In the instant case, Sonya is the defendant(D) and Femi is the victim(V).

This is a case of homicide where

Sonya is accused of Femi’s Murder. Murder is “an unlawful killing of a human being in the Queen’s
peace with malice aforethought.”

In order to convict D for murder, all three elements of actus reus must be present. Firstly, Femi was
‘unlawfully killed’ by Sonya. The second element of actus reus requires one to be a human being. The
court held in A-G reference (no.3 of 1994),1998 that a fetus may not be classified as human being. A
child having an independent existence from its mother is capable of being killed provided its wholly
separated and expelled from its mother’s body. The jury found in Poulton (1832) that the child wasn’t
born alive, and therefore the mother could not be guilty of murder. It was also held in Inglis (2011) that
no matter how extreme the disability, it doesn’t prevent a person from being a human being. However,
a person ceases to be a human being when their stem ceases to be active irrespective of them being
kept alive by artificial means. The Courts applied the ‘brain stem’ test in Malcherek and Steel (1981) to
decide “when the victims had died?” and concluded that the victims were considered dead before  the
medical professionals switched off their life support machines and thus Malcherek and Steel therefore
continued to be the operative cause of their deaths. Thus, it can be concluded that Femi was a human
being. The third requirement of “in the Queen’s peace” is a redundant one and thus considered fulfilled.

There is an ambiguity as to whether Femi was murdered by a ‘positive act’ or an ‘omission’? The answer
is both. Sonya threw the bread knife at Femi voluntarily which is a ‘positive act’. However, there was
also failure to act on part of Sonya when she saw Femi unconscious and left which accounts to
‘omission’ and following points need to be proved. The offence should be such that it could be
committed by omission and ‘Murder’ being a result crime is capable of being committed by omission.
The circumstances must be as such as creating a legal duty to act; duties imposed on a person with a
special relationship to harm i.e. D themselves created a dangerous situation. The leading case on this is
R v Miller (1954) where the courts held that the defendant had created a dangerous situation and owed
a duty to call the fire brigade upon becoming aware of the fire. He was therefore liable for his omission
to do so. D’s failure to act must be in breach of that duty but D’s failure to act won’t necessarily mean
that he was in breach of that duty if D did everything possible in his capacity as would be expected from
someone in their place, the performance of duty was justified and the failure to act was justified.
Sonya’s breached her duty towards Femi since she left him unconscious. It is important to note that D’s
failure to act must have been voluntary which was present here since Sonya left Femi in the room
voluntarily shutting the door and leaving him despite knowing that he was unconscious. Lastly, causation
must be established that is the harm must have been caused by omission.

Both factual and legal causation need to be proved. In order to prove factual causation “But for test”
established in the case of White, (1910) will be applied. The accused conduct must be “sine qua non’ of
the prohibited consequence. Femi wouldn’t have died of gas poisoning as and when he did but for Sonya
leaving him unconscious in there. To be the factual cause of a criminal harm, the causal connection
doesn’t need to be direct-Mitchell (1983). Once the factual causation is established, it is important to
prove the legal causation because only then liability will be imposed. Unlike factual causation, legal
causation is more of a moral judgment and is closely linked to ideas of responsibility and culpability. The
consequence must be attributable to the culpable act. The courts in Dalloway, 1847 acquitted the
defendant as the jury was presumably satisfied that the death couldn’t be avoided at any costs and thus
the child’s death was not attributable to accused’s negligence. It is important to note that was the
culpable act the main or substantial cause of death? Femi died because of being asphyxiated by “gas”
which resulted because Sonya shut the door and extinguished the fire as a consequence. There are two
possibilities here to be decided by jury. If the leakage is considered accidental and unintentional, Sonya
won’t be held liable for murder since the gas leak was an intervening event superseding Sonya’s cause
breaking the chain of causation. Alternatively, her conviction will reduce to ‘constructive manslaughter’.
On the contrary, if chain of causation stays intact, and gas leakage is because of Sonya, then she will be
convicted for murder.

To establish the mens rea of murder, it must be proved that Sonya had an intention to either cause GBH
or kill. In R v Moloney the defendant pulled the trigger in drunken state and wasn’t aware that the gun
was aimed at his step father. The trial judge directed on oblique intent and the jury convicted. The Court
of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the defendant appealed to the House of Lords where his conviction
for murder was substituted for manslaughter. It was not a case of oblique intent and the judge should
not have issued a direction relating to further expansion of intention. However, Sonya’s words “that
serves you right, you bully. I hope you die” illustrate that she had a direct purpose or intention to kill
him. Thus, charge for murder will be established.

Once the murder charge is established, two partial defenses exists. Sonya cannot escape liability under
diminished responsibility since she did not suffer from an abnormal mental functioning. However, she
can appeal before courts under s.54 of CJA,2009 for the defence of “loss of self-control”. To establish a
successful defence, she must have one of the two qualifying triggers in s 55(3) and s 55(4) of the Act.
Under s 55(3), Sonya’s loss of self-control was attributable to her fear of violence from Femi. A typical
situation covered by this trigger is also seen in the case of Ahluwalia (1992). For the purpose of s 54(1)
(c),if a person of D’s age and sex with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint might have acted
in the same or similar way as D, then the ‘objective test’, would be satisfied and defence would be
successfully established before the courts. Thereby reducing Sonya’s conviction from murder to
voluntary manslaughter.