PEOPLE VS.

DIVINAGRACIA
GR 240230
FACTS:
Through a confidential informant, police were informed that a certain alias Ensol (later
identified to be Divinagracia) was selling marijuana and decided to conduct a buy-bust operation
to arrest the culprit. On the operation, the police undercover, along with the informant who
identified and introduce the police to the suspects that they want to buy drugs, would buy a
sachet of marijuana with the marked money. After the completion of the transaction, the
undercover police would identify himself as one and arrest Divinagracia and one of his
companions at that time who was identified as Sy. Kagawad Villar was the Barangay Kagawad
at the time of the incident and was requested to witness the inventory of the evidences such as
the drugs and marked money against the accused. The suspects were accused of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. They defended
themselves with denial and claim it was a frame-up. RTC deemed Divinagracia and Sy to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. RTC brushed of theviolation of procedure found in Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 in that no representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media were
present after the seizure as it held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs has
been duly preserved by the unbroken chain of custody of the corpus delicti. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
No. The legality of entrapment operations involving illegal drugs begins and ends with
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It provides the chain of custody rule; outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their
integrity and evidentiary value.
The implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, (IRR) on the other hand,
filled in the void of the law by providing the details as to the place where the physical inventory
and photographing of seized items should be accomplished and added a proviso on permissible
deviation from the strict compliance with what the law requires on justifiable grounds. Simply
stated, the law commands that the seized drugs must be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure and the same must be conducted in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, and three other witnesses, namely: (a) a representative from the media;
(b) a representative of the DOJ; and (c) an elected public official. Compliance with the
requirements forecloses any opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence
in any manner. Non-compliance without justifiable grounds is tantamount to failure in
establishing the identity of the corpus delicti, and essential element of the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of the accused.In the present case, it is
undisputed that the police officers failed to comply with the three-witness rule under Section 21
mention above. The prosecution never hid this fact nor made any attempt to deny that only
Kagawad Villar witnessed the inventory of the confiscated items. No justifiable ground was
given for the breached in mandatory procedure. Because of this, the evidence become
inadmissible in court as the can no longer be sure if the evidence are tampered or not. Hence, the
accused are acquitted of their crimes.
 PEOPLE VS. SANTOS
G.R NO. 243627
FACTS:
On January 16,2016, accused-appellant was arrested for Illegal sale and Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Operatives from Anti-Illegal Drug- Special Operation task
group of the Valenzuela City police conducted a buy bust operation after receiving an
information that accused-appellant was said to be in possession of illegal drugs. They recovered
two plastic sachet of crystalline substance and were tested positive for shabu. The officers
brought accused-appellant to the police station where they allegedly marked, inventoried and
photographed the seized items.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant is liable for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs
HELD:
No, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC Valenzuela in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused, appealed that there was a non-compliance in the
chain of custody. Police officers failed to immediately mark the items at the place of arrest
without reasonable ground makes the evidence inadmissible. As a defense, they accomplished
the marking, inventory and photography at the police station. However, the CA observes that
there is still deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct. Of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a representative or media. Police officers stated that there was
no available at the time of arrest. The court finds that they fail to show earnest effort to comply
with the said requirement. Therefore, CA acquitted, Xandra Littaua from violation of Illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
 PEOPLE VS. JAAFAR
G.R. NO. 219829
FACTS:
At 8:00 a.m. on September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of
Police, Police Superintendent Alberto Capacio Larubis that a certain "Mana" was selling
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) at the port area barangay located just beside the police
station. Mana was later identified as Jaafar.
Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house. Chief Larubis instructed SP04 Enrico
Morales to form a team composed of SPO3 Tabunyag, PO3 Perez, P03 Hasim, PO2 Canete, PO2
Bobby Rey Bucoy, POl Insang, and PO1 Marlon Takazi M. Look and to schedule a buy-bust
operation the next day. He also instructed the team to coordinate with agents from the PDEA.
PO1 Look was designated as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela
Cruz were designated as the arresting officers. On September 11, 2009, the buy-bust team left the
police station at 1:45 a.m. and went to Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at
the door of his house and asked them if they were buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the
affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked ₱500.00 bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside the house. Gani
came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who
immediately lit a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team. The police
officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Eventually, the arresting officers
caught up with him 30 meters away from his house.
In his defense, Gani testified that he was at an internet café located near the police station
at 2:00 a.m. on September 11, 2009. After stepping out of the establishment, Gani was suddenly
apprehended by unknown persons, who later identified themselves as PO1 Look and P02 Bucoy.
Meanwhile, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet cafe at 12:00 m.n. on September 11, 2009,
watching people play video games. He left after two hours and made his way home. Upon
entering an alley, Jaafar saw six persons headed towards him. One of them pointed a gun at him
and told him not to run. Out of fear, he ran towards the main road. However, the six persons,
who turned out to be police officers, caught up with him.
They conducted a body search but found nothing since Jaafar was only wearing boxer
shorts and at-shirt. Jaafar was detained after his arrest and brought to the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the City Hall of Isabela the next day. In its Decision dated May 15, 2012, the RTC
convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it
acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence.
Jaafar filed an appeal before the CA but ruled that although the sachet of shabu was not
formally offered in evidence during trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and the
forensic chemist. Being part of their direct testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of
the
case. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not err in considering
the shabu as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt
despite the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered
by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds that
the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant non- compliance with
the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust
team marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do
not show that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no
evidence to show that the physical inventory was done in the presence of accused-appellant or
his representative, representatives from the media and the DOJ, and an elected public official.
The buy-bust team had an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by law
to be present during the physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received the
confidential tip early in the morning. He immediately instructed SP04 Morales to form a buy-
bust team and coordinate with agents from the PDEA. The buy-bust team had ample time to
contact an elected public official and representatives from the media and the DOJ. The
prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buy bust operation had been carefully
planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution
relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution did not even
offer any explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under the law.
Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there was no
reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of the
exacting standards under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Police officers are presumed and are
required to know the laws they are charged with executing.
 CORONEL V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 214536
FACTS:
On May 19, 2010, the accused-petitioners were arrested during the operation with a
search warrant covering a building at No. 1734 F. Muñoz Street, Pasay City conducted by
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency in coordination with Philippine National Police in which
they are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating Article II l, Section 7 and 15 of the R.
A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002).
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the accused-petitioners before the Court on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the petitioners do not assail the determination that they violated Art. II, Sec. 15
of the R. A. No. 9165 and so the conviction as regards to this was sustained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has established that the petitioner knowingly visited a
drug den (Violation to Section II).
HELD:
No, the drug test results which was the basis of the prosecution to imply that petitioners
were aware of the nature of the place as a drug den before visiting it despite that the drug tests
were conducted right after their arrest is not justifiable and insufficient.
The prosecution assumed that the petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before
their arrest, however there was no showing of evidence if how long petitioners were at the
alleged drug den or how long drugs had been in their system. There is no basis to assume that the
petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest and thus, at the location of the
arrest.
Furthermore, there was no attempt to show that the petitioners knew the nature of the
alleged drug den or even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to
be in possession of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody found in the act of using,
selling or buying illegal drugs nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same. There were
no acts alleged or evidence found which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the
place as a drug den.
Therefore, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was granted. As a result,
petitioners were acquitted of violation to Sec. 7 of the R. A. No. 9165. However, petitioners were
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of violation of Sec. 15 Art. II of the said Republic
Act.
 ESTIPONA VS. HON. LOBRIGO
G.R. 226679
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of
shabu. Under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.
On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed to enter a plea of
guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia).
The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly
prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court.
Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the
Supreme Court's rule-making power and therefore violative of the equal protection clause, he
filed a Petition before the SC to declare Sec. 23 unconstitutional.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that (1) Congress was not
impleaded, (2) the constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally, (3) the proper
action should have been a petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition fails to satisfy
the requisites for judicial review.
ISSUES:
Whether section 23 of republic act no. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the
power of the supreme court to promulgate rules of procedure.
HELD:
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make
exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive
ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken
the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young
citizens.
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical
matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that
everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the Court
may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular
trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it
was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
The power of Congress (to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines under Sec. 13,
Art, VIII of he 1935 Constitution), however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In
In re: Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up
to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional.
The rule making power of this [1987] Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. The separation of powers among the three
co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively
repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its
legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or
modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the
law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon.
Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if
it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.
 PEOPLE VS. MORILLA
G.R. NO. 189883
FACTS:
During a checkpoint, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang and Ruel Dequilla were caught illegally
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a
Starex van with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance.
During the trial, Mayor Mitra argued that he was without any knowledge of the contents
of the sacks and explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because
the latter bought his fishing boat. Likewise, Morilla insisted that he thought what he was
transporting were wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other
passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of
the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
ISSUES:
Whether or not intent or knowledge is material in determining the culpability of an
accused in drug cases.
HELD:
No, intent or knowledge is not material in determining the culpability of an accused in
drug cases.
The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since
it is punished as an offense under a special law. Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in
flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to
another." It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following
the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of
criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
 PEOPLE VS. LAYLO
G.R. NO. 192235
FACTS:
In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian
clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street, Calumpang,
Binangonan, Rizal. While the police officers were in front of a sari- sari store at around 5:40
p.m., appellant Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, "Gusto mong
umiskor ng shabu?" PO1 Reyes replied, "Bakit mayroon ka ba?" Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, "Dos (₱200.00) ang isa." Upon hearing
this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo.
Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor
then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was
carrying. PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from
Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
forensic testing. Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the laboratory
examination on the specimens submitted and found the recovered items positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The police officers charged
Laylo forattempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as
basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet
containing 0.02 grams of shabu. The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of
the facts. Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the
street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1
Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic sachets in
each of their pockets.
Afterwards, they were brought to the police station where, despite protests and claims that the
drugs were planted on them, they were arrested and charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Laylo is guilty under Sec. 26(b) Article II of R.A. 9165.
RULING:
 Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment. From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they
were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the
substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same
plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court.
Even the consideration of ₱200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the
police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves
as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not
consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of
dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the
following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:
xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical;
xxx
Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of
the intended crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor. The sale was
aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under
arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there was
an attempt to sell shabu. In addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of
corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence.
Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he failed to substantiate
his claim. The witnesses presented by the defense were not able to positively affirm that illegal
drugs were planted on appellant by the police officers when they testified that "they saw
someone place something inside appellant’s jacket." In Quinicot v. People, we held that
allegations of frame-up and extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses in
most dangerous drugs cases.
They are viewed by the Court with disfavor, for such defenses can easily be concocted
and fabricated. Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and reckless
to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de Guzman, we have ruled that peddlers of illicit
drugs have been known, with ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their
wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not.
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time
and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and
delivery of the prohibited drugs.
 Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ official duties should prevail
over the self-serving denial of appellant.