)
to the pair as a sign of defiance towards the male and of
seduction towards the female.
Manolo knows Pardo well and thus knew when he
needed to stop the fight. Wild partridges respond to
the duel and to its intensification in a purely instinctive
way. In contrast, the caged bird (who in this instance
had already experienced five such breeding seasons,
cinco celos) has learned through his interaction with
his master to engage with the duel of song and to inter-
pret victory differently: without the option for a direct
8. Applying interactionist analysis to contexts in which
humans and animal interact is not disproportional, tak-
ing into account that “the interaction order catches hu-
mans in just that angle of their existence that displays
considerable overlap with the social life of other species”
(Goffman 1983: 3).
 Santiago M. CRUZADA, Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS, and Alberto
physical combat, the decoy partridge needs, and over
time becomes attuned to, a sort of material extension
of himself in order to reach his foe.9 The lead pellets
fired by the hunter provide such an extension. The
hunter, in this manner, becomes the mediating agent
through which the reclamo is empowered within the
confines of his cage.10 This at least is how the hunter
speaks about it, assuring us that each partridge that
he killed to “his Pardo” made him “stronger, braver
and more experienced” and that failing to stop the fight
at the right moment risked “spoiling the bird, render-
ing him useless.”
For Manolo, Pardo is not simply an animal, though
this does not mean he simply ceases to be one. Just as
the hunter has to acquire some of the knowledge and
behavior of the partridge, “the caged partridge also
has to understand the hunter’s point of practice,” noted
the master. This in turn enables a temporary inversion
of hunting roles: in that precise moment it is the caged
partridge who is the hunter, with the human vigilantly
acting as support in a translocation that builds a so-
phisticated architecture of deceit. The caged bird plays
the fictitious role of “wild partridge” animal, while si-
multaneously acting frankly and deceiving as a “hunter”
partridge. The ability to simultaneously embody the
“alterity” of the hunter as a trickster and the perspective
of a wild partridge allows the reclamo to act in two dif-
ferent spaces of motivation at once: “the space of pred-
atory mastery” and “the space of animal imitation”
(Willerslev 2004: 639). In this manner the decoy par-
tridge is empowered, developing an ability over time
to learn to “understand” and play with these different
perspectives during the process of deceit.
9. There is a considerable difference between this type of
fight and others where there are physical fights between
cockerels, in which human intervention during the fight
is not carried out in a material way (see Geertz 1973 and
Marvin 1984).
10. The hunters claim that during the period of celo, male
partridges that fight physically need to see their rival de-
feated or fleeing, and that is—they say—something char-
acteristic of the species. However, in order to train the
reclamo, it is important, once the wild partridge has been
killed, for the hunter to “show” it to his bird so that it can
“realize” that victory has been thanks to the use of its
calls and not as the result of a physical dispute. The role
of the “song-trickster” in the reclamo is developed and
learned progressively from the first hunts.
DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR 520
After a few eternal minutes, Manolo waited for last
refute from Pardo to the wild male. Normally the female
is shot first, thus ensuring the pair is killed as the male
does not fly away, further emboldening the caged bird.
But in this case Pardo was dealing with a shy female,
which did not want to come in, and so the hunter was
obliged to shoot the male bird outright. The wild bird
must be shot within sight of the cage. Otherwise, as
Manolo pointed out, “Pardo might think that the wild
partridge left having had the last word,” and, even if
lying dead behind him, he would feel like he had lost
the duel. Firing his gun right after Pardo’s call within
the series of escalating exchanges, Manolo demonstrated
impeccable aim and timing. Frightened by the noise,
the female flew away but seconds later, Pardo, tireless
in his pursuit, began to beckon her again with his soft,
seductive call, attempting to deceive her once again.
The bull facing deception
The Seville bullring, La Maestranza, is the birthplace of
modern bullfighting (García-Baquero, Romero de Solís,
and Vázquez Parladé 2001). The murmur of twelve
thousand spectators recedes until a complete silence
fills the ring: the faena de muleta is about to begin.
Holding red cloth draped around a stick (muleta), the
bullfighter moves slowly toward the animal, black and
weighing half a ton. He fixes his stare on the bull’s eyes,
allowing for a certain degree of orientation in the inter-
action (Simmel [1901] 1986: 188). The bullfighter’s out-
fit or traje de luces—green in this case with gold adorn-
ments—contrasts with the red muleta, which he holds
in front of him, provoking the bull. Determined, as if
it has not even seen the bullfighter, the bull charges
the muleta. This is the essence of bullfighting: the ani-
mal charges the cloth, confusing it with a solid object
which provokes it. For that reason, in bullfighting jar-
gon, the muleta is known as an engaño (deception),
making the exact nature or purpose of this implement
patent.
The bull is judged according to its singular response
towards the engaño. Bravura (ferocity) and nobleza
(nobility and honesty in behavior) are the adjectives
used to define the qualities most prized in a bull, which
are “measured” in terms of the insistence with which
each animal charges at the muleta (the engaño or de-
ception), repeatedly and with no hesitation in spite of
its progressive loss of strength, and its increasing suf-
fering and irritation. One might expect the bull to stop
charging, to run away, to ignore the engaño and seek
521
refuge behind the panels at the side of the ring, as hap-
pens on a number of occasions; but this is an animal
that, according to those in the know, and after centu-
ries of genetic selection mixed with the individual “will”
of each bull, is predisposed to attack (Wolff 2007;
Zumbiehl 2009). Its “nobility,” the way in which it ex-
presses its ferocity and its “intentions” is related to the
way it single-mindedly charges the muleta, without get-
ting distracted by anything else, and especially not the
bullfighter who stands just a few centimeters away.
Without looking to either side, its head down, the bull
charges, “fixated on the engaño” and intent on reaching
it with its horns. And so this continues until, exhausted,
the bull can no longer continue to charge elegantly.
The bullfighter, in turn, must show his habilidad con
el engaño, mastery of the deception, drawing the bull to-
ward and around him using the muleta, in moves known
as pases. The aim is to get the bull to charge the muleta
without its horns actually touching it, barely brushing
past it, until at the end of each series of pases the animal
“passes through” it in what is known as the pase de pecho,
leading to a certain frustration for the bull when it “finds
out” that there is nothing behind the material, which it
“thought” to be a solid object. Despite this, the animal
no se desengaña, does not undeceive itself, and continues
to charge, showing his bravura, ferocity and individual-
ity. The bullfighter takes advantage of the bull’s behav-
ior, attempting to get the animal to charge increasingly
close to his body with each pass, without actually touch-
ing the muleta. To achieve this, he must slow down the
speed of the bull’s charge, modeling the path it takes.
The bull has never faced a human or a muleta before.
Therefore, in the section of the bullfight known as the
faena de muleta, the animal’s instinct and determination
to charge is combined with the modulation imposed by
the bullfighter.
The task of the bullfighter is to model, moderate, and
dominate the bull’s charge and to prolong its movement
in the animal’s vain—but obstinate—attempt to pursue
the muleta, without ever allowing the bull to reach it.
The movement of both bodies is accompanied by the
movement of the object (Simmel [1896] 1991). The way
in which the bullfighter handles and manipulates the mu-
leta acts as a form of deception. It encourages the bull to
repeatedly pass close to and around the bullfighter’s body,
linking together pases that provoke a tangled human–
animal movement to which the public attributes a certain
aesthetic value and which generates an explicit emotion
among the audience. This is the quintessence of modern
bullfighting, which pursues, through deception, a practi-
DECEPTION IN PRACTICE
cal coupling or connection between bullfighter and bull
in the different pases (Gil Calvo 1989; Paquiro [1836]
1994; Zumbiehl 2009) and which is grounded in the ca-
pacity of the bullfighter to sense, to think with and for
the animal (Ortega y Gasset 1962; Saumade 1995; Wolff
2007), recognizing the bull’s agency and endowing it with
an undoubted protagonism in the bullring.
The public watching the faena de muleta in Seville
particularly values the silence that occurs in this section
of the bullfight, which requires a display of respect, al-
most devotion. Murmurs of disapproval can be heard
if the deception is not executed properly, either because
the animal is not behaving as expected or because the
bullfighter does not demonstrate the necessary skills
for deception. When executed correctly there may be
cries of olé at the end of each pase, showing the public’s
approval, and even, exceptionally, an open display of col-
lective jubilation as the bullfighter and bull become con-
nected in a kind of dance made up of the pases executed
between the two of them. We should not forget that the
bullfighter is taking great risks, barely a few centimeters
from the bull’s horns. At the end, death comes, and in its
execution, the means of deception used—the muleta—
plays a secondary role: it is used to get the bull to lower
its head so that the bullfighter—in the most dangerous
move in the whole faena—can drive his sword into just
the right place, leading to the quickest death possible.
Death is the moment that is furthest away from
deception and, in the words of the bullfighting fans
(aficionados), closest to the “raw truth”; it is necessary,
but not sufficient to evaluate the skill and artistry of a
faena, which focuses above all on the art of deception,
on what the bullfighter can make happen by means of
deception. Death is not the act that is valued most
highly by the public. The only thing expected and valued
is that killing is performed in a manner that is resound-
ingly fast and precise—almost surgical. Hence, the final
deathblow with the sword does not inhabit the world of
bullfighting artistry, which revolves around the skill
with which deception (the muleta) is deployed with re-
gard to the bull; rather, it belongs to the world of tech-
nique. It is not celebrated with an olé; instead, its correct
execution leads the public to exclaim in a way that is
more akin to the sporting world: it is the moment in
which the truth becomes the same for the bull, bull-
fighter, and the public.
In effect, the spectacle of bullfighting revolves en-
tirely around deception. Embodied today in the muleta,
deception is the mediator in the relationship between
bull and bullfighter, but it also becomes an element that
 Santiago M. CRUZADA, Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS, and Alberto
fosters the aesthetic production created by both bodies,
an object that delights the public, who do not condemn
deception in this sphere but instead accept it as a nec-
essary element to produce the excitement produced by
the artistic spectacle. The bull, bullfighter, and the pub-
lic are all fundamentally linked around an act of decep-
tion, although the perception of the same is different
for each party involved. Deception is not a resource
that undermines the elegance of the bullfighter in the
eyes of the public; it is not the trick that allows him
to hide from the danger of the bull, or the parapet that
protects him. Rather, it is the object that allows him to
attain the aesthetic performance he pursues and, there-
fore, it is his ability in the art of this deception that leads
the public to appreciate his skill. Deception, far from be-
ing a necessary requirement, or the lesser of two evils, is
at the very heart of bullfighting: it allows the public to ex-
press and enjoy the command, the level-headedness, the
pleasure, the value, and the artistry of the bullfighter as
well as the bull.11 A brave and noble behavior when faced
with this deception is rewarded with applause when the
dead bull is taken out of arena, and even with a public
pardon if the audience so requests it if the bull’s behavior
has been exceptional during the faena.
A clear distinction is drawn in bullfighting between
deception and lying. Deception is present as the means
through which the relationship between bull and bull-
fighter must necessarily occur, allowing them to become
connected and linked in the type of synchronized move-
ments expected by the public, who yearns for excitement
and emotion. But there are no lies. Beyond a highly fo-
cused and explicit deception (the muleta), the bullfighter
has no other means of defending himself, or escaping, or
getting away from an animal that surpasses him physi-
cally. A simple piece of cloth (material deception) is not
sufficient to elude a fatal goring. Deception is, therefore,
sincere, and its true nature, which promotes interaction,
is not concealed (Crăciun 2012: 859–60). The muleta that
fosters the movement of the bull becomes the best indica-
tor of the negation of the lie in terms of the risk and ev-
ident danger to which the bullfighter is exposed, but also
11. Bullfighting fans and bullfighters alike recognize that
the deception allows the bull to “show itself as it is” in
the bullring, it “strips” it of many of its attributes of in-
stinct and race, in order to “show its lineage” (sacar su
casta), which is more cultural than biological, since it is
achieved through a selective process of the species’ be-
havior (see Marvin 2015: 42–5).
DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR 522
because the bull “recognizes” a reality in relation to which
it decides to charge. For fans of bullfighting, in turn, there
is no greater truth than facing the risk of death with a
scrap of material. In Seville, this is known as “ir por
derecho” (to proceed directly or justly) and “torear con
la verdad por delante” (sincerely, with nothing to hide
and facing death squarely). Bullfighting has retained cer-
tain immutable principles since it first appeared, and
which justify its existence: “the presence of a bull that
charges . . . and the existence of a bullfighter—fighting
on foot in this case—capable of facing with honesty
and truth the risk of fighting a beast” (Cabrera 2011:
16). Deception and truth are inherent for the three parties
involved in the relationship, but a lie, in bullfighting,
would not only invalidate that relationship, it would
not even provoke it: there is deception, but within a con-
text of truth where there is no room for lies.
The historic centrality of this spectacle in Hispanic
culture highlights a unique understanding of deception.
In his fighting of the bull, the bullfighter, a model of mas-
culinity and ethical hero (Tierno Galván 1988), exempli-
fies both a praxis and an ethics of deception. Deception
(a necessary tool for aesthetic production) takes place
within a context of truth, which corresponds to the very
real danger of death through the action of the bull.
Hence, as bullfighting fans assure, deception is not only
used without lying, it is implemented without derision,
without mockery: deceiving the bull is not equivalent
to humiliating it; the animal’s defeat is not even cele-
brated as such, in a simplistic way. Bullfighting, from this
perspective, displays an “honest” use of deception that
does not undermine the dignity of the other, in this case
the bull, precisely because the animal is seen as an ac-
tive agent in the relationship (Thompson 2010: 324–7).
Hence, in bullfighting, through deception, an identified
truth is revealed that is shared and accepted by all those
who participate in the bullfighting spectacle.
This method of deception is repeated one afternoon
after another in the bullfighting ritual, a cultural classic
that transcends its fans, reflecting a way of being and see-
ing the world (Tierno Galván 1988). This form of decep-
tion cannot be confused with mockery or ridicule, or with
taking advantage of the other by eluding danger; it cannot
be equated with but instead is the opposite of a lie, involv-
ing a level of knowledge elevated to artistry, so that only
through the “honest,” “truthful,” and “brave” mastery of
deception can an aesthetic relationship develop between
human and beast, at once enemy and necessary interac-
tive accomplice for artistic production to occur.
523
Deception in practice, broadening
the interactionist analysis
The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1962: 34–
5) argued that bullfighting is not the same as hunting.
Although both activities involve an intense relationship
between human and animal, in hunting one of the par-
ties acts as the hunter and the other seeks to avoid being
hunted, whereas in bullfighting, the bullfighter does not
intend to hunt the bull, and the bull does not intend to
hunt the bullfighter. This article has sought to go beyond
this type of analysis, considering the ontological, episte-
mic and even axiological peculiarity of deception in one
type of hunting and in bullfighting in southern Spain.
Although partridge decoy hunting and bullfighting are
not equivalent, they possess a similarity that is usually
ignored: the use of deception to provoke and give con-
tent to extraordinary interactions between humans and
animals, which in turn generate singular frameworks of
experience (related to practical knowledge, artistry, and
the almost mythical union between man and animal),
and which themselves cannot take place without de-
ception. Analyzing deception as the trigger for a rela-
tionship reveals its role in the emergence of a commu-
nicative situation that, according to the interactionist
approach, has particular requirements:
a single visual and cognitive focus of attention; a mutual
and preferential openness to verbal communication; a
heightened mutual relevance of acts; an eye-to-eye eco-
logical huddle that maximizes each participant’s oppor-
tunity to perceive the other participants’ monitoring
him. Given these communication arrangements, their
presence tends to be acknowledged or ratified through
expressive signs, and a “we rationale” is likely to emerge,
that is, a sense of the single thing that we are doing to-
gether at the time (Goffman 1972: 17–18).
Goffman believes that all interactions must be identified
and ratified by the participants. In the case of deception
in partridge hunting with decoys and in bullfighting,
recognition and ratification of the encounter take place,
but the implicit motives of the person who initiates the
interaction are unknown by the other party. Motives
based on a non-truth cannot be revealed: otherwise,
there would be no deception. Goffman reflects on deceit
and feigning during the interaction itself, as an intrinsic
part of its content (1959, 1972). However, our examples
suggest that this perspective needs to be broadened given
that deception is not only intrinsic to the interaction, but
DECEPTION IN PRACTICE
it is also through it, by way of persuasion, that the ac-
tual interaction itself is established. Persuasion must
facilitate the occurrence and development of the inter-
action (Bailey 1991: 128); the resilience of the interac-
tion will depend on the persuasive potential of the de-
ception used. The hunter—reclamo complex uses the
biosemiotics of the wild partridge to attract it, and the
bullfighter incites the bull using the muleta, spurring
the animal into an inevitable fight. Before the encounter
begins as such, there is already interaction through per-
suasion. This means that the relationship must be effec-
tively constructed within the “subjectivity of the spe-
cies” (Lestel 2010) of each animal and, we would say,
within the subjectivity that, in each interactive moment,
is displayed by the specific animal with which interac-
tion takes place. There must be an intention—through
deception—to maintain such an interaction according
to a certain logic (Simmel 1950).
The importance of these nuances reveals that decep-
tion is not only a content of the interaction, but also
the trigger and leitmotiv of it: deception is the device that
fosters and marks the encounter in a particular sense.
From this perspective, we can grasp the role of deception
as a mediator in the interaction—through persuasive de-
ception—which is far removed from the purpose or con-
sequences of it. Recognizing the dynamism and interac-
tive nature of deception broadens the perspective from
which it has been conventionally analyzed. On the one
hand, it focuses on the provocation of the encounter
(which precedes the actual interaction); on the other, it
substantially broadens the consideration of deception
(shifting from content to being understood as a means
of interaction); and finally, it recognizes the constructive,
creative, positive, and necessary dimension of deception
(shifting away from a perspective that considers it to be a
secondary element, devalued at any rate, an accessory, or
even incompatible with authentic reality). In both the
reclamo partridge hunting and in bullfighting, deception
implies a unique ontology, insofar as deception serves to
turn ordinary realities into extraordinary ones, commu-
nicated as they are in a particular way, depending on how
they are socially constructed within the interaction. De-
ception in these cases also implies a singular epistemol-
ogy, as the central element in an entire system of knowl-
edge that allows for precisely the construction of that
singular interaction and framework of experience. And
finally, it also suggests a specific axiology, given that, in
both practices, deception is not only permitted, but is
also a crucial moral and aesthetic element.
 Santiago M. CRUZADA, Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS, and Alberto
Our discussion and case studies raise a number of
important questions relevant to ongoing research inter-
est in reconsidering the role of animals in social inter-
actions (Haraway 2008; Livingston and Puar 2011;
Ingold 2013; Kohn 2013; Latimer and Miele 2013; Lestel
and Taylor 2013; Ogden, Hall, and Tanita 2013; Van
Dooren, Kirksey, and Münster 2016). This varied body
of work, focused on the communicative-interactive pro-
cesses between humans and animals (Kulick 2017),
shares the need to recognize some form of subjectivity,
one which has been historically monopolized by human
beings. However, in most cases relationships are ana-
lyzed without allowing the specific elements that pro-
duce the human–animal entanglements and endow
them with content, treating them as if they had arisen
inevitably or through an uncontrollable contingency.
If deception is considered a practice that provokes an
interaction between humans and animals, then the act
of deceiving takes on a phenomenological dimension:
it shapes the space, the fundamental language of the
framework of experience, in which different beings re-
late with each other. The fabric of the relationship con-
cocted between humans and animals in the practices
analyzed is grounded in a type of pragmatic deception
that connects the perceptive-cognitive worlds (Merk-
welt) of the participants and is resolved in a world of ac-
tion (Wirkwelt) as a consequence of this linkage (von
Uexküll [1934] 1965). In the attempt to generate a space
for relations with animals, reclamo partridge hunters
and bullfighters use deception as a practical tool that al-
lows them to construct face-to-face encounters. Ap-
proaching deception as a practice in these cases shows
how relational processes are constructed and not edified
ab initio; that entanglements are weaved while they are
taking place and cannot be counted in media res, as if
they were not modeled by the content thereof, by face-
to-face communicative situations, or by the moments
in which a non-truth is used. Put differently, the act of
deceiving enables the encounter and endows it with
content, leading to the emergence of a preceding inter-
active context and a consequent relational space.
Analyzing deception as a practice moves away from
the aim of accounting for stories produced by relation-
ships between humans and non-humans—the “arts of
noticing” to use Anna Tsing’s (2011: 6–1) term—to one
that allows us to examine more carefully the phenome-
nological construction of such relationships (Digard
2012: 571). Hence, deception, as well as being the foun-
dation through which interactions are established, also
DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR 524
constitutes a practical ability, and is linked to the dif-
ferent dispositions acquired by the participants over
the course of a relationship. Accepting these premises
broadens an otherwise narrow analytical framework
of deception, allowing one to consider multiple analyti-
cal spheres and to understand interactions that take
place between all kinds of being, enveloped in dynamics
that imply the use of non-truth. The fact that the prac-
tices analyzed—reclamo partridge hunting and bull-
fighting—incite public admiration and condemnation
in equal measure, can be linked to the consideration of
deception either as a mediating practice of relations, or,
in contrast, as an amoral tool used by a superior being
to subject an inferior one through the use of lies and
fraud.
Our study proposes changing the questions posed
around deception in order to ultimately gain a better
understanding of the relations and framework of expe-
rience established through its mediation. We have ar-
gued in favor of viewing deception as a practice and a
vehicle, a cornerstone for a particular social construc-
tion of reality. An eminently objectivist, rationalist
and moralizing “way of thinking” (Del Campo Tejedor
2017) has obscured the multiplicity and heterogeneity
of practices where deception is crucial for the genera-
tion of interactions and the construction of certain
frameworks of experience. Considering deception as a
resource, a mediator, as a kind of know-how, or prac-
tice, allows us to understand better what happens under
its sign. Our ethnographic examples reveal that consid-
ering deception from this angle allows us to unmask the
sense and meaning behind certain interactions, partic-
ularly some between humans and animals. By substan-
tially broadening the classic interactionist perspective,
we believe that this proposal can also be applied to rela-
tions between humans, in which visions based exclu-
sively on the understanding of deception as an immoral
tactic to conceal the true nature of things continues to
prevail. We believe that in spite of its eminently symbolic-
discursive character, human deception could also be
productively considered as an activator of relationships
and not merely as an expression of an attempt to distort
reality. Indeed, deception among humans also presents
a phenomenological dimension as a catalyst for social
relations, one that we should integrate in further analy-
ses and in ways that are analogous to how we have done
here. Thus, our article offers a new problematization of
an old issue or, perhaps, a reconceptualization; an inten-
tion to rethink, analyze, and develop a more complex
525
approach to a notion that we use regularly in our every-
day life: deception.
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our thanks to Miguel Alexiades for
his helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions.
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Santiago M. CRUZADA is a PhD in Ecological Anthropology at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide and an Assistant
Professor of Social Anthropology at the Universidad de Sevilla. His research focuses on the biosemiotics of hunter–
animal relationships in the Sierra Morena Extremeña (Badajoz, Spain).
Esteban RUIZ-BALLESTEROS is a Professor of Social Anthropology and Head of Department of Social Anthropology,
Basic Psychology and Public Health at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide. His research focuses on environmental
anthropology, community-based tourism and community–construction processes in Andalusia (Spain) and Ecuador.
Alberto DEL CAMPO TEJEDOR is a Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide. His
research focuses on rites of passage, carnivals, folk music, tourism and orality in different areas of the Mediterranean
region—primarily in Andalusia and Italy—and Ecuador.
Santiago M. Cruzada
Esteban Ruiz-Ballesteros
Alberto del Campo Tejedor
Department of Social Anthropology, Basic Psychology and Public Health
Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Ed. 11, 37 planta, Despacho 2. Ctra. Utrera, 1
41013, Seville
Spain
qruzada@gmail.com
eruibal@upo.es
acamtej@upo.es