People v.
Trigo his wife was already seriously wounded, the appellant would not have left her alone in
Art. 247 Death Under Exceptional Cirsumstances
Facts: For the death of his wife, Alicia Dequiña Trigo, the accused-appellant, Bertito
Trigo, was charged with the crime of PARRICIDE at Roxas City, and under the
information which reads:
That the above-named accused deliberated to kill his estranged wife ALICIA
DEQUIÑA TRIGO, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, assault and stab his
said wife with a knife (sevillana), thereby inflicting stab wounds on the different parts
of her body which caused her death thereafter.
The prosecution's version of the killing is based mainly on the testimony of Marcos
Fuentes. He testified, inter alia, that he knew the spouses Bertito and Alicia Trigo
because he bought from them their house; that at about nine o'clock in the morning,
he was at the market of the town of Pontevedra; that he met Alicia Trigo at the said
market and even greeted her; that he did not notice at the time whether Alicia was
with a companion or not; that after a while, a commotion took place; that when he
stood up he saw Bertito Trigo stabbing Alicia; that he saw blood spurting from Alicia's
left chest; that Bertito Trigo was at the time in front of Alicia and holding the latter with
one of his arms; that there were no other persons near Alicia when he saw the latter
bleeding; that Alicia later fell on the ground; and that he was about 50 meters from
where the incident took place.
Upon being arraigned, the court a quo rendered its decision convicting Trigo of the
offense charged. Not satisfied with the decision, Trigo appealed.
Issues: WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
THE FF GROUNDS:
The prosecution did not prove the motive of the appellant for killing his wife - NO
It was not him but a certain Orline Buaco who stabbed his wife - NO
Ruling:
The law is well-settled that motive is relevant only where the Identity of the person
accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where there are no
eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons. In the
case at bar, the Identity of the accused was positively proved by the eyewitness.
Hence, motive is irrelevant.
In rejecting this defense, the trial court correctly observed significant
factors/circumstances surrounding the incident which belie appellant's defense that it
was not he who stabbed and killed Alicia Trigo.
Firstly, there is great improbability of Orline Buaco's alleged first attack hitting his wife
if the said attack were aimed at the accused. Secondly, there is greater improbability
of the deceased Alicia Trigo sustaining multiple stab wounds if it were the appellant
whom Buaco wanted to stab as then the latter would have aimed all the five other
thrusts of the weapon at the accused and not at the deceased Alicia Trigo. Thirdly,
there was failure not only to shield her from the attack but also failure to retaliate
within the duration of the next five attacks upon the deceased. Fourthly, knowing that
the care of a policeman especially after Buaco had already fled, and there was no
more danger that the latter might attack him. Fifthly, after appellant had secured
police protection at the police station, appellant never returned to personally attend to
his wife and to ascertain if she received timely medical attention at the provincial
hospital. All these facts and circumstances were considered by the trial court to
bolster one thing-that accused was really estranged from his wife and it was he who
killed her.
The direct and circumstantial evidence established at the trial sufficiently prove the
guilt of accused-appellant. As aforestated, the trial court's findings of fact are
generally given due respect. Appellant has the burden, therefore, to convince this
Court that a departure from this rule is justified upon satisfactory showing that the trial
court misapplied some facts of weight and substance as would alter the result of the
proceedings. He failed to do so. The judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS TALISIC
DOCTRINE: Death under exceptional circumstances
FACTS: Version of to the Prosecution: The facts as gathered from the testimonies of
Prosecution Witnesses Dr. Regino Gaite, Danilo Talisic and Victoria Sapyo Tautho
are as follows:
Sixteen-year old Danilo Talisic testified that at dawn of May 8, 1988, his mother,
Janita Talisic, was stabbed to death with a chisel by his father Jimmy Talisic, who
afterwards displayed the bloodied weapon before their altar. Realizing that his mother
was already dead, Danilo decided to bring his younger sister to their grandfather's
house.They passed by the house of their aunt, Victoria Sapyo Tautho, a sister of the
deceased, and related to her the bizarre killing. Danilo also related the killing to his
paternal grandfather, Simon Talisic, who thereupon proceeded to the house of his
son, Accused-appellant Jimmy Talisic, and brought the latter to the military camp at
Tipanoy, Iligan City. Substantially corroborating Danilo's testimony, Victoria Sagio
Tautho stated that she found her sister's lifeless body sprawled on the floor of their
living room, as well as the crimson-drenched chisel at the altar.
Dr. Regino Gaite who examined the body of the deceased and issued the necropsy
report said that the multiple wounds resulted in hemorrhage and shock which
ultimately caused the death of the victim.
Version of the Defense: Testifying for his defense, accused-appellant declared that
between the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 in the early morning of May 8, 1988, she (sic)
was requested by his wife to fetch water from a well as they had earlier (planned) to
go to the city together. As requested, he then fetched water from a well about 200
meters away from their house which took him about 30 minutes to do so. When he
came back from the well and while climbing up the stairs, he was surprised to see a
man lying on top of his wife. He tried to draw his bolo and stabbed the man who,
however, was able to run away. He tried to run after him but did not overtake him. He
came back to their house but only to be met by a stabbing thrust from his wife using a
chisel. He was not hit as he was able to parry the blow, thus prompting him to grab
the chisel from his wife. He lost his temper and stabbed her to death.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not finding that accused-appellant had killed his
wife under exceptional circumstances — NO
RULING: NO. The Decision of the trial court convicting Jimmy Talisic y Villamor of
parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The accused-appellant argues that he killed his wife under the exceptional
circumstance provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro. . . .
An absolutory cause is present "where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed." Article 247 is an example of
an absolutory cause.
Having admitted the killing, the accused must now bear the burden of showing the
applicability of Article 247. Accordingly, the defense must prove the following:
1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter,
under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
We stress that the burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three elements
rests on the defense. Most critically, Appellant Jimmy Talisic must prove that he
caught his wife in flagrante delicto; that he killed her while she was in the very act of
voluntary sexual intercourse with another man or immediately thereafter. Sadly for
him, he has miserably failed to do so.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find no reason — as indeed
appellant has failed to provide any — to overturn the trial court's well-reasoned ruling.
Verily, the claim of the accused-appellant is thoroughly unworthy of belief. He was
unable to controvert the finding of the trial court as follows:
The version of the accused that he caught the victim in flagrante delicto of adultery is
quite difficult to swallow hook, line and sinker. It is very unlikely for a wife in her right
senses to indulge in marital infidelity knowing that her husband is just around the
corner and would soon come back because he was just away for a short while to
fetch water. If there was tryst, the victim could have chosen to perpetrate the
adulterous act not in the living room of their very own house. The plausible place of
assignation would have been outside to avoid impending danger of being caught.
One thing more, it is very unlikely that after the victim was caught in flagrante, she
would just stay put, watch her husband run berserk, chasing her paramour with a
lethal weapon (bolo). The normal reaction of one in this kind of dreadful situation is to
swiftly flee from the scene while there is yet time.
If the accused was attacked by the victim with a chisel, would he not use his bolo
since he was admittedly raging mad due to the victim's infidelity? Why used [sic] a
chisel when the bolo in hand was more handy?
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that appellant did indeed surprise his wife in
flagrante delicto, his account of subsequent events is implausible. It is difficult to
believe his story of how, upon catching sight of the infidelity, he immediately drew his
bolo and hacked but missed the other man who, amazingly, had sufficient time to pull
up his pants, button up, elude said attack and escape unscathed. Further, his claim
that he did not recognize the man or even see his face is irreconcilable with his
insistence that the color of the latter's short pants was yellow. His declarations as to
the location of the alleged paramour's short pants are also conflicting. Worse, the
defense of appellant is belied by his own incredible and inconsistent testimony.
The foregoing demonstrate that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable
to this case because appellant failed to prove the essential requisite of having caught
his wife and her alleged paramour in flagrante delicto. Indeed, appellant succeeded
only in demonstrating his utter lack of credibility on the witness stand.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.

DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Death Under Exceptional Circumstances
FACTS:
Francisco Abarca is found by the RTC Leyte to be guilty of the complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder and is penalized with death. He
committed the crime on July 15, arming himself with an unlicensed firearm (armalite)
M-16 rifle, with an intent to kill Khingsley Paul Koh whom Francisco’s wife, Jenny,
was having an affair with. The affair began when the accused was studying for the
1983 Bar examinations in Manila while Jenny was left behind in their Tacloban
residence. On said day the accused had just arrived home at around 6pm and saw
the two having sex and when he was seen, he ran away and went to the house of PC
Soldier C2C Talbo. He then searched for Koh which he found at a mahjong place and
shot him three times. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room
adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired
by the accused.
The accused raises his defense that he only acted out of uncontrollable
passion as he felt deceived, betrayed and disgraced by his wife’s infidelity which
disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his
acts. They also negate the qualifying circumstance of treachery which the Court
attached to his crime, and that he should have been convicted under Article 247 of
the RPC instead.
ISSUE:
WON the accused should have been convicted under Article 247 of the RPC
WON there is treachery present in this case.
WON the accused is guilty of murder for the death of the Amparado couple.
RULING:
YES. The Court rules that the trial court erred in convicting the accused with a
complex crime. Given that Article 247 entails the infliction of physical injuries or death
to the victim under exceptional circumstances, it falls under the present case.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim
in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following
elements:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both
of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not
say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the
death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the
accused's rage. Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
punished with destierro, but that is intended for his protection. The Court rules that
under Article 247, the crime that the accused committed is not murder. Said Article
does not define nor provide for a specific crime, but grants the accused a privilege or
benefit for the killing or inflicting injuries to another under the circumstances
mentioned.
NO. It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances,
not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or
other qualifying circumstances, we cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this
case.
NO. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired
shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault as he performed
negligence. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of
Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and
one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent
of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to
fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.)
Thus, the Court modifies the decision, from the inflicted injuries to the Amparados he
shall be sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
NOTES: Destierro, or banishment, as the prescribed punishment for committing
Article 247 is,, as held in a case, intended more for the protection of the accused than
a punishment
People vs Oyanib
DOCTRINE/TOPIC:Death under exceptional circumstances
FACTS: Accused, Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza was found guilty of parricide for the
death of his wife Tita T. Oyanib and of Jesus Esquierdo. On September 11, 1995 the
Iligan City Prosecutor filed with the RTC 2 separate informations charging accused
with murder and parricide the first informtion states that On September 4,1995, the
accused was armed with a 6 inches hunting knife attacked Jesus which caused his
death. And the other information stated that on the same night with the same knife
attacked his wife Tita, which resulted in her death. The accused voluntarily
surrendered himself on Sept. 11, 1995 to the police and was detained. The RTC
arraigned accused on Jan. 17, 1996, accused pleaded not guilty.
Manolito and Tita werer married on Febuary 3 1979, had 2 children and lived
in Iligan City. In 1994 the couple separated;Manolito kept the custody of the children.
Tita rented a room on the second floor of Edgardo. At 9:30 of Sept 4, 1995, Edgardo
was watching TV at the sala downstairs, and they heard a commotion from upstairs.
When Edgardo and his family checked, they saw Tita wearing a duster lying on the
floor with a lot of blood and Manolito stabbing Jesus. Jesus was wearing a pair of
long pants. When accused left Edgardo called the police
SPO3 Eduard Tubil received information that there was a stabbing incident
at Llagas residence at Purok 3-A Tambacan Iligan City. When SP03 Eduard Tubil got
to the scene he saw the lifeless bodies of Jesus who was wearing a t-shirt and pants.
He collected a knife as evidence. He checked up of Tita and also saw that she was
dead
On Sept 5, 1995 the Doctor examined the bodies and stated that the cause of death
was due to the multiple stabs they sustained.
Manolito's defense was that even if they were separated, he still tried to win Tita’s
heart but apparently she was uninterested. Then one day Manolito saw Tita with
Jesus who were intimate with each other by the hanging bridge at Brgy Tambacan.
Manolito confronted them but they ignored and threatened Manilito. Manolito saw a
letter from his daughter of his son’s failing grade which required a meeting which
requires the parents to meet with the teacher. Manolito went to Tita’s house to inform
her when he climbed the steps of the house he heard “sounds of romance” from the
room so he pried the door with a knife and was shocked to see that Jesus was on top
of Tita with his pants down. Jesus kicked Manolito but the kick made Jesus fall. So
Manolito stabbed him. Tita went away to grab a bottle of Tanduay and hit Manolito on
the head. In the commotion Manolito stabbed Jesus again many times. Tita stabbed
Manolito with a broken glass of the Tanduay bottle, so Manolito also stabbed Tita.
Then Edgardo came
ISSUE: WON the accused can use Art 247 “Death of physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances ” as a defense, but only his penalty was lowered
RULING: Yes Art 247 is applicable in this case because all the elements were
present. And that he invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory
and an exempting cause. “An absolutory cause is present ‘where the act committed is
a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. ’
NOTES:
Elements of Art 247
That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person
That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter
That he has not promoted or facilitated prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he
or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse
"The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage of overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity.Simply put, the killing
by the husband of his wife must occur with her flagrant adultery."
"It must be resorted to only with great caution so much that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately after"
According to People vs Wagas The vindication of a Man’s honor is justified because
of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it
does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto, and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much
so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBEN TAKBOBO
(ART. 247 – Death under Exceptional Circumstances)
FACTS:
Ruben Takbobo (“Ruben”), a middle-aged fisherman, was charged with killing his wife
before the Cebu City RTC. On or about 11:00 P.M. on Mar. 25, 1991, in Brgy.
Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu, Ruben, husband of Lucia Takbobo (“Lucia”), hacked and
stabbed the latter with a knife and bolo, inflicting multiple fatal hack and stab wounds
that resulted in her death. Ruben entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment, but,
considering the gravity of the offense, the lower court ordered both the prosecution
and the defense to submit evidence in order to determine motive and the
circumstances surrounding the crime. Record shows that Sps. Ruben and Lucia
Takbobo were married in 1969. They had nine children, one of whom is already dead.
The couple, together with their youngest daughter, 6-year old Madilyn, and a nephew
were residing at Brgy. Guiwanon when the fatal incident happened. The other
Takbobo children were staying with a certain David Manus since, according to the
sworn statement of their daughter, Marybel, "they were afraid of their father."
According to Sps. Takbobo’s daughter, Madilyn, on the night of the incident, at
around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, she woke to the sound of quarreling between her
parents. According to her, the quarrel transpired because Ruben was unable to pay
his debt to a certain Danilo. While they were quarreling, Ruben got a hunting knife
and a bolo and hacked Lucia starting at her feet, on the neck, on the hands, armpit,
and breasts. 16-year old Irene Takbobo, daughter of Sps. Takbobo, also testified
before the trial court and stated that on one occasion before her mother's death, and
apparently for no reason, one of her fingers was cut and the third finger of her older
sister was split by a bolo wielded by her father. Appellant Ruben “appears to have
had a propensity for inexplicable resort to violence against the members of his
family”, based from both statements. Shortly thereafter, Ruben went to the police
authorities and told them about the same.
On the other hand, Appellant Ruben would like to impress upon the Court that he
killed his wife because he caught her sleeping with another man. According to him,
on the wee hours of March 25, 1991, after a night of sea fishing activity, “he was
surprised when, upon opening their door, he saw his wife sleeping with another man,
who happened to be their neighbor, Cadiz Catulong (“Catulong”). He tried to kill him
by stabbing him but his wife pushed the man who then immediately jumped out of the
window. As a result, his wife was hit by his thrust. He then found out that his wife had
no panty. He tried to look for Catulong but failed to find him. He immediately related
the incident to the police though he was not able to execute his affidavit as he was
then very confused.”
On October 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of
Parricide, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as to pay the costs
ISSUES:
WON the appellant can avail of the extenuating circumstance of Article 247. – NO.
WON the court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of (1) passion
and obfuscation; (2) voluntary surrender; and (3) voluntary plea of guilty in the
October 1991 judgment.
RULING:
There was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the sexual act
between Lucia and Catulong. Appellant’s inconsistencies during his stint on the
witness stand (initially stating that he witnessed his wife having carnal relations with
another man when he arrived, to his statement of seeing his wife’s seducer already
putting on his pants when he arrived), coupled with his uncorroborated and self-
serving testimony failed to tilt the scales of justice in his favor. Furthermore,
appellant’s statement of (1) "(his) purpose was to kill the man but she pushed the
man and my wife was killed”; and (2) that his wife had no panties on, was contrary to
the physical evidence exhibited, as represented by the pictures taken of the latter,
wherein (1) her cause of death was from multiple hack and stab wounds; and (2) that
his wife was apparently wearing panties. Finally, the testimony of Pat. Renaldo
Singco, the police officer to whom Ruben surrendered to, claims that Ruben never
mentioned that he surprised his wife in the act of infidelity or that, on that occasion,
Catulong was present or was inside their house or, for that matter, anywhere in the
vicinity thereof. The “normal human reaction” would have been to tell that fact to the
police right after the stabbing incident when appellant went to the PNP station and/or
during the investigation thereafter.
Indeed, the last two mitigating circumstances are present herein. The records of the
case confirm the compliance by appellant with the requisites for the appreciation of
voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty. However, with respect to the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, both requisites of such
circumstance is wanting.
In the case at bar, the appellant was not able to prove by convincing evidence that he
saw his wife sleeping with another man. Hence, as correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, that allegation of the appellant "is an afterthought to lessen his liability," and
that what appears is that appellant killed his wife because "he was not in his right
mind." Therefore, appellant cannot be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
NOTES:
Requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation (“Crime of
Passion”)
there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
and
said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his moral equanimity.
In the case at bar, there are two present mitigating circumstances (voluntary
surrender & voluntary plea of guilty). As such, the defense argues, while the Solicitor
General recommends, that with the presence of the two mitigating circumstances, the
penalty should be reduced to reclusion temporal as accorded in par. 5, Art. 64 of the
RPC. However, the court argues that Art. 64 is only applicable to divisible penalties
and, since the crime of Parricide imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
the penalty imposed herein is is indivisible and should be governed by Art. 63 of the
RPC.
People v. Manero (1993)
Art. 248 Murder
Facts: The Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside an
eatery in Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary
to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards.
Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed.
Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA,
starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and
Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links
with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is
the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay
leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the
conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr.
Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.
Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a placard on a street-post
beside the eatery. The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the
cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo."
Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same
message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery.
Later, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants,
proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim. Edilberto drew his
revolver and fired at Bantil’s forehead. They grappled for its possession until "Bantil"
was extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again
fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" managed to seek refuge in
the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround
the house and not to allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of
hemorrhage.
Fr. Tulio Favali arrived on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez.
While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside
to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some
fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved
and rejoiced.
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter
simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point,
Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)?
Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your
head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali
dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted
Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark,
Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired
anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain
to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers,
his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-
in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance.
On their defense of alibi, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they
heard gunshots that they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay
Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members and
co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to where the
crime took place
Issues: WON the trial court erred in the ff:
disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would
tend to establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; - NO
that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; - NO
that there was only one (1) gunman, Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no
showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their
proximity at the time to Edilberto - NO
Ruling:
The consistent ruling of this Court that no physical impossibility exists in instances
where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or
some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the place where
he allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime.
It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr.
Peter Geremias whom the group targeted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was
deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest.
It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive
of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there
is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present. The findings of the court
a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as evidenced
by the concerted acts of all the accused.
Art. 8 There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit a crime and decide to commit it.
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not
merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage
murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero
brothers and their militiamen. 1) Appellants all assumed a fighting stance to
discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. 2)
They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other
occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage.
Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the
crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in
concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles.
While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their
collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
Considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali was attended with abuse of
superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse,
exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved
nor expressly pleaded in the complaint.
G.R. No. 111206-08 October 06, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Article 248 MURDER
FACTS:
Three separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee
for the shooting of Roland Chapman, Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman. He is
charged with TWO murders (Chapman and Hultman) and ONE frustrated murder
(Leino). The three crimes occurred in once continuing incident, on July 12, 1991,
when the three friends went to a party and drank until past 3am and Maureen
requested Leino to be walked home as she did not want to let her parents know she
was going home so late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the
car and listened to the radio.
As they started walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped
on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and
asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to
check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and
handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. Accused did not bother to
look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it. When Chapman
came and asked the accused why he is bothering them Teehankee shot Chapman
and then afterwards shot the other two.
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3)
people looking on and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The
three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas
to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21
VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352
Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO
CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located
at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. The first
shot were heard by security guards Florece and Cadenas who were on duty, along
with driver Mangubat who was resting in his quarters. Cadenas noticed in full the
plate number of the getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as
silver metallic gray. Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had
a good look at him.
During the police investigation, witnesses of the event, Cadenas, Mangubat,
and Leino who had survived his gunshot wounds, identified the accused in three
different line-ups set by the police to positively confirm Teehankee’s commission of
the crime. Nevertheless, the accused pleaded not guilty, claiming that the lower court
had erred in finding their testimonies as credible and that the prosection has failed to
find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
NO. Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3)
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. We have no reason to
doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the crime
was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away
when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-
motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense
counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure
he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very
sure. It could not have been somebody else.” Five (5) minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that precisely
because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related
that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with
his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant
belonged to an influential family. The accused’s claim that Cadenas was only beaten
up by the FBI in order to force him to incriminate the accused is also belied by the fact
that Cadenas ’entire family was allowed to saty with him at the NBI headquarters and
likewise extended protection.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun
with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot
exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of
the positive identification of appellant. Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on
Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant
consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence
on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the
gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said
statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed
Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were
looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the
gunman.
 As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we
hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence
shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on
the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's
car. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by
appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time
between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period
which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of
the crime without risk to himself
Thus, the Court MODIFIES the decision, with Teehankee found guilty for
HOMICIDE for shooting Roland Chapman, MURDER qualified by Treachery for
shooting Maureen Hultman, and FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified by treachery for
shooting Jussi Leino.
PEOPLE VS ENGUITO
DOCTRINE: Murder
FACTS: Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver who while driving his motorela with his
wife on board, from Lapasan towards Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, picked up a
passenger near the Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the
deceased, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the
Marcos bridge towards his home. After travelling a distance of 300 meters more or
less and near the Sacred Heart of Jesus Montessori School, Requerme's motorela
was bumped by a white motor vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing
it to run very fast for the next 400 meters until it reached the area in front of Wheels
Marketing. Because of the violent push the motorela turned around facing the
direction from where it came from and fell on its right side.
Felipe Requerme screamed for help thinking that his wife was pinned underneath. A
tamaraw pick-up stopped near them and he immediately informed that they were
intentionally hit by the white vehicle. A short time later a police mobile patrol arrived
and with the assistance of the people around, they pushed the motorela to return it to
its natural position. Requerme and his wife were brought to the Operation Kahusay ug
Kalinaw (OKK), a 24-hour police station where all victims of crimes report in Cagayan
de Oro. At the OKK the driver of the white service pick-up who bumped his motorela
arrived. Requerme identified the driver as Thadeos Enguito whom he pointed inside
the courtroom. Later, Requerme and his wife were brought to the city hospital for
medical check up. They were also brought to the Northern Mindanao Regional
Training Hospital to identify the deceased.
PO3 Ricardo Catiil was assigned as driver of the mobile division patrol no. 07 on
September 22, 1991 together with SPO1 Albert Calingasan and Armando Mana.
They parked the mobile car at the other end of the Marcos bridge along C. M. Recto
Avenue at about 2:30 in the morning. Shortly thereafter, he saw a car coming from
Cagayan de Oro poblacion crossing the bridge running fast with a damage on its right
portion. He estimated the speed at 80 kph. Observing something unusual they
pursued the vehicle, switched on their siren and caught up with the vehicle at Km. 3,
2.6 kilometers from the place of incident. Catiil and the other two policemen alighted
from the car and accosted the driver and brought him to the OKK. He noticed that the
face of the driver was bleeding which he believed may have been caused by the
splintered windshield. Examining the vehicle, they noticed that in addition to the
broken windshield, the right portion of the signal light and the head light were also
damaged. The right front tire was flat. When asked, the driver admitted that he
bumped someone at the Marcos bridge.
SPO1 Albert Calingasan, supporting the testimony of Ricardo Catiil who was the
driver of the mobile patrol car 07, declared that they were at the middle of the Marcos
bridge when they saw a Ceres Kia car running fast and they pursued it until it stopped
at Km. 3. After delivering the accused at the OKK, Calingasan together with his two
companions drove back to the place of incident. They saw blood on the street. There
were also bits of human flesh found on the cemented road and the right leg was
completely severed. Calingasan explained that when they followed at the hospital and
viewed the body of the victim, they saw that the right leg was severed from the body.
PO3 Virgilio Maquiling was assigned with mobile patrol 05 of the Cagayan de Oro
Police Station at about 2:00 o'clock dawn of September 22, 1991. They were on
patrol near the Golez residence almost near the foot of the Marcos bridge facing
Iligan City. Maquiling and his companions saw a Ceres Kia coming from Liceo de
Cagayan and turned right at the bridge and went towards the place where the incident
occurred. Maquiling observed that the way the vehicle was driven, the driver may
have been drunk. Twenty minutes later, the same vehicle came back with its right
portion damaged. Suspecting that something untoward may have occurred, he called
mobile patrol 101 to intercept the vehicle. Not long after a PU driver informed
Maquiling and his companions that a motorela was involved in a traffic accident at the
other end of the bridge near Licoan Bakery and Restaurant. Proceeding to the place
of incident, he saw a body of a person at Abellanosa Street which is located
immediately below the bridge about 10 feet high. He also saw that the right leg of the
person was hanging at the Marcos bridge railing about seven meters away from the
body. Maquiling, using his radio, called the paramedic. They immediately brought the
body of the victim to the NMRTH.
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares who conducted the autopsy on the body of Achumbre
declared that he suffered massive hemorrhage and, in fact, it was impossible for the
victim to survive even with the most modern medical attendance. There was massive
accumulation of clot and no amount of surgery could have saved the victim. Death
was almost instantaneous.
Georgita Achumbre knows the accused because he used to come to their house and
he and her husband were both employed with G & P Builders and they used to play
basketball together. At 5:00 o'clock in the morning of September 22, 1991 she
received news of her husband's death. Together with her brother-in-law she
proceeded to the NMRTH and saw the body of her husband lying on a table and
covered with white cloth. She was informed that her husband was dead on arrival.
From the hospital she went to the police station to retrieve the wallet of her husband
which contained P3,000.00. When she confronted the accused at the police station
why he killed her husband, Thadeos Enguito answered that he was mauled by her
husband and it was an act of revenge. The accused explained that the victim became
angry when he was made to pay the bills of Enguito's friend who was seated on the
other table.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found
that since the prosecution's evidence showed that accused killed the victim by means
of motor vehicle, he should be guilty of the crime of murder. Appellant Thadeos
Enguito was then found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
WITH LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals correctly convicted the accused-appellant— YES
RULING: YES. The crime committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of
murder with less serious physical injuries sentencing him to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use of motor
vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was
perpetrated by means thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor
vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By
his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the
crossing. Accused-appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police
instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already
noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his
pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased who was hit when he
(Achumbre) was at the railing of the Marcos bridge. Accused-appellant further used
the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer
away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police
mobile patrol which was following him.
NOTES:
Motorela - The passenger room is built around the motorbike and has two facing
benches and a seat on each side of the driver.
People vs Whisenhunt
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Murder
FACTS: On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with the
murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo.
During the trial the following circumstances were successfully proven by the
prosecution without a shadow of doubt that:
Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellant’s condominium unit on
September 23, 1993;
On September 24, 1993, accused-appellant’s housemaid was looking for her kitchen
knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom;
On September 25, 1993, accused- appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the
dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellant’s
bedroom;
Accused disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna;
Accused also disposed of Elsa’s personal belongings along the road going to Bagac,
Bataan;
The mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa,
were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed;
Hair specimens found inside accused-appellant’s bathroom and bedroom showed
similarities with hair taken from Elsa’s head; and
The bloodstains found on accused-appellant’s bedspread, covers and in the trunk of
his car, all matched Elsa’s blood type.
The events on Sept 23, 1993 are as follows: (1) 8:30 am Demetrio the driver of
Accused reported for work. He was told to fetch Elsa at her parent’s house. (2) 10:30
am he saw Elsa and brought her to the accused's condo. (3) 2pm he was asked to
deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the personal manager. Then he was asked to
stay until 10pm to send Elsa home. He waited for Elsa but he has not heard from the
accused. Then he went home
The events on Sept 24, 1993 are as follows: (1) Demetrio reported for work. At 12
noon, lucy asked if he saw a knife that was missing, then overheard that the missing
knife was at the accused’s bedroom. So demetrio got the knife and gave it to lucy. (2)
3:40 pm Demetrio was asked to buy cigarettes and gave it to lucy. (3) At 5pm he was
asked to go home
The events on Sept 25, 1993 are as follows: (1) 8am he reported at the accused’s
condo and he followed up with his salary, Amy Serrano was also there so he asked if
Elsa was at the accused’s condo; accused answered yes. Demetrio did not see Elsa.
Amy handed Demetro black plastic bags which he gave to the accused. (2) he was
ordered to drive lucy to cubao to get clothes from his home (3) since lucy was going
home Demetrio dropped lucy at Farmer’s Market. The next day, the accused
confessed that he killed Elsa and mutilated her body, and then helped him to get rid
of the body. Before they reached Bataan they threw the bag where Elsa’s body was
and her clothes into the river. Accused took something from a bag, tore it to pieces
and threw it in the river as well. Demetrio was scared of the accused since then.
Demetrio was told to clean the car so that it won't smell. Accused and Demetrio
started off for Manila. As they passed a place called Kabog-kabog, he saw the
accused take out an ATM card, he burned, twisted it and threw it out of the window.
They arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue Demetrio asked the accused
if he could get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left, the
accused told him, “Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you
money.” Accused then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. Then he
told the police, the police investigated and all of demetrio’s testimony was true.
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: WON Accused is guilty of Murder.
RULING: Yes Accused is guilty of murder.
Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself,
establish that accused-appellant committed
the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the
relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. Abuse of superior strength must be
shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case, nobody witnessed the
actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrio’s testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the
pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his
superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from
viewing the photograph of accused- appellant that he has a rather small frame.
Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim
was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victim’s
head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the
killing to murder. In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa, he further
cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her
body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The
sight of Elsa’s severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs
offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer
cannot help but feel utter
pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains. In a case with strikingly
similar facts, the Court ruled that “Even if treachery was not present in this case, the
crime would still be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of
the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal
Code is "outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim.”
NOTES: Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or
infanticide as long as the following circumstances are present:
With Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity
In consideration of a price, reward or promise
By means of inundation fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, standing of. Vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste or ruin
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public
calamity
With evident premeditation
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Elements of Murder
That a person was killed
That the accused killed him
That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
That the killing is not parricide or infanticide
The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused
through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must
be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts;
and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of
the guilt of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS on damages and civil indemnity.
PEOPLE VS ULEP
FACTS: Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking
insensibly to himself in his room. His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan, convinced him
to come out of his room and talk to him, but Wapili told Leydan that he could not really
understand himself. After a while, Wapili went back to his room and turned off the
lights. Moments later, the lights went on again and Leydan heard a disturbance inside
the room, as if Wapili was smashing the furniture. Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan
called Pastor Bonid of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray
over" Wapili, but they could not enter the latter's room as he became wild and
violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan.
Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two (2) of his neighbors attempted to tie Wapili with
a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger than
anyone of them. Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on
running without any particular direction.
Thus, Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor, and
asked for assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando, he banged Plando's
vehicle parked outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1
Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all members of the
PNP assigned to secure the premises of the nearby Roman Catholic Church of
Kidapawan.
At around four o'clock in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Ulep together with
SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board an Anfra police service
jeep. The three (3) police officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep
when they saw the naked Wapili approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was
armed with is disputed. The police claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a
rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a
rattan stool.
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his
weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and
continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only about two
(2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle,
hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1
Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his head and literally blew his
brains out.
The post mortem examination of the body showed that Wapili sustained five (5)
gunshot wounds: one (1) on the right portion of the head, one (1) on the right
cheek, one (1) on the abdomen and two (2) on the right thigh. Wapili died due to
the multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Omandac concluded that the shots were fired at
close range, perhaps within twenty-four (24) inches, judging from the powder burns
found around some of the wounds in the body of the victim, and that the wound in the
head, which caused the victim's instantaneous death, was inflicted while "the victim
was in a lying position.”
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder and sentencing
him to death. The means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the
alleged aggression is not reasonable because the victim, Buenaventura Wapili,
was already on the ground, therefore, there was no necessity for the accused to
pump another shot on the back portion of the victim's head.
ISSUE: WON the crime qualifies to murder — NO
RULING: NO. The accused is guilty only for the crime of homicide for failure of
the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to murder. This Court
disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of Wapili by
accused-appellant was attended by treachery, thus qualifying the offense to
murder. We discern nothing from the evidence that the assault was so sudden and
unexpected and that accused-appellant deliberately adopted a mode of attack
intended to insure the killing of Wapili, without the victim having the opportunity to
defend himself. The killing of Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant
went to the scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after having been
summoned for assistance. The situation that the victim, at the time accused-appellant
shot him in the head, was prostrate on the ground is of no moment when considering
the presence of treachery. The decision to kill was made in an instant and the
victim's helpless position was merely incidental to his having been previously
shot by accused-appellant in the performance of his official duty.
Indeed, to hold him criminally liable for murder and sentence him to death under the
circumstances would certainly have the effect of demoralizing other police officers
who may be called upon to discharge official functions under similar or identical
conditions. We would then have a dispirited police force who may be half-
hearted, if not totally unwilling, to perform their assigned duties for fear that
they would suffer the same fate as that of accused-appellant.
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the
penalty of reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years. There being an incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of a duty, the penalty should be one (1) degree lower, i.e., from
reclusion temporal to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 69, in relation to Art. 61, par. 2,
and Art. 71, of the Code, to be imposed in its minimum period since accused-
appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and there was no aggravating
circumstance to offset this mitigating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the minimum period
of prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years.

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise
be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with
authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. They must always bear in
mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human
rights.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA,
JR., accused-appellants.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 248 MURDER
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were found guilty for the crime of Murder qualified by
treachery, with Juanito and Honorio as accessories in killing Arnulfo B. Tuadles. On
November 1, 1996, the appellants along with the victim whom Alberto “Ambet” was
friends with, were inside the International Business Club playing cards such as poker
or “pusoy dos”, ordinary poker, or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens
of thousands of pesos. Since one of their friends failed to show, only the two of them
played and continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to
visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of
November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an
argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented
two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the
course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind
his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to
accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution
was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to
how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the
testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was caused
by Tuadles ’refusal to pay Antonio’s winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation
where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio’s gun from atop a
sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles ’hand and
they grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared,
Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had
actually pulled the trigger.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in these
succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards, prosecution
eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home. They remained at
Antonio’s residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls
and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Antonio,
accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada.
All the accused pleaded not guilty and continued to rest their arguments on
self-defense, and that the court erred in finding credibility in SG Bobis ’testimony
since he initially stated that he did not see the actual incident when he later negated
this and told that he had indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind and
shoot Tuadles in the head pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis ’
testimony, according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness ’
unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellants were guilty for the crime of Murder, with Nieto
and Cartalla as accessories.
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that given the positions of Nieto and Cartalla as
security guards, they should have immediately placed Antonio under arrest rather
than accompanying him to his house. Bobis ’reasoning that he was initially controlled
by fear and confusion ergo his denial at first is accepted by the Court since his fear is
justified given the accused’s threats towards them. This Court also recognizes that
the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not
uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the
credibility of witnesses.
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was
given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was no match
to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active
duty of the San Juan Police Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering
SG Bobis ’lowly station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one of
intimidation, if not fear.
Furthermore, the accused Antonio fails to provide all the elements necessary
to prove that he was acting out of self-defense, as there was no proof of an unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. Having admitted responsibility for the killing of
Tuadles, appellant Antonio claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On this score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he had not
been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
Third, his surrender was voluntary.
Lastly, the Court rules that there is no treachery present in the case, all
evidence points out that the incident was an impulse killing and made in the spur of
the moment. It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to
pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with
treachery.
Thus, the Court finds Antonio guilty of HOMICIDE, Nieto with accessory to
the crime of HOMICIDE and Cartalla ACQUITTED as the prosecution failed to prove
that he had profited nor any motive in concealing the crime.
*Cartalla is actually the investigating officer in the case and only accused as
accessory because of his failure to submit the laser sight equipped in the gun used by
Antonio.
People v. Tac-an(1903)
Art. 248 Murder
Facts: Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition and of murder, imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases.
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then 18-years-old, and the deceased Francis Ernest
Escaño III, 15-years-old, were classmates in the 3rd-year of highschool in Tagbilaran
City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the
same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and his
parents lived and on those occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a
handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from
Renato. Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and
Francis turned sour.
The strained relationship between the two was aggravated when Francis learned that
Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him,
apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their
relationship occurred when graffiti appeared on the wall of the 3rd-year high school
classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx
gang and describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual). Renato attributed the graffiti to
Francis.
On December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the high school building to attend
his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook prepared for their Mathematics
class on his chair, and approached the teacher to raise a question. Upon returning to
his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was angered by
what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis was seated. Francis,
however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato's scrapbook. A
fistfight would have ensued but some classmates and two teachers intervened. While
the English III class was still going on, Renato slipped out of the classroom and went
home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom approximately 15 minutes later.
The Mathematics class had just started in Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into
the room, shut the door and holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon
sighting Francis seated behind and to the right of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at
Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis
and Ruel jumped up and with several of their classmates rushed forward towards the
teacher's platform to seek protection from their teacher. Renato fired a second time,
this time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students
rushed back towards the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the
classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the classroom.
Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the door, the only door to
and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher's platform nearest the door and
for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door. This
time, Francis was hit on the head. He fell and remained sprawled on the floor
bleeding profusely.
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher,
apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached
Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room.
Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he
is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more.
Renato then left with two remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room
15. Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he
found some teachers and students and ordered them to lock the door and close the
windows, in effect holding them as hostages.
After some time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers arrived and surrounded
the faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, they called upon Renato to
surrender himself. Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's father who, by this
time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to surrender himself. Renato then turned
over his gun. The PC soldiers rushed him to the Hospital. Francis died before
reaching the hospital.
Issues: WON the trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder
based on the ff:
There was no treachery present - NO
There was no evident premeditation - YES
For B29 discharge of firearms:
WON the accused is guilty of Discharge of Firearms - NO
WON the accused is guilty of Illegal possession of firearms aggravated by the fact
that the firearm was used to kill Francis - YES
Ruling:
The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the following
factors:
The Court pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room
15 had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the
second floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as
he stood on the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel
sought to dash through the door.
Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to
warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and
talking to Ruel Ungab.
That Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only
be ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and
the other students were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to
evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances
underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out
in a manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against
Renato.
Finally, the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still
alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed
with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of execution
which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to himself.
We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and
that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the
same as a generic aggravating circumstance.
In order that evident premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of
(a) the time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action
manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the
crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination
of the offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time
Renato left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was
testimony to the fact that before that fatal day, anger and resentment had welled up
between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when
Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis.
Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
For B29 discharge of firearms
In this case accused Renato has not fulfulled the elements of the violation of
discharge of firearms
(1) That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person. Although
has shown that this element was present when he had fired 5 bullets in order to kill
Francis. But the sedond element (2) That the offender has no intention to kill that
person. was not fullfilled because in order for the accused to be guilty of the
discharge he should have no intention to kill the victim. The porpose of Renato must
have been only to threaten francis
Art. 254. Discharge of firearms. — Any person who shall shoot at another with any
firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, unless the facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute
frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, homicide or any other crime for which a
higher penalty is prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.
Elements of Discharce of firearms (1) That the offender discharges a firearm against
or at another person (2) That the offender has no intention to kill that person.
Accused was guilty of the illegal possession becase the essential elements
in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms are present. Those
elements are as follows
: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who
possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. The
unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession, which includes
not only actual physical possession, but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.” And it was aggravated by
the special circumstance that P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable
penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where
such firearm was used to destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human
life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into
account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987
Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866.
People v. Pugay (1988)
Art. 248 Murder
Facts: The deceased Bayani Miranda, a 25-year-old retardate, was at the fiesta fair at
the town plaza of Cavite where the supposed murder took place. Sometime after
midnight, a group of inebriated men including accused-appellants Fernando Pugay
and Benjamin Samson arrived.
When the group saw Miranda walking nearby, they started making fun of him, making
him dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. It is to be noted that Miranda and the
accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay. Pugay then
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its
contents on the body of Miranda.
Eyewitness Eduardo Gabion, who was seated in the ferris wheel reading a comic
book at the time, told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of
pouring the gasoline. The accused Samson then set Miranda on fire.
Several spectators including the ferris wheel operator rushed to help extinguish the
flames by pouring water and sand, and wrapping Miranda with rags.
Gabion would later testify that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when
they noticed the deceased burning.
The accused Pugay admitted in his statement to the police hours after the incident,
that he poured a can of gasoline believing it was merely water, and that Samson set
the deceased on fire. Meanwhile, Samson alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline, but did not see the person who set him on fire. The accused-appellants
later repudiated their statements claiming they were extracted by force.
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged which
was the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed to weaken the defense.
Issues: Whether or not the accused 1) Pugay and 2) Samson should be convicted of
murder.
Ruling:
NO. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused Pugay is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel
and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused
knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid
could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making
fun of the deceased.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some
reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For
the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid
poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he
would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.
Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he
merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not
relieve him of criminal responsibility.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined
and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which
such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused
Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning.
US vs Baluyot
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Art 248 Murder
FACTS: At the general election of 1916, accused Jose I. Baluyot lost to Conrado
Lerma who was elected governor of the Province of Bataan. As a result of this
contest, a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot that
Governor Lerma was persecuting him. On August 1918, Baluyot went to Bataan,
taking with him a revolver, and went to the capital to meet with the Governor in his
office. After the Governor’s meeting with Anjuarez, Baluyot entered the office. The
evidence shows that at the time Baluyot re-entered the governor's office, the latter
was sitting behind his desk in an ordinary office chair, unarmed. Baluyot approached
the desk and seemed to be asking the governor for his revolver. Immediately upon
asking the governor about his revolver, and discovering that he was unarmed,
Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired. The bullet first fired by Baluyot entered the
frontal region of the right shoulder blade of Governor Lerma. The line of direction
followed by the ball indicates that the accused directed the shot in somewhat
downward direction and that Governor Lerma was in all probability reclining
backwards in the chair at the instant the shot struck him. The governor immediately
arose, desiring to make good his escape, started to run, and Baluyot, raising his
revolver, again fired. The ball struck Governor Lerma in the region of the right
shoulder blade and passed through the body an inch or two from the wound made by
the first shot. The firing of the second shot was seen by Antonino Aranjuez, whose
attention had been attracted by the noise of the first shot. Aranjuez was able to see
the scene where Baluyot, with his arm extended, fired the second shot at his fleeing
victim. The governor at this moment had his right hand raised to his already wounded
shoulder and was running in a direction away from his assailant rather than towards
him. After the second shot was fired, Governor Lerma continued his flight along the
corridor and, instead of attempting to pass out to the right into the recorder's office,
which would have exposed him to the danger of another shot while passing through
the open space, he took refuge in a closet at the end of the corridor. Once within, he
shut the door and placed himself in a position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer,
who vainly attempted to open the door. The governor then began to call aloud for
help, and Baluyot, judging the position of the governor's head from the direction of the
sound thus emitted, fired his revolver in the direction indicated. The bullet passed
through the panel of the door and struck Governor Lerma in the forward part of the
head near and above the right temple. Death ensued in about two or three hours,
without recovery of consciousness. Baluyot, immediately after the tragedy, stepped
over to a window of the room overlooking the public square and calling to a squad of
Constabulary, who were directing themselves to the provincial building, indicated that
they should come up. At the same time he threw his revolver to the ground, with three
empty shells and others that had not been discharged. Upon the arrival of the
Constabulary he surrendered without resistance.
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of murder
RULING:
The qualifying circumstance of alevosía (treachery) essential to the crime of murder
was found to be present in the case at bar not only because of the sudden and
unexpected manner in which the fatal assault with a deadly weapon was begun
against the defenseless victim, but also because of the peculiar conditions under
which the offense was finally consummated. Even though a deadly attack may be
begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of alevosía, yet if the assault is
continued and the crime consummated with alevosía, such circumstance may be
taken into consideration as a qualifying factor in the offense of murder. In the herein
case, an assault was begun suddenly and unexpectedly by the firing of a pistol by the
accused at his victim, who was unarmed. As the latter attempted to flee, he was
pursued by the accused and driven to take refuge in a closet, where he called aloud
for help. The accused then tried to force open the door but was unable to do so,
owing to the resistance of the deceased from within. The accused, however, judging
the position of the deceased from the cries emitted, fired his pistol in the direction
thus indicated. The bullet passed through the panel of the door and, entering the
head of the deceased, produced death. Hence, the Court ruled that the final attack
was characterized by alevosía and the crime perpetrated was murder even though
the attack had not been originally begun with alevosía.
NOTES:
Alevosía-treachery
Elements of treachery(1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or infanticide as long
as the following circumstances are present:
With Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity
In consideration of a price, reward or promise
By means of inundation fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, standing of. Vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste or ruin
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public
calamity
With evident premeditation
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Elements of Murder
That a person was killed
That the accused killed him
That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
That the killing is not parricide or infanticide
G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INOCENCIO GONZALES, JR., accused-appellant.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ART 248 MURDER
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 around 2:30 pm, the families of Noel Andres and
Inocencio Gonzales were on their way to the exit of Loyola Memorial Park. The
appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids,
while the private complainant was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife
Feliber Andres, his two-year-old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-
law, Francar Valdez. At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the
accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant
Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant’s car
window.
NOEL’s VERSION: He had calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving to
which the accused replied, “Accidents are accidents, what’s your problem.” He saw
the accused turn red with anger, deciding to turn back, he was then stopped by
Inocencio’s son, Dino, and said, “Anong problema mo sa erpat ko?” Threatened, he
went back inside his car and partially opened the window to talk to Dino. Suddenly,
one of his passengers said "Binaril kami". He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and
saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and
nephew Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were
shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot.
INOCENCIO’S VERSION: Accused claims that Andres had cut his path leading to
their almost collision. He then claims that Noel got out of his car and repeatedly
cursed at him, "Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong
magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo." The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly
replied, "Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang."
Dino, the appellant’s son, who rode in another vehicle decided to go back
when he did not see his father’s car behind him. When Dino arrived at the scene, he
confronted Andres and the two had an altercation and Andres suddenly reached for
something inside his vehicle. This prompted the accused to get his own gun, an
automatic Glock pistol from his glove compartment and ready to shoot. This is when
the appellant’s daughter Trisha who was riding in Dino’s car arrived at the scene,
walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father
and, in the process, held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his
hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost
his balance and the gun accidentally fired.
The Court finds the appellant guilty for the complex crime of Murder, Double
Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder for shooting Noel but instead hitting Feliber,
John and Kevin. The accused contends his testimony and claims he had not intended
to shoot anyone during the incident and only got his gun from his car when he thought
Noel was doing the same.
ISSUE:
WON Treachery exists in the crime committed.
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of Murder,
Double Frustrated Murder, and Attempted Murder.
RULING:
NO. The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a chance encounter.
They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection
inside the memorial park. The means employed for the commission of the crime or
the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted
by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time
eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim, this was not
present in this case. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. The
fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim does not by itself amount to
treachery. There is no evidence on record that the appellant deliberately positioned
himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him when he fired the shot
NO, Court rules that in absence of Treachery, it should only be Homicide. We have
earlier pointed out that the intent to kill is absent in this case. Considering the nature
and location of their injuries and the number of days required for the treatment of the
two children, who had metallic fragments in their faces and were already discharged
after six days, we find that the crime committed for the injuries sustained by the
children are two counts of slight physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal
Code
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of
a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the
appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino
Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit.The appellant’s use of
a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have
reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant
is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
NOTES: Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the appellant of firing
a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony, and two counts of slight
physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the imposition of penalties for complex
crimes, which requires two or more grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
G.R. No. L-50884
March 30, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALUFRANIA
(Unintentional Abortion)
FACTS:
In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania (“Salufrania”) was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, with the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion, with the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Marciana Abuyo (“Marciana”) P12,000.00 and to pay costs. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.
PROSECUTION
The lone eyewitness of the prosecution is Pedro Salufrania (“Pedro”), 13-year old son
of herein appellant and of deceased. After determination by the courts that Pedro was
intelligent and capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them
truly, as well as not being threatened to testify by anyone against his father-accused,
he testified that at about 6 o'clock in the evening of Dec. 3, 1974, Salufrania and
Marciana were quarreling in their small house at a far-away sittio in barrio Tigbinan,
Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel, Salufrania boxed Marciana, who
was 7 months pregnant at the time, on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor,
Salufrania strangled Marciana to death. Pedro further testified that after the incident,
Salufrania went out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were
the only ones who witnessed how the accused killed their mother because his sister
and other brothers were already asleep when the incident happened; that his brothers
Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept
watch at their mothers body while their father was away; that their father arrived early
the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the
hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the
house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from
Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
Witness states that he is now living with his uncle Eduardo Abuyo in fear of Salufrania
because of his threat to kill Pedro should he reveal the true cause of Marciana’s
death (deceased’s relatives knowledge of cause of death was stomach ailment and
headache).
DEFENSE
For the defense, the accused Salufrania stood at the witness stand and narrated his
version of the story coupled with three other witness, namely Geronimo Villlan
(“Villan”), Juanita Bragais (“Bragais”), and Liling Angeles Balce (“Balce”), to
corroborate his claims. Salufrania states that at around 9 o’clock in the morning of
Dec. 3, 1974, Marciana arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for
about a week; that she was hungry upon her arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food
and after eating their lunch, he proceeded to his work while his wife rested in their
house; that when he returned home at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his wife
complained of stomach pain and he was told to prepare the beddings because she
was already sleepy; that at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of Dec. 4, 1974, he was
awakened by his wife who was still complaining of stomach pain, and that she asked
for a drink of hot water; that while he was boiling water, Villan arrived and assisted
him in administering to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or massaging
and "banti" that Villan and Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but
when her condition worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico
Villanueva who might be able to ,save the life of their mother; that his children left and
returned without Rico Villanueva but the latter arrived a little later.
Salufrania then sent for Bragais but the latter was not able to cure his wife, since the
latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death of his wife, he ordered
his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose house was about two (2)
kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed
the body of his wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister Consolacion
Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he
sent Chiding and his elder son to inform the brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay
about her death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador Abuyo came; that he informed
the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause of death of his wife; that upon the
suggestion of the brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo,
the body of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried at the
Talisay Cemetery; that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded
the latter's death, and that they loved each other whilst alive; that after her burial, his
son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then,
he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of
his wife, aside from the members of his family, Villan, Francisco Repuya and Balce
were also present.
Subsequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime stated above and
sentenced him to the penalty of death. Therefore, this case is on automatic review
before this Court.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of the testimony of
an incompetent witness, and on inconsistent and insufficient evidence of the
prosecution. – NO.
WON the trial court erred in discrediting the evidence for the accused – NO.
WON the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the complex crime of parricide
with intentional abortion. – YES.
RULING:
Appellant alleges that Pedro is presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19(b) of
the Revised Rules of court since he is only thirteen (13) years old when he testified,
and only eleven (11) years old when the offense charged occurred, and, therefore, his
testimony should not have been admitted. Appellant's contention is without merit. The
trial court's conclusion that Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by
Pedro's responsiveness to the questions propounded to him when he was already
under oath. Even with all the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities pointed out
by Salufrania to discredit Pedro’s testimony, the court found the testimony of Pedro to
be very clear, convincing and truthful, with each alleged inconsistency and
improbability satisfactorily explained by the court. Even if there were discrepancies,
such discrepancies were minor and may be considered as earmarks of verisimilitude.
This contention is without merit. After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo
Villan and Angeles Liling Balce, this Court is convinced that their testimonies and
accounts of the incident are fabricated, untruthful and not worth of credence. Their
exact and uniform declarations, that Marciana died at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4
December 1974, in their house at sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Carnarines
Norte, of stomach pain, which seemed to be very fresh and clear in their minds,
despite the lapse of four long years and without sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their testimonies unconvincing.
Furthermore, two of the defense ’witness has no basis for presentation since both
Bragais and Balce were not present at the time of death of Marciana, both of whom
allegedly arrived after the victim’s death, with the former being summoned by
Salufrania while the latter was allegedly called by one of his sons . Francisco Repuya,
who was also alleged by Salufrania to be present when Marciana died, did not testify.
Villan who claimed he passed-by the house of Salufrania and saw the latter boiling
water for medicine for Marciana, who was about to give birth was discredited by
Salufrania himself who declared he was merely boiling water for a hot drink for his
wife, who was suffering from her old stomach ailment. In like manner, Villan
discredited the Salufrania, about the presence of Francisco Repuya, who allegedly
alternated with Villan in applying the native treatments of 'hilot' and 'bantil' to
Marciana, when throughout his testimony he (Villan) never mentioned the presence of
Francisco Repuya.
In this contention, Salufrania is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex
crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with
Unintentional Abortion. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the
immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to
cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but
not necessarily to cause an abortion.
Wherefore, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs
against the appellant.
WITNESS STATEMENTS:
PROSECUTION:
DR. JUAN L. DYQUIANGCO JR. – Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines Norte
that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about ten (10) post mortem
examinations; that he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine
the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in the
Municipal Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 December
1974. Post-mortem examination yielded results of death b strangulation with the
victim pregnant with a baby boy about 7-8 months old.
NARCISO ABUYO – sister of Marciana and resident of Gabon Talisay Camarines
Norte
He testified that Salufrania and his sister, Marciana, were lawfully wedded husband
and wife; he declared that his sister was more or less seven (7) months pregnant
when she died; that he first came to know about his sister's death on Dec. 4, 1974
thru his nephews Pedro and Alex Salufrania who first informed him that their mother
died of stomach ailment and headache; that he went to Tigbinan to request for the
body of his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines Norte.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana, the three (3) children of
his deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father
Salufrania; that when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraña told him
that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache,
rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that
immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the
matter to the attention of the police authorities of Talisay, Camarines Norte, who
investigated Alex and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
DEFENSE:
GERONIMO VILLAN
A neighbor of Sulfrania. He declared that Marciana died at around 6:00 o'clock in the
morning of Dec. 4, 1974 in her house at Sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines
Norte; that he happened to pass by because his attention was attracted by the bright
light in the fireplace and he saw Salufrania boiling "ikmo" and garlic as medicine for
his wife who was about to deliver a child; that he helped the accused by applying
"ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana and by administering the native
treatment known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and pulling the skin with two fingers
of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana worsened, he told Salufrania to
go and get Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter arrived at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at that time Marciana was
already dead.
JUANITA BRAGAIS
He testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Salufrania at
about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of Dec. 4, 1974. He further testified that when he
reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana was already dead so he just helped
Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in-law
at Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
ANGELES LILLING BALCE
Caimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte and
testified that she arrived in the house of Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the
morning of Dec. 4, 1974 after being called by one of the latter's sons; that she saw
Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that
Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment.
NOTES:
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
That there is a pregnant woman;
That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion;
That the violence is intentionally exerted; and
That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom.

INCONSISTENCIES POINTED OUT BY SALUFRANIA IN PEDRO’S TESTIMONY
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT REBUTTAL BY THE SUPREME COURT
INCONSISTENCIES
REBUTTAL
Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was asked whether he was
threatened by his uncle to testify against his father
Pedro became confused when the trial court ordered that the original question be
reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that when asked the third time,
he affirmed his first answer.
Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of December
3. while on cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December 4
It must be noted that he affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died
on December 3, just as he had testified during direct examination.
Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the question "And isn't it that your mother died in the
early morning on that day (December 4) and not on the evening of December 3?"
Thus, Pedro's answer could have resulted only from a misapprehension of the a
question, and for no other reason.
Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant leave the house to get a
hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the following morning.
However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left at noon or in the
afternoon of December 4.
Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw appellant sleep beside
the dead body of his mother.
Pedro misapprehended the question propounded to him.
It must be noted that the question was so worded that it could have misled Pedro to
think that what was being asked was the time when appellant brought his dead wife to
Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he saw his
father leave in the evening of December 3 and again saw him asleep and thus not
noticed appellant's coming back after securing a hammock and sleeping beside the
deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth when he said that, upon waking up,
he saw his father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then, appellant had already
returned with the hammock.
Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to Tigbinan
in the morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the
evening.
Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question purportedly mentioning the time when the
victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. It is to be noted that the question's thrust is
whether or not the victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it was brought was
merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention to the part of the question
involving time.
Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers and
sister, kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-
examination, he testified that they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep.
There is nothing inconsistent here. The children could have kept vigil while lying down
with their deceased mother.
IMPROBABILITIES POINTED OUT BY SALUFRANIA IN PEDRO’S TESTIMONY
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT REBUTTAL BY THE SUPREME COURT
IMPROBABILITIES
REBUTTAL
It was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he testified
that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on, he closed
his eyes pretending to sleep.
Even though the room was dimly lighted, Pedro was only two (2) meters away from
his parents; thus, he could easily see, as he saw, the attack on his mother.
Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept his eyes closed
all the while, as he was aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it was to be expected
that he had his eyes open and, thus, he saw the heinous crime unfold and ultimately
consummated.
Salufrania does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in Pedro's
divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to
appellant, such fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the
date he started to live separately from him.
Even though Pedro started to live separately from his father from December 6, it
cannot be said that the influence of appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that time.
It must be noted that Pedro was young and was still very much under appellant's
influence and control. The thought and memory of his father's viciousness were still
too fresh even after three days from his mother's death. The fear that he too could be
killed by appellant in like manner must have deterred him from divulging the truth
earlier.
It was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of his mother.
At that moment, when his mother was being assaulted and strangled, Pedro must
have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and powerless to do anything.
This is a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that different
people react differently to the same types of situations. One cannot overlook that
there is no standard form of behaviour when one is confronted by a shocking
occurrence.
Since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation to present Pedro's
brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the victim, it is
presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if presented.
First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been competent to
testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming that he was competent to
testify, his testimony could be merely corroborative.
Corroboration is not necessary in this case because the details of the crime have
already been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the
eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption,
especially when the testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely
corroborative.
People v. Porras(1996)
Art. 249 Homicide
Facts: The appealed judgment went for the People, found appellants John Jenn
Porras and Sergio Emelo guilty of MURDER and appellant Sergio Emelo guilty of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE John Jenn Porras is hereby acquitted.
Accused John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo went to the police Station looking for
Pfc. Roldan Emelo of the Cavite City PNP, a cousin of the latter. They were directed
by Sgt. Pilapil to where he was. They had some food and drinks at the Banaue
Restaurant and Emelo asked for his black ammo pouch and some .38 caliber
ammunition; that thereafter, flagged him down along M. Gregorio St. They proceeded
to the Aroma Beer House where the victim, Rosendo Mortel was tabled and wherein
some misunderstanding happened. Mortel went out and was shot at close range by
either Porras or Emelo as seen by a waitress. Porras, after seeing Mortel sprawled on
the ground and bloodied, fled into an alley and thereafter returned and shot the victim
twice and sped away on a tricycle. Sgt. Catalino Bermas was then monitoring the
situation on his motorcycle and gave chase.
During the chase, Bermas was shot by Emelo along the way after having told them
(Emelo and Real) to go to the Police Station and Bermas, feeling the effects of his
wounds chanced upon Cpl. Dela Cruz in front of the Beer House and asked for his
assistance. They rode in tandem and pursued the tricycle, but they failed to catch the
assailants.
Sgt. Amorico Alvarez, who was then following up unsolved cases in the Station was
apprised of the shooting, went to the place and was informed about the identity of the
tricycle which they traced to the house of Real whereat they found the black ammo
pouch. and the camouflage holster with the name of Emelo inscribed and with live
and spent bullets on the back seat and putting together the evidence thus far
gathered, he was able to apprehend the three, namely: Porras, Emelo and Real.
Appellants claim that some of the trial court's factual findings are product of
imagination and gross misrepresentation allegedly due to lack of. evidentiary support.
While our examination of the record shows that the assailed factual findings are in
some respects inaccurate they, however, did not debilitate the prosecution's case and
neither did they affect the appellant's finding of guilt.
Issues: Whether or not The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the case of Porras. - YES
Ruling: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as
conclusively as the killing itself. And to appreciate it, two conditions must concur, viz:
(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution be
deliberately and consciously adopted. In this regard, the prosecution failed to
definitively establish the manner in which the initial assault against the deceased
victim was committed to justify the appreciation of treachery.
This hiatus in the prosecution's evidence cannot be substituted by mere suppositions
as what the trial court apparently did. It is a well settled rule that in order to appreciate
treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in this case,
the same must be shown present at the inception of the attack. Absent any showing
therefore, treachery as a qualifying circumstance may not be considered.
With respect to Emelo, we find that the trial court properly discarded the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and correctly ruled that the crime committed is Frustrated
Homicide and not Frustrated Murder as alleged in the information. The shooting of
Sgt. Catalino Bermas who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing appellants was, at
best, done in a spur of the moment, an act which can hardly be characterized as
treacherous for it was nowhere proved that the same was deliberately adopted to
deny Sgt. Bermas the opportunity to defend himself.
The actual participation of the appellants in the killing of Rosendo Mortel having been
established by the prosecution, they are therefore equally liable pursuant to the rule
on conspiracy "that the act of one is the act of all". Conspiracy proved concerns solely
the killing of Mortel and is not the shooting of Sgt. Catalino Bermas. Thus, appellant
Sergio Emelo alone should be held liable for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
DOCTRINE: Homicide
FACTS: The complaining witness, Silvino Belarmino, had been suffering from a
certain disease, for which Dr. Antonio G. Sison prescribed the following medicine:
Spartein sulphate - 1.00
Phenobarbital - 0.50
Carbromal - 5.00
Mx. Div. et pone in cap. No. XV
Sig.; One capsule, once a day
Belarmino presented the prescription to the Universal Drug Store, in the City of
Manila, where he secured the medicine described therein contained in a bottle on
which the prescription was written, and after taking said medicine his health was
somewhat improved. When the symptoms of the said disease recurred, following the
instructions given him by Doctor Sison to continue taking said medicine, he copied
said prescription (Exhibit 2), and, in the morning of February 18, 1941, presented it to
the Escudero Drug Store, in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, and asked Dr. Leon
Castillo, the manager of the said drug store, and a friend of the complainant, whether
they could prepare said medicine, after having failed to secure the same in other drug
stores in the locality; and having been answered in the affirmative, the complaining
witness requested Doctor Castillo to have prepared for him 1/3 of the formula and
Doctor Castillo himself wrote "1/3 f." on Exhibit 2, for P1, as the whole formula cost
P3; as there was some doubt as to the figure appearing after the word "carbromal" on
Exhibit 2, Belarmino requested Doctor Castillo to check it up, and the latter corrected
the said figure by writing the figure "5" in ink in the figure "6" appearing after the word
"carbromal."
As Belarmino himself wanted to be sure about the said figure, he proposed to return
to said drug store in the afternoon with the bottle marked Exhibit C, on which the
prescription was written. Mrs. Raymundo was already a pharmacy graduate, but she
had not yet taken and passed the government examination conducted by the Board of
Pharmaceutical Examiners; and she had worked as a pharmacy clerk in different drug
stores in the City of Manila, before her employment in the same capacity in the
Escudero Drug Store in the City of San Pablo. Mrs. Raymundo prepared the balance
and began computing the formula contained in Exhibit 2 to reduce it to 1/3 after which
she proceeded to compound the medicine, using, among others, the substances
contained in said two bottles. The medicine compounded by defendant and appellant
was placed in five (5) capsules and was delivered to herein complainant.
At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the complainant took one of the
capsules with a glass of water, and left his house for a walk; and about 20 minutes
after he had taken said medicine, he became ill. He felt dizzy and had difficulty in
breathing, and he could hardly stand as his knees became shaky, and for that reason,
he immediately consulted with physicians, namely, Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr.
Ricardo Reyes, and the latter advised him to go home and rest. About two hours
afterwards, complainant's legs began to stiffen, his stomach to harden, his lips to
draw back, and his tongue to shrink to his throat, and he could not talk and thought
that he was in a serious condition; and so complainant's family sent for Dr. Ricardo
Reyes, who advised complainant's wife to rub his body with hot water which produced
some relief, after he had urinated; and the following day when Doctor Reyes returned,
complainant explained to him all that had happened and showed him the remaining
four capsules contained in the cardboard box, marked as Exhibit B, on which the
prescription had not been written, and Doctor Reyes advised the complainant not to
take any more of said remaining four capsules.
That believing that there must have been something wrong with the medicine, the
complaining witness sent two of the four capsules to the Bureau of Science for
examination. It was shown that the filling prescription Exhibit 2, defendant and
appellant had erroneously used and mixed, instead of spartein sulphate as called for
in the prescription, strychnine sulphate, a highly poisonous substance — 50.5
milligrams in one and 61.75 milligrams in the other.
It has also been shown by expert testimony presented in this case that herein
complainant had been a victim of strychnine poisoning and that 50.5 milligrams of
strychnine sulphate found in one of the capsules examined was sufficient to cause
the death of herein complainant, if not for the fact that, in compounding said
prescription, phenobarbital and carbromal had been mixed therewith, in the quantities
specified in the prescription, which two substances diminished the deadly effect of
strychnine sulphate as poison.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna acquitted Dr. Leon Castillo, manager of the
Escudero Drug Store, on the ground of reasonable doubt, but found herein defendant
and appellant, Nena Tanalega Raymundo, guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
through reckless imprudence.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellant was correctly convicted for the crime of
frustrated homicide through reckless imprudence — NO
RULING: NO. The offense of frustrated homicide requires the concurrence of the
essential requisite of intent to kill, which is incompatible with the charge of reckless
imprudence; although a charge for physical injuries, serious or less serious, through
reckless imprudence, is legally proper under the law; as in that case the act sought to
be punished is the material damage or injury actually done. Defendant and appellant
Nena Tanalega Raymundo is found guilty of having prepared one medicine for
another, under a false name, in violation of the provisions of section 751 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals concluded that the offense committed by the
defendant and appellant was slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Furthermore, counsel for defendant and appellant contends that the offense of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence were imputable to herein defendant
and appellant because the period for corresponding criminal action had already
prescribed.
The legal question raised by counsel for defendant and appellant appears to be quite
plausible, and defendant and appellant would appear to be entitled to a judgment of
acquittal, under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code (1940 ed.) provides as
follows:
SEC. 751. Responsibility for quality of drugs. — Every pharmacist shall be
responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell
or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture,
prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison
under any fraudulent name, direction, pretense or to adulterate any drug, chemical,
medicine, or poison so used, sold, or offered for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine,
or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this
section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States
Pharmacopoeia.And the violation of any provision contained in said section 751 of the
Revised Administrative Code (1940 ed.) is punished in accordance with the
provisions of section 2676 thereof, which are as follows:
SEC. 2676. General Violation of Pharmacy Law. — Any person engaging in the
practice of pharmacy in the (Philippine Islands) Philippines contrary to any provision
of the Pharmacy Law or violating any provision of said law for which no specific
penalty is provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed five
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill; and druggists must exercise
care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In
reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. And in Criminal
Law, run the same rigorous rules. Apothecaries, or apothecary clerks, who are guilty
of negligence in the sale of medicine when death ensues in consequence, have been
held guilty of manslaughter. (Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C. C., 169.) United
States vs. Pineda, 37 Phil. 456, 458.
In the instant case, the defendant and appellant Nena Tanalega Raymundo, was only
a pharmacy clerk. But it must be borne in mind that, at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense, defendant and appellant was already a pharmacy graduate, and
that she had worked as a pharmacy clerk in several drug stores in the City of Manila,
although she had not yet taken and passed the examinations prescribed by the Board
of Pharmaceutical Examiners. But the offenses penalized under the provisions of
section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code, in connection with the provisions of
section 2676 thereof, may be committed not only by licensed druggists and
pharmacists, but also by any other person preparing any drug, chemical, medicine or
poison, under any fraudulent name.
G.R. Nos. L-32246-48 June 30, 1988
ARCADIO CORTEZ y VENGZON, PAULINO SAMPANG y BUNGUE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 249 HOMICIDE
FACTS:
On October 21, 1961, Santiago Baltazar, his wide, Escolastica Pingol and
their four sons Ruben, Pablo, Orlando and Luis were sleeping in their house when
Santiago was awakened by the barking of the dogs. Then he heard a voice which he
recognized as that of Arcadio Cortez for he knew him long before the incident, asking
"Are the owners of the house in?” He peeped through a hole and there on the ground
he saw and recognized, for the moon was very bright, another man, Paulino
Sampang, also an acquaintance of his. He then went downstairs, and approached
Paulino who was armed with a .22 cal. gun. He asked them what they wanted to
which he answered "If you want to know, you come and see our Commander." When
he said "Commander he was referring to Arcadio Cortez who was under a bullcart.
When Santiago Baltazar approached Arcadio Cortez, the latter moved away
from him and holding a (G)arand with his two hands over his head, told Baltazar: "Go
back to your wife." Baltazar started moving towards the house and upon reaching the
foot of the stairs, he faced them (Arcadio Cortez and Paulino Sampang). At this
instance, Cortez and Sampang began shooting at the house and also at him. He lost
consciousness after getting hit in his right thigh, and upon waking up he felt Pablo
embracing him and saw that his wife and youngest son already dead.
People began coming to the premises. Among them was Vice-Mayor
Genaro Dimalanta to whom Santiago Baltazar gave two unfired bullets which he
found on the ground. They fell when the Garand held by Arcadio Cortez jammed
twice. Thus, the Court convicted the petitioners for the crime of homicide and less
physical injuries. The appellants question Baltazar’s testimony, since he initially failed
to name them as the culprits, when Major Lim visited him while he was hospitalized
and he claims that he did not know who it was.
ISSUE:
WON the appellants are guilty of Homicide and Less Physical Injuries.
RULING:
YES. Since Baltazar reasoned out that he had initially feigned ignorance was
out of fear that they might come back, the Court finds that his fear and apprehension
for the safety of his family and his guarded suspicion of the identity of the
investigators were reasonable reactions of an ordinary man agitated by a frightful and
shocking occurrence. He had just witnessed the violent deaths of his wife and
youngest son. With the memory of the traumatic experience still fresh in his mind, he
reasonably entertained the belief that to reveal the identities of the culprits would be
tantamount to inviting their retribution.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, corpus delicti here has also been proven.
As early as People v. Mones [58 Phil. 5 (1933)], this Court has held that corpus delicti
is the fact of specific loss or injury and that in homicide, the fact of death, whether or
not feloniously caused, is the corpus delicti. This has been sufficiently shown by the
death certificates of the victims and the testimony of Santiago Baltazar. With sufficient
proof of the corpus delicti, the extrajudicial confessions are thus sufficient to convict
Cortez and Sampang of homicide and less serious physical injuries.
Lastly, we consider the defense raised by petitioners. Cortez claimed that he
was in a neighboring sitio guarding his growing crops against wild pigs while
Sampang alleged that he was at home attending to his sick child. Alibi is easily
fabricated such that courts must accept it only with great caution. For such defense to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused were somewhere else but that it must be
clearly shown that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Alibi also fails due to
the positive identification of Baltazar. He had knowd Cortez and Sampang for a
considerable period of time and there was no showing that he held a grudge nor ill
towards the two.
Thus, the Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the trial court.
People vs Dalabajan
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Murder
FACTS: During a dance party, Melencio dela Cruz saw Hernando Dalabajan kick and
stab one Amado Zabalo, Jr. as the latter was corning out of the barangay hall. Amado
tried to escape but Hernando, Dominador, Fernando and their other
relatives pursued him. The three accused-appellants helped one another in hitting
Amado with bladed instruments, wooden clubs and a boat paddle on different parts of
his body, resulting in his death. Thereafter, the three accused left the already
unmoving body of the victim which was face down in the water and proceeded back
towards the seashore. At this juncture, Melencio dela Cruz, who was hiding behind
the bushes by the seashore from where he watched the incident happen, then went to
the house of the victim and reported the incident to the latter's relatives. A case of
murder was then instituted. However, after it was submitted for decision but prior to
the promulgation thereof Amado Zabalo, Sr., the victim's father, executed an Affidavit
of Desistance. Melencio dela Cruz, the sole eyewitness for the prosecution, also
executed an affidavit recanting his testimony and instead stating that he did not
witness the incident. Meanwhile, Hernando Dalabajan contended that during the
party, from out of nowhere Amado suddenly appeared and hacked him with a bolo
hitting him on his right elbow. Hernando ran away but Amado chased him. When
Hernando stumbled to the ground Amado hacked him again hitting him. He then
clubbed Amado the people around ganged up on the latter.
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of murder - YES
RULING: Accused is guilty of murder becaus there is a presence of a qualifying
cirumstance which is treachery
The Court in assessing the circumstances of the killing of the deceased Amado
Zabalo, Jr. by all the 3 accused who actively helped one another in perpetrating the
killing could not but rule that the killing was attended by treachery to qualify the
offense to murder. The above finding was primarily premised on the fact that at the
time the attack was launched at the sea by the 3 accused, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself. Thus, at the time of attack the victim was in the water with
a depth up to his armpit. In the situation he found himself, it is quite obvious his
freedom of movement to adequately protect and defend his person was very much
restricted taken in conjunction with the 3 aggressors who were riding in a banca and
hitting him all at the same time.
From the manner of attack employed by the accused, it may reasonably be deduced
or inferred that accused consciously adopted the mode of attack employed by them to
insure its success. When they pursued the victim who run towards the seashore and
opted to go to the water, it must be construed when they availed themselves of a
banca, they did so with a decided advantage on their part without risk to their
personal safety. It can thus be seen that at the time the fatal blows were delivered
treachery can thus be firmly appreciated against them.
Treachery may not be present at the inception of the attack, but if the attack is
continuous and treachery existed at the time of the consummation of the killing the
crime committed is not homicide but murder. (People vs. Cariño, et al., 58 SCRA
516).
NOTES:
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person which is not parricide or infanticide as long
as the following circumstances are present:
With Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity
In consideration of a price, reward or promise
By means of inundation fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, standing of. Vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste or ruin
On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public
calamity
With evident premeditation
With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Elements of Murder
That a person was killed
That the accused killed him
That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
That the killing is not parricide or infanticide
G.R. No. 109617
August 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FELIPE SION @ "JUNIOR," JOHNNY JUGUILON, EDONG SION, FELIX SION @
"ELLET," and FEDERICO DISU @ “MIGUEL”
(Art. 251- Death in Tumultuous Affray Cases)
FACTS:
In a decision dated 20 January 1993, but promulgated on 8 February 1993, Dagupan
City Regional Trial Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" (“Sion”) and
Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu (“Disu”) guilty of the crime of Murder by hurling
stones and stabbing Fernando Abaoag (“Fernando”), with the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty which cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance. The
two accused are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to
indemnify jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of
the proceedings. Sion and Disu are ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim the
sum of P11,910.00 as actual damages.
On Nov. 19, Sion, Disu, Johnny Juguilon (“Juguilon”), Edong Sion (“Edong”), Felix
Sion alias "Ellet," (“Ellet”) and "four (4) other John Does were issued warrants of
arrest by the MCTC of San Fabian. However, the warrant was served only on
appellant Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Disu was granted bail for
P40,000.00. Accused failed to submit required counter-affidavits. On Jan. 21, 1992,
an Information was filed with the Dagupan City RTC against appellants Sion and Disu
and Juguilon, Edong, Ellet, and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as John,
Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder. On Jun. 2 1992,
Sion was arrested. Then on Jun. 10, 1992, the RTC annulled and voided the bail
earlier granted to Disu by the MCTC for luck of proper hearing, denied the motion for
bail filed by appellant Sion, and ordered their detention in jail.
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the
wife of the victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health
Officer; Rosendo Imuslan, Brgy. Captain of Brgy. Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio.
On the other hand, the defense presented as its witness appellant Disu; appellant
Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of appellant Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
PROSECUTION
On or about 7:00PM of Oct. 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the brgy. road in front of
his house situated in Brgy. Binday. He was with his elder brother Carlos and Ricardo
Manuel when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived complaining that he was being
chased by Sion and Juguilon. On that same occasion, Abaoag also arrived and asked
Ronnie Manuel why he was making trouble. The latter answered, "I am not making
trouble uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Sion and
Juguilon were trying to stab me. Seconds later, Sion and Juguilon appeared and
started throwing stones. Abaoag told them to stop throwing stones but before they
left, one of them uttered "even you Andong, you are interfering, you will also have
your day, vulva of your mother, you Abaoag[s]". Apparently, the utterance was
directed against Abaoag whose nickname is Andong.
At about 9 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag heard the sound of stone
throwing at the nearby house. He went out to see the commotion. When already near
the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his brother Abaoag already outside
his house. He also saw Juguilon hurl a big stone against Abaoag. Upon being hit on
the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back towards Ellet, Edong and Disu who were
also throwing stones towards Abaoag. On the other hand, appellant Sion, who was
near the victim, stabbed Abaoag.
Cesar Abaoag tried to extend help to his brother but Disu hurled a stone which landed
on his right side. When he heard Sion shouting, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar
Abaoag ran to his brother's house and informed Felicitas, Abaoag’s wife, about the
her husband. They both went to the place of the incident together. The assailants
were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the ground very
weak and dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered "naalaak"
which in English means "I was hit". Abaoag told his wife that his assailants were
Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion. The victim
was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Brgy. Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando Gatchalian, on the
night of the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied double-bladed weapon
(dagger) near the scene of the crime. Cesar Abaoag recognized this weapon as the
one used by appellant Sion in stabbing the victim On her part, Felicitas Abaoag
declared that she spent more than P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of her husband
whose death saddened her, she being left alone to take care of their children.
DEFENSE
In his defense, Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong and Ellet, respectively,
admitted that he participated in a stone-throwing incident and "free-for-all rumble"
between his group the Sions and Johnny Juguilon, and the Abaoags and Manuels.
However, he professed his innocence, claiming that it was his brother Edong and
Juguilon who stabbed the victim.
Sion then summarized his statement as such: on Oct. 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m.,
he, together with Juguilon went to the house of Eling Alcantara to talk with his son.
Ronnie Manuel was already there when they arrived. While at the place, Juguilon and
Ronnie Manuel started fighting. Ronnie Manuel ran and proceeded to the place of his
cousin. He was pacifying Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Juguilon threw stones at
Ronnie Manuel. At this point, victim Abaoag intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of
your mother Juguilon, you are too much, you will also have your day." Juguilon
answered "vulva of your mother Andoy, do not interfere because you are not our
enemy." After the verbal exchange, he took Juguilon to their (Sion's) house. At about
9:00 p.m., that same evening, they (Sions) stoned their (Abaoags) house. He and
Idong and Juguilon looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, victim
Abaoag and two other companions, who were at Marta Soriano’s. Subsequently,
there was a free for all rumble between the Manuels and the Abaoags, and the Sions
and Juguilon, in front of the house of Loly Galdones. He denied that he stabbed
Abaoag three times. It was Idong Sion and Juguilon who stabbed Abaoag. After
Abaoag was stabbed, everyone dispersed. He went home and rushed towards
Juguilon because he was stabbed. He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and
Hospital. He did not report the incident to Brgy. Captain Imuslan. On Oct. 17, 1:00
p.m., he presented himself to Kagawad Lagman who brought him to the Police
Station.
In his defense, Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no participation
in killing Abaoag, and during the whole night of Oct. 16, 1991, while the incidents in
question were taking place, he was resting and sleeping in the house of his employer,
Felicidad Gatchalian, after working the entire day. However, before going home, he
went to the store of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of
Sion where he stayed for about five minutes. He only learned about the killing the
following morning when he was told that he was one of the suspects. He was arrested
about a month after the incident.
On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar asserted
that neither his brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at Sion's house; there
was no free-for-all fight between the Sions and the Abaoags; Juguilon and Edong
merely threw stones at, but did not stab, Abaoag; and it was only appellant Sion who
stabbed Abaoag.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in convicting them of murder through the qualifying
circumstance of treachery; - YES
WON the trial court erred in taking into account the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty; - YES
WON the trial court erred in ruling that conspiracy was established; - NO
WON the trial court erred in not appreciating the presence of voluntary surrender; and
- YES
RULING:
The trial court erred in convicting Sion and Disu of murder through the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. There is no clear and convincing evidence of treachery. As
recounted by Cesar Abaoag, he and the victim were six (6) meters away from
Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at the victim which signaled the other
accused to the same. Considering the distance between the assailants and the victim
when the attack commenced, and the fact the three were two (2) waves of stoning
which preceded the stabbing of the victim, these should have sufficiently forewarned
the victim of the greater danger which loomed and prompted him to escape.
Moreover, in the absence of clear details showing how the victim was stabbed, from
behind or the victim was entirely helpless when stabbed, it cannot be said that the
attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the victim entirely defenseless.
Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim was forewarned of the
attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal, or the attack was not so
sudden as to have caught the deceased completely unaware.
The trial court erred in appreciating against appellants the generic aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, based solely on the fact that the victim was stabbed thrice,
with the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung causing severe bleeding and its
collapse. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any showing that appellants,
for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and
inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The mere fact that wounds in
excess of what was indispensably necessary to cause death was found on the body
of the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty
and with the intention of deliberately intensifying the victim's suffering.
There is a presence of conspiracy between the appellants. There is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of
all. The confluence of the appellants acts, from coming together to stone the house of
the victim, to the subsequent throwing of stones after the initial throw of Juguilon, and
the fleeing together, indubitably manifested a community of interest and unity of
purpose and design to take the victim’s life.
Appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Sion surrendered to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, escorted and
surrendered him to the police. His admission that he surrendered because he was
already suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his
surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. At the time of his
surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been issued. Whatever the
accused's reason for surrendering — either the fear of reprisal from victim's relatives
or, in this case, his knowledge that he was already a suspect — "does not gainsay the
spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he saved the
State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested."
Wherefore, appellants FELIFE SION, alias "JUNIOR" or FELIFE RODRIGUEZ, JR.,
and FEDERICO DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are hereby declared GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized
in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the former entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
they are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years of prison mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
minimum as maximum, with all the accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the
provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Except as so modified, the rest of
the challenged judgment stands.
ON ART. 251 – DEATH IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY CASES
The court belied the claim of appellant Sion that the fatal stabbing of Abaoag was a
result of a "free-for-all rumble," which should have lowered liability to that of causing
death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, which
carries a penalty lower than that for homicide. However, it was ascertained beyond
doubt, through the testimony of Cesar Abaoag, that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal
stab wounds; hence, this claim must be rejected.
In order to be convicted under Art 251, the following requisites must be present:
That there be several persons (four or more);
That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally;
That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner;
That someone was killed in the course of the affray;
That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.
NOTES:
Appellants also, aside from those stated above, also contended that Cesar Abaoag
falsely identified Sion as because:
if witness Cesar Abaoag actually saw Sion stab the victim, then Cesar should have
immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of this fact. Cesar's failure
was then unusual and unnatural.
Victim’s wife’s testimony on the alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as far as
the assailant's identities were concerned because the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I
was hit"), without identifying Sion as the one who stabbed him; and, her claim that her
husband identified all the five (5) accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an
impossibility."
the prosecution witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital
witnesses" — such as Marta Soriano, Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara — should
have been presented to corroborate the "biased" testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas
Abaoag.
On the review of the evidence, the court was convinced that Cesar Abaoag positively
identified appellants as he was two meters away during the incident and saw
appellant Sion stab the victim. Witness also saw the rest of the accused, including
appellant Disu, throwing stones at the victim. Appellant Sion himself admitted
witness ’presence during direct examination.
It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently
explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative
value. His pressing concern then was to get someone to help his wounded brother.
The “dying declaration” made by the victim to his wife is admissible as evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity,
because the declarant's death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it
often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and
trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and
every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. Court finds no
ulterior motive on the part of victim’s wife to fabricate the declarations of her husband.
It is well-settled that the decision as whom to present as witnesses for the prosecution
is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case and the non-
presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense. The
prosecution is not obliged to present all possible witnesses, especially if their
testimony will only serve to corroborate that of another eyewitness' testimony, in
which case the former may every well be dispensed with considering that the
testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, would suffice.
Appellee contested that there was no voluntary surrender because Sion surrendered
to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the
police authorities. However, according to Section 388 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 which expressly provides, in part, that "[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal
Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in
their jurisdictions…”. hus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are
now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority.
People v.Maramara(1999)
Art. 251 Death in Tumultuous Affray Cases
Facts: A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers
Association of which accused-appellant is the president, was held in the yard of
accused-appellant's house in Masbate. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato
was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of accused-
appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened,
Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety.
Miguelito Donato was about two (2) meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed
at the fence. Not for long, accused-appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and
fired at victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left breast. Ricardo Donato
tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo's head with an
iron bar which knocked him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained
consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their
son Miguelito.
Miguelito died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito expired, his
father asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused-appellant.
The defense had a different story. At about 11:00 in the evening, brothers Ricardo
and Miguelito Donato arrived at the benefit dance and approached the dancing pair of
Rowena del Rosario and Dante Arce. Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on
Dante Arce. Accused-appellant, who was about eight (8) meters away, rushed to the
scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accused-appellant's hands at his back and then
Miguelito repeatedly stabbed accused-appellant on different parts of his body.
Accused-appellant regained consciousness at the Claveria hospital. There was no
way accused-appellant could have resisted Miguelito's attack, much less was he
capable of inflicting injury on Miguelito, since the stronger Ricardo was holding
accused-appellant's hands and was dragging him away while Miguelito kept lunging a
six-inch bladed weapon at him.
Dr. Gil that he attended to accused-appellant at the Claveria Hospital. Accused-
appellant suffered four (4) penetrating stab wounds on different parts of his body--two
on the stomach, one on the left nipple and one on the left arm. Although he was
accused-appellant's attending physician, Dr. Gil never asked the details of the
stabbing incident nor the identity of assailant, as he was purely concerned with the
treatment of accused-appellant's injuries.
The trial court rendered a guilty verdict, hence, this appeal.
Issues: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
Murder and, at the least, should be held liable only for the death of Miguelito Donato
in a tumultuous affray as defined under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.. -NO
Ruling: There is no merit in accused-appellant's position that he should be held liable
only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was in such a situation that the accused came to the scene and joined the
fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four
(4) stab wounds in different parts of his body-two on the stomach, one on the left
nipple, and one on the left arm. Then the accused-appellant, with his handgun, shot
Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article
251 of the Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo
and Regarder Donato positively identified accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato's
killer.
We do not subscribe, however, to the trial court's appreciation of treachery. The use
of a firearm is not sufficient indication of treachery. The accused-appellant can be
convicted only of homicide.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DELOS SANTOS, and
JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 251 Death in Tumultuous Affray
FACTS:
Petitioners are identified as Marcos Loyalists, and is found by the trial court
guilty for the murder of which occurred during a rally on July 27, 1986 at Luneta by
Marcos loyalists. Despite denied by the authorities to hold the rally, 3000 loyalists
continued to gather at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. When Col. Edgar Dula Torres asked them for permit, they were given ten
minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano then shouted “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng Cory
infiltrators.” Which was followed by Nuega’s statement, “Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!”
The police pushed the crowd and used tear gas, the loyalists scampered away while
some fought back by throwing stones. They then fled to Maria Orosa street where the
situation subsidized.
Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking the persons
in yellow, the color of “Coryistas,” and saw one man also wearing a yellow shirt being
chased by the group shouting “Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!” The man being chased
was Salcedo, after getting caught he was boxed, kicked and mauled by the group. He
tried to extricate himself but the group once again pounced and pummeled him.
Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at Luneta, rush to his aid tyring to
pacify the maulers, he then showed a Loyalist tag given to him which led for them to
back off for a while and grab Salcedo but Salcedo was immediately boxed by Raul
Bilosos in the head. Accused Richard de los Sanros also boxed Salcedo twice on the
head and kicked him even after he had fallen. His other co-accused, Tan, Pacadar,
and Tamayo continued to beat him up even after Salcedo had fled for the second
time. The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. He was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital where he was dead on arrival.
Salcedo died of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic” and was found to have
multiple bruises and abrasions in his body. The mauling was witnessed by bystanders
and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video
of the event. A reward of P10k was given to anyone who could give information
regarding his killers. Several persons including Sumilang and Banculo came and
identified the accused.
Appellants Romeo and Joselito contend that the fact that they are not in the pictures
taken by the witness shows their innocence and non-participation in the crime. They
also claimed that they were merely bystanders and viewed the incident from a
distance. On the other hand, the three other accused can be seen in the photographs.
Richard de Los Santos claims that he was only on the pictures because he also
watched the mauling with the others. Pacadar claimed that he was in the pictures
because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo, while Tan testified that he
tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo but was ignored. Lastly, in their
defense they contended that Sumilang and Banculo only identified them out of
interest for the reward.
ISSUE:
WON the accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. The Court finds credibility in the identification of Sumilang and Banculo since
there is not proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified due to the reward nor was it
proven that they received any. Furthermore, evidence shows that Sumilang
immediately reported the incident two hours after the mauling occurred, which was far
earlier than the announcement of reward. Even if the pictures did not record two of
the accused hitting the victim, they were unequivocally identified by witnesses, their
denials and alibis cannot overcome the eyeball identification of Sumilang and
Banculo. The Court further clarifies that the photographs did not capture the entirety
of the sequence leading to Salcedo’s death, but only segments of it.
The court rules that the correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of
the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by testimony of the person who
made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its exactness and accuracy.
In this care there is no tumultuous affray that occurred. Confusion is present because
of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the
loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that
the loyalists have picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly,
taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks, and blows on him. Because of the number of
assailants to be as much as fifty, and were armed with stones which they hit the
victim with, they took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and
frustrated any attempt for Salcedo to escape. Their relentless pursuit towards him,
and continuance in beating him even if he had already fallen into the ground and was
begging for mercy shows their deliberate use of their strength and numbers which
qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery is not found in this case since there was no proof that the attack on
Salcedo was deliberately and consciously adopted. While they did target him due to
the fact that he was wearing a yellow shirt and allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign
against the rallyist, he still had the opportunity to sense their temper and run away
from them. However, we find the existence of conspiracy since at the time they were
committing their crime, their actions impliedly show unity of purpose among them, a
concerted effort to bring about Salcedo’s demise.
NOTES:
Tumultuous Affray- takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and
they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person
is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
Elements of Tumultuous Affray:
That there be several persons
That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally
That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner
That someone was killed in the course of the affray
It cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased
That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.
PEOPLE VS LADJAALAM
DOCTRINE: Use of Firearms, RA 8294
FACTS: PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does. After the search warrant
was issued, a briefing was conducted. After the briefing, more than thirty (30)
policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house
of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles. Before they
could reach appellant’s house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards
the house shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid, raid’. When the policemen were about ten (10)
meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the
house. SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who
were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them.
They all knew appellant.
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence.
Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the
extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other
members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house
through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other
policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a
young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the
second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner.
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw
appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going
upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after
breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the
other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the
second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the
second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested
appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase.
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle with magazine on top of the sofa
at the sala on the second floor. The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the
magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted
seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle
magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition and another with twenty-
one (21) live ammunition. He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines in a corner
at the second floor. The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the
PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any
application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given
authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence.
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña,
Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as
members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a
copy of the search warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then searched appellant’s room on
the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998,
pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum
foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or
‘shabu’. Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different
denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38
caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with
[a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1)
empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
ISSUE: WON the trial was correct in convicting him of the crime of illegal possession
of firearms — NO
RULING: NO. The appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years
and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for
which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.
Section 1 of PD1866 as amended by RA 8294, the new law, provides, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (₱30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this
case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.62 In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and
direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance.
G.R. No. 159703
March 3, 2008
CEDRIC SAYCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Art. 254- Discharge of Firearms)
(RA 10591 - Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cedric Sayco (“Sayco”) was charged before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bais City with illegal possession of firearms.
PROSECUTION:
PO3 Mariano Labe testified on January 17, 2002. He declared that on or about 3:35
in the afternoon of Jan. 3, 1999, while they were at the Police Station, they received
information from a concerned citizen from Tavera St., Bais City, that one unidentified
person was inside Abueva's Repair Shop located at Tavera St., tucking a handgun on
his waist. Upon arrival at Tavera St., they saw one unidentified person tucking a
handgun on his right side waistline. They approached the unidentified person and
asked him if he had a license to possess said firearm, but the answer was in the
negative. At this juncture, they immediately effected the arrest, and confiscated from
his possession and custody a Caliber 9MM marked "SIGSAUER P299" with 14 live
ammunitions with Serial No. AE 25171. The arrested person was identified as Sayco,
a resident of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.
SPO2 VALENTINO ZAMORA and SPO2 VICENTE DORADO, members of the PNP
Bais City, testified on February 26, 2002 and corroborated the testimony of PO3
Labe. SPO2 Zamora further declared that during the incident, they talked to the
accused in Cebuano, but they found out then that the latter is an Ilonggo, so they
spoke to him in English.
DEFENSE:
Petitioner does not deny that he was in possession of the subject firearm and
ammunitions when he was apprehended on January 3, 1999 in Bais City, but he
insists that he had the requisite permits to carry the same, specifically:
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment (Non-expendable Property) for a Cal 9mm (SIG
SAUER) with Serial Number: AE 25171, 2 Mags for Cal 9mm pistol, and 24 Ctgs for
9mm Ammo;
Mission Order dated January 1, 1999 for the duration of 01 January 1999 to 31 March
1999, regarding a CONFIDENTIAL purpose in Negros Island.
Petitioner insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and
ammunitions from the AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are government
property duly licensed to the Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same
could not be licensed under his name; instead, he obtained a Memorandum Receipt
and a Mission Order regarding the subject firearm and ammunitions and authorized
him to carry the same around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he merely
acted in good faith when he relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order
for authority to carry said firearm and ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave injustice
if he were to be punished for the deficiency of said documents
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the petitioner for violation of P.D. 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, despite the latter's Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order
as proof of authority to possess the subject firearm
WON the prosecution's evidence proved the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING:
It is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission order cannot
take the place of a duly issued firearms license, and an accused who relies on said
documents cannot invoke good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms, as this is a malum prohibitum. The court abandons the ruling
on Pp v. Macarandang, the case appellant heavily relies on, because the law is clear
and that no provision is made for a secret agent. It is not within the power of this
Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. As such, he
is not exempt.
As matters stand, Section 879, and reinforced by paragraph 6, Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, is still the basic law on the issuance,
possession and carrying of government-owned firearms. According to such, it is clear
that petitioner is not authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and
ammunition, notwithstanding the memorandum receipt and mission order which were
illegally issued to him.
The rules governing memorandum receipts and mission orders covering the issuance
to and the possession and/or carrying of government-owned firearms by special or
confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows:
Special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of
any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular
compensation for services rendered are not exempt from obtaining a regular license
to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence;
Special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and possess
government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a
memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms.
Neither will they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms
license and a permit to carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-
owned firearms covered by a memorandum receipt; and
Special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry
firearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in
possession of or bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered
by permits to carry the same outside of residence. As he offered no evidence that he
is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is receiving regular compensation from
said agency, he cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential
civilian agent. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-
owned firearm and ammunitions.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 23, 2003 and August
7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27228 together with the Decision
dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City are MODIFIED insofar
only as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Petitioner Cedric Sayco y
Villanueva is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum (FROM four (4)
months of arresto mayor as maximum [sic] to two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional as maximum).
NOTES:
The mission order issued to petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular
civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian agent. Worse, petitioner was not even
acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was carrying the subject
firearm and ammunitions. Petitioner testified that at that time, he was not on an official
mission in Bais City but had merely visited the place to attend to a family emergency.
G.R. No. 163267 May 05, 2010
TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ART 254 DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS RA 10951
FACTS:
Petitioner Evangelista was charged with unlawful possession of firearms
after having found 1 9mm Jericho pistol, 1 Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun, and
19 9mm bullets at the NAIA without a permit. Petitioner originally arrived after a flight
from Dubai, where he was apprehended by Customs Police Maximo Acierto after
being informed by his superior that a passenger in Flight no. 657 would be arriving
from Dubai bringing with him firearms and ammunitions. During the investigation,
petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that he bought the
subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities,
which turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai
In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime
imputed against him for he was never in custody and possession of any firearm or
ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines. The defense uses the testimony of
Capt. Nadurata, who testified that he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in
Dubai where it was explained that Evangelista was being detained as he was found in
possession of forearms and if he would not be allowed to board, then he would be
imprisoned in Dubai, and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if he would
accept the custody of petitioner and his firearms, which Nadurata agreed to. Because
it was already confiscated from him even before he had boarded the flight, this shows
that there was no way it was in his possession once he arrived here.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is still liable for the offense charged.
WON the Philippines has territorial jurisdiction of the crimes charged, given that he
was initially detained in Dubai.
RULING:
1. YES. Appellant’s signature on the Customs Declaration Form, which
contains the entry "2 PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE,"
proves that he was the one who brought the guns to Manila. While appellant claims
that he signed the Customs Declaration Form without reading it because of his
excitement, however, he does not claim that he was coerced or persuaded in affixing
his signature thereon. Even assuming that there was prior accomplishment of the
form which contains incriminating details, petitioner could have easily taken
precautionary measures by not affixing his signature thereto. Or he could have
registered his objection thereto especially when no life threatening acts were being
employed against him upon his arrival in the country.
Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject
firearms. As held in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under
PD 1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or
constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the same. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused, as
his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts
and the surrounding circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his
possession.
Capt. Nadurata’s testimony also reveals that the possession of the firearm
during the flight from Dubai to Manila was for and behalf of appellant. More
importantly, the Court takes note of petitioner’s admission during the clarificatory
questioning by the trial court, wherein he answered “yes” after the Court asked him of
the condition given by the Dubai police of agreeing to release him provided that he
will bring the guns and ammunitions with him to the Philippines. The Court declares
that this constitutes as judicial admission of his possession of the subject firearms
and ammunitions.
2. YES. Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt
that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was
charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the
Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he
was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.
And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has
no license or authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of
the crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of
license to possess the firearm. The fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been
shown that petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in possession
of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them,
an essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
was perpetrated and completed in no other place except the Philippines.
Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against
petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no
pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime
committed in Dubai.
Thus, the Court denies the petition and affirms the CA decision and finding appellant
in violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 121917 | 1997-03-12
Art. 254 Discharge of Firearms - RA 10591
Facts: High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under P.D. 1866. Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered
judgment convicting petitioner of the crime charged.
The People's detailed narration of facts is as follows:
Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa
Highway Restaurant in Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy
downpour that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles along McArthur Highway.
While inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running
fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an
accident considering the inclement weather. True enough, immediately after the
vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast, followed by a
sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something.
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side.
Manarang decided to report the incident to the Philippine National Police of Angeles
City. By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the
place of the accident taking the general direction to the north.
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit
somebody. He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle.
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number and instructed
its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while
raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in
this case. There was no one else with him inside the vehicle. Appellant was wearing a
short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun
tucked on the left side of his waist. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun
but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal
papers. SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal
papers, it would have to be shown in the office. After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja
told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant. SPO2
Borja checked the cylinder of the gun and found six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an
armalite rifle tucked in appellant 's back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so
when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle,
Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant. Suspecting that appellant could
also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of
appellant's vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the
driver 's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode.
He asked the appellant for the papers covering the rifle and the appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms.
During the investigation, the appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating that
he used them for shooting. He was not able to produce any permit to carry or
memorandum receipt to cover the firearms.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866
because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms and ammunition. - NO
Ruling: In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject
firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid
warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second
element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's
purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records
reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his authority
to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation of the
charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not,
despite the ample time given him, present any proper document showing his
authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he
could have produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at
least during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform
the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms
under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for
Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform
Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify
the issuance of a Mission Order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED
US VS Jeffrey
DOCTRINE: Art. 257 - Unintentional abortion
FACTS: On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Teodorica Saguinsin was in a
Chinese shop situated in Guadalupe, municipality of San Pedro Macati, Rizal
Province, a man named D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any apparent
reason whatever, struck the woman three times on the hip with a bottle that he was
carrying, in consequence of which the woman fell to the ground with an abundant
hemorrhage from the womb; she was immediately taken to her home in a carretela,
and being three months pregnant she had a miscarriage on the following day. The
woman was ill and unable to attend to her usual duties for forty-five days.
Therefore a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the Court of First Instance
of said province on the 5th of June, 1909, charging D. B. Jeffrey with the crime of
lesiones menos graves (less serious injuries). The trial court sentenced the accused,
on the 19th of August, 1909, to the penalty of forty-five days of arresto mayor, to pay
a fine of 325 pesetas, to indemnify the injured woman in the sum of P50, and, in case
of insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity, to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, not, however, to exceed one-third of the main penalty, and
to pay the costs. From this judgment defendant’s counsel has appealed.
From the facts above related it is clearly shown that the crime of abortion, defined and
punished by article 411 of the Penal Code, has been committed, inasmuch as, in
consequence of the maltreatment received, on the evening of March 1, 1909, by
Teodorica Saguinsin, a married woman who for three months had been pregnant, she
fell to the ground, and had a severe hemorrhage and, being unable to return to her
home, was taken there in a vehicle, with the assistance of Basilisa Pascual, who
witnessed the occurrence. On the following day she had a miscarriage, as certified by
the president of the municipal board of health of the town of San Pedro Macati who
made an examination of and attended the victim of the maltreatment.
ISSUE: WON D. B. Jeffrey is liable for the crime of unintentional abortion— YES
RULING: YES. The crime committed is that of abortion and not that of lesiones, it is
our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be set aside.
Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the
fact that, without any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica Saguinsin,
presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused
the miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the
consequences thereof, to wit, for the abortion.
People vs Genoves
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Abortion
FACTS: On May 28, 1934, Crispin Genoves and Soledad Rivera were laborers in
adjoining cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke of the plow which Genoves was
repairing belonged to her and tried to take it by force. Genoves struck Soledad with
his fist, causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and returned to the fray, then she
received another strike which caused her again to fall to the ground. Immediately after
the incident deceased proceeded to the municipal building, and complained about the
maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with children, and as she complained to
the chief of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of the
sanitary district. According to testimony, the deceased was in good health the day
before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain which were
symptoms of premature delivery. Deceased remained in this condition until June 10,
1934. On that date the condition culminated in the painful and difficult premature
delivery of one of the twin babies that she was carrying, but the other baby was never
born as Soledad died of hemorrhage before the other baby could be delivered. Both
babies were dead.
The other defense is that the accused did not strike the deceased, but this fact is
clearly established by the prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and provocation, as the offended
party by force induced the appellant to use force on his part.
ISSUE: WON Genoves is guilty of Homicide with unintentional Abortion - YES
RULING: Genoves is guilty of homicide with unintentional Abortion but since he has a
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong Genosa only
suffered 12 years and and one day to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusión
temporal.
The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion. It is generally known that a fall is
liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of
events from the assault to her death. The accused must be held responsible for the
natural consequences of his act.
NOTES:
Abortion = the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus, or the violent expulsion of the
fetus from the maternal womb which results the death of the fetus.
Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion
by violence, but unintentionally.
Elements of unintentional abortion are as follows : (1) That there is a pregnant
woman, (2) That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending
abortion, (3) That the violence i intentionally exerted ,and (4) That as a result of the
violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ARTICLE 256-257 INTENTIONAL ABORTION and
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
FACTS:
Appellant Filomena Salufrania was charged with the crime of Parricide and
Intentional Abortion, under Articles 246 and 256 of the RPC for the death of his wife,
Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania and their 8-months old fetus. The crime occurred on
December 03, 1974 at about 6pm in their house. Pedro Salufrania, the son of the
accused and the deceased, testified that on said night the two were quarellling and
saw his father box his mother on the stomach, and once fallen on the floor, his father
strangled her to death. He also saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of Marciana
and that she died on the spot where she fell. Pedro Salufrania further testified that
after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went out of the house to get a
hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the
accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep
when the horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister
Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body
while their father was away; that their father arrived early the next morning with the
hammock and after placing their dead mother on the hammock, the accused carried
her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching.
Pedro further testified that Filomena had threatened to kill him and his
siblings should he reveal the true cause of his mother’s death. They are currently
living in the house of their uncle, Marciana’s brother, Narciso Abuyo. Abuyo testified
that the children were afraid of going home with their father after the funeral, and
when Alex had told him the reason why, he immediately reported it to the police. The
accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the
deceased Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December
1974, Marciana arrived home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a
week; that she was hungry upon her arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and
after eating their lunch, he proceeded to his work while his wife rested in their house.
At 4am he was awakened by his wife because of terrible stomach pain and even after
giving her the native treatments of “hilot” and “banti”, his wife passed away.
Accused contends his innocence, and that he had not been fighting with his
wife prior her death. He also questions the credibility of Pedro’s testimony since he is
only 13 years old when he testified and 11 years old when the crime occurred, falling
under Section 19 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, wherein children who
appear to the court to be of such “tender age” cannot be witnesses in the trial. Lastly,
appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to
show that he had the intention to cause an abortion
ISSUE:
1. WON Pedro’s testimony should be held credible
2. WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder and
Intentional Abortion.
RULING:
1. YES. Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the
trial court determined Pedro Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify
under oath. They reiterate the trial court’s assessment of Pedro, stating “The
testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim Marciana
Abuyo and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear,
convincing and truthful.”
2. NO. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom.
We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently
established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an
abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not
necessarily to cause an abortion. It has also been clearly established (a) that
Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b)
that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c) that,
as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her womb.
Thus, the Court finds the accused GUILTY FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
PARRICIDE WITH UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION.
G.R. No. 2957
January 3, 1907
THE UNITED STATES VS. JUAN BOGEL (alias CATALIN) ET AL
(Art. 262- Mutilation)
FACTS:
The guilt of the accused of the crime of robbery with which they were charged was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It was further proven that one of the accused, on
the occasion of the robbery, stabbed a woman named Fabiana in one eye, and that
as a result of the wound thus inflicted she lost the use of the eye.
The trial court imposed the penalty for mutilation, with cadena temporal in its medium
degree to cadena perpetua, after classifying the stabbing of an eye as mutilation.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of cadena temporal to a maximum
degree, prescribed in par. 2 of Art. 503 of the Penal Code rather than par. 3 of article
503, in relation to par. 1 and 2 of Art. 416 of the Penal Code – YES.
WON lost of an eye should be classified as mutilation – NO.
RULING:
Viada, in his commentary on Art. 415 of the Penal Code, which penalizes intentional
mutilations, points out that by mutilation (mutilacion) is understood, according to the
Diccionario de la lengua, the lopping or clipping off (cercenamiento) of some part of
the body, and it is evident that the putting out of an eye does not fall under this
definition. Unless the putting out of an eye by stabbing is a mutilation in the sense in
which this word is defined above, it is manifest that the penalty to be imposed in this
case is that prescribed in par. 3 and not paragraph 2 of Art. 503, which only imposes
cadena temporal.
NOTES:
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 503 are as follows:
One guilty of robbery with violence or intimidation to the person will be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
2. With cadena temporal in its medium degree to cadena perpetua when the robbery
was accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or when for the purpose of or on
occasion of the robbery any wounds are inflicted which are penalized in paragraph 1
of article 416 of the Penal Code, or when the person who was robbed was held
prisoner for ransom or period longer than one day.
3. With cadena temporal when the purpose of or on occasion of the robbery any of
the wounds are inflicted which are penalized in paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal
Code.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code provide that he wounds, strikes,
or maltreats another will be punished for the crime of grave injuries.
1. With prision mayor if as a result of the wounds the offended person became an
imbecile, impotent, or blind.
2. With prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees if as a result of the
wounds the offended person lost an eye or some principal member, or has been
incapacitated or unfitted for the work in which prior thereto he was habitually
engaged.
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, Petitioner, versus SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170723 | 2008-03-03
Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving
him, either totally or partially, or some essential organ of reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
Facts:The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against
respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz
(Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and
several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre used to be in charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child
caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters. Sometime in 1978, respondent
Pedro Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their
four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent Olondriz, came
to know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry
spend a few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In
June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine months of age, formally became the ward
of respondent Pedro Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his
developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical
growth did not appear normal in that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on
his tummy like a frog x x x;" he did not utter his first word until he was three years of
age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up and
walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry
at the Colegio de San Agustin, but the child experienced significant learning
difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for
neurological and psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation done on
Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached
concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to
performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required
that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether or
not the former could validly give his consent to the medical procedure on account of
his mental deficiency.
Respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation: The responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written consent
was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence,
respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a criminal
complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and
262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre
maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any way amount to
mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely intact. In any case,
respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure performed is reversible through
another procedure called Vasovasostomy.
The Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the facts alleged did not amount to the
crime of mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., "the vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived Larry of his
reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." He ratiocinated
that while the operation renders him the inability to procreate, the operation is
reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage contemplated under
Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the
DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.
The Secretary of the DOJ dismissed the petition.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the
latter affirmed the public prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause for the criminal
complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. - NO.
Ruling: A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements] of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1)
that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and
2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
Mutilation is also known by the name of 'castration', which consists of the amputation
of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could not fail to punish with
the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a
person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that in order for 'castration' to
exist, it is indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not
look only to the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of
an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although
voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not come under the provisions of
this article.
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some
essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such
procedure does not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for
reproduction." Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of
a limb or essential part (of the body), with the operative expression being
"deprivation." In the same manner, the word "castration" is defined as the removal of
the testes or ovaries. Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as
defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE VS BUKA
DOCTRINE: Arts 262-266
FACTS: The victim with some other companions were bound for General Santos City
from Miasong Malungon, South Cotabato, riding on a weapons carrier. Upon reaching
Sitio Samlang, Brgy Datal Batong, of said Municipality, at around 11:30 A.M. they
were ambushed by the accused resulting to (sic) the death of Estelita Imarga, Elena
Pamoso and wounding (sic) Felipe Noquera. The weapons carrier was driven by
Paquito Alvarez. Per Medical report the cause of death of Estelita Imarga was "gun
shot wounds, left chest," Elena Pamoso was "gun shot wounds, right chest" (Exhibits
"D" and "D-1") while Felipe Noquera suffered injuries.
Paquito Alvarez, driver of the weapons carrier which was ambushed declared that he
saw the ambushers with guns and recognized two of them as Beren and Purong, the
real name (sic) are Beren Mandong and Purong Bilaan. He recognized these two
among the ambushers because he is acquainted with them long time (sic) before the
incident. The others were new to him and hence did not recognize them.
When they were shot at, he speed (sic) up his truck until they reached Datal Kangil, a
place three kilometers, more or less, from the ambush scene where he asked for help
from the Barangay Captain. They went back to retrieve one of the victims Estelita
Imarga who fell from the weapons carrier and brought her to Datal Kangil.
Felipe Noquera, the one who sustained gun shot wounds but escaped death, testified
that they were ambushed at Sitio Samlang, Datal Batong, Malungon, at around 11:00-
11:30 o'clock A.M., on December 14, 1978, on their way to General Santos City from
Brgy. Miasong, of said Municipality, riding on a weapons Carrier (sic). He saw the
ambushers and recognized Angel, Beren, Pral and Lapnayo whose real names are
Angel Pral, Beren Mandong, Ngay Pral, Lapnayo Buka and Purong Bilaan. The
witness was acquainted with these persons long (sic) time before the incident for he
used to see them in Datal Batong. He (Noquera) being a driver himself of a weapons
carrier. He identified Angel Pral and Beren Mandong in court during his open
testimony. He saw each of these two ambushers with long firearms. In spite of the
rigid cross examination on this witness he stood pat on the identity of the two
accused, testifying firmly that he saw them (accused) holding long firearm each, but
he did not know what kind firearms were those. He was investigated by the office of
the Provincial Fiscal and he told the same version — re — the identity of these two
accused.
Luis Esconde, one of the persons on board the weapon (sic) carrier at the time of the
of the time (sic) of the ambushcade (sic) testified that upon reaching sitio Samlang,
he saw the ambushers more than five, who fired at them and he recognized three of
them, Lapnayo, Beren and Angel, whose real name (sic) are Lapnayo Buka, Beren
Mandong, and Angel Pral. He did not recognized (sic) the others. He readily pointed
to the accused Angel Pral and Beren Mandong when he was made to identify them in
Court. He is acquainted with said accused because he usually see (sic) them in Datal
Batong during market days, cockfighting and card games. He saw the victims of the
ambush Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso who died immediately thereafter, while
Felipe Noquera suffered gun shot wounds (TSN, pp. 46-51, Feb. 3, 1982). Upon rigid
cross-examination this witness also stand (sic) pat on the identity of these two
accused whom he saw holding long firearm (sic) each.
Ricardo Salvador, one of the persons on the (sic) board the weapon (sic) carrier at
the time and date of the ambush, stated that he saw the ambushers, but he only
recognized Beren, whose real name is Beren Mandong, also holding a long firearm.
He saw the victims Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso who died immediately
thereafter while Felipe Noquera suffered gunshot wounds. (TSN, pp. 61-64, Feb. 3,
1982). On cross (sic), this witness firmly stated that he knew personally Beren
Mandong before the incident because he usually saw him in Datal Batong, while the
rest of the ambushers were not known to him, hence, he could not recognize them
(TSN, pp. 64-65, Feb. 3, 1982).
In convicting each of the accused for murder as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1893
and 1895 and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1894, the trial court considered
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation since the
"ambush or shooting was so sudden and unexpected assault (sic) perpetrated by all
the accused insured the killing of the two defenseless victim Estelita Imarga and
Elena Pamoso and the frustrated death (sic) of Felipe Noquera."
Unable to accept the verdict, accused Angel Pral and Beren Mandong, hereinafter
referred to as the Appellants, filed their Notice of Appeal to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).
ISSUE: WON the crimes committed by the accused were the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder as charged by the lower court — NO
RULING: NO. The accused are guilty of homicide on two (2) counts and of attempted
homicide, with the generic aggravating circumstances of treachery and band.
In Criminal Case No. 1984, the accused cannot be convicted for the crime of murder
because, as testified to by Dr. Casimiro Mansilla, the doctor who examined the victim,
Felipe Noquera, the latter would have lived even without medical attendance because
the "wound was just a slight physical injury” which description falls under the definition
only of an “attempted murder/homicide.”
The trial court, in ruling that murder was committed in the case of Elena Pamaso and
Estelita Imarga and frustrated murder in the case of Felipe Noquera, considered the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. We disagree with
the trial court on this score.
For evident premeditation to be present, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and,
(3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. While treachery was duly proven against appellants
such circumstance is not, however, alleged in the three (3) informations.
For treachery to qualify the crime of homicide to murder, it must be alleged in the
information, otherwise it will only be considered a generic aggravating circumstance,
if proven. Therefore, treachery is only a generic aggravating circumstance in these
cases. The informations allege that the aggravating circumstance of band attended
the commission of the crimes charged. There is a band whenever more than three (3)
armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense. The
accusatory portions of the informations elaborate this circumstance by stating that the
five (5) named accused, two (2) of whom are the Appellants, and two (2) other John
Does "armed with assorted high-powered weapons such as Garand rifle, shotgun and
surit and with evidence premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, attack, assault and shoot with
assorted high powered weapons" the weapons carrier of Edon Escobillo thereby
causing the death and injuries described therein. Evidently, the prosecution did not
intend to make the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men as a qualifying
circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Otherwise, it would have
expressly alleged it as such as in the case of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and evident premeditation. Accordingly, band absorbed aid of armed men.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of sex alleged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1893 and 1895 cannot be appreciated
against the Appellants, there being no proof that they deliberately intended to offend
the sex of the victims or show manifest disrespect towards them.
G.R. Nos. 80399-404 November 13, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH and RUDY GAID, accused-appellants.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: ART 262-266
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid were each charged with
two counts of forcible abduction with rape, one count of robbery with frustrated
homicide, and one count of robbery. The crimes occurred on March 31, 1983 at about
8pm sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza had just attended mass with their friends
Rolly Imperio and Luis Tamang. They proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill
using an Isuzu pick-up owned by Luis ’mother. Going home, two armed men (Fortich
and Gaid) suddenly emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and fired a single shot
which hit the left side of their care. They introduced themselves as members of the
New People's Army (NPA) and ordered the sisters to get inside the vehicle while
Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head using his gun, which caused him to fall, while
Tumang was hit several times by Fortich causing him to momentarily lose
consciousness. Tumang was divested of his wallet containing one hundred sixty
pesos (P160.00) in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00), six Saudi Arabia Riyals P30.42),
one 12K gold wristwatch worth P500.00, pants valued at P140.00, and shoes worth
P125.00. Imperio, on the other hand, was stripped of his pants valued at P135.00, a
wallet worth P45.00 containing P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt.
Leaving the two and stealing their car, the two drove towards Acuna Beach with the
two sisters still in the back seat. Appellants detoured and entered a dirt road leading
to Malasag where they parked the vehicle. At his juncture, Gaid had transferred to the
backseat with Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in front with Fortich. Gaid
poked his gun at the right side of Marilou's neck and ordered her to remove her pants
under pain of death. Gaid then raped Marilou while Fortich raped Maritess.
Appellants switched victims twice before divesting them of their watches, a handbag
containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt, toilet tissue and toothbrush, and the pick-up's
stereo and tools. They then drove down the highway and left the sisters at a gasoline
station some three kilometers from the city.
Prosecution witness Jaime Rivera testified that appellants went to his house at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning of April 1, 1983, bringing with them a revolver and a bag
containing a car stereo, watch and wallet. He was apparently asked to sell the
revolver for not less than P300.00, with a promise that he would receive a fifty percent
commission. However, both accused pleaded not guilty on all charges. Fortich claims
that during that night he was with other accused Gaid and after going out to dinner
and a few drinks, they went to Carmen Hill to relax when suddnely they were attacked
by the two men, Imperio and Tumang, causing them to defend themselves and in
their escape, used their pick-up truck with the two sisters and after conversing, left
them at Marcos Bridge unharmed while Gaid drove him home in his house in Patag.
ISSUE:
WON the two accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. Appellants anchor their defense solely on the denial of the charges
imputed to them. It is an established doctrine that the defense of denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Aside from being positively
identified, the different versions presented by appellants are contrary to ordinary
human experience. The court is convinced that Marilou did recognize the physical
features of her tormentors as she was in a supine position when appellants
successively mounted her. She was as close to the appellants as was physically
possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than
during a sexual act. Marilou had ample opportunity to observe appellants while she
was being terrorized and, subsequently raped. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of her statement where she declared that she recognized appellants as her
transgressors.
The trial court found ample evidence to support a finding of conspiracy. In
the case at bar, the evidence revealed that appellants arrived together at Carmen Hill
and, at gunpoint, forcibly took Imperio and Tumang's personal belongings and fled
with the sisters on board the stolen pick-up. After fleeing, appellants successively
abused Marilou and Maritess inside the vehicle. These acts manifestly disclose their
"joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.”
With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3977,
the trial court correctly observed that the element of intent to kill was not present. It
must be stressed that while Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never shot
Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it. The trial court, however, erred in
designating the crime committed as robbery with frustrated homicide. There is no
such crime. There should have been two separate informations: one for robbery and
another for frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in the
information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of appellants for the
crime of simple robbery.
Thus, the Court rules appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are
hereby convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and, likewise, of three
counts of rape as defined and penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article 335, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Li vs People
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.
FACTS:
Two different versions of the incident were presented. According to Ronaldo Tan and
dela Camara’s version, Li refused to have a drink, and that the reason for the fight
was an improper bath in public. Arugay was watching the television with his sisters
Cristy and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they heard a noise
caused by Li and Sangalang who were then bathing naked outside their house.
Enraged, Arugay yelled, “Pare bastos kayo, ba’t kayo nakahubad?” Li shouted back,
“Putang Ina!” and threw something at the Arugays ’house. Sangalang also yelled,
“Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!” Arugay went outside and confronted the
two which eventually ended up with Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat on the head
and later stabbing him with a knife. Sangalang was also seen stabbing the victim at
least once with a knife. Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag
him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed
Arugay once. Dela Camara was confronted by Li’s sister, Kristine, who proceeded to
pull her hair and slap her around. Kristine also wielded a bolo, with which she hacked
dela Camara in the arm. dela Camara was able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at
least once, so she claimed. Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was
stabbed, with Li and Sangalang chasing him.
Li’s version states that he encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18
April 1993, a few hours before the brawl. Arugay was carrying a bayong containing
various liquors. He invited Li to a drinking session which the latter refused as he had
work the following day. At 1am Li saw that Arugay and his girlfriend hurled objects
and kicked the gate of his house. Upon seeing that Arugay has gotten himself two
kitchen knives, Li armed himself with a baseball bat. Li managed to evade Arugay’s
thrusts and successfully hit him with the bat on the shoulder with which Arugay ran
back to his house and emerged carrying a bolo. Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo but
Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his right
temple, right wrist, and right shoulder. Li passed out. Sangalang was also present
when the incident started. Arugay had multiple stab wounds while Li was brought to
the hospital.
ISSUE: WON Li is guilty for Slight physical injuries and maltreatment
RULING: Yes Li is guilty of Slight physical injuries
The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victim’s right arm that resulted
from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victim’s supervening death
from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of
the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of
speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for
labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries,
NOTES:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 20 pesos and censure when the offender
has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging
in his habitual work nor require medical assistance.
By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the
offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
Three kinds if slight physical injuries
Physical injuries which incapacitated the offended party for lafor from 1 to 9 days, or
required medical attendance during the same period
Physical injuries which did not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work or which did not require medical attendance
Ill- treatment of another by deed without causing injury
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(R.A. 8049- Anti-Hazing Law)
FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. After dinner, they
went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on
what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were
scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included:
"Indian Run," – required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the
"Bicol Express," – the neophytes would sit on the floor with their backs against the
wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their
legs;
"Rounds," – the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries"
(the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during
initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
"Auxies’ Privilege Round," – the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day – Feb. 9, 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically.
The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing as on their first day.
After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident/alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of
physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries
to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as
they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was
really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans. Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were
jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and
modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. One of the accused had by then passed away, so the following Decision
applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as
indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional
amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
However, the separate criminal case against the remaining nine accused failed to
commence. So much so in fact that the trial court dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile,
on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
However, on 25 October 2006, the CA reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed
the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial. Petitioner Gerarda Villa assailed this judgment
and filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, citing that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case.
On the other hand, after the CA lowered the criminal liability of Tecson et. Al from
Homicide to Slight Physical Injuries, the latter of which carries a probationable
sentence, they immediately applied for probation which was allegedly granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 by the Caloocan RTC.
Tecson et. Al now alleges that upon their completion of the terms and conditions
under PD No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law, discharged them from
probation and criminal liability, and declared the criminal case against them
terminated on various dates in April 2003. Tecson et. Al has filed Motions for
Clarification or Reconsideration with the SC regarding their judgment of elevating the
penalty to reckless imprudence resulting to Homicide, and the extinguishment of their
criminal liability through probation..
Under a motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG, it stipulates that although it
relents to the findings of the Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither
the felonious intent to kill nor the felonious intent to Lenny Villa, further conceding that
the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa), it
contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that for deceit
(dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that
the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused
was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby
considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that
it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice
aforethought. Also, the OSG asserts that Victorino et al. should have been similarly
convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since
the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed
to his death.
ISSUES:
WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
WON the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies.
WON the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases
against them.
RULING:
In light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s
dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal, and that any
appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against
double jeopardy. Though the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
However, upon a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
arguments, the Court found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion
in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings
were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, the
Court denies the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
The Court denies with finality the motion filed by the OSG. The court emphasizes that
the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that
committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result
of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The law requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an
accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony. Accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting
physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, the Court rules that the imposable penalty is
what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
On the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration filed by Tecson et al.:
The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking the annulment of the
judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
Tecson et. al. insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight
physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective
availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence,
they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. As per Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, there is
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation. Coupled with
Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be ascertained that only the
accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein, to avoid double
jeopardy. However, the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that
issued the criminal judgment. As it is, the Court partially annulled the decision of the
CA, in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein, through a Rule 65 petition, was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have no legal effect, as they were
issued without jurisdiction.
Tecson et. al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Branch 130
of Caloocan City RTC did not have competence to take cognizance of the
applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case, which
was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC. Under Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, the
law requires that an application for probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted
and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.
The records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
granted the probation applications. Records reveals that the CA had not yet
relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took
cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the
accused filed their respective applications while a motion for reconsideration was still
pending before the CA and the records were still with that court. According to Art. 78
of the Revised Penal Code, the court of origin only reacquires jurisdiction over the
case for appropriate action after the appellate court submits a certified true copy of
the judgment or final order which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from
which the appeal was taken. Since a motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the CA and the records were still with that court, the Court finds that RTC
Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et al. It
had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on
probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated.
Section 4 of the Probation Law indicates probation may be granted whether the
sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation
shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal; a defendant cannot avail of probation once they appealed their
case in the appellate court. Tecson et. al should not have been eligible to seek
probation after appealing their homicide conviction by the RTC to the CA.
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et al. from probation did not totally extinguish their
criminal liability.
A void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no
judgment had been rendered at all. Considering that the orders of Branch 130 of
Caloocan City RTC were made in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
However, in light of a recent decision by this Court in Colinares v. People, Tecson et.
al. may now apply for probation regardless of the appeal of their case from judgment
of the RTC that bars Tecson et. al. from applying for probation under Sec. 4 of the
Probation Law, on the basis that had the RTC done what was right and imposed the
correct penalty in the first place, the right to apply for probation would have been
available right at the onset.
Wherefore, remises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner
Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning
G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible
to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of
the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.
[G.R. No. 174786]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LTSG. DOMINADOR
BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG.
GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.
RA 8049 Anti-Hazing Law
Facts:While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of
fraternity members for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of
liability of schools and school authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-
Hazing Law.
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months
of investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for
the preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the
orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005, finding probable cause to
charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez),
Leotharius C. Montez (Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S.
Simpas (Simpas) – collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case against Alvarez et al.
was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military the finding of probable cause to charge the school authorities as accomplices
to hazing. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of
hazing.
The school authorities (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. They argued that the Information did not contain all the essential
elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the
purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover,
they stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a
fraternity, a sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the
Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the “physical,
mental, and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine
and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular
members.” Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they were
given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had
already been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with
whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that
the case against them must be dismissed.
In view of the dismissal of the case against the principals, the court ruled that the
Information charging Bayabos et al. as accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
Issues:
Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
- YES
Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments
for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law -
NO
Ruling:
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso
facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the
case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence
of the crime has in fact been established. We note in the present case that Bayabos
et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against
Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed
against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does
not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so
much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported
principals.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite
for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the
recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who
have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the
perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are
established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or
subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were
employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization.
In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against
persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a
person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s
admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the
accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or
failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered
an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization
includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army
training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies,
partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the Department of
Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained
merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term organization within the
meaning of the law.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must
be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the
crime of accomplice to hazing. The indictment merely states that psychological pain
and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the
purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby
DENIED and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The
dismissal of the case in Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3
August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209464 July 01, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: RA 8049 – ANTI-HAZING LAW
FACTS:
On January 14, 2006 in Villa Novaliches, Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha
Phi Omega Fraternity with more or less than twenty other members and officers
conducted initiation rites for new member Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla.
He was brought into the hospital around 3:20 am in the ER of JP Rizal Hospital where
Dr. Masilungan was the attending physician. He observed Villanueva to be already
motionless and had no heartbeat. They tried to revive him for 15-30 minutes but
sadly, Villanueva failed to respond and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan
disclosed that Villanueva was brought by two men who had told him they found the
victim motionless on the ground at a store in Brngy. Pansol. From his medico-legal
report, he deduced the wounds sustained by the victim to be from hazing due to his
past experience of undergoing hazing and also past patients with hazing injuries.
A medico-legal officer, Dr. Roy Camarillo, examined the body, and found
various external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three
(33) external injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that the cause
of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based
on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his previous examinations of
hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related.
The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the
caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it. The police asked Capillan if there
were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños) students who rented
the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that
about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be
renting the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following
morning. Another witness, Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route near the
resort testified that he was approached by a man saying they needed a ride to the
hospital. Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who
looked very weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of
the man being carried and sensed it was cold. Magat asked the men what happened
to their companion. They replied that he had too much to drink.
Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13 January
2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right. Marlon told
Joey that it was his "finals" night.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that
Dungo and Sibal were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no
record of any request for initiation or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity. Atty.
Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT)
of the UP Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on
March 31, 2006 against the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva.
On their defense, seven witnesses were presented to prove their innocence. Richard
Cornelo, an APO member, said that on the night of the incident he met Dungo at the
UPLB Graduate School which the latter asked if he would be attending the ceremony
which he answered in the negative. Ana Rivera, Dungo’s girlfriend, testified that she
and Dungo were together the entire night with Dungo sleeping at her boarding house
and was only woken up by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungol to go to a resort,
which he did. Dungo corroborated Anna’s testimony, and further relayed that upon
arrival at the resort, he saw Rudolfo, fellow APO brother, and Villanueva already
unconscious. Gilbert Gopez, the Grand Chancellor of APO for years 2005-06 testified
that he cancelled the final rites after seeing Villanueva’s bruised cheek caused by
Castillo just before the initiation supposedly occurred. This was also corroborated by
Sibal, who accompanied Villanueva and claimed to have later found him seated in
one of the resort’s benches and already unconscious. He then called Dungo for help.
After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP
Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that
Dungo had done the same.
In this appeal, petitioners contended that the prosecution failed to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed
the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in
the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. WON the offense charged by the trial courts were correct, finding the
appellants guilty of violating RA 8049 beyond reasonable doubt.
2. WON Conspiracy was duly proven by the Court
RULING:
YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be
determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with
Section 4 of the law, which provides different classes of persons who are held liable
as principals and accomplices. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be
present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in
the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing
would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that
induced the victim to be present.
2. YES. Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be
related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to
haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders
would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the
fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the
infliction of physical injuries.
Witness Susan Ignacio, testified that she saw more than twenty (20) persons
arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney. She estimated the ages of
these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15)
persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked like they were praying.
Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy some
items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she was
shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald
Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal,
Jr.
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate. As properly
held by the RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of the petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The
testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability. The
corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend
of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she
loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not
hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses
to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.
Thus, the Court denies their petition and affirms the resolution of CA finding
the appellants guilty in violation of RA 8049.
NOTES:
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of
violence, acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts. The
physical form of hazing may include beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise,
drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy
and forced kissing. Moreover, hazing does not only result in physical injuries and
hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress.
PEOPLE VS ORITA
DOCTRINE: Abolition of “frustrated rape”
FACTS: Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the
St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had
left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house. All of a sudden, somebody held
her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since
the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced
complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left
arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the
second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked
to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted
her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as
he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not
fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving.
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position,
only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage,
appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping which
she succeeded in doing. Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which
was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house, and knocked on the
door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on
the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras,
the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they
discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the
boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody running
away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial
Hospital where she was physically examined. Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident
physician who examined complainant, declared that the hymen was still intact; no
laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty;
vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
ISSUE: WON the accused was correctly convicted by the trial court — NO
RULING: NO. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, not frustrated rape as there is no crime of frustrated rape.
We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion, is whether or not the
accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was of the belief
that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the
crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of
the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs
shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily
connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. Our concern now is whether or
not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by
the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.
Thus, the felony is consummated. We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil.
694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of
the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
NOTES:
People vs Erina where frustrated rape was the crime charged was a stray decision and
is not the controlling doctrine.
People vs Campuhan
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: Art 266 Rape
FACTS: The defendant was found guilty of statutory rape for raping the four-year-old daughter
Ma. Corazon Pamintuan in their house. The defendant, Primo Campuhan, was a helper of the
brother of the Corazon Pamintuan. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of the victim, while preparing
Milo for her daughters, heard a noise upstairs shouting, “Ayoko, ayoko”. Upon hearing, she
rushed upstairs and saw the defendant inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were
down to his knees. Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. She yelled “POTANG INA
MO ANAK KO YAN” boxed him several times before the defendant was able to pull up his shorts
and run outside of the house. However, he was caught by Corazon’s brother. In convicting the
accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo
with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina.
The defendant appealed the decision of the court.
ISSUE: W/N the statements of Corazon is sufficient enough to prove that the defendant is guilty
of statutory rape.
RULING: No. The Court ruled, through Justice Bellosillo, statements is insufficient to prove that
a consummated rape was committed. Committing a rape should commence on the defendant
having full carnal knowledge of the victim. It should be consummated rape when there is the
touching of the penis on the labia of the women even though no perfect penetration occurred.
However, absent of any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape. In the case at bar, it cannot be
held that it was consummated rape because the penis of the defendant never touched the
female organs of the victim on the basis of the testimony of the victim. However, in cases of
rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of
unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the
penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted
rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear. Under Article 6, rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, all the panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers.

elements for attempted rape was present, thus accused should be punished to such. The Court
Isip testified that accused failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June
modified the decision of the lower court from Statutory Rape to Attempted Rape.
26, 1995, around 2AM, accused boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at
NOTES: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal the talipapa. Accused alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances (1)By using force or thereafter disappeared. That same morning, around 7:30AM, a certain Boy found the dead
intimidation. (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3)When body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the
the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan.
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the
Elements of Rape: (1)Penetration (2) Force (3) Resistance (4) Non consent (5) Absence of
septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises.
spousal relationship Results of the autopsy revealed that the cause of death was asphyxiation due to strangling
with signs of traumatic head injury. Evidence of penetration of the victim’s vagina by an adult
G.R. No. 122485 male organ is also present, with the hymen having complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00
February 1, 1999 o'clock position, congested with blood clots. Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAHINAY SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed her accused Mahinay, was missing. According to Isip, it
(Art. 266-A - Rape) was unlikely for accused to just disappear from the apartment since whenever he would go
out, he would normally return on the same day or early morning of the following day. At the
FACTS: second floor of the house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of
Accused Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1953. dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon, identified by Elvira Chan to
His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue
residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, slippers which Isip identified as that of accused. Also found in the yard, near the septic tank
Metro Manila. Mahinay stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified
away from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's by Isip as accused's belongings. A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral
neighbor. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound slip addressed to the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano
yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing, accused was retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank.
always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank.
After a series of follow-up operations, accused was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
PROSECUTION Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the
On June 25, 1995, at 8AM., accused joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10AM, assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, accused executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
accused, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when accused came face to face
with his friends. Meanwhile, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who owned a store fronting with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and
the compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators
Isip's unfinished house at around 4PM. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from
Rivera's store. DEFENSE:
On July 10, 1995, accused Mahinay was sentenced to the crime of rape with homicide with the
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house, penalty of death, to which accused pleaded not guilty to. Accused then offers his version:
which was near Isip’s, between 6-7PM to call his office. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt.
Suni met accused along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8-9PM, he saw Ma. Victoria On June 25, 1995, around 9:30AM on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, he joined
standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house. Later, around 9PM, accused showed up Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria
at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed accused that there was none Isip, accused's employer. After consuming three cases of beer, he was summoned by Isip to
left of it. She notice that accused appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was clean the jeepney, finishing around 12NN. Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance
worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound. Meanwhile, of P300.00.
 house on that fateful night. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew that the
At 2PM, accused, instead of going out with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy accused was in the second floor of the unfinished house on that specific night. Furthermore, it
for another drinking session. They consumed another case of beer. Around 6PM, Zaldy, a co- is strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where accused Larry Mahinay
worker, fetched him. They went to Zaldy's house and drank gin around 8 o'clock p.m. At around was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead body of the child. The accused’s
9PM, they went out and bought another bottle from a nearby store. While they were at the silence was also indicative of his guilt. If the accused did not commit the crime and was only
store, accused and Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, accused forced to dispose of the body in the septic tank, he could have repelled the accusation of the
left.
crime at any point. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. A person's silence

therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
On his way home, accused passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isip's Finally, the circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt.
apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip's
unfinished house. Around 10PM, Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED, finding accused Larry Mahinay
the body inside the room where accused was sleeping. As accused stood up, Zaldy pointed to y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to
him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill death by electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
him. He, however, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in Ma. Victoria Chan, except for the award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is
bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they would kill
him. At 4AM the following morning, he left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and NOTES:
later to Batangas. A. The three principles in the review of rape cases:
1. An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
Subsequently, accused was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, accused heard the 2. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are
police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme
killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was caution; and
assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial 3. The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
confession. allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

ISSUES: B. At the time of the commission of this heinous act in the case at bar, rape was still
1. WON the accused is guilty of the crime of rape with homicide considered a crime against chastity, although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A.

No. 8353), rape has since been re-classified as a crime against persons under Articles
RULING:
266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the
Circumstantial evidence surrounding the accused is more than enough to prove accused’s guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. The four witnesses that the prosecution produced offended party.
should be given full faith and credit as there is absence of any evidence as to the existence of

improper motive and that there was any reason for them to testify falsely against accused. The
belongings of the victim being found where the accused slept on the night of the incident is a C. In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's vagina;
clear indication that that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises. rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is
enough to consummate the sexual intercourse. The mere touching by the male's
On the other hand, the version of the accused was belied by his own extra-judicial confession organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman's private
wherein he, after having been informed of his constitutional rights, voluntarily gave his parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession is believed to have been
freely and voluntarily given. There was no evidence that the accused was maltreated or coaxed
into confessing the crime, as he so claimed to be. G.R. No. 104954 December 13, 1994

The version given by the accused is in and of itself unbelievable and unnatural. In open court, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
accused stated that he was staying in the apartment of Isip and only slept at the unfinished
 vs. and 2) that coitus was done through the use of force or intimidation. This the prosecution
was able to do in the case at bench.
MARIO FABRO Y ARQUIZA, accused-appellant.
The use of force by appellant on private complainant on the night of May 14, 1989
was set forth clearly in her testimony. She said that he grabbed his hand and dragged her for
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: RAPE about ten (10) meters. When he struggled with him, he held her by the neck, choked her, and
caused her to faint. Even appellant admitted private complainant's unconsciousness in his
direct examination. Also, Reyval Lopez testified that when private complainant arrived home
27
that night, her hair was in disarray and there were bruises on her arms. Further, her
FACTS: medical examination revealed that she had a linear abrasion on the anterior aspect of her left
On May 14, 1989, Rebecca O, Sequancia was working as a maid for Reyyal Lopez. elbow. All these establish the force and physical violence exerted on private complainant by
Among her co-workers was Janet Fabro, wife of the accused. At around 9pm he was ordered appellant.
by Lopez to buy band-aids and on her way, she passed by an Ihaw-Ihaw restaurant where she Furthermore, the results of private complainant's physical examination does not
saw the accused. Without uttering a word, he started to trail her. She asked him to stop negate the commission of rape. While the doctor found no vaginal or hymenal laceration or
following her, but her words fell on deaf ears. Finding the Alicia store already closed, private spermatozoa in her private parts, appellant's acquittal does not follow. It is settled that
complainant headed back home to Lopez's house. Appellant suggested they go to his cousin 28
neither complete penetration nor ejaculation is necessary to constitute rape. What is
to buy band-aids. She ignored him. Suddenly, he grabbed her left hand and dragged her for essential is that there be penetration of the female organ, no matter how slight.
about eight (8) to ten (10) meters to a dark, deserted area where she tried to escape but
failed. In addition, we note the ranting letter appellant wrote to Reyval Lopez and his
common-law wife showing his guilt. Most telling is that line where he writes, "Wala po
Rebecca lost consciousness amidst the struggle, and woke up after hearing a talaga ako sa sariling pag-iisip o katauhan kung bakit at pa'no ko nagawa 'yon. Sila o siya
gunshot from afar. She then saw accused Mario by her side, zipping up his pants while her pang itinuturing ko na mga kapatid. . ." (I was not in my right mind that I did that to him/her
pants are removed, her back and private parts hurt and found sticky matter on her vagina. or they who I consider siblings.) Clearly, he was writing about the dastardly deed he
She then went back to the house where she told Lopez what had happened and they committed against her. Indeed, he could not offer any other sensible explanation for his
reported to the authorities the incident the following day. letter.
The 21-year-old appellant offered a different version of what transpired on that IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision, dated April
fateful night, claiming that he was on her way to visit his wife when he was asked by Rebecca 24, 1992, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11030 convicting appellant MARIO FABRO
to accompany her to the market. Afterwards, accused made amorous advances to her which Y ARGUIZA and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
the appellant responded to. They did not, however, consummate their love-making. They
merely spent the night kissing each other. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that,
after he was charged with rape, he sent a letter to Lopez and his common-law wife, asking
for their forgiveness. He explained that he wrote the letter to his former employers because PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-
he was being charged with a crime he did not commit. He also denied any romantic appellant.
relationship between him and private complainant
G.R. No. 117472 | 1996-06-25
ISSUE:
Republic Act 8353: The Anti-Rape Law of 1997
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
RULING:

YES. To establish rape under Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
elements must be shown: 1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; circumstances:
 a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; Issues: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding the accused committed the crime
charged, as it overlooked the fact that the healed lacerations could not have been due to the
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; pumping of the penis of the accused to the vagina of the private complainant - NO

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and Ruling: In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal
wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
occurred.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. A mere knocking at the
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction. In the
case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations
Facts: The defendant, Leo Echagaray, was convicted for the crime of rape and was sentenced
of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as
to suffer the penalty of death.
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994.
The defendant raped Rodessa Echegaray, a ten-year old girl and the former’s daughter on
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
one afternoon. While the victim’s mother was in a gambling session, the defendant ordered
complaint. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the
the victim’s brother to get out of the house. Then, he approached the victim, brought her to
Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Rodessa
a room and did the heinous crime. While the defendant was pumping on her, he even
positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her
uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which the victim answered: "Tama na Papa,
account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious
masakit". The victim’s plea proved futile as the defendant continued with his act. After
sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable
satisfying his bestial instinct, the defendant threatened to kill her mother if she would
that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from
divulge what had happened.

The victim kept to herself the ordeal she suffered because she was afraid and the defendant
was always high on drugs. The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this
PEOPLE VS SILVANO
usually took place when her mother was out of the house. However, after the fifth time, the
victim decided to inform her grandmother, who in turn told the victim’s mother. The victim
and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where the victim confided the sexual DOCTRINE: Elements of the crime of rape
assaults she suffered.
FACTS: Sheryl Silvano is a beautiful mestiza, and already 5'6" tall at her age of sixteen
(16) years, having been born on January 20, 1980. Her height have been inherited from
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her
her parents as her father is 6'2" tall and her mother is a mestiza. She is the legitimate
mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However, daughter of David Silvano y Hayag, the accused in this case, and Shirley Ann G.
when the appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay Pedrosa.
mo, nakakulong"
On January 23, 1996 at 10:30 in the evening, while Sheryl was sleeping in her room
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the at the second floor of their house located at 134-C Scout Rallos Street, Barangay
Sacred Heart, Quezon City, she was awakened by her father. The accused then
lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward started scolding Sheryl for her coming late. The accused who appeared tipsy,
testimony of the ten-year old victim. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential started undressing Sheryl by lifting her T-shirt, as a form of punishment for her
the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have coming home late, which punishment she has been experiencing from the
insinuated itself into the victim's vagina. accused since she was 13 years old. After lifting Sheryl's T-shirt, as she was not then
wearing any bra, the accused started holding Sheryl's breast at the same time kissing
it. As Sheryl was practically leaning on the bed, the accused dragged Sheryl at the
edge of the bed of that she would be facing the accused a little bit. The accused then
knelt down on the floor and continued holding the breasts of Sheryl with one hand while
the other hand was holding the private organ of Sheryl. Sheryl tried to prevent the
accused from doing what he was doing but the accused told Sheryl "you did
something wrong and I told you I would do that as a punishment to you.” Despite
the pleas of Sheryl, the accused continued kissing her breasts. Afterwards, the accused
pulled Sheryl at the side of the bed and the accused removed her pair of short pants
and panty. After removing the pair of short pants and panty of Sheryl, the accused
grasped the hips and waist of Sheryl and pulled her towards him. Thereafter, when the
accused was already in between the thighs of Sheryl, the accused started kissing the
private organ of Sheryl, the accused was at the same time inserting his finger into
Sheryl's vagina. Thereafter, the accused stood up a bit, pulled down his short pants
and knelt down at the side of the bed. The accused then got a hold of Sheryl's two feet
and placed them on top of his shoulders. The accused once again grasped the hips of
Sheryl and pulled her nearer to him. When Sheryl was pulled nearer to the accused,
the accused inserted his private organ into Sheryl's private organ. Although Sheryl
tried to free herself by pushing the shoulders of the accused with her two feet and telling
the accused to stop what he was doing to her, the accused, in order to have a full grip,
got hold of the legs of Sheryl and placed them in between the arms of the accused (pp.
8-9, tsn, ibid). After inserting the accused's private organ into the private organ of
Sheryl, the accused performed a pumping motion. Subsequently, the accused's private
organ was removed from the private organ of Sheryl and the accused rubbed his organ
with the private organ of Sheryl. Thereafter, Sheryl felt something cold which was a
sticky liquid emitted from the private organ of the accused and which the accused
scattered in between Sheryl's private organ and on her stomach. Later on, the accused
got a tissue paper and wiped the liquid-like substance. The accused then put on his
pair of pants and left the room. The following morning, Sheryl went to school.
On February 12, Sheryl who could no longer bear the punishment in the form of
sexual abuse she had been getting from her father as in fact she was first raped
when she was thirteen (13) years of age, left their house at Scout Rallos, Quezon
City, and stayed at her maternal grandmother's house at Scout Lozano, Quezon
City. When she was asked to go back to her parents' house and settle her difference
with the accused, Sheryl confided to her mother and grandmother the real reason why
she did not like to go back to their house. Thereupon, her mother and grandmother
immediately sought the assistance of General Hercules Cataluña, Chief of the Central
Police District Command, who happens to be married to a cousin of the mother of
Sheryl.
Consequently, appellant was charged with rape by his own daughter to which he
pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Prior to the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution, the complaint was amended without objection from appellant, who when
re-arraigned entered the same plea.
The lower court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the victim.
ISSUE: WON the accused was correctly convicted for the crime of rape by the lower
court — YES
RULING: YES. The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
on the penalty. Aware that life once taken, is like virginity which once defiled, can
never be restored, a thorough scrutiny of the case is in order. Against the proffered
excuses of appellant, however, and guided by the three principles in the review of rape
cases, to wit:
a.) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, through innocent, to disprove;
b.) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution; and
c.) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
7
the fundamental presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant was
overcome with the requisite quantum of proof in criminal cases and his
guilt sufficiently established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The qualified rape of an underaged relative for which appellant was charged is
classified as a heinous crime and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Section 11, Republic Act (R.A.) 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary
elements of 1.) sexual congress 2.) with a woman 3.) by force and without
consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of death penalty, the additional
elements that 4.) the victims is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and
5.) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the
victim, should also be alleged and proven. All such elements are undisputedly
present in this case. The victim herein at the age of sixteen (16) years was subjected
to forced sexual intercourse by appellant. The victim's claim that she was ravished is
corroborated by the medical findings of the physician who examined her. It was
declared that subject is in non-virgin state physically.
It is settled that carnal knowledge is consummated by the mere touching of the
woman's labia of the pudendum by the male sex organ. The briefest contact of
penile invasion is as serious as full penetration and thus, rapture of the hymen
is not required. In addition, the absence of fresh lacerations does not disprove rape.
Appellant could have been held liable for "instrument or object rape" under R.A. 8353
when he inserted his tongue and finger into her daughter's vaginal orifice. Luckily for
him, at the time he committed such act, "instrument or object rape" was not yet
punishable.
 Corollarily, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulation 43 of R.A. No. 7610 defines “Lascivious
For his defense, appellant claims among others, that the victim offered only a token conduct” as:
resistance when the alleged sexual acts were being done. Be that as it may, the
“The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot be construed as a voluntary
submission to appellant's desires. It is enough if the prosecution had proven that breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
force or intimidation concurred in the commission of the crime, as in this case. The law mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. The failure humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
of the victim to immediately reveal his father's incestuous acts is not indicative of masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
fabricated charges.
Undeniably, all the aforestated elements are present in the case. Ireno committed
People vs Bonaagua lascivious acts against AAA by touching her breasts and licking her vagina and the lascivious
or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8 years old at the time as established by
DOCTRINE/TOPIC:Acts of lasciviousness her birth certificate.45 Thus, the CA correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of
FACTS: In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It must be emphasized, however, that
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266A of like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its
the RPC, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor daughter, AAA. slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates
The prosecution presented its evidence on the incidents when AAA was raped.One Christmas the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the
afternoon inside a room while AAA was lying in bed and her brothers were playing outside vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape
the house. On the evening of the same day. Accused threatened to kill her mother by placing through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
the latter’s body in a drum and have it cemented if she would report the incidents. Twice one present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the
afternoon inside her father’s room at the carwash station where he removed her shorts and victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his
panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina. One afternoon, AAA finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretations,
complained of severe abdominal pain where her mother brought her to the hospital. The since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
results revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 o’clock position on the conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable
hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through
rape committed by accusedappellant. After being discharged from the hospital, AAA’s sexual assault.
mother took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape
against accused . G.R. No. 187495 April 24, 2014
After the Bonaagua presented his defense, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting Ireno
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
with four (4) counts of Rape. The CA modified the RTC’s decision finding Ireno guilty of Acts
of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape. . The CA opined that vs.
since the prosecution failed to establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger into the
EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.
vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness – YES
HELD: Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That it is done under DOCTRINE/TOPIC: MARITAL RAPE
any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the FACTS:
offended party is under 12 years of age; and
Appellant is married to KKK and has two children, MMM and OOO. Initially they were
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. happy and fulfilled in their business ventures, but in 1997 Edgar started being brutal in bed.
He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her
vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms
of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by
complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay
in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from
goal of providing a good future for the children. her through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by
the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK. Moreover, the Court observed that
On October 16, 1998 accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on
refusal. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between
the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, uncertainty and certitude
he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain
and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just
held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. He flexed her two legs enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation
apart, gripped her hands, mounted her and raped her. The following night, KKK decided to be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree
sleep in the children’s bedroom, and where the accused-appellant barged into the room and as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. This is clearly shown as
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands,
in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation
of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse. Evidence of overwhelming force and
To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by
and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short
short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also pants.
my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Nevertheless, the accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, Even entertaining the alibi presented that the accused-appellant had indeed
and raped her. Afterwards, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of
you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed
to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his
Appellant contends that he did not commit the crime given that they were husband residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan,
and wife and that it is a duty of the wife to have sex with her husband. Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less
ISSUE: by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time.

WON the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape. Thus, the Court affirms the decision of the CA, finding Edgar Jumawan guilty for two
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
RULING: without eligibility for parole.

One of such measures is R.A. No 8353, insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at
least, presumed. Under said law, he cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
vs.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant.
the equal protection clause. As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No.
 G.R. No. 196435. | 2014-0-29 Issues: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. - NO
Republic Act 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) Art. 266- A
Ruling: The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape
Facts: On appeal is the October 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed by sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse.
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, finding
appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is “termed statutory
sexual assault and one count of statutory rape. rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows: the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim
does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.”In this case, the
The victim in these cases, “AAA[” testified that she was playing with her playmates
prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape.
whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which was just below their house. “AAA”
clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts
located in their house and where the accused was employed. While “AAA” was at the house of rape by sexual assault. We agree with the CA that “AAA’s” “uncertainty” on whether it was
of the accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lit cigarette by a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her
the said accused. “AAA” testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused credibility. Such “uncertainty” is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an
who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual
his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6) year old girl. assault. “The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
Officer who examined “AAA” identified his Medico-Legal Report and testified that the victim
person’s genital or anal orifice.” In any event, “inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony
indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was
do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do
possible that the said burns were caused by a lit cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s
not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.”
skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the
victim and that the same could have been done 24 hours from the time of his examination. Moreover, appellant’s argument that “AAA” did not manifest any stress or anxiety
considering her traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis.
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his
Besides, it is settled that people react differently when confronted with a startling
brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the
experience. There is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a
house of accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 a.m. and slept until
traumatic experience.
5:00 p.m. of the same day.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED.
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of “AAA’s” body, the defense
presented a supposed playmate of “AAA” in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to
Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates together with “AAA” and
Joel. The son of accused were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a PEOPLE VS GADUYON
Good Friday in the year 1999. This Joel supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently
burned the anal portion of “AAA’s” body. Mary’s exact words were to the effect that
DOCTRINE: Qualified rape, qualified object rape, sexual abuse
“napatakan ang puwit ni “AAA”.
FACTS: Three Informations were filed against appellant: (1) Criminal Case No. 6572
Appellant argued that “AAA” never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety despite her for Qualified Rape; (2) Criminal Case No. 6573 for Sexual Abuse; (3) Criminal Case
alleged traumatic experience. Appellant concluded that these “inconsistencies and No. 6574 for Qualified Object Rape. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
contradictions” are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction imposed upon by the RTC. Upon termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution: Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom
he has three daughters. Their eldest child is "AAA," who at the time material to this
case was only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her auntie
in Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus the only ones left in
the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00 p.m. of the said date, "AAA"
was lying in her bed in the family room located at the upper portion of their house when
appellant fondled her breasts and touched her arms.Appellant threatened "AAA" not to
tell her mother about the incident or else something bad might happen to the latter.
At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day, August 22, 2002, and while her mother and
sisters were still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when appellant lowered her
shorts and panty. Appellant spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina.
"AAA" felt pain but could do nothing but cry. Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted
it again into "AAA’s" vagina. When he was done, appellant put her shorts and panty
back on and again threatened “AAA."
After more than a month or on October 9, 2002, at about 10:30 p.m. and while "AAA"
was sleeping in a double-deck bed and her sister was in the lower portion thereof,
"AAA" was suddenly awakened. She noticed that her short pants had been lowered
while appellant was already lying beside her. Appellant then inserted his index finger
into "AAA’s" vagina. "AAA" only cried upon feeling the pain. After his deplorable act,
appellant reiterated his previous threat to “AAA."
After a few minutes, "AAA’s" mother entered the room where her daughters were
sleeping. She noticed that "AAA" was covered with pillows, except for her head and
feet. Upon approaching "AAA," she saw that her legs were spread apart and her panty
was slightly lowered and inserted at the center of her genitals. The mother then
suspected that her husband did something bad to "AAA" since only she and her
husband were awake at that time. However, she opted to remain silent and just pray.
When "AAA" went to school the following day, she was asked by her religion teacher if
her father did something bad to her. "AAA" who was teary-eyed did not answer. Later,
"AAA’s" class adviser called her. They ate in the canteen and thereafter proceeded to
the adoration chapel to pray. After praying, the teacher asked "AAA" the same
question propounded by the religion teacher. This time, "AAA" replied that her
father did something bad to her twice but did not reveal the details surrounding
the same. "AAA’s" mother then came and asked her daughter if appellant did
something bad to her. "AAA" answered "Yes. It happened twice." Thus, "AAA" and her
mother went to the police station and reported the incidents of her defilement. A
physical examination done upon "AAA" revealed that she was in a non-virgin
physical state but that there are no signs of any form of trauma. A psychiatric
evaluation likewise revealed that "AAA" was suffering from Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder with Depressed Mood.
The RTC gave more weight to "AAA’s" positive testimony as against appellant’s
bare denials since her testimony was candid, straightforward and free from
material contradictions. Her testimony was complemented by the findings of the
medico-legal officer who examined "AAA." In fact, "AAA" suffered intense psychological
stress and depression as a result of the abuses.
Accordingly, the RTC found him guilty on ALL the charges. The CA sustained
appellant’s conviction.
ISSUE: WON the lower courts erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on the aforementioned charges — NO
RULING: NO. Given the foregoing circumstances, the CA correctly affirmed the
Decision of the RTC finding appellant guilty of the crimes charged. However, the
Supreme Court modified the penalties for such charges.
The crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, reclassified the crime of rape as a crime against persons. It also amended
Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed-
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d.
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through
sexual assault. In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual intercourse, carnal
knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. This is also referred to as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended
by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.
There must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator’s
penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual
intercourse.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly
known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or
object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape.”
On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", defines and penalizes
child prostitution and other sexual abuse. "Sexual abuse includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious conduct means the
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus
or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.”
The Information in Criminal Case No. 6573 against appellant was for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph
3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be:
Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x.
In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the
act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female is below eighteen (18) years of age. This paragraph
"punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through
coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.”
Appellant is guilty of the two kinds of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and of
sexual abuse under RA 7610.
Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals that there was carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse through force, threat and intimidation on August 22, 2002. Appellant
also committed rape by sexual assault when he inserted his finger into the genitalia of
"AAA" on October 9, 2002. He also subjected "AAA," a minor at 12 years of age, to
sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence, when
he mashed her breasts and stroked her arms on August 21, 2002.
We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA" is
worthy of credence. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. She did not
waver on the material points of her testimony and maintained the same even on cross-
examination. Indeed, her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict
appellant for the crimes alleged in the Informations. Moreover, "AAA’s" testimony is
corroborated by the result of her medical examination which showed the presence of a
deep healed laceration in her private part. This finding is consistent with her declaration
that appellant inserted his penis and finger into her vagina. "Where a victim’s testimony
is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for
concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.”
G.R. No. 175876 February 20, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS TEODORO y ANGELES, accused-appellant.
DOCTRINE/TOPIC: STATUTORY RAPE
FACTS:
Tomas Teodoro was convicted for two counts of rape in which the victim, AAA, was
the 8-year old daughter of BBB, his common-law wife. The records show that on December 18,
1997 BBB left home on an errand in Surigao, and her children, including AAA, were left under
the care of Teodoro, her common-law husband. He returned home drunk, late that night, and
his arrival roused the children from their sleep. Soon after dinner, the children went to bed.
AAA was asleep beside her siblings, when he roused AAA, and ordered her to strip naked.
When she refused, he himself undressed her, and had carnal knowledge with her. AAA did not
tell her mother about what Teodoro had done to her.
 On February 8, 1998, BBB was again away from the house, having gone to Manila. 2. NO. The Court rules that the recantation of her testimony shall be disregarded if
Teodoro committed the rape in a fashion similar to that in the first rape. This time, AAA told the records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial
of the rapes to CCC, the older brother of BBB. CCC immediately reported the crimes to the support of the accused. Moreover, it is shown that AAA cried most of the time during her
Police Station. Hence, Teodoro was arrested. AAA was then taken to the hospital for physical intended recantation. Such demeanor reflected how much she despised what he had done,
and medical examination. Based on the medical certificate of AAA, Teodoro was charged with and that she was only doing this due to the fact the her family still needed the material support
two counts of statutory rape. of Teodoro.

On his defense, Teodoro claimed that he had only caressed or touched AAA’s body This was further revealed by the admission of her mother, BBB, who declared she
on February 08. Said touching was a mistake, thinking the body was BBB’s since he came home wanted Teodoro to be released so he could help financially for their children and how she
drunk and stopped when he realized it was AAA who shouted “Cle, Cle, ayaw! (Uncle, stop prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges against him.
that!)”
Thus, the Court affirms the decision of the RTC and the CA and finds the accused
The RTC ruled the accused guilty for two counts of statutory rape. Not long guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of statutory rape.
afterwards, AAA filed a recantation of her testimony which the court denied. The CA also
rejects AAA’s recantation, which the accused argues that the Court erred in rejecting as it
proves his innocence to the crime.
ISSUE:
1. WON the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for statutory rape. People vs Laog
2. Should the recantation by AAA be accepted? TOPIC: RAPE AND MURDER – Special complex crime
FACTS: Appellant Laog was convicted for the murder of one Jennifer and the rape of AAA.
RULING: AAA testified that at around six o’clock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her
friend, Jennifer PatawaranRosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for
1. YES. The Court already stated in People v. Campuhan that the mere touching of
the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to work at a canteen. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid
constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary for rape to be consummated is for the penis them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without
to come in contact with the lips/labias of pudendum of the victim. More importantly, the warning, the appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe. When Jennifer saw this, she
elements of statutory rape are that: 1) the victim is a female under 12 yrs old or is demented, cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down.
and 2) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body
with thick grass. He turned to AAA and hit her in the head several times more with the lead
Simply put, carnal knowledge does not require full penetration of the vagina and is simply the pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such a defenseless position, appellant
act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. Accordingly, the conclusion that
pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then
touching the labia majora/minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds
went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA,
from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis or vaginal
appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. The defense denied the
surface, which entails some degree of penetration by the penis in order to touch it. AAA’s
recollections given in court when she was only 8 yrs. Old shows an unbroken and consistent allegations and said that appellant was at home watching TV at the time of the crime.
narration of the incidents and something that no child of her age could have invented. She The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. On appeal, CA
remained categorical and steadfast throughout her testimony, recalling how she was affirmed with modification the trial court’s judgment.
undressed by Teodoro, who then went on top of her, inserted his male organ to her vagina,
and made push and pull motions causing severe pain to her female organ. ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt – YES
Dr. Abrenillo’s examination of how AAA’s labia majora and minora were tender and RULING: It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is
gaping also proves that Teodoro’s penis had gone beyond the mons pubis and reached her
the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medicolegal officer. In fact, a medical
labias.
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of eligibility for parole.
the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST
complainants about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,38 as what we find in this DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND
case. MOISES ALQUIZOLA, RESPONDENTS.
While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant indeed was the one
who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of G.R. No. 183652 | 2015-02-25
the separate crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
Republic Act 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997) Art. 266- A
review on any question, including one not raised by the parties.39 The facts alleged and proven
clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex
Facts: AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her
crime provided under Article 266B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno. After
In People v. Larrañaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance away
follows:
from Gemeno’s house. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate
“A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a
their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are: xxx (5) Two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy in two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass
rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA
of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, AAA
the subject of separate complaints. became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses
were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them
death. Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then,
and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take
under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. They woke her up and Lim gave
aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but
so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with
Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she
thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the
Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered. Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and
the woman victim of the rape. having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her
Therefore, SC AFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accusedappellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape With Homicide under Article 266B of Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It must
kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious. be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual intercourse
between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. the next day. She was all alone. After dressing shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the
up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, she told her relationship.
parents that she was raped. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination. The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAA’s private organ. It could mean that AAA actually consented to the
The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond fornication. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. In a similar case, the Court held:
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private
respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. The victim’s moral
on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim
before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable
discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the
found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted. carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not
one of its essential elements.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting the private respondents. - YES Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything.
It is a truism that “the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
Ruling: First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole unpredictable, and the people react differently”.
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, bolsters the claim of the
latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual. But the CA seemed to forget that AAA WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED.
was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.

Under Art.266-A, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years
of age. Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume more hard liquor than she could
handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. The
CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not
shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered
weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. Also, it has
been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from
the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the
guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.