CONSTI2 Case Digests From Course Outline

CONSTI2 Case Digests from Course Outline
THEORIES OF STATE & CONSTITUTION
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.]
Facts:
On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The
application reflected an average increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The
application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. On 28
January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh,
subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled
to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s
customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly
credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions.
Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB rendered its
decision adopting COA’s recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a
rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to
MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that “the
provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the Board’s Order dated
28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of
P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its
billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or
correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.” The ERB held that
income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be “borne by the
stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of
their business” hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying
the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that
in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be
included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually
used in service during the test year.
On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as
it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the
refund of such amount to MERALCO’s customers beginning February 1994 and until its
billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. MERALCO was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of
P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCO’s billing cycles beginning February
1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the
excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with the applicant’s billing cycles
beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCO’s customers or
correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.
1. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State’s police powers

The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of
public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good.
Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as
long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.
ICHONG v HERNANDEZ DIGEST CASE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ G.R. NO. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS:
A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with
an effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their
licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation
of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business;
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for
registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die,
to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting
under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in
the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1)
the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise
is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the
Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations
are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the
value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of
statutory origin.
ISSUE:
WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process
and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution
RULING:
NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police
power of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real
and actual threat and danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of retail business and free citizens and country from the said dominance and
control.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to
be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope
of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. However, the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the most
important of these are: the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license
and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.
The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the statistics
on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the
constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of
the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and
the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official
statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the
alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage distribution of
assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is
true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average
between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.
The Court finds that law does not also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom
and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident —
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.
Therefore, petition is denied.
Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation – Tests of a Valid Ordinance)
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation
created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation , this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.
On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to
any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof
for the operation of a casino.
On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino
and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino
operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its
own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.”
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents
of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
YNOT V. IAC | POWERS OF ADMINITRATIVE AGENCIES
G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987
Petitioner: Restituto Ynot

Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated
National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal
Industry, Region IV, Iloilo City
Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Summary
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
1. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished.
3. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
FACTS:
 Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos.
 Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot
sued for recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin.
 After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation.
The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity.
(Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.
RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
 To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another.” The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there.
 The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
 In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
 In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for
the petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even
inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
 Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature,
the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by
a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
 The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution.
OTHER ISSUES
Constitutionality is not always presumed.
 while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is
not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then “will be the
time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant
warning.
 Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing
another distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
 EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates a new rule instead of
implementing an existing law.
 EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of the President’s legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. (whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law)
 In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of
the executive order.
 Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have
been made by the President “in his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
History of Due Process Clause
 The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient.
 This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an “iron rule” laying down an implacable and immutable
command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of
the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require
No Due Process in this case.
 The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
 We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to “the law of the land,” which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as “the
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.”
 This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process
 The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police
power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power
 The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that “present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes
be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy
needs.”
 We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power
 To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals (US v. Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is
not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate.
The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of
the police, to enforce it.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as
affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond
is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
[ GR No. L-24693, Jul 31, 1967 ]
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA +
DECISION
127 Phil. 306
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager
of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities regularly paying
taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and representing
an investment of more than P3 million." [1] (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved
on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting
as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision
in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay
and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as
his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form
has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities
of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the
City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents
or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar
as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party,
in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on
July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain
from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relations to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power
and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination, with
the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident
of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2 That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels
and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then
the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances
of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
his 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted
with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating
in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress
was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of
showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners
against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law,
the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila
to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No.
4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. *** . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people. * * *. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation."[2]
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed
than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., [3] where
the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed
up the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle
of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
[4]
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."[5] It would be, to paraphrase
another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived
or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. [6] Negatively put, police power is "that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."[7]
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable
in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore
that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;[8] providing a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;[9] prohibiting gambling;[10] prohibiting jueteng;[11] and monte;
[12]
prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;
[13]
prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;[14] and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,[15] all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest
the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process.[16] There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case,
be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to
spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile
to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified
as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
[17]
It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." [18] It is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"[19] decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." [20] Questions of due process are not
to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.[21]
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to
meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern
is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be
more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here,
to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to
single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-
class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. [22] As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the
sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable."[23]
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta[24] this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the
only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform. [25]
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here
the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.[26] The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with
this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of
the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold
storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted. * * *. And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community
may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." [27]
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive
when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners
cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty,
which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought
which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is
this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can
do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. * * *. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power."[28]
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state * *
*. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. [29]
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,[30] no longer "retains
its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest." [31] What cannot be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider.[32] How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in
a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a
half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance
void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer
it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.[33] to Adderley v. Florida,[34] the principle
has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is
an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is
this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean."[35]
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., [G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
Facts: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its
Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune
Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals which
rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority
to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council
of Makati by ordinance.
Issue: Whether the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a
private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls?
Held: No, -It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA[4] are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development authority.” [30] It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the metropolis.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan
political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. [56] R. A.
No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function
is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, [57] whereas
in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal
and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
[1] Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 61

designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not
only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and
hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing
developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the
authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 perpetuate such
authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any
person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first secure the necessary
permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary. With regard to the issuance
of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. These provisions are issued
pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to
promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the decree.
[2] SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal
protection, or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or
ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before
receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank
in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued,
or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may
prescribe, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two
hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who are
actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the passage
of this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be required to
make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond duly
executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be security
for the safekeeping of such arms.
[3] In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which
makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d)
which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
[4] The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic
violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized “to set the policies
concerning traffic” and “coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic
management programs.” In addition, the MMDA may “install and administer a single
ticketing system,” fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. C
EMINENT DOMAIN
Roxas vs CA, G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999 / Case Digest
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
FACTS:
 This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner
and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
 Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of
three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in
the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area.
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took
over legislative power from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was
signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
 Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR
a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O.
No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory
acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Hacienda Palico
 On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled
"Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime
Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner
to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the
results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for
compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program."
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary
Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was
addressed as follows:
Roxas y Cia, Limited

Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila.
 Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico
were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under
the CARL; that based on the DAR's valuation criteria, the government was
offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this
offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioner's
rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just
compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DAR's offer, or
upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same,
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land.
 Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent
to the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled
"Request to Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested that a trust
account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be
opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered
value.
 Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with
the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation
for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds.
On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda,
respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
Hacienda Banilad
 On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu,

Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner addressed as follows:
Mr. Jaime Pimentel

Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas
 The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory
acquisition under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other
schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent
DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto.
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary,
sent to petitioner two (2) separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda
Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition
over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the
Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:
Roxas y Cia. Limited

7th Floor, CachoGonzales
Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila.
 Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for

729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares.
 On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land
Valuation Manager a "Request to Open Trust Account" in petitioner's name as
compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. A second "Request to
Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of
said Hacienda.
 On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and
P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for
petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad.
 On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and
Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway
 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6,
1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of
867.4571 hectares.
 On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region
IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioner's
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T44664 and
T44663. The Resolutions were addressed to:
Roxas & Company, Inc.

7th Flr. CachoGonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M
 Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J.

Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to
nonagricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was
applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
 In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed
petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian
reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on
the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as
unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18
degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
 Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11,
1993, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and
Banilad.
 On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N00179646 (BA) with
respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the
CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner
alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had
been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural
production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the
land to nonagricultural.
 In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case
involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian
reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform for determination.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies;
2. W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in
accordance with law;
3. assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to nonagricultural,
W/N this court has the power to rule on this issue.
HELD:
1. YES.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is
not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are:
1. when the question raised is purely legal;

2. when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3. when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5. when the respondent acted in disregard of due process;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter;
7. when irreparable damage will be suffered;
8. when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
9. when strong public interest is involved;
10.when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
11.in quo warranto proceedings.
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its
rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer

beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's land without just compensation to petitioner.
A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a
beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before
this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the
State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired
by the government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides
that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds." Respondent DAR's
opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not
cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did
not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this
compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition
proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due
process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries
necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.
2. NO.
Procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law:
A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL),
provides for two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary.
The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16
of R.A. 6657.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the
farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a
Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post
it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where
the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance
or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty
days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to
make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested
parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice.
Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner
of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the
DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision
of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation.
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the
identification of the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the law is
silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR
issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in
his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a
Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO
then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a
"conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to
the prospective farmerbeneficiaries the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views,
suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is
asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification
of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the estate
exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all
papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR
Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property. The BLAD shall
prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a
Notice of Acquisition for the subject property. From this point, the provisions of Section
16 of R.A. 6657 then apply.
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice
of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner,
the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to
the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry ou such regulation, the owners
are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The CARL was not
intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power
of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private
property.
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was
amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1,
Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference
meeting were expanded and amplified in said amendments.
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands enumerated under
Section 7 of the CARL. In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO prepares the
Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF), as the case may be, over a particular landholding. The MARO notifies the
landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC and prospective beneficiaries of
the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least one week before the scheduled
date and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the ocular
inspection and investigation by identifying the land and landowner, determining the
suitability of the land for agriculture and productivity, interviewing and screening
prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC
prepares the Field Investigation Report which shall be signed by all parties concerned.
In addition to the field investigation, a boundary or subdivision survey of the land ma
also be conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. This survey shall delineate the areas
covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the landowner, areas with
infrastructure, and the areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey and field
investigation, the MARO sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly
authorized representative inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the farmer
beneficiaries, representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department of Agriculture (DA),
nongovernment organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties. At
the public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues
that may be raised in relation thereto, inputs to the valuation of the subject
landholding, and other comments and recommendations by all parties concerned. The
Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF which
files shall be forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and
validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the VOCF/CACF. He
then forwards the records to the RARO for another review.
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the
number of governmen agencies involved in the identification and delineation of the land
subject to acquisition. This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to the landowner before
the conduct of the field investigation and the sending must comply with specific
requirements. Representatives of the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the
Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal delivery with proof of service, or by
registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is under CARP
coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which
area he shall retain. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend
the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field
investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and determining its
suitability for agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the Notice of Coverage shall be
posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal and barangay halls
where the property
is located. The date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal
Office to representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries.
The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of the
landowner and the various representatives. If the landowner and other representatives
are absent, the field investigation shall proceed, provided they were duly notified
thereof. Should there be a variance between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to
whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture,
the degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a
composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further
investigation. The team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the field
investigation, the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and
Land Use Map, a copy of which shall be furnished the landowner "by personal delivery
with proof of service or registered mail with return card." Another copy of the Report
and Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the municipal or barangay
halls where the property is located.
B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano,
sent a letter of invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to
petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico.
The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and
the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With regard to Hacienda
Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of Hacienda
Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually
attended the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting
on behalf of petitioner corporation. The Minutes was also signed by the representatives
of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was sent or
conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a
Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR.
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to
the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O.
No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating
Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of
invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The procedure in the sending of these
notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the
owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and
therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and
employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the

landowner by "personal delivery or registered mail." Whether the landowner be a
natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal
delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative Orders
also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between
natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the Revised
Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before
the DARAB is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
Notices and pleadings are served on private domestic corporations or partnerships in
the following manner:
Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant is
a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors or partners.
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent,
or any of its directors.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation

before the DARAB and the regular courts are served on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those through whom
the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action.
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner
corporation.
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its
haciendas, the areas found actually subject to CARP were not properly identified before
they were taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist that the lands were
identified because they are all registered property and the technical description in their
respective titles specifies their metes and bounds. Respondents admit at the same time,
however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive
agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the
land.
The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two
haciendas, but only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and
only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of
1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The haciendas are
not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax declarations over the haciendas
describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and "forest, sugarland, pasture land,
horticulture and woodland."
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically
requires that the land subject
to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts
of land. Before Notices of Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas
of the landholdings were not properly segregated and delineated. Upon receipt of this
notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether
these retained portions were compact or contiguous, and which portions were excluded
from CARP coverage. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not show that petitioner,
through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that
petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in
those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is
exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total area
of his agricultural land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained,
which shall be compact or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the area chosen for
retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain on
the portion or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total
area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions
both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the
Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over the two of these four titles. The land
covered by two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares
thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where
these portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four
titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied
participation therein, The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report,
however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and
received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive
Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice
requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner,
however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an
essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his
right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
3. NO.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to
resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing
the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of
the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
Belen v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 76182, 195 SCRA 59 - March 11, 1991
FACTS:
A small portion of land (Lot No. 10, Block 18 at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila) measuring
a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc.,
was leased to Pedro M. Belen, which the latter has built a house.
Respondents Alfredo Juliano and his family occupied a portion of the said land and later
on bought a house standing thereon, not belonging to Belen and moved in without the
latter's knowledge.
On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that
Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one-half of the
rental to Manotok Realty, Inc. Belen v. Court of Appeals
Later a fire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano
not to build anything on the land any more. However, on Juliano's pleas, Belen acceded
to Juliano's continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy
should not be longer than two and a half (2 1/2) years.
Juliano failed to leave after the stipulated term. Belen v. Court of Appeals
Read: Manosca v. Court of Appeals
 Metropolitan Trial Court: Ordered defendant to vacate the land.

 Regional Trial Court: Reversed the judgment of MTC by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1670.
 Court of Appeals: Resolved against Belen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Manotok Realty, Inc divested its title to the National Housing
Authority and was there an appropriate action of eminent domain. Belen v. Court of
Appeals
HELD:
The petition was hereby granted and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals,
reversed.
Presidential Decree No. 1670 was struck down as "unconstitutional and therefore, null
and void."
Also refer to:
 G.R. No. 55166 (Manotok, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.)

 G.R. No. 55167 (Tiongson, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al)
The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by
which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties
or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Belen v. Court of Appeals
Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an
expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so.
Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the questioned
decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the
expropriation of the properties, moot and academic.
Read: People vs. Copro
In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated."
This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested
her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds
only with copies of the decrees to support its request. Belen v. Court of Appeals
This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when it
exercises the power of eminent domain.
The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners')
right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally,
they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just
compensation." Belen v. Court of Appeals
This Court further observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the
decrees provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that
"of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court,
whichever came first."
Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the
City Assessor.
PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance
therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of
possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to
convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries
thereof. Belen v. Court of Appeals
Case Brief: City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta

G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death. As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang
Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for
the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is
authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, ” to make such
further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it
shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section
1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting
police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does
not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order
to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of
his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety,
health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that
his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to
the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and
regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The
state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters
relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is
not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent
positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside
of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

CASE DIGEST
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims
that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the
private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because
other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons
owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the
particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to
exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and
determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of
the expropriation.
HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right
of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right
to inquire to.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ZAIN B. ANGAS, GR Nos. 60225-26,

1992-05-08
Facts:
petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation
and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure
and development projects throughout the country, filed two... complaints for eminent
domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and Civil Case No. 2277,
respectively. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots... situated
at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-
electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary
works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith.
Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After responsive pleadings
were filed and issues joined, a series of hearings before court-designated
commissioners were held.
Issues:
The basic issue in this original action for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National
Power Corporation is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on
just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the
Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416
which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.
Ruling:
Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in
Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be
interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits, following the... principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general
terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the
general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same
class or of the same nature as... those specifically enumerated (Crawford, Statutory
Construction, p. 191; Go Tiaco vs. Union Ins. Society of Camilan, 40 Phil. 40; Mutuc vs.
COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228)
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the... trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal
interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties
expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the
payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of... interest involved in the joint judgment
of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and
not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Plaintiff National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled entity,
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is vested with the power of eminent
domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the
construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution
throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendant
spouses Gutierrez. Chiefly, the only controversy existing between the party’s litigants is
the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation fee of the
expropriated properties. It is the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals
committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full
market value of the land of P 10 pesos per square meter traversed by its transmission
lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement (for
the passage of transmission lines) transmits no rights, except that of the easement. Full
ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not totally deprived of
the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except
those that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits
that if full market value is required, then full transfer of ownership is only the logical
equivalent otherwise, they are to pay only P1 per square meter as identified by the
corporation commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING:
While it is true that plaintiff is (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below
said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is
allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires
cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected
portion of their property.
The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land
for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.

Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
En Banc
[MENDOZA, J.]
FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the
eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a
taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays
to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime
time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of
prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.

ISSUE#1: Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional
question on the assailed provision?
HELD#1: YES.
[W]e have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies
to provide free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and
other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential
election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should
it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses
again because it is required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to
question the validity of §92.
ISSUE#2: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and
unlawful taking of private property for public use without just compensation?
HELD#2: NO.
Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to
amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires.”

CONSTI2 Case Digests From Course Outline

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONSTI2 Case Digests From Course Outline

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CONSTI2 Case Digests from Course Outline

THEORIES OF STATE & CONSTITUTION

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.]

1. Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the State’s police powers

ICHONG v HERNANDEZ DIGEST CASE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Therefore, petition is denied.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]

Petitioner: Restituto Ynot

Law Applicable: EO No. 626-A

127 Phil. 306

[1] Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 61

ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,

Roxas y Cia, Limited

 On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu,

Mr. Jaime Pimentel

Roxas y Cia. Limited

 Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for

Roxas & Company, Inc.

 Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J.

1. when the question raised is purely legal;

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer

A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657

B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation

C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway

Belen v. Court of Appeals

Juliano failed to leave after the stipulated term. Belen v. Court of Appeals

Read: Manosca v. Court of Appeals

 Metropolitan Trial Court: Ordered defendant to vacate the land.

Also refer to:

 G.R. No. 55166 (Manotok, et al. v. National Housing Authority, et al.)

Read: People vs. Copro

In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated."

Case Brief: City Govt of Quezon City v Ericta

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ZAIN B. ANGAS, GR Nos. 60225-26,

Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.

You might also like