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Legal Writing Finals, Garcia Nigel
Legal Writing Finals, Garcia Nigel
Garcia
SUN 10:00AM-12:00NN 2015-0448
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THE PARTIES
3. Petitioner Silver Films, Inc. (respondent in the court a quo) is a film producer engaged in the
business of employing actors and actresses for the motion pictures they produce, and holds office
in Kamuning Rd., Quezon City, represented in this case by his counsel of records, Atty. Andres
Rizal, with office address at 403 McKinley Village, Taguig City.
4. Private respondent Lorenzo Garcia (petitioner in the court a quo) is an actor, of legal age, with
postal address at No. 44 Maginhawa St., Quezon City, represented in this case by the Mayer Law
Offices, c/o Atty. Katy Mayer, with office address at unit 9/F Victory 1 Condominium, 4520
Kalaw St., Manila.
5. Parties have the capacity to sue and be sued and may be served with processes at
aforementioned addresses and through counsels of records.
Legal Writing- Atty. Molina Final Exam Nigel R. Garcia
SUN 10:00AM-12:00NN 2015-0448
MATERIAL DATES
6. This originated as a case from the Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 107, Manila) docketed
as Civil Case No. 30012, from which the judge rendered an Order on 24 October 2004 approving
the 17 June 2003 amendment entered by the parties as a Compromise Agreement.
7. Petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the dispute between the parties had
already been settled and amicably resolved as per amendment to the 2000 and 2002 Contract
dated 17 June 2003. RTC noted that notwithstanding that the Amendment dated 17 June 2003
was the basis of petitioner Silver Films, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, it resolved to render a
compromise judgment in favor of respondent Garcia.
8. The RTC, for the resolution of motions filed by petitioner Silver Films, Inc. rendered on its 06
March 2005 Order a judgment terminating the proceedings of the case and denying the Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Defer Filing of Answer for having become moot and
academic, while upholding the compromise judgment on its 24 October 2004 Order.
9. On 05 June 2005 (on the case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 54389), the Court of Appeals affirmed
the 24 October 2004 Order of the RTC which ruled that the amendment dated 17 June 2003
between Brenda Simon and petitioner Silver Films, Inc. was a compromise agreement, and was
ratified when respondent Garcia expressed his conformity through his 03 July 2004
Manifestation.
One. Since there was consent of all parties, there was an Amendment or Compromise Agreement
to the contract signed by Simon and Silver Films’ representative to which amendment Garcia
through his Manifestation expressed his conformity.
Two. The compromise agreement was perfected and is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind of Silver Films and/or Simon by claiming, in their
Opposition/Reply to Garcia’s Manifestation, that after the 2000 National Film Festival fiasco in
which Garcia was involved, the relationship between the parties had become bitter to render
compliance with the terms and conditions of the amendment no longer possible and consequently
release Garcia from the 2000 and 2002 contracts.
13. Silver Films, Inc. implores the Court to rectify the above rulings for not only do they
contravene the law, they are also irrational and unjust.
21. Silver Films, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order dated 24 October 2004. The
lower court, however, rendered an Order dated 06 March 2005 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Silver Films, Inc. and ruled in favor of Garcia, stating that:
“A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties through the Amendment dated 17 June
2003. xxx”. (At page 4)
22. Silver Films, Inc. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals and the case was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 54389. Silver Films, Inc. filed its appellant’s brief. In response, Garcia filed his
appellee’s brief.
23. On 05 June 2005 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence, this
petition.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
Petitioner Silver Films Inc. presents the following questions of law:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ADDENDUM SUBMITTED BY SILVER FILMS, INC. TO
MERELY SERVE AS BASIS FOR ITS MOTION TO DISMISS CAN BE USED IN
RENDERING JUDGMENT ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW FOR A COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT THERE BEING NO SUCH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES THAT ELEVATED THE PREVIOUSLY REJECTED ADDENDUM TO THE
LEVEL OF A JUDGMENT ON A COMPROMISE.
The lower Court erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the Amendment and in
treating the rejected Amendment as the Compromise Agreement itself. The denial of the motion
to dismiss amounts to a rejection of the Amendment, hence, this indisputable circumstance bars
the trial court from treating the rejected Amendment as the Compromise Agreement.
II.
RENDERING JUDGMENT ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WHEN THE PARTIES
DID NOT AGREE TO SUCH A COMPROMISE IS ERRONEOUS.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court which ruled that the agreement
entered into by Silver Films and Brenda Simon, and later on ratified by Garcia is a compromise
agreement. This is despite the facts that Simon and Silver Films did not treat it to be a
compromise, and that defendant initially disapproved such agreement for being grossly
disadvantageous to him, and that he did not give his manager the consent to represent him in
such agreement. In its 06 March 2004 Order, the trial court held that:
“A compromise agreement was entered into by parties through the Amendment dated 17 June
2003. A perusal of the Amendment dated 17 June 2003 shows that it was duly signed by plaintiff
Simon as agent of plaintiff Garcia and defendant Silver Films, Inc. and their respective counsel.
Though the terms thereof are disadvantageous to him, plaintiff Garcia ratified the same. Thus, for
all intents and purposes, the subject amendment has all the attributes of a compromise agreement
though not denominated as such.”
Even assuming that an extrajudicial compromise agreement existed, Silver Films, Inc. has not
given consent to such. Or even assuming that a judicial compromise existed, the approval of the
court would be untenable because it did not become binding between the parties upon its
execution, because it was not amenable to Silver Films. This makes the decision of the courts
erroneous in rendering Garcia’s offer as a valid compromise agreement.
The intent of Silver Films, Inc. to disregard all the previous agreements – including the
addendum which was not even settled in court, is clearly shown in the new 23 June 2004 contract
it entered with Simon, which seeks to release Garcia from all his contractual commitments.
Conclusively, the parties indeed did not agree to such compromise agreement.
III.
RENDERING A JUDGMENT THAT THERE HAS BEEN MEETING OF THE MINDS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT ELEVATED THE PREVIOUSLY REJECTED
ADDENDUM TO THE LEVEL OF A JUDGMENT ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS
ERRONEOUS.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment on a compromise when such compromise has not been
perfected by the acceptance of all the parties. It ruled that:
"In the instant case, there was an Amendment to the contract signed by Simon and Silver Films'
representative to which addendum Garcia through his Manifestation expressed his conformity.
There was, therefore, consent of all the parties.”
Consent is defined as the concurrence of the wills of the contracting parties with respect to the
object and the cause which shall constitute the contract. It is the meeting of the minds between
all the parties regarding the contract.
It stated the facts of the case that said the 17 June 2003 agreement entered by Silver Films and
Brenda Simon was to be treated as an amendment to the prior 2000 and 2002 contracts.
However, such an agreement was not settled in court which means that no agreement existed.
Also, it was never meant and agreed by them to be a compromise agreement. In the first place,
respondent Garcia did not approve such agreement and he communicated his disapproval about
it. Therefore, there was no concurrence of the wills or meeting of the minds of all the parties
concerned on the assailed agreement and consequently, no compromise agreement can be
executed.
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute.
A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
The condition that Garcia will ratify the agreement provided that it should be considered as a
compromise agreement constitutes a counter offer. Meaning to say, the original offer ceased to
exist, and the new qualified offer in the part of Garcia will only constitute a valid agreement if
accepted by Silver Films, Inc. It is undisputed that Silver Films did not consent to such an offer
Legal Writing- Atty. Molina Final Exam Nigel R. Garcia
SUN 10:00AM-12:00NN 2015-0448
making the counter offer as good as null, and must be equally treated as that of the rejected
addendum.
We can therefore arrive that the addendum is inexistent so is the compromise agreement that is
invoked by Garcia. Hence, the court erred in treating the proposed addendum as a compromise
agreement that will enable Garcia to maintain his upheld contract.
Garcia’s contention that he did not give his manager the consent to represent him in the 17 June
2003 agreement would make the addendum unenforceable. Consequently, it would make the
compromise agreement unenforceable as well.
Even honoring the Manifestation of Garcia will not support the erroneous ruling, because of the
absence of his consent in the addendum which is the basis of the compromise agreement he seeks
to uphold. It is a rule that consent could be given not only by the party himself but by anyone
duly authorized and acting for and on his behalf. However, by Garcia’s own admission, the
addendum was entered into without his knowledge and consent.
Provisions of the Civil Code which govern defective contracts provide that a contract entered
into in the name of another by one who ostensibly might have but who, in reality, had no real
authority or legal representation, or who, having such authority, acted beyond his powers, would
be unenforceable. Unenforceable contracts are susceptible of ratification; however it should have
been made before its revocation by the other contracting party.6 Silver Films, Inc. revoked the
addendum thereby invalidating Garcia’s ratification, when the producer expressed its willingness
to release respondent from all his contractual agreements during the preliminary conference held
on 23 June 2003.
PRAYERS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the RTC Order
dated 24 October, 2004 and the CA Decision dated 5 June 2005 appealed to be reversed and set
aside and the case be DISMISSED. Petitioner prays for the cost of the suit and for other reliefs as
may be deemed just or equitable.
Manila, June 25, 2020