Coordinated Bargaining at Gene

73-28,287
COHEN, Abraham, 1932-

COORDINATED BARGAINING AT GENERAL
ELECTRIC: AN ANALYSIS.
Cornell University, Ph.D., 1973
Sociology, labor relations
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COORDINATED BARGAINING AT GENERAL ELECTRIC:
AN ANALYSIS
A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell
University for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Abraham Cohen
May 1973
DEDICATION
To my wife, Rachel and my children, Ron,
Yuval and Daphna, for their love, encouragement
and sacrifice.
ii
VITA
Mr. Cohen was born in Tel Aviv, Israel, in 1932. He is married
and has two sons and a daughter. He received his B.A. degree in
Political Science from the University of Tel Aviv in 1959. From 1953
to 1960 he was employed at the Histadrut (The General Federation of
Labor in Israel) in various positions, the last of these being the
National Secretary-General of the Israel National Union of Graduates
in the Social Sciences and Humanities and the Executive Director of
the Academic Department of Histadrut. In September 1960 he entered
graduate studies at the University of California at 3erkeley in the
fields of public and personnel administration and industrial relations
and earned a master's degree in Political Science. Upon returning to
Israel in 1964 he was appointed Personnel Manager of a large food
factory "Osem" Ltd. In this post he was responsible for all contract
negotiations and administration. For a couple of years he taught part-
time at the Hebrew University in Tel Aviv as an instructor in Public
Administration. In August 1970 he left his position at "Osem" to pur
sue doctoral studies at Cornell University, New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations. Mr. Cohen is a member of the Industrial
Relations Research Association in Israel.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank all officials of the General Electric
Company and the unions involved, too many to be listed, for their kind
ness, cooperation and willingness to supply the information needed for
the preparation of this study. Their contributions are highly appreci
ated .
A special word of appreciation and gratitude is due to Professor
Vernon H. Jensen, Chairman of the author's Special Committee for his
invaluable guidance and encouragement and for his constructive coun
sel and comments in making the research and in writing the final form
of the dissertation.
The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the New York
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, for
supporting him financially, in the form of research assistantships,
during his stay at Cornell.
Special thanks are due to Mrs. M. Henry for promptly typing the
final form of the dissertation, and for her patience and understanding.
Last, but not least, the author wishes to express his special
gratitudes to his wife Rachel, for her love and sacrifice, and for the
painstaking work of typing the first draft of the dissertation.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I COORDINATED BARGAINING AND STRUCTURES of

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1
Bargaining Structures A
Cooperation Between Unions in Collective Bargaining 8
Obstacles to Cooperation 11
Coalition and Coordinated Bargaining Defined 12
Uniqueness of Coalition and Coordinated

Bargaining 17
The Role of the IUD in Spreading Union

Cooperation 18
The Legal Status of Coalition and

Coordinated Bargaining 21
Addendum - Scope and Objectives of this Study 24
Methods of Investigation 27
A. Company and Union Publications,

Documents and Restricted Materials 28
B. Interviews 28
C. Questionnaires to Local Unions 30
Limitations and Suggestions for Further

Research 31
II UNION RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES OF COORDINATED

BARGAINING 33
The Changing Character of American Industry 35
Unions Seek Power Equilibrium through

Coordinated Bargaining 38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER Page
II (Continued)
The Growing Scope and Complexity
of Negotiable Issues 42
Similarity of Major Benefits and Terms of

Employment 43
Standardized Conditions Lead to Centralization

within Management and to Cooperation among Unions 45
III THE BACKGROUND IN GENERAL ELECTRIC — THE COMPANY,

THE UNIONS, AND THE COMPANY’S LABOR POLICY 50
The General Electric Company 50
The Unions at General Electric 53
General Electric Labor Policy 61
General Electric's New Approach to

Labor Relations 63
The Essence of "Boulwarism" 66
IV UNION RATIONALE FOR COORDINATED BARGAINING

AT GENERAL ELECTRIC 78
GE's Boulwarism and Division Among the Unions 79
Unions Resent "Boulwarism" 83
GE's Initial Offers — The"Tempting Dish" 85
"Boulwarism" Viewed as Menace to Unionism 89
"Boulwarism" as Practiced in 1960,

Ruled Illegal 94
Unions’ Cooperation Becomes a Necessity 98
Coordinated Bargaining — Logical Evolution 100
V THE FORMATION OF COORDINATED BARGAINING AT

GENERAL ELECTRIC IN 1965-1966 104
Coordinated Bargaining at GE is Revived 106
The Role of the AFL-CIO 112
vi
CHAPTER Page
V (continued)
The First Unity Convention 116
The Communication System 120
VI PREPARATION FOR THE 1966 NEGOTIATIONS AND THE

LEGAL STATUS OF COORDINATED BARGAINING 126
Intended Coalition 126
Coalition Intentions Abandoned 128
The Issue of the "Mixed" Negotiating Committee 130
An Injunction against General Electric 133
The Legality of Coordinated Bargaining Upheld 136
General Electric Fights Union Unity Drives 141
Unity Strengthened 144
The Parties Strong and Determined 145
VII THE 1966 NEGOTIATIONS 148
Union Strategy 148
Local Coordination 152
Union Demands 153
Management Position 155
General Electric's "First, Full and Firm" Offer 158
The Test of Power Begins 161
General Electric Modifies Initial Offer 163
Strike Preparations 165
President Johnson Intervenes 168
Power Considerations 170
vii
R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER Page
VII (Continued)
Settlement Is Reached 172
Evaluation 175
Was Unity Solid? 180
Conclusions 183
VIII THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1969-1970 NEGOTIATIONS 185
National Unity Conference 187
National Goals 189
Ballots for 1969 Goals 190
Grass Root Meetings 191
Unity Week 192
Reorganization 193
Communications 196
Expansion of the Coordinated Group 197
IX PRE-STRIKE NEGOTIATIONS, 1969 202
Pre-Negotiations Subcommittee Discussions 202
Formal Contract Negotiations 205
•'Boulwarism" Still Active 215
Union Demands and GE's First Offer 219
GE's Initial Offer Remains Firm 222
X THE 1969-70 STRIKE AND SETTLEMENT 228
Negotiations Resumed 231
General Electric’s Second Offer is Rejected 234
Strike is Solid Despite Back-to-Work Campaign 238
viii
CHAPTER Page
X (Continued)
Chief Federal Mediator Intervenes 241
Economic Pressures Help Mediation 243
"Give-and-Take" Restored Through Mediation

— Settlement Reached 245
The Settlement: Better than Initial Offer? 247
Cost of Living 247
Wages 249
U nions’ Primary Goal Achieved 251
Was Unity Solid? 256
Extent of Unity 256
Satisfaction of Local Unions 258
"Boulwarism" Was Defeated 262
XI CONCLUSIONS 265
"Boulwarism" Generated Coordinated Bargaining

at GE 265
Coordinated Bargaining Has Shattered

"Boulwarism" 267
Implications of Union Victory at General Electric 272
APPENDICES 274
BIBLIOGRAPHY 288
ix
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
1 General Electric Sales, Net Earnings and

Employment 54
2 The Major Unions at General Electric, 1966 57
3 General Electric Publications: Centrally Prepared

by Employee Communication Operation 74
A General Electric Local Publications: Locally

Prepared Materials Appearing in Employee
Publications at Individual Locals 75
5 Regional Offices of the CCB, 1966 122
6 Grass Roots Meetings, 1966 124
7 The Coordinating Unions at General Electric, 1966 149
8 Average Hourly Wage Increases In GE-IUE

Settlements and in Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Manufacturing, 1954-1965. 157
9 General Electric Proposals and the Final

Settlement, 1966 174
10 Composition of the Coordinated Bargaining

Group at General Electric, 1969. 200
11 IUE's Proposals.and GE's First Offer of

October 7, 1969 220
12 General Electric's First Offer and the

Final Settlement, 1969-1970. 248
13 Comparison of the 1970 Settlement with GE's

Offers in Wage Increase and Cost-of-Living
Adjustment 250
14 Average Hourly Increases of Wage Rates in

First-Year Settlements in General Electric
and in Manufacturing, 1955 to 1969-1970. 269
Chapter I
COORDINATED BARGAINING AND STRUCTURES OF

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining structures in the United States have been
altered in the last decade with the growth of coordinated or coalition
bargaining in large manufacturing companies. More often than not, how
ever, the introduction and application of this bargaining approach by
unions in the last ten years was met with strong opposition by American
management.^- Consequently, the issue of coordinated or coalition bar
gaining has become a highly controversial phenomenon in the companies
or the industries involved. Controversy was avoided, however, in situ
ations where managements were responsive and agreed to bargain with
multi-union alliances.
Efforts by unions to achieve new bargaining relationships and
the antagonistic position of management in many cases reflect the im
portance of bargaining structures to unions and management. Explicit
^ For a comprehensive account of recent union attempts at spreading

coalition or coordinated bargaining see William N. Chernish, Coalition
Bargaining; A Study of Union Tactics and Public Policy, 1969. For a
brief account see Philip J. Schwarz, Coalition Bargaining (Ithaca:
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Univer
sity, 1970), Key Issues Series, No. 5.
2
in this controversy over structure is a basic struggle between the
parties involved for improved bargaining power. Through coordinated
efforts unions seek to enhance their bargaining power through the ex
pansion of bargaining structures, whereas managements, on the other
hand, try to maintain the status quo in positions of power by rejecting
the efforts of the unions. In essence, then, the controversy over
coordinated and coalition bargaining reflects another variant in the
struggle for the achievement of a balance of power. The latter is in
deed basic to the process of collective bargaining, and an essential
requirement for maintaining meaningful negotiations between the par-

2
ties. To attain a balance of power unions and managements alike have
at all times striven to devise appropriate bargaining structures that
can accommodate their specific situations and needs. When circum
stances change in a manner that distort the equilibrium of power, the
affected parties usually seek to revise existing structures. Hence,
bargaining structures, or more precisely the decision-making and the
negotiating units in particular, always were highly important, if not
central, factors in the struggle between unions and managements.
In this constant struggle for power a basic question arises:
should a bargaining structure or a negotiating unit be large or small,
centralized or decentralized, national or local, company-wide or
industry-wide, and which structure best accommodate the specific needs
of the parties and maximize their bargaining power? Past and present
2
Vernon H. Jensen, "The Process of Collective Bargaining and the
Question of Its Obsolescence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review.
Vol. 16, No. 4 (July 1963), p. 550.
3
bargaining structures in the United States supply no challengeable
answer and provide no prescription for an ideal structure. Each situ
ation has its own needs. As Professor Harold W. Davey indicated,
"...the structure of bargaining relationships in the American economy

3
reflects a pattern of variety and diversity." Moreover, bargaining
structures are not only diversified but also dynamic. For various
reasons any specific structure may be modified over time to fit chang
ing needs and new conditions. Actually, as Professor Neil W. Chamberlain
pointed out, structural relationships are in a "constant state of
flux."4
Despite their diversity and dynamic character, past and present
bargaining patterns provide clues or general criteria as to the major
factors which determine bargaining structures. Professor Arnold R.
Weber categorized these structural determinants within five groups:
(1) market factors; (2) the nature of bargaining issues; (3) represen
tational factors; (4) government policies; and (5) power tactics in the
bargaining process.^ A bargaining structure is not an outcome of just
one single factor but largely a combination of them. In many cases, if
3
Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining, 2nd ed., 1959,
p. 83.
4 ..
Neil W. Chamberlain, Determinants of Collective Bargaining Struc
tures," The Structure of Collective Bargaining: Problems and Prospects,
Arnold R. Weber, ed., 1961. p. 17.
Arnold R. Weber, "Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective

Bargaining," Challenges to Collective Bargaining. Lloyd Ulman, ed.,
1967, p. 14.
4
not in most, all factors come into play in determining the desired
structure, and each party may be influenced differently by them, thus
leading to possible conflict and ultimate compromise.
Bargaining Structures
In order to understand better the phenomenon of coordinated and
coalition bargaining as variants in the totality of bargaining struc
tures in the United States, a brief summary of the major bargaining
patterns is necessary.
In the variety of existing collective bargaining structures one
can identify several major characteristic patterns as follows:
(1) Structures tend to embrace the scope of the product market
In order to insure uniformity of wages by taking wages out of compe
tition. Accordingly, local-market industries such as building (com
mercial and residential construction), trade (retail, wholesale,bakeries),
service (hotels and restaurants, laundries, etc.) and publishing and
printing have local or regional bargaining structures. On the other
hand, mass production industries such as steel. automobiles and rubber
tires have company-wide bargaining structures coextensive with their
national product market.
(2) Industrial unions usually seek centralized structures that
cover the product market while craft unions prefer decentralized forms
coextensive with the labor market.^ To the latter unions, the main
concern is the craft rather than the product. Accordingly they seek
** Weber, p. 15.
5
job monopoly or the protection of the craft within the area of compe
titive labor markets. Nevertheless, in certain types of craft bar
gaining such as between construction crafts and national contractors,
a tendency toward centralization is increasing.^ A similar trend on
an industry-wide scale has been developed by the International Typo
graphical Union in its dealings with the American Newspaper Publishers'
Association. National and industry-wide bargaining takes place also
in some trade and service industries, terminating with master con
tracts of varying degrees of scope and coverage. Such master con
tracts are usually supplemented by local agreements. In a few indus
tries, however, such as in wallpaper and elevator construction,

g
industry-wide contracts cover practically all labor issues.
(3) Although centralized bargaining structures are considered
as unions' goal in mass production industries, some of these industries
have decentralized structures, that is, plant-wide negotiating units
(chemical, food, and oil), while other industries have hybrid struc
tures (electrical manufacturing, paper and bakeries). Centralized
company-wide bargaining units have been largely rejected by multi-plant
companies producing homogeneous comodities. The reason is clear: by
maintaining local bargaining structures such a company can transfer
production from struck to non-struck plants. On the other hand, cen-
^ Margaret K. Chandler, "Craft Bargaining," Frontiers of Collective

Bargaining. John 7 Dunlop and Neil W. Chamberlain, eds., 1967, p. 61.
g
Jesse Thomas Carpenter, Employers' Associations and Collective
Bargaining in New York City. 1950, pp. 148-156.
6
tralized structures have been accepted often by vertically integrated
multi-plant companies in order to prevent unions from striking single
key plants and causing chain interruptions of work (General Motors,
Ford, International Harvester).
(4) Multiple-unit bargaining structures are very common, par
ticularly, but not only, in non-manufacturing industries. According
to a survey of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of 252 con
tracts covering 5,000 workers or more, in effect in 1970 in all in
dustries except railroads, airlines and government, 90 out of 126 agree
ments in non-manufacturing (over 71 percent), covering 1,247,450 out
of 1,741,050 workers, were negotiated on a multi-employer basis. In
manufacturing industries, on the other hand, only 39 out of 126 con
tracts (about 31 percent), covering 580,550 out of 2,362,025 employees,

9
were bargained with multi-employer units. In a more recent BLS sur
vey of all contracts covering 2,000 workers or more in the said indus
tries, in effect in 1971, multi-employer agreements accounted for about
66 percent of all contracts in non-manufacturing but only 19 percent
in manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s I n various non-manufacturing industries
multi-employer structures have been formed, mostly but not necessarily,
on a regional or a local basis. In some instances such as in the coal
and trucking industries, contract negotiations through employers'
9
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Agreements Cover
ing 5.000 Workers or M o r e . 1970, Bulletin No. 1686, p. 8.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Agreements

Covering 2.000 Workers or M o r e . 1972, Bulletin No. 1729, p. 9.
7
associations were adopted as a defense against whipsawing tactics of
one large union (the United Mine Workers and the Teamsters, respec
tively) . A similar pattern developed in the steel industry where
eleven major companies negotiate on a joint basis with the United
Steelworkers, although no master agreement for all companies resulted.
In other industries such as in building, service, trade, entertain
ment, printing, publishing, railroads, maritime, longshoring, food and
apparel, employers' associations were originally formed to deal with
multiple craft unions. Here, too, association bargaining was initially
resorted to as a defensive move against union power. In some of the
latter industries such as in maritime, longshoring, airlines, and ap
parel, employers' associations negotiate separately with each union.
In other industries multi-employer units bargain with local trades
councils or joint union committees of all or most of the unions in
volved, such as is the case in some service, trade, printing, building,
entertainment, and railroad industries. Multi-employer multi-union
bargaining units have also evolved, since 1934, in the pulp and paper
12
industry on the West Coast.
(5) Where formal multi-employer structures are not feasible,
such as in oligopolistic industries dominated by a few large companies
(automobile, steel, copper, rubber, meatpacking and electrical manu-
11 Clark Kerr and Lloyd H. Fisher, "Multiple-employer Bargaining:

The San Francisco Experience,” Insights into Labor Issues. R. A. Lester
and J. Shister, eds., 1948, pp. 27-28. See also Robert Franklin Hoxie,
Trade Unionism in the United States, 2nd ed., 1923, p. 201.
12
For a comprehensive account of multi-employer associations see the
work by Carpenter noted earlier.
8
facturing), bargaining structures are on a single-employer basis with

13
pattern setters and pattern followers in each industry. In struc
tures following "Pattern bargaining," terms negotiated at the unit of
direct impact usually get extended later to all major companies, thus
approximating uniformity of wages and benefits throughout the particu
lar industry.
(6) Another variant in collective bargaining structures is the
multi-union single employer formation. Just as employers, facing one
strong union, resort to association bargaining to avoid being whip-
sawed and played-off against each other, so do unions dealing with a
large single employer or with employers’ associations. Concerted
action by unions, however, comes into being in various ways and the
degree of cooperation among them varies in different industries and
circumstances. As Professor George H. Hildebrand indicated, mutual
bargaining efforts by unions "can extend all the way from tacit collu
sion among separately negotiating organizations to a formal alliance

14
involving common demands, common negotiations and common settlement."
Cooperation Between Unions in Collective Bargaining
Historically, formal union cooperation for the purpose of bar
gaining has evolved on three major l e v e l s (1) cooperation within

13
Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining, 3rd ed., 1972,
p. 39.
^ George H. Hildebrand, "Coordinated Bargaining; An Economist's Point

of View," Industrial Relations Research Association. Proceedings of the
1968 Annual SprinE Meeting. IRRA, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968, p. 524.
^ Herbert J. Lahne, "Coalition Bargaining and the Future of Union

Structure," Labor Law Journal. Vol. 18, No. 6 (June 1967), p. 353.
9
a national union, that is, between locals affiliated with the same
national union. The formal structure is usually a joint board or a
district council established on a city or regional basis; (2) Cooper
ation between locals affiliated with different national unions and
through regional or metropolitan trades councils. Prominent among
them are the long-time building trades councils, the printing trades
councils and the metal trades councils; and (3) the more recent co
operation, between national unions or between national unions and local
unions on a company-wide, or industry-wide basis. Cooperation on this
level takes place through joint negotiating committees comprised of
representatives of the unions involved in each situation.
Examples of inter-union cooperation in bargaining, particularly
on the local level, are numerous and date back to the early days of
bargaining relationships in this country. Joint-union negotiations
with construction employers, for instance, began as early as in the
1880's and by the railroad operating crafts since 1 9 0 2 . ^ Most other
multi-union alliances, noted earlier in connection with employers'
associations were formed during the 1930's. Increasing mutual interests
among unions, having parallel jurisdictions, extended union cooperation
in a growing number of companies and industries. In 1956, for example,
the major meatpacking firms agreed to bargain with a joint negotiating
committee composed of representatives of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen and of the United Packinghouse Workers. Joint bar
gaining evolved also in the shoe industry in the late 1950's. This
16 Hildebrand, p. 524.
10
occurred, for example, in St, Louis, Missouri, where locals of the
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and the United Shoe Workers of America
negotiated jointly with the two largest companies, Brown Shoe Co., and
International Shoe Co.1^
Formal union alliances for the purpose of bargaining are not
confined to affiliates of the AFL-CIO. The best example, but not the
only one, is the long tradition of joint negotiations carried out by
independent and affiliated unions in the railroad industry. Similar
cooperation exists in the glove industry between the United Glove Wor
kers (independent) and Local 1714 of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
(AFL-CIO). Joint negotiations are also conducted with the California
and Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corporation by the independent Longshore
men and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) and the Sugar Workers Union, an
affiliate of the Seafarers' International Union. Another type of for
mal union alliance, two independent unions, the ILWU and the Teamsters,
negotiated jointly and reached a joint agreement with Kaiser Gypsum in
1963.18
Quite aside from formal union alliances for the purpose of joint
bargaining, cooperation between unions can take on various other forms,
often informally. Accordingly, union cooperation may be effectuated
through sharing information, joint planning of bargaining goals, joint
consultation prior to and during negotiations, seeking similar settle
ment terms, mutual respect for picket lines, and moral and financial
^ "Trade Union Alliances for Collective Bargaining," Monthly Labor

Review. Vol. 88, No. 5 (May 1965), p. IV.
18 Ibid.
11
support to striking members. Sometimes these types of mutual assis
tance are not less effective in enhancing union strength than formal
multi-union bargaining structures. Indeed, in most bargaining relation
ships where formal union alliances are absent, some of the foregoing
forms of cooperation prevail.
Obstacles to Cooperation
Union efforts in promoting cooperation among themselves should
not obscure, however, the inherent limitations and shortcoming to it,
particularly among craft unions. If disadvantages were non-existent
should not unions be more willing to merge or, at least, to formalize
their cooperation in each and every bargaining situation? The fact
that multi-union alliances do not prevail everywhere, and some do not
last long, clearly implies the existence of limitations and obstacles.
Some obstacles are external barriers, such as organizational
structures of managements, employers' opposition, government policies
and labor legislation. Other obstacles, perhaps not less important,
are those inherent in the very nature of unionism. The predominant
factors inhibiting cooperation or impeding formal multi-union alliances
of lasting duration are basically those responsible for the formation
of different and diversified unions. Among them are: heterogeneity
of membership (education, race, age, sex), differing skills and occu
pations, degree of competitiveness in the labor market, varying or
conflicting interests and objectives, and ambitions for self autonomy
and independence. Internal obstacles to union cooperation stem from
economic, social and political factors. Inter-union formal alliances
12
may flatten wages to the disadvantage of specialized or highly skilled
groups, may hamper institutional autonomy of the individual unions and

19
may cause representational and leadership problems.
Once these barriers are removed, union willingness to enter into,
or remain in, inter-union alliances depends on whether the joint
economic gains expected or achieved through such alliance outweigh the

20
gains anticipated from independent bargaining. The recent, and cur
rent, expansion of union cooperation in the manufacturing sector,
effectuated in the form of coordinated or coalition bargaining, is a
clear indication that more and more unions prefer alliances.
As seen in the foregoing summary of collective bargaining struc
tures, cooperation or alllnaces for the purpose of bargaining, among
employers and unions alike, are not uncommon in American industry.
Hence, the coordinated or coalition bargaining approach is not neces
sarily a new invention in bargaining structure, except perhaps for the
terms which are often used s;'nonymo u 5j.y. To show the resemblence of
coalition and coordinated bargaining to other forms of inter-union co
operation reviewed earlier, a definition of these new terms is neces
sary.
Coalition and Coordinated Bargaining Defined
The terms coalition bargaining and coordinated bargaining have

19
For more details on obstacles to cooperation between unions, see
works noted earlier by Chamberlain, pp. 11-19; Chandler, pp. 63-65;
and E. Robert Livernash, "Special and Local Negotiations," Frontiers
of Collective Bargaining. John T. Dunlop and Neil W. Chamberlain, eds.,
1967, pp. 27-49.
20
Chamberlain, p. 16.
13
sometimes been used loosely and interchangeably. Often employers make
use of the-.term coalition bargaining whereas unionists have used the
term coordinated bargaining. The most important reason for this, as
will be developed shortly, is the distinction between the two terms
which has arisen from decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). Distinction between the two, or definition, has become impor
tant.
Literally, coalition is an alliance for coordinated action be
tween two or more individuals or groups having similar interests and
objectives. Under such an alliance the participants commit themselves
voluntarily to act jointly toward the achievement of certain common
goals.
Coordinated action is thus the method or the means by which
coalition operates. Likewise, coordinated action in this context im
plies a joint activity undertaken by two or more individuals or groups
in a harmonized manner. Usually coordinated action is directed to the
attainment of common objee tives o f the coordinating members.
In collective bargaining, coalition and coordinated bargaining
are both alliances, or joint actions, between two or more unions for
the purpose of negotiating more effectively. The unions involved might
represent different groups of employees of a multi-plant employer, or
of several employers, on common matters affecting each.
In Social Psychology Prof. William A. Gamson defines coalition as

follows: "A coalition is the joint use of resources to determine the
outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving more than
two units," William A. Gamson, "Experimental Studies of Coalition For
mation," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Leonard Berkowitz,
ed., 1964, p. 85. See similar definition in John W. Thibout and Harold
H. Kelly, The Social Psychology of Groups. 1959, p. 205.
14
Like other structural combinations, discussed earlier, either
coalition or coordinated bargaining is devised primarily to maximize
the power position of the cooperating unions with respect to the employer
or employers with whom they deal. In either, ultimate goals are basi
cally the same: (1) to seek and reach uniformity in benefits and terms
of employment for all workers in a multi-plant company or in an indus
try; (2) to improve pay, benefits and terms of employment for their
constituents. Similar, too, are the methods and the course of action
pursued by each, whether in coalition or coordinated bargaining, before
they reach the bargaining table. In each there is joint determination
of common goals and joint planning of common actions. Furthermore,
within developments in recent years, new efforts at coordinated or
coalition bargaining have been promoted or guided by the Industrial
Union Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO. Finally, under each method the
collaborating unions are represented at the bargaining table by a
"mixed," inter-union, negotiating committee comprised of representatives
of all or most participating unions.
It is at the bargaining table where coalition and coordinated
bargaining depart from each other. If the alliance is requesting and
pressing management to bargain jointly for all unions at the same time
in order to reach and sign a single common labor contract. covering
jointly all separately certified bargaining units, it is coalition bar
gaining . If, on the other hand, the inter-union negotiating committee
is formally seeking to bargain only for one union and no joint multi
union, or master contract is demanded, it is coordinated bargaining.
15
In other words, the real distinction between coalition and coor
dinated bargaining lies in the end result, that is, in the immediate
formal outcome sought or requested by the cooperating unions at the
bargaining table. Accordingly, coalition bargaining seeks joint nego
tiations, common terms and a single multi-unit contract for major
issues on a company-wide or an industry-wide basis. Coordinated bar
gaining seeks joint negotiations but for a single union, leading, of
course, to common terms for all under separate contracts for each bar-
22
gaining union or unit within an industry or a company.
Although, as Philip J. Schwarz has pointed out, coalition bar-

23
gaining may be labor's goal of present coordinated bargaining, exis
ting legal restrictions preclude the imposition of coalitions without
the consent of employers. So far, the only instance where a coalition
between unions, aiming at joint negotiations and a single master con
tract, is lawful is when employers are willing to negotiate with the
coalition on such a basis. As indicated by Julius G. Serot* Assistant
For a similar distinction between coalition and coordinated bar

gaining see Lynn E. Wagner, "Multi-Union Bargaining: A Legal Analysis,"
Labor Law Journal. Vol. XIX (December 1968), pp. 733,737.
23
Schwarz, p. 21. Actually, this objective was made clear by Leonard
Lesser, General Counsel of the IUD. In a speech delivered in January
1968 at the Fourth Annual Labor-Management Conference, Lesser said in
part:
"We are at a way-station on the road to coalition bargaining
where a group of unions representing different units of an
employer will be able to face a single employer at a bar
gaining table, over terms and conditions of employment uni
formly applicable to all employees of the company."
Leonard Lesser, "Labor's Viewpoint"in "Coalition Bargain
ing: Three Views," Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Labor-
Management Conference. the University of Arizona, January
1968, p. 12.
16
General Counsel, Division of Litigation of the National Labor Relations
Board, it has always been lawful for a company and a union "to bargain
24
beyond the periphery of a particular unit if they both agree to do so"
As will be seen later, any coalition attempt resisted by employers,
and carried to the point of impasse, has been regarded as illegal under
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. Coordinated bargaining, on the other
hand, has been held to be lawful, that is, unions may legally force
bargaining with a joint committee of the participating unions for the
purpose of negotiating on items which will be included in their separate
agreements.
It is largely because of legal barriers that unions refrain from
pushing objectives of coalitions to the point of impasse or from even
using the term coalition. For the same reasons management people like
to define as coalition any union cooperation, whether it seeks a single
master contract for all units involved or separate agreements for each
union. As claimed by Irving Abramson, General Counsel of the. Inter
national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) , "Those
hostile to its use by unions [coordinated bargaining] dubbed it as
'coalition1 bargaining, attributing to it implications of a conspiracy

25
to compel multi-unit bargaining."
^ Julius G. Serot, "Coalition Bargaining: What Is It?" in "Coalition

Bargaining: Three Views," Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Labor-
Management Conference. University of Arizona, January 1968, p. 10.
25
Irving Abramson, "Coordinated Bargaining by Unions," New York Univer
sity Twentieth Annual Conference on Labor. 1968, p. 232. Abramson for
got, though, that even union sources used in the past the term "coali
tion." See for example: IUE News. March 24, 1966, p. 1; AFL-CIO News.
October 22, 1966, p. 3; AFTE's Engineers Outlook. October 1966, p. 1,
and November 1966, p. 1; UAW Solidarity. January 1967, p. 15 and Feb
ruary 1967, p. 15, and Sheet Metal Workers' Journal, November 1966,
pp. 20-21.
17
Experience of union cooperation in the last decade shows that
unions have actually resorted more to coordinated bargaining than to
coalition bargaining. There are practical barriers as well as legal
ones, but the legal barriers stop unions from forcing coalition bar-
26
gaining, and they can only reach to coordinated hargaing when em
ployers willingly accept coalition.
Uniqueness of Coalition and Coordinated Bargaining
Neither type of alliance, that is, coalition bargaining or co
ordinated bargaining, is a new phenomenon in union cooperation in
collective bargaining. What is new and unique is: (1) their names;
(2) the role of the AFL-CIO's IUD in initiating, encouraging, guiding
or directing the activities; (3) the "organized" promotion and rapid
spread of them in the manufacturing sector in the 1960’s, and, (4)
the stiff opposition by employers to both, and particularly to coali
tion bargining. Indeed, the last decade has witnessed continued ef
forts by the IUD and some unions to impose coalition or coordinated
bargaining on increasing numbers of companies and industries against
the employers’ will.
As will be discussed in the following chapter, unions have felt
compelled to resort to large-scale cooperation in manufacturing to
retain a balance of power in collective bargaining. Briefly stated,
unions claim that the proliferation of mergers, or combinations, be
tween companies in the 1960's cut across the jurisdiction of many
unions, thus adversely affecting the bargaining power of each union

26
This is the principal reason why I prefer the former term as a
title for this research.
18
in the face of large centralized employers. Before dealing, however,
with labor's rationale for the recent new wave of concerted action
among unions, it might be helpful to review first the role of the IUD
in generating and conducting such union alliances, to mention some
major recent attempts at coalition or coordinated bargaining, and to
note the legal standing of each form of union alliance.
The Role of the IUD in Spreading Union Cooperation
Despite some dissimilarities prevailing in past and present
union cooperation, the common feature of recent coordinated efforts
is the existence of close contacts and consultations between the par
ticipating unions and the AFL-CIO's IUD. When a coordinated group
reaches the stage of joint action, it usually operates through a joint
committee known as the Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB), or
the Coordinated Bargaining Committee (CBC). Normally such a committee
is composed of top officials of the union^(in most cases by union
presidents), and an IUD representative who usually serves as the chief
coordinator.
The IUD's initiative in promoting multi-union bargaining had
begun in the late 1950's under the direction of its first president
— Walter Reuther. A first attempt at coordinated bargaining, but of
a limited nature, was undertaken in 1959 at U.S. Pipe and Foundry Com
pany. This attempt involved a group of three, two Steelworkers locals
and one Molders local, each having bargaining rights at a different
plant of the Company. The only explicit objective of the group then
19
was to force on the employer a common expiration date in all three
► . 27
contracts.
As has become evident in subsequent attempts in other situations,
common expiration dates turned out to be one of the unions' major
goals. The logic is rather simple: by having all of a company's con
tracts expire simultaneously the unions expected to exert more effec
tive economic pressures on the employer.
In order to improve cooperation and coordination among collab
orating unions, however, the IUD established, beginning in the early
1960's, formal Coordinated Bargaining Committees for each concerted
action. As stated in IUD's report to its convention in 1961, "By
means of these committees, different unions bargaining with the same
company or with a given industry, are able to better coordinate their

28
collective bargaining approaches and programs."
Coordinated bargaining programs were further formalized in 1964
with the establishment of the Collective Bargaining Service Section
within the IUD. This Section was assigned the task of coordinating
29
the activities of the various inter-union committees.
In general, the major tangible success of these joint bargaining
committees had been procedural and legal, namely, forcing companies

27
James G. Davis, "A Management Viewpoint," in "Coalition Bargain
ing: Three Views," p. 8.
28
AFL-CIO, Report to Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO. 4th Con
stitutional Convention. Washington. D. C.. November 16-17. 1961. p. 31.
29
Guy Farmer, Collective Bargaining in Transition: Coalition Bar
gaining and Union Power. Counselors Inc., Research Monograph No. 27,
1969, p. 21.
20
to negotiate with the multi-union committees on terms of employment
affecting members of each union, instead of dealing separately with
each certified union. As will be seen shortly, this tactical and
legal achievement, embodied in the unions1 right of having free-choice
in selecting their own representatives at the bargaining table, was

30
recognized and established as lawful by the NLRB and the courts.
Unions, in their bid for more power under the direction of the
AFL-CIO's IUD, made several attempts in the last decade to force em-
31
ployers to negotiate with union alliances. Thus far, however, most
attempts at the ultimate goal of imposing national joint negotiations
of pure coalition type, whether on industry or company-wide basis,
have failed both legally and practically. Negative results, in this
respect, followed major efforts to establish coalitions in the potash
industry in 1961; at the American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Cor
poration in 1964-1965; at the Johns-Manvilie Company and Olin Mathieson
Corporation since 1965; at General Electric and Westinghouse in the
1966 and 1969-70 negotiations; at Union Carbide Corporation in 1966-67;
at die Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M) in 1967, and
finally in the copper industry in 1967-1968 and in 1971.
The only exception to date is the IUD success in conducting joint
national negotiations, since 1964, on a multi-unit basis (coalition
style) with the American Home Products Corporation. The vaule of this
30
See footnotes 34, 35 below.
31
For a detailed account of recent union alliances, see Chernish.
For brief accounts see the works by Schwarz, and by Farmer. The lat
ter source is most critical.
21
single victory for coalition bargaining, however, has been somewhat
questionable as it has been: (1) related only to pension and insurance
programs, and (2) the program was accepted willingly by the company,
due to its previous tradition of applying the same benefits to all com
pany employees.
All in all, there have been only a few cases where real coalition
bargaining has prevailed, only where employers have willingly accepted
it either on limited issues, such as with the Home Products Corp., or
on ail economic and common issues, such as with the San Francisco news-
33
papers and printers in 1969. Most large multi-plant companies, how
ever, have strongly rejected the idea of engaging in coalition bar
gaining and have vehemently and successfully upset all efforts at
coalition to date.
The Legal Status of Coalition and Coordinated Bargaining
Understandable opposition by employers to coalition bargaining
is based primarily on power considerations. Yet, to thwart coalitions,
employers rely mainly on legal grounds. Fortunately, from their point
of view, the law forbids a forced coalition against the will of one
party. Or, more precisely, pressures by one party for joint bargain
ing, forcing to the point of impasse the expansion of certified bar-
32
Farmer, p. 22 and Chernish, pp. 70-74. See also Earl L. Engle,
"Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare — and a Dilusion," Industrial
Relations Research Association. Proceedings of the 1968 Annual Spring
Meeting. IRRA, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968. p. 516.
^ Schwarz, p. 22.
22
gaining units from plant-wide to a company, or industry basis, are il
legal under the terms of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. Indeed all
34 35
major NLRB decisions and federal court rulings on this issue have
reaffirmed in principle the illegality of such actions as unfair labor
practices. Moreover, the courts have ruled out as unlawful a "lock-in"
agreement between unions, which deprives individual unions of the
right to sign a contract until all other unions have agreed to sign.
Nevertheless, while legal rulings have declared actions to force
acceptance of coalition unlawful, the NLRB explicitly regards cooper
ation and coordination among unions at the bargaining table as fully
legitimate and legal. In particular, the rulings have approved the
unions' right to negotiate each contract through a "mixed" committee
composed of representatives of all coordinating unions.
The legal status of coalition and coordinated bargaining was a
major subject of an IUD session of top union officials held in
Washington, D. C. in June 1967. A report, presented by labor lawyers,
clearly summarized the legal situation and is worth reviewing. It
was indicated that the law permits coordinating unions to only sit in
on the negotiations for a single union at a time, as part of the bar
gaining team of that union, unless, of course, the employer agrees to
simultaneous negotiations with all. The report carefully emphasized

34
See for example NLRB decisions in American Radiator & Standard
Corp. case, 155 N.L.R.B. 736 (1965), and the General Electric Co.
Case, 173 N.L.R.B. 253 (1968).
35
See for instance Standard Oil C o . \r_. NLRB, 322 F. 2d 40 (6th Cir.
1963); McLeod v. General Electric C o . 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y., 1966)
and General Electric C o . NLRB, 412 F. 2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1969).
23
that, "The certified bargaining agent must be careful not to delegate
to a coordinated committee its power to accept or reject an employer
offer. In addition, a union's refusal to sign an agreement until
other unions have reached a settlement is well established as an un-

36
fair labor practice."
The legal and practical inability of coalitions to attain their
ultimate goal — the expansion of the bargaining units and the shift
to centralized multi-unit joint bargaining terminating with a single
contract — should by no means prove the failure of the other tech
nique, that is, the coordinated bargaining approach. Most attempts
to achieve coalition that have failed, including those noted earlier,
have shifted to functions such as coordinated bargaining, for which
consent of the employers is not required. David Lasser of the IUE
revealed, however, that in several instances a number of multi-plant
companies, such as Revere Brass, Rohm and Haas-, Quaker Oats, American
Home Products, responded favorably to unions engaged in coordinated
bargaining. According to Lasser it was agreed with those companies
that a settlement reached with an inter-union committee at the plant
where the first bargaining took place would be applied "to the other
37
unions and plants with appropriate local modification." In general,
as has been evident in some major experiences of coordinated bargain-
36
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Labor Relations Yearbook - 1967,
p. 310.
37
David Lasser, "Coordinated bargaining; A Union Point of View,"
Industrial Relations Research Association. Proceedings of the 1968
Annual Spring Meeting. IRRA, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968, p. 516.
24
ing noted earlier, notably in the 1969-1970 confrontation with General
Electric, and in the copper industry in 1971, coordinated bargaining
promoted union strength at the bargaining table. Some substantial
economic terms have been achieved, although at the price of lengthy
and costly strikes.
Addendum
Scope and Objectives of this Study
Because of the growing number of ventures into coordinated bargaining
in the industrial sector of the United States economy, this bargaining
technique may be considered one of the most important developments in
the American industrial relations system in the last decade. It may
profoundly affect the labor relations of this country for years to come
and deserves more research than so far has been undertaken.
A full understanding of the origin, the causes and the circumstances
which have generated the emergence and the spread of coordinated bar
gaining in the industrial sector cannot be attained without more
thorough studies than have been made. The methods, as well as the
goals and the results of such union cooperation cannot be fully ap
preciated or assessed without more intensive studies.
In light of the foregoing statement, this study will focus on one
major experience in coordinated bargaining, that is the experience of
the General Electric Company (GE) in 1966 and in the 1969-70 negoti
ations. The reasons for choosing GE as a subject of this study are
the following:
25
(1) Coordinated bargaining at GE has been the most extensive so
far in terms of the number of employees involved.
(2) Coordinated bargaining atGE is one of thefew comprehensive
experiences where almost all matters of contract negotiations, not only
pension and welfare plans, have become subjects for concerted action
and joint negotiation.
(3) Coordination of bargaining at GE encountered, perhaps, one of
the "toughest" employers in the United States in terms of the union-
management relationship.
(4) Coordinated bargaining atGE has committedthe AFL-CIO, as a
central labor organization, and particularly its president, George
Meany, to an unprecedented involvement in union-management relations.
This direct engagement of the AFL-CIO in collective bargaining is
one manifestation of the changes that may take place if coordinated
bargaining should continue to spread.
In general, the major objectives in this research are threefold,
as follows:
(1) To find out the real factors which led to the formation of
coordinated bargaining at GE.
(2) To study the structure, mechanism, methods and tactics
adopted by the unions' Coordinated Bargaining Committee (CBC) and the

38
legal questions involved in the application of this technique,
38
Although the same CBC was engaged in coordinated bargaining with
the Westinghouse Corporation too, this study is confined solely to
the GE case.
26
(3) To evaluate the results of the two confrontations between
the coordinating unions and GE.
The primary objective in reviewing and assessing the events and
the results of the two confrontations, however, is to determine whether
or not coordinated bargaining has established itself as an effective
response to GE's unique and hard-line approach in collective bargain
ing, which, after 1948, became a nightmare to unions at GE and, perhaps,
to the labor movement as a whole.
In the course of this research it will be attempted to substan
tiate and validate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis A . Coordinated bargaining at GE stemmed from:
(1) G E ’s unique approach to collective bargaining as well
as from union weakness, division, and inability of the in
dividual unions to represent workers efficiently at the bar
gaining table.
(2) The growing similarity and identity of terms and
conditions of employment, pay increases and most fringe
benefits affecting members of all unions representing GE
workers.
(3) Inability of local union to handle effectively
increasingly complicated issues, such as welfare plans,
health insurance and pension benefits. This inability of
the local unions resulted from:
(a) the growing complication of the subject
matter of negotiations which required more ex-
27
pertise on the part of the unions involved;
(b) the lack of authority on the part of
local GE management to accept changes which
might affect centralized company-wide policies
and programs.
Hypothesis B . Coordinated bargaining at GE was willingly
supported by local unions; it was not forced upon them only
to enhance the status and roles of powerful national union
leaders, as some have argued.
Hypothesis C . Coordinated bargaining has become a power
ful labor front that can match the centralized collective
bargaining power of GE.
Hypothesis D. The Coordinating unions at GE were able,
particularly in the 1969-1970 round, to force GE to aban
don some of its Boulwaristic tactics and to partially re
store the traditional "give-and-take" approach in collective
bargaining.
Methods of Investigation
In conducting this research three major sources of information
were utilized: A. Company and Union publications as well as documents
and restricted materials; B. Interviews with central company officers
and with national officials of the major unions involved in the coor
dinated bargaining campaign at GE; C. Questionnaires which were sent
out to local unions.
28
A. Company and Union Publications. Documents and Restricted Materials
Thanks to the generosity and the cooperation of the GE management
and the officials of the IUE and of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW), the author enjoyed free access to a large
amount of original and relevant material. While the Company supplied
almost any material requested, the unions allowed the author to
scrutinize freely and use their voluminous files, as well as all CBC
files, on the coordinated experiences with GE, including confidential
reports and minutes of negotiations.
B. Interviews
To supplement the study of documentary and official materials
several structured interviews were conducted with ranking company and
union officials. The major interviews were with the following per
sons:
Company: David L. Benetar, GE's Legal Counsel; John R. Baldwin,
Manager-Union Relations and GE's chief negotiator; William H.
Weicker, Consultant-Union Relations.
Unions: (1) IUE: John H. Shambo, Chairman of the National
General Electric Conference Board and IUE's chief negotiator;
Henry F. McKinnell, Administrative Assistant and member of
the CBC Steering Committee.
(2) American Federation of Technical Engineers
(AFTE): William T. Cleary, AFTE president and member of
the Coordinated Bargaining Committee (CBC) .
29
(3) International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) : Fred J. Purcell, General Vice President
and Co-Chairman of the CBC Steering Committee; James Pinto,
former president of IAM Local 784, Utica, N.Y. and currently
member of the CBC Steering Committee; Richard Piche, Grand
Lodge Representative, Auburn, N.Y.; Larry Manca, Business
Representative, Utica, N.Y.
(4) International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW): Richard Mills, Treasurer and member of the
Steering Committee; Mr. Halloran, Business Representative,
Local 139, Elmira, N.Y.
(5) Sheet Metal Workers International Associ
ation (SMWIA): Paul F. Stuckenschneider, formerly Business
Representative, Local 571, Cicero, 111., and currently mem
ber of the CBC Steering Committee.
In addition to the above interviews, the author met twice with
Coordinator Carlin Allen of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department
(IUD).
As a supplement to these personal meetings, several telephone
interviews were conducted with representatives of other national unions
on the CBC Steering Committee. These interviews included conversations
with the following persons:
John B. Curan, Vice President of the International

Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers (IBFO).
Gerald G. Bale, International Representative of the

United Automobile Workers (UAW).
30
Gordon Brehrn of the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW).
Frank Demaria of the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters.
Dominic Carnevale of the Plumbers.
As a supplement to these telephone interviews, all latter offi
cials responded to a written survey which included twenty questions (see
sample in Appendix A). Two more members of the CBC Steering Committee:
Albert Vottero, First Vice President of the American Flint Glass Wor
kers Union (AFGW), and Representative George Turner of the Steelworkers
(USW), also responded to the survey.
In all, by personal interviews, telephone conversations and the
written survey, much first-hand information was obtained from all
twelve international and national unions which had representation rights
at GE and were members of the CBC Steering Committee.
C. Questionnaires to Local Unions
With the cooperation of the international and national unions,
and through their main offices, special questionnaires (see Appendix B)
were sent to all GE local unions whose parent organizations were rep
resented on the Steering Committee. Because the IUE bargains nationally
with GE, locals of the IUE were excluded in this survey.
The primary objectives of both the questionnaires and the inter
views were: (1) to obtain original data not available in published
sources; (2) to find out the real origin of coordinated bargaining at
GE, as well as the operational methods and the bargaining tactics of
the coordinated alliance; and (3) most important, to find out the
31
real views of the unions on this relatively new bargaining method, the
advantages and disadvantages of the coordinated approach to the unions
involved, the effects of the alliance on GE locals and its possible
impact on future union and labor relations at GE.
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
While cooperation from the Company and the respective national
unions was more than satisfactory, the expectations of similar cooper
ation from the local unions were only partially fulfilled. Only 32
out of 93 locals responded to the questionnaires. Such a limited re
turn, though not uncommon, perhaps may not be adequate for making
generalizations. Yet, two facts may compensate for this inadequacy:
(1) the fact that all parent organizations, that is, all national
unions involved, cooperated and responded to the survey; and (2) the
fact that almost all responding locals, regardless of union affili
ation, held very similar views on most issues surveyed. These facts
and particularly the similarity of replies on most questions provide
a strong indication of the common attitude and reaction of GE locals
to the coordinated bargaining drives. Accordingly, one may speculate
that non-responding locals might well have responded to the question
naire in a very similar manner.
The possibility that all non-responding locals might have been
dissatisfied with the coordinated bargaining approach is remote be
cause all their national unions reported no such discontent among
their GE locals. Also, as revealed in the oral and written survey,
32
the fact that all GE unions are currently engaged in coordinated prep
arations for the 1973 negotiations with GE clearly supports this con
clusion.
If further research is to be done on coordinated bargaining at
GE, it is recommended that a special survey be conducted among the
members of GE unions. It might be important, as well as interesting,
to investigate in particular the attitude and the reaction of the rank
and file of the various local unions. It would undoubtedly add an
Important dimension to the knowledge about the role and viability of
coordinated bargaining.
Chapter II
UNION RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES OF COORDINATED BARGAINING.
Union rationale for coordinated bargaining hinges mainly on the
objectives of this new approach to collective bargaining. As far as
the general goals of coordinated bargaining are concerned, definitions
vary considerably. Management spokesmen tend to view this new bar
gaining technique as a destructive weapon which poses a threat to the
collective bargaining process and to industrial peace: "The gravest
threat in recent years to industrial peace," is how one top manage
ment official described it.^ More specific charges about union al
liances have been brought by Virgil B. Day, Vice President of General
Electric Company. Speaking in 1967 on "Changing Concepts in Union-
Management Relations," he referred to this type of bargaining as a

2
major factor in causing trouble in free collective bargaining. "In
the case of coalition bargaining," he agonized,
"...it may again be asked whether or not the very

purpose is to ’escalate* the prospects of industry-
crippling strikes and thereby to create national
'emergencies." 3
Francis A. O'Connell, Director, Industrial Relations for Olin

Mathleson Chemical Corporation, in a speech delivered on December 9,
1966, at the National Association of Manufacturers' Congress of Indus
try in New York City. Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Labor Re
lations Yearbook - 1966. p . 208.
2 Virgil B. Day, "Changing Concepts in Union Management Relations,"
remarks for Panel Discussion during Management Conference on "Manage
ment of Changes," National Industrial Conference Board, New York City,
January 19, p. 2.
3 Ibid.. p. 6.
33
concluding that
What this gets down to is that the supposedly new

tactic of coalition may be one more element in a
total strategy — of which coalition bargaining
is only one aspect — of creating greater crises
so as to encourage intervention in the hope of
getting higher settlements. ^
Union people, on the other hand, choose rather innocent-sounding
descriptions: describing it merely as a combined effort to "help the
worker approach the bargaining table with some sense of equality with
his employer," and a response of labor in self-defense, to "a real
threat to the collective bargaining process constituted by conglomerates
and the growing concentration of corporate wealth" — said a union
president."* IUD's first president, Walter P. Reuther, further stated
that coordinated bargaining is "essential to deal with diversified
companies and put bargaining on a rational basis where several unions
deal with the same company."**
To follow union rationale for coordinated bargaining one should
examine the two major points in the preceding statements: (1) In
what sense have diversified corporations and conglomerates posed a
"real threat to collective bargaining process"? and (2) What does it
mean to put bargaining on a "rational basis"?
A
Ibid.
^ President I. W. Abel of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, in

a keynote address delivered at the IUD 8th Constitutional Convention.
BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook - 1969. pp. 388-389.
^ At IUD Executive Board's meeting held in December 1966. BNA,

Labor Relations Yearbook. 1966. p . 244.
35
The Chanelng Character of American Industry
Unions argue, not without justification, that within the last
decade or two there has been a considerable shift of power at the bar
gaining table in favor of the large corporations. The vertically in
tegrated companies or the highly diversified conglomerates no longer
resemble the familiar traditional company structure. Whether by
growth, or through mergers and acquisitions, large companies have ex
panded their operations into more products, more markets and more
industries. A multi-market and multi-industry corporation, such as
Wilson & Company is a good example of a diversified conglomerate. Prior
to 1967, Wilson & Company engaged in producing meat and food products,
chemicals and athletic goods. In 1967, the Company merged with Ling
Temco Vought, Inc. (LTV), which manufactured electronic systems and
missiles. Litton Industries, Inc. is another example. Its production
ranges from typewriters and display counters to off-shore oil drilling,
shipbuilding and space products. International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation (ITT), Gulf & Western, and Textron, Inc., are also good
examples of diversified conglomerates.
The continued process of diversification of many corporations
through growth, mergers or acquisitions has gradually cut across the
jurisdictions of many international unions.^ To mention but a few
cases, Litton Industries, Inc., had in 1967 about 190 plants and bar
gaining relationships with locals affiliated with eleven international
^ Jack T. Conway {then the IUD’s Executive Director), in an address

to the IUD’s Conference on Coordinated Collective Bargaining, June
1967. Agenda (the IUD's organ), July 1967, p. 7.
36
unions. General Electric had in 1965 some 150 plants in the United
States and contracts with over 90 local unions affiliated with 14 in
ternational unions. Olin Mathieson operated about 75 plants and had
contracts with 49 different local unions in 13 international unions.
Union Carbide had over 100 plants and separate contracts with locals
of 25 international unions.
According to spokesmen for unions, the continued process of
growth, mergers or acquisitions of many large companies has led to
collective bargaining between uneven powers, where corporations have
been enjoying the advantage of dealing with separate unions or locals
from a common center of decision-making power. This situation, em
anating from a confrontation between powerful centralized employer and
diversely fragmented unions, has enabled a corporation to play off one
union against another and use effectively a "divide-and-rule" strategy
and whipsawing tactics. As Professor George H. Hildebrand pointed
out, such a company "had most effectively played the organizations
[unions] off against each other and had successfully restrained the
g
cost of economic concessions to them all." Thus, unions in isolation
have had little economic power to impose acceptance of their demands
on a giant corporation. Their separate local strikes at different
times proved inadequate to pressure effectively and seriously a diver
sified multi-plant company.
g
George H. Hildebrand, "Cloudy Future for Coalition Bargaining,"
Harvard Business Review. Vol. 46 (November-December 1968) p. 121.
37
This proposition is derived from a basic principle of collective
bargaining theory, according to which "the competitive strength of the
labor group under individual bargaining is equal. . .or tends to be

9
equal only to the competitive strength of its weakest member. ..."
The principle which was stated with respect of workers as individuals
would appear to be equally valid in situations where a strong employer
deals with several unions.
Dealing with giant multi-product, multi-market companies, for
example, the position of local unions is similar to that of an in
dividual worker, before unionism, striving alone to improve his bene
fits and working conditions. Surely, the individual's power was no
match at all to his employer's strength. The company could almost
always force on him acceptance of its terms. The local union alone
may be no better against a multi-plant corporation. But while the in
dividual employee could quit if he did not like his conditions, the
individual local union has only recourse to the strike. However, as
pointed out by one of labor's spokesmen, the "well-heeled conglomerate
can well afford to take the strike to drivehome a bitter lesson to

..10
other locals.
Robert Franklin Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States, 2nd ed.,
1923, p. 256. Emphasis added.
Jack T. Conway, "Coordinated Bargaining. . .'Historical Necessity,'"

Agenda. January-February, 1968, p. 26.
38
Pnlons Seek Power Equilibrium through Coordinated Bargaining
Coordinated bargaining is thus a response of labor to increased
corporate power. Through cooperation among themselves unions seek to
achieve or restore the balance of power and to approach the bargaining
table with "rationality" and some "sense of equality" with the employer.
As Jack Conway, then the Executive Director of IUD, contended on Janu
ary 1, 1967:
It has been out of the necessity to react to

these dynamically changing corporation complexes
that the labor movement has been led to the develop
ment of the coordinated bargaining technique.
Through this means we are in the process of de
veloping a structure capable of handling the prob
lems posed by the radically different corporate
entities we f a c e . H
This new structure which would be capable of putting bargaining on a
"rational basis" had been explained earlier by IUD’s President Reuther
in his report to the IUD's biennial convention held in 1965: "We
intend to increase efforts to bring multiple-plant companies with
several unions into national bargaining on economic items which are

12
national in scope *. . ."
In essence, Reuther's statement set up not only the structure
but virtually monitored the ultimate goal of coordinated bargaining,
namely, to reach the stage of national joint bargaining with inter
union alliances on an industry-wide, or at least on a company-wide,
basis in order to achieve common economic terms for all workers of
the multi-plant employers.
^ BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook - 1967. p. 82.

12
BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook - 1965. p. 196.
39
Union expectations of reaching this prime goal through cooperation
and coordination rely basically on power considerations. Unequivocably,
from a union point of view, adequate power is a crucial factor to union
success in representation of employees1 rights and in the bargaining
process. It is crucial because collective bargaining is largely a
power process. More often than not, the outcome in almost any bargain
ing relationship is dependent on the ability of the parties, that is
their potential power, to inflict losses on each other when there is
disagreement to proposed terms. As Professor George P. Shultz has in
dicated: "Power is the key to effectiveness for a labor organization.
Without it, unions have little ability to represent workers effectively
in seeking such crucial objectives as fair treatment on the job, a

13
high level and desired structure of compensation. . . ."
Throughout the years, it has become clear to union leaders in
some major industries that with the existing fractionalism and frag
mentation of the trade unions, unions have been unable, and are in
creasingly unable, to match the strength of the giant corporation at
the bargaining table. Consequently, the unions have become aware that
fragmentation and weakness should be overcome if a sense of equality
and rationality in collective bargaining was to be achieved. Being
unable to attain full unity, due largely to traditional rivalry among
unions, the only way to augment their separate powers was through some
13--------------
George P. Shultz, "Strategies for National Labor Policy," The
Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 6 (October 1963), p. 2.
40
degree of cooperation and collaboration, leaving each union's autonomy
unchanged.1^
The rationale of the unions for cooperation among themselves was
made explicit in a statement issued in 1965 by six union presidents
announcing formation of an alliance to meet General Electric. In their
introductory words they wrote, in part:
The problems affecting our members are the

same, no matter which of our unions they belong
to. They are subject to the same economic and
industrial pressures; their social and economic
needs are the same. . . .
And more specifically:
Just as American labor down through the

years found that it is futile for individuals
to try to bargain with large companies, so we
recognize where a number uf unions bargain
with a single employer that cooperation is the
necessary key to success.^
Clearly, it is the "futility" of individual bargaining with large
employers that has led unions, in several companies and industries, to
form coordinated bargaining alliances capable, in their view, of re
storing the balance of power. And as was pointed out once by Professor
Neil W. Chamberlain, "The more employees in the alliance, the greater
the cost to their employer of disagreeing on their terms. . .
And Indeed, this aggregated union power consolidated within the
newly formed centralized coalitions is what gives the cooperating

14
For a comprehensive account on the rivalry among unions see Walter
Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL. 1960.
^ IUE News. October 14, 1965, p. 2.
^ Chamberlain, p. 10.
41
unions their countervailing power against the giant corporations. It
is this concentration of power that enables unions to bring their maxi
mum economic strength to the bargaining table with a potential to
threaten or even conduct crippling national strikes against multi-plant
employers or an entire industry.
On this ultimate objective, perhaps, rests the underlying theory
of coordinated bargaining and its negative impact on management and em
ployers. As indicated by F. A. O'Connell, Director of Industrial Re
lations for Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, in a speech delivered
at the National Association of Manufacturers' Congress of Industry held
in New York City, December 9, 1966, the main idea of coordinated bar
gaining is simple: "It proceeds upon the assumption that an employer
faced with a catastrophic multi-plant or company-wide strike will bow
more readily to union demands than an employer dealing with one plant
and one union at a tirne.""^ This statement should be contrasted with
an argument made in a recent pamphlet on coordinated bargaining put
out by the IUD. Commenting on the ineffectiveness of a partial strike
against a multi-plant employer, it is explained that "union pressure,
even a strike by one part of the giant's workers, is only a minor an-
18
noyance if the rest of the company continues to produce profits."
By and large, a careful analysis of the factors stimulating the
creation of the coordinated bargaining structures in the last decade
^ BNA, Daily Labor Report. No. 239, December 9, 1966, p. A-8.
18
IUD, Coordinated Bargaining: Labor's New Approach to Effective
Contract Negotiations, n.d., p. 8.
42
hinges upon motivations stemming from union fragmentation and weakness

19
more than anything else. Yet, there are two other major factors
which may have stimulated the introduction of coordinated bargaining:
(1) the growing scope and complexity of negotiable issues, and (2)
the uniformity or similarity of major benefits and terms of employment
provided to most employees regardless of union identity.
The Growing Scope and Complexity of Negotiable Issues
Whereas collective agreements in the period prior to World War II
were relatively simple, they have become more comprehensive and com
plex since. A wide variety of issues have been brought to the bargain
ing table. Some of these new items affecting "conditions of employ
ment" are in the area of job evaluation and classification, incentive
plans, cost-of-living escalators, seniority, grievance procedures, etc.
But most complicated matters belong to "fringe benefits" — largely a
post-war development. Of particular importance are those related to
welfare Issues, pension plans, life and health insurance.
These highly complex issues require most capable and well-trained
representatives at the bargaining table. This serious problem has been
managed successfully by multi-plant companies through centralized and
specialized personnel. On the union side, however, the issue has been
much harder to tackle. Being more political and social in nature than
business organizations, but mostly because they are small relative to
the problems, local unions have found it more difficult to adjust to
the new needs. Lack of expertise on these complicated matters has ob-
19
See also Hildebrand, "Coordinated Bargaining;. . .," p. 525.
A3
viously impaired the ability of local unions in contract negotiations
and made them increasingly dependent on their national unions. Even
typical local issues such as job evaluation, classification, incen
tive plans, seniority and the grievance procedure, today require the
assistance of professional staff, usually available only at the head
quarters of the national union. Obviously, this process has gradually
led to the expansion of centralized patterns in collective bargaining
within internationals, and has helped pave the way for the emergence
of multi-union alliances.
Similarity of Major Benefits and Terms of Employment
The second factor which has generated the resort to coalition or
coordinated bargainins is, no doubt, the uniformity, or similarity, of
major company-wide or industry-wide benefits and terms of employment.
In most cases company-wide benefits are also administered centrally by
the company's main office.
In many industries it has become a tradition to follow patterns
adopted by a major company. In other words, a labor contract signed
by a leading company in each industry sets a pattern for the rest of
the industry. Such is the case with U. S. Steel, Armour, General

20
Motors and General Electric, to mention but a few.
While similarity of benefits exists among major employers in an
industry, more uniformity prevails generally within a multi-plant em
ployer. As pointed out by Irving Abramson, General Counsel of the IUE:
20
For a brief discussion on "pattern" bargaining see Weber, pp. 16-17,
20-24, and Davey, 3rd ed., pp. 38-39 and pp. 255-256.
44
It is not uncommon for a large company to have

a uniform insurance and pension plan covering ail
of its employees. . .regardless of the number of
plants or bargaining units covered by such a plan.
Under these conditions an employer will normally
resist any attempt to fragment its pension or in
surance plan or vary its benefits as between bar
gaining units. Where the pension or insurance
plan embraces employees in many small bargaining
units, it is concededly impractical, if not unwise,
to destroy the homogeneity of the p l a n . 21
The unions are thus limited in their ability to influence or modify
plans. According to allegations made by union representatives, ex
perience has proved that most fringe benefits and welfare plans are
practically non-negotiable on the local level. They charge that local
bargaining on such issues has become meaningless because of their weak
ness and the lack of authority on the part of local management to in
troduce changes the unions would like. According to a union spokesman:
Until recent years, when union bargaining com

mittees met across the table from management
representatives, they faced negotiators of com
parable status who were authorized to make
decisions.
This has sharply changed in many Industries
and companies. Too often union negotiators now
bargain with management representatives who just
do not have the authority to indulge in the es
sential give and take that is demanded in modern
bargaining.22
As also stated in an AFL-CIO report summarizing the IUD's activities
in coordinated bargaining: "Almost universally, pensions, vacations,
insurance plans and the like are decided by the companies' home offices
23
and cannot be changed by 'local' bargaining."
21
Abramson, p. 235.
22
Harry Conn, "Modern Union Policy— Co-ordinate," Agenda, December
1965, p. 9.
23
As quoted in Daily Labor Report. No. 236, December 6, 1967, p. D-l.
45
Standardized Conditions Lead to Centralization

within Management and to Cooperation among Unions
Thus, a company's desire or need to maintain uniform company-
wide policies on major benefits also gave Impetus to centralization
patterns within management. Hence, this process has actually increased
the bargaining strength of a multi-plant employer having relations with
several unions. Consequently, a large company has gained an Important
advantage in the balance of power over a diversity of local and national
unions representing its employees. As claimed by the IUD, by dealing
with each union separately, "such corporations can pressure the weakest
union into accepting less than is justified. Then management can use
24
that settlement to force the next weakest into settlement, and so on."
The foregoing centralization trends among managements thus
created adverse conditions for unions which unquestionably impaired
their ability to represent their constituents effectively. This, in
turn, has spurred cooperation among unions to regain the necessary
balance of power whether through coalition or through coordinated bar
gaining. Indeed, as became apparent, a marked, one-sided superiority
in economic power between management and unions could not last long
either way in the long run. Centralization on the part of management
has inevitably called for centralization on the part of unions, and
vice versa. As pointed out by Frederick H. Harbison and Robert Dubin,
"Bigness on the side of industry leads to bigness on the side of or-

25
ganlzed labor. The reverse is also true."
24
IUD, Coordinated Bargaining. . ., p. 8.
25
Fredrick H. Harbison and Robert Dubin, Patterns of Union Manage
ment Relations. 1947, p. 184.
The logic of this eventual process is simple. Facing a manage
ment which employs a strong and centralized labor policy, unions in
isolation from each other felt unable to fulfill their duties. Hence,
cooperation among them, with respect to common issues, was the only
effective course open. As claimed by Irving Abramson,
How, then, does one of many unions representing

a small portion of the employees covered by a
single insurance and pension plan effect any changes
to such a plan without consulting the other bargain
ing unions? Without consultation and coordination
among all of the unions representing employees
covered by the pension and insurance plan, bargain
ing by one union under these circumstances is less
than ineffectual — it is an exercise in utter
futility .26
A similar approach favoring union cooperation on industry-wide
bargaining, in view of corporate centralized power, was advocated as
far back as 1947 by U. S. Senator Elbert D. Thomas. Speaking in the
Senate in favor of area-wide and industry-wide collective bargaining,
Senator Thomas said: "Barring joint activities of local unions and
reducing the function of international unions to that of an advisory
body should, in fairness, require the same treatment for corporations

27
with plants scattered widely over the country."
In summary, the standardized conditions in large segments of in
dustries, or the uniformity of benefits within a multi-plant company,
which are by no means independent variables, have produced over time
two causal effects: (1) Increased centralization of labor policies
26
Abramson, p. 235.
27
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
Minority Views. Federal Labor Relations Act of 1947, 80th Congress,
1st Session, Report 105, part 2, April 22, p. 7.
47
within large multi-plant companies; and (2) Collaboration among unions
to maximize their aggregate power in response to the employers 1 cen
tralized strength. A good example of the realization of this evolu
tionary process is the emergence of coordinated bargaining at General
Electric and Westinghouse.
Apparently, the adoption and expansion of coalition or coordinated
bargaining by unions in the industrial sector reflects a new and logi
cal turn in union approach to collective bargaining. Actually, this
turn is a natural outgrowth of a process necessitated by the changing
character of American industry and its increasing centralization in
face of multiple unionism. Accordingly, it seems right to fully con
cur with Professor Robert F. Hoxie's conclusion made more than a half
a century ago that "The union organization tends to parallel the
capitalistic or employers 1 organization. It attempts to cover the
industrial field within which there is labor competition with respect

28
to work, wages, and conditions of employment." Professor Hoxie's
proposition, which was carefully substantiated through his. historical

29
and analytical review, seems to hold true in present developments.
It should be added, however, that the second effect of uniform
benefits noted above, is not always a direct outcome of the first ef
fect. Collaboration among unions operating within an industry or a
multi-plant company may well be the product of the increasing number
of common issues, common desires and joint interests sought by unions.
JO
Hoxle, p. 80.
29
Hoxie, pp. 78-102.
48
The broadened area of common concerns and common interests are
powerful enough to create the fertile ground, as well as the cohesive
ness, that motivate cooperation and joint action among individuals,

30
organizations or unions. Such a process toward cooperation between
unions may develop in an industry or a large company regardless of
the employers' bargaining structure and irrespective of the existence
of centralization or decentralization within management. Common in
terests and jointly-shared desires to improve and unify "chaotic and
cheap” wages, benefits and other conditions of employment, were, ac
cording to one union leader, among the main causes spurring the for-
31
matlon of coordinated bargaining in the copper industry in 1967.
To summarize this discussion and analysis, one may conclude that
there have been at least seven major factors which give impetus to the
rise of coalition or coordinated bargaining in the last decade:
1. The changing character of American industry reflected

by mergers of companies, and vertical and horizontal
expansion of corporations.
2. The spread of Increased centralization of labor

policies within multi-plant companies.
30
The conclusions of John W. Thibout and Harold H. Kelly with respect
to coalition formation among individuals may well fit the case for
union coalition or coordination. In their words: "Coalitions con
sist of cooperation among individuals to the end of exercising control
over others. . .they form among persons whose interests are the same
with respect to an external agent who possesses some degree of power
over them," Thibout and Kelly, p. 208. Emphasis added.
31
Joseph P. Molony (Vice President of the United Steelworkers),
"The Union's Need to Coordinate Bargaining," Collective Bargaining
Today: Proceedings of the Collective Bargaining Forum - 1969. BNA,
1970, p. 67.
3. Division and relative weakness of unions due mainly to
rivalry and multiplicity of unions in industries and in
many large companies.
4. The growing complexity of issues in labor relations.
5. The increasing uniformity or similarity of benefits

and terms of employment on a company-wide or industry
wide scale.
6 . Inability of local unions and local management to in

dependently effectuate changes concerning contract
Issues of company-wide nature.
7. Power considerations which call for each party in the

collective bargaining spectrum to design a structure
which will maximize its bargaining strength.
Chapter III
THE BACKGROUND IN GENERAL ELECTRIC

— THE COMPANY, THE UNIONS, AND THE COMPANY'S LABOR POLICY
Before discussing union rationale for the formation of coordinated
bargaining at GE, it is useful and necessary to give a brief account of
the company's character and its major unions. Equally important is to
show in some detail GE's approach to employee and union relations. The
latter evidently was a major cause for the development of coordinated
bargaining among the unions with which it dealt.
The General Electric Company
General Electric for a long time has been a big, diversified com
pany. Now eighty-years old its rapid post-war expansion and growth has
made it a huge, multi-national industrial giant. For example, GE's
world-wide volume of sales of products and services in the last decade
grew sharply from $4,666.6 million in 1961 to $9,425.3 million in 1971
(see Table 1). Consequently, GE is ranked the fourth largest indus
trial corporation in the w orld .1
^ GE, "General Electric Negotiations, Background Sheet, 1969 Negotiations,"

p. 5; and GE, 1971 Annual Report, pp. 36-37. See also James D. Compton,
"Victory at GE: How it was Done," The American Federationist (July 1970),
p. 1 .
50
51
As will be evident in Table 1 below, GE*s net earnings in the last
decade rose markedly, from $238.4 million in 1961 to $471.8 million in
1971. Indeed, except for decreases in certain years, which were partly
caused by strikes (in 1966, 1969 and 1970) G E ’s annual net earnings
2
were almost doubled during this period.
In the electrical industry the company is considered the largest
manufacturer of electrical products. Actually, GE is not only the
largest in the electrical field, but ". . .one of the most diversified
producers of apparatus, equipment, and appliances used in the genera
tion, transmission, distribution, control and utilization of electri-

3
city." Furthermore, GE is among the leading manufacturers in chemicals,
has several glass plants and is also involved in various metallurgical
fields. In addition, GE is "one of the principal companies in the
aerospace field, is one of the few manufacturers of large jet engines,
and is a world leader in both the number and size of land-based nuclear
4
power plants."
G E ’s lines of production are grouped within four major categories:
(1) Industrial Components and Materials; (2) Consumer Products; (3)
Heavy Capital Goods, and (4) Aerospace and Defense Products. This
highly diversified industrial complex in 1966 operated 194 plants in
GE, 1966 Annual Report, pp. 32-33, and 1971 Annual Report, pp. 36-37.
3
Standard and Poor's, Standard Corporation Descriptions. October 31,
1967, p. 6267. See also GE, Philadelphia Daily Headliner. June 16,
1966 p. 2.
4
Herbert R. Northrup, Boulwaristn. 1964, p. 3.
52
113 locations across the country and manufactured a variety of products
in 128 different lines of production in almost every basic industry.^
Or, as reported by the Company in 1966, GE manufactured over 100,000
products and had 5,600 competitors in thirteen basic industries.^
This diversity of product and market, plus the durable nature of
most GE products have had significant bearing on GE's bargaining strength.
Unquestionably, these conditions enhanced GE's power against its unions,
and considerably increased its capability to withstand for a long
period any strike, because, at best, it could only be partial. Ob
viously, in turn, these conditions have impaired significantly the
ability of GE unions to pressure GE, particularly, when acting in iso
lation from each other. Hence, sporadic strikes by individual unions
would conceivably have only small impact on GE's total overall oper
ation. As claimed by Joseph P. Molony, Vice President of the United
Steelworkers, "in such cases, the strike weapon, which is the only ul
timate weapon we as unions have when our efforts at the bargaining table
are frustrated, has lost most of its meaning."^
The bigness of GE is reflected also in the magnitude of its em
ployment. GE's world-wide employment in 1966 was more than 350,000
■* Fortune, 1966 Plant and Product Directory of the 1000 Largest In
dustrial Corporations. Vol. I.
^ GE, "General Electric Negotiations Fact Sheet," 1966, p. 4.
^ As quoted in Willard F. Mueller, "Conglomerate Mergers, Economic,

Social, and Political Implications," Collective Bargaining Today;
Proceedings of the Collective Bargaining Forum - 1970. BNA, 1971, p.
112.
employees. Its 1966 average employment in the United States totaled
g
290,825, a 13 percent Increase over 1965 when 257,903 were employed.
The following Table 1 shows the development, since 1957, of all
three elements mentioned above: (1) the volume of GE's sales of pro
ducts and services; (2) GE's net earnings, and (3) the annual average
number of GE employees In the United States.
The Unions at General Electric
Speaking of unions at GE, four important major facts should be
borne In mind. First, although unions have representation rights at
approximately 80 percent of the Company's facilities, less than one-

9
half of GE employees in the United States are unionized. This is a
sad fact for the union movement, partly because union organizational
drives have been ineffective or unsuccessful, but mainly because GE
employment is increasingly composed of white-collar personnel, tech
nical and professional employees. The latter constitute the "Achilles
heal" of organized labor. Inevitably, the net result is a weak union
organization within a giant, powerful industrial complex.
Second, as reported by GE, twenty percent of the Company's pro
duction is from non-union operations, mostly in the space and computer
fields. This fact implies that one-fifth of GE's production is strike
proof and can function regularly despite any possible company-wide
shut-down.
GE, 1966 Annual Report, pp. 32-33.
q
GE, "General Electric Negotiations Fact Sheet," 1966, pp. 1-5. Un
less otherwise noted, all facts and figures of this section are taken
from this source.
54
TABLE 1. General Electric Sales, Net Earnings and Employment.
Worldwide Sales of Worldwide Net

Products and Ser- Earnings (In Average Number
vices (In million million of Employees
Year dollars) dollars) in the U.S.
1957 4,489.3 251.3 265,805

1958 4,235.9 238.5 234,652
1959 4,466.5 277.6 231,977
1960 4,383.2 218.7 236,250
1961 4,666.6 238.4 234,855
1962 4,986.1 256.5 243,112
1963 5,177.0 272.2 244,896
1964 5,319.2 219.6 242,895
1965 6,213.6 355.1 257,903
1966 7,177.3 338.9 290,825
1967 7,741.2 361.4 296,258
1968 8,381.6 357.1 305,165
1969 8,448.0 278.0 317,874
1970 8,726.7 328.5 312,000*
1971 9,425.3 471.8 290,000*
* This round figure was supplied to the author in a letter from the
Company dated October 4, 1972. The figure for 1971 does not include
employees transferred co Honeywell following sale of certain infor
mation systems.
Source: General Electric Annual Reports.
55
A third detrimental fact for GE unions, and perhaps an outcome of
the first, is that GE has bargaining relationships with more than 100
national and local unions. Obviously, such a diversity and division
within union ranks is not a promising power base, particularly against
the Goliath of the electrical industry.
Fourth, and not less crucial for power considerations, is the fact
that all but three of GE labor contracts are negotiated at the local
plant level. Doutlessly, it is an ideal situation for management and
an anathema for unions striving to increase their economic power against
a large and diversified company.
The major nationally bargained agreement is with the IUE which, in
1966, represented 79,400 GE employees scattered in 65 plants throughout
the country. The national agreement,^traditionally followed by local
supplements, covers such major locations as Lynn and Pittsfield, Mass
achusetts; Schenectady and Syracuse, Mew York; Fort Wayne, Indiana;
Louisville, Kentucky; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Bridgeport, Connec
ticut, and Cleveland, Ohio.
The second company-wide contract is negotiated with the indepen
dent union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE),which
in 1966 represented 16,400 GE employees. The UE national agreement
covers major locations such as Erie and Allentown, Pennsylvania; Balti
more, Maryland; Decatur, Indiana, and Elmira, New York
The third GE contract bargained at the national level is executed
The national contract at GE, as elsewhere in any multi-plant company,

means a company-wide agreement negotiated centrally by GE and the
national bargaining committee of the union. Such a contract usually
covers all major general issues of pay,benefits and common conditions of
employment. It does not cover specific local issues and local procedures.
Reproduced w ith
permission of the copyrijht owner. Further reared, ,«■
r e p r o d u c e prohibited without permission.
56
with a small union, the Pattern Makers, which in 1966 spoke for only
300 GE employees, most of them work at Schenectady, New York.
As noted above,except for these three nationally-bargained agree
ments, all other GE contracts are negotiated with local unions at the
local plant level. The Company's tradition of negotiating all these
agreements on a local basis stems, as explained by GE, from its desire
"...to insure that individual local employee needs are taken into ac
c o u n t . " ^ Most local unions, however, are affiliated with major inter
national unions. Table 2 shows the total membership of the principal
unions having representation rights at GE in 1966, and the number of
GE employees represented.
The figures contained in Table 2 provide some important points
of interest:
(1) The IUE was the dominant union operating at GE in 1966. While
the IUE represented only about 27 percent of total GE employees in the
United States, it bargained nationally for some 60 percent of GE union
ized workers. Nevertheless, IUE representation was, and still is,limited
to one-third of the total of 194 GE plants noted earlier.

(2) Organized labor at GE is heavily divided and fractionalized
among over a dozen international unions.

(3) With the exception of the IUE, UE and IAM,each of the other
unions represent less than 6,000 scattered employees and altogether not
more than 24,000. Moreover, five unions represent less than 650 wor
kers each, most of whom are spread at various GE locations.

(4) Excluding the IUE, all other unions have only a small frac
tion of their total membership working at GE. Hence, the GE employ-
^"L GE, Philadelphia Daily Headliner, June 16, 1966, p. 2.
57
TABLE 2. The Major Unions at General Electric - 1966.
Number of
Number of GE Employees Total Number of
Union GE Locals Represented Union membership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers (IUE) 65 79,400 270,842
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America (UE - Independent) 20 16,400 165,000
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (LAM) 33 12,900 808,065
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agriculture Implement Workers (UAW) 6 5,700 1,168,067
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers
of America (AIW) 2 5,500 69,220
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW) 30 4,500 806,000
Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association (SMWIA) 2 3,400 100,000
American Federation of Technical Engineers (AFTE) 9 2,600 15,000
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 1 945 965,000
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America (Teamsters- Independent) 3 640 1,506,769
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices

of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the
United States and Canada (Plumbers) 3 400 255,765
American Flint Glass Workers' Union of
North America (AFGW) 1 150 31,239
Pattern Makers' League of North America 3 90 12,446
International Brotherhood of Firemen and
Oilers (IBFO) 3 60 43,000
TOTAL 181 132,685
Source: GE, "General Electric Negotiations Fact Sheet,” 1966, p. 2 and GE's letter to the
author dated October 4, 1972.
Data In column (4) Is based on U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Directory of National and International Labor Unions In the United States: 1965.
GPO, Washington, D. C., Bulletin No. 1493.
58
ment is not central to their operati cns «itid nc t a focal point in their
union business. Adding to this the fact that their GE members are in
variably spread in several, sometimes remote, locations makes national
unions' responsibilities even harder to come by.
The foregoing facts may produce at least three major implications
or conclusions:
(a) Multiplicity of unions at GE has inevitably led to

weakness of organized labor at GE and thus reduced
their bargaining power considerably.
(b) Obviously, the division of unions at GE, coupled
with the dominating pattern of local contracts,
created a convenient situation for GE management.
By enjoying the advantage of dealing with some
" 100-odd unions" on mostly a plant-by-plant basis,
the ground was paved for GE, as charged by unions ,12
to utilize effectively the "divide and rule"
policy. This is apparently what enabled GE to con
duct whab an IUE official described "relentless
drives...to secure acceptances by the weakest of
the bargaining units and then to undermine die
13
resistance of any holdouts."
(c) The structure and composition of unions at GE,
along with the local nature of most contracts,
however, made GE unions unable to challenge in
dividually the powerful company, nor to represent
effectively the interests of their GE members.
Consequently, over the years, most unions became
increasingly dependent on their largest col-
______________
See,for example, David Lasser, "A Victory for Coordinated Bargain
ing," The American Federationist (April 1967), p. 13.
59
league at GE, namely, the IUE, and finally they

followed its lead on almost all major common issues.
As can be seen from the three implications just noted, the very
conditions of unions at GE were condusive to some sort of cooperation
among themselves. Accordingly, one may say, within those conditions
germinated the early seeds from which coordinated bargaining at GE
later evolved.
The figures in Table 2 above, however, do not disclose an impor
tant feature of unionism at GE, that is, the past rivalry among its major
craft and industrial unions. While the traditional antagonism between
craft unionism and industrial unionism characterized early relation
ships among GE unions in the 1930's and the 19 4 0 *s, bitter ideological
and political rivalry ran its course later, particularly between the
IUE and the UE. This rivalry was marked after 1949 when the CIO ex
pelled the UE (then the dominant industrial union at GE) for alleged
Communist domination, and formed the IUE in its stead. The embroiled
jurisdictional battle that followed, in which the IUE gradually and
finally, in 1954, captured the dominancy at GE, certainly did not add
14
strength to unionism and organized labor within this company. On
the contrary, the expulsion of the UE from the CIO encouraged, in the
early 1950's, more unions to enter the contest of representing GE em-

14
For a detailed account of early unionism at GE see Walter Galenson,
The CIO Challenge to the A F L . Chapter 5. On the struggle between the
IUE and the UE see Salvatore Joseph Bella, "Boulwarism and Collective
Bargaining at General Electric: A Study in Union-Management Relations,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University), 1962, Chapter V, and Northrup,
Chapters 5-6.
60
ployees. This struggle caused some bargaining units, which left the UE,
to choose unions other than the new IUE or to prefer no union represen
tation. All this happened at a time when GE was growing rapidly and
extensively and additional new and diversified plants were being es
tablished. Consequently, a wider variety of unions, ranging from the
large Teamsters International to the small union of the Flint Glass
Workers, was chosen to represent employees at various GE locations.
Thus, as the Company reported: "By the mid-1950's, General Electric
local plant managements found themselves negotiating some 100 separate
contracts with a spectrum of unions within and without the AFL-CIO."^
The figures of Table 2 do not reveal the serious internal turmoil
which engulfed the IUE in its first fifteen years of existence. The
Internal conflicts and warfare in the IUE revolved around growing local
and national disagreement with the leadership of IUE's first president,
James B. Carey, who in 1936 helped form, and until 1941 helped lead,
the U E . ^ Internal warfare within the IUE continued vigorously until
early in 1965 when Carey was forced to resign after a governmental in
vestigation found his announced victory in the IUE's election of 1964,
had been achieved by fraud .^ Obviously, this unhealthy condition of
the IUE was not a positive contribution to effective representation of
IUE members at GE.
^ GE, Relations News Letter, July 20, 1966, p. 5.
^ For an account on the internal conflicts within the IUE and on James
Carey, see the works by Bella and by Northrup noted earlier.
^ Donald E. Cullen, Negotiating Labor-Management Contracts (Ithaca:

New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell
University, 1965) Bulletin 56, p. 25.
61
In conclusion, the extent of unionization at GE on one hand and
the multiplicity, composition and character of GE unions on the other,
coupled with bitter IUE-UE rivalry and IUE internal troubles were,
without any doubt, major sources of severe weakness for organized labor
within GE.
General Electric Labor Policy
G E ’s post-war labor policy and particularly its unique bargain
ing method have had a direct bearing upon the conduct and structure
and bargaining strategy of G E ’s unions. Consequently, a discussion of
the Company’s approach is necessary.
According to one labor leader, the Company's attitude toward

18
unions until 1946 or 1947 was "absolutely normal." Unions there had
been treated by GE approximately the same way as by most other American
large companies, or actually even better. It may be termed "even
better" because of GE's favorable approach to unions demonstrated dur
ing the unionization drives in the 1930's and early 1940’s.
While most management in mass production industries invariably
fought vehemently against unionization, the electrical industry, and
in particular, GE met unions' organizational drives tolerably or even
favorably. Thus, at the time when most mass production industries such
as auto, steel and rubber were undergoing violent unionization drives,

19
GE was enjoying quiet and peaceful labor relations. Undoubtedly, GE
Information obtained from Hr. Fred Purcell, General Vice President

of the Machinists (IAH), August 11, 1972, personal interview, Utica,
N.Y. For more details on labor relations at GE prior to 1947 see the
works by Northrup and by Bella noted earlier.
19
Galenson, p. 239.
62
unions owe their organizational success at GE mainly to the tolerant
views of the Company's top executives at that period — Gerard Swope,
President, and Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board.
These two persons, who headed GE for eighteen years between the
two world wars, were outstanding in management circles for their lib
eral and friendly attitudes toward labor. Gerard Swope not only in-
20
creased employee benefits of various kinds, but also granted the UE
21
a company-wide contract as early as February 1938. Moreover, in 1926
Swope had already attempted the establishment of a single industrial
company union at GE. Swope's initiative in this respect was high
lighted in that year, when, at his request, he met with President
William Green of the AFL and offered him the formation of such a com-
22
pany-wide industrial union by the AFL. Swope's failure later to avoid
rival unionism at GE was due largely to idological conflicts and also
to the bitter fued which prevailed within the labor movement on basically
the same issue of dual unionism throughout the country. This labor
struggle which finally split the AFL and led to the establishment of
the CIO increased union fractionalism at GE.
However, no serious friction ever existed between GE management
under Swope and GE unions. Aside from some scattered local strikes,
GE did not experience a single company-wide strike during Swope's presi-

20
John W. Hammond, Men and Volts: The Story of General Electric, 1941,
p. 386.
21
Galenson, p. 251.
22
David Loth, Swope of G E .. 1950, pp. 168-172.
63
dency. But, although the golden era of GG unions ended apparently with
the retirement of Swope in 1940, GE unions continued to enjoy relatively
good relations with GE management during World War II. Obviously, war
conditions helped to maintain peaceful and stable union-manageraent re
lations .
General Electricfs New Approach to Labor Relations
The change in GE's labor policy, or more precisely, the change
in its approach to unionism in general and to collective bargaining

23
in particular was the direct result of its first company-wide strike.
As will be explained shortly, a total shutdown at GE occurred early in
1946, along with the wave of strikes which stormed the country im
mediately after World War II. Indeed, the magnitude of these strikes
prompted the enactment in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act designed to curb
excessive union powers. However, none of the national strikes generated
such an Impact on management as the GE strike of 1946. It was an or
dinary strike, like many others, which followed a failure to reach an
agreement on terms of a new labor contract. It was launched by the- UE
which, according to GE, represented in 1946"96 percent of those em
ployees who were represented by unions in the Company, and about 60

24
percent of the Company's total employment." The strike, which lasted
from January 15 to March 13, 1946, caused the shutdown of all GE's
93
GE, "The Story of General Electric's 1960 Negotiations with the IUE,"
p. (i).
24
Ibid. Additional facts concerning the 1946 strike and its reper
cussions are from the same source, p. (i).
64
plants throughout the country for the first time in its long history.
The settlement was not reached until GE raised its wage offer from the
pre-strike 10 cents per hour, to 18.5 cents. As claimed by the Com
pany "...there was absolutely no doubt who had won the strike," and
that while the stoppage was very successful for the .union it was "little
short of a debacle" for the Company.
What bothered GE was not only the success of the strike in en
hancing the prestige of union officials, but also the union's ability
to gain broad support not only from GE employees but also from "many
segments of the community who seemed to assume that if the union is
striking, the company must be in the wrong." Unlike most other manage
ments who had learned not to be overexcited by the impact of strikes
on employees or the community, GE management seemed to be shocked. In
the words of a spokesman for the Company:
This was a somber event for General Electric

management, who had been feeling a false security
in the knowledge that the company had been a good
employer, had treated employees fairly, and had
pioneered in the voluntary installation of many
employee benefit p r o g r a m s . ^5
Hence, the "shock" of the first national strike at GE spurred GE
management to abandon its "outdated" labor policy and to formulate a
new approach to employee and union relations. As pointed out by GE,
"The jolt of the 1946 strike helped to produce a management decision
in 1947 to embark on a new approach to employee relations, and to union

26
relations." The task of initiating a new approach was assigned to
26 Ibid.
65
GE's marketing expert, Lemuel R. Boulware, who had been newly appointed
Vice President in charge of Relations Services.
Referring to his new assignment, Lemuel R. Boulware later wrote:
What I was being told that day in 1947 was that

General Electric simply had to correct the redicu-
lous situation where — despite the best of inten
tions and the best practices known — the company
was distrusted and disapproved of by employees and
neighbors....
I was told to find out what was wrong and come
up with a program that would utilize in employee
and community relations those principles and prac
tices that had been found successfull in dealing
with people in other areas of the business.
Boulware's labor philosophy, conceived in 1947 and followed by
GE afterward, constituted a unique formula for handling employee and
union relations. The new program, soon to be known as "Boulwarism,"
revolutionized GE strategy and provided GE management with a tremendous
bargaining power. It so happened, though, that the adoption of "Boul
warism" coincided with the downfall of the UE, due to internal union
turmoil, and the rise of "Boulwarism" subsequently coincided with in
creased rivalry among GE unions. Whether because of "Boulwarism" or
because of union weakness, or both, GE's superior position and dominant
role in subsequent contract negotiations was clear. Although often
criticized by leaders of the Union and challenged before the NLRB, the
important challenge came with the formation of coordinated bargaining
in 1966 by GE unions. GE management, the one-time loser in the 1946
strike, became, at least until 1966, the continuous winner in all con
frontations with its unions.

27
Lemuel R. Boulware, The Truth About Boulwarism. 1969, p. 3.
66
Following the radical change in the balance of power between GE
management and its various unions, there is little wonder why"Boul-
warisra" rapidly became anathema to organized labor.
At this point, the inevitable questions became more relevant:
What is "Boulwarism"? How does it function? Why would the Company

28
give up its past "enviable reputation for progressive labor relations"
and allow itself to be dubbed "one of the major citadels of anti-union

29
activity in the United States"? To answer these questions a brief
30
summary of the essence of "Boulwarism" will be given.
The Essence of "Boulwarism"
When GE's chief negotiator, John R. Ealdwin, was asked to explain

31
the principles of "Boulwarism," he shrugged off the question and dis
avowed any knowledge of the concept. His unwillingness to comment on
the term and to admit that GE's approach to labor relations was tough
and unique stemmed, most likely, from his awareness of the illegality
32 33
of "Boulwarism" as held by the NLRB and the Courts. While his denial
of any toughness in GE's approach to bargaining is tactical and logical,

Jo-----------
Cullen, p. 21
29
Lasser, p. 14.
30
For comprehensive analyses see the works by Boulware, by Northrup
and by Bella, noted earlier.
31
March 24, 1972 personal interview at GE headquarters, New York City.
32 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
33 NLRB v. General Electric., 418 F2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969).
67
the uniqueness of this approach to GE cannot be refuted. However new
was the collective bargaining philosophy of GE's "Boulwarism," GE has
admitted, "it certainly was a^ new practice in labor management rela
tions which had been characterized by both sides coming into collective
bargaining with everyone knowing that one would ask for more than it
„34
expected to get and the other would offer less than it expected to give."
GE's approach to collective bargaining is a direct outcome of
its new employee relations philosophy. This philosophy consists of a
three-part program:
First, General Electric strives to determine,

and to put into place voluntarily all that is war
ranted in the way of wage and benefit adjustments
for all employees.
Second, General Electric tries to give individual

attention to employees' desires and problems in
the day-to-day relationship between each employee
and his supervisor.
Third, the Company tries to back up its per

formance by communicating fully to employees,
throughout the year, on all matters which affect
their relationship with the C o m p a n y . 35
The absence of any reference to union existence or role in
management-employee relations under GE's new approach is surely ap
parent. No mention of union is perhaps understandable when speaking
strictly of employee relations, but is also one indication of the place
and importance attributed to unions by GE's adopted policy.
The foregoing tenets of GE's program for employee relations made

A f
GE, "The Story of General Electric's 1960 Negotiations with the
IUE," p. (ii). Emphasis added.
35 Ibid.. pp. (i-ii).
68
it necessary, according to the Company, to revise, also, its approach
to collective bargaining. "If employees were really to understand that
General Electric was voluntarily putting into place all that was war
ranted in the way of wage and benefit increases," GE contended, "the

36
old 'ask and bid' auction-type of bargaining had to go." And instead
of the old-fashioned method of bargaining GE concluded that "A new col
lective bargaining philosophy had to be developed which would permit
the Company to put everything that it truly considered to be warranted
into its initial offer, and therefore make it obvious to all that
General Electric was not being forced to be fair by the belligerent

37
actions of a labor union."
The basic ideas behind the new concept of bargaining are clear:
(1) The Company, and not the Union, is the only source of all rewards
to employees, and (2) The Company "makes it right" voluntarily and needs
not be coerced to do so by the Union. This is not to say that the Union
had no place in bargaining. GE always emphasized before making its
initial full offer, that it made careful consideration of all Union de
mands. The Union's part in GE's new bargaining style can be better
understood by observing the process followed by GE before it made its
package-offer. As outlined by GE's Vice President, Virgil B. Day, in
1965:
In following our approach, General Electric ex

haustively researches and studies on a continuing
basis all the available facts of the issues involved.
We try to listen, year-around, to union officials
'if.
Ibid.. p. (ii).
37 Ibid.
69
and to our employees. We pay careful attention to

all the demands brought in by the union represen
tatives with which we bargain and solicit their
help in getting all the pertinent information that
bears on our situation during contract negotiations.
Finally, after weeks of discussion across the bar
gaining table, obtaining all of the thoughts we can
from the union representatives, and carefully con
sidering their proposals, we make a fair and firm
offer.3°
So far the process described by Mr. Day sounds tather sensible,
harmless, and in line with early steps of the common orthodox method
of bargaining. Apparently, any respected management usually follows
these same familiar bargaining principles. What, then, is the dif
ference between "Boulwarism" and the orthodox approaches in bargaining?
What is so unique in the new bargaining policy adopted by GE?
Aside from other distinguishing characteristics, the major point
of departure between "Boulwarism" and the orthodox techniques, begins
when management's first offer is put on the table. While this very
act of presenting management's first offer usually signals the begin
ning of the principal bargaining stage in the orthodox style, GE an
ticipates the end of meaningful bargaining. To be more accurate,
although GE may be willing to rearrange the package in response to union
requests, the Company expects no further bargaining on the size of its
offer even in the face of a strike, except in the face of new relevant
facts. As explained by the Company in the GE News in 1966, "Whenever
In an address entitled "Collective Bargaining and the'Suffocating

Blanket'," before the Twelfth Annual Industrial Relations Conference
of the Electronic Industries Association, Scottsdale, Arizona, April
14, 1965. Emphasis added.
70
additional facts or a significant change in the facts indicates that
the proposal needs further revision and development, the Company will
promptly and willingly make the change desired. However, there comes
39
a point beyond which the Company cannot go."
While labeling its initial proposal a fair and firm offer, GE
strongly rejects accusations of being firm and inflexible on it. Re
futing these charges Mr. Day claimed:
This lengthy procedure [of making the initial

offer], incidently, is in sharp contrast to the
common misrepresentation which portrays us as
starting negotiations with a proposal, which we
then allegedly refuse to alter. We do modify and
have made various concessions on our offers on
the basis of new information a union may report,
but not just to "prove" that we are bargaining.
In our initial offers, there is nothing held back
for dramatic last-minute concessions.^*®
This latter feature of Boulware's formula, indicating thatthere
is nothing held back in GE's initial offers, was made more explicit in
GE's publication to its management personnel on July 30, 1966. In its
words: "General Electric will do the right thing voluntarily, but will
not be coerced into making unsound commitment at the bargaining table

41
either before, during or after a strike."
But this is not yet all aspects of "Boulwarism." GE's labor doc
trine is far more comprehensive. Practically, the process of making
See for instance GE News. Cleveland, Ohio, August 9, 1966, p. 3.
^ Virgil B. Day, in a speech entitled "Truth in Bargaining, Free

Speech, and the NLRB," before a joint meeting of the Cincinnati Per
sonnel Society and the society for the Advancement of Management,
Cincinnati, Ohio, February 4, 1965, p. 2.
41
GE, Relations News Letter. July 20, 1966, p. 6 .
71
and "selling" the initial full and firm offer is based on, and applied
by, GE's successful marketing techniques. As initiated by Boulware,
the offer to employees, or by his definition, "to job customers," should
be prepared and presented in the same manner as a new merchandise is
produced and sold to product customers. Thus, all principles and tools
of product marketing methods, such as, market research, product plan
ning, sales planning, sales organization, sales training, dynamic pric
ing, advertising and sales promotion, are emulated and employed in for
mulating employee r e w a r d s . ^
Most important to GE's approach to labor relations and collective
bargaining is the vital role of communications♦ Analogically, one may
say that communication to "Boulwarism" is as important as blood is to
a human being. It was not enough to be a good employer, Boulware de
termined in reviewing the 1946 debacle, you had to be known as a good
employer. And according to GE, "being a good employer and being known
43
as a good employer is the essence of what is known today as 'Boulwarism'."
Why is communication so emphasized by GE in connection with col
lective bargaining? The answer can be found in the second and third
44
tenets of GE's approach to employee relations, noted earlier. But
to understand fully the importance attributed by GE to employee com
munication in practice, one should contemplate GE's own appraisal of

42
Boulware, pp. 22-23.
^ GE, "The Story of General Electric's 1960 Negotiations with IUE,"

P* (i).
44
See above, p.67.
72
the efficacy of its communication. In a foreword commenting on em
ployee communication in connection with the 1966 negotiations, the
Company explained:
General Electric has an excellent record of

peaceful settlements in union negotiations. There
have been only two major work stoppages in the
Company’s history — a nine-week strike by the UE
twenty years ago and a three-week strike by IUE in
1960. This is testimony not only to the Company’s
performance in providing good and well-paying jobs,
but also to the comprehensive efforts the Company
has made over the years to keep employees informed
on all aspects of the business, on compensation
policies and practices, and on management's con
cern for their best interests.
It is this practice of full, frank, two-way com
munication with employees on a day-in, day-out basis
which provides the background of understanding en
abling employees to appraise the soundness and fair
ness of management actions in its negotiations with
union representatives. Because of this understanding,
employees are equipped and motivated to study the
issues, to discern the course of action most soundly
in their own best interests, and to make their wishes
known. Through this continuing interchange of in
formation, employees have developed a keen awareness
of the degree to which their own welfare is tied to
the welfare of the business.
In General Electric, this continuing communication
is not limited to a centralized program, emanating
from a single source. It is, rather a philosophy
of full, frank, two-way communication existing in
the many Company offices and manufacturing plants
across the country. It is implemented through the
day-to-day contacts between managers, supervisors,
and employees, working together on the achievement
of their common goals and on the solution to their
common problems, strongly supported by the employee
newspapers, bulletins, and other publications pro- ^
duced locally at each of these individual locations.
GE, Employee Communication in Connection with 1966 General Electric

Union Negotiations. January 1967, p. 1.
73
Furthermore, according to the Company this continuing communica
tion is not limited to a centralized program. It is, rather, a philosophy
of a full two-way communication employed in all GE plants across the
country. It is implemented through daily contacts between managers,
supervisors, and employees, and also via employee newspapers, bulletins,
and other publications produced locally at each plant, in addition to

46
centrally-prepared media.
In its pursuit of a highly elaborated communication system, GE
puts great emphasis on various kinds of publications, whether of cen
tral or local origin, or a combination of both. To get an idea of the
magnitude of GE's conmunication media, Table 3 and Table 4 below pre
sent lists of the principal publications and their designations, as
employed by the Company centrally and locally.
In summary, GE's new formula for collective bargaining, termed
as the "truth in bargaining," consists according to the Company of
five steps as follows:

/
1. Studying Facts
The Company tries to determine, through intensive re
search, the right thing to do. At the same time, union
officials are encouraged to make their own independent
search. Union opinions are at all times given full atten
tion, while, at the same time, the Company carefully ex
plains its views and gives serious study before and during
bargaining periods to all pertinent facts, trends and
opinions.
Intensive fact-gathering and other forms of research
go on both inside and outside the Company, on both
economic and non-economic subjects. Findings are an
alyzed, screened and mark a beginning point for negoti
ations. . . .
46 Ibid.
74
TABLE 3. General Electric Publications: Centrally Prepared

by Employee Communication Operation
Name of Publication Description
Relations News Letter Issued as needed to provide depth analysis on

matters of broad concern in the field of emr
ployee and labor relations. It is distributed
to General Electric managers and to selected
individuals in business, government, and edu
cation concerned with the issues treated.
Employee Relations News A regular weekly publication issued to keep all
General Electric managers, employee relations
and sales people currently informed on develop
ments in the field of employee relations.
Material from this publication is widely re
printed by the individual Company components
in their local employee publications.
Negotiations News issued daily during negotiations to report on
current developments at the bargaining tables.
These reports are reprinted by most of the
components for employee distribution.
Monogram A regular monthly magazine distributed to all
salaried employees throughout the Company.
Special reports on negotiations are reprinted
in component publications reaching hourly em
ployees.
Letter to Sales and
A special publication designed to meet the
Service People
needs of General Electric sales people in dis
cussing the negotiations outlook with customers.
GE News Special Edition Designed to remind employees of management's
continuing efforts to provide good and well-
paying jobs, and our determination to continue
to do so over the years ahead.
Issue Grams Short messages widely used in employee pub
lications to summarize the Company's position
on matters of interest to employees.
Source: GE, Employee Communication in Connection with 1966 General

Electric Union Negotiations. January 1967, p. 3.
75
TABLE 4. General Electric Local Publications: Locally Prepared

Materials Appearing in Employee Publications at In
dividual Locations
Name of Publication Description
GE News 25 of the larger plant locations publish an

employee newspaper. These vary in frequency
from daily to bi-weekly.
Daily Headliners These employee bulletins, published at some
40 plant locations, vary in format. Most
are two or four pages, prepared in the
morning and distributed to employees at
noontime.
Department
At multi-department locations, it is common
Newsletters
practice for the individual departments to
issue employee bulletins for their own em
ployee groups.
Management Bulletins Published at many locations to keep all
managers and supervisors quickly informed
on current developments and oral communica
tion needs.
Letters to Employees'
A commonly used medium by which managers
Homes
reach employees and their families.
Special Publications Including booklets, pay envelope stuffers,
and mailing pieces on matters of particular
importance.
Letters to Community
by which managers reach community civic
Residents
officials, businessmen, clergy, educators,
and others.
Community Newspaper
Used by the plants to keep all community
messages.
residents informed on matters of common
concern.
Source: GE, Employee Communication in Connection with 1966 General

Electric Union Negotiations. January 1967, p. 3.
76
2. Discussions with the Union

The Company tries to explore fully with union represen
tatives the pros and cons of alternate courses of action to
determine which will bring the union and General Electric to
the soundest course.
Discussions necessarily focus on the needs of the business,
the concerns and preferences of employees, and the proposals
advanced by the union as the result of its own independent
research.
The Company seeks to get all the facts and opinions from
all sources during these discussions so that its offer may
include as many of the things employees desire as possible,
while still meeting the needs of the business....
3. Making the Offer

The Company attempts to include in its initial bargaining
proposals everything it believes to be the right thing to do,
thus making it unnecessary for a show of belligerence by
union officials in order to get the right offer.
After making this full offer, the Company understandably
stands firm, unless new or changed facts are introduced call
ing for reconsideration. . . .
4. Modifying the Offer

. . .Whenever additional facts or a significant change in
the facts indicates that the proposal needs further revision
and development, the Company will promptly and willingly make
the change desired. However, there comes a point beyond
which the Company cannot go. . . .
5. Keeping Employees Informed

. . .Employees should know why the Company makes the offer
it dees, the kind of fact-finding and discussion that went
into if and what the Company thinks acceptance or rejection
of the offer can mean in terms of their welfare. Employees
need to hear the story of negotiations from both sides of the
fence, not merely from the Company or Union alone.
. . .Employee decision-making based on good factual back
ground information is a "must" on a year-round basis, and
also an important part of contract negotiations.^
The foregoing background, particularly on GE's labor policy, is
vital to the understanding of the circumstances under which, or because
of which, the idea of coordinated bargaining has been conceived. The
Ibid., p. 60. Cited in an abbreviated form.
77
next chapter will continue with GE's approach to labor, but will deal
largely with labor's critical evaluation of the Company's policies and
practices.
Chapter IV
UNION RATIONALE FOR COORDINATED BARGAINING

AT GENERAL ELECTRIC
In a recent pamphlet on coordinated bargaining, published by
the AFL-CIO, it is claimed that the truth about this bargaining ap
proach has been obscured by a "fog of propaganda"against it. The
pamphlet goes on to say that in fact there is nothing new or radical
about coordinated bargaining and its logic is rather simple: While
in collective bargaining workers form a union in order "to speak to
their employer with one voice," in coordinated bargaining, workers in
various unions "form joint committees to make sure the employer is
speaking to them with one voice.
Recalling GE's unique approach in bargaining since 1947, it is
doubtful that unions at GE resorted to coordinated bargaining to as
sure that GE management would speak to them "with one voice." It has
been widely known that GE's single "firm and fair offer" has always
been offered, almost simultaneously, to all unions at all negotiating
tables. As pointed out on October 28, 1969, by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in reviewing the GE-IUE 1960 negotiations, "Side by
side with its policies of 'doing right voluntarily' through a 'firm,
fair offer," GE also pursued a policy of guaranteeing uniformity
^ International Labor Press Ass., AFL-CIO, Coordinated Bargaining.

n . d ., p. 2.
78
79
among unions, and between union and non-union employees. Thus all
2
unions received substantially the same offer. . . . " This fact was
also acknowledged by David Lasser, Assistant to the IUE President,
who served as Chairman of the Steering Committee of the coordinating
unions at GE in 1966. In his words, "Company offers were generally

3
identical on economic issues and most important contract matters."
Thus, GE has apparently always spoken with one voice, although its tone
might not have been encouraging for the unions.
G E rs Boulwarism and Division Among the Unions
The rationale of the unions for coordinated bargaining at GE

4
revolves basically around the same arguments summarized in Chapter II.
At GE, however, all alleged reasons have been greatly amplified by one
more decisive and eminent factor, non-existent at other companies, that
is G E ’s "Boulwarism." Hence, it seems that GE's unique labor policy
was the major cause of coordination among unions there. Nonetheless,
one obviously need not preclude the possibility of the emergence of
such bargaining method had "Boulwarism" not been practiced by GE. Put
ting it in another way, coordinated bargaining would have evolved at
GE anyway because of the spread of this approach to the industrial sec
tor in the early 1960's, even in the absence of Boulwarism. But what
^ NLRB v. General Electric Co.. 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), at 741.
^ Lasser, p. 16.
4
See above, pp. 48-49.
80
is more important is that coordinated bargaining at GE would have emerged
because of "Boulwarism," even in the absence of this technique elsewhere.
The IUE's efforts to coordinate bargaining at GE back in 1960 or even
earlier, in 1958,^ before such attempts in other manufacturing indus
tries,are good evidence of this.
Thus, regardless of other important factors, it is largely the
stiffness of GE's labor relations policy, on one hand, and the apparent
division and weakness of the unions at GE on the other, that motivated
collaboration by unions there. By coordinating their bargaining ac
tivities at GE, unions sought to unify and strengthen their own voice.
They wanted to solidify their scattered positions into a single and
effective front. By combining they sought, and hoped, to gain the
power deemed necessary to counter GE's hard policy of "Boulwarism,"
which had belittled their separate entities in the eyes of their con
stituents.
Indeed, the common idea among all leaders and officials of unions
at GE, who responded in this study, is that "Boulwarism" was the major
cause which generated and stimulated the formation of coordinated bar
gaining at GE. As was stated unequivocably by Henry F. McKinnell of
the IUE, "The Coordinated Bargaining Committee was born out of neces
sity. It came into existence because a man named Lemuel R. Boulware
was hired by the General Electric Company in 1947."^ In 1966 Edward
^ GE, Relations News Letter. July 20, 1966, p. 5.
^ Henry F. McKinnell, "Coordinated Bargaining — An Antidote for

Boulwarism," 1972, p. 1.
81
J. Carlough, representative of the Sheet Metal Workers on the Steering
Committee of the coordinating unions made a typical statement reflect
ing the same views. After criticizing the Boulwaristic formula of bar
gaining, or, in his words, of "non-bargaining," Carlough concluded:
"Why had GE been so successful in its 'non-bargaining'approach? Pri
marily because its bargaining opponent — organized labor — because
of weakness and division, had been unable to effectively cope with the
[non] bargaining tactics of this corporate giant.
This leads to an interesting point. Coordinated bargaining ef
forts at other large companies were designed to augment union strength
in order to overcome or withstand effectively superior management
structures of bargaining. The major problem confronting unions dealing
with other large companies has been primarily to match bargaining struc
tures, or at least, to reduce employers' advantages gained from grow
ing centralization. At GE, however, the central focus of the coordinat
ing unions has been not so much the bargaining structure as the bar
gaining method of GE. This is not to say, of course, that the objective
of nullifying adverse structural imbalance or the desire to equalize
bargaining structures were absent among GE unions. These aspirations
were very much alive at GE too. Regardless, the major target of unions
at GE was to fight GE's unique and tough approach in bargaining.
This point was clearly acknowledged by Philip D. Moore, GE's Vice
President for Employee Relations, in his report to GE managers on the
last stages of the 1969-70 strike. Under the subtitle, "Boulwarism —
Dead or Alive," he said:
^ Edward J. Carlough, "The General Electric Settlement," Sheet Metal

Workers' Journal. November 1966, p. 19. Emphasis added.
82
During the initial stages of negotiations this

summer, and even in the early days of the strike,
some of the things union officials said and did led
us to conclude that the method of bargaining we
employ at General Electric is a major issue. Union
officials were especially critical of our practice
of making a package proposal and communicating its
content to employees. They argued repeatedly that
we should give them advance notice, that we should
withhold public communication while they considered
the offer, and that we should be willing to negoti
ate on its elements piece by piece without regard
for the total.®
Thus, GE knew full well that, while coordinated bargaining campaigns
at other companies have been initiated to defeat superior bargaining
structures of management, the effort at GE was primarily to counter
and shatter G E ’s method of collective bargaining, namely, to dispose
of GE's "Boulwarism."
Flowing from this, an additional factor might be explicitly added
to Arnold Weber's five major determinants of collective bargaining

9
structures. It is this: within given conditions, a specific method
or style of bargaining practiced by one party may also cause the other
party to seek structural changes in the bargaining units involved.
While such an outcome may be explained in terms of tactics and power
considerations, it is basically more in response to a specific method
of bargaining than anything else.
Q
GE, "IUE Negotiations Status Report," January 19, 1970, p. 1.
9
Market factors, the nature of bargaining issues, representational
factors, government policies and power tactics in the bargaining pro
cess. Weber, p. 15.
83
Unions Resent "Boulwarism"
The crucial question is why GE's labor policy was so much res
ponsible for the creation of coordinated bargaining. Or, in other
words, what elements of "Boulwarism" generated a joint action among
GE's rival unions?
The answer is rather simple: Unions have learned to fear and
resent every aspect of "Boulwarism." Consequently, it amplified and
intensified the need for union cooperation. But why fear and resent
"Boulwarism"?The answer lies in the philosophy and psychology of
unionism. To justify their existence, unions everywhere have to pro
vide good and effective representation service for their constituents.
Moreover, in a manner similar to Boulware's basic philosophy, unions
institutionally, too, ought to be known as good and effective organi
zations. To this end, they have to achieve, and to be seen as achiev
ing, some tangible gains for their members from the employers with whom
they deal. As Professor Harold W. Davey points out, "Unions at all
times strive to negotiate visible gains that can be publicized as bar
gaining victories. . . .
Unfortunately for GE unions, and especially the IUE, they had
been unable to demonstrate individually any significant achievement of
their own making following the adoption by GE of its labor policy of
"Boulwarism." The inevitable outcome was that GE unions came to re
gard "Boulwarism" as a deadly poison, threatening their entities.
They saw in it a serious danger to their existence, both at GE and
^ Davey, 3rd ed., p. 130. Emphasis added.
84
elsewhere. As lamented in an IUE publication in 1961, "under the
tutelage of Lemuel Ricketts Boulware, this campaign to prevent union
ization and weaken existing unions has become so systematized and per
fected into an efficient and well defined program that it has become
widely admired and emulated by a number of anti-labor employers."^
Commenting on the importance attributed by unions at GE to the 1966
negotiations, David Lasser said: "A new failure would not only fix GE
and Westinghouse more firmly on their course, but could lead to defeat
ism among employees. And this could have repercussions elsewhere in

12
the labor-management field." Perhaps best reflecting the unions'
critical evaluation of "Boulwarism" and its impact on GE's unions is
a statement made by James D. Compton, who in 1968 succeeded David Lasser
as Executive Assistant to the IUE President and as Chairman of the
Steering Committee of the coordinating unions at GE. He said:
The most cogent indictment, both moral and legal,

is Boulwarism's refusal to permit effective union
participation in bargaining. Its aim is to cut a
union down to size, to beat union leadership to the
punch and its strategy is tantamount to a Machiavel
lian use of power tq discredit and, if possible, to
destroy the union.
If true, these charges could obviously justify the unions' view
of Boulwarism as a serious menace to their existence. If GE's labor
^ IUE, "What is 'Boulwarism'?" February 1961, p.1.Emphasis added.
^ Lasser, p. 14.
13
Information in a letter to the author from James D. Compton, Ex
ecutive Assistant to IUE's President, March 16, 1971.
85
policy and negotiation strategy really deprived unions from scoring vital
bargaining gains, their fear and resentment of "Boulwarism" is easily
explained.
Despite continuing denials by GE management of any intention to
discredit them, union successes at the bargaining table after 1948 were
negligible. Contracts between GE and the IUE, at least until 1966,were
concluded ", . .on substantially the terms of the company's first offers,
rather than at some point midway between the parties' opening positions."^
GE's Initial Offers — The "Tempting Dish"
GE's initial full offers were apparently formulated, as explained
in the preceding chapter, so as to meet the needs and desires of GE em
ployees and, perhaps, their union's demands. However, since these of
fers, most of which became final settlements, had been made voluntarily
by the Company and not as a result of union pressures, unions under
standably felt their role to be undermined. As A. H. Raskin, the labor
editor of the New York Times, once put it:
But because the dynamics of the situation derives

from the company, and because through its communica
tions, General Electric makes that point abundantly
clear, union officials often see in the GE approach
a threat to their own security; or as the case might
be, a convenient scapegoat for union failure to prove
its worth even though employees may have fared well
in the process.^
^ Cullen, p. 24.
^ A. H. Raskin, "Showdown for Carey," The New York Times, October 23,
1960, p. 8.
86
One reason for the success of "Boulwarism," inherent in the bar
gaining strategy, is no doubt its most cogent principle of presenting
at the bargaining table, voluntarily, what A. H. Raskin termed a "tempt-

16
ing dish." Although rejected publicly by GE unions, most unions'
officials concurred, in private, with Raskin's description of GE's of
fers on pay and benefits. In essence, they acknowledged that, unlike
other companies, GE always put on the bargaining table a relatively
good economic package, albeit somewhat less than what was finally given
in comparable industries. Thus, while perhaps not fully satisfying,
GE's initial offers were generally far from being unreasonable, and so
left little room for further gains by the unions.
Being initially offered by a company forcefully determined not to
budge from its "fair and firm" stand, a "tempting dish," however, only
worsened the position of the unions. It affected them both materially
and psychologically, especially when divided and individually unable
to challenge the Company. A flat rejection of a relatively good offer
made it difficult for a single union to amass employee support for a
dubious strike which, even if successful, could bring only some minor
Improvements. On the other hand, an acceptance of the Company's offer
could have been interpreted by employees as a surrender. As The New
York Times pointed out editorially on October 17, 1966, while comment
ing on the 1966 settlement at GE, "The package offer of 5 percent a
year in contract improvements which the Company made to an AFL-CIO union
coalition before the original strike deadline was so substantial that
87
the unions would have been hard pressed to explain to their members why
they were s t r i k i n g . I n d e e d , this dilemma was well reflected in the
reaction of the large IAM Local 1669 at Utica, New York, in October 1969.
This Local, along with all IAM Locals, was officially involved in the
coordinated campaign against GE and presumably was expected to follow
the line determined by the Coordinated Bargaining Committee. Neverthe
less, although it rejected G E ’s pre-strike offer, the Local union sur
prisingly voted against the strike. It was only after intervention by
a top national IAM leader that this Local joined the strike, a few days
18
after the company-wide strike began.
Strike or no strike, this combination of factors (a tempting dish
and GE's unbending position), coupled with other ingredients of "Boul-
warism," resulted, until recently, in consecutive union failures at the
bargaining table. Though the Company had been willing to make, and ac
tually made, modifications and rearrangements in the contents of its

19
package-offer, GE rarely agreed to increase the size of its initial
offer in the final settlement. Hence, G E ’s first offers became generally

20
described also as final settlements. As was pointed out by three ob-
^ The New York Times. October 17, 1966, p. 36.
18
Information obtained in personal interviews.
19
20
For this reason one union official preferred in our interview to
add two more "F's" — First and Final — as complementary adjectives
to GE's favorite definition of "Fair and Firm" or "Full and Fair"
offer.
88
servers, "Whatever the reason, many of the postwar settlements at GE

21
were very close to the company's initial offer." In the 1953 settle
ment GE made a significant change in its initial wage offer to the IUE,
from a 1.79 to a 3.15 percent increase. Nevertheless, the unions could
not claim the credit for forcing GE to deviate from "Boulwarism." As
was explained by Professor Herbert R. Northrup, a former member of GE's
staff, and an ardent proponent of "Boulwarism," the change was neces
sitated by the appearance of new facts during negotiations (similar in
creases in the auto industry), and such a course by the Company was
22
fully in line with Boulware's formula. Clearly, while GE's "full and
fair" offer, might be a tempting dish for employees, it is also a grave
concern to their unions.
In this connection, some officials of unions also agonized that
largely because of the tempting dish of "Boulwarism',' unions were unsuc
cessful in making effective inroads into the large segment of unorganized

23
employees at GE. Unionization indeed has much less appeal to employees
when their company makes public and vigorously maintains its practice
of "doing it right voluntarily." By and large, as Professor Harold W.
Davey rightly pointed out, "Considerable harm to union-management re
lationships can come from such approaches as 'Boulwarism' that inten
tionally circumvent bargaining conventions by stressing a 'first and
last offer’."2A
21
James A. Gross, Donald E. Cullen and Kurt L. Hanslowe, "Good Faith
in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies," Cornell Law Review, Vol. 53,
No. 6 (July 1968), p. 1026.
22 Northrup, p. 56.
23
Information obtained in personal interviews.
2^ Davey, 3rd ed., p. 133.
89
"Boulwarism" Viewed as Menace to Unionism
Unions at GE were aware that Boulwarism made them lose stature
and faith in the eyes of members and non-members alike. Unionism at
GE was considered to be in jeopardy, because, as IUE President Paul
Jennings claimed, . .Boulwarism at its heart was a denial of the
very concept of unionism. . . .It was not paternalism," added Mr.
Jennings, "but a structure and a philosophical approach that, when put
together over the years, was an absolute denial of. . .the ability of
a union to function for workers, and the ability to meet at a bargain-

25
ing table and resolve differences."
The success of "Boulwarism" over unionism, and its repercussions
in eroding union effectiveness at GE, were quite apparent even before
the mid-1950's. These implications were perhaps best illustrated in
the following description given by Professor Northrup:
By 1954, the Boulware approach to bargaining had

been firmly established and proven in General Elec
tric. Continuous, effective communication was
clearly reaching the employees and motivating them.
Almost alone in American industry, GE employees were
declining to give their union officials an automatic
strike vote to use as a bargaining club in negoti
ations, and were even refusing to authorize strikes.
While other industries were acceding to the union
shop or other forms of compulsory unionism, GE suc
cessfully declined to accept this demand or others
which it deemed unwise.^6
25
Paul Jennings, "The Experience as Seen by Union Leadership," Col
lective Bargaining Today. Proceedings of the Collective Bargaining
Forum - 1970. BNA, 1971, p. 164.
^ Northrup, p. 57.
90
In essence, this situation is undoubtedly a direct outcome of continuous
union failures at the bargaining table, which in itself is the result
of clear absence of union power. To change this situation, unions had
to improve their performance at the bargaining table. For this reason
they sought cooperation among themselves. Indeed, the desire to achieve
meaningful collective bargaining at GE was emphasized by the coordinat
ing unions early in 1966. In its statement issued at Bal Harbour,
Florida, in February 1966, the joint Committee on Collective Bargaining
o f .eight AFL-CIO unions at GE claimed: "We are joining together in
this effort to_ secure genuine collective bargaining for the first time
27
in many years from these [GE and Westinghouse] corporations."
The major difficulty.however; was that the desire of the unions
to attain or restore genuine collective bargaining, in the traditional
sense of the term, was entirely incompatible with "Boulwarism." In
deed, the proclaimed objectives formulated by Boulware himself precluded
such compatibility. In his recent book Boulware made it clear that
since GE, following his approach, tries to "do it right voluntarily,"
the Company's offer was fully in the "balanced-best-interests" of all
". . .for it reflected the full truth as we saw it, with nothing held
back for spurious jockeying of the type earlier described or for out-
28
moded haggling of the 'flea-bitten eastern bazaar' type." If nothing
is held back for further negotiations, once the first full offer is on
27
AFL-CIO News. February 26, 1966, p. 2. Emphasis added.
28
Boulware, p. 88.
91
the table, the role of the union as active participant in the process
of bargaining is obviously undermined. More so, as the Second Circuit

29
Court of Appeals indicated, upon upholding NLRB's decision on GE-IUE
1960 negotiations, . .such conduct [by GE] amounts to a declaration
on thepart of the Company that not only the union, but the process of
30
collective bargaining itself may be dispensed with."
The major and central idea from which the philosophy of"Boulwarism"
derives is no doubt Boulware's own contention about any union and manage
ment relationship, that: "a union contract was then, as it is now, largely
a collection of concessions by the employer; there was little or nothing

31
of importance the union was to d o . . . . " In this sentence perhaps
rests the whole ideology of "Boulwarism," but here, too, may lie its
own downfall, both legally and practically.
No union, regardless of its size or nature, can remain for a long
period of time indifferent to such injurious policy and practice on the
part of the employer with whom it deals. As contended by the ITJE N e w s ,
the GE strategy of presenting its offers "on a take-it-or-leave-it" basis
and, simultaneously, conducting a "violent propaganda campaign" against
the union in an effort to"brainwash the workers into believing that
29
The legality cf "Boulwarism" as practiced in the 1960 negotiations
with the IUE will be discussed shortly.
• jn
J NLRB v. General Electric C o .. 418 F2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), at 748.
31
Boulware, p. 88. Emphasis supplied.
92
management — not the union — best represents the interests of the
workers," was a well-calculated policy of paralyzing the union. The
IUE News succinctly summarized GE's objectives as being aimed to "under-

32
mine the union both in the shop and at the bargaining table."
In order to understand better the IUE rationale and its drive for
coordinated bargaining at GE, it is necessary, as an essential part of
the background, to examine briefly charges by unions against G E ’s con
duct in the 1960 negotiations and the judicial decisions which followed.
As reported by the IUE N e w s . GE workers cared more about job
security in 1960 than any other single issue. Due to increasing lay
offs in most GE plants, job security had become the most important bar
gaining issue for the IUE. It was claimed:
Every proposal made by the IUE — whether it was

supplementary unemployment benefits or a productivity
increase — was "too costly"; would kill G E ’s com
petitive position and result in loss of jobs. Even
a joint committee on automation, which would not
have cost the company a single penny, was rejected.
It was clear to the union negotiators. . .that this
was not a case of "tough"bargaining, it was a case
of no bargaining.. . .On August 30, after denying
the feasibility of every single union proposal, GE
management finally made its offer. It was essen
tially the same thing it had been pushing in its
enormous propaganda machinery directed at the em
ployees back in the plants. It was ignoring the
union, ignoring the elected representatives of the
workers. It was offering its package directly to
the employees saying that strikes wouldn't pay off,
that GE could hold out forever and they best accept
[it] and go on in the dai^y effort to make bigger
profits for the company.-^
^ IUE News. January 14, 1965, pp. 6-7.
33
Ibid.. p. 7.
93
As a partial reply to these charges, and in a way reflecting GE's
attitude toward the traditional methods of collective bargaining, the
Company stated:
The most continuous Carey [then IUE President]

charge that we were not bargaining because we hadn’t
put an offer on the table deserves some comment.
What Carey had in mind is that we put our proposals
on the table right in the beginning, and he puts his
demands on the table, and then we start bickering
over whether their demands are too high — our pro
posals too low — and so on to negotiation-mediation-
compromise-strike- or whatever. The issue would
presumably be resolved by a contest of strength, with
the side able to exert the strongest pressure winning.
And, of course, it might take a strike to see w h o ’s
strongest, and who can hold out the longest. This
seems to be Carey's idea of the way to proceed. He
says, ”When your proposal is on the table, collective
bargaining begins.”
We don't subscribe to Carey1s personal version of
collective bargaining. ^ -
GE preferred to use negotiations as purely informative in character,
part ofits research preparation, in order to later lay down a fair
and full offer with nothing held back. As reported in a supplement to
its regular management newsletter, Relations Review:
We try to hold nothing back. We don't keep a

few extras hidden, to pull out at the last minute
to try to tempt the union negotiations. We believe
that if we did this the union would always believe
that a little something more was hidden. We would
then reduce the bargaining process to a farce.
As already shown, the 1960 negotiations proved to be a complete
failure for the IUE. "Boulwarism" enjoyed its greatest victory over
A I
GE, "The Story of General Electric's 1960 Negotiations with the IUE,"
p. 16. Emphasis added.
35
As quoted in BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook. 1969. p. 74.
94
this union since the formation of the IUE in 1949. The company-wide
strike called by the IUE was broken after three weeks. The Union fully
capitulated and had no choice but to sign the contract strictly on the
Company’s pre-strike terms, in what the New York Times labor editor re
garded as "the worst setback any union has received in a nationwide

36
strike since World War II."
"Boulwarism" as Practiced in 1960. Ruled Illegal
This "worst setback" for the IUE also brought GE's"Boulwarism"
under the heaviest criticism ever. A much-prolonged judicial battle
over the legality or illegality of "Boulwarism" as practiced during
the 1960 negotiations with the IUE resulted In its outright condem-
37 38 39
nation by the Trial Examiner, the NLRB and the federal courts.
In essence, all held the view that GE's conduct in the 1960 contract
negotiations was an unlawful method of bargaining, violative of Sec
tion 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Every
aspect of "Boulwarism" was criticized, particularly when considered
in the overall context. As the NLRB put it in its ruling on the case
in 1964:
qg
A. H. Raskin, "GE's Labor Formula," The New York Times. October 25,
1960, p. 31.
37
General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B.192(1964), Trial Examiner Inter
mediate Report.
38 General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
39 N.L.R.B. v. General Electric C o .. 418 F. 2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1969).
95
In short, both major facets of Respondent's [GE's]

1960 'bargaining' technique, its campaign among the
employees and its conduct at the bargaining table,
complementing each other, were calculated to disparage
the Union and to impose without substantial alteration
Respondent's 'fair and firm' proposal, rather than to
satisfy the true standards of good faith collective
bargaining required by the statute. A course of con
duct whose major purpose is so directed scarcely evinces
a sincere desire to resolve differences and reach a
common ground.
Claiming that GE's approach to collective bargaining actually
''robs them [the Unions] of their commonly accepted meaning," the Board
further commented:
'Collective bargaining' as thus practiced [by GE]

is tantamount to mere formality and serves to trans
form the role of the statutory representative from
a joint participant in the bargaining process to
that of an adviser. In practical effect, Respondent's
'bargaining' position is akin to that of a party who
enters into negotiations 'with a predetermined re
solve not to budge from an initial position,' an at
titude inconsistent with good-faith bargaining.
While the Trial Examiner and the Board spoke of GE's conduct as
reducing the Union to an advisory position fn bargaining, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals viewed GE's approach as one which entirely
ignored the existence of the unions. Enforcing the NLRB decision, this
court ruled on October 28, 1969, that "we hold that an employer may not
so combine 'take-it-or-leave-it' bargaining methods with a widely pub
licized stance of unbending firmness that he is himself unable to alter

42
a position once taken." In the view of the Court, the overall con-
40
General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B., at 196.
41
Ibid., at 195-196 (footnote omitted).
42 NLRB v. General Electric C o .. 418 F2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) at 762.
96
duct by the Company was not only a refusal to bargain "in fact," but:
It also constitutes, as the facts of this action

demonstrate, an absence of subjective good faith,
for it implies that the Company can deliberately
bargain and communicate as. though the Union did not
exist, in clear derogation of the Union's status as
exclusive representative of its members under sec
tion 9 (a).43
The Court also questioned the validity of GE's statements which emphasized
that "no false pride in the offer and no silly face-saving about chang
ing it would deter us in the slightest from embracing any improvements.
. . . ,"44 The Court held that the Company, "having created a view of
the bargaining process that admitted of no compromise, was trapped by
its own creation. It could no longer seek peace without total victory,
for it had by its own words and actions branded any compromise a de-
45
feat." To support its assertion the Court cited Philip Moore, GE's
chief negotiator, who in response to IUE's efforts seeking a last minute
compromise before the 1960 strike deadline, said: "After all our month
of bargaining and after telling the employees before they went to vote
that this is it, we would look ridiculous to change it at this late date;
46
and secondly the answer is 'no'." Clearly, Moore's statement is en
tirely incompatible with GE's stated policy of having no face-saving
problems in changing its initial offers.

43
Ibid.. at 762-763. Emphasis added.
44
45 NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir 1969) at 760.
(Footnote omitted.)
97
The IUE was not friendless in fighting "Boulwarism." Even Cir
cuit Judge Friendly, who dissented in part, expressed his sympathy for
the Union. In his words: "It is easy to understand that anyone review
ing this enormous record would emerge with a good deal of sympathy for
47
the situation of the Union and distaste for the tactics of the employer."
Yet,neither sympathetic words nor the favorable court decisions of 1969

48
and 1970 could retroactively salvage the IUE and other GE unions from
"Boulwarism" as practiced during the 1950's and the early 1960's.
Throughout that period IUE's record in collective agreements with GE
was poor and this is what actually counts in appraising union effective
ness. Whenever a union carries with it such a poor record in contract
negotiations, its prestige is no doubt seriously undermined and dis
paraged, and its authority over its constituents is critically injured.
Obviously, no union can take this kind of punishment endlessly. A
counter action was inevitable. Thus, the harsh impact of "Boulwarism"
on the IUE and on other GE unions generated union reaction. The de
bacle of the IUE in the 1960 negotiations gave the final signal to each
of the GE unions.
47 Ibid., p. 765.
48
GE expectations to change the judicial verdict on its Boulwaristic
approach to labor relations and collective bargaining faded away when
the United States Supreme Court refused to consider the issue and later
rejected GE's petition for rehearing. 90 S. Ct. 995 (1970) and - S. Ct.
- (1970).
98
Unions' Cooperation Becomes a Necessity
Clearly, after a long and painstaking experience with GE's
''Boulwarism"and particularly after IUE's abortive three-week strike in
1960, the IUE realized that the prime reason for the effectiveness and
success of "Boulwarism" was due in large part to the'absence of coun
tervailing power. Lack of effective union power was obviously an out
come of union fragmentation and disunity. It was evident to the IUE
that primarily because of the division and weakness of unions at GE
the Company for years had been able to enjoy a superior position and
advantage by maintaining a strong, centralized, and whipsawing strategy
over the diverse, weak unions.
All coordinating unions at GE shared with the IUE a similar dis
taste for "Boulwarism." They seemed to have acquired the same view
about the way to fight "Boulwarism." Perhaps best reflecting this uni
versal attitude is a statement made on June 9, 1966, by Rodney Bower,
AFTE Vice President and member of the Steering Committee of the coor
dinating unions. In a speech delivered at a unity rally in Cleveland,
Ohio, Bower said,
In truth, as we all know, this is GE's way of

dividing the employees, exploiting the weaker seg
ments and ultimately building the box-score of
settlements achieved on their own 'take-it-or-leave-
i t r terms. This divide and conquer technique must
be wiped o u t ! Our Unions simply must unite their
efforts for a greater measure of justice.^9
49
American Federation of Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO-CLC (AFTE),
Engineers Outlook. July 1966, p. 2. Emphasis added. See similar views
expressed by Albert Vottero, First Vice President of the American
Flint Glass Workers, "Coordinated Bargaining," American Flint. Feb
ruary 1967, p. 1.
99
At another rally, held on June 1, 1966, in Chicago, Illinois, James
Crouch, President of the large GE Local 571 of the Sheet Metal Workers,
expressed similar resentment of GE's tactics. Considering unity as
the best defensive course, he promised the coordinating unions: "...you
can count on our people to stand solid in this great fight [against GE]
for a better way of life for our members. . .
Beyond doubt, it became clear to the unions that due largely to
their fragmentation and weakness combined with GE's unique labor policy
and bargaining technique, the Company had effectively achieved two devas
tating results: (1) the Company had utterly undermined and disparaged
its unions at the bargaining table, and (2) the Company successfully
discredited the unions and made them look foolish in the eyes of their
members. As Professor James W. Kuhn mildly put it, the division among
GE unions produced a situation "so perfectly suited to the tactics of
divide and conquer," that GE could easily and successfully pursue a
policy "which enhanced its advantage at both the local and national
levels."^’
Evidently, then, GE unions realized that their continuous failures
at GE "were at least as much of their own making as that of GE's labor

52
policy." Consequently, the unions at GE, and particularly its prin-
^ Sheet Metal Workers' Journal, July 1966, p. 10.
^ James W. Kuhn, "On the Significance of the General Electric Strike,"

Collective Bargaining Today. Proceedings of the Collective Bargaining
Forum - 1970. BNA, 1971, p. 160.
52 Ibid.. p. 162.
100
cipal union — the IUE — came to the conviction that in order to re
gain a countervailing and effective balance of power, "Boulwarism" had
to be fought against strongly in two parallel actions: (1) by challen
ging the legality of G E ’s bargaining technique through litigation be
fore the NLRB and the courts, and (2) by augmenting their collective
power through some measure of unity or, at least, some degree of col
laboration in order to coordinate their bargaining power, formulate
common goals on common issues, and speak to this mighty corporation with
one voice. Since unity through mergers was hard to attain, the only way
to gain power was through formation of a coordinated bargaining front,
leaving each union's autonomy unaffected.
Coordinated Bargaining — Logical Evolution
The latter course seems natural and rather logical in labor re
lations in similar circumstances. Past experiences in many industries
support the proposition that wherever the relative bargaining power of
one party is considerably inferior to the other's, the weaker party,
sooner or later, tends to seek greater power through alliances with
other related groups. Multi-unit bargaining in varying industries such
as construction, railroads, coal, newspapers, airlines, hotels and res
taurants and even in steel, are good examples of such alliances. Indeed,
the practice of multi-employer bargaining was largely motivated by power
considerations. As was pointed out a generation ago by two labor re
lations experts, "In any industry where the business units are small
[no longer a necessary condition] and they face as a group the unified
101
power of a strong international union, bargaining on a multi-employer

53
basis is often the only means of mutual protection. . .
This necessity of cooperation, coordination or coalition appar
ently exists in all avenues of society, among individuals or among all
kinds of groups. Alliances for joint action should always be antici
pated among individuals or groups having common desires and needs and
common adversaries. As concluded by two group psychologists, John W.
Thibout and Harold H. Kelly, "Insofar as the outcomes [common interests]
of all the individuals in a given subset are affected in the same way
by another individual, the basis exists for their forming a coalition

54
against him."
Substituting the term "parties" for the term "individuals" in
the foregoing statement, and considering GE as the subset in question,
one can easily comprehend and appreciate the psychological motivation
of, and the necessity for unions' cooperation at GE.
In the final analysis, however, while psychological motivations
provide the basis for the coordinated effort of GE unions, power con
siderations account for its pragmatic justification. As pointed out
earlier, the individual unions lacked the degree of power necessary to
deal effectively with this big and rigid company. Since 1948, the bal-
53
Harbison and Dubin, p. 184. For a similar view see also Frank C.
Pierson, "Cooperation Among Managements in Collective Bargaining,"
Labor Law Journal. Vol. 11, No. 7 (July 1960), pp. 621-628.
Thibout and Kelly, p. 205.
102
ance (or imbalance) of power had unquestionably shifted heavily in favor
of GE. Time and time again, GE enjoyed undebatable superiority at the
bargaining table. Such conditions, however, are of course unhealthy
for a sound collective bargaining process. Effective and meaningful
bargaining relationships can exist only between parties with more or
less equal power. Otherwise, the concept of collective bargaining loses
its true meaning. As Professor Vernon H. Jensen put it while analyzing
basic postulates about collective bargaining:
It must be assumed that the parties, over time,

find some balance of power. Any situation in which
one party has power arbitrarily to impose its will
on the other is not a situation in which bargaining
can take place. Power to paralyze is alien to the
collective bargaining p r o c e s s . 55
Undoubtedly, from 1948 to at least 1966, GE unions experienced
such a situation. Following the 1960 negotiations, however, they de
termined to correct the situation by restoring the balance of power
through coordinated effort. Ironically, by considering the formation
of coordinated bargaining, GE unions were evidently trying to fulfill
again one of the two "glaring needs" in negotiations and union relations
mentioned by Boulware. This "need" called for "the employee represen
tative and employer representative to come to the bargaining table more
nearly as equals than had been true in the recent past."^ Conceivably,
GE unions fully accepted Boulware's own interpretation of the necessary
^ Jensen, p. 550.
^ Boulware, p. 107.
103
requirements for effective and meaningful bargaining process. His in
terpretation made it explicit that: "Any bargaining to be worthy of the
name had to involve equals. That is, it had to be between two parties
who were relatively equal as to the ability and freedom to accept or
reject the other's offer to buy or sell ."^7 GE unions had been longing
for years to achieve such vital equality at the bargaining table. By
mounting a joint fight against GE they hoped to attain this equality.
As commented editorially by the AFL-CIO News in 1965, combined strength
of the coordinating unions at GE and Westinghouse would at least "help
offset the power of the companies to impose terms rather than enter
58
into good faith collective bargaining." IUE President Jenning was
more explicit about the idea of achieving equality at the bargaining
table. In his report summarizing the 1966 negotiations he indicated
". . .the idea of coordinated bargaining offered hope that unions would
be able to sit across the bargaining table as equals with these indus
trial giants.
Hence, this common plight was an inevitable outcome of the circum
stances and atmosphere prevalent at GE since 1948. Once the need of
coordinated bargaining was fully realized by the IUE and most other GE
unions in the early 1960's its emergence was just a question of time
and form. These two issues will constitute the subject of the follow
ing chapter.
57 Ibid.
AFL-CIO News. November 6 , 1965, p. 4.

59
IUE, "Special Report to the International Executive Board, Summary
of 1966 IUE-GE Negotiations," p. 5.
Chapter V
THE FORMATION OF COORDINATED BARGAINING

AT GENERAL ELECTRIC IN 1965-1966
In this chapter some of the major events in the creation of the
coordinated bargaining front by the unions at GE in 1965-1966 will be
reviewed. By doing so, additional union justification for the idea of
coordinated bargaining at GE will come to the fore.
A good indication of the unions' desire to gain adequate counter
power against GE through union cooperation, even before the 1966 nego
tiations, were the two previous attempts to form a coordinated bargain
ing front in 1958 and 1960. Due mainly to existing rivalry among the
unions, suspicion, and lack of experience in unified bargaining ac
tivities, these two attempts were shortlived and were dissipated
quickly without realizing any single objective. Another major factor
inhibiting success in these early attempts at coordinated bargaining
was the unpopular personality of IUE's first President, James B. Carey.
Many leaders and officials of GE unions, including the IUE, confirmed
in private that Carey was not the right person to lead such an alli
ance.^ Some referred to Carey's difficulties within the IUE and to
his inability to get along with key IUE Locals (such as Schenectady,
^ Information obtained in personal interviews.
104
105
New York), which, on several occasions, had disregarded his lead and
followed an independent course. They further contended that Carey's
presence In 1963 was the major reason for setting aside coordination
efforts in that year's negotiations with GE. Thus, although the 1960
debacle of the IUE magnified the need for coordinated bargaining at GE,
such bargaining was not to take place during his presidency. Carey's
2
forced resignation early in 1965 removed the last obstacle, and his
successor's friendly character paved the way for another major attempt
at broader union cooperation. It was apparent from the outset that the
personality of IUE's new President, Paul B. Jennings, would remove the
obstacle of personality and it was clear that another attempt at alli
ance would be made.
GE was not unmindful of the implications of the change in the
IUE's leadership. Speaking on the significant differences between the
1966 "coalition" and earlier ones, GE indicated, "The new IUE president,
Paul Jennings, seems more effective in personal relationships with other
union officials than was his predecessor, Mr. Carey, who apparently an-
3
tagnoized his peers repeatedly." According to GE, the Company felt
that the difference between the two leaders might increase the pros
pects for a serious and successful alliance among the unions in 1966.
In the Company's words:
With a change in control of the IUE union's

presidency in the preceding year, from James B.
Carey to Paul B. Jennings, it was felt that a more
successful effort would be made to hold together
2
See above, p. 60.
3
GE, Relations News Letter. July 20, 1966, p. 5.
106
a 'coalition' of AFL-CIO unions. . .so as to pre

sent a united front against the company and
enhance prospects for a wider strike than any
experienced by the company in two decades.^
The outcome of the change in the IUE leadership was soon demon
strated. Indeed, the serious preparations undertaken by the IUE and
the AFL-CIO's IUD in forming, in 1965, another coordinated bargaining
structure, seemed to be promising and meaningful.
Coordinated Bargaining at GE is Revived
Though Lemuel R. Boulware had retired from GE, and although his
labor policy led to charges of unfair labor practices and the activities
of the Company in the negotiations in 1960 were declared illegal by the
NLRB in 1964, GE made public its intention to carry on with"Boulwarism"
as before.^ Hence, the need of GE unions to coordinate their actions
toward the 1966 negotiations was very much alive. Likewise, the IUD
initiative, encouragement and support of union cooperation at various
multi-plant companies made coordinated bargaining at GE imminent.
With the full backing of the AFL-CIO, and of the IUD in particular,
and in order to avoid another debacle in the 1966 negotiations, IUE's
President decided to revive the coordinated bargaining approach on as
broad a basis as possible. As Henry F. McKinnell of the IUE pointed out,
"Realizing the urgent need to take steps to correct a worsening situ-

4
GE, Relations News Letter. December 19, 1966, p. 2.
^ See for example two speeches delivered in 1965 by Virgil B. Day, GE

Vice President, noted earlier on pp. 68-70.
107
ation and to combat Boulwarism, he [Paul Jennings] hit upon the idea
of coordinating the bargaining activities of AFL-CIO unions which had
contracts with the two giant corporations [GE and Westinghouse ]."8
Most labor contracts at GE, fortunate from a union point of view,
had similar expiration dates. This fact was crucial to the success of
coordinated bargaining if a company-wide strike by all cooperating
unions was to be considered.^ No doubt, this advantage of having
similar termination dates in most GE contracts gave a good leverage to
the IUE in its endeavor to organize union cooperation.
The early announcements of efforts at coordination at GE were
made public by Paul Jennings in Roanoke, Virginia, in June 1965. The
occasion was a meeting between delegates from AO Local unions in GE
locations and the new IUE leadership. The purpose of the meeting was
to discuss the issue of how to get a better deal for GE workers in
national negotiations with the Company. Jennings' statement was rather
simple but meaningful: "We are attempting to develop the broadest

g
cooperation, inside AFL-CIO, of unions that deal with GE." Later in
June, at the meeting of the IUE Executive Board held in Montreal,
Jennings reported that he met personally with the presidents of several
unions and had considered joint programs which would enable unions in
6 McKinnell, p. 2.
^ Practically, in the absence of uniformity in expiration dates, the

achievement of such a goal becomes the first major target of the co
ordinating unions, because it is this basic requirement that in fact
endows collaborating unions with real, tangible and effective power
against multiplant corporations.
8 IUE News. June 10, 1965, p. 12.
108
the electrical manufacturing industry . .to put together the broad
est possible coalition designed to deal most effectively with manage
ment." He further indicated that, through these cooperative alliances,
". . .we will be able to develop programs that should be more than a
9
match for any corporation in our industry."
Cooperation and coordination in the 1966 negotiations with GE
and Westinghouse became the slogans of the year for the IUE. Solid
union fronts seemed to be paying off in other Industries. The "Steel
workers made their gains [in the 1965 negotiations] because they were
united," claimed the IUE News in its editorial of September 16, 1965.
The paper concluded that, "With similar unity in our own industry,
reason can be made to prevail h e r e . " ^
Although the main theme of the editorial was coordinated bargain
ing, one may also sense in it an aspiration for a higher objective,
namely, a real unity. After all, the Steelworkers made their gains be
cause they were actually organized in one big union. Indeed, as one
IUE official acknowledged in private, the IUE's ideal objective was to
have only one big industrial union at G E . ^
The idea of mergers and consolidation into one large union at GE
was perhaps appealing to that official of the IUE, but neither in 1965,
nor currently, has it ever been more than a dream. Hence, the only
possible avenue toward unity was clearly through coordinated bargaining.
9
Ibid., August 5, 1965, p. 8 . Note the use of the term "Coalition."
^ Ibid., September 16, 1965, p. 4.
^ Information obtained in personal interview.
109
Failures of previous attempts at coordination pointed to the need
for a more careful and meaningful cooperation in 1965-66 if success
were to be attained. Accordingly, as will be noted shortly, the AFL-
CIO and the IUD determined to extend their full assistance and sup
port to the coordinating unions at GG. Likewise, the IUE Executive
Board resolved in September 1965 to do "everything in our power" to
assure effective coordination with other AFL-CIO unions in the 1966
negotiations.
The first official meeting of the unions concerned took place in
Washington, D. C., on September 20, 1965, when representatives of six
AFL-CIO unions met under the auspices of the IUD to discuss coordinated
bargaining on pension and insurance problems. The participating unions
were the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
(IUE), the International Association of Machinists (IAM) , the United
Automobile Workers (UAW), the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW), the Allied Industrial Workers (AIW), and the American
Federation of Technical Engineers (AFTE).
Although a month later the coordinating unions would embark on
a program covering all contract issues, the cohesive theme in Septem
ber 1965 was pension and insurance. As reported by the Allied Indus
trial Worker, the union of the Allied Industrial Workers had joined
with five other unions *in an attempt to solve pension and insurance
problems facing employees of GE Co. and Westinghouse." The paper fur
ther explained that the problems of pension and insurance became press
ing matters at GE because of the "new Social Security legislation and
110
recent labor-management agreements in the pension and insurance fields.

12
..." Issues of pension and medical insurance were of particular
concern in that year following the enactment of the Amendments to the
Social Security Act, 1965. The revised act increased the size of bene
fits to all employees, regardless of union designation. As a result,
employers could have reduced their contributions to such programs un
less supplementary benefits were negotiated. According to a pamphlet
issued later by the coordinated unions, if the GE pension formula was
allowed to remain in effect, a GE employee "would lose $540.00 a year

13
or $45.00 a month in pensions over a 25 year period." Obviously,
this development made common action among the various unions highly
attractive. Moreover, it gave greater moral and practical justifica
tion to the coordinated bargaining idea, both internally and publicly.
The participants of the September meeting issued a joint state
ment on pension and insurance programs entitled "A Compact with the
Future," and circulated it on October 6 , 1965, among 160,000 union mem
bers at each of the 200 GE and Westinghouse plants. To generate rank
and file interest, the day of October 6 , 1965, was declared "Pension
and Insurance Action Day" in all GE and Westinghouse plants. Union
rationale for this cooperation was clearly stated by the presidents of
^ AIW, Allied Industrial Worker. October 1965, p. 11. See also AFL-
CIO N e w s , September 25, 1965, p. 5.
13
Committee on Collective Bargaining at GE and Westinghouse, Program
for Progress. We Unite for a Greater Measure of Justice. 1966, p. 40.
Ill
the six collaborating unions. They wrote in part: "The problems af
fecting our members are the same, no matter which of our unions they
belong to. They are subject to the same economic and industrial press
ures; their social and economic needs are the same. ..." And more
specifically, "Just as American labor down through the years found that
it is futile for individuals to try to bargain with large companies, so
we recognize where a number of unions bargain with a single employer

14
that cooperation is the necessary key to success."
In addition to this general statement, the delegates to the con
ference agreed to ppol their efforts to win better pension and insur
ance benefits. They indicated that both GE and Westinghouse mist improve
pension plans in line with the increased benefits won in other indus
tries. More important, the delegates called upon the two companies "to
plug the gaps in Medicare and raise pensions in line with recent Social
Security increases.
The introduction of the coordinated bargaining approach at GE,
although limited in scope to pension and insurance issues, was welcomed
and hailed by the participating u n i o n s . ^ The favorable response by
the unions encouraged, in turn, the IUD and the IUE to proceed to the
next coordinated step in which AFL-CIO*s President George Meany became
directly involved.
14 IUE News. October 14, 1965, p. 2.
^ LAM, The Machinist. September 30, 1965, p. 5.
^ See for example IBEW, Electrical Workers' Journal. "Coordination"

(an editorial), October 1965, p. 19.
112
The Role of the AFL-CIO
The next step in the coordination activities took place on Oc
tober 21, 1965. It was a meeting of seven union presidents with AFL-
CIO President George Meany, which included the six previously-mentioned
unions and the Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA) .
This meeting was marked by two major developments:
(1) The entry of Meany himself on the scene, which reflected
"a drive to give more impetus to the program"^ and the utmost concern
attributed by Meany and the AFL-CIO to the negative repercussions of

18
another victory of GE's "Boulwarism" on the entire labor movement;
(2) The extension of the coordinated bargaining program to in
clude all collective bargaining matters such as wages, income and em
ployment security, holidays, vacations and other common fringe benefits

19
in which the individual union agreements were virtually the same.
The expansion of the coordinated program to cover all contract
Issues was not surprising. It was an obvious eventuality. What seemed
strange was the fact that the initial program of the coordinating unions
was limited only to pension and insurance matters when, it was said,
"the problems affecting our members are the same. . .[and] their social
^ David R. Jones, "7 Unions to Share 1966 Contract Alms."The New York
Times, October 26, 1965, p. 23.
18
Lasser, p. 14.
19
IUE News. October 28, 1965, p. 1. See also the IUD Agenda. Novem
ber 1965, p. 9.
113
and economic needs are the same." It Is likely that the sponsoring
unions chose a two-step process largely because of tactical and in
ternal considerations.
It was at the October meeting that a joint body of the coordin
ating unions was officially formed. Following the ItJD's pattern on
coordinated bargaining, the participants decided to form a Committee on
Collective Bargaining (CCB) composed of the seven union presidents under
the chairmanship of George Meany, to formulate common policy and coor
dinate common action. In addition, a Steering Committee was formed to
help serve the administrative functions of the CCB. Members of the
Steering Committee were each appointed as a chairman of one of the
five subcommittees designated to prepare common contract proposals to
be presented to the companies in the 1966 negotiations. The subcom
mittees handled the following subjects: (1 ) economics; (2) collective
bargaining programs; (3) pensions and insurance; (4) publicity and edu
cation, and (5) legal issues.
As claimed by David Lasser, chairman of the Steering Committee,
a unanimous agreement was required in all committees on all major ac
tivities. He further indicated that "where differences inevitably arose,

20
they were thrashed out until a consensus developed." Indeed, a large
and well-organized machine was set up to assure a real and effective
coordinated program.
20
Lasser, p. 14. The accuracy of this statement was later questioned
by a top union leader in a personal interview with the author in Feb
ruary 1972.
114
The CCB also made an Important decision at the October meeting
safeguarding the autonomy of the various local unions and directed
to their specific needs. As reported by the Allied Industrial Worker,
the joint conference resolved that "problems involving local working

21
conditions will be dealt with by each union separately, as in the past."
The special interest of the AFL-CIO and the IUD in the coordinated
campaign at GE was further demonstrated at their 1965 conventions. At
both conventions strong commitments were made to aid GE unions morally
as well as materially. It should be indicated here, perhaps, that in
1965 the IUD still functioned under UAW President Walter Reuther who
had, in fact, initiated and inspired I U D ’s extensive drive for coor
dinated bargaining wherever needed. Stating that no negotiations in
1966 would be more important than those involving GE and Westinghouse,
the IUD Convention, held in November 1965, pledged "the full support
and resources of the IUD to the efforts of the Committee on Collective
Bargaining. . .and [we] call upon all affiliated unions to join. . .in
22
this pledge." A similar resolution was adopted at the AFL-CIO Con
vention held in December 1965. On that occasion IUE President Paul
Jennings emphasized that the purpose of the CCB is not "to declare a
war against GE and Westinghouse," but to put a program that would
guarantee a return to good faith bargaining with these two giants and
meet the needs of all unions involved. This was a logical supplement
21
Allied Industrial Worker, November 1965, p. 1.
^ IUE News. November 25, 1965, p. 1.
115
to Jennings' words a month earlier when he said at the IUD Convention
that . .when you are divided you are weak. We are no longer divided,
and corporations such as GE, will not be able to play off one inter-
23
national union against another."
It should be pointed out here that the role of the AFL-CIO in
the coordinated program at GE and Westinghouse differed markedly from
its involvement in coordinated bargaining elsewhere. The major dif
ferences were:
(1) It was the first time, and to date the only occasion, that
George Meany himself headed a coordinated bargaining committee. In
addition, his active leadership was not restricted to the preparatory
stages but extended throughout the negotiation periods with GE and
Westinghouse in 1966 as well as in 1969-70. Commenting on Meany's role
and on the AFL-CIO's support, David Lasser said:
Meany. . .gave the movement his active support,

participating as a major speaker at national con
ferences, signing statements and securing the en
thusiastic endorsement of the AFL-CIO Executive
Council and the AFL-CIO Convention.
A member of the AFL-CIO public relations staff
was assigned to the CCB and the full resources of
AFL-CIO departments were made available.^
(2) As reflected in later developments and confirmed by Carlin

25
Allen, a senior coordinator of the IUD, the concerted campaign at GE
^ Lasser, p. 14.
25
In a personal interview at the AFL-CIO, Washington, D. C., Feb
ruary 16, 1972.
116
and Westinghouse was the only Instance where neither the AFL-CIO nor
the IUD assumed any operative role in actual bargaining. Undoubtedly,
however, the entry of George Meany on the scene, his deep interest in
this campaign, his ability to ensure full support of the federation,
and the wide publicity given to his statements gave strong momentum and
encouragement to the coordinating unions at GE and Westinghouse. Con
sequently, the general feeling was, indeed, that the AFL-CIO was help
ing to coordinate union efforts to win better wages, benefits and work-
26
ing conditions from these two companies. All in all, the involvement
of the AFL-CIO and the IUD in all aspects of this joint union action,
except in actual bargaining, was of such an extent that it seemed as
if the whole labor movement rose to its feet to fight GE.
The First Unity Convention
To increase local interest as well as to gain the support of the
local unions in the coordinated bargaining program, the joint body of
the cooperating unions, the CCB, resolved to hold a national unity con
vention in which local union leaders from all GE and Westinghouse plant
locations would take part. Participating in the convention, held on
March 15, 1966, in Washington, D. C., were 300 delegates representing
160,000 GE and Westinghouse employees, affiliated with eight AFL-CIO
unions (the eighth union was the American Flint Glass Workers, who
joined the CCB in December.1965). According to some participants it
26
The Machinist. November A, 1965, p. 4.
117
was a highly successful event. As regarded by the IUE News, the conven
tion exhibited a "spirit of unity unparalleled in the history of the
27
labor movement. ..." The conference set an historic precedent be
cause, "this was the first time that so many rank and file representa
tives of so many international unions have joined together in a coor-
28
dinated effort." Following a day-long discussion, the convention
approved a joint bargaining program — Program for Progress — to be
come the national goals of the coordinating unions.
Initially, the joint program was drafted a month earlier by the
CCB at the meeting of the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council in Bal Harbour,
Florida. The Washington conference simply approved the program with

29
almost no change. The inter-union goals were:
1. To provide for a catch-up in wages and other

benefits in which the GE and Westinghouse agreements
had allegedly fallen behind other unions since 1960.
2. To provide for GE and Westinghouse employees a
fair share of the gains in productivity that had enabled,
these corporations to realize:isuch substantial increases
in profits."
3. To secure for GE and Westinghouse employees wages
and other benefit provisions equal to those provided by
30
comparable companies and industries.
27 Ibid.. March 24, 1966, p. 5.

9ft
Allied Industrial Worker. April 1966, p. 1.
^ AFL-CIO News, February 26, 1966, p. 2.

30
See for example, AFTE, Engineers Outlook, March 1966, p. 1.
118
To justify these goals, the CCB explained that,
Employees of the two firms. . . have fallen 25 to

30 cents an hour behind other basic industry wage
and benefit levels since 1960. While improvements
ranged between 2.7 and 3.9 percent per year in other
industries. . .they have averaged only 2.1 percent
at GE and 1.8 percent at Westinghouse. The cost
of living has risen by 7.7 percent since 3une 1960,
. . .reducing the 'real net gain 1 to eight-tenths
of 1 percent for GE workers and one-half of 1 per
cent for Westinghouse employees. [Moreover]. . .
employee productivity based on sales per employee
has been rising about 5 percent a year.^T
The national bargaining demands adopted by the convention included:
A. Three major economic issues: (1) a substantial wage

increase, cost of living escalator, and elimination of geo
graphical differentials; (2 ) nine paid holidays and longer
vacations with additional vacation bonus, and (3) income
and employment security provisions with supplemental unem
ployment benefits on top.
B. Five non-economic goals and a number of objectives

dealing with pensions, insurance and health. Among the main
32
non-economic goals were: (1) a full arbitration clause,
and (2) a full union shop.
A "Resolution of Unity" endorsed by the convention stated that
"Our members will know and the companies will know that all bargaining
33
units will be directing their energies toward the same national goals."
31
Ibid., p. 2. See also IBEW, Electrical Workers'Journal. March 1966,
pp. 2-4. For a comparison of wage increases at GE with average wage
increases in manufacturing in that period, see below, p. 157.
32
As it stood then, mandatory arbitration at GE was limited, largely
to discipline and discharge cases. Arbitation of other unresolved is
sues required consent of both parties in each case.
33
IUE News. March 24, 1966, p. 5. See also AFL-CIO News, March
19, 1966, pp. 1 and 3.
119
Aside from the adoption of the "same national goals," it became
apparent at this unity convention that the cooperating unions were de
termined to fight "Boulwarism." Almost all speakers strongly denounced
GE's labor policy and particularly its bargaining approach. As George
Meany indicated in his address to the convention, ". . .bargaining is
not simply a legal ceremony. . .but means joining together in good faith
3A
to work out the best agreement." It was believed at the conference
that only through this kind of union cooperation would GE's "Boulwarism"
be shattered. President Russel Stephens of the AFTE expressed this
optimistic view when he officially opened the meeting: "This conference

35
marks the end of the divide and conquer tactics of GE and Westinghouse,"
Likewise, the final "Unity Resolution" adopted that day made it ex
plicitly clear that "By the action we have taken here today we intend
36
to confront company-wide policies with a union-wide program."
Although it was too early then to predict union success at the
coming negotiations with GE, the general impression was that this unity
rally provided stimulating hopes to GE unions. As expressed later by
one delegate,
"It's a long way from March to September (when

GE agreements expire) but I think a good start
3A AFL-CIO N e w s . Ibid., p. 3.
35
Harry Conn, "Determined, Spirited Unity Displayed by Eight Unions
Set to Face GE," American Flint. May 1966, p. 14.
36
AIW, "GE-Westinghouse Unity Resolution," Allied Industrial Worker.
April 1966, p. 4.
120
has been made by our 8-union group toward demonstrat

ing to General Electric that it will have to do
business with a united labor front this summer or
face the kind of problems that it has heretofore only
read about.37
The significance of this unity convention was primarily the direct
involvement of local union leaders in officially resolving common policy
and common bargaining goals for the 1966 negotiations. Their active
participation in the convention’s deliberations reflected also their
hatred of "Boulwarism" and their unequivocal support of the coordinated
bargaining idea. As reported by the Allied Industrial Worker, "Delegate
after delegate came to the microphone to hail the new unity in the elec-
38
trical manufacturing industry." Thus, although the initiative for the
coordinated bargaining drive at GE came originally from the IUE and
leaders of national unions, local unions actually supported this idea
willingly. Moreover, as has been recently confirmed, all Locals had
been consulted by their national unions prior to announcing the forma-

39
tion of coordinated bargaining. Consent of the Locals was obviously
required because of the local nature of most GE contracts.
The Communication System
To ensure efficient coordination at the multiple bargaining tables
in order to reach the same national goals, the CCB introduced an elaborate
37
Edward J. Carlough, "March is O.K.," Sheet Metal Workers’ Journal.
April 1966, p. 19.
OQ
Allied Industrial Worker. April 1966, p. 1.
39
Information obtained in personal interviews and in the written sur
vey conducted by the author.
121
communication system to match the teletype networks utilized effectively
by the companies in past negotiations. Accordingly, seventeen regional
union coordinators (See Table 5) were appointed to work on a full-time
basis. An equivalent number of teletypes were Installed in the re
gional offices, linking them with coordinating headquarters in Washing
ton and with key national negotiation centers in New York (for GE) and
in Pittsburgh (for Westinghouse). Thus all bargaining developments,
company statements and local union actions were transmitted daily by
the coordinators to Washington, then condensed and disseminated back

40
to the locals through the regional coordinators. Through this elab
orate medium every bargaining committee going into negotiations with GE
knew what had happened at every other GE negotiations table the day
before.^
In addition to regional coordinators and a teletype communication
system, the CCB also acted to increase the effectiveness of coordina
tion at all national and local bargaining tables. This was allegedly
achieved by including representatives of the other coordinating unions

42
on each negotiating committee. Generally speaking, inter-union nego-
^ Lasser, p. 16.
41
IUD, Agenda. October 1966, p. 17. According to IBEW, Technician
Engineer. September/October 1966, p. 12, "The first words flashed over
the teletype on August 22 when Jerry Dale, Communications Coordinator
and a member of the staff of the United Auto Workers, sent out the mes
sage: 'This is CCB Washington. Greetings Brothers. Your Unity TWX
News Network is now in operation1."
42
McKinnell, p. 14. See also UAW Solidarity. October 1966, p. 14.
122
TABLE 5. Regional Offices of the CCB, 1966.
Location Union in Charge of Coordination
Atlanta, Georgia IBEW
Boston, Massachusetts IUE

Chicago, Illinois Sheet Metal Workers
Cincinnati, Ohio UAW
Cleveland, Ohio IBEW
Columbus, Ohio IUE

Little Rock, Arkansas IBEW
Louisville, Kentucky IUE

Milwaukee, Wisconsin AIW
New York, New York IBEW
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania AFTE
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania IUE
San Jose, California IAM and IBEW
Schenectady, New York IUE
Utica, New York IAM
Source: IBEW, The Electrical Workers 1Journal. Vol. 65, No. 7,

August/September, 1966, p. 42.
tiating committees were, and are the identity card of coordinated bar
gaining. In essence, such mixed committees of skilled and experienced
negotiators are an incarnation of a fundamental principle of the co
ordinated bargaining approach. The idea behind this device is to
counter, or cope with, bargaining methods of multi-plant companies.
As reported by the Electrical Union World. "The technique called ’co
ordinated bargaining' is viewed by the unions as similar to that used
123
by the corporation [GE] Itself in moving a team of experienced negoti
ators from one set of bargaining sessions to another with all the unions
43
it deals with." Whether or not this important principle was actually
fulfilled on a company-wide basis at GE is open to question. This issue
will be discussed later upon evaluating the results of the coordinated
bargaining experience.
Finally, in order to counter the harassment of GE's traditional
mass communication, the CCB decided to carry out a large-scale com
munication of its own. This objective was achieved in two ways:
1. Through Unity, a joint monthly publication issued by the CCB
from March 1966 and throughout the negotiations with GE and Westinghouse.
The purpose of Unity was first to denounce GE's "Boulwarism" and to
criticize or argue with the companies' positions. Second, to spread
the idea of the new coordinated bargaining approach and to explain the
common inter-union goals as adopted by the unity convention in Washing
ton, D. C.
2. Through local and regional inter-union unity meetings with
rank and file. The major objective of these "grass roots" meetings
was to explain and advance the agreed joint collective bargaining pro
gram throughout the country, and to obtain full support at the grass
roots level.
All in all, 17 such joint meetings were planned to take place in
mid 1966 in various locations. Technical and administrative respon
sibility for the grass-roots meetings was divided among the partici
pating unions (see Table 6).
^ IBEW, Local 3, Electrical Union World, August 1-15, 1966, p. 12.
124
TABLE 6 . Grass Roots Meetings, 1966.
Date Place Sponsoring Union
May 17 Columbus, Ohio IUE
May 25 Schenectady, New York IUE

May 26 Atlanta, Georgia Sheet Metal Workers
June 1 Chicago, Illinois IBEW
June 2 Louisville, Kentucky IUE
June 7 Evendale, Ohio UAW
June 8 Buffalo, New York IUE
June 9 Cleveland, Ohio IBEW
June 14 Lynn, Massachusetts AFTE
June 15 Newark, New Jersey IBEW
June 16 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania AFTE
June 20 Burlingame, California IAM
June 22 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania IBEW
June 23 Utica, New York IAM
June 27 Little Rock, Arkansas IBEW
June 29 Danville, Illinois IAM
June 30 Fort Wayne, Indiana IAM
Source: IAM. The Machinist. Vol. XXI. No. 10. Mav 5. 1966, p. 5.
Looking back at the preparatory work done by the CCB and the
Steering Committee, four major phases of action can be identified:
(1) Adoption of common agreed-upon policy on

common bargaining issues.
(2) Involvement of local union leaders in for
mulating the common bargaining goals for the 1966
negotiations.
(3) Fighting GE's mass communication to its em
ployees by an opposing large-scale communications system.
125
(4) A resolution to strengthen union negotiating

teams by including experienced members of other coor
dinating unions.
Hence, everything was ready for the big show — the actual con
frontation with the giant corporations. All evidence indicated that
in the forthcoming negotiations with GE, scheduled to open officially
in August 1966, the collaborating unions would put "Boulwarism" to its
most serious test since its adoption in 1948. Obviously, it would also
be a test of power for the new union alliance. In a sense, the real
questions then were, would coordinated bargaining be able to force GE
to retreat from its tradition of "one-and-only-one-offer," would it
be able to extract more concessions from the Company, or, put more
plainly, would "Boulwarism" be defeated?
In order to answer these questions a brief review of the 1966
negotiations is required.
Chapter VI
PREPARATION FOR THE 1966 NEGOTIATIONS AND

THE LEGAL STATUS OF COORDINATED BARGAINING
Intended Coalition
The original objective of the union alliance at GE was clearly
a true coalition. The initial aim was to try to impose on GE joint
national bargaining on all common goals with a CCB negotiating team
composed of all participating unions. The idea was to eliminate GE's
traditional pattern of bargaining individually with "100 odd" local
unions. Instead, the CCB sought to consolidate these separate bar
gaining units that had existed traditionally with the IUE and other
unions, within the national negotiations.
This posture was well reflected in a telegram sent on March 23,
1966, to GE President, Fred J. Borch, signed by the presidents of the
eight cooperating unions. Justifying their request for a joint infor
mal meeting with GE (and for another joint meeting with Westinghouse),
the presidents of the unions stated that "The contracts of the unions
on the major issues. . .are the same, and we naturally have developed
a common program to improve our agreements."^-
^ AFL-CIO News. March 26, 1966, p. 3.
126
127
Although the Initial request was only for an Informal meeting with
GE management, it was clear from the telegram that the CCB was heading
toward coalition bargaining. As GE pointed out later, "The 1966 coali
tion obviously[had] far different objectives than those formed in prior
years. One aspect of this [was] their apparent determination to force
some form of joint bargaining, and to force us to bargain nationally

2
with the seven unions which [had] only local certification." This is
in fact the prime objective of coalition bargaining as indicated once
by the IUD's director, Leonard Lesser, to establish "the right of a group
of unions representing employees of a single employer to negotiate on

3
behalf of all employees, regardless of bargaining units."
Nevertheless, all union officials recently questioned, denied any
intention on their part to impose on GE the conclusion of a single con
tract covering members of all their unions. As explained, they sought
joint bargaining with GE only to avoid local bargaining on common issues.
All admitted, though, that what they had actually wanted to achieve
through joint bargaining was, and still is, a set of national contracts.
In essence, they sought to reach jointly a basic company-wide agreement
for each national union with additional local supplements. If true,such
an attempt would have constituted a "modified" coalition approach rather
than pure coalition, which is based on a single, formal multi-union con
tract.
All attempts made by the Steering Committee and the CCB, however,
2
GE, Employee Communication in Connection with 1966 General Electric
Union Negotiations, pp. 38-39.
3
BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook. 1967. p. 309.
128
to secure a central meeting with GE, whether on all commonuilon goals
or, as in the early stage, on pensions and insurance problems only,
were strongly rejected by the Company. In response, GE explained
separately to each union that the Company saw no reason to depart from
the procedures as defined in the existing contracts, which had "served
our employees and the Company well in the past."^ Evidently, GE based
its rejection of a meeting with a multi-union team on legal grounds,
pointing to the illegality of coalition bargaining. It claimed, also,
that the real purpose of the IUE and other collaborating unions was to
set the basis for a crippling company or industry-wide strike, thereby
creating a national emergency and precipitating government interven-

5
tion.
Coalition Intentions Abandoned
GE's persistent refusal to neeot-'ate with the coalition seemed
to be effective when, on April 13, 1966, the IUE alone wrote a letter
to GE indicating its willingness to abandon any further requests for
joint negotiations. The letter, signed by John H. Callahan, Chairman
of the GE-IUE Conference Board, stated explicitly that, "Speaking for
the GE-IUE Conference Board, we will not pursue that matter (joint
negotiations) any further and will abandon any suggestions for any such
joing meeting or for joint discussions."^ The letter proposed a GE-IUE

4
GE, Employee Communication. . .. p. 85.
^ GE, Employee Communication. . .. p. 85.
129
meeting to establish ground rules for pre-negotiation sub-committee
meetings. GE readily agreed and, on the basis of this assurance, a
meeting was planned to take place on May A. As agreed, the purpose
of this meeting was to lay out the ground rules for subcommittee ses
sions to be held prior to official mandatory negotiations scheduled
to start on, or after August 1, 1966.
As became evident on May A, though, IUE's proclaimed departure
from its previous coalition posture did not extinguish union cooperation
at GE. While the IUE's move, proposing a separate meeting with GE,
perhaps terminated union attempts at coalition bargaining, the meeting
of May A itself marked the actual realization of coordinated bargain
ing. Being unable to impose coalition bargaining, becuase of GE's ob
jection, the IUE switched, with the CCB's consent, to the other alter
native, that is, to coordinated bargaining. For obvious tactical
reasons the IUE did not notify GE of this change in advance. Hence,
to the surprise of GE negotiators, the IUE negotiating team appeared
at the first meeting on May A, 1966, with representatives of all but
one of the unions which comprised the alliance. A representative of
the IUD, Leonard Lesser, was also present.^ Each representative wore
a lapel button identifying his respective union. When GE protested
the strange composition of the union bargaining team, the IUE explained
that all of the individuals present had been chosen to render advice
and help in the discussions confined to IUE matters, and were actually
non-voting members of the IUE negotiating committee. The IUE further
^ AIW, Allied Industrial Workers. May 1966, p. 5.
130
emphasized Its legal right to choose Its own representatives to the

g
bargaining table. Despite these explanations or, as stated later by
9
the U. S. District Court, without even listening to them, the GE
negotiating team walked out of the meeting room. So, the first meet
ing ended before it actually started. After the meeting, GE's chief
negotiator, Philip D. Moore, issued the following statement:
When we got into this morning's meeting, we

found that the regular negotiating committee of
the IUE was now insisting on having representatives
from most of the other unions in their coalition
group present at the same time, but this was
clearly not what we had agreed to. In the face
of this kind of subterfuge, we recessed our par
ticipation in the meeting until such time as the
IUE is ready to deal with us in a sincere effort
to form G E-IUE s u b c o m m i t t e e s . ^
The Issue of the "Mixed" Negotiating Committee
While the "advisory" role of other union representatives on the
IUE bargaining team was questionable, the implications of their mere
presence were rather meaningful to both parties, morally, psychologi
cally and practically. Doubtless, such an addition to the IUE's
negotiating committee implied increased support, strengthening union
performance at the bargaining table. One may question the need for
such external addition once all cooperating unions have pledged to seek
identical objectives. One may theorize that a coordinated bargaining

O
BNA, Daily Labor Report. No. 87, May 4, 1966, p. A-12.
q
McLeod v. General Electric C o .. 257 F.Supp. 690 (1966), at 701, 706.
^ GE, Employee Communication. . .. p. 86 .
131
activity can be conducted fairly well without the physical presence
of representatives of other unions. In practice, however, unions re
gard this device of "mixed" committees as an important element of co
ordination. As claimed later by the IUE and noted by Professor
Stephen B. Goldberg, such a technique ". . .would provide inter-union
communication adequate to prevent GE's signing a contract with one
union on terms favorable to the company and then using that contract
as a lever to obtain favorable contract terms from other u n i o n s . " ^
Weighing the available evidence, however, one can not accept
this contention as a major justification for "mixed" union bargaining
committees. It does not seem convincing that the presence of repre
sentatives of other unions is primarily required for maintenance of
better inter-union communication or to safeguard against any union de
viation from the common agreed goals. Rather, their presence is needed
mainly as a demonstrative factor representing unity of interests or
solidarity for a common cause among the coordinating unions. The
prevalence of this demonstrative factor produces in turn a power effect
which influences the conduct of both parties at the bargaining table.
If considered as representative, the findings of the author's survey
among national and local unions that deal with GE support this con
clusion. Indeed, as revealed in the survey, except for the national
IUE-GE negotiations, most contract negotiations with GE, in 1966, were
conducted without mixed committees. Notwithstanding this fact, almost
^ Stephen B. Goldberg, "Coordinated Bargaining Tactics of Unions,"

Cornell Law Review. Vol. 54, No. 6 (July 1969), p. 898.
132
all local unions strictly pursued the same bargaining objectives agreed
to jointly on common issues. By conducting a common bargaining pro
gram, local negotiations on company-wide issues lost most, if not all,
of their significance. Local unions could only follow the pattern set
by the IUE's mixed committee at the national bargaining table in New
York City. For this reason, the "power effect" of a broad inter-union
committee was more vital at the national level. Nevertheless, the ab
sence of mixed committees at the local level reflected one weakness

12
of the CCB, acknowledged by a top union leader.
Following the early impasse on May 4, although long before man
datory contract negotiations were officially to take place, both par
ties resorted to legal battle, reaching from the NLRB all the way to
the Supreme Court. Both GE and the IUE promptly filed unfair iabor
practice charges against each other with the NLRB. The IUE protested
GE's refusal to bargain as violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA). The Company, on the other hard,
charged the IUE and all other coordinating unions with engaging in an
illegal conspiratory coalition to force it to bargain with them
nationally as a single unit, despite the local certifications of most
bargaining units. In addition, GE charged that the unions had illegally
"locked themselves together" so that none of them could bargain freely

13
and reach agreement without the consent of all others. As summarized
12
Mr. Fred Purcell, General Vice President of the IAM and Co-Chairman
of the Steering Committee of the coordinating unions, August 11, 1972,
personal interview, Utica, New York.
13
by the Company, its NLRB charge against the IUE and the other seven
coordinating unions consisted of the five following points:
1. In the case of the seven unions in the

coalition which have nothing but local cer
tification, it is illegal for them to try
to force the Company to bargain with them
nationally.
2. Even if each of the unions in the coalition
were certified to bargain with General Electric
nationally, it would be illegal for such
national unions to try to force us to bargain
with them as a single unit.
3. In addition to the charges identified above, it
is illegal for two or more unions to lock them
selves together, so that one or more of them
cannot bargain freely without the consent of
the others.
4. It is illegal for one or more unions to con
spire in subterfuges to promote illegal ob
jectives.
5. It is likewise illegal for other union repre
sentatives to become conspirators by sitting
in with IUE, claiming they are part of the IUE
negotiating committee, and thereby failing to
give proper representation to employees at the
local level where they are certified.
An Injunction against General Electric
GE's arguments failed to convince the NLRB. The Board decided
to dismiss the Company's charges, and proceeded on an unusual course
— to seek a temporary injunction under Section 10(j) of the Act, for
cing GE to negotiate with the mixed committee of the IUE. The injunc
tion was granted on August 18, 1966, by Judge Marvin E. Frankel of the
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. Upholding the

14
134
position of the IUE, the court ordered GE to meet with the multi-union
, ,
negotiating committee.
, 1 5
While the injunction reflected an unprecedented course with res
pect to coordinated bargaining, the legality of mixed committees had
already been determined by the NLRB and the courts. In 1963, in
Standard Oil v. NLRB, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the
right of several locals of an international union to include on their
negotiating committees representatives of each o t h e r . ^ In 1965, In
the American Radiator & Standard case, the NLRB expanded this inter
pretation when it upheld the legality of mixed committees though the
local unions concerned were affiliated with several international
unions
In the GE case, Judge Frankel rejected as baseless G E ’s charges
of conspiracy against the coordinating unions and rebuked the Company
for aborting the May 4th meeting. Consequently, he described the GE

18
walkout as "the boldest and most explicit form of refusal to bargain."
Judge Frankel confirmed the right of GE unions to ". . .assist each
other and discover if possible areas of agreement, of 'unity', and of
mutual support in dealing with the unified, unitary, centralized manage-

19
ment they confront." The Court reminded GE of its own coordinated
McLeod v. General Electric C o .. 257 F.Supp.690(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
16 Standard Oil Co. v. N L R B . 322 F.2d40 (6 th Cir. 1963).
^ American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.. 155 NLRB 736 (1965).
1 ft
McLeod v. General Electric C o .. 257 F.Supp.690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) at 702.
19 Ibid.. at 704.
135
bargaining practices and in the light of these, pointed out the absur
dity of its charges against the coordinating unions. In the court's
words: "While it [GE] takes pains to coordinate its own dealings in
all the many bargaining units, it foresees a danger of 'national strikes'
from an approach to similar coordination on the other side of the bar-

20
gaining table."
This injunction, the first of this nature with regard to coor
dinated bargaining, meant also a first victory to the coordinating
unions, although obviously not in itself adequate to secure contrac
tual concessions from GE. Having no choice, the Company agreed, under
protest, to resume or, in fact, to begin contract negotiations with
this broad coinnittee. The first official session took place on August
23, while the Company appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.
A few weeks later, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, dis
solved the injunction on the ground that the injunctive relief was not
21
an appropriate method of dealing with this complicated case. With
out discussing the legality of coordinated bargaining the Court ruled
that the matter should be processed routinely by the NLRB. When the
Court issued its mandate on September 20, the Company again refused to
talk to, or actually ignored the "outsiders" on the IUE's enlarged com
mittee. But on the next day, September 21, Supreme Court Justice Harlan
22
ordered reinstatement of the injunction. The negotiations with the
20 Ibid.. at 704-705.
21 366 F. 2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
22 87 S.Ct. 5, 17 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1966).
136
IUE's "mixed” committee were then resumed without further objection on
the part of GE. However, Justice Harlan concurred in the Court of Ap
peals' decision to refer the issue of the legality of coordinated bar
gaining back to the NLRB for hearing and prompt decision.
The Legality of Coordinated Bargaining Upheld
It was not until two years later, on October 23, 1968, that the
NLRB decided the case. In a four to one decision the NLRB sustained
the IUE's charges and upheld the trial examiner's conclusion that GE
had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the LMRA by its refusal to bar
gain with the IUE from May 4 to August 23, and also on September 20
23
and 21, 1966. This decision was later enforced in relevant part on
24
June 9, 1969, by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New York.
The Court upheld NLRB's ruling on all questions, but one. The Court
merely disagreed with the Board's decision as far as the period of in
formal preliminary negotiations — from May 4 to August, 1966, was con
cerned. As pointed out by the Court, the Board took the position that
"while it recognized the distinction between informal preliminary dis
cussions based upon mutual consent in the spring of 1966 and mandatory
bargaining in August, the Company's condition [to meet only with pure
25
IUE committee] would be equally illegal in either period." The Cir-
2^ General Electric Co., 173 NLRB, 253 (1968).
24 General Electric v. NLRB. 412 F.2d512 (2nd Cir. 1969).
25 Ibid., at 521.
137
cult Court rejected this contention and concluded that, "the Company
could condition a meeting on a ‘traditional' IUE committee in the in
formal pre-August period, regardless of its inability to do so later
in the mandatory bargaining period." However, the Court added: "Ob
viously, we do not pass upon the wisdom of such a negotiating position

26
in the future."
Both the NLRB and the Circuit Court ruled, in essence, that the
mere presence of "outsiders" on the IUE negotiating committee did not
constitute evidence of bad faith bargaining, nor was it, per s e . in
herently disruptive of the bargaining process so, long as actual bar
gaining was confined to the IUE. Relying on Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, which guarantees employees the fundamental right
to "bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,"
the Circuit Court made it clear that, "We hold that the IUE did have
the right to include members of other unions on its negotiating com
mittee, and the Company was not lawfully entitled to refuse to. bargain
with that committee so long as it sought to bargain solely on behalf

27
of those employees represented by the IUE. ..."
Both the NLRB and the Court rejected GE's contentions that the
CCB was attempting to impose joint bargaining through the IUE mixed
committee and that the IUE was actually "locked-in" to an agreement
whereby it would not accept any offer until all other unions were satis-
26
Ibid. Footnote omitted.
27 Ibid.. at 520.
138
fied. The Court indicated that neither the trial examiner nor the NLRB
had found any substantial evidence to support G E ’s charges during any
stage of the negotiations, including the first meeting of May 4, 1966.
Furthermore, in a statement that may shed additional light on
the nature of the coordinated bargaining technique, the Circuit Court
emphasized that:
Throughout the proceedings before Judge Frankel

the IUE disclaimed any intention to bargain for
others and maintained its ability to enter into
any agreement that satisfied its demands regardless
of the position of other unions. . . . Moreover,
during the period when the Company had to, and did,
deal with the mixed IUE committee, the committee
neither bargained nor tried to bargain for employees
other than those represented by IUE.
Although not explicity stated, it was clearly implicit in the de
cisions of the NLRB and the Circuit Court that had a pressure been put
on GE for joint bargaining, or had a "lock-in" agreement among the CCB
unions been proved, G E ’s refusal to bargain would have been unquestion
ably justified. A similar position on these two features of coalition
bargaining was taken by the Sixth Circuit Court in the Standard Oil
case noted earlier. In that case the Court explicitly ruled that the
four locals (of the same international union) had acted improperly in
refusing to sign their separate contracts until all locals were satis-
29
fied.
In summary, while coalition objectives were implicitly found to
oo
Ibid., at 522.
OQ
Standard Oil Co. v. N L R B . 322 F.2d 40(6th Cir. 1963), at 45.
139
be unlawful, their absence in the CCB group in 1966 led to confirmation
of the CCB's status as a lawful coordinated bargaining alliance at GE.

30
The Company did not appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
In retrospect, one may perhaps wonder why GE preferred to go
through this lengthy judicial battle rather than to accept coalition
or coordinated bargaining. The real question is why did GE oppose
coalition or coordinated bargaining so strongly and fight against it
so vigorously? Such an antagonistic course of action seems somewhat
illogical when taken by a company which is noted for its tradition of
pursuing a uniform labor policy on major pay and benefit issues. If
common benefits are granted voluntarily to all employees, why not nego
tiate jointly with all their unions on the same issues?

31
GE's chief negotiator, John R. Baldwin, was asked this question.
In response, he explained that GE is a highly diversified company and,
therefore, its employees had chosen various local unions as their legiti
mate representatives. Respecting the wishes of its employees, GE had
faithfully bargained with their lawful representatives on the basis of
the existing bargaining units as certified by the NLRB. The insistence
30
March 21, 1972, personal interview, New York City. Por additional
evaluations of the legal aspects of coordinated bargaining at GE see
David L. Benetar (GE's Legal Counsel), "Coalition Bargaining under the
NLRA," Proceedings of New York University Twentieth Annual Conference
on Labor, 196S, pp. 219-229, and Irving Abramson (IUE's Legal Counsel),
"Coordinated Bargaining by Unions," ibid.. pp. 231-252.
31
March 24, 1972, personal interview, at GE headquarters, New York
City.
140
of GE to preserve the certified bargaining units, Mr. Baldwin emphasized,
was in line with the Company's policy of respecting the wishes of its
employees.
This statement that GE respects employees' wishes suggests a ques
tion: Because GE employees, or at least their legitimate representatives,
have chosen since 1966 to negotiate on a coalition or coordinated basis,
why has the Company not been willing to respect this wish? Mr. Baldwin's
reply was that GE also obeys the law and wants to maintain the tradi
tional structure of the bargaining units intact as certified by the
NLRB.
This reply hardly answered the question because, as pointed out
earlier, a change in certified bargaining units does not necessarily
violate the law if effected with the mutual consent of the parties.
The real question is then, why GE's consent was persistently withheld.
GE's strong opposition to the new union method of bargaining stems
undoubtedly from power considerations. For GE, as well as for any large
multi-product company, diversified and weak unions are preferable to a
united labor front. A company-wide strike is far more damaging than
sporadic limited stoppages. This was GE's major concern and it is well
reflected in one of its statements made in 1966. Summarizing in nine
arguments its rationale against coalition bargaining, the Company
pointed out, in part:
Various aspects of preliminary 'coordinated' bar

gaining such as union pooling research and informa
tion, improving communications with one another and
with their membership, analyzing the long-range im
141
pact of their demands and strategies, etc. — are

not basically a concern to General Electric pro
vided these are not merely instruments for enfor
cing strike discipline on locals whether they want
to strike or not.32
General Electric Fights Union Unity Drives
In addition to the legal battle, both GE and the CCB resorted to
full-scale propaganda activity to promote their respective causes. The
CCB used its new publication, Unity, to spread information about the
jointly-agreed upon goals and conducted a regional "grass roots" meet
ing to gain rank and file support. Likewise, GE shifted its vast com
munications media into high gear. It was obvious that the primary
purpose of GE was to crack the unity among its AFL-CIO unions. As will
be discussed shortly, the "grass roots" unity meetings provided GE
with excellent targets for attack. As claimed by Henry F. McKinnell
of the IUE, "Whenever a meeting was planned near a GE location, dire
warnings were distributed to GE employees, advising them that ’strangers
are in town' or ’the coalition is coming' or cautioning them to 'recon
sider the consequences of abandoning local interest in favor of an ex-

33
periment in coalition bargaining."
In its barrage of communication, GE tried to split the unions
apart by disparaging the CCB, and pointing out the diverse interests
of the participating unions, the uselessness of the coordinated drive

32
"Why We Do Not Accept Coalition Bargaining," GE, Employee Relations
Ne w s. No. 66-28, July 25, 1966, p. 1.
33 McKinnell, p. 10.
142
at GE and its damaging repercussion on local employees. In several
instances GE questioned the wisdom of IUE members in succumbing to a
coalition under which "a small union representing a handfull of G.E.
employees could prevent a big union, like the IUE, from reaching a
34
sound settlement this year." In locations where unions other than
IUE had bargaining rights, GE emphasized the futility of counting on
the IUE or on other leaders of the CCB. For example, at the Hotpoint
division in Chicago, Illinois, the stronghold of the Sheet Metal Wor
kers, GE told the employees: "The IUE, obviously, is the prime factor
in this coalition, yet they did not seem to show concern for Hotpoint's
Household Refrigerator Department employees in March when the union

35
struck G.E.'s Louisville plant and caused lay-offs here." To members
of the AFTE at the Philadelphia works, the Company said, ". . .it ap
pears the needs and concerns of local AFTE members will take a back
36
seat to the political ambitions of the 'coalition' leaders." The
Company further explained to AFTE members that,
Of particular importance to AFTE members should

be the question of how 'coalition' bargaining
could affect them. As salaried employees they have
substantially different personal interests from
employees in other 'coalition' unions — who are
primarily concerned about the problems of hourly-
' rated employees. Yet, according to the 'coalition's'
unity resolution, AFTE members could find themselves
on strike over demands which couldn't possibly
benefit them.3?
3A
See for example, "The Coalition Comes to Louisville," GE News.
Louisville, Kentucky, June 2, 1966.
35
GE News, Chicago, Illinois, June 1, 1966, p. 2.
^ GE, Philadelphia Daily Headliner. June 16, 1966, p. 2.
37 Ibid.. p. 3.
143
In essence, GE's message to all union members attending the grass
roots meetings was almost Identical. The Company denounced the CCB
alliance and warned against Its negative implications for local in
terests. Furthermore, GE called upon the participating unions to break
their ties with the CCB and to re-establish their independence. As
carried by GE Schenectady News. the Company message stated explicitly:
We want a sound peaceful settlement. The coalition

is reducing the chances for it by undermining the suc
cessful bargaining relationships that have been de
veloped through years of experience.
We therefore call on all attendees at today's meet
ing, and most particularly the representatives of the
Schenectady unions, to reconsider the consequences of
abandoning local interests in favor of an experiment
in coalition bargaining.
It is our hope that the coalition group in its de
liberations today will seek a_ way for each of the
unions to regain its individual freedom of action,
not only during the pre-negotiations period but later
this summer when each must meet the responsibilities
of negotiating good contracts for their m e m b e r s . 38
In addition to GE publications directed against the CCB unions,
almost all national and local unions surveyed reported oral pressures
by GE to discourage local union officials and local membership from
coordinated bargaining activity. Furthermore, at least two unions, the
IAM and the AFTE, publicly charged GE with granting unexpected pay in
creases in some locations, labeled by the Company "inequity adjustments,"
for the sole purpose of disrupting unity among the coordinating unions.
According to the Machinist, IAM members working at two GE plants in Evan-
dale, Ohio, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, reported receiving such pay in-
38
GE Schenectady N e w s , May 27, 1966, p. 8 . Emphasis added.
144
39
creases of four to eighteen cents a n hour. Moreover, IAM Vice
President Gilbert Brunner, a member of the CCB's Steering Committee,
also charged that "other unions reported similar increases in at least

40
ten GE plants." The AFTE's Engineers Outlook regarded these raises
as evidence of G E ’s fears concerning the unions' alliance. Claiming
that "Unity is already paying off at GE in the form of widespread wage
increases described as inequity adjustments," the paper stated: "One
thing is sure, GE never gives something for nothing. Is GE running
scared? "4 ^
Unity Strengthened
Scared or not, one conclusion is inevitable: GE did all it could
to foil the unions' drive for joint activity and to avoid possible suc
cess of the CCB. The question now is how successful was GE in tor
pedoing the growth of unity among its unions? Two major facts point
out GE's failure at that preliminary stage:
1. The stalemate after May 4, 1966, in the customary GE-IUE
prenegotiations subconroittee meetings, spread to all major GE loca
tions. The Company was unable to meet with local unions for prelim-
inary talks. Most locals adopted the policy of "wait and see."
^ The Machinist. July 7, 1966, p. 5.
40 Ibid.
41
Engineers Outlook. July 1966, p. 1.
42
GE, Employee Communication. . ., pp. 101-110.
145
2. Instead of splitting or reducing the power of the CCB, in
July 1966, three additional unions, the Steelworkers, the Carpenters

43
and the Plumbers joined the coordinated bargaining alliance. These
additions brought to eleven the number of coordinating unions.
The Parties Strong and Determined
As the mandatory negotiation period was approaching it became
apparent that neither side was successful in preventing the other party
from pursuing its initially-determined course. As GE pointed out, "We
are convinced that the basic strategy of the union coalition is to pre
sent a 'united front' for unanimously rejecting any Company proposals

44
(no matter how good) in favor of forcing a broad-scale strike."
Nevertheless, the Company would not budge one iota from its traditional
bargaining practices. The Company made it clear that:
For many years General Electric has stood firmly

for the principle of negotiating in a forthright
manner which holds nothing back simply to be able
to make last-minute, strike-threat concessions.
In this year's negotiations we intend to bargain
in the same way because we believe it really serves
everyone best in the long run.
The CCB, on the other hand, strongly denounced GE for intensify
ing the campaign against its members. The coordinating unions par-
43
AFL-CIO, CCB, Unity. No. 4, July 1966, p. 3. The Carpenters, though,
had bargaining relationship with Westinghouse, not with GE.
44
GE, Employee Relations News, No. 66-28, July 25, 1966, p. 1.
^ Ibid., emphasis added.
146
ticularly attacked GE for seeking to break their unity by trying to
reach a "collusive deal" or a "sweetheart contract" with the indepen
dent union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of Amer
ica (UE), so as to avoid responsible bargaining with unions represen-

46
ting the bulk of GE employees. Determined to keep its unity in
force, the CCB reminded the unions that "It was a collusive deal be
tween GE and UE in 1963 that brought about the substandard pension,
insurance and vacation provisions with which its workers are now sad
dled, and the miserly wage increase which has already been wiped out
by rising living costs ."47
To strengthen their unity and solidify their ranks, the CCB de
cided late in July, 1966, to conduct a series of follow-up regional
meetings. In addition, the CCB designated August 16, 1966, as Unity
Day, when members of all coordinating unions "will demonstrate their

48
support by wearing a special unity button. ..."
Moreover, in the July meeting of the top CCB leaders, George
Meany "reaffirmed in the strongest terms" total AFL-CIO support for

49
the coordinated drive against GE and Westinghouse. Expressing the
CCB's determination to pursue its joint objectives and in response to
46
AFL-CIO N e w s . June 18, 1966, p. 1.
47 Ibid.. p. 7.
4® The Machinist. July 28, 1966, p. 5.
49
Unity. No. 4, July 1966, p. 3.
147
GE's declared intention of maintaining its Boulware bargaining policy
intact, Meany said: "In spite of all the attacks that may be leveled
against us, we intend to continue and to strengthen these coordinated
activities for they represent the only effective way to secure genuine
collective bargaining with GE and Westinghouse."^^
With this overheated warlike atmosphere, the two parties entered
into their first official bargaining session on August 23, 1966,
50 Ibid.
Chapter VII
THE 1966 NEGOTIATIONS
A brief account of the factual events of the 1966 negotiations,
the tactics of the parties, their major contract proposals and the
final settlement reached on October 14, 1966 is the subject of this
chapter. It concludes with an evaluation of the overall results of
this first large-scale confrontation between GE's "Boulwarism" and
the unions' new coordinated bargaining front. Because the principal
struggle between the two giants took place at the national bargain
ing level, it is necessary to concentrate on the GE-IUE negotiations.
Before proceeding into the events, a quick review of the com
position of the labor front at GE will be helpful. Table 7 below
shows the various unions in the coordinated bargaining group.
Union Strategy
As explained by various union officials, and as found out by
perusal of the minutes of the negotiation sessions, the basic bargain
ing strategy of the CCB was to bargain issue-by-issue. In other words,
after presentation of the IUE demands (as spelled out shortly), the CCB
continuously pressured GE to make a clear response on each item, so as
to develop bargaining on the merits of each subject or provision dis-
148
149
TABLE 7. The Coordinating Unions at General Electric, 1966
Number of Number of Em

The Unions Locals at GE ployees Represented
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) 65 79,400
International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(LAM) 33 12,900
International Union, United Auto
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers (UAW) 6 5,700
International Union, Allied In
dustrial Workers of America (AIW) 2 5,500
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW) 30 4,500
Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association (SMWIA) 2 3,400
American Federation of Technical
Engineers (AFTE) 9 2,600
United Steelworkers of America (USWAj 1 945
United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe
Fitting Industry of the United States
and Canada (Plumbers) 3 400
American Flint Glass Workers Union
of North America (AFGW) __1_ 150
TOTAL 152 115,495
Source: GE, "Negotiations Fact Sheet," 1966, p. 2.
150
cussed. Clearly, the strategy of the CCB vas to force 6E to abandon
or alter Its method of bargaining. GE, of course, vas not unaware of
this and was ready and able to meet the challenge. The result: In
the first three weeks of negotiations the lUE's mixed committee was
able to develop discussions only on its own demands. The impressive
expansion of the IUE negotiating committee did not scare GE. As in
past negotiations the Company made no commitments on single issues,
but responded by presenting one package offer refusing the request
of the CCB to have them one by one. Furthermore, the package was not
put on the bargaining table until September 14, 1966, only two weeks
and a half before the expiration dates of most GE contracts. As
lamented by Henry F. McKinnell, "From August 23 until September 15
valuable time was consumed by the company's insistence upon going over
the union's proposals. Although pressed by the union almost daily,
the company refused to present its proposals until September 14."^
Replying to such charges, GE emphasized at the time that the de
lay in presenting the Company's offer should in itself refute pub
licized beliefs that the Company had a ready, "pre-packaged" offer to
make before negotiations actually started. As explained in response
to a question of an employee in Syracuse, New York, the Company said
in part: "It is true that a great deal of research has been completed
by the Company in terms of employee needs before any negotiations be-
* McKinnell, p. 13. A point should be made here, though, that nego

tiations were suspended for the week of September 5 because of the
lUE's national convention.
151
gin, but a good realistic offer can be formulated only after the union
demands have been made and considered in light of demands and needs of
2
all interested parties."
The IUE presented all of its demands in the first two bargaining
sessions. At the first session on August 23, the IUE negotiating team
Included representatives of only six coordinating unions and a repre
sentative of the IUD. Not represented at the first meeting were four
other members of the CCB; the Flint Glass Workers, Steelworkers, Car-
3
penters and Plumbers. As explained by several union officials, the
absence in negotiations of representatives of some participating unions,
at one time or another, was not crucial once the principle of mixed
committees had been legally approved and practically accepted by the
Company.
Perhaps more convincing evidence of the acceptability of the
"outsiders" on the IUE committee, is their Inclusion as members of one
or another of the four joint GE-IUE subcommittees established on Aug-

4
ust 23. To avoid misunderstanding, though, GE made it clear at the
outset that the court-imposed recognition of the enlarged committee
was to be confined strictly to negotiations relating to the IUE alone.
In his opening statement at the first meeting, the Company's chief nego
tiator, Philip D. Moore, warned the CCB delegation:

2
GE, Department Newsletter. Syracuse, New York, No. 61, September 12,
1966, p. 1.
3
The Carpenters joined the CCB by force of having locals at Westing-
house .
^ GE, Employee Relations News. No. 66-33, August 29, 1966, p. 2.
152
Any indications, here or elsewhere, that you are

in fact here for any other purpose than to discuss
IUE problems or that you are frustrating the ability
of other unions to independently work out contract
arrangements with the Company, will be grounds for
us to take further action before the Board and in
the Court.5
Having limited the scope of bargaining to IUE matters, Mr. Moore, on
behalf of the Company, added, "we have no ill will toward the IUE bar
gaining committee — whatever its size."**
Local Coordination
In essence, then, the issue of a mixed-committee had been prac
tically resolved at the national level. However, when looking at
local negotiations, which had commenced at approximately the same time
between GE and the CCB unions, the picture was clearly different in at
least two respects:
(1) Surprisingly, only a few locals affiliated with

the international or national unions comprising the CCB
cared to appear at the local bargaining tables with repre
sentatives of other unions.^ None of the locals which res
ponded to the questionnaire used the mixed-coimnittee for
mula, although its legality had been established by then.
Doubtless,lack of inter-union cooperation at the local bargaining tables
reflected, as some national union officials conceded, a serious defi
ciency in the overall CCB program, though not a crucial one. Truly,
^ GE, Employee Relations News Supplement. August 29, 1966, p. 3.
** Ibid. Emphasis added.
^ This fact was confirmed by national and local unions whether in per
sonal Interviews or in responding to the questionnaire.
153
the impact of union coordination at the national level was justifiably
considered to be more decisive on GE's bargaining method — and on the
expected settlement — than local coordination. Nevertheless, the ab
sence of mixed committees in most GE locations was an indication, per
haps, of less willingness on the part of local unions to let "outsiders"
become involved in their problems.
(2) In some of the few situations where local unions

appeared with mixed-committees GE bluntly refused to bar
gain. Although the legality of such enlarged committees
had been confirmed in New York City, GE resorted to legal
action elsewhere. As reported by the Machinist, the Com
pany filed unfair labor practice charges against two IAM
Lodges, 78 and 1916 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, because their
negotiating committees were composed of members of both
Lodges.® The Company reacted similarly to a joint com
mittee composed of members of IAM Lodge 113 and the large
9
Local of the Sheet Metal Workers in Chicago, Illinois.
Union Demands
The principal confrontation, however, was obviously not at the
local level but at the national negotiations in New York City. As an
ticipated, the IUE enlarged committee presented its demands on the
basis of the "national goals" formulated and adopted at the Unity Con-
The Machinist. September 8 , 1966, p. 5.
9
Ibid. See also GE, Employee Relations News, No. 66-33, August 29,
1966, p. 2.
154
ference on March 15, 1966, in Washington, D. C. Likewise, similar de
mands were made by all collaborating unions at their local bargaining
tabl es.^
The CCB demands fell generally into three categories:
1. Wage Increases, unspecified as to amount, but

to include an immediate and substantial "catch
up" wage boost, a large annual improvement fac
tor [based on productivity], a cost of living
escalator, reduction of geographic wage dif
ferentials, and a skilled trades adjustment;
2. Benefit improvements, including complete re
opening of pensions, insurance, and vacations,
matters on which the 1963 agreement did not
require the company to reopen until 1968;
3. Contract language revisions and non-economic
demands on a broad front, including a full
union shop, major revision of the arbitration
clause negotiated in 1963, and concessions in
such areas as subcontracting and recall
rights .11
The unspecified "catchup" ir- pay was soon clarified when theunions
asked an Immediate wage increase of 32 cents an hour "to catch up in
wages and make them comparable to other wages in the electrical indus
try ."12
^ AFL-CIO N ews. September 3, 1966, p. 3. See also The Machinist.

September 1, 1966, p. 5, and also GE, Relations News Letter. December
19, 1966, p. 3.
11 GE, Relations News Letter. December 19, 1966, p. 2.
12
The Machinist. September 1, 1966, p. 5. See also AFL-CIO News.
September 3, 1966, p. 3, and UAW Solidarity. October 1966, p. 14.
155
Management Position
GE's position on the CCB's wage demands had been repeatedly pub
licized in its elaborate communication media long before negotiations
commenced. The Company claimed that if all the CCB's wage demands were
to be realized, "this provision alone might soar toward two or three

13
times the guidepost level [of 3.2 percent annual pay increase]."
Adding wage goals to benefit goals, GE further claimed, would bring
total CCB demands to figures about four times as large as the govern-
14
ment guidelines had set. In addition, the Company strongly rejected
the CCB's contention that a catchup in wages was required. A syndicated
article entitled "How Do You Catch Up When You're Not Behind" was
carried by GE News or other local Company newspapers in many GE plants
prior to, or during negotiations. With some local differences, all
these publications revealed that the Company was paying its employees
better than average local wages and always above both the state and
national wage averages in manufacturing as published in the Bureau of
Labor Statistics reports.^ Where such comparisons were unfavorable
to local GE employees the Company used other sorts of statistics to

16
support its assertion that no catchup in wages was required.
13
GE News - Lamp Division. Cleveland, Ohio, March 11, 1966, p. 6 .
14 Ibid.
^ See for example GE News. Pittsfield, Massachusetts, August 26, 1966,

p. 3, and GE News, Rome, Georgia, August 30, 1966, p. 4.
^ See for instance GE News. Syracuse, New York, June 10, 1966, p. 6 ;
GE N e ws. Burlington, Vermont, July 8 , 1966, p. 1, and GE News. Louis
ville, Kentucky, August 5, 1966, p. 1.
156
While the accuracy of GE figures Is undoubtedly reliable, the
fact remains that average wage Increases at GE had somehow lagged be
hind average wage increases provided for in major collective bargaining
agreements in manufacturing. It is this comparison that concerned GE
unions most. Table 8 below contains a comparison of average hourly
wage increases in GE-IUE settlements from 1954 to 1966, and the aver
age wage increases in manufacturing for the appropriate years. The
figures exclude adjustments for cost-of-living.
Despite the comparisons shown in Table 8 , it is the GE research
that actually counts in preparing the Company’s package offer. Com
pany releases made it abundantly clear that GE's offer would not be
influenced by the CCB’s catchup theory, nor by the Unions' long list
of demands. A special Company bulletin on the progress of GE-IUE
negotiations, distributed in most plants a day before GE's offer was
put on the table, notified employees that ". . .it isn't likely that
any Company offer could ever give union officials everything they say
they would like because. . .they don't really expect to get them s l l . " ^
Rather, GE pointed out its favorite traditional formula that "The big
challenge to GE negotiators is to come up with an offer that is as
close as possible to meeting employee wants, but is still sensible from

18
a business point of view."
There is nothing new or irrational about this posture. It is
logical to expect that any rational employer would conceivably preach
^ See for example GE, Negotiation News, a Special Bulletin Issued at

Youngstown Lamp Plant, September 13, 1966, p. 1.
TABLE 8 . Average Hourly Wage Increases in GE-IUE Settlements and in Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Manufacturing, 1954-1965.
In First-Year Settlements Deferred Wage Increases Changes Effective in

GE All Manufacturing in GE All Manufacturing
Year Cents* Percent Cents Percent Cents* Percent Cents Percent
1954 4.8 2.68 5.7 **

1955 5.5 3.0 9.5 **
1956 5.9 3.0 ** **
1957 6.1 3.0 11.5 **
1958 7.4 3.48 ** **
1959 7.6 3.46 9.1 3.7

1960 6 .8+ 3.0 8.9 3.2
1961 0.0 0.0 8.0 3.0
1962 9.6+ 4.0 8.0 3.0
1963 6.2+ 2.5 8.0 3.0
1964 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.6
1965 6.5+ 2.5 10.0 3.7
* Computed by multiplying the percentage increases by the average straight time hourly
earnings for the respective years.
** Not available.
+ For 18 months
Source : (1) For figures related to GE: GE-IUE Wage Agreements: 1954-1955. p.(3): 1955-60. p.(43
1960-1963, p.(If : 1963-1966, p. (i) .
157
(2) For figures related to all manufacturing: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics. 1971, Bulletin No. 1705, Table
85, p. 165.
158
for, and practically adopt, the same principle of satisfying employee
needs while keeping the business in a healthy position. The start
ling difference, however, is that despite the 1964 NLRB decision con-
19
demnlng "Boulwarism" as practiced in 1960, GE kept in full force its
massive employee communication, or employee-directed propaganda, on
major Issues under negotiations. Hence, in addition to GE's success
ful refusal to bargain issue-by-issue as requested by the CCB unions,
the foregoing observation reflects a second, but major, aspect of
"Boulwarism" which GE strongly and successfully still maintained.
General Electric's "First. Full and Firm" Offer
On September 14, 1966, GE presented its package-offer. The Com
pany made it clear that "the economic offer was in accord with current
market conditions and was right up to the limit of what was fair but
20
not excessive. ..." Identical or similar offers were made by the
Company, at about the same time, to the independent UE and to other

21
unions not in the coordinated group.
The Company's proposal was for a three-year contract covering

22
pay and benefit provisions. It featured the following improvements:
19 General Electric Co., 150 NLRB 192 (1964).

20
GE, Relations News Letter, December 19, 1966, p. 3.
21
22
GE News. Special Edition, September 15, 1966, pp. 1-2. See iden
tical offer made to local unions at Hotpoint Works in Chicago, Illinois,
The Hotpoint News, Special Edition, September 20, 1966, p. 2.
159
1. Three Annual Wage Increases: A A percent Increase on

October 3, 1966, a 3 percent Increase on October 2,
1967, and a 3 percent Increase on September 30, 1968.
Minimum annual raise guaranteed — 5 cents per hour.
2. Two Cost-of-Living Adjustments; A 3 cent (about one
percent) an hour increase on October 2, 1967, and an
additional 3 cents an hour on September 30, 1968.
(Cost-of-living clause had been absent in GE con
tracts from 1960.)
3. Skilled Trades Adjustment: An additional increase of
1 to 10 cents per hour for employees on higher-rated
jobs (starting with a minimum of at least $2,975 an
hour) to be applied before the first general raise.
A. Vacation Improvement: Two weeks of vacation after
two years (instead of five years) of service for
hourly paid employees.
5. Another Paid Holiday: A ninth holiday with pay to be
effective after January 1, 1969. (To some unions it
would have been the eighth paid holiday).
6. Eight Improvements in the Pension P l a n ; The major
Improvements were:
(a) Normal minimum pension to be raised from
$2.70 to $A.50 a month per year of service.
(b) Payments to rise to $125 per month, instead
of $65, depending upon years of service to
age 62.
7. Five Improvements in Health Insurance.
8. Greater Protection in Event of Layoff.
Shortly thereafter the Company added proposals for changes in
contract language but these changes did not include major items re
160
quested by the CCB unions such as the union shop and broader arbitration
clauses.^
In presenting its economic package to the unions and in explain
ing its features to employees, GE stated that this proposal represented
what it considered the best combination of pay and benefit improvements.
However, it added:
At the same time, we recognize that there are other

possible arrangements and alternatives within this
general framework that may be more appealing to some
union officials and the employees they represent.
At the bargaining tables over the next few days,
Company negotiators will be exploring these possi
bilities with union officials in a genuine attempt
to reach sound agreements.24
One can easily perceive the third aspect of "Boulwarism" contained in
the foregoing statement. The Company considered only the possibility
of changing or rearranging the mixture of its first offer, but definitly
not of increasing its size. In a sense, this practice by GE, of not
increasing its initial offer, was a basic feature of "Boulwarism." The
elimination of this basic feature was not only the major objective of
coordinated bargaining at GE but also the principal factor prompting
its emergence. Hence, to expect the coordinating unions to accede to
GE and settle on its first offer would be to overlook their motivation
or misunderstand their primary goal.
23
24
GE, Employee Communication. . .. p. 137. Emphasis added.
161
The Test of Power Begins
It was when GE presented its initial offer that the real test of
power between coordinated bargaining and "Boulwarism" began. Only at
this point could the CCB prove and justify itself by challenging and
breaking GE's basic approach of denying the union ". . .the political
victory of appearing to force the company to accede to union demands,

25
or at least to seek a compromise satisfactory to the union." Nat
urally, the success of the unions or GE's failure in the collective
bargaining process would be judged on the scope and size of the pack
age agreed to. Certainly, only if the Company were forced by the unions
to change its initial offer and to reach an agreement on substantially
higher terms would it be reasonable to conclude that "Boulwarism" had
been beaten and defeated. This, however, was a very difficult task
since, as noted earlier, most of GE's first offers were traditionally
rather tempting and generous so that not much room was left for further
substantial increases. Being aware of this fact, which might diminish
the potential success of the CCB upon final agreement, union sources,
in spite of it, admitted publicly, even during the negotiations, that

26
GE's first offer was good although inadequate. Moreover, IUE leader
ship tried to capitalize on it by giving credit to the coordinating
unions. As contended later by David Lasser, assistant to IUE's presi-
"25
Herbert R. Northrup, "The Case for Boulwarism," Harvard Business
Review. Vol. 41, No. 5 (September-Qctober 1963), p. 88 .
26
IUE N e w s . September 29, 1966, p. 2.
162
dent, and chairman of the C C B ’s Steering Committee, GE's first offer
was
...vastly better than the company had predicted six

months earlier. Not only was the wage offer in ex
cess of the then-current 'guidelines' (which GE had
earlier described as too generous), but it also in
cluded substantial improvements in pensions, insur
ance and other fringe terms which legally were not
open for bargaining until 1968. There is not the
slightest doubt that the unbroken front of the CCB
unions was responsible.27
By presenting a vastly better offer, the Company obviously made it
harder for the unions to force a substantial upward change. At the
same time, of course, GE preserved its "Boulwaristic" policy of "doing
right voluntarily" in the first offer. Whether or not the Company had
indeed presented an improved first offer deliberately, as David Lasser
speculated, or whether it was just a natural manifestation of the regu
lar course of "Boulwarism," is hard to determine. But if Mr. Lasser
was right, then why in the absence of coordinated bargaining in 1955
did GE make a better initial offer than in 1966, as claimed by the
IUE ?28
The IUE and other CCB unions, as expected, totally rejected as
"glaringly inadequate," GE's first offer. Reasons for rejecting the
offer were specific. As stated in UAW Solidarity.
GE's wage offer is below that of other recent

settlements and represents only about half the es
timated productivity increase. It does not provide
27
Lasser, p. 16. Emphasis added. See similar statement in UAW
Solidarity. October 1966, p. 14.
28
IUE News. September 29, 1966, p. 2.
163
any catchup money, nor a real cost-of-living clause

or annual improvement factor to keep GE workers' buy
ing power abreast of recent price increases.
It also fails to eliminate geographical wage dif
ferentials , provides no SUB or paid sick leave and
falls to deal with such important non-economic
issues as arbitration of grievances, the union shop
and a host of other demands.29
In view of these charges against GE's proposal one may seriously ques
tion the validity of Lasser's contention noted earlier. The statement
in Solidarity clearly demonstrates the wide gap which existed between
the CCB's opening position and GE's first and firm offer of September
14.
A week later on September 20, the CCB unions, in the hope of reach
ing a bargained and improved agreement, submitted to GE a revised list
of demands as a counter proposal. As will be noted shortly, the modi
fied list emphasized eight major or priority subjects that, according
to the union, had to be improved in order to reach agreement. In ef
fect, though, only the catchup theory as a separate demand was aban
doned by the CCB while all other initial demands, excluding vacation,
30
remained on the list.
General Electric Modifies Initial Offer
GE quickly responded, but still without any significant deviation
from its bargaining style. Following its practice of being somewhat
responslbe to union requests or preferences, the Company suggested, on
September 22, a slightly rearranged package which remained within the
29
UAW Solidarity, October 1966, p. 14.
30
AFL-CIO News, September 24, 1966, pp. 1, 3.
164
general framework of the original offer. Conditional upon lengthening
the duration of the proposed contract from 36 months to 38 months the
Company agreed to "sweetenthe pot" in two respects: (1) that the ad
ditional paid holiday be effective in 1968 instead of 1969; (2) that
the skilled trades adjustment be extended to employees in the next
lower grade than previously offered. Following another union rejection
GE proposed, on September 27, a third modified offer. In this last
pre-strike proposal, the Company made two more concessions, one on
cost-of-living and the other on early retirement, should the union

31
agree to a^ 4 2-month package. In cost-of-living GE was willing to pro
vide an additional three-cent increment to go into effect on September
29. 1969. In the early retirement provision, the Company proposed to
introduce in 1968 a personal option feature enabling an early retiree
to select one of two pension arrangements.
Since these seemingly minor changes were conditioned on extending
the duration of the proposed contract, there is little reason to share
The Machinist’s view that GE "broke an old negotiating policy." Nothing
significant was changed in G E ’s bargaining method. The Company remained
as before. The longer term of the contract, particularly the 42-month
package, could have meant "a loss to all GE workers" as alleged by IUE’s
President, Paul Jennings, or would have offset most of the additional

31
See for example GE, Letter to Community Residents. Detroit, Michigan,
September 30, 1966, p. 2; GE, Relations News Letter, December 19, 1966,
p. 3., and The Machinist. September 29, 1966, p. 4.
165
benefits offered. Hence, it seems more proper to accept Jennings' con
clusion that the new A 2-month proposal was "nothing more than a reshuf-
33
fling of the 36 and 38 month offers." The link between this method
of reshuffling offers and "Boulwarism," was described by Edward J.
Carlough, representative of the Sheet Metal Workers on the CCB's Steer
ing Committee, when commenting on GE's 42-month proposal he said: "No
matter how often GE reshuffled the deck, they always made certain that
the cards they dealt out to the union always contained the joker of
'Boulwarism'."^
Strike Preparations
Soon after the Company's second offer was rejected as being "worse
than the first," the CCB requested each union to poll its members and
called a national conference of the CCB unions for September 28 in
Washington, D. C. According to union sources all local unions voted
to reject GE's offer as "totally inadquate," and all but a few locals
voted to strike GE upon expiration of contracts, that is, on midnight,

35
October 2,1966. On September 28, the IUE-GE Conference Board unani-
lmously rejected the Company's offer. This rejection was affirmed later
that day by delegates of all the locals attending the CCB's national
33
Paul Jennings, "Special Report to the International Executive Board,
Summary of 1966 IUE-GE Negotiations," p. 8 .
A/
Edward J. Carlough, "The General Electric Settlement," Sheet Metal
Workers* Journal. November 1966, p. 20.
35
AFTE, Engineers Outlook, October 1966, p. 1.
166
conference headed by AFL-CIO's President George Meany: . .we want
to make it clear to GE that the offer now before us is not acceptable;
and that we do not accept the Boulware philosophy that it cannot be

36
improved. It must be improved — by midnight, October 2."
For an agreement to be acceptable, the participants of the national
conference called upon the Company to make substantial improvements on
the basis of the CCB's eight revised goals, presented to GE on Septem
ber 20. These remaining goals were:
(1 ) cost-of-living;
(2 ) higher, but unspecified, wage increase and a
higher minimum increase guaranteed;
(3) reduction of geographical wage differentials;
(A) additional holiday to be effective immediately;
(5) union shop;
(6) wider scope of arbitration;
(7) improved recall rights; and
(8 ) subcontracting.37
The IUE negotiating committee specified, on September 23, the
amount of wage Increase sought and the higher annual minimum requested.
In a statement made by the committee that day, in response to GE's
second offer, the Union indeed asked for more adequate annual increase,
but subsequently specifying: "We propose A percent yearly with a 7 cent
an hour minimum, to compensate employees for their increased produc
t i v i ty."^
36
Lasser, p. 16. See also AFL-CIO News, October 1, 1966, pp. 1, 3.
37
38
IUE, "Statement of IUE-GE Negotiating Committee,"September 23,
1966, p. 1.
167
The CCB's national conference held on September 28, also estab
lished a "Special Action Committee," or a "Review Committee," composed
of presidents of the CCB unions with George Meany as chairman. The
new committee.was to evaluate any additional offer and to make appro
priate recommendations for further actions. To strengthen the spirit
of unity and solidarity among the unions. Meany again pledged full sup-
39
port of the AFL-CIO to the coordinating unions.
Unity among the eleven allied unions and their locals was unques
tionable, and it was indeed clear that if no acceptable agreement was
reached by October 2, a company-wide strike would shut down most GE
plants. In view of the apparent deadlock between the parties, Mr.
William Simkin, Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser
vice (FMCS), stepped in and tried to work out a settlement. His medi
ation, which began on September 29, helped to produce on October 1,
another modified company offer on the basis of the 42-month package.
This fourth proposal would have advanced by three months the effective
date of the three-cent increment on cost-of-living and would provide
an additional one cent increase in the guaranteed minimum. Being still
unattractive, the new offer failed to gain union acceptance. According
to IUE's President, "the new offer merely reduced the amount of the
40
loss in the original 42 month offer." Officially, GE's last offer
was rejected on Sunday, October 2, by the IUE-GE Conference Board upon
recommendation of the CCB.'s Special Action Committee.
39 AFL-CIO News. October 1, 1966, p. 1, 3.
^ Jennings, p. 8 .
168
It may be interesting to note here that although the CCB was the
top body of the coordinating unions, it was careful, legally and prac
tically, not to make decisions but recommendations. Thus, it was al
ways the IUE-GE Conference Board, not the CCB, that officially rejected
all GE offers to the IUE.
Hence, following the rejection of GE's last offer, the strike
seemed inevitable. All members of the CCB unions at GE plant across
the country were ready for the strike signal or for any last minute
acceptable offer. The deadline was midnight, Sunday, October 2. Where
local contracts expired earlier, as in the case of IAM Lodge 967 at
Auburn, New York, local members were working on a day-to-day basis

41
awaiting the deadline.
President Johnson Intervenes
The ability of GE to stand successfully against the united labor
front was unquestionable. Even the threat of an imminent company-wide
strike, the first of such magnitude since 1946, did not move GE to make
any significant concession. Boulware's approach was still dominant and
was carried out faithfully. This was well reflected in the statement
made on September 29, by GE's chief negotiator, Philip D. Moore. Com
menting on IUE's rejection of the Company's third offer, Moore sAid, in
part: We have clearly told you before and we want to re

peat again today that we are not holding anything
back for last-minute horsetrading. We have put every
thing we believe to be warranted on the table already,
and we are not seeking from you any propositions that
41
The Machinist. October 6 , 1966, p. 5.
169
would enlarge, expand or inflate what we have already

offered.
We really mean what we say when we tell you — as
we have before today — that the threat of a strike
cannot convince us all by itself that we need to ’up
our o f f e r . '^2
On the other hand, it was also clear that the CCB could unite its unions
for a joint large-scale action against GE. The question remained, how
ever, whether this union unity could pass the test of a joint strike in
the drive to achieve the CCB goals.
The question was not answered because the test was averted. In
the light of the war in Vietnam, and amid talks of a possible Taft-
Hartley injunction against the nation-wide strike, President Lyndon
Johnson requested the parties, in a last-minute move, to postpone the
strike deadline for two weeks and to try to reach a peaceful settlement.
43
The President appointed a special panel of three Cabinet members to
assist the federal mediator in settling the dispute. The postponement
of the deadline was motivated by President Johnson's desire to avoid

44
interruption of GE's defense production, vitally needed for the war.
Both parties complied and informally agreed to extend the existing con
tracts for a period of two weeks. The negotiations were moved to Wash
ington, D.C. and resumed with the Presidential panel.
42
GE, Employee Relations News, No. 66-37, October 3, 1966, pp. 1-2.
43
The President's panel was composed of Robert McNamara, Defense
Secretary, Willard W. Wirtz, Lhbor Secretary, and John T. Connor, Com
merce Secretary.
44
GE, Relations News Letter, December 19, 1966, p. 3, and Jennings,
p. 9.
170
There were few face-to-face negotiations between the parties
during the two-week extension. Most sessions were held by the Presi
dential mediators with each party separately. In the first week the
unions stood firm on their eight revised goals and expected to negoti
ate on each of these subjects separately. The Company, on the other
hand, made it clear to the mediators that "no new money" would be avail
able. As before, the Company announced that while it was willing to
consider any suggestion for modification and rearrangement, it would

45
not enlarge the economic dimensions of the initial proposal.
In light of these unbending positions, prospects of a peaceful
agreement seemed rather remote. As late as October 10, less than a
week before the new strike deadline, the Presidential panel reported
the negotiations were still deadlocked. However, as pointed out by
the two parties, the Company and the CCB were both "aware of the possi
bility of the federal government’s asking for a federal Taft-Hartley
injunction for all organized GE plants if no agreement[was]reached by
the end of the w e e k . " ^
Power Considerations
The unions thought an eighty-day injunction would have devas
tating effects on the integrity of their alliance.It seemed that
AS GE, "Negotiation Mews," October 6 , 1966, p. 1 .
^ GE, ''Negotiation News "Pittsfield, Massachusetts, No. 27, October

11, 1966, p. 1; see similar statement by Jennings, p. 10.
171
the CCB highly doubted its ability to maintain continued unity among
its members during the period of a federal injunction. Of particular
concern was the likelihood of a partial and selective injunction. It
was believed that under such a development the coordinated bargaining
front might fall apart. Hence, toward the end of the two-week exten
sion, the CCB's eight goals were reduced to only four key issues: (1)
cost-6 f-living escalator clause; (2) elimination of area wage differen-

47
tials; (3) modified union shop, and (4) broader arbitration clause.
The Company, on the other hand, obviously enjoyed a much better
bargaining position. One of GE's major arguments against coalition or
coordinated bargaining had been that they might inevitably precipitate
undesirable governmental intervention. GE had always been noted for
its stiff objection to federal or any other external intervention.
Ironically, then, GE seemed to be in this case, the only potential
beneficiary, save the public, of an anticipated federal injunction.
Consequently GE's bargaining position was considerably enhanced during
the two-week extension period. Wisely enough, by rejecting the Union’s
demand for retroactivity from October 3 of any settlement reached, the
Company also successfully diverted major union efforts from their re
maining national goals. At least, GE could use the retroactivity issue
as an important trade-off item. The Company Indeed did so.
Under these circumstances the prospects for an agreement looked
promising. GE had only to concede on one or two issues besides retro
activity. This is exactly what happened two days before the extended
47
Carlough, p. 20.
172
period expired. On October 14, GE made only one significant conces
sion, leaving unmet the other three major goals of the CCB. In the
face of the Unions weak position it could be speculated here that had
it not been for the Presidential panel GE would not even have made one
single concession at that stage. The Tinions were pressured "to the
ropes." Being apt to be stripped of their power to strike, they were
unable to challenge GE in an effective way. They had no choice but to
accept the Company terms. As pointed out by Edward J. Carlough, who
represented the Sheet Metal Workers on the CCB's steering comnittee,
", . .the question that the Steering Committee had to

decide in analyzing GE's revised offer of October 14
was not the clear-cut one of acceptance, or immediate
strike. It was rather the question of acceptance, or
strike eighty days later, or in early January of next
year. This would have required maintaining the unity
of our coalition, and the support of our respective
memberships during another trying period. ^
Settlement Is Reached
Being aware of this situation, all three central bodies of the
coordinating unions (the IUE full negotiating committee, the eleven-
union steering committee and the CCB itself with President Meany as
chairman) recommended, in their separate meetings held on October 14,
acceptance of GE's offer. Hence, a final agreement was reached.
According to the IUE News, this occurred when "GE abandoned

49
’Boulwarism' and added substantially to the value of its offer."
^ Ibid. Note here the use of the term "coalition" despite union
denial of coalition intentions.
'49
IUE News, October 20, 1966, p. 6 .
173
Other unions, too, similarly hailed the agreement. The Machinst re
ported the settlement under the headline "Labor Unity Wins at GE"
the AFTE's Engineers Outlook observed that the coordinated effort re
sulted in "an excellent economic package and at last after many years
broke the GE 'take it or leave it' bargaining pattern. . . Simi
lar views were held by the AFL-CIO N e w s , which reported Meany's state-
52
ment asserting the death of "Boulwarism."
On the other hand, GE contended that the terms of the final agree
ment were substantially those proposed by the Company in its September
22 proposal for a 38-month agreement and subsequently modified in its

53
42-month offer prior to the October 3 deadline.
The crucial question was: who was right and who was wrong? In
other words, did the final settlement reflect, as claimed by the Unions,
a substantial increase over GE's previous offers, or was it substan
tially the same, as stipulated by GE?
In order to make an objective judgment, one has simply to compare
major items in the Company's proposals with the final settlement reached
on October 14, 1966. Table 9 below may serve this purpose. Deliberately
omitted in this Table are GE's two last pre-strike offers of September
The Machinist.October 20, 1966, p. 2.
^ Engineers Outlook. November 1966, p. 1.
^ AFL-CIO News. October 22,1966,pp. 1, 3.
53
GE, Employee Relations News. No. 66-39, October 24, 1966, p. 1.
174
TABLE 9. General Electric Proposals and the Final Settlement, 1966.
Initial Offer Modified Offer The Settlement

September 14 September 22 October 14, 1966
Length of Contract 36 months 38 months 36-3/4 months
Wage Increase 4%-lst year Same Same
3%-2nd year
3%-3rd year
Minimum increase Minimum guaranteed
guarantted 5(4 an an hour annually
hour annually
Cost of Living 3*4 an hr. 10/2/67 Same 2 cost-of-living in
3rf an hr. 9/30/68 creases, on 10/2/67
and 9/30/68. Each
increase will have a
minimum of 1/ 2% and
a maximum of 1-3/4%
depending on fluc
tuations in the Con
sumer Price Index.*
Skilled Trades
Adjustment Additional 1 to Same as 9/14, Same as 9/22.
10i an hour. but extended
to employees
in next lower
grade.
Vacation 2-week vacation
after 2 years Same Same
Holiday Additional paid Additional paid Same as 9/22
holiday starting holiday start
in 1969. ing in 1968.
Pension Minimum pension Same Same
to be raised
from $2.70 to $4.50
per month per year
of service
* Cost of Living Formula:
(1) one-half of 1% (0.5%) if Index increases by less than 2% (or even
if the Index decreases), or
(2) 1% (1.0%) if the Index increases by at least 2% but less than 3%, or
(3) 1-1/2% if the Index increases by at least 3% but less than 3-1/2%, or
(4) 1-3/4% if the Index increases by 3-1/2% or more.
Source: GE Mews, Special Edition September 15, 1966, p. 1; GE, Employee
Relations News, No. 66-36, September 26, 1966, pp. 1-2; GE Relations
News Letter. December 19, 1966, pp. 3-4; and National Agreement(and
Wage Agreement) between General Electric Company and International Union
of Electrical. Radio and Machine Workers-A'p’L-CIO and Its Affiliated GE-
IUE (AFL-CIO) Locals, October 3, 1966-October 26, 1969.
175
27, and October 1, 1966, because the offers were conditioned by union
acceptance of a 42-month package Instead of the original 36-month pro
posal. The much longer duration of the contract would have undoubtedly
wiped out the additional nominal gains contained in such a 42-month
offer.
Evaluation
Only one criterion is needed to determine the success or failure
at the bargaining table of GE's "Boulwarism" and of its challengers.
What is necessary is no more than a comparison of the final settlement
with the Company's initial "full and firm" offer made on September 14,
1966. To claim defeat of "Boulwarism," the unions had to show that
the settlement of October 14 contained substantially higher terms than
GE's first offer. Could GE unions justifiably make this claim?
Except for a change in the cost-of-living adjustment, there were
only a few, economically insignificant, improvements in the final set
tlement. Furthermore, the change represented in the cost-of-living
clause was highly questionable. Although indicating a GE concession
to the Union's demand for a cost-of-living escalator, the money value
of the final "sharing" formula was rather slight in comparison with
GE's first offer. While the Company's initial proposal would have
guaranteed every worker an automatic "add-on" increase of three cents
an hour cost-of-living adjustment in 1967 and in 1968, the final set
tlement guaranteed only one-half a percent, or one and a half cents
an hour for an average employee. On the other hand, under the final
176
agreement the cost-of-living adjustment could go as high as one and
three-quarters percent, or 5.25 cents an hour for average workers if
the cost-of-living index rose by three and a half percent or more each
year. Thus, the maximum possible gain for the average employee could
be 0.75 percent or 2.25 cents an hour in each of the last two years of
the contract. As pointed out by GE, the question of whether or not
the provisions of the agreement proved more or less costly to the Com
pany than its initial offer depended on the following:
If the Consumer Price Index rises by as much as

2% per year but not 3%, the increased cost (at each
of the two dates) will be about the same as under
the original offer;
If the CPI gqes up by 3% or more per year, the
increased cost will be 0.5% or (if as much as 3.5%)
0.75% higher;
If the CPI goes up less than 2% per year, the
cost will be 0.5% less than what had been originally
offered.54
There was, therefore, little reason for the CCB unions to rejoice.
The economic settlement obviously did not reflect a substantial improve
ment over GE's initial offer and could not be termed a great union vic
tory.
David Lasser, trying to make the case that the final settlement
was substantial, said: "the coordinated union action resulted in a net
gain of more than $200 in wages and benefits for the average GE employee
over the company's original offer. If this sum of $200 is converted
to cents per hour spread over the 36-3/4 months of the new contract, the
54
^ IUE News. October 20, 1966, p. 6 . See also Jennings, p. 11.
177
real net gain per hour in wages and fringe benefits would be only 3.
cents, hardly different from the Company's offer. To call it a sub
stantial gain is undoubtedly an exaggeration.
Furthermore, as admitted by the IUE and other unions, some of the
key Issues of the CCB's "national goals," such as union shop, arbitration,
geographical differentials, were not resolved and remained "on top of
the 11-union agenda for future action. . . Clearly the coordin
ating unions had been unable in 1966 to Impose on GE the acceptance of
their major demands. Hence, it is necessary to agree with GE that the
final settlement of October 14, 1966, provided substantially the terms
proposed by the Company in its previous o f f ers.^ It was pointed out
in Business Week that although the Company "moved a little from its
initial offer and gave ground in areas where it vowed to hold tight"
58
GE was able to successfully maintain its hard bargaining policy intact.
Nevertheless, there is still one question unanswered. As indi
cated earlier, union spokesmen claimed, even before the settlement was
reached, that GE's first offer was particularly good merely because of
the existence of coordinated bargaining. Edward J. Carlough of the
^ IUE News, ibid. See similar statements made by Carlough of the

Sheet Metal Workers, p. 21, and by Albert Vottero, First Vice Presi
dent of the American Flint Workers in an editorial in the American
Flint, February 1969, p. 1. See also Unity. No. 7, February 1967, p. 2.
^ GE, Relations News Letter. December 19, 1966, p. 3.
58
"Who Won in the GE Settlement," Business Week. No. 1938, October
22, 1966, p. 149.
178
Sheet Metal Workers asserted unequivocably that GE "would never have
made a wage offer of a 10 percent Increase for three years, without

59
the coalition." While it is hard to refute this proposition off
hand, it is equally difficult to substantiate its validity. One fact
remained obvious: the CCB unions were unable to force GE to increase
its wage proposal. As in previous years, the Company's first offer
in 1966 became its last and finally was accepted by the Union intact
in the October 1A settlement.
The question about what was really behind the initial offer de
serves fuller comment. According to Business Week, it had "jolted
union strategists ."^Was it so unusual for GE to start with a relatively
good package? Not necessarily. As was discussed at length in the pre
vious chapter the Company had long been noted for the "tempting dish"
feature of its initial offers. Was the offer this time an outstanding
one? One way to look at it is to compare it with the settlements
achieved in other industries in 1966. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, average first-year increases of hourly wage rates in settle
ments reached in 1966in manufacturing was A.2 percent .^1 GE's first-year
wage increase was only A percent.
While the foregoing presentation might not fully refute the con-
59
Carlough, p. 21. See similar argument in the Engineers Outlook.
January 1967, p. 2. See also Unity. No. 7, February 1967, p. 2.
^ "Who Won in the GE Settlement," p. 152.

61 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics: 1970 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1971), Bulletin No.
1966, Table 93, p. 167.
179
tention of the union, it clearly indicates that, despite the coordinated
bargaining drive, GE was not forced in 1966 to budge considerably from
its "Boulwaristic" approach in collective bargaining.
The only point where one might hold that a gain was achieved be
cause of coordinated bargaining is the achievement of a cost-of-living
formula. It was no secret that GE had strenuously refused to tie cost-
of-living adjustments to fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index. The
Company had finally accepted the cost-of-living escalator principle,
albeit in a modified find limited form. Despite the Company's conten
tions about the questionability of this union success, but along GE's
own computations, the settlement on cost-of-living could incur for the
Company additional costs. Should the Consumer Price Index have risen
by 3 percent or more in each of the first two years of the contract,
the Company would have had to pay cost-of-living adjustments exceeding
its original offer by a half a percent to three-quarters of a percent
an hour in the second year and by one percent to one and a half per
cent an hour in the third year. Although for an individual worker the
change would not reflect a considerable difference over GE's initial
offer, it would not be an insignificant figure in labor costs for GE.
Although hard to prove, it seems that GE would not have acceded
to union pressures on this issue had it been dealing separately with
each union with no coordinated ties. Obviously, no new economic fact
had arisen during the 1966 negotiations to justify GE's acceptance of
the CCB demand except the rise of joint union pressure and a threaten
ing union unity. However, to claim, as McKinnell of the IUE did, that
180
. .unity enabled the workers to get a contract worth almost twice as

62
much as GE intended giving," is entirely baseless and far remote from
reality, to say the least. More sensible and realistic is a statement
made by IUD's Agenda. Commenting on the GE settlement it said that
"The unions didn't get all they wanted. But they learned that the only
way to deal with a national company is on a unified national basis.
And that lesson of 1966 points the way toward bigger gains in future
„63
years.
Was Unity Solid?
The last questions with respect to the 1966 negotiations are:
(1) Was unity among the coordinating unions maintained throughout?
(2) Were the local unions satisfied with the settlement? and (3) Did
the local unions accept and settle on the same terms?
1. Extent of Unity: Generally speaking, unity among the coor
dinating unions proved to be substantial and solid throughout the en
tire negotiations with all locals. Except for two local unions that
will be noted shortly, there were no defections or deviations from the
CCB *8 policy.
2. Satisfaction of Locals: Based on the survey of local unions
the evidence indicates they were less satisfied with the nationally
agreed contract that the CCB's leadership. It seems that the locals
^ McKinnel, p. 30.
63
Agenda. November 1966, p. 22.
181
expected to achieve through coordinated bargaining more convincing
gains than those actually won. Apparently they somewhat overestimated
the CCB's power and consequently hoped to realize in one unity effort
all that had been unsuccessfully fought for in previous individual bar
gaining.
3. Settlements of Local Unions; Officially and legally, local
unions were not bound by the IUE's nationally-agreed settlement. Ac
cording to the CCB principles they were entirely free to seek addi
tional gains. Practically, however, except for the two local unions
that will be mentioned shortly, all locals followed suit and settled
on basically the same nationally-bargained terms. The reasons are quite
simple. First, as noted earlier, it was, and still is, a common GE
policy to offer identical terms to all unions and employees alike, re
gardless of union designation. Hence, with power to hold the line on
uniformtiy, one may say, local unions were more bound by GE's company-
wide labor policy than by the CCB goals. Second, due to past experience,
local unions were well aware of their•inability to extract individually,
from GE any substantial gain in excess of terms offered to other unions.
Consequently, once the national settlement was approved by the IUE-GE
Conference Board, most local unions followed the pattern and accepted
the settlement. As reported by GE, with but a few exceptions "mainly
involving only local Issues, local negotiations with 'coalition' unions

64
have been resolved on the same terms as those agreed to in Washington."
64
182
A notable exception, revealed in the survey, is one single agree
ment reached by GE and one very large local union, a disciple of the CCB.
This contract, signed by AIW Local 783 of Owensboro, Kentucky, and cover
ing close to 4,500 employees, was a contract to run for 42 months! Ac
ceptance of such a long duration obviously was a clear deviation from
the pattern set by the CCB in the IUE's nationally-agreed contract.
It was certainly a violation of a vital objective of the CCB to attain
common expiration dates. Due to this fact, AIW Local 783 would not take
part in the long company-wide strike mounted by the CCB unions in 1969-
70.«
Another exception was an abortive three-week strike staged by Local
1017 of the American Flint Glass Workers' Union in Logan,Ohio. The
strike, which was in support of "demands for wage increases and improved
working conditions,"^could obviously not be termed as a strike over
local issues because a wage increase was involved. Hence, it clearly
reflected a dissatisfaction on the part of a small local union, repre
senting less than 150 employees, with the national wage settlement ap
proved by the CCB.
The two foreoing deviations from the CCB policy, however, could
certainly not nullify the apparent strong unity which, as a rule, solidly
encompassed almost all coordinating unions.
Critics of coordinated bargaining, including the GE management,
often denounced this union bargaining technique for ignoring the specific
needs and desires of local unions and their rank and file. The occur-
^ Nevertheless, in responding to the questionnaire, this local strongly

favored the idea of coordinated bargaining as a necessary approach to
deal with GE.
^ American Flint, December 1966, p. 13.
183
rence In 1966 of twelve local strikes^ at various GE plants over local
issues, clearly demonstrated that local interests were not ignored by
affiliates of the CCB. On the other hand, it is basically true that,
once a national or key settlement is reached, leadership of any coor
dinated bargaining alliance does not view favorably the extension of
local strikes. Such strikes may end up largely with contracts having
different expiration dates which obviously do not enhance coordinated
efforts in future campaigns.
Conclusions
In view of the results of the 1966 negotiations between GE and
the CCB unions the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. The CCB unions did not achieve substantial concessions

from GE such as they had demanded or later proclaimed.
2. GE's "Boulwarism'Vas certainly not defeated as hoped for

by the coordinating unions.
Nevertheless,
3. The coordinating unions were successful in establishing

the alliance firmly, both legally and practically.
4. Under the direction of the AFL-CIO, the alliance demon

strated its ability to unite all participating unions
for the purpose of collective bargaining. It proved
its power to authorize a company-wide strike by all
unions.
^ This figure does not include the two-day strike which took place
at the large jet engine plant in Evendale, Ohio. The strike involved
some 6,000 employees represented by the UAW and the IAM and was ter
minated on October 19, 1966 by a Taft-Hartley injunction. GE, Employee
Relations News. No. 66-39, October 24, 1966, p. 3.
184
5. The CCB became a significant and powerful factor which

would have to be reckoned with by GE in future negoti
ations.
An important development in the 1966 negotiations was the role
of the AFL-CIO as a participant in what was previously a sole union
domain. The AFL-CIO, or more precisely its dynamic President, George
Meany, became deeply embroiled in the decision-making process involved
in contract negotiations with GE. This could be looked upon as a rev
olutionary development, but it may signify only that the labor movement
felt strongly about the fight for coordinated bargaining and saw GE as
a critical enemy. It may not reflect a change in the policy of the
parent organization, or of the constituent unions, regarding who par
ticipates in negotiations.
Chapter VIII
THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1969-1970 NEGOTIATIONS
Due mainly to its legal and organizational successes in 1966,
the coordinating group looked ahead to the 1969 round with GE, expec
ting to improve its bargaining power and to extract, this time, some
convincing gains. The 1966 experience, which was later regarded as
a "warm-up" for 1969,^ indeed paved the way in atleast three major
respects:
(1) The collaborating unions as well as their rank and file
were more fully convinced that coordinated bargaining was the only way
to bargain effectively with GE;
(2) The legal status of coordinated bargaining had been recog
nized as lawful, although not yet final;
(3) For the first time in its history GE had been compelled
to deal with a united labor front whose potential power might be enough
to move the Company if demands of the coordinated group were not met
satisfactorily.
Being aware of the advantages of the new bargaining approach,
coordination became the central theme of the 13th convention of the IUE
held in September 1968. In his address to the convention, IUE President
Paul Jennings declared that "The multi-union bargaining approach is es-
^ Schwarz, p. 15.
185
186
sential if we are to be able to deal effectively with such industrial
titans." But he warned that both GE and Westinghouse would be "tougher
and more adept at the game in 1969" than they were during their reluc-
2
tant first engagement in 1966.
As the 1969 negotiations with GE drew near, the allied unions
gained moral and encouraging support when two favorable legal decisions
on coordinated bargaining were announced. Although the rulings were
limited in their nature, both the NLRB (on October 23, 1968) and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit (on June 9, 1969) upheld
IUE's right to appear at the bargaining table with a joint inter-union

3
committee.
In contrast to the situation in 1966, there was ample time for
preparation for the 1969 negotiations. Consequently, the CCB and its
Steering Committee undertook an expanded and more intensive organiza
tional program. Two aspects of the preparatory groundwork were highly
emphasized: (1) Intensifying and improving communication and coor
dination among the collaborating unions, and also with the AFL-CIO,
and (2) Expanding the unions’ alliance to include all AFL-CIO unions
that deal with GE and Westinghouse, in order to bring the greatest pos
sible force to the bargaining table.
3 BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook, 1968, p. 258.
3 173 NLRB 253 (1968), and General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F 2d 512
(2nd Cir. 1969). As recalled, the legality of "mixed" negotiating com
mittees was limited to negotiations confined strictly to employees rep
resented by one union. For more details see discussion in Chapter VI
above, pp. 130-133.
187
The IUD continued to play a significant role, extending a most
helpful hand. In its first newsletter under the new leadership of
President I. W. Abel of the Steelworkers, the IUD promised to "play a

4
full part in the second coordinated campaign at GE and Westinghouse."
In addition, the AFL-CIO Executive Council resolved in its meeting on
February 24, 1969, to pledge its full support to the coordinating unions
because, as it was put, "only through coordination can unions overcome
the ’divide and conquer’ tactics of totally unified management."^
National Unity Conference
On February 2, 1969, George Meany, AFL-CIO President, acting as
chairman of the Coordinated Bargaining Committee at GE and Westinghouse
(CBC‘
, a new name for the CCB), issued a call for a national conference
to be held in Washington, D.C. on March 6 . Invited to participate in
the conference were representatives of ten AFL-CIO unions which composed
the C B C : IUE, IAM, IBEW, AIW, AFTE, USW, SMWIA, AFGW, the Plumbers and
the Carpenters.^ As in 1966, the purpose of the joint conference was
to discuss the forthcoming negotiations with GE and Westinghouse and to
map the national bargaining goals .7 Conspicuously absent at the con

4
BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook. 1969. p. 83.
5 AFL-CIO News. March 1, 1969, p. 10.
® AFL-CIO News, February 8 , 1969, p. 1. As noted earlier, the Carpen

ters had no bargaining relationship with GE, but only with Westinghouse.
7 Ibid.
188
ference were representatives of the UAW, one of the six unions which
formed the coordinated alliance at GE in September 1965. The UAW was
not invited to the conference because it had withdrawn from the AFL-CIO
in 1968 and consequently was no longer a member of the CBC.
About 500 delegates of all CBC unions attended this meeting,
which was termed as a "Unity Rally." A set of bargaining goals, pre
pared by the CBC's Steering Committee was unanimously adopted and the
delegates pledged "their determination to win equity and justice in

g
the form of substantially improved contracts with the two companies."
Justifying continuation of coordinated bargaining, the conference
claimed in its resolution on unity: "We have learned from bitter ex
perience that uncoordinated plant by plant negotiations and negotiations
by individual unions work well for the companies but disastrously for
the workers," adding that "Coordinated bargaining is labor’s response
to the realities of negotiating with a giant corporation that deals with

9
many unions." The unions specifically announced that: "We are better
prepared than ever before for the long needed 'move ahead' negotiations
with General Electric and Westinghouse. Those objectives which we did
not achieve in 1966, we will achieve in 1 9 6 9 . " ^
IUE, President's Report to the IUE 14th Constitutional Convention.

August 24-28, 1970. p. 146.
9
CBC, "Resolution on Unity," Issues and Answers. 1969. p. 30.
^ Ibid. See also AFTE, Engineers Outlook. March 1969, p. 2.
189
National Goals
What were these objectives and what were the CBC's specific bar
gaining goals for 1969? As reported by the AFL-CIO News the CBC was
looking for improvements in 83 specific contract terms. Highlights of
these goals were: 11
1. Wage Increase — A substantial, but unspecified, wage

increase, based on the increase in the cost-of-living
since 1966, increased worker productivity, and wage
settlements in other industries.
2. Cost-of-Living -- A full cost-of-living clause with a

minimum quarterly increase linked to the rise in the
Consumer Price Index; to be precise, a quarterly in
crease of one cent per hour for every 0.4 increase in
the Consumer Price Index.
3. Skilled Trades and Incentive Workers — A meaningful

but unspecified, across-the-board wage supplement for
Increased skills, applied to the base rates, and in
creases for incentive workers.
4. Elimination of Geographic Wage Differentials.
5. Shorter Work Week — A 37.5-hour work week, with 40

hours' pay.
6. Improved Vacations — A revised vacation schedule with

a minimum of two weeks after one year of service and
six weeks after 25 years. Vacation pay to be paid at
125 percent of the employee's average earnings.
7. Holiday Benefits — Two additional paid holidays and
elimination of existing holiday qualification provisions.
^ AFL-CIO News. March 15, 1969, p. 3., and CBC, Issues and Answers.
1969.
190
8. Pension System — A non-contrlbutory plan with minimum

pension benefit of $7.50 a month per year ofservice,
full pension after 30 years of service regardless of
age, as well as ten additional improvements to be pro
posed .
9. Insurance and Health Plan — Elimination of employee

contributions for both employee and dependents, and
nine other improvements.
10. Employment and Income Security — Increased benefit

payments with payment to begin on the first day of
unemployment. Increased job protection and transfer
rights. Negotiations over subcontracting to prevent
loss of jobs.
11. Full Union Shop.
12. Full Arbitration Clause.
Ballots for 1969 Goals
To create membership interest in the coordinated program and to
promote its own identity and gain support, the CBC had announced, at
the unity conference, a plan to send ballots to all union members at
GE and Westinghouse plants to ascertain their priorities with respect
to contract proposals.
As Chairman of the CBC, AFL-CIO President Meany sent question
naires on April 17, to 200,000 employees of the two electrical com
panies (Meany's letter and the questionnaire are reproduced in full
in Appendix C ) . They were specifically asked to present their views
on the relative priorities to be attached to the bargaining goals en-
191
dorsed by the conference. This action by George Meany was designed
to give greater prestige to the action, but it also showed the extent
of his direct involvement in the joint program of the coordinating
unions. However, despite Meany"s personal appeal to the union members,
the response was disappointingly low. The return of the questionnaires

13
was about 25 percent. According to Unitv. however, the returns in
dicated an overwhelming support of the national CBC demands by the rank
and file.*^
Grass Root Meetings
To ensure better understanding of the national bargaining goals
and to enlist full support of the rank and file, the CBC emphasized the
need for regional grass roots meetings. As in 1966, the CBC proclaimed
its intention to sponsor a series of such inter-union meetings inthe
16 major cities across the country having largestconcentration ofGE
and Westinghouse workers. The first of the sixteen meetings was held
on April 21, 1969, in Louisville, Kentucky, and the final one on June
24, in San Jose, California.^As pointed out by Henry F. McKinnell, of
the IUE, the grass roots meetings "were arranged so that locals from as
12 AFL-CIO News. April 19, 1969, p. 2.
13
Information obtained in a personal interview, Washington, D. C.
^ CBC, Unity. June 1969, p. 2.
15 AFL-CIO News. April 5, 1969, p. 7.
192
many Internationals as possible would have the opportunity to act as
host."^ Each participant in the scheduled regional meeting received
a grass roots kit, entitled "A Commitment for Progress," containing a
list of the national bargaining goals and explanations of the various
demands. Also included in the kit were informative materials about GE
and Westinghouse profits and facts and figures illustrating the in
feriority of their benefits as compared to those of other industries.
According to IUE News all the grass roots meetings were "ex
tremely successful" and a resolution supporting the CBC goals was unan
imously adopted at each meeting .*7 All the coordinating unions were
encouraged by these joint meetings and regarded them as good indica
tions of possible future gains at the bargaining table. As the AFTE's
Engineers Outlook put it at the time: "The grass roots meetings held to
date have been a huge success — an indication that 1969 will be a good
18
year for union members at GE-W."
Unity Week
Another demonstration of close cooperation among members of the
ten coordinating unions was conducted by the CBC in the form of a "Unity
Week," starting August 25, 1969. The program for that week included
McKinnel, p. 34.
17 IUE News. July 24, 1969, p. 8 .
18
Engineers Outlook. May 1969, p. 3. See similar statement in Unity.
May 1969, p. 1.
193
various activities, including plant demonstrations, area meetings, pub-

19
licity in newspapers and radio news broadcasts. All employees of GE
and Westinghouse represented by the CBC unions were expected to display
buttons and bumper stickers and participate in joint rallies to support
the committee’s bargaining demands and to "let both corporations know

,.20
the workers solidly support the CBC bargaining goals.
Reorganization
To improve the administrative efficiency of the Steering Committee,
the centralized inter-union bodies of the CBC were functionally and
structurally reorganized. Following these changes, the new structure
provided for: The Coordinated Bargaining Committee(CBC) and the Steering

21
Committee. The CBC was the highest body of the coordinating unions,
composed of the ten union presidents, with AFL-CIO President George
Meany as chairman. It was to determine general policies for the inter
union alliance. The Steering Committee was the chief operating body,
composed of representatives of the ten union presidents. It was to
implement the policies set by the CBC. Under it were four major Sub
committees:
(1) Committee on National Bargaining Goals: Responsible

for developing the bargaining goals to be recommended
^ CBC, Unity. Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1969. p. 1.
20
IUE News. July 24, 1969, p. 8 .
21
CBC, "How the Coordinated Bargaining Committee Operates," 1969, p. 1.
194
to the Steering Committee. It was assisted by five

sub-committees in charge of the following areas:
(a) wages, (b) employment security, (c) contract
language, (d) salaried employees, and (e) pensions
and insurance.
2. Legal Committee: Responsible for guiding the Steering

Committee on any legal problems involved in its
operations and for consulting and getting agreements
between the legal staffs of the various unions on
any legal questions.
3. Economic Committee: Responsible for analyzing and

developing for the Steering Committee the financial
and economic situations of GE and Westinghouse,
their effect upon the bargaining situation and the
development of information and programs relating to
the elimination of wage differentials.
4. Publicity and Education Committee: Responsible for

development of publicity and education programs for
submission to the Steering Committee, and for carry
ing out the programs that were agreed upon. This
included the publication of Unity, educational pro
grams for the unions, the training and direction of
the communication activities of the regional coor
dinators and preparation for meetings, such as the
grass roots meetings.
The overall structure of the CBC is shown in the diagram on the
following page.
195
The Structure of the

Coordinated Bargaining Committee, 1969
Coordinated Bargaining Committee

Ten Union Presidents
George Meany — Chairman
Steering Committee
Representatives of the
Ten Union Presidents
Committee on National Legal Economic Publicity and

Bargaining Goals Committee Committee Education Committee
Wages Employment Contract Language Salaried Pensions and

Employees Insurance
Source: CBC, "How the Coordinated Bargaining Committee Operates,"

1969, pp. 1-2.
196
Communications
On the communications front, the CBC reactivated in 1969 two im
portant channels of communications utilized in 1966: (1) Unity, the
monthly publication issued by the CBC reappeared and was distributed
regularly to all union members at GE and Westinghouse, and (2) inspired
by the success of the teletype network in 1966, the CBC installed an
other teletype system, equipped with the "latest and most rapid communi-
22
cations equipment available from the Bell Telephone Company." Its
purpose was to maintain a rapid link between the CBC in Washington, D.C.,
national bargaining headquarters in New York City (for negotiations
with GE) and in Pittsburgh (for negotiations with Westinghouse), and
with the seventeen area coordinators serving in the regional offices

23
of the CBC across the country. As reported by IUE News, the regional
communication network would "provide information daily to the local
unions and also keep the national negotiating committees informed of

24
developments at the local level."
Commenting in retrospect on the role of this communications sys
tem, James D. Compton, Chairman of the Steering Committee from 1969,
wrote: "more than anything else, the CBC network frustrated company at
tempts to shake isolated bargaining units loose by claiming that others
22 Unity. Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1969, p. 4.
22 Ibid., pp. 1 and 4.
24 IUE News. July 24, 1969, p. 8 .
197
25
had already settled." He said that this teletype system "helped the
unions to keep track of picket lines and boycott developments and to
monitor each step of the Company's back-to-work program and warn locals
26
what to expect." Almost all unions which responded to the survey in
dicated that the communications system employed in the 1969 negotiations
with GE was more effective than in 1966.
The extensive program for communications, coupled with the con
tinuous joint work undertaken by the Steering Committee and its sub
committees, manifested a better link and greater cooperation among the
CBC u nions. Union leaders felt that their preparations for the 1969
negotiations were effective, successful and encouraging. As IUE Presi
dent Jennings claimed, the preparations gave strong indication that
the CBC unions were determined "to make 1969 the year that employees
„27
of both corporations would obtain the best contracts ever.
Expansion of the Coordinated Group
In its drive to expand the coordinating group, the CBC developed
and maintained close communications with three other unions unaffiliated
with the AFL-CIO: the United Automobile Workers, the Teamsters, and the
Federation of Salaried Employees, the latter only at Westinghouse. Though
25
James D. Compton, "Victory at GE: How It Was Done," The American
Federationist (July 1970), p. 3.
IUE, President's Report to the IUE 14th Constitutional Convention,

pp. 147-148.
198
Ineligible for CBC membership, all three unions took part in the Steer
ing Committee sessions and were also represented on the IUE negotiating
28
committee. Moreover, full cooperation and coordination had been de
veloped outside the Steering Committee with the independent United Elec
trical Workers (UE) — a long-time bitter rival of the IUE and the
29
second largest union in GE. This friendly course was arranged in a
meeting between the presidents of the IUE and the UE on January 27,
30
1969. No public explanation was given, however, as to why the UE was
not permitted to sit in on the CBC Steering Committee, the same as the
other three independent unions. As disclosed in private by some union
sources, the IUE was willing to have UE representatives on the Steering
Committee. The IAM, the IBEW and the Steelworkers, however, objected
31
strongly and threatened to quit the CEC if the UE was invited. None
theless, despite this enmity, the informal cooperation between the CBC
unions and the UE prevailed continuously. As pointed out by GE, late
in September 1969, "The UE, which is also negotiating a separate national
contract with GE, appears to be a silent partner in the coalition. . .

32
and to all appearances that cooperation has been taking place."
28
Compton, p. 2.
29
See for example "Rival Unions Talk Unity," Business Week. February 8 ,
1969, p. 80.
30
Daily Labor Report, No. 18, January 28, 1969, p. A-10.
31
Information obtained in personal interviews with national officials
of some major unions of the CBC.
32
GE, "Negotiations Background Sheet, 1969 Negotiations," Rev., Sep
tember 29, 1969, p. 3.
199
The expansion of the coordinating group was carried further with
the addition, later in 1969, of the International Brotherhood of Fire
men and Oilers, bringing the total number of the collaborating unions
to fifteen. The allied unions represented in 1969 about 145,000 workers

33
including 88,500 members of the IUE and 16,000 members of the UE.
Table 10 shows the makeup of the national unions which were mem
bers of CBC's Steering Committee in 1969, including the three indepen
dent unions, the UAW, the Teamsters, and the Federation of Salaried
Employees at Westinghouse. Excluded from the Table is the independent
UE, which was not represented on the Steering Committee. In 1969 the
UE represented 16,000 employees at 23 GE plants.
As shown in Table 10, the alliance in 1969 was clearly larger
and more comprehensive than in 1966. With the added participation of
the UE, the coordinated bargaining group of 1969 enjoyed more strength
than before. The expansion of the alliance was undoubtedly very promis
ing and encouraging to the coordinating unions as they approached the
second collective confrontation with G E ’s "Boulwarism." (Contract
negotiations with GE were scheduled for August 26. The IUE agreement
and most local contracts were to expire at midnight October 26, 1969.)
The expansion of the coordinated group created confidence within
the CBC and led to optimistic statements. As claimed by James D. Compton,
Chairman of the Steering Committee, in an interview broadcasted by the
AFL-CIO radio Program "Labor News Conference, early in May 1969, "Coor-
^ GE, "A Report on 1969 Negotiations," issued by Philip D. Moore, Vice

President-Employee Relations to GE Managers, August 18, 1969, p. 1.
TABLE 10. Composition of the Coordinated Bargaining Group at General Electric, 1969.
Number of Number of
The Unions Locals at GE Employees Represented
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers (IUE) 71 88,500
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (IAM) 33 15,500
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers (UAW) 5 7,800
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 30 5,700
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America (AIW) 2 4,800
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association (SMWIA) 2 3,500
American Federation of Technical Engineers (AFTE) 9 2,800
International Association of Teamsters,Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America (Teamsters) 4 + 1,200
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 1 + 800
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada 3 + 500
American Flint Glass Workers Union of North America (AFGW) 1 + 150
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers* 3 55
United Brotherhood of Joiners and Carpenters ** — —
Federation of Salaried Employees at Westinghouse ** — —
TOTAL 164 131,305
* The Firemen and Oilers joined the CBC late In 1969.
** The Carpenters and the Federation of Salaried Employees at Westinghouse did not have representation
rights at GE.
+ The figures for these unions are somewhat different in other GE publications._________________________
Source: GE, "Negotiations Background Sheet, 1969 Negotiations," Rev. August 20, 1969 and supplemental
200
information supplied by the Company to the author, in a letter of October 4, 1972.
201
34
dlnated bargaining this year will be far more successful than in 1966."
Consequently, there was an Impression that the 1969 negotiations would
witness what Business Week described as '"Boulwarism vs. Boulwarism,* a

35
situation that hardly bodes well for an early or easy settlement."
Clearly, GE was facing a solid union front, headed and generated by
the IUD and the AFL-CIO top leadership. The latter, as noted earlier,
regarded the 1969 round with GE as an "all labor" campaign and committed
full backing to the coordinated alliance with money, manpower and pol-
36
itical assistance to eliminate GE's "Boulwarism." Obviously, however,
GE had no intention of surrendering. Despite the expansion of the coor
dinated bargaining group and its increased power, the Company still felt
it would successfully challenge the allied unions. Regardless of other
consideration, one fact remained clear: even taken together, the total
number of unionized GE employees in 1969 was still less than half of GE's
37
total employment in the United States. GE actions prior to the 1969
V
negotiations clearly demonstrated its determination to continue its
unique bargaining posture intact. Hence, with the legality of coordinated

38
bargaining already established and upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
the 1969 battle between the giants began.
^ Unity. May 1969, p. 1.

35
"GE Bind Tightens," Business Week. September 6 , 1969, p. 48. Emphasis
added.
36
"Crisis Bargaining Looms in GE Talks," Business Week. October 4, 1969,
p. 66 .
37
GE, "Negotiations Background Sheet, 1969 Negotiations, p. 2.
38
See above, p.186.For more details see discussion in Chapter VI,
above, pp. 130-133.
Chapter IX
PRE-STRIKE NEGOTIATIONS, 1969
Pre-Negotiations Subcommittee Discussions
Formal negotiations between GE and the IUE began on August 12,
1969, two weeks ahead of the original schedule. Prior to formal nego
tiations, however, the parties agreed to conduct pre-negotiations sub
committee discussions on IUE's proposals concerning three major issues:
(1) pensions and health insurance; (2) skilled trades, and (3) con
tract language. The first pre-negotiation meeting was held on May 14,
1969. Quite as expected, the IUE subcommittee appeared with represen
tatives of other unions. As noted by the Daily Labor Report, while
such a mixed union committee had caused an immediate walkout of the GE
delegation in 1966, it attracted in 1969 "only brief attention and ap
parently passed off smoothly."*
The value of the preliminary discussions, however, seems rather
questionable. An exchange of letters early in July 1969, between John
Shambo, IUE Chairman of the GE Conference Board Negotiating Committee
and John Baldwin, GE's chief negotiator, reveals the parties' conflict
ing attitudes toward these preliminary negotiations. While the IUE
expected to bargain on each of its approximately 120 proposals, GE was
* Daily Labor Report. No. 100, May 23, 1969, p. A-10.
202
203
ready only to listen to IUE suggestions. The way GE regarded these
talks is well reflected in Baldwin's "Boulwaristic" reply of July 10
to Shambo's complaint about the unproductivity of the subcommittees:
"The pre-negotiations subcommittees were designed to give both sides
an opportunity to obtain information and viewpoints on specific sub-

2
jects in the bargaining area." Obviously, this interpretation was
not shared by the IUE. According to the IUE N e w s , John Shambo again
criticized GE, complaining that little progress had been made in the
subcommittee meetings during the preceding two months. The reason for
lack of progress was, in Shambo's words: "There has not been a single
3
definitive response from the company on any of the matters discussed."
Yet, according to GE, the Company was "very receptive to union sugges
tions and ideas" discussed by the subcommittees on skilled trades and
benefit plans. On the other hand, the Company admitted to being not
"very receptive" to union requests on issues covered by the subcommittee
on contract language, such as union shop, unrestricted arbitration
clause, substantial modifications in the management rights clause,

4
limitations on subcontracting..
Despite the controversy over the progress achieved in the pre
negotiation meetings, one telling fact did emerge, that is, the high
degree of coordination practiced by the unions. Indeed, the coordin-
2
In a letter from John Baldwin to John Shambo, July 10, 1969.
3 IUE N e w s . July 24, 1969, p. 8 .

»
^ GE, "A Report on 1969 Negotiations," 1969, pp. 1-2.
204
ation among the CBC unions seemed to be effective not only in rallies
and conferences but also at the various bargaining tables across the
country. It soon became clear to GE that wherever pre-negotiation meet
ings took place, all local unions adopted a unified strategy of not
discussing wages before issues of contract language. As reported by
Philip D. Moore, GE's Vice President for Employee Relations, ". . .we
have been unable to move because the strategy imposed on the local
business agents by the top AFL-CIO command apparently required them to
stall as long as they could and then to discuss 'contract language'
before pay."^ Moreover, Moore also charged that all unions, including
the independent UE, rejected or ignored GE requests for an early start
of formal contract negotiations at all bargaining tables across the
country.^
In contrast to, or inspite of, the joint strategy, which re
flected a high degree of unity and discipline among the CBC unions,
an individualistic or independent feature of separate bargaining still
existed at most local bargaining tables. As pointed out with regard
to the 1966 negotiations, most local unions involved in coordinated bar
gaining in the 1969-70 negotiations with GE did not have "mixed" nego
tiating committees. All locals which responded to the survey of the
1966 and 1969-70 negotiations had appeared at the various bargaining
tables in 1966 as well as in 1969-70 without representatives of other
5 Ibid.. p. 3.
^ Ibid., p . 2.
205
unions on their negotiating teams. As indicated in connection with
the 1966 negotiations, unions justified the absence of mixed committees
at the local level by pointing out the central inter-union team par
ticipating in the national GE-IUE negotiations. Understandably, they
assigned greater importance to the national negotiations which, they
expected, would set the pattern on national goals for all local unions.
Nevertheless, when measured against the principles and objectives of
the coordinated bargaining theory, this course of "individualism" as
practiced by most GE unions at the local level in 1966 and in 1969-70
seems a strange and rather incompatible phenomenon.
Formal Contract Negotiations
In 1969, as in 1966, formal contract negotiations between GE
and the IUE and other CBC unions depicted, from their outset, the
ideological and strategic differences engulfing the parties or inherent
in their contrasting bargaining methods.
As soon as the formal negotiations commenced on August 12, the
IUE and other CBC unions mounted continuous pressure on GE in two res
pects: (1) From the outset they tried vigorously, though without suc
cess, to impose on GE the traditional "horse trade," the give-and-take
method of bargaining; (2) For many sessions the coordinating unions
continued their policy of no talks on economic matters before contract
language issues were discussed and resolved.
In essence, the IUE insisted on getting a point-by-point response
206
and upon discussing each of the 122 contract language changes they had
proposed, rather than receiving a last-minute package offer. As Shambo
stated on August 26, upon presentation in writing of the lUE's final
contract proposals, "IUE hopes GE will respond on each issue early
enough for full-scale, give-and-take discussion wherever warranted."^
But as in the past, IUE's persistent requests were ignored. Despite
the NLRB decision against GE's bargaining method, handed down in Decern-
g
ber 1964, GE's "Boulwarism" was still in full action. No give-and-
take bargaining took place at the bargaining table. According to union
sources, "As September dragged on, GE rejected each union proposal
without discussion and refused to make any counter-proposal on any
issue.
Indeed, GE continued to practice the "Boulwaristic" policy. Jud
ging from the union minutes of the negotiations, and also from GE,"Nego
tiation News" it seems clear that the Company continued at that stage
to regard the bargaining table as a "study room" and to view negotiations
as an "information tool." Considered as such, negotiations with the IUE
were merely part of GE's comprehensive research needed to formulate its
"firm and fair offer."
^ AFL-CIO N e w s , August 30, 1969, p. 5.

g
General Electric Co., 150 NLRB 192 (1964). As recalled, the Company
appealed the case before the Second Circuit Court and almost five years
lapsed until the Court, on October 28,. 1969, upheld the NLRB decision
against GE. NLRB v. General Electric C o ., 418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir.1969).
9
James D. Compton, "Victory at GE: How It Was Done,", p. 3. See also
McKinnel, p. 40.
207
Actually, though, it is not uncommon for a company to refuse to
negotiate on an issue-by-issue basis. In fact, as Professor Davey
noted, there has been a growing tendency in recent years, among manage
ment and unions alike, to pursue voluntarily the strategy of package
d e a l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , when GE turns down union requests for part by
part bargaining, it is somehow immediately linked to GE's "Boulwarism."
The fact that makes GE's common position different from other companies
is, obviously the Company's unique policy of not budging later from
its initial package offer save for some rearrangements or when new facts
appear. Hence, IUE efforts to achieve issue by issue settlements,
against the current stream of package deals, takes on a special mean
ing. They may be seen as an attempt to fight "Boulwarism" at its roots.
They basically reflect the union desire to eliminate that famous "firm
and fair offer" that leaves little room for meaningful union gains.
In this context, it may be worthwhile to make a close observation
on what actually happened at the GE-IUE bargaining table in that early
stage of the 1969 contract negotiations. Such an observation might
improve the understanding of the "battle on bargaining concepts" waged
by the parties. For this reason, parts of some deliberations which
took place during August and September 1969, as reported in the IUE's
minutes are reproduced below. They might shed some light on the atmos
phere, strategy and conduct of the parties.
Harold W. Davey, 3rd ed., pp. 130-131.
208
Excerpts from the IUE’s Minutes of the GE-IUE National

Negotiations. August-Septenber 1969.
First Meeting. August 12. 1969. Morning Session.
Shambo (IUE): I repeated we were not getting any response to our

proposals and it looked as though we were faced with a take it
. . .attitude. We think we developed a sound package on contract
language. We gave you our proposals as we went along each day.
The only response we got was that you would take a look at this.
We don't intend to pursue this pattern. This is not collective
bargaining. I suspect you have the package already. We pre
sented over 100 proposals. We ought to get some response. How
do we know where we stand. It's been a one way street so far.
You said you get a deeper insight, but now we should get a res
ponse. You have the benefit of our proposals in writing. We
should get your position on these proposals so we know where we
stand.
Baldwin (GE): Until such time as we have all your demands and your
priorities of what you want it is difficult for us to come to
some conclusion. . . .If you are saying we should go piecemeal
that's difficult to do. . . .We did respond. . . .we were looking
at some of these. . . .
August 12. 1969. Afternoon Session
Shambo: Are you going to have proposals on contract language?
Baldwin: No.
Shambo: It is still a one way street.
Baldwin: We will be responsive as we were today.
Abramson (IUE): In the sub-committee you told us that we were not

in formal negotiations. Now we are in formal negotiations and
you still don't have anything.
Baldwin: Jennings [IUE President] said he had indicated he would

give us position papers, and that there would be others.
Rock (IUE): You said you listened thismorning, what about now?
Baldwin: I listened this afternoon too.
Reproduced from appropriate pages in the IUE's "GE Negotiations

Minutes, 1969."
209
August 13, 1969. Morning Session; The union representatives asked

for responses to union requests made at subcommittee sessions.
Baldwin suggests to start on Article III - Safety issues.
Shambo: You have [had] proposals for two months. We think we de
tailed them and now we are looking for proposals from you.
Baldwin: I'm proposing to give your proposals full consideration.
Shambo: You mean after all this time you are not ready? When will
we get them?
Baldwin; When we are ready.
Shambo: We should be ready for negotiations. It's not a one way

street.
Baldwin: Let me give my impression. You have a feeling that nego

tiations don't start until we have given you proposals. We are
going to respond. . . .
Abramson: We want over this question of subcommittees. The Union

gave you all its arguments. It has no further arguments. Let's
stop dancing around. You are placing this negotiation in a
cloud of mystery.
Hilbert (GE): You misconceived the notion of subcommittee. You

were not required to submit proposals in writing. Negotiations
begin today. . . .We will discuss Article III today.
Abramson: We gave you all the arguments. If you had questions you
should have asked then.
Hilbert: We will respond to Article III. We will talk about it

today. Negotiations start today.
Shambo: We agreed to have the subcommittees do the work.
Jandreau (IUE): We talked, explained, and went into detail. You

gave us the same answer.
Hilbert: We said that we would respond in time. . . .
Shambo: We would like a response.
Baldwin: At the appropriate time . . . .
Dicicco (IUE): I get upset when I take part in subcommittee meetings

and come here to go over this again. It makes no sense whatso
ever to me.
210
Hilbert: This is when negotiations start. Everyone chimed in here

at this point [sic].
Shambo; There are going to be some negotiations, or the people are

going to find out about it. . . .
Hilbert; We still have 2 months.
Abramson: Someone said we will have it all wrapped up.
Baldwin: I noted your statements on the purpose of the subcommittees.

They will stand on their own. If that's all you have to say on
Article III let's go to another area.
Shambo: What is your proposal on Article III?
Baldwin: We will give it to you when ready.
Abramson: I think it is important to discuss basic questions, to

discuss your concept of negotiations. If we have to go over this
all over again we are wasting time. The process of negotiations
involves a give and take.
Hilbert: We give and you take.
Abramson: The basic ingredient is the exchange proposals. You say

you will listen and when you are ready, "we will give you our
answer." Each one of our proposals will be given full consider
ation and not be submerged as in the past. We will not let you
do it. We resent it. Let's have an exchange of ideas.
Dicicco: What did we do in the subcommittee? We had an in-depth

discussion.
Hilbert:This is the first inning, we still have 2-1/2 months to go.
Abramson: Iwas present at a subcommittee meeting and I thought we

had a good exchange of ideas on where we stand. I asked Mr.
Ritter [of GE] if we would get a proposal. He was clear, he
said "I cannot respond, Mr. Baldwin will." Why don't we get
one proposal?
Hilbert: What is your need to get one right now?
Abramson: Why don't you give us your proposals? Let's begin bar
gaining .
Badlwin: Is the only thing you are concerned with the matter of
time? If we couldget off the semantic discussion we could make
some progress.
211
Shambo: Do you have a proposal on this?
Baldwin; Not at this time.
August 27. 1969. Afternoon Session
Dicicco: You haven't given us the benefit of your thinking on any

thing. What does bargaining mean?
Baldwin: It means I have an opportunity to understand all your

proposals. The Union to date has been completely unwilling
to move along.
Abramson: What about the non-economic proposals?
Baldwin: I have to see the whole thing.
Shambo: We would like to hear your response on Article III.
Baldwin: We heard you. WTe noted your proposal. This is an area

we are looking at. When we come to a conclusion we'll be back
to you.
Abramson: When?
Baldwin: At the appropriate time.
Abramson: It's discouraging to the Committee to have to listen to

you and not get a response. It is a charade and a sham.
Baldwin: Let's move ahead and get to them. Shall we go to Article V?
[Later in the day]
Brunner (IAM): Can you explain why you establish subcommittees? We

had subcommittee meetings and there is not one iota of evidence
that anything came out of these meetings.
Baldwin: Because in actual truth in the subcommittee meetings we

were to discuss areas of joint interest to the Company. I did
find them very helpful. Negotiations are covering many areas
not covered in subcommittee meetings.
[Later in the day]
Shambo: You people are going to bargain this year if we have to

stay here Saturday and Sunday.
Baldwin: We are bargaining now.
Shambo; We would like response tomorrow on union recognition.
Baldwin; My response tomorrow will be the same as I gave you today.

We will not be ready. I'll repeat it tomorrow.
Shambo: How about Wednesday of next week?
Baldwin; I don't know. It depends on how far we move ahead.
September 3. 1969.
Abramson; We gave you contract proposals three months in advance.

We have had subcommittee meetings on them. We talked for weeks.
Now you are saying you won't give us a counter proposal until
you think the time is proper. You asked for our proposals. Why
can't we get yours?
Baldwin; We didn't ask for them.
Jandreau; Ritter [of GE] did.Ritter asked for them in a subcom

mittee meeting and asked to have them a week in advance of our
discussion.
[Later in the day while discussing another article]
Baldwin: We are considering it and you will get it in due time.
Shambo; When you start making some proposals then we will proceed
to negotiations. You haven't made a single proposal yet. This
time we are going to have real collective bargaining. Have you
given us a proposal on Article I?
Baldwin; No.
Shambo; On Article II?
Baldwin: No.
Shambo; On Article III?
Baldwin; No
Shambo; On Article IV?
Baldwin: No.
Shambo; On Atticle V?
Baldwin: No.
213
Shambo: You haven't made a single proposal. That is what you

call collective bargaining?
[Later in the day]

Shambo: . . .When are you going to make counter proposals?
Baldwin: When you give us the reasons for your proposals.
Abramson: You have had that for three months.
Baldwin: Have I had a chance to discuss the things I think the

employees are interested in? Let's get your thinking on those
things I haven't had your thinking on. You have been totally
unwilling to discuss a general wage increase, cost of living,
skilled increase.
Abramson: You will not force us to talk about what you want —
we know your game — we want some demonstration of collective
bargaining.
[Later in the afternoon]
Baldwin: Until such time as I hear from the Union a broad cross
section of what your demands are and what your priorities are
I won't be in a position to give proposals.
September 4, 1969. Morning Session [After discussing Job Classification]
Shambo: We are sick and tired of your stalling. This year we do

have some real bargaining power and we intend to use it to get
a peaceful settlement. We want you to engage in genuine collec
tive bargaining.
Baldwin: That,s a tactic.
September 9. 1969, Afternoon Session
Shambo: You are refusing to make any counter proposal in writing.

It's pretty clear that you have no desire or willingness to par
ticipate in free collective bargaining across this table. You
have demonstrated that you are not responsive to any of our pro
posals. Instead you are directing your main thrust of responses
directly to your employees through your propaganda. You are by
passing the Union,you are looking at us as your enemies. You
are not participating in free collective bargaining....you are
not bargaining anymore now than you did in 1960, when you violated
the law.
214
Baldwin: I think we have been bargaining, we have been responsive,

why you delay I don't know — as soon as we get all your pro
posals we will move ahead.
September 11, 1969. Morning Session
Baldwin: . ..I'd like two of those days [of next week] to give
you our thinking on the results of our study and research in the
areas of your demands.
Shambo: You have refused to discuss these things across the table.
Don't forget we still have wages, contract language, the area
differentials and other matters to discuss. Are you going to
come out with your package next week?
Baldwin: . . .1 don't intend to come outwith the package next

week. Ijust want you to have the results of our research on a
wide range of subjects.
Shambo: Will there be proposals?
Baldwin: We just want to make some presentations. Will you give us

these two days?
Shambo: We will consider that.
Baldwin: We have stayed on the Union agenda for four weeks and all
I am asking for is two days so that we can make a presentation
to you on your demands. All you have to do is listen.
Shambo: I want your request in writing and I will give you an answer
Tuesday morning.
[Later in the day]
Baldwin: All I am asking for is two days of next week to present our
results of research on cost of living, wages, skilled worker ad
justments and benefits.
[Later in the day]
Baldwin: Just let me have one more try. I want to know why I can't
have two days next week to present the Company's research. Why
do you have to take until Monday?
Shambo: I'll respond Tuesday not Monday. And we want to know why
you can't wait until next Tuesday.
[Later in the day]
Baldwin: We want to avoid crisis bargaining. We have been beseech

ing the Union to give us their thinking on areas they have not
discussed and you have refused, so now we have taken the initiative.
215
Shambo: We have been talking for four months and we haven't re
ceived a single proposal yet. Go ahead Leo [Jandreau] on to
vacations — Article IX — in areas that are non-economic.
The character of the negotiations did not change significantly as
negotiations progressed. The parties continued to dwell on the Union
agenda for a few more weeks. An exception was the two days of Septem
ber 17 and 18. granted by the Union to GE for a comprehensive presen
tation of its views on various economic and general Issues. However,
although discussions were later developed on the merits of each of the
Union's demands, the basic strategy of the parties remained largely
unchanged.
"Boulwarism" Still Active
As seen in the foregoing excerpts from the negotiation minutes,
the Union was successful in setting the bargaining agenda. It was
clearly able to drag GE, as initially planned by the CBC, into a dis
cussion of each one of the union proposals on contract language before
turning to negotiations on wage and benefit issues. As reported by GE,
"Negotiations News," the Union's negotiators continued to insist on
"an extremely rigid agenda which not only excludes discussion of such
basic economic items as pay, benefits, cost-of-living, etc., but also
excludes any part of their 122 contract language proposals that may in-
12
volve economic factors." It was not before October 1, that the Union
13
began with the oral presentation of its economic demands. On the
12
GE, "Negotiations News," September 4, 1969, p. 1.
13
GE, "Negotiations News," October 2, 1969, p. 1.
216
other hand, the Union was clearly unable to evoke counter proposals
by GE on a piecemeal basis. The Company did not present a concrete
proposal on any issue until October 7, when it came up with its pack
age offer. Thus, while the CBC won procedural control over the "form"
of the negotiation process, GE undoubtedly dominated the "substance"
of it.
Indeed, GE did not modify its "Boulwaristic" tradition in bar
gaining. The Company went on preparing its "firm and fair" package
offer. As stated in Baldwin's letter of September 11 to Shambo, "We
are now actively working on the development of major contract proposals
to you on a wide range of important matters based on your demands and

14
our own continuing research." Not until October 7, 1969, after ex
hausting the Union's agenda, was GE's complete offer handed to the IUE.
The package offer was presented simultaneously to the UE land to the
local u n i o n s . ^ The timing and the form in which the Company made its
offer bitterly angered the unions and brought renewed charges against
GE for its rigid "Boulwaristic" tactics. Their major concern was G E ’s
publicity surrounding the presentation of the package proposal. Accor
ding to James D. Compton, Chairman of the CBC's Steering Committee, the
Company had already released the offer through its official news pub
lication the day before its delivery to the u n i o n s . ^ Clearly, as part
TZ
In a letter to John H. Shambo, Chairman of IUE-GE Conference Board,
September 11, 1969, p. 2.
^ Allied Industrial Worker. November 1969, p. 5.
^ In a letter to the author from James D. Compton noted earlier. For

a similar accusation see The Machinist, November 6 , 1969, p. 11. Accor
ding to GE "Negotiations News," however, the Company’s offer went to the
press on the day it was presented to the IUE, that is on October 7, 1969.
217
of the battle against GE's "Boulwarisra," the CBC unions, as well as
the cooperating UE, had sought to avoid publication of the Company's
offer. They asked a three-day blackout on internal and external com
munication. GE, however, rejected the request. Consequently, the Union
committee walked out and, according to GE, the offer went to the press
the same day. The CBC lost once again. "Boulwarism"was still much
alive.
The following excerpt from GE "Negotiations News" describes
the events which occurred on October 7.
On Tuesday morning [October 7] the Company tried to

present its 1969 contract proposals across the table to
the IUE bargaining committee.
As soon as union negotiators understood the Company
was actually going to spell out its specific proposals,
they launched a series of objections.
IUE's John Shambo said he had wanted an advance
notice and a three-day blackout on communication to em
ployees and the public.
IUE ASKED DAILY.
J6 hn Baldwin, GE's chief negotiator, said, 'This
is an interesting position for you to take. On prac
tically a daily basis, you have asked me for proposals
in writing. On Friday, I told you we would work the
weekend and expedite a proposal. Today is the first
negotiating day of the week and I am prepared to review
the proposal we've developed. It's in your interest
and ours to get into extensive discussion of these pro
posals. We have well over two weeks to negotiate on
this and I think we should continue our meeting today.'
As far as the communication blackout was concerned,
Baldwin said previous experience in negotiations has
shown there is no way to prevent such important in
formation from getting out to employees and he said he
felt both Company and union should be free to communi
cate.
At this point, the IUE asked for time to caucus
among themselves until 11 o'clock. The Company re
luctantly agreed and returned to the empty room. The
union then called and said they would not return to
the bargaining table until 10 a.m. on Wednesday.
In view of the union's action, the Company delivered
to the union shortly before lunch a copy of the pro
posal they had intended to review in detail across
the table.
MANY PRESS INQUIRIES
By 1 o'clock, newspaper reporters were calling GE
headquarters asking about a union press statement say
ing GE had published its contract offer. The same
kind of thing happened in several plant cities. The
union press release apparently did not comment on what
was in the offer, but addressed itself to the Company's
timing. The reporters wanted to know what was in the
offer, which still had not been publicly released.
Just before 2 o'clock, when the IUE cancelled the
afternoon session, the Company told the union it was
going to release the contents of the offer at 2 p.m.
(Actually it was 2:30.) There seemed no reason why ^
employees and the public should not know all about it.
As seen in the foregoing excerpt, even GE's own account of the
October 7 events cannot but acknowledge GE's observance of "Boulwarist
tactics. Interestingly, almost identical developments characterized
events at the GE-UE bargaining table. Perhaps best reflecting GE ad
herence to Boulware's approach in collective bargaining is a section
contained in GE's letter of October 7, 1969, to the IUE. In this
letter John R. Baldwin wrote in part:
This proposal is subject to continuing negoti

ations, in the course of which we will be glad to
consider and discuss any appropriate modifications
or rearrangements. As you are well aware, though,
it is not our practice to put forth an offer with
the deliberate intention of having: it ratcheted
upward; nothine has been held back, to be thrown
in as a 'concession 1 to some form of threat.18
^ GE, "Negotiations News," October 8 , 1969, p. 1.
18
In a letter to John H. Shambo, Chairman of IUE-GE Conference Board
October 7, 1969, p. 3. Emphasis added.
219
Union Demands and GE's First Offer
Considering the primary determination of the coordinating unions
to force GE to change its pattern of bargaining, the Company's state
ment just noted obviously did not promise an easy and peaceful settle
ment. A comparison of the major features of IUE's proposals presented
on August 26 and GE's "single and firm" offer of October 7, 1969, re
veals the wide gap which existed between their positions. (Table 11
presents this.)
As seen in Table 11, there was a wide disparity between the two
proposals. Specifically, a spokesman of the CBC was correct when he
said the Company "was silent on area wage differentials, cost-of-living
protection, improved grievance procedures or any of the other issues

19
stressed by the unions and their members." What GE called "the best
offer in its history" was termed by the coordinating unions as one of
the "worst offers," and a "horrible example of deceptive packaging

20
which gives with one hand and takes away with the other. . . ."
Commenting on GE's offer, IUE President Paul Jennings told his
GE Conference Board in part:
Analysis of GE's offer reveals it to be a 6%

increase for the average employee. But over the
past 3 years, GE workers have lost every penny of
their 12.9% in raises due to cost of living boosts.
That means GE's proposal would restore only half
of what workers have lost during the current agree
ment. At the same time, GE demands the removal of
what little cost of living protection workers had
in the 1966-69 agreement [maximum of 1.75% increase
per year]. . . .
19
James D. Compton, "Victory at GE; How It Was done,", p. 3.
20
IUE President Paul Jennings in his comments at the IUE-GE Confer
ence Board, the IUE News, October 16, 1969, p. 3. See also APL-CIO
News. October 11, 1969, p. 19.
220
TABLE 11. IUE's Proposals and GE's First Offer of October 7t 1969.
Subject IUE's Proposals GE's Offer

Length of Contract 30 months 36 months
Wage Increase 354 an hr - 1st year 204 an hr - 1st year
304 an hr - 2nd year wage reopener - 2nd year
254 an hr - last 6 months wage reopener - 3rd year
Skill Trades Additional Increase of 504 an hour Additional Increases of 5 to 254 an
Adjustment over the life of the contract hour for hlgh-skill employees on day
work jobs, effective Immediately
Cost of Living Full escalator clause with quarterly No cost-of-llvlng adjustment.
wage Increase of 14 an hour for each
0.4 point rise In the Consumer Price
Index.
Area Wage Elimination of differentials through No proposal
Differentials a special fund to which the company
would contribute 54 an hour for each
employee covered by contract.
Weekly Work Hours 37.5-hour work week with 40 hours pay No proposal
Pension Benefits 1. Non-contrlbutory plan with a Contributory plan with a monthly mini-
minimum benefit of $7.50 (Instead of mum base ranging from $5 to $7.50 a
$4.50)per month for each year of servlce.month per each year of service at rg-
2. Full pension after 30 years of tlrement aze. To be effective
service regardless of age. January 1, 1970.
Insurance Program A comprehensive non-contributory In Improvements In several Insurance pro
surance plan for workers and depen grams, starting in the 2nd year of
dents. the contract. Some benefits to be
effective January 1, 1970. Beginning
In 2nd year, GE to pay employee's
Insurance plan costs.
Vacations 1. A revised vacations schedule as 1. 2 weeks after 1 year of service
follows: effective January 1, 1971.
2 weeks after 1 year of service
3 weeks after 5 years of service 2. 4 weeks after 15 years, effective
4 weeks after 10 years of service January 1, 1972.
5 weeks after 15 years of service
6 weeks after 20 years of service
2. Vacation pay, 25Z above employee's
average weekly earnings.
Holidays Additional 2 paid holidays No proposal
Sick Leave 20 paid days per year for each Effective January 1, 1972: 2 paid
employee days after 5 years of service,
3 paid days after 10 years of service
4 paid days after 15 years of service
Union Shop Full union shop No proposal
Arbitration Full arbitration of all unresolved No proposal.
grievances.
Sources; For IUE's proposals, HIE News. Vol. 20, No. 12, September 4, 1969, p. 2.
For GE's offer, Baldwin's letter of October 7, 1969, to John Shambo.
221
The company claims that it is a 20-45 cent offer,

but the overwhelming majority of workers would get
only 20 cents. A -small percentage of skilled wor
kers would get from 5 to 15 cents more. An insig
nificant number would get more. However, skilled
workers on transition rates get nothing. The com
pany claim that this is a 20-45 cent offer is a
fraud, the IUE's study shows.
Nothing is offered to narrow the geographical
wage gap. There is no cost of living protection in
the company offer and there is no protection
against reduction of any wage rate. The company
seeks dictatorial power over all wage rates with
the ability to reduce them at will. Further, the
company refuses to allow arbitration of unresolved
grievances dealing with wage rate reductions.
While rebuffing union proposals to make all unre
solved grievances subject to peaceful, impartial
and binding arbitration, GE wants to impose im
possible restrictions on the right to strike on
grievances .21
GE had explained, however, that the wage reopeners it proposed
for the second and the third years of the contract should take care
of increases in cost-of-living. On the issue of geographic wage dif
ferentials, the Company claimed that in contrast to government data
indicating a 12 percent average in pay differences between regions
across the country, the GE average was as low as 6 percent. The Com
pany further pointed out that GE area wage differentials were continu
ing to shrink due to supplemental pay increases negotiated on local

22
basis. On the other hand, the Company's own statistics somehow con
firmed Jennings' contentions with respect to the narrowness of the
skilled trades adjustment. GE data showed that only 28 percent of all
21
IUE News, ibid. Reflecting the increased cooperation between the
independent UE and the IUE, UE President Albert Fitzgerald attended
this meeting of the IUE Conference Board.
^ GE, "Negotiations News," October 15, 1969, p. 1.
222
IUE-represented employees would receive skilled work increases ranging
from 5 to 25 cents an hour, but less than 14 percent of these skilled

23
employees would get 15 cents or more.
The GE offer was rejected by the CBC unions as "totally unaccept
able." The independent UE followed suit simultaneously. It is inter
esting to note here that from October 7, the UE appeared at the bar
gaining table with representatives of the IUE, the UAW and the Teamsters.
According to GE"Negotiations News" these new members of the UE's nego
tiating committee "led much of the discussions" on October 8 when GE's

24
offer was flatly rejected.
GE's Initial Offer Remains Firm
Repeated efforts and threats by the coordinating unions intended
to wrest an improved offer from GE were of no avail. On October 21,
in a last offer before the strike deadline, the IUE presented to GE a
modified proposal discarding some of its original demands and reducing
others. Its basic demands concerning wage increases, cost-of-living
adjustment,union shop and broader arbitration clause, however, remained

25
unchanged. According to GE it was apparent that the counterproposal
did not reflect any significant change over the Union's original eco
nomic demands. The Company noted that the unions "dropped out their
24
25 AFL-CIO News. October 25, 1969, p. 3.
223
demand for a 37-1/2-hour work week and a vacation bonus and made some
other minor reductions in benefit demands, but they called for moving
26
the Company’s major proposals all into the first year." Obviously,
the Company turned down the union’s counterproposals.
Thus, although the possibility of a company-wide strike, the
first since 1946, seemed to be very real, the Company would not make
any changes in its original firm offer. In his October 21st report
to GE managers, Philip D. Moore, G E ’s Vice President for Employee Re
lations, predicted a long strike. He asserted, however, that the stop
page could be shortened or averted if union members could voice their
objection to it before union leadership, or if the Company would make
some major visible concessions to the CBC unions. Moore ruled out
the latter course. He emphatically said to GE managers:
I want to reassure you we have no intention of

adding to our offer. It Is a good one. It has
been carefully researched. It is right on target.
We have reviewed our research findings with the
unions and they have been unable to present us
any new facts that remotely suggest we ought to
do better.2?
This typical "Boulwaristic" statement illustrates GE's outright
refusal to reach a compromise settlement. Clearly, the Company would
be willing to settle only on its own terms, that is, solely on its
initial package offer of October 7. In line with another fundamental
tenet of "Boulwarism," this point was made clear, not only to GE man
agers but to all its employees, through the Company's elaborate com-
26
27
GE, "IUE Negotiations Status Report,"October 21, 1969, p. 1. Em
phasis added.
224
munication system. A special edition of GE News which carried details
of the initial offer reiterated GE's willingness to negotiate with
union officials only on the contents of the offer. ". . .it is not the
Company's intention," added GE News, "to rachet up the offer simply to
avoid a strike crisis."^
In the face of an almost inevitable strike, the Company's position
remained particularly rigid. Unlike in 1966, GE did not even make
modified or alternative offers. This rigidity seemed to be a well cal
culated course aimed at thwarting coordinated bargaining. GE's basic
idea was that a failure by the CBC unions to extract substantial gains
from GE in excess of its initial offer would destroy the very purpose
of coordinated bargaining. Philip D. Moore made this point explicit
when he wrote:
. . .the IUE-coalition exists only to wring some

highly visible and major concessions from us —
after we have made our traditional fair, firm offer.
If it fails to achieve this, then of course there
really isn't any good reason for all the AFL-CIO
build-up accompanying this form of bargaining.29
Clearly, then, GE wanted the coordinated bargaining alliance to
fail and collapse. It hoped that by holding firm to its initial offer
and by taking a strike, if necessary, unity among the unions would not
last long. It may have expected that since over half of GE's employees
were not unionized, unity could not prevail for long in the face of a
work stoppage. The Company erred, however, in its calculations. It
og
GE News. Special Edition, October, 1969, p. 1.
29
GE, "IUE Negotiations Status Report," September 30, 1969, p. 2.
225
miscalculated the extent and strength of the solidarity prevailing among
the unions and especially it underestimated their propensity and ability
to maintain this unity in an endurance contest. As later became appar
ent, the CBC unions were determined to maintain their unity and were
ready to fight "Boulwarism" by all possible means. It was well demon
strated by the CBC unions throughout most of the GE unionized plants.
GE, of course, was not unaware of this all-union ambition. Its Vice
President Moore took cognizance of it when, on September 30, he wrote
the following statement:
As we listen to union representatives here in

New York — and as we analyze reports from plants
where coalition unions are involved in local bar
gaining — it appears to us union officials have
worked themselves up to some form of holy crusade
to undertake this year, similar to the one Jim
Carey undertook in 1 9 6 0 . ^
Contrary to Moore's observation, however, the "holy crusade"
against GE in 1969 was not similar to Carey's in 1960. The 1969 coor
dinated group was considerably more powerful and its impact could thus
be far more effective on GE. By sticking firmly to its initial offer
in 1969, GE did not weaken the unions' ties, their mutual dependence
and solidarity. On the contrary, GE's stiff position accentuated the
fundamental conflict between the parties, intensified the hostile at
mosphere and magnified the need for increased unity among thecooper
ating unions. In all, it stiffened union resolve to defeat GE's strat
egy once and for all.
The "holy war" against GE's "Boulwarism"became more vital to
226
the unions after the Company persistently refused to budge one iota
than it had been before GE presented its first offer. In essence, the
predicament of the unions was not only the problem of gaining improved
pay and benefits, not just in achieving meaningful negotiations with
GE, but the survival of the coordinated approach. As the American Feder
ation of Technical Engineers' Executive Council indicated in its resolu
tion approving a strike,members of the union were "determined to win a
fair contract — and more importantly to gain equality with GE at the

31
bargaining table." Clearly, GE's approach to bargaining continued
as the major target for attack.
In a CBC statement issued on October 23, AFL-CIO President George
Meany accused GE of making "mockery of the word 'negotiate'," by re
fusing to budge from its "one woefully weak and totally unacceptable
offer." He warned the Company that if the workers were forced to strike,
they "will have every bit of support they need from the entire AFL-CIO
32
until the hour of victory."
Meanwhile, most GE locals of the 13 unions involved voted to re
ject the Company's offer and to strike GE upon the expiration of their
contracts at midnight October 26. There were a few cases, notably in
Utica, New York,where local unions voted to reject GE's offer, but not
to strike. In a final effort to avert the strike, the CBC proposed,
however, to submit all issues to a binding arbitration by the American
Arbitration Association. But despite the possibility of facing the
31
Engineers Outlook. November, 1969, p. 3.
^ AFL-CIO News. October 25, 1969, p. 3.
227
first company-wide strike since 1946, GE calmly rejected the idea of

33
arbitration and found no reason to increase its original offer. The
Company chose to take the strike and to put the coordinating unions to
the test.
Thus far, five major features characterize the development in the
pre-strike stages:
1. The unquestionable unity or full coordination existing

effectively among the allied unions.
2. The apparent close pursuit of the CBC's tactics and

actions by the independent UE in its separate national
34
negotiations with GE.
3. The persistent efforts by the CBC unions to impose the

traditional give-and-take approach in collective bar
gaining .
4. The successful adherence of GE to "Boulwarism"

throughout the negotiations.
5. The slight shift in the balance of power in favor of

the unions as far as initiative and setting the agenda
35
at the bargaining table were concerned.
33
Daily Labor Report. No. 208, October 27, 1969, p. A-10, and No. 209,
October 28, 1969, p. A - 8 .
34
GE, "Report on 1969 Negotiations," p. 2; and GE, "IUE Negotiations
Status Report," December 3, 1969, p. 3.
35
On this point see also "Crisis Bargaining Looms in GE Talks, Business
We e k .October 4, 1969, p. 66 .
Chapter X
THE 1969-1970 STRIKE AND SETTLEMENT
The strike against GE began at midnight October 26, following
the Nixon Administration's "hands-off" policy. According to the CBC
over 145,000 members of the coordinating unions, out of GE's 170,000
production and maintenance workers [total domestic employment of GE
in 1969 was 317,874], set up picket lines at 280 plants and shops
throughout the country. GE's figure was somewhat smaller. The Com
pany reported on October 29 that only about 130,000 hourly production
and maintenance workers were on strike, while 185,000 employees, in
cluding 40,000 production workers, reported to work. According to GE,
the figure of 40,000 consisted of 30,000 non-represented and 10,000
unionized workers who, "for a variety of reasons (contract hasn't ex
pired, did not vote to strike, defied picket lines) came to work to
day ."1
Demonstrating the AFL-CIO involvement in the coordinated program
at GE President George Meany announced on November 3 a CBC resolution
to conduct AFL-CIO strike-support rallies between November 17 and 20
in 23 major cities across the country. Emphasizing the importance
the AFL-CIO placed upon a total union victory, Meany said ". . .this
is not just a fight for justice by the GE workers; it is a fight for
1 GE, "Negotiations News,"October 29, 1969, p. 1.
228
229
survival by the American trade union movement." At the same time
Meany announced a national fund-raising campaign to support the strikers.
The target was to raise $13 million by contributions of one dollar from
each of the more than 13 million union members affiliated with the AFL-
CIO. To this end, Meany sent out, early in November, a letter to the
presidents of all AFL-CIO affiliated national unions asking them to
make immediate donations to the federation’s strike-relief fund set up
for GE strikers. Meany again emphasized:"This is more than another big
strike. It is a strike that involves the future of collective bargain
ing, not only in GE, not only in the electrical industry, but every-
3
where in America."
The AFL-CIO involvement in the GE dispute was far beyond the
federation's normal interest in bargaining affairs. As pointed out
by Business W eek. "Although the federation usually leaves bargaining
to the individual unions, it is in the GE campaign to the hilt. George
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO is personally involved in the 10-union

-A
coalition's commitment to upset GE's ’Boulwarism’. . ." To increase
and heighten pressures against GE, the AFL-CIO also decided in Novem
ber to call for a nation-wide boycott of GE products, starting the day
after Thanksgiving. In announcing this action, George Meany stated
that unless a satisfactory settlement was reached by Friday, November
~2
IUE.President Report to the IUE's lAth Constitutional Convention,
p. 151; see also AFL-CIO News. November 8 , 1969, p. 1.
3 AFL-CIO News. November 15, 1969, p. 1.
4
"Crisis Bargaining Looms in GE Talks," Business Week. October A,
1969, p. 62. 66 .
230
28, "we will boycott everything that bears a GE label every place in
this country for as long as it takes to get a contract."'*
On October 28, coincidental with the beginning of the strike,
perhaps unexpectedly for each of the parties, the U. S. Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit, upheld the NLRB decision of December 16,
1964. As discussed earlier, the Court, too, ruled out GE's "Boulwarism,"
the take-it-or-leave-it approach, in the form practiced in 1960, as a
violation of the Labor Management Relations Act mandate to bargain in

g
good faith.
These two crucial developments, that is, the announcement of the
AFL-CIO national boycott and the Circuit Court's decision against GE's
"Boulwarism,"increased markedly the pressures on the Company. Leaders
of the CBC unions rejoiced, particularly over the Court resolution.
As claimed by IUE's General Counsel upon hearing the Court's decision:
"Boulwarism is dead. The strikers killed it, and the court just buried
i t ."7
At that early stage of the strike, such a statement was premature
and perhaps expressed more a wish than an accomplished fact. A court
decision coupled with a two-day old strike certainly could not, and
did not, prove the defeat of "Boulwarism." Such an eventuality would
come only if the allied unions succeeded in extracting substantially
AFL-CIO News, November 29, 1969, p. 4. See also,"Boycott of GE

Goods May Prolong Strike," Business Week. November 29, p,33.
^ NLRB v. General Electric C o . 418 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1969). For
further details see discussion above, pp. 94-98.
7 Damon Stetson, "G.E. Ruled Unfair by Appeals Court in 1960 Bargain

ing," New York Tines. October 29, 1969, p. 1.
231
higher terms than those Initially provided in GE's first offer. This
remained as the task. GE's reaction to the court's decision left no
basis for the union leaders to rejoice so early, if at all. The Com
pany stated strongly:
We know of nothing we have done in the current

negotiations that could or should be changed by
the 1960 decision.
We can't conceive of anything arising out of
this court ruling that will require us to enlarge
our current proposal. We are already repeatedly
on record as being willing to modify, rearrange,
or otherwise change as new facts warrant. However,
as we have told the union several times, they have
presented us with no persuasive evidence so far
that indicates to us we should change. We have
also made it clear that the threat of a strike —
or a strike — does not influence our position.®
As the strike progressed, one fundamental fact became apparent:
that is, the unity and solidarity among the strikers of all coordina
ting unions. They showed determination to stay on strike as long as
needed. Doubtlessly, this was stimulated by the CBC and the vigorous
commitment of the AFL-CIO and the entire labor movement to support GE
strikers. The effectiveness of the strike was undebatable. It was to
run for100 days. Maintenance of an effective prolonged strike was the
major test of the coordinated group, because it was the only way to
bring the Company to terms. Coupled with the nation-wide consumer boy
cott sponsored by the AFL-CIO, the strike finally had an important ef
fect on the Company.
Negotiations Resumed
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) entered
Q
232
the dispute and the national negotiations between GE and the IUE's
inter-union committee resumed on November 7. National negotiations be
tween GE and the UE's committee had resumed earlier, on October 29,
without the assistance of the FMCS. When the UE negotiations were reach
ing impasse, an agreement to leave the door open for further GE-UE nego
tiations had been reached. Note has been made of the coordination be
tween the IUE and UE and it is interesting that the coordination had
continued at the bargaining tables, as seen in their similar positions.
While the UE had not been represented on the IUE's broad negotiating
committee, half of its own bargaining team was often composed of other
9
unions, notably of the IUE, the UAW and sometimes the Teamsters. On
several occasions GE had noted that the "strangers" on the UE's com
mittee took a conspicuously active part in negotiating for the U E . ^
Negotiations with local unions,also, were largely stalled during the
strike. This was due to recognition of the prime importance attributed
by both parties, and particularly by the CBC unions, to the national
negotiations carried out in New York City. Findings of the survey among
the national and local unions unequivocably confirmed this fact.
Although negotiations were again underway in early November al
most no progress was made at either national bargaining table. The IUE's
committee, however, seemed again to have gained the upper hand in dic
tating the agenda as well as the pace of the bargaining sessions. GE
9
GE, Relations Reviews, October 13, 1969, p. 1. See also various
Issues of GE, "Negotiations News," October 1969-January 1970.
^ See for example GE, "Negotiations News," November 12, 1969, p. 1.
233
was forced again to enter into another round of detailed discussions of
all issues of contract language pressed by the Union before it could
move the Union to discuss economic questions. The Union held firmly to
its revised pre-strike positions on all matters and repeatedly requested
GE to make counterproposals. When the talks finally reached pay and
benefits, the Union made it clear that "its wage demands were firm, and
there was no need for any further discussion on their p a r t . " ^ The
Union further took the position that it was GE's turn to make a move
and called upon the Company to change its basic approach to collective
bargaining and to make a new offer. GE responded by pointing to its
original "best" offer of October 7, and to its willingness to rearrange
the package. It reiterated its refusal to increase the offer or to
substitute the two wage reopeners with two specified wage increases.
In an effort to defrost the stalemate, GE, On December 2, Initi
ated a special top-level meeting with a small committee of IUE leaders
to discuss the relations between the Company and the Union. The Com
pany's team was headed by GE's Vice President Moore and IUE's committee
by President Jennings. Both officials had not participated before in
actual bargaining in the 1969 negotiations. It is to be noted that
this meeting was not evidence of any break among the CBC unions. The
12
IUE had secured the CBC's approval to attend this special meeting.
Little came of it. According to IUE N e w s , "while it was the first top-
^ GE, "Negotiations News," December 1, 1969, p. 1.
12
IUE News. December 18, 1969, p. 3.
234
level subcommittee meeting requested by the company in more than 20

13
years, the results were unsatisfactory."
General Electric's Second Offer is Rejected
Continued union pressures for a change in GE's approach to bar
gaining, coupled with the increasing impact of the company-wide, six-
week old strike, affected GE's position. The change, both in form and
partially in substance, occurred on Saturday, December 6 , when GE
finally presented a second offer. Although this proposal was flatly
rejected as inadequate, some union officials viewed the company's move,
in itself, as a victory for the unions and a vindication of the coor-

14
dinated bargaining method.
In contrast to the October 7 package, the new proposal provided
for the following three major features:
1. Two across-the-board wage increases of 3 percent each

in the second and third years of the contract (instead
of the two annual wage reopeners proposed in GE's
first offer).
2. A new cost-of-living pay escalator with an annual

maximum of 2 percent increase for the second and
the third years (not provided in the first offer).
The new formula was based on a 1/2 percent increase
in pay for each 1 percent rise above the first 1
percent increase in the Consumer Price Index, with
the 2 percent annual maximum. Under the escalator
14
The Machinist, December 18, 1969, p. 1.
235
"sharing" formula in the 1966-1969 contract, the

maximum annual cost-of-living adjustment was 1.75
percent.
3. Four weeks vacation after 15 years of Company ser

vice, and five weeks after 30 years, effective
January 1, 1972. (Absent here was a two-week
vacation after one year of service, effective
January 1, 1971, provided in G E ’s first offer.)
Except for the cost-of-living escalator formula this modified
proposal did not reflect a marked change in substance over the first
offer. Its presentation, however, did reflect a considerable change
in GE bargaining policy. Unlike its previous tradition of publicizing
the Company's offers in all communications media, this time GE avoided
immediate publication, largely because of Union p r e s s u r e s . T o be
more specific, the Company seemed to have complied with three union re
quests. As conceded editorially in GE Relations Reviews.
In making the [second] offer, we followed a

procedure the IUE has long urged — we gave ad
vance notice that the new proposal was coming;
we first presented it orally to the union repre
sentatives-; we said we would reserve a^ decision
until Monday, December 8 , oti communicating about
it, unless the IUE publicized developments before
then.
Compliance with the Union's requests undoubtedly was, for the first time
ever, a significant retreat for GE and a partial success for the CBC.
GE, "IUE Negotiations Status Report," January 19, 1970, pp. 1-2;
and GE, "A Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17,
1970, p. 2.
^ GE, Relations Reviews. December 9, 1969, p. 1. Emphasis added.
236
The revised offer, however, was dismissed out of hand by the
Union as totally unacceptable on the grounds that it either fell short
of or ignored every major Union proposal. IUE's President Jennings
later termed it a "shadow rather than substance."^ Clearly, the CBC
was not ready, economically or politically, to settle on a merely "re
arranged" package. It sought to reach tangible and substantial gains
which would justify its existence, particuarly after taking such a
lengthy strike. The next day, that is on December 7, the negotiating
committee made a counterproposal for a 16-month contract featuring an
immmediate wage increase of 35 cents an hour and an uncapped cost-of-
living pay after 12 months. Most other initial demands were also in
cluded in the proposed short-term contract. GE rejected this proposal
as a "backward step," and later charged the IUE before the NLRB with
unfair labor practices for its "evasive" conduct at the bargaining

18
table "calculated to prevent meaningful negotiations."
Reporting on events of the December 7 bargaining session, the
Company complained that it was "shocked" by the fact that all of its
repeated efforts at the bargaining table to get the Union committee to
discuss the elements of its new proposal were of no avail. According
to the Company, the IUE's committee, as well as the separate UE negoti
ating team, continued to ignore GE's second offer while pressing for
19
acceptance of their identical 16-month contract proposals. During
^ IUE News. December 18, 1969, p. 3.

18
GE, "Negotiations News," December 11, 1969, p. 1 and Daily Labor
Report. No. 238, December 10, 1969, p. A-12.
19
GE, "Negotiations News," December 9, 1969, pp. 1-3.
237
the discussions on December 7, the Company had made it clear to the
unions that its second offer was made in response to their demands and
represented the maximum economic package possible. To dispel any ex
pectations that a longer strike might force the Company to cave in, GE
20
negotiators emphasized that "we do not intend to offer more."
When no progress could be made the IUE committee abruptly walked
out of the bargaining session on December 11, charging that continued
meetings would be a "hoax. . .creating the false illusion that any real
21
bargaining is going on." On the same day, in apparent coordination
with the CBC, the independent UE committee notified GE of its intention
to "recess" for a few days. In a subsequent pressrelease, GE manage
ment regarded the IUE's move as a disgraceful performance by the Union
officials and an affront to the federal mediators. Hence the impasse
continued and the tension grew.
Upon the request of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser
vice (FMCS), however, the IUE's negotiating committee returned on
December 15 to the bargaining table. The FMCS also decided to inter
vene in the UE negotiations beginning the same day. The resumption of
the bargaining sessions, with the mediators present, resulted in little
progress. The mediators brought to the fore the issues they felt were
less controversial, but no agreement on any of these issues could be

22
reached. While GE accused the Unions in using delaying tactics, CBC
^ Ibid., December 11, 1969, p. 1.

21
AFL-CIO News, December 13, 1969, p. 1.
^ GE, "Negotiations News," December 19, 1969, p. 1.
238
members charged that the Company was not really bargaining. For example,
an AIW representative on the IUE bargaining committee said: "The company
is making a sham of the bargaining process. It keeps saying it wants to
'negotiate,' but then proceeds to play the old take-it-or-leave-it re
frain day-in day-out. . . .In a very real sense, GE is not bargaining

23
at all." So, despite efforts of the federal mediators, no progress was
made up to January 1970.
Strike Is Solid Despite Back-to-Work Campaign
Coincidental to the unsuccessful developments at the bargaining
table, Union officials accused GE of conducting a massive back-to-work
campaign beginning late in November. According to the AFL-CIO News,
the Company prepared a plan, included in a GE confidential memorandum
obtained by Union officials, outlining five steps by which plant mana-

24
gers should act to attract strikers back to work in the holiday season.
McKinnell of the IUE reported that GE's efficient propaganda machine
shifted into high gear in its efforts to break the strike. He charged
that "Strikers were deluged with letters, bombarded with radio and TV
appeals and pestered with telephone calls from foremen. GE urged the
strikers: 'This is a good offer. Either make your negotiators accept

25
it or ignore them and go back to work'." While GE never acknowledged
"25
Allied Industrial Worker, December 1969, pp. 1 and 10.
24
AFL-CIO N e w s , December 13, 1969, p. 4. See also IUE News. December
18, 1969, p. 1, and The Machinist. December 11, 1969, pp. 1 and 5.
25 McKinnell, p. 49.
239
the fact that it conducted a back-to-work campaign, the Company made no
secret of its expectations from the strikers. Relying on its effective
communications system, the Company cherished the hope that the strikers
themselves might exert pressures on Union leaders to terminate the strike
and accept GE's second offer. However, as GE Vice President Moore later
commented, "It was an empty hope, and the holiday season came and went
with the coalition still clinging to its opening demands and refusing
26
to identify priorities."
GE undoubtedly hoped for a shrinkage in the picket lines, a
demoralization among the strikers, an effective back-to-work movement
and a break in the coordinated group. Yet, the strike wore on in high
gear and showed no signs of relaxation. After a CBC meeting in mid
December 1969, AFL-CIO President George Meany issued a statement saying
in part that every report received by the CBC proved that "the strike
and boycott are growing stronger week by week." Moreover, noted Meany,
"even production workers who are not union members are observing picket
27
lines." While GE management refused to comment on the back-to-work
28
campaign, Union officials described it as a complete failure. McKinnell
of the IUE contended that fewer than 150 strikers across the country
heeded the company's plea. According to the AFL-CIO N e w s , a spokesman
26
GE, "A Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17,
1970, p. 2.
^ AFL-CIO News, December 20, 1969, p. 3.
28
See for example Sheet Metal Workers' Journal. January 1970, p. 11;
The Machinsts. January 8 , 1970, p. 2, and Allied Industrial Worker.
February 1970, p. 1.
240
at: GE's headquarters admitted that '"there has been no great return' to
29
work through picket lines." In this respect it should be noted that
all national and local unions which responded to the oral or written
survey termed GE's back-to-work movement an absolute failure, and the
strike a remarkable success.
Union newspapers were full of stories highlighting the increased
solidarity among all union members, the success of the strike and the
effectiveness of the consumer boycott activities. In responding to
the questionnaires, all Unions involved claimed the success of the
strike; however, the effectiveness of the boycott was somewhat ques
tionable or uncertain in many locations. It is obviously impossible
to evaluate accuratley the boycott's effectiveness without reliable and
comprehensive data. A. H. Raskin stated that "the boycott had little

30
discernible effect outside G.E. plant communities. . . ." Nonethe
less, whatever the exact impact the boycott had on reducing the sales
of GE and Hotpoint products, it probably constituted an additional
psychological and economic pressure on GE. Otherwise GE would not have
bothered to publish a separate advertisement, one of its twenty paid
ads carried by major newspapers in large cities, sharply criticizing
the boycott.
In sum, the contest between the parties by the end of December
showed no signs of a forthcoming settlement. The company-wide strike

*29
AFL-CIO News. January 3, 1970, p. 1.
30
New York Times. January 11, 1970, p. 12.
was as solid as before and unity among the Unions was unbreakable. No
local union accepted GE's second offer and none of the unions deviated
from the CBC policy . On top of that, another small union, the Firemen
31
and Oilers, joined the CBC late in December 1969. On the other hand,
despite contentions of the Unions, the AFL-CIO's national fund-raising
campaign which aimed at a $13 million target, was far from successful.
By early January 1970 nation-wide contributions toward the GE strike

32
fund had not reached even the $2 million mark. In the third week of
January President Meany sent out another letter to all union leaders
33
urging them to send more money for the strikers. According to the
Sheet Metal Workers' Journal, the $1.00-a-member drive initiated by
Meany finally netted the striking unions a little less than $3 million.
Chief Federal Mediator Intervenes
On January 8, 1970, within this atmosphere and under increasing
public concern, the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, J. Curtis Counts, personally entered the scene in an effort
to end the strike and achieve a settlement.
Counts' entry into the dispute marked a radical change in the
31
Firemen and Oilers Journal. January-February 1970, p. 11; AFL-CIO
News. January 3, 1970, p. 1.
32 AFL-CIO News, ibid.
33 Ibid., January 24, 1970.
34
Sheet Metal Workers' Journal. May 1970, p. 18.
242
mediation strategy. He clamped down on public statements. One effort
was to create a dearth of written material on developments at the bar
gaining table during the last stages of the long strike. The meager
factual information available deals only with the form rather than the
substance of the negotiations which ensued under the chief mediator.
It appears from the data available that mediator Counts introduced three
major changes which, in retrospect, undoubtedly contributed greatly to
the final settlement. These changes were:
1. Most sessions conducted by Counts were held separately

with representatives of each party. There were only
two instances where face-to-face bargaining sessions
took place.
2. The mediated negotiations under Counts were carried

out with streamlined subcommittees of each party.
Counts met only twice with the full CBC negotiating
committee.
3. The parties agreed to Counts' request to maintain a

full news blackout on all issues under negotiation.
Although the chief federal mediator was later hailed by both par
ties for his efforts and vital role in reaching a settlement, one must
recognize the fact that Counts actually enjoyed what his predecessors
in mediating the dispute had lacked. When Counts became personally
involved, conditions seemed to be riper for serious negotiations. The
impact of the lengthy strike had begun to be sharply felt. It began to
hurt both parties cricially.
243
Economic Pressures Help Mediation
The economic pressures on GE were unprecedented. On January 8 ,
subsequent to the addition of the Firemen and Oilers as a new partner
in the CBC, 1,100 members of Local 771 of the UAW in Warren, Michigan,
joined the company-wide strike upon expiration of their contract. A

35
week later Teamsters Local 317 in Syracuse, New York, followed suit.
Hence the strike in January 1970 was even wider than before. The spirit
and morale of the strikers seemed also very high. A. H. Raskin of the
New York Times in the last stages of the strike said: "Morale on the
strike front is at a high level, with more workers off the job now than
36
at the start of the walkout."
While its chief competitor, Westinghouse, enjoyed uninterrupted
operation, GE's manufacturing production was severely cut. The unions
claimed that GE's production was almost at a halt, not more than ten
percent of capacity at the most. The Company admitted that its produc
tion level, including the work done at non-union plants was "probably
37
something near 30 percent of normal." GE conceded later that the
Company's losses in sales during the strike were extremely high and its
38
profits "severely damaged." Earnings for the fourth quarter of 1969
35
IUE N e w s , February 4, 1970, p. 6 .
^ Cited in IUE News. January 8 , 1970, p. 3.
37
GE, "IUE Negotiations Status Report," December 3, 1969, p. 2.
38
GE, "A Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17,
1970, p. 3.
244
fell to 21 cents a share, compared with $1.35 per share in the final
39
quarter of 1968.
Similarly, the hardship on GE strikers in such a prolonged shut
down was also obvious. In mid January 1970, the economic pressures on
the individual strikers were unbearable. As noted earlier, the AFL-CIO's
fund-raising drive failed to produce anywhere near the money sought.
The IUE ran out of money as January drew to a close and CBC leaders
became skeptical about their ability to carry on the strike much longer.
In addition to economic pressures on both parties, there were
also increasing public pressures to end the strike. Public concern de
veloped mainly in communities where large GE plants were located and
the impact of the strike was strongly felt. Mayors of cities affected
by the strike attempted to intervene and proposed to settle the dispute
through arbitration. Several Congressmen and Senators, too, notably
Senator Javits of New York, urged the parties to reach prompt settle
ment. Senator Javits proposed to the parties that they accept his plan
for a fact-finding panel. While the unions agreed to settle the dis
pute through arbitration or a fact-finding board, GE rejected both al
ternatives, expressing its hopes for a quicker settlement through fed-

40
eral mediation by J. Curtis Counts.
39 ~
GE, 1969 Annual Report, p. 3.
40
In a telegram sent to Senator Javits, GE's Chief Executive explained
that Counts' personal entry into the dispute "offers a shorter route
toward ending the strike than the necessary slower process of familiar
izing a new fact-finding group with the complex economic and contractual
issues involved." GE."Negotiations News,"January 7, 1970, p. 1.
245
Because of mounting public pressures and particularly under the
growing punishment of the lengthy strike, both parties began to signal
some willingness or readiness to move toward an acceptable compromise.
The following citations may support this conclusion:
Explaining GE's position to 40 mayors convened on January 15,
1970, in New York City to seek settlement of the strike, GE's chief
negotiator, John Baldwin, said in part:
I should add that we are not cemented to the de

tails of either of these [the two GE] offers. . . .
We are quite willing to work out modifications,
within reasonable economic dimensions, which will
meet the needs a £ the union negotiators see them.
We want a settlement.^
In a reply to Senator Javits, accepting his plan for a fact
finding board to settle the strike, IUE's President Jennings wrote on
January 6 , in part:
With the strike now in its eleventh week, the

Impact upon the workers, the company and the com
munity is^ most serious. . . .We are desirous of
bringing this conflict to a speedy conclusion in
the interests of all. . . .4™
"Give-and-Take" Restored Through Mediation —

Settlement Reached
Under these circumstances and the encouraging signals, Chief
Federal Mediator Counts worked intensively to narrow the differences
between the parties. The major issues remaining in dispute were wage
^ GE, "Negotiations News," January 16, p. 2. Emphasis added.
42
Daily Labor Report, No. 3, January 6 , 1970, p. A-9. Emphasis added.
246
Increase, cost-of-living, union shop and a broader arbitration clause.

43
Finally, on the basis of what even GE termed a "genuine give-and-take,"
the go-between mediator was successful in bringing the parties toward
a settlement. The Union gave in on union shop and the improved arbi
tration clause and also agreed to a longer-term contract. In return,
the Company gave more in wages and in the cost-of-living adjustment.
On these lines the Company made its third offer on January 24. Follow
ing additional revisions worked out in subcommittee meetings, a tenta
tive agreement was reached by the parties on January 29. On the same
day, the CBC Steering Committee recommended acceptance of the settle
ment. On January 30, the Company and the negotiating committees of
both the IUE and the UE signed the agreement subject to ratification.
The IUE-GE Conference Board ratified it on February 2, and on February
3 all but two IUE Locals approved. The two dissenting locals came in line
shortly thereafter. Within a few days, local unions of the CBC
followed suit and settled on the same terms.
Except for a few locations noted later, the 100-day strike, the
longest and costliest work stoppage in GE's history came to an end.
The historic battle between coordinated bargaining and GE's "Boulwarism"
was over.
While the Company regarded the agreement as a fair settlement

44 45
to all parties, the CBC termed it a great union victory. AFL-CIO
43
GE, "A Final Status Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February
17, 1970, p. 3.
44
GE, Relations Reviews, February 2, 1970, p. 1.
45
CBC, Unity. Vol. 2, No. 6 , February 1970, p. 1; IUE News. February
4, 1970, p. 1; Engineers Outlook, February 4, 1970, p. 1.
247
President Meany described it as a "great collective bargaining victory"
marking the "end of 'Boulwarism,’ the doctrine that has too long dis-
46
graced and discredited GE's labor relations policy."
The Settlement; Better than Initial Offer?
The crucial question is to what extent did the final settlement
reflect a victory for the CBC unions and, consequently, a defeat of
GE's "Boulwarism"? A comparison of the settlement with GE's initial
"firm but fair" offer provides the most obvious answer. Table 12 shows
a comparison of major items. (For a more detailed comparison see GE's
Highlights of the Settlement reproduced in Appendix D.)
It is clearly demonstrated that some substantial changes were
made between GE's initial offer and the terms of the settlement. There
are noticeable improvements, except for the skilled trades, in each
item as compared with the October 7 offer. The most discernable, and
perhaps greatest, changes are those related to the cost-of-living es
calator and wage increases.
Cost of Living
Considered as of January 1970, the possible net gain provided
in the settlement to each employee, in the cost-of-living escalator
alone, was 24 cents an hour over the life of the contract. Moreover,
out of this figure 3 cents an hour (just a little less than 1 percent
for the average GE worker) was paid at once. This provision increased
the immediate first-year wage boost from 20 cents to 23 cents per hour.
46 _
AFL-CIO News, February 7, 1970, pp. 1 and 3.
248
TABLE 12. General Electric's First Offer and the Final Settlement, 1969-1970.
GE's First Offer The Final Settlement

Sublect October 7. 1969 January 30. 1970
Length of Contract 36 months 40 months
Wage Increase 204 an hour-lst year 204 an hour - Immediately
wage reopener-2r>d year 154 an hour on 3/1/71
wage reopener-3rd year 154 an hour on 5/1/72
Skilled Trades Additional Increases of 5 to 251 an Same as In October 7 offer.
Adjustment hour for hlgh-skill day workers,
effective Immediately.
Cost-of-Llvlng No cost-of-livlng adjustment (a) 84 maximum per hour each year,
based on 3 annual adjustments of
14 an hour for each 0.3Z of Con
sumer Price Index Increase during
the preceding year. Effective
dates: 10/26/70, 10/71, 10/72.
{b> 34 of the first year to be
paid Immediately.
Pensions Contributory plan with a monthly (a) Same, effective Immediately.
minimum base ranging from $5 to (b) Minimum base to be increased
$7.50 a month per each year of as follows: l/l/71-$5.50 to S7.50;
service at age 65, effective 1/1/70. l/l/72-$6.00 to $7.50; l/l/73-$6.50
to $7.50
(c) 15Z Increase In past pension
credits for long service employees
Insurance (a) Several Improvements In contri (a) Same, plus additional Improve
butory Insurance orograms effective ments and earlier dates.
at various dates
(b) Effective In 2nd year: GE Co pay (b) Same
employee's Insurance plan costs
(practically an added 1Z pay Increase)
Vacations (a) 2 weeks after 1 year of service, Effective 1/1/71: 4 weeks after
effective 1/1/71. 15 years; 5 weeks after 30 years.
(b) 4 weeks after 15 years, effec
tive 1/1/72
Sick Pay Effective 1/1/72: Effective Immediately: Same
2 paid days after 5 years schedule, plus 5 paid days after
3 paid days after 10 years 25 years of service
4 paid days after 15 years
Source: Baldwin's letter of October 7, 1969 to IUE's chief negotiator, John Shambo;
GE's Relations Reviews. February 2, 1970 and National Agreement (and Wage Agreement)
between General Electric Company and International Union of Electrical. Radio and
Machine Workers (AFL-CIO and Its Affiliates. CE-IUE (AFL-CIO) Locals. January 26.
1970-Hay 26. 1973.
249
Wages
It is practically impossible to compare the wage increase pro
vided in the settlement for the second and third years with the two wage
reopeners offered on October 7. It is possible, however, to compare
it with G E ’s second offer of December 6 . In its second proposal, GE
replaced the wage reopeners with two annual pay increases of 3 percent
each for the second and the third years. Had it been accepted, the
3 percent hike could have yielded 10.35 cents an hour to the average
GE employee in the second year and 10.65 cents per hour in the third
47
year. Accordingly, the combined wage hike in the last two years of
the contract could have totaled 21 cents an hour. Hence, the settle
ment which provided 15 cents per hour in each of the last two years
clearly improved by 9 cents an hour the net gain to the average GE wor
ker. In sum, as viewed in January 1970, the final wage settlement
along with the cost-of-living adjustments provided the average GE em
ployee with a possible total net gain of 33 cents per hour in excess
of GE's initial pay offer. This difference is obviously most signifi
cant by any standard. The following table illustrates how the total
difference, as just noted, is derived.
It is to be noted, however, GE explained some of the changes in
the settlement were made in return for the Union's acceptance of a 40-
month contract, instead of GE's original offer for a 36-month agreement.
The extension of the contract's lif.e by four months obviously reduced,
to some extent, the money value of the economic gains pointed out above.
47
CBC, Unity, February 1970, p. 3.
250
TABLE 13. Comparison of the 1970 Settlement with GE's Offers in

Wage Increase and Cost-of-Living Adjustment (in cents
per hour).
In the In GE's First The

Settlement and Second Offers Difference
Wage Increase
1 st year 20 20 0
2nd year 15 10.35 (3%) 4.65
3rd year 15 10.65 (3%) 4.35
Cost-of-Living Adjustment
1 st year 8 0 8
2nd year 8 0 8
3rd year 8 __0_ 8
TOTAL 74 41 33
However, no arithmetic is needed to prove that the extension of the
life of the contract cannot wipe out more than a minimal part of the
33-cent pay increase provided for in wages and cost-of-living adjust
ments. Hence, GE's comment that the settlement terms "fit pretty well
48
into the economic boundaries we established last fall" seems rather
questionable unless what was initially offered by GE was less than its
established economic boundaries; that is, if GE's first offer was no
longer a full package. If this were so, one could conclude that a
major principle of "Boulwarism" had been abandoned at the outset in
1969. It is more likely that GE moved from its "fair and firm" offer.
It Is also interesting to point out, as revealed in private by some
union officials, that the CBS's consent to extend the contract by four
months was due to its desire to have a more convenient expiration date,
^ GE,"4 Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17, 1970.

p. 3.
251
in the spring of 1973 rather than in the winter of 1973. Although not
quite convincing, such a reason is not uncommon in union strategy.
Unions* Primary Goal Achieved
The comparison between GE*s first offer and the final terms of
the settlement indeed shows clearly some marked changes in important
items. As Business Week pointed out, ". . .not in two decades has GE
49
altered initial proposals to its unions as much as it has this time."
CBC unions obviously shared this view. Hence, they could rightly claim
that the settlement also demonstrated a defeat for GE's "Boulwarism."
"The company was forced to alter its position regarding their method
of bargaining," claimed the American Flint and added, "The settlement
agreement represents a tremendous improvement over the first take-it-

..50
or-leave-it proposal.
The goal of forcing GE to conclude a contract with substantially
higher terms than those provided in its initial offer was exactly what
the unions had been seeking to achieve. However, the CBC’s prime de
sire was to see the changes achieved, or conceded by the Company, in
real collective bargaining— in the traditional "give-and-take" ap
proach. Although it is hard to draw a line here between form and sub
stance, it seems that economic gains themselves were not the only tar
get of the CBC unions. The formal adoption of changes by GE, due to
union pressures. was equally important.

49
"The Rough Road to GE s Settlement," Business Week. January 31, 1970,
pp. 28-29.
^ American Flint. February 1970, p. 12.
252
To justify their existence unions in general seek periodically
to attain, by vitue of their actions, some visible bargaining gains for
which they can be credited institutionally. At GE, as pointed out
earlier, this need was particularly important due to the Company's
unique approach to bargaining which made it impossible for any single
union to appear as victor. The CBC's major target was, therefore, to
force through bargaining an increase of the Company’s initial firm of
fer, but not so much for the merit of the increase as for its formal
acceptance. The dispute between the CBC and GE involved, in essence,
not only bread and butter issues, but ideology and basic concepts of
bargaining. As IUE President Jennings pointed out, "That's why this
strike was an historic strike, because what was involved was more than
dollars and cents. What was involved was basic to collective bargain
ing. "^Indeed, it was crystal clear to both parties that the dispute
which generated this lengthy and costly strike actually transcended

52
economic matters. The coordinating unions stressed this issue relent
lessly. In a paid advertisement carried by 21 daily newspapers across
the country, the CBC made it explicit that "We're on strike to end GE's
arrogant policy of 'take it or leave i t '. What we want is democratic
Paul Jennings,"The Electrical Industry Dispute; the Experience as

Seen by Union Leadership," Collective Bargaining Today: Proceedings of
the Collective Bargaining Forum. 1970. ENA, 1971, p. 164.
52
James W. Kuhn, "On the Significance of the General Electric Strike,"
Ibid., p. 155. See also "Inflationary End to a Class War," Time
February 9, 1970, p. 71.
253
53
'give and take! with GE at the collective bargaining table." This
point was perhaps best reflected in the following words attributed to
a GE striker, Ralph Boyd, one of several hundred black workers at
Schenectady.
Some people think this is a strike for a few cents

an hour, but it is about human dignity. It is about
the workingman's right to organize, and it is about
an employer's duty to bargain, not to tell us to take
or leave his offer. For those issues, I would rather
starve than surrender.54
Similar views were expressed by union leaders after the settlement was
reached. The emphasis in their statements was not on the economic
gains derived from the new contract. Soon after reaching agreement,
union spokesmen were reported to state that "the most outstanding
thing about this is that it is the first fully negotiated contract
with General Electric in 20 y e a r s . A l m o s t all union officials sur
veyed fully concurred with this statement. They specifically referred
to negotiations conducted at the national bargaining table during the
last stages of the strike.
As noted earlier, real bargaining in the "give-and-take" approach
took place between the parties only in the last two or three weeks of
the strike and mostly through the chief federal mediator. However,
53
American Flint. January 1970, p. 19; The Machinist, December 4,
1969, p. 8 .
^ "Inflationary End to a Class War," Time. February 9, 1970, p. 72.
55
Ibid., p. 28. See also Damon Stetson, "Two Union Panels Approve
Agreements with G.E.," New York Times. January 31, 1970, p. 18.
254
despite his active and vital role in narrowing the gap between their
positions, the settlement was reached largely because of Increasing
economic pressures on both parties. And as pointed out by Professor
James W. Kuhn ". . .as is usual when both sides wield the power to
hurt each other, both were persuaded of the wisdom of compromising

56
their stands to achieve a workable settlement."
It is clear, however, that these successful pressures on GE to
end the strike on terms higher than its initial offer, could have been
created only through unity or close cooperation among the separate
unions. National and local unions which responded to the oral or writ
ten survey acknowledged this conclusion. All held the view, also, that
the terms achieved by the coordinated bargaining alliance could not have
been attained without i t . Obviously, as past experience at GE shows,
sporadic strikes could not have matched the magnitude and impact of a
joint multi-union walkout and could not have hurt GE effectively enough
to extract additional concessions. Evidently, by coordinating their
efforts and actions, the unions at GE were able to match employer or
ganization with an equally centralized organization powerful enough to
fight "Boulwarism" successfully.
By matching their strength to the Company's, unions at GE achieved
a balance of power necessary for effective bargaining. Yet, in order
for GE to be persuaded of the wisdom of compromising, the unions had
to demonstrate their power. This was done through the lengthy strike.
^ James W. Kuhn, "A New View of Boulwarism: The Significance of the

GE Strike," Labor Law Journal (September 1970), p. 590.
255
When the impact of the economic pressures on GE was strongly felt,the
Company was ready to bargain, to make concessions and to compromise.
GE's Vice President Moore held a contradictory view. He claimed
that, "It is tragic, but true, that the settlement we arrived at after
15 weeks of strike could have been reached at the bargaining table last
summer, had the union coalition been able to negotiate with us t h e n . " ^
Evidence presented earlier in this, and the previous, chapter does not
support Moore's statement however. The settlement could not have been
reached in the summer of 1969, not because of the Union's inability to
negotiate, as alleged, but because of GE's explicit and persistent re
fusal to increase its initial offer at that stage of the negotiations.
Considering the character and objectives of the parties and the
extent of the issues then under dispute, it is most likely that the
strike could not have been avoided. Nonetheless, in contrast to Moore's
assertion, one can more readily accept Time's proposition that the agree
ment finally reached was "the kind of settlement GE probably could have
got from the unions last fall — that the unions surely could not have
58
got from GE — without a strike."
In the last analysis, it should be noted that despite this vic
tory of the unions over "Boulwarism," they did not attain all their
major national bargaining demands. The unions were unable to impose
^ GE, "A Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17,

1970, p. 1 .
58
"Inflationary End to a Class War," Time. February 9, 1970, p. 72.
256
on GE the elimination of geographical differentials or the long-time
goals of union shop and improved arbitration clause. But after all,
neither party to any bargaining situation between equal powers expects
or actually can achieve all of its declared or hidden objectives.
Mutual concessions are part of the game in collective bargaining. The
1969-1970 confrontation at GE was no exception. Both sides were
finally forced or persuaded to make mutual concessions and to reach a
compromise settlement. This may also prove that the coordinating
unions were finally able, by virtue of their prolonged strike and with
the assistance of the chief federal mediator, to restore the element
of compromise into GE's lexicon, that is, to restore the "give-and-
take" method to the bargaining table at GE.
Was Unity Solid?
The last questions with respect to the 1969-1970 negotiations
are:
1. Did the solid unity among the coordinating unions last
throughout the whole campaign?
2. Were the local unions satisfied with the IUE's final settle
ment? Did they settle with GE on the same terms?
Extent of Unity
Despite mounting economic pressures, union solidarity in the last
stages of the work stoppage remained as firm as before. In spite of
continued efforts by the Company throughout the strike to disrupt unity,
no union deviated from the CBC line. None of them was tempted into
257
signing an early agreement with GE, or into resuming work while nego
tiating. Many such attempts by the Company were reported by the unions.
The Machinist, for instance, cited a letter from the Company sent to IAM
Local 1000 in Bloomington, Illinois, saying in part: "you gentlemen call
off this strike at least temporarily and allow your members to come back
59
to work while we continue to negotiate a new agreement." The Com
pany’s plea remained unheeded. Another example of a similar and unsuc
cessful attempt by GE was reported by Local 1805 of the IBEW in Baltimore,
Maryland.^ As noted earlier, G E ’s efforts at pursuading individual
union members to return to work also failed, or as viewed by A. H.
Raskin, "Back-to-work attempts fostered by the company [had] minimal
success.In sum, the strike was effective and solid throughout. As
reported by Time, the striking members of the CBC unions were "as united
in bitterness against their employer as any band of workers who fought

62
the U. S. industrial class wars of the 1930’s."
Moreover, hardly any local negotiations were conducted during the
strike. In general, local unions were wholly engaged in strike and
boycott activities. The reason was obvious.They were allwatching and
waiting for new developments at the CBC's national bargaining table.
59
The Machinist, November 20, 1S69, p. 2.
^ IUE News. February 4, 1970, p. 6 .
^ New York Times, January 11, 1970, p. 12.
62
258
They knew very well they would not get better terms from local GE
management. Hence, local bargaining was largely stalled during the
strike. Perhaps the best description of the local scene and the CBC's
control over local unions is a short summary made by GE*s Vice Presi
dent Moore. In his post-strike report to GE managers, Moore wrote in
part:
Looking back, it is evident that the coalition

bargaining structure served only one purpose: to
strike. .It shut off constructive discussion. It
imposed a^ chain-wide s trike discipline on all
locals, regardless of nominal union affiliation.
It even forced reluctant memberships out on the
street, as in Utica. It paralyzed local bargain
ing, and as a result, some IAM, UAW, IBEW and other
union members had to lose even more pay while local
union officials scurried to tidy up plant problems
they had neglected while the big committee was
operating in New York.63
When speaking of the extent of unity one cannot ignore the vital
role of the cooperation achieved between the CBC and the independent
UE throughout the 1969-1970 negotiations. With the UE fully coordin
ating each of its actions with the allied group, unity among GE unions
was almost complete. Hence, although GE still technically negotiated
with some "100-odd" unions, it found itself dealing actually with one
big union, that is, the CBC.
Satisfaction of Local Unions
Reaction of local unions other than the IUE's to the IUE settle
ment was somewhat mixed. Although most were generally satisfied, some
local unions were disappointed,for various reasons. The AFTE salaried
GE, "Final Report on 1969 Contract Negotiations," February 17, 1970,

p. 4. Emphasis added.
259
members, for instance, felt their interests were ignored. Some new or
improved benefits for the hourly-paid workers, such as the new pro
vision for sick pay, did not apply to AFTE members or other salaried
employees. They had enjoyed a better provision long before. The fact
that their benefits were not improved, too, annoyed them. In particu
lar, AFTE locals disliked the flat cent-per-hour wage increase which,
in proportion to their relatively higher salaries, meant a lower pay
boost. Thus, while the IUE hailed the cents-per-hour nature of the wage
settlement as a great step in reducing the existing disproportionalities

64
in wages, AFTE locals, notably those in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
65
continued in a separate struggle for a percentage wage increase.
Within a few days, however, AFTE members returned to work without
realizing their goal.
According to the survey, some locals of the UAW, IAM and IBEW
were particularly dissatisfied with the CBC's failure to achieve the
union shop and an improved arbitration clause. Some tried individu
ally to continue the struggle where, in their view, national negoti
ations failed, especially over the union shop issue. In this context
it may be interesting to note that, although GE is commonly known as
an extremely anti-union shop employer, the Company did have, even be
fore 1969, two local contracts which included full union shop clauses.
These contracts have been signed with the UAW in Patterson, New Jersey,
^ IUE News. February 4, 1970, p. 3.
^ AFL-CIO N e w s . February 7, 1970, pp. 1 and 3.
260
and with the IBEW in Blue Ash, O h i o . ^ nevertheless, all local efforts
to increase the list of contracts having union shop provisions failed,
too. Many union officials, however, speculated in private that had
the company-wide strike lasted for two or three more weeks, the Com
pany would have surrendered on this issue, too. At the same time, they
admitted that the CBC unions, particularly the IUE, could not have con
tinued the work stoppage any longer largely because of lack of money
to support the strikers.
The sharpest criticism of the IUE national settlement came from
the Machinists. Following a day-long meeting of IAM representatives
of all GE locals, IAM Vice President Gilbert Brunner, who was also a
member of the CBC Steering Committee, issued on February 3, 1970, a
statement saying in part:
The consensus of opinion [sic] among our delegates

and representatives is that GE's offer is inadequate
and does not meet the objectives of the 14,000 IAM
members employed by GE.
Not only is the money insufficient, but the offer
lacks any form or vestige of union security. It also
lacks a final terminal point to settle, one way or
another, all grievances that arise under the contract,
and it lacks the basic princiDie of uniform wage rates
regardless of geographical location of a plant. . . .
If and when GE makes this proposal to IAM members
our delegates will recommend that it be voted down.
They have too much invested to do otherwise.67
Brunner's statement shows dissatisfaction among the Machinists not with
local issues but with four major problems which were on top of the CBC's
In Exhibit VIII attached to John Baldwin's letter of August 29,

1969, to the IUE.
^ The Machinist. February 12, 1970, p. 1.
261
list: wages, union shop, arbitration clause, and the elimination of
geographic differences. A week later, however, it became evident that
none of the four matters generated the continued strikes by the
Machinists. The real causes were local issues. This was clearly ex
pressed by Brunner himself when he complained that "Despite reaching
agreement with the other 13 unions earlier this month, GE forced nearly
a score of IAM locals to extend their strike because of failure to move
i -l j
on local issues." 6 8
By the third week of February all but three small IAM locals had
reached agreement with GE. Early in March the CBC announced officially
that except for an IAM local of tool and die workers at Louisville, Ken-
69
tucky, all unions had settled with GE. The CBC's last battle against
GE ended shortly. Consequently, on March 9, 1970, AFL-CIO President
Meany terminated the nation-wide consumer boycott of GE and Hotpoint
products.7^ The all-union campaign against GE thus was over.
Finally, it is to be noted that all local unions settled with GE
basically on the same terms concluded in the IUE-GE agreement. Never
theless, the continued separate campaigns waged by local unions, other
than IUE'S,after the IUE agreement was reached, clearly indicated that
membership on the CBC did not necessarily restrict locals from pursuing
additional goals. Apparently, as union officials surveyed pointed out,
Ibid.. February 19, 1970, p. 1.
69 AFL-CIO News. March 7, 1970, p. 3.
70 Ibid.. March 14, 1970, p. 8.
262
local unions were also, legally and practically, free to sign a contract
before the national IUE settlement was concluded, even on inferior terms.
In practice, however, such a case did not occur in the 1969-1970 nego
tiations. Instead, strong unity prevailed as long as it was needed to
reach the major national agreement with GE.
According to the survey, except for one small l o c a l , ^ all
national and local unions surveyed, were in full agreement that unity
at GE in 1969-1970 was very much worth the efforts. Although pointing
to. the failure of the CBC in attaining such major goals as the union
shop, full arbitration clause and the elimination of geographical dif
ferences, all of them hailed the agreement reached as a great achieve
ment. In addition, they held firmly that, in face of GE's "Boulwarism,"
the settlement terms could definitely not have been achieved without
the coordinated bargaining effort. In their opinion, the CBC's succes
sful campaign had shattered ’Boulwarism" or dealt it a severe blow.
"Boulwarism" Was Defeated
There is no doubt that the CBC indeed defeated GE's "Boulwarism"
in the 1969-1970 confrontation. The analysis throughout this chapter
clearly supports this conclusion.
To sum up, at least five major setbacks were inflicted upon GE's
labor policy in the last confrontation with the CBC. These are as follows:
^ A small local of a small craft union in a Midwestern state.
263
1. Due to the solid unity among the coordinating unions,

GE lost its ability to play off one union against an
other.
2. GE lost its previous dominating status at the bargain

ing table. The Company lost its initiative and control.
In most cases, it was the CBC which dictated the agenda
and the pace of negotiations.
3. The Company was finally forced, in the last stage of

the strike, to bargain partially on the basis of the
traditional "give-and-take" method.
4. Twice in the 1969-1970 negotiations GE was obliged

to abstain from the use of its elaborate communica
tion system. In contrast to its past tradition, the
company did not publicize its second and third
offers.
5. GE was olearly forced to increase the size of its initial

package offer. The Company's famous first offer was
robbed of its most familiar descriptions. It was no
longer "full and firm" and no longer to become the
final settlement as previously.
Lastly, it may be concluded that the long 1969-1970 contest has
proved that "Boulwarism" "can work effectively only where unions are
72
fragmented and lack a countervailing power. . . ." On the same basis
and in light of the last confrontation, it may be logical to conclude
that "Boulwarism" cannot be successful or effective when a strong co
ordinated alliance is its opponent.

_
"GE Puts Unity to Test," Business W e e k . June 25, 1966, p. 106.
264
At any rate, in the last contest between the two, "Boulwarism"
was clearly not the winner. As stated by one GE executive in

73
Schenectady: "Boulwarism just does not work today."
73
Chapter XI
CONCLUSIONS
In the foregoing pages the story of the coordinated bargaining
campaign at General Electric Company has been told in all of its major
aspects, particularly those which constituted the objectives of this
research as stated in Chapter I above. Moreover, the study has sub
stantiated the hypotheses with respect to the origins of coordinated
bargaining at GE as well as to its results. Yet, because of their
unique importance, the following conclusions should be emphasized.
"Boulwarism'1 Generated Coordinated Bargaining at GE
Speaking of the origins of this bargaining technique, it was
clearly established that coordinated bargaining at GE emerged pri
marily because of GE's "Boulwarism" and union division and weakness.
While making this conclusion, however, one should not preclude the
possibility that coordinated bargaining at this highly diversified com
pany could have evolved even in the absence of "Boulwarism," as has
actually occurred in many other industrial giants in the last decade.
Indeed, while almost all national and local unions surveyed viewed
"Boulwarism"as the major factor which generated the coordinated drive
at GE, they equally replied that coordinated bargaining there should
265
266
prevail in any event,even if "Boulwarism1' were abandoned. To ascer
tain union thinking on this possibility the unions were asked the
following question:
Since GE's bargaining tactics, known as "Boulwarism"

were declared to be unlawful, do you consider
coordinated bargaining at GE to be still necessary?
Why?1
The general position of the unions was that coordinated bargaining is
the only way in which GE unions can deal effectively with this large
company. As one representative of a small local in New York State
pointed out in response to the above question, coordinated bargaining
at GE would still be necessary because it is the "only effective way
to maintain a balance of bargaining strength with this corporate

2
giant." Another reply, made by an official of a large local in Ohio,
was typical and more specific:
Yes. We are dealing with a multi-national cor

poration which deals with many different unions
and coordinated bargaining makes it more difficult
for the company to divide its employees by using
one union against the other in contract negoti
ations and settlement of disputes.
It gives the employees a greater sense of
security.3
In all, while evidence in this study strongly supports the hy
pothesis that GE's "Boulwarism" was a major factor spurring coordinated
See question number 20 in Appendix A and question lumber 24 in Appen

dix B .
2
Statement made by an official representing a local union in New York
State in response to question 24 of the written survey.
3
In response to question 24.
267
bargaining at GE, it is equally safe to conclude that this union bar
gaining technique would have emerged at GE even in the absence of
"Boulwarism." It is interesting, however, to point out that a sig
nificant number of locals, as well as national unions were very skep
tical about the possibility that GE would abandon its hard-line labor
approach. This view is well reflected in the response of one official
representing a large local, who stated that:
We that have any dealings with General Electric know

that Boulwarism is not entirely dead at General
Electric. They will continue this policy as long as
they get by with it.^
Coordinated Bargaining Has Shattered "Boulwarism"
When John R. Baldwin, GE's chief negotiator, was asked to comment
on union charges that GE had never actually bargained after making its
initial offer, nor was it willing to increase it, Baldwin strongly re
jected these accusations. When he was asked to point to any past con
tract negotiations since 1948 in which the Company did increase its
first "full and firm" offer, Baldwin, without hestitation, pointed to
the 1966 negotiations and to the 1969-1970 settlement. He did not pro
vide any other specific example of such occurrence.^
Indeed, as Baldwin implicitly admitted, it was in 1966, or more
obvious, in the 1969-1970 settlement that GE was obliged to alter its
traditional policy and to increase significantly the size of its initial

_
Statement made by an official representing one local in the Midwest
in response to question 24 of the written survey.
^ Information obtained from Mr. John R. Baldwin, March 24, 1972, per
sonal interview, New York City.
268
proposals. These two marked deviations from G E ’s bargaining posture
were obviously forced upon GE by the concerted action of the coor
dinating unions. As noted earlier, all national unions and all but
one local union^ which responded to the oral or written survey, held
the firm view that GE was forced to move from its original bargaining
positions in 1966 and in 1969-1970 only because of coordinated bargain
ing. In other words, the common union view was that GE unions could
not have achieved the improved terms of the 1966 and the 1970 settle
ments without the use of the coordinated bargaining method.
Relying on the findings and the analysis of this study, one can
fully agree with this contention. Yet, to add support to this conclu
sion about the advantages of coordinated bargaining at GE, it may be
necessary to compare briefly the wage settlements scored through
coordinated action with some previous wage settlements achieved by the
IUE when it bargained individually. Table 14 below shows such a com
parison with respect also to average first-year wage settlements nego
tiated in manufacturing.
In comparing the figures in Table 14, one has to consider the
fact that the wage increases agreed upon in 1960 and 1963 were in ef
fect for 18 months each. This actually reduces the rate of change in
those years to 2 percent in 1960 and to 1.66 percent in 1963. With
^ The dissenting union, a small local in the Midwest, actually did

not make any comment about coordinated bargaining. Although this
local is affiliated with a CBC union, it reported, in replying to the
survey, that, having enjoyed good relations with local GE management,
it was not involved in the coordinated bargaining campaign and had
nothing to say on this issue.
269
TABLE 14. Average Hourly Increases of Wage Rates in First-Year

Settlements in General Electric and in Manufacturing,
1955 to 1969-1970.
General Electric Manufacturing

Year Cents * Percent Cents Percent
1955 5.5 3.0 9.5 **
1960 6.8 3.0 (18 months) 8.9 3.2
1963 6.2 2.5 (18 months) 8.0 3.0
1966 10.3 4.0 10.3 4.2
1969/70 23.Of 7.2 21.5 7.0
* Except for 1969/70 where the GE-IUE wage agreement specified

the increase in cents per hour, the figures were computed by
multiplying the percentage increase by the average hourly
earnings for the respective years.
** Not available.
+ Actually the 1069/70 agreement provided for a general wage

increase of 20& an hour. However, since the company unusually
agreed to an immediate pay of additional cost-of-living
increase, it is proper to include it in the first-year wage
settlement.
Source: (1) For figures related to GE: GE-IUE Wage Agreements:

1953-1960. p. (4) ;1960-63. p/1); 1963-66. p.(l);
1966-1969. p. (&.) :197Q-1973. p. (5).
(2) For figures related to manufacturing: U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of
Labor Statistics, 1971, Bulletin No. 1705, Table 85,
p. 165.
270
this correction the Table indicates a significantly improved balance
for the coordinated bargaining approach over individual union bargain
ing.
The achievements of the coordinated bargaining campaigns at GE
are even more impressive when viewed along with wage settlements reached
by the IUE in 1960 and in 1963. As noted earlier in this study, the
IUE suffered in 1960 one of its worst defeats at GE. As a result, the
Company was able to eliminate the cost-of-living escalator in all of
its labor contracts. Moreover, the 1960 agreement was for a three-
year contract with only two wage increases, eighteen months apart!
Consequently, no wage increase was given in 1961 to GE employees.
Similar poor results were scored individually in 1963 by the IUE
and other GE unions. The unions recieved no cost-of-living adjustments
and had to settle, again, for only two wage hikes in a three-year con
tract. Thus, GE workers were not entitled to a wage increase in 1964!
Clearly, after observing and weighing these two independent per
formances of the IUE, the results achieved by the coordinated alliance,
particularly in 1969-1970, are obviously more impressive and strongly
convincing. Hence, the conclusion is clear. Looking at it from the
unions' point of view, the superiority of coordinated bargaining over
fragmentation and isolation at GE is unquestionable.
In accord with this conclusion it is no surprise that except for
the one local union noted earlier, all national and local union offi
cials who responded to the oral or written survey indicated that they
271
would willingly continue to participate in coordinated bargaining with
GE in the future.
Critics of the coordinated bargaining approach, including GE
management, often contend that involvement of local unions in such a
centralized bargaining method may impede local interests and also in
fringe upon the autonomy of local unions. It was earlier established
that local interests at GE were not ignored due to the coordinated cam
paigns. Likewise, it may be said here that, in general, local union
autonomy at various GE locations was not hampered. Only very few of
the national and local unions surveyed conceded some potential effects
of the coordinated alliance on local autonomy. The dominant view was
that the coordinated bargaining approach left no adverse effects on the
locals.
Local autonomy and stature could have been hampered only if locals
were actually not free to accept any GE proposals or to pursue addi
tional goals if so desired. GE locals, however, were legally and prac
tically free to follow either course. Moreover, their past experience
in dealing separately with local GE management never provided them much
autonomy or prestige anyway. As acknowledged in almost all responses
to the survey, local unions and local managements alike were virtually
powerless to independently effect any contractual changes concerning
major company-wide issues. Consequently local unions always ended up
accepting unified company terms. Thus, as far as company-wide issues
were concerned, local autonomy at GE locals in the past was largely an
empty concept. In sum, being able to achieve through coordinated bar
272
gaining what had never been possible in individual bargaining at GE
can obviously but add to union prestige, although the main credit goes
to the aggregated power of all unions involved rather than to a par
ticular local.
Implications of Union Victory at General Electric
The success of the last concerted campaign at GE^ seems to have
given a decisive vindication as well as great momentum to the idea of
coordinated bargaining at GE and elsewhere. This result is well re
flected in statements made by IUE President Jennings and AFL-CIO Presi-

g
dent Meany. Perhaps best representing union feeling about the im
portance of coordinated bargaining in future negotiations, is a view
expressed by Albert Vottero, First Vice President of the American Flint
Glass Workers and member of the CBC Steering Committee. Hailing the
GE-IUE settlement of January 1970, Vottero wrote in part in his edi
torial :
. . .this action [coordinated bargaining] represents

a new phase of collective bargaining which may very
well have far reaching repercussions on future labor
management relations in contract negotiations.
Coordinated bargaining appears to be the most ef
fective way to deal with growing conglomerates and
mergers in industry. If we are to achieve the best
IUD's coordinator Carlin Allen said in private his department would

be very satisfied to reach similar achievements in coordinated efforts
at other companies.
O
IUE N e w s . February 4, 1970, p. 3. See also editorial on p. 4; AFL-
CIO N e w s . February 7, 1970, pp. 1 and 3, and March 14, 1970, p. 8 .
273
results for both blue and white collar workers, It

is essential that we forget our individual peeves
and self interests for the good of everybody con
cerned .9
From a union point of view, indeed, if advantages of coordinated
bargaining over separate bargaining were still in doubt, the last GE
experience amply demonstrated its superiority.
As far as GE is concerned, the strike of 1969-1970 was no less
of a "debacle" for the Company than the 1946 shutdown. Hence, inas
much as the 1946 work stoppage "shocked" the Company and caused it to
develop a new labor and union policy, the 1969-1970 round with the co
ordinated bargaining alliance should necessitate an equal self
reappraisal and change. Some union officials contended in private
that such a reappraisal had already been made by GE and that they an
ticipated some fundamental changes in future union-management rela
tions there. Positive changes in GE labor policies would undoubtedly
be beneficial to both parties. If GE would indeed adopt a construc
tive approach, the 1973 negotiations could mark the beginning of a new
era in union-management relations at this Company.
American Flint, February 1970, p. 1.
APPENDICES
274
275
APPENDIX A
A Questionnaire Sent to International and National Unions
1. In how many GE plant did the (name of union inserted) have

representation rights in 1966 and 1969-70 and how many workers
did you represent in each plant?
Year No. of plants No. of workers
1966
1969-70
2. What were the major problems your locals encountered in bar
gaining with GE before adoption of the coordinated bargaining
approach?
3. Were your GE locals able, prior to 1966, to gather the specific

facts and information they needed to carry on meaningful nego
tiations on complex issues before the inception of coordinated
bargaining at GE? That is, were they able to bargain indepen
dently and effectively with local GE management?
4. Was the local GE management able to respond and agree to local

demands on issues they considered to be company-wide policy?
5. What is your understanding of the reasons and objectives of

coordinated bargaining at GE, and what did the (name of union
inserted) expect to achieve through it?
6. Did the company-wide coordination among the unions operate

effectively, strategically and administratively, in 1966 and
1969-1970, or did it fail in one respect or another?
7. On how many (name of union inserted) local negotiating committees

did you have representatives of other GE unions in 1966 and
1969-70?
1966
1969-70
8. Did you send (name of union inserted) delegates to attend local

negotiations between GE and other national unions in 1966 and
1969-70? That is, on how many local negotiating teams was the
(name of union inserted) represented?
1966 1969-70
276
9. Did any of your locals have independent and meaningful negotiations

with GE in 1966 and 1969-70 on national issues before the IUE
settlement, or were all locals actually waiting to follow the
pattern set by IUE-GE in New York City?
10. How complete was the shutdown in 1969-70 in GE plants represented

by your locals? What percentage of workers took part in the
strike?
11. How effective was the AFL-CIO’s consumer boycott on GE products?
12. How effective was G E ’s back-to-work campaign in plants represented

by the (name of union inserted)?
13. Did your locals have a real give-and-take bargaining with GE at

any stage of the negotiations in 1966 and in 1969-70? At what
stage?
1966: 1969-70:
14. How do you evaluate the (name of union inserted) settlements of

1966 and 1970 with GE? How do the contracts' terms of 1966 and
1970 compare with (name of union inserted) previous settlements
with GE? Do you think your locals achieved better agreements
from GE with coordinated bargaining than they would have achieved
without it?
15. Dii the coordinated bargaining at GE accomplish its goals in

1966 and in 1969-70? What remained to be achieved?
16. Were all your GE locals satisfied with the achievements of the
coordinated bargaining approach? Why, or why not?
17. Would you please list the major advantages actually gained by
your GE locals through coordinated bargaining?
18. Were there any adverse effects of the coordinated bargaining

approach on your GE locals? What were these effects?
19.- Will all your GE locals willingly continue to participate in a

coordinated bargaining with GE in the future? Why, or why not?
20. Since G E ’s bargaining tactics, known as Boulwarism, were declared

to be unlawful, do you consider coordinated bargaining at GE to
be still necessary? Why?
277
APPENDIX B
A Questionnaire Sent to Local Unions
1. How many GE workers did your local represent in 1966 and in 1969-70?
1966:
1969-70:
2. What were the major problems your local encountered in bargaining with
GE before the adoption of the coordinated bargaining approach?
3. Was your local union able, prior to 1966, to gather the specific facts
and information it needed to carry on meaningful negotiations on
complex issues before the inception of coordinated bargaining at GE?
That is, was your local able to bargain independently and effectively
with local GE management?
4. Was the local GE management able to respond and agree to your demands
on issues they considered to be company-wide policy?
5. Did your national union solicit your approval as a local before the
formation of the coordinated bargaining front at GE?
6. Did you experience any pressure from GE to persuade you not to join the
coordinating unions in 1965-66 and in 1969? In what way?
278
-2-
7. What is your understanding of the reasons and the objectives for

coordinated bargaining at GE, and what did your local expect to
achieve through it?
8. Did the information your local received in official reports from the
Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB) in 1966 and from the CBC
in 1969-70 keep you sufficiently informed of pertinent developments?
1966:
1969-70:
9. Did you have representatives of other GE unions on your local

negotiating committee in 1966 and in 1969-70?
1966:
1969-70:
10. Did your local strike in 1969-70? On what dates did the strike start
and end?
11. What percentage of the total bargaining unit you represented did not
report for work during the 1969-70 strike?
12. How effective was the AFL-CIOfs consumer boycott on GE products

in your locality?
279
-3-
13. How effective was GE's back-to-work campaign in your bargaining unit?
14. (a) How many settlement offers did GE make to your local during
negotiations in I960 and in 1969-70?
1966:
1969-70:
(b) Did these offers differ in any important respect from those made
by GE to IUE at the national level?
(c) Mere the offers made public by GE before their presentation at

your local bargaining table?
15. Did you have a real give-and-take bargaining with GE at any stage of
the negotiations in 1966 and in 1969-70? at what stage?
1966:
1969-70;
16. Mas your local satisfied with GE-IUE national settlements of 1956
and of January 1970? Uhy or why not?
17. On what dates did your local reach settlements with GE in 1966 and
in 1969-70?
1966:
1969-70:
280
-4-
18. Did you settle locally in both years on the terms accepted nationally
by the IUE?
19. How do you evaluate your local settlements of 1956 and January 1970?
How do the contract terms of 1966 and 1970 compare with your previous
settlements I’ith GE?
Do you think your local achieved better agreements from GE with
coordinated bargaining than you would have achieved without it?
20. Did the coordinated bargaining approach at GE accomplish its goals

in 1966 and in 1969-70? What remained to be achieved?
21 . Would you please list the major advantages actually gained by ycur
local through coordinated bargaining?
22. Were there any adverse effects of the coordinated bargaining approach
on your local? What were these effects?
281
-5-
23. Hill your local willingly continue to participate in coordinated

bargaining with GE in the future? T-Jhy, or why not?
24. Since G E ’s bargaining tactics, known as Boulwarism, were declared

to be unlawful, do you consider coordinated bargaining at GE to be
still necessary? Why?
Local Union name and designation:
Address:
Please return b y ______________ , 1972 to:
Mr. A. Cohen
c/o Professor Donald E. Cullen
267 Ives, ILR School
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850
APPENDIX C
P C
B A L L O T r a •' *'
it
t ~a
AFL-CIO
283
COORDINATED BARGAINING COMMITTEE

of GE-Westinghouse Unions
1126 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. C. 2 0 0 3 6
2 0 2 /2 9 6 -1 2 0 0
17C -»u*»
| '7
GEORGE M EA NY
P R E S ID E N T , A F L - C I O
C H A IR M A N
To GE-W Workers:
I. W . A B EL
P R E S ID E N T , U S W
E DW ARD F . CAR LO UG H, Sr.

The member unions of this committee want to know your views on
P R E S ID E N T . S M W
the 1969 bargaining program. That is the purpose of this question
C A R L G R IE P E N T R O G naire.
P R E S ID E N T , A IW
M. A. HUTCHESON
P R E S ID E N T , C A R P E N T E R S First of all, it lists the basic contract improvements drawn up
P A U L J E N N IN G S
by joint committees of GE-W unions. These bargaining goals are based
P R E S ID E N T . IU E on what you want and need, as reported by elected representatives of
G EO RG E M . PARKER each union. They were ratified at the national conference March 6 ,
P R E S ID E N T , F G W
to which every GE-W local union was invited. They will be discussed
C H A R L E S H . P IL L A R D
P R E S ID E N T , IB E W further at a series of regional conferences, one of which will be
PETER T. SC H O EM A N N
held soon in your area.
P R E S ID E N T , P L U M B E R S
R O Y S IE M IL L E R But your negotiating teams want to hear directly from as many

P R E S ID E N T , 1AM
members as possible. Therefore we are asking you to indicate the
J A M E S W O O D S ID E
P R E S ID E N T . A F T E priorities you give to these proposals -- that is, which one is most
important to you, which ranks second and so on. And in case some
thing you believe is important was somehow overlooked, there's a
STEERING COMMITTEE space for you to say so.
JAM ES D. COM PTO N
C H A IR M A N
Please indicate your preference as follows: The item you con
R IC H A R D M IL L S , IB E W
TREASURER
sider to be most important among all items mark "1 " in the box; the
item you consider of second importance mark "2 ", and the item of
RODNEY BOW ER
AFTE third importance to you, mark "3" and so on through the. 10 items
G IL B R U N N E R you consider desirable. If you consider several items of equal
IA M
importance, for example, two items both rating top importance, you
D O N A LD CAG LE
A IW
can mark them both "1 ".
E D W A R D J . C A R L O U G H , JR.
SMW In case of any question concerning this ballot contact your
FR A NK POLLARA union representative. Fill the ballot out, detach, seal and mail
USW
it (no postage required) immediately. Or if you prefer, give the
D O M IN IC C A R N E V A L E ballot to your local union president for bulk mailing. The ballots
UA
will be studied and tabulated to determine your union's 1969 bar
J. L . RHODES
CARPENTERS gaining priorities, using your votes as a major guide.
A LB ERT VOTTERO
PCW
Ballots must be postmarked by May 15th in order to be counted.
Sincerely and fraternally yours,
George Meany
Chairman
TEAR OFF PORTION BELOW AND RETURN_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

BALLOT FOR CBC 1959 GOALS 284
CHECK C 0 M °A N Y A N D M E TH O D OF P A Y M E N T
GE □ W □ Hourly □ Salaried □
A F T E R R E A D IN G A L L G O A L S , O N B O T H S ID E S , IN D IC A T E T H E T E N M O S T IM P O R T A N T .
' ' ........ " ,l ' J
Financing: Non-contributory. Credited Service.- A ccum ulate all service, regardless of

M inim um Pension B enefit: $ 7.50 per month per year of reason fo r absence.
service. Pension Contribution-. Employees who w ithdraw contribu
Im prove B enefit Form ula. tions should receive 2/ 3’s o f pension benefit.
Benefits fo r Long-Term Employees: Full pension a fte r 30 Survivors’ B enefit— GE: Substantial im provem ent in case
years of service regardless o f age. of death before retire m e n t.
Supplem ental B enefit: GE: $130 m inim um at age 60 after Survivors’ B enefit— W : Introduce adequate Survivors’ Ben
10 years o f service. efits in case of death before retirem ent.
Supplem ental B enefit— W: $7.50 per month per year of Vesting: Five years of service regardless o f age payable
service, $130 m inim um no maximum. a t early or norm al retirem ent.
P erm anent Lay-Off.- Unreduced full pension to employees
age 50 or over w ith 10 or more years of service. Voluntary R etirem ent: Full pension at age 62.
Disability Benefit: Eligible a fte r 10 years of service. Raise Cost-of-Living Adjustm ent: A djust pension benefit fo r
supplem ental b e n e fit from $75 to $100 per m onth. present and fu tu re retirees to keep up w ith rise of C.O.L.
.•w-
Union Recognition: National A greem ent. Leave of Absence for Union Officials and R epresentatives
When on Union Business: Improved contract language.
Union Shop: M aximum possible union security. Also provide for an adequate number.
Discrim ination: No discrim ination in hiring, testing, pay Full A rbitration Clauses W ith Ho Restrictions: The right
m ent of equal wages, assignm ent of jobs, seniority, pro to strike or arb itrate on all issues.
motions, training, tran sfe r or layoff, or any other term or A Jointly A dm inistered Training Program: For all job classi
condition of em ploym ent.
fications.
Service Credits: Service credits to be given an employee Job Posting and Bidding: Based on seniority.
fo r all service regardless of reason for absence.
An Educational Program : To be established jointly to pro
Probationary Period: M axim um th irty (3D)-day probationary vide additional educational opportunities fo r th e w orker
period. and his fam ily.
Substantial cer.ts-ner-hour w age increase. Increased s h ift differential.

A m eaningful increase fo r skilled, both hourly & salaried. Double tim e for all overtim e.
A program to elim in ate all industry and geographic differ Im proved pay fo r holidays & Sundays worked.
entials. Provide fo r annual paid personal leave.
A fu ll cost-of-living clause. Im prove bereavem ent pay program .
Im proved vacation schedule w ith vacation bonus. Provide annual paid sick leave.
A dditional paid holidays. M ilita ry pay improved to include em ergency call-ups.
Shorter w ork w eek w ith no c u t in take-hom e pay. Elim inate m easured day-work.
Establish a program o t retraining to com pensate for Rate schedule based on autom atic progression.
changes in technology.
Im prove annual sick leave provisions.
Rate retention for jobs affected by change in technology.
I'.'iaiiiterance of job security by adding an attritio n clause. Im prove personal leave program .
--------------------------------------- HERE
Fully non-contributory for employees, dependents, and all W: Life insurance at 200% of gross annual earnings.
re tire s .
W: Accidental death and dismemberment at 100% of
Sickness and accident benefits at % 's of gross pay for 52 gross annual earnings.
weeks.
Six weeks' sickness and accident benefit for disability from W: Full payment of semi-private hospital room and extras
pregnancy, child birth or miscarriage. for 365 days.
Comprehensive dental care program for employees and W: Full payment of usual and customary surgical charges,
dependents. including maternity.
Long-term disability protection after exhaustion of sick W: Limit major medical deductible to $50 per year ($100
ness and accident benefits. per family maximum) with 85-15% co-insurance.
Retired employees to receive same health coverage as
active employees. Comprehensive out-of-hospital coverage for x-ray, emer
gency, accident and sickness, including doctors’ bills.
GE: Eliminate deductible and co-insurance.
GL- Continue all insurance coverage during any period of W: Continue all insurance coverage for one year of layoff
a temporary nature. or leave of absence.
FOLD HERE
4W.UJ^ WWUHIJIJ
-*-*-
**-*—ut >^Ttinii»'
•
’
■ifA* *
Start weekly layoff benefits or income extension aid at Prohibit the transfer of work from one plant to another if
the onset of unemployment. it will result in a decrease of employment opportunities
in the base plant._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A worker shall have the right to transfer with his job. Prohibit subcontracting where manpower is available to
Workers on layoff snail have the right to transfer, with do the work.
preference over new employees, to any other company Restrict overtime work when there are workers unem-
plant where employment is building up. ployed and available to work in the plant._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(USE TH E S E L IN E S FOR ANY A D D IT IO N A L CO M M EN TS OR PROPOSALS, ON N ATIO N A L NOT LOCAL GOALS)
FOLD HERE
FIRST CLASS
PERMIT NO. 6370
W A S H INGTON, D.C.
Business Reply Mail No postage s tam p necessary if m a ile d in th e U n ite d States
Postage w ill b e paid by
COORDINATED BARGAINING COMMITTEE

OF AFL-CIO— GE— W UNIONS
815 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W.
ROOM 202
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
APPENDIX D
n f<a n f%n r ^ .* n
/' '.,«.* . V /* ' " . l~ \ / * - ! f •* t * ^ "> ’ ’ — M « (J • \ l" f
ir. ... v; ••, k< u i« iJ •J .. .: j ’f.J' vi-i ..7 ». '••_ '•’ _• 'J '--. ~ ■..-J
w 1
E d ito r’s Note: Jan. 26, 1970 is cited below as the effective date
fo r many of the provisions of the new contract. Whether that
proves to be the actual date depends on when the IU E and UE
ratifications occur. The Jan. 26 provisions may have to go into
effect at a later dale if ratification is not prompt.
Unions other than the IU E and U E must reach local settle
ments. As of last week, 25 unions o f the more than 100 w ith
which G E bargains locally had already signed up.
Highlights of the settlement w ith the IU E and U E are:
PAY
a First year general pay increase o f 20 cents per hour (same as in the original
proposal)
n 5? to 25? per hour more fo r high-skill day workers (as in original proposal)
J 5 ? 3
/IpAV' a ^ econc^ anc* t^ ’rc^ ^’ear Senera^ Pay rai ses of%-pY< plusAcost-of-living increases:
Effective Im m ediately:
“ 3<
i more per hour ($1.20 per week fo r salaried),
% / S reflecting c-o-1 increases since the previous con
tract expired.
Effective Oct. 26, 1970:
a Adjustm ent o f I f per hour fo r each fu ll 0.3% of

C P I increase during the preceding year, to a m a xi-:
mum of 8 f. (T he immediate 3 f c-o-I increase is
included in the first year’s 8<f m axim um .)
Effective Oct. 25, 1971, and again on Oct. 30, 1972:
n 3 Adjustm ent o f I f per hour for each fu ll 0.3% C P I

/( /> ’•■*' increase during the preceding year up to a maximum
o f Sc.
287
P e n s io n s R ise fo r L o n g S e r v ic e S a v in g s P la n — In c re a s e
J:rn.- i~ ;s'7 0 - j - 7-V ■ £& , / Q / 0 . . . e ffe c tiv e im m e d ia t e ly
P re s e n t m o n th ly m in im u m o f S4.£}0 p e r y e ar * a S t o c k a c q u ir e d u n d e r the p la n m a y be sold
o f s e rv ic e in c r e a s e d to new le ve ls ranging / d ir e c t ly to the C o m p a n y at a s a v in g s o f $6
a
A fro m $5 to $7.50 at age 65. y d o /td L p e r tra n s a c tio n .
o A s an a d d e d fe a tu re , s u b s e q u e n t in cre a se s
in the p e n s io n m in im u m on the fo llo w in g
s c h e d u le : V a c a t io n s Im p r o v e d f o r L c n g e r - S o t v io e E m p lo y e e s
% S E f fe c iiv e Jan. 1, 1971— $5.50 to $7.50 • • e f f e c t iv e : Jan. 1 ,-19 72 - 7977
E f fe c tiv e Jan. 1, 1972— $6.00 to $7.50
0 /?n 5 w e e k s a fte r 30 ye a rs
E f fe c t iv e Jan. 1, 1973— $6.50 to $7.50
3 4 w e e k s a fte r 15 y e a rs
o G E to p ay s u p p le m e n ta l b e n e fits u f $125 a
m on th to d is a b le d p e n s io n e r s n o t e lig ib le S E © K P A V/
& G t o P S f o r S o c ia l S e c u rity .
S i c k Pay B e n e fits
• • anQ' f u d d e r p ro v is io n s e ffe c tiv e Jan. 1, 1971 A
'
'jTT
/I*l'
l'
i-
O. '. . . e f f e c t i v e : 4 fln. 1, 1075- ^ 4 ^9/ &
I ° Past p e n s io n c r e d it s rise fo r all e m p lo y e e s
w ith s e rv ic e p r io r to Jan. 1. 1961, b ase d on : 2 p a id days fo r 5 th ru 9 y e a rs s e r v ic e
t h e ir a v e r u n p e a rn in g s d ur in g 195S. 1950, j£?yy. B 3 p a id days to r 10 tn ru 14 y e a rs s r v ic e
and 1861./ ( J c > { I ^ %) JLty t-'- -VUi-
,H 4 p a id days fo r 1 5 - y ^ V :—s-e-we-;--
a a Im p r o v e d S u rv iv o rs h ip O p t i o n f a ci li t a t e s
/ - e le c tio n o f o p t io n and lib e ra liz e s e m p lo y e e a Pa '^ ^ a7s Tor ^ y ears s e rv ic e o r o v e r
p en sio n.
C B T 0 .7 2 : I c - i i.'J r ' crt
Q Im p r o v e d d e a th b e n e f i t g u a ra n te e s life tim e
D G SiTh ii-j " 3LJ " if'.'i-j .4 3
If . p p e n s io n fo r s u rv iv in g spouse of e lig ib le em-
y )C l''frl+ ' p lo y e e s w h o d ie b e fo r e r e tir e m e n t. B e n e fits Im p r o v e d /,
/A l£ ,{/f' . .. e f f e c t i v e :-G o tr-9 ^rT 9 f& " ■1, 7 9 7 /
u M ilita ry s e rv ic e p a id tim e o f f lib e r a liz e d
J m 'sJ I a C o u r t d u ty pay w h e n s u b p o e n a e d
Bui S O L A R I S ; 12
D e a th -in -fa m ily p ro v is io n e x p a n d e d
In s u ra n c e PIan i m p r o v e d
'/ ffU if- • • e f f e c tiv e : . z.6, m o
g
r . 'i
t, J
<**•• r "7 ? • -*
i l l J »_VJ L-.* i*
*T r * r “ "
lh
h . - , / • • *•
» Si *■' *
r ‘ t.
*! ‘ ■=.• ^ -w
r 'i r\ r"-y
■ '-4 »•I . V
B e t t e r In c o m e E x te n s io n A i d ^
a A fu r t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t in T yp e “ A ” c o v e r a g e
ST/l-mr' . .. e ffe c tiv e :•© e tr^ S rtS rQ 'x ' & H • f 9 / /
in a d d itio n to th o s e p ro p o s e d in th e D ec. 6 / V
n £ ' t/ ' ° ^ er: lOC)^0 c o v e r a g e of h o s p ita l room and (1 c IE A a v a ila b le s o o n e r
b o a rd f o r up to 365 d ays o f c o n fin e m e n t in a ,J' o Y o u r c r e d it s r e in s ta te d 1 y e a r a f t e r l a y c / f
c a le n d a r ye ar. jl if w o r k in g (in ste ad o f r e b u ild in g 4 w e e k s p e r
p B H o s p ita l e x p e n s e s and s u rg e o n s ' fe e s are in j_ / y e a r o f s e rv ic e a f t e r r e lu m in g )
yo P A ttT Z s T y p e “ A ” c o v e r a g e , w ith no d e d u c t i b l e . ^ 0 '~ d 'u /l
j* a F o u r w e e k s pay ( e ig h t w e e k s o f b e n e fits )
aa, - n C o m p a n y w ill pay fir s t $500 o f^ T y p e “ A ” a v a ila b le a fte r 24 m o n th s s e rv ic e
/L ily c o s ts in s te a d o f p re s e n t $ 2 2 5 . ( ^ T c - ': P ta c <£2£.)
i:2 E 3 iV !5 D ? J A L E 5 .7- Li ^ O !.'$* I.11f 1T
g ® 8 5 % o f T y p e “ B ” e x p e n s e s o v e r $50 re
covered. N e w P r o g r a m T o i m p r o v e b ki.ir. A
E A n e w L o n g T e rm D is a b ility in s u ra n c e Plan 'J 'l'ijt f - • • e f f e c t i v e :-G-&tr3GrbSn*'3~ ^' ' 1
n ( e m p lo y e e - p a id ) is a v a ila b le to all h ou rly T u itio n r e f u n d up to $400
e m p lo y e e s w h o e le c t to p a r tic ip a te .
yfa&'91 Id e n tic a l b e n e fits to e m p lo y e e s on la y o ff
a E x p en se s f o r eye e x e rc is e s are n o w c o v e re d .
1 G E to c o n tin u e lo c a l tr a in in g p r o g r a m s
/ t / f ..f b H ig h e r w e e k l y s ic k n e s s and a c c id e n t pay-
r* n r -* f . r * * Ffcii r-.r n P r!3 R r-\ r~ 3
r m en ts ( C . J —2Sr4S7-0)— tew t ' - J C ,u V .r> rim k. i i v y r t.-. a ,* x V C jJ it ljw k. -a
. . . and fu r t h e r im p ro v e m e n ts effective-k',4e-r-i«-
'J l'a O . ■e f f e c t i v e : ■Oe-b -Sfr . - l 9 t 0 * K J9 • >
tro-at-include th ese: J r 'ir ^ r :'./,/9 7 7
E m e rg e n c y aid p la n a v a ila b le s o o n e r
o GE to p r y e m p lo y e e ’s In suran ce Plan co sts:
p ra ctica l!-/ an a d d e d 1% pay b o o s t -tCk:4»- * v, :c• / : ri [7:t td 2t
-£S— ;~
• • ' e f f e c t i v e : - @ e t r S 6 r t 5 r 6 " .f/S -il. 7, 7 9 7 /
si A d d e d c o v e r a g e fo r d e n ta l ca re and h e a r
ing a icls-i-A irtT ^ b -rT d fh )-- 0 U p to 12 m o n th s s e rv ic e c r e d it s fo r a b s e n c e s
T J lp ilf d u e to layo ff, illn e s s o r a c c id e n t. U p to 18
u Plus o th e r im p r o v e m e n ts m o n th s f o r c o m p e n s a b le illn e s s o r a c c id e n t.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
288
289
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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73-28,287

COHEN, Abraham, 1932-

University Microfilms, A XEROX Com pany, Ann Arbor, Michigan

The negative m icrofilm copy of this

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell

University for the Degree of

To my wife, Rachel and my children, Ron,

Yuval and Daphna, for their love, encouragement

Mr. Cohen was born in Tel Aviv, Israel, in 1932. He is married

to 1960 he was employed at the Histadrut (The General Federation of

Labor in Israel) in various positions, the last of these being the

National Secretary-General of the Israel National Union of Graduates

in the Social Sciences and Humanities and the Executive Director of

the Academic Department of Histadrut. In September 1960 he entered

graduate studies at the University of California at 3erkeley in the

fields of public and personnel administration and industrial relations

and earned a master's degree in Political Science. Upon returning to

Israel in 1964 he was appointed Personnel Manager of a large food

negotiations and administration. For a couple of years he taught part-

time at the Hebrew University in Tel Aviv as an instructor in Public

Administration. In August 1970 he left his position at "Osem" to pur­

sue doctoral studies at Cornell University, New York State School of

Industrial and Labor Relations. Mr. Cohen is a member of the Industrial

Relations Research Association in Israel.

The author wishes to thank all officials of the General Electric

ness, cooperation and willingness to supply the information needed for

the preparation of this study. Their contributions are highly appreci­

A special word of appreciation and gratitude is due to Professor

Vernon H. Jensen, Chairman of the author's Special Committee for his

invaluable guidance and encouragement and for his constructive coun­

State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, for

supporting him financially, in the form of research assistantships,

during his stay at Cornell.

painstaking work of typing the first draft of the dissertation.

I COORDINATED BARGAINING AND STRUCTURES of

Cooperation Between Unions in Collective Bargaining 8

Coalition and Coordinated Bargaining Defined 12

Uniqueness of Coalition and Coordinated

The Role of the IUD in Spreading Union

The Legal Status of Coalition and

Addendum - Scope and Objectives of this Study 24

A. Company and Union Publications,

Limitations and Suggestions for Further

II UNION RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES OF COORDINATED

The Changing Character of American Industry 35

Unions Seek Power Equilibrium through

Similarity of Major Benefits and Terms of

Standardized Conditions Lead to Centralization

III THE BACKGROUND IN GENERAL ELECTRIC — THE COMPANY,

The General Electric Company 50

The Unions at General Electric 53

General Electric Labor Policy 61

General Electric's New Approach to

The Essence of "Boulwarism" 66

IV UNION RATIONALE FOR COORDINATED BARGAINING

GE's Boulwarism and Division Among the Unions 79

Unions Resent "Boulwarism" 83

GE's Initial Offers — The"Tempting Dish" 85

"Boulwarism" Viewed as Menace to Unionism 89

"Boulwarism" as Practiced in 1960,

Unions’ Cooperation Becomes a Necessity 98

Coordinated Bargaining — Logical Evolution 100

V THE FORMATION OF COORDINATED BARGAINING AT

Administration. In August 1970 he left his position at "Osem" to pur

the preparation of this study. Their contributions are highly appreci

invaluable guidance and encouragement and for his constructive coun