EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS ACTIVITY #1

1. Gumabon vs. PNB, GR#202514, 7/25/2016

Facts:
On August 12, 2004, Anna Marie filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages
before the RTC against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the PNB Delta branch manager
Silverio Fernandez (Fernandez). The case stemmed from the PNB's refusal to release Anna
Marie's money in a consolidated savings account and in two foreign exchange time deposits,
evidenced by Foreign Exchange Certificates of Time Deposit (FXCTD).

Anna Marie, together with her mother Angeles and her siblings Anna Elena and Santiago, (the
Gumabons) deposited with the PNB Delta Branch $10,945.28 and $16,830.91, for which they
were issued FXCTD Nos. A-993902[5] and A-993992,[6] respectively.

The Gumabons also maintained eight (8) savings accounts[7] in the same bank. Anna Marie
decided to consolidate the eight (8) savings accounts and to withdraw P-2,727,235.85 from the
consolidated savings account to help her sister's financial needs.

Anna Marie called the PNB employee handling her accounts, Reino Antonio Salvoro (Salvoro),
to facilitate the consolidation of the savings accounts and the withdrawal. When she went to the
bank she was informed that she could not withdraw from the savings accounts since her bank
records were missing and Salvoro could not be contacted. Anna Marie presented her two
FXCTDs, but was also unable to withdraw against them. Fernandez informed her that the bank
would still verify and investigate before allowing the withdrawal since Salvoro had not reported
for work.

Anna Marie sent two demand letters.

After a month, the PNB finally consolidated the savings accounts and issued a passbook for
Savings Account (SA) No. 6121200.[9] The PNB also confirmed that the total deposits
amounted to P-2,734,207.36. Anna Marie, her mother, and the PNB executed a Deed of Waiver
and Quitclaim dated May 23, 2003[10] to settle all questions regarding the consolidation of the
savings accounts. After withdrawals, the balance of her consolidated savings account was
P250,741.82.

The PNB sent letters to Anna Marie to inform her that the PNB refused to honor its obligation
under FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992,[11] and that the PNB withheld the release of the
balance of P-250,741.82 in the consolidated savings account.

Anna Marie pre-terminated, withdrew and/or debited sums against her deposits. She filed before
the RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages against the PNB and Fernandez.

Anna Marie contended that the PNB's refusal to pay her time deposits is contrary to law. The
PNB cannot claim that the bank deposits have been paid since the certificates of the time
deposits are still with Anna Marie.
Anna Marie stated that the PNB had already acknowledged the account's balance in the Deed of
Waiver and Quitclaim amounting to P2,734,207.36. As of January 26, 2004, the remaining
balance was P250,741.82. PNB presented no concrete proof that this amount had been
withdrawn.
nna Marie prayed that the PNB and Fernandez be held solidarily liable for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, costs of suit, and legal interests because of the
PNB's refusal to honor its obligations.
In its answer,[15] the PNB argued that: (1) Anna Marie is not entitled to the balance of the
consolidated savings account based on solutio indebiti; (2) the PNB already paid the $10,058.01
covered by FXCTD No. 993902; (3) the PNB is liable to pay only $10,718.87 of FXCTD No.
993992, instead of the full amount of $17,235.41; and (4) Anna Marie is guilty of contributory
negligence.

First, Anna Marie is not entitled to the alleged balance of P250,741.82. The PNB's investigation
showed that Anna Marie withdrew a total of P251,246.81

The PNB offered photocopies of the PNB's miscellaneous ticket[18] and the manager's check as
evidence to prove the withdrawals. The PNB argued that unjust enrichment would result if Anna
Marie would be allowed to collect P-250,741.82 from the consolidated savings account without
deducting her previous withdrawal of P251,246.81.

Second, Anna Marie is not entitled to receive $10,058.01 covered by FXCTD No. 993902. Based
on the PNB's records, Anna Marie pre-terminated FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, and
used the deposit, together with another deposit covered by FXCTD No. 993914 (for $8,111.35),
to purchase a foreign demand draft a facsimile copy of Anna Rose's Statement of Account (SOA)
[19] from the PNB Bank to prove that the amount covered by FXCTD No. 993902 was already
paid.
Third, Anna Marie is only entitled to receive $10,718.87 instead of the full amount of $17,235.41
he amount of $1,950.00 was part of the money used by Anna Marie to purchase the manager's
check; (2) the amount of $2,566.54 was credited to Current Account No. 227-810961-8 owned
by Anna Marie's aunt, Lolita Lim; and (3) the amount of $2,000.00 was credited to Current
Account No. 2108107498 of Anna Marie and Savings Account No. 212-5057333 of Anna
Marie/or Angeles or Santiago/or Elena (all surnamed Gumabon). Hence, these amounts should
be deducted from the amount payable to Anna Marie.
Finally, t he PNB alleged that Anna Marie was guilty of contributory negligence in her bank
dealings.
In her reply
Anna Marie argued that the best evidence of her withdrawals is the withdrawal slips duly signed
by her and the passbooks pertaining to the accounts. PNB, however, failed to show any of the
withdrawal slips and/or passbooks, and also failed to present sufficient evidence that she used
her accounts' funds.
The RTC ruled in Anna Marie's favour.
he RTC held that the PNB had not yet paid the remaining balance of $10,058.01 under FXCTD
No. 993902. Anna Marie's SOA,[22] which the PNB relied upon, is a mere photocopy and does
not satisfy the best evidence rule.
The PNB failed to obtain the deposition of a PNC Bank officer or present any other evidence to
show that the amounts stated in the SOA came from FXCTD No. 993902.
the alleged pre-termination of FXCTD No. 993902 on March 11, 2002, is hard to believe since
the certificate shows that the last entry was made on March 24, 2003, with a reflected balance of
$10,058.01.
the PNB appealed before the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC's ruling.
The CA held that the PNB had paid the actual amounts claimed by Anna Marie in her complaint.
The CA noted Anna Marie's suspicious and exclusive dealings with Salvoro and the Gumabons'
instruction to Salvoro to make unauthorized and unrecorded withdrawals. Hence, there are no
entries of withdrawals reflected in Anna Marie's passbook.
The CA also considered Anna Rose's SOA as proof that the PNB had paid the remaining balance
of $10,058.01 on FXCTD No. 993902. The CA held that the PNB verified the SOA and it was
corroborated by the affidavit[25] of the PNB Branch Operations Officer in New York. The CA
stated that the RTC should have allowed the taking of the deposition of the PNB bank officer.
The CA also relied on the PNB's investigation and concluded that the PNB had already paid the
amounts claimed by Anna Marie
Anna Marie moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the CA's decision; hence, the present
petition.

Issues:
Anna Marie is entitled to the payment of the following amounts:(a) $10,058.01 or the
outstanding balance under FXCTD No. 993902;(b) $20,244.42 for FXCTD No. 993992;(c)
P250.741.82 for SA No. 6121200; and (3) Damages.

Ruling:
We grant the petition and reverse the CA 's ruling.
PNB failed to establish the fact ofpayment to Anna Marie in FXCTD Nos. 993902 and 993992,
and SA No. 6121200.
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b)
competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce a belief in its
existence or nonexistence.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the competence of evidence is the
best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the original copy of
the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry.[36] he
CA should not have admitted the subject documents even if the PNB tendered the excluded
evidence.
We rule that the SOA is inadmissible because it fails to qualify as relevant evidence. As the RTC
correctly stated, the SOA "does not show which of the amount stated therein came from the
funds of Certificate of Time Deposit No. A-993902.
The affidavit of the PNB New York's bank officer is also inadmissible in the light of the
following self-explanatory provision of the Rules of Court:"Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, x x x."[42]Formal offer
means that the offeror shall inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into
evidence. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if
this has been previously marked and identified.[43] he RTC had correctly stated, the PNB should
not have allowed the withdrawals, if there were indeed any, without the presentation of the
covering foreign certificates of time deposit. There are no irregularities on Anna Marie's
certificates to justify the PNB's refusal to pay the stated amounts in the certificates when it was
presented for payment.
herefore, the PNB is liable for Anna Marie's claims since it failed to prove that it had already
been discharged from its obligation.
PNB is liable to Anna Mariefor actual, Moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees
for its negligent acts as a banking institution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 16, 2011 decision and June
26, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed. The October 26, 2010 decision of
the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with MODIFICATIONS. Thus, the Philippine
National Bank is ORDERED to pay Anna Marie Gumabon the followin

2. Atienza vs. Board of Medicine, GR#177407, 2/9/2011.

Facts: Due to her Lumbar parts, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was
referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory
tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. This, she underwent kidney operation in 1999,
September. On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband Romeo Sioson, filed a complaint
for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the board of medicine against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation. It was alleged in the complaint that the
gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner,
consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left
non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Among the evidence presented are certified
photocopy of the results of the ultrasound and X-ray conducted to Editha with the interpretation
that both of her kidneys are in their proper anatomical location.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors who conducted the kidney operation are liable for gross
negligence despite the evidence presented were mere photocopies.

Held: Yes. To begin with, it is a well settled rule that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine. It is the
safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting
a matter of fact. This, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that
Editha’s kidneys before, and after the time of her operation, as with most human beings, were in
their proper anatomical locations.

3. Dr. Llana vs. Biong, GR#182356, 12/4/2013

Facts:
On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue,
Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat Juan stopped the
car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red A few seconds after
the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car's rear end,
violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car's rear end collapsed and its rear
windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero.
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business. First week
of May 2000 Dra. dela Llana's condition did not improve despite three months of extensive
physical therapy
Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release
the compression of her nerve.
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued
Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC)
She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident medical
expenses an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury.
Dra. dela Llana's illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular
accident.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving. A whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden
jerking of the spine in the neck area. The CA reversed the RTC ruling. Dra. dela Llana failed to
establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by
preponderance of evidence. The interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra.
dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy.

Issue:
Whether Joel's reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llana's injury.

Ruling:
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder.
The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder.
The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe petition
unmeritorious. In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel's
negligence and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana.

She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel's negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury,
and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. None of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary
facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed
below.

These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched
assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures. The medical
certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for
the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC. However, even if we consider the
medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value
for being hearsay. It was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical
certificate. However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify
and affirm the contents of the medical certificate.

The medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel's
reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the
whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows
that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in
neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel's reckless driving caused her whiplash
injury without violating the rules on evidence.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.

Principles:
the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and the damages.
Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-
delict before we determine Rebecca's liability as Joel's employer. She should show the chain of
causation between Joel's reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this
foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then
proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
n civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the
burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence. courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.