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CRIMINAL LAW

HOMICIDE EXAM

Q, Sue left home in 2020, aged 16, fleeing from abusive parents. She is now living with
Bill, aged 25, who has introduced her to drugs and prostitution. Bill regularly forces Sue
to give him her earnings. He is jealous and possessive and has beaten her on a number
of occasions. Sue, a vulnerable girl, has often harmed herself as a means of coping.
One night, fearing that Bill will beat her up as she has spent her daily earnings, Sue cuts
her wrists. When Bill comes into the bedroom and sees what she has done, he taunts
her saying she has made a pathetic job of slashing her wrists. Sue goes to the kitchen,
gets a carving knife and returns to the bedroom, where she throws it at Bill. It strikes
him in the eye and penetrates the brain, killing him instantly.
Discuss Sue’s potential liability for the death of Bill together with any defences she may
raise.

Ans: The fact raises the issue of Sue to a considerable charge of murder in relation to
the crime of her actions. The elements of murder is formed through determining whether
or not there was any intention to kill or cause GBH. Here in this present fact the actions
of sue highly likely relates to intention to kill or cause GBH. A classic definition of
murder is provided by Coke where an individual of a sound memory is killed under the
Queens peace with a malice aforethought R vs Moloney (1985).

Therefore, the actus reus and mens rea of the murder is to be determined first in
relation to the fact. Among others it can be said that the common elements of the actus
reus of murder can be proved because the killing was unlawful R vs Clegg (1994) and it
was of a human being under the Queens peace Inglis (2011). The mens rea for the
murder is intention to kill or cause GBH. Here most probably Sue may have direct
intention as she throws the knife at Bill striking him to death R vs Woolin (1999) as
applied in R vs Matthews and Alleyne (2003). The important issue that is to be
discussed here is the causation. Sue is clearly the factual cause of Bills death as for the
act of Sue the death of Bills was caused otherwise Bill would not have died. According
to the case of R vs white (1910) the factual causation for Sue can highly likely be
established. Whereas in relation to legal causation, Sue’s actions are the sole cause of
death and it is clear that his actions did contribute significantly towards the death R vs
Pagett (1983). Thus the actus reus of murder is established.
To convict Sue of murder, the prosecution must show that he had either the intent to kill
or the intent to do grievous bodily damage. Intent can be determined by a person's
"purpose/desire" or by evidence of foresight. Sue appears to have intended to cause
serious bodily damage, which would be sufficient for the mens rea of murder. If it cannot
be demonstrated that his objective was to cause serious injury, the judge will instruct
the jury that they may only infer intent if death or serious harm is a nearly certain result
of Sue's acts, and Sue was aware of this. The trial judge could issue a 'Nedrick'
directive if necessary-R v Nedrick (1986). This would include asking the jury to assess
whether there was evidence that Sue anticipated death or serious bodily damage as a
near-certain outcome of his actions. At least one of these conditions appears to be likely
to be met. A jury could only conclude that Sue intended death or severe bodily injury if
there was proof that he foresaw death or severe bodily damage as a near-certain result
of his actions. The loss of control defence is set up in such a way that Sue will have to
prove that he acted in a certain way as a result of a qualifying trigger.

Section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 established the statutory defense of
loss of control (CJA 2009). It is a partial murder defense that, if successful, reduces
responsibility to manslaughter (sec. 54(7)). Sue may argue loss of self-control if she is
charged with murder. While the defendant has the evidential burden of presenting
evidence in support of the defense (sec. 54(6)), the prosecution has the legal burden of
establishing the defense beyond a reasonable doubt (sec. 54(5)). It's up to the trial
judge to decide if there's enough evidence to let the jury decide on the defense: Dawes,
Hatter, and Bowyer [2013]. The first question that can arise here is that whether she
acted as a result of her fear of serious violence by Bill, as defined by the 2009 Act (also
known as the "fear trigger"). This is not the case in this instance. The Act also allows for
a second possibility: Sue's loss of self-control was prompted by Bills words, which
constituted highly serious conditions that enabled Tim to feel justified in believing he
had been badly mistreated. There are a few things to think about here. First, the law
makes it plain that Bill's comments alone aren't enough. Second, the prosecution would
have to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the remarks stated did not constitute
extremely serious circumstances.

The prosecution could still argue that the 'anger' trigger isn't accessible because sec.
55(6) (c) clearly prohibits it from being used in situations where the thing said or done
that apparently triggered D's behavior is sexual infidelity. However, the Court of Appeal
in R v Clinton [2012] held that while s. 54(4) of the 2009 Act excludes sexual infidelity as
a trigger for the loss of control defence, it should not be interpreted to mean that
evidence of sexual infidelity is automatically excluded (as part of the context in which
the issue of whether or not there was a qualifying trigger could be considered).

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