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Statutory interpretation
Once Parliament has passed legislation it is for the judiciary to make sense of the provisions in statutes – to
interpret or construe the meaning of the words used. The interpretation of statutes is, in fact, a critical function of
the judiciary. Despite England and Wales being a common law jurisdiction, in the modern legal system there is a
large and growing volume of legislation as government seeks greater regulation of social and economic activity.

The role of the judiciary in relation to the legislature is to ‘give effect’ to Parliament’s intention. This means that in
dealing with statutory provisions the judiciary must interpret or construe the meaning of words in a statute in a way
that is consistent with what Parliament intended. As Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Claim (1844) expressed
the approach:

However, there are two fundamental complexities in this simple statement. First, the natural limitations of
language mean that interpreting the meaning of words can sometimes be fraught. Words may have several
different meanings depending on the context, and the meaning of words changes over time. Different judges in
the same case may interpret words differently and it is necessary to understand the approach that the judiciary
take to this difficult task.

The second challenge for the judiciary in giving effect to Parliament’s intention is that it is not always clear
precisely what Parliament did intend when they used a particular word or phrase in an Act of Parliament.

Why is the interpretation of statutes so difficult?

Interpretation is an essential step in human communication. We all interpret the meaning of spoken and written
words to ‘make sense’ of what is being read or heard. However, there are special challenges in interpreting
statutes. As explained by Francis Bennion in his famous book Statute law (1990) there are a number of features
of statutes that make interpretation difficult. These include:

 Ellipsis – when the draftsperson refrains from using certain words that they regard as implied
automatically.
 Use of broad terms (wide meaning); for example, ‘vehicle’ clearly includes motor cars, buses – but what
else does it include? Also the meaning of broad terms may change over time, for example does the word
‘family’ include a common-law spouse?
 Unforeseeable developments – when there have been social or economic changes that influence the
meaning of words.
 Inadequate use of words – printing errors, drafting errors.

Why does interpretation matter so much?

The way in which a judge interprets the meaning of a particular word may make the difference between a
defendant in a criminal trial being found innocent or guilty. The judge must decide the meaning, scope and
applicability of legislation to a particular fact situation. The distinguished jurist A.V. Dicey noted how important the
interpretative work of the judges is:

Statutes themselves, though manifestly the work of Parliament, often receive more than half their meaning from
judicial decisions. (Lectures on the relation between law and public opinion in England during the nineteenth
century. (1905, 2001 edn) p.486)

Some of the cases included in this chapter demonstrate clearly the practical impact of differing judicial
interpretations of statutory provisions. The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should
be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act.

The words of an Act of Parliament are authoritative. The constitutional role of the judiciary is the application of
legislation. If the wording of the legislation is ambiguous or unclear, then its meaning will need to be interpreted:

Barrister Salman Raffi

Bar-at-Law, LL.M., LL.B.
S t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a ti o n Page |2

while the ordinary meaning of a word in the English language is a matter of fact, its legal meaning is, self-
evidently, a matter of law.

Ambiguity or lack of clarity may arise because the Act has been poorly drafted (using generic or ambiguous
terms) or does not cover all eventualities (particularly in relation to complex subject areas). The meanings of
words also change over time.

The 'rules' of statutory interpretation

These 'rules' are sometimes referred to as the rules of construction. This is derived from the verb 'to construe'
meaning 'to interpret. Judges use a variety of different approaches when faced with an issue of statutory
interpretation. These are commonly referred to as the 'rules' of interpretation, although they are not strict rules;
judges are not bound to follow one (or indeed any) of them and do not have to announce in any way which 'rule'
they have used. It is perhaps better, then, to think of them as approaches to interpretation or as a framework for
discussion, rather than as traditional rules. They are:

I. The literal rule

II. The golden rule
III. The mischief rule.

These three approaches are discussed below.

1. The literal rule

The literal rule provides that words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning. The rationale behind
the use of the literal rule is that if the words of the statute are clear they must be applied as they represent the
intention of Parliament as expressed in the words used. This is so even if the outcome is harsh or undesirable.
This Legal principle was made clear in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 1 CI & Fin 85:

The only rule for construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the
Parliament which passed the Act. If the words are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in that natural and ordinary sense.

In Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1082, CA a car park is not a 'road' for the purposes of
the Road Traffic Act 1988. The purpose of a road is a means for cars to move along it to a destination; the
purpose of a car park is for cars to stand still. Parking a car on a road does not make it a car park. Driving a car
across a car park does not make it a road as it is incidental to its main function.

The literal rule requires that words are given their ordinary, grammatical meaning, even if this produces an absurd
outcome. An example of its application is found in Fisher v Bell (1960] 3 All ER 731, where a shopkeeper
charged under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 with offering for sale a prohibited knife was
acquitted, as under contract law the display of an item did not constitute an offer for sale but an invitation to treat,
even though the Act had been created to restrict the sale of such items.

Similarly, in Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB 147, DC the defendant had impersonated a dead person and
voted in an election in his name. The relevant statute provided that it was an offence to impersonate 'any person
entitled to vote' at an election. Since the person impersonated was dead, he was not entitled to vote, and thus
Whiteley could not be convicted. Of course, this application of the literal rule ironically went against Parliament's
intention.

2. The golden rule

The golden rule provides that words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning as far as possible but
only to the extent that they do not produce absurdity (narrow approach) or an affront to public policy (wide
approach). The rationale behind the golden rule is that it mitigates some of the potential harshness arising from
use of the literal rule. This Legal principle was referred to in Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, HL:

Barrister Salman Raffi

Bar-at-Law, LL.M., LL.B.
S t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a ti o n Page |3

The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity,
repugnance, or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but not farther.

In R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367 (narrow approach; absurdity) Section 57 of the Offences against the Person
Act 1861 provided that whosoever being married shall marry any other person during the lifetime of his spouse'
shall commit bigamy. marry had been interpreted literally, the offence could never have committed, since no one
married could ever marry another. The words 'shall marry' were interpreted as 'shall go through the ceremony of
marriage.

The court is to apply the meaning that will not have this effect. An example is Adler v George (1964] 1 All ER
628, where it was an offence to obstruct a member of the armed forces in the vicinity of designated locations. The
defendant was actually caught in such a location. A literal interpretation of the provision would acquit the
defendant, as he was actually in the place in question rather than its vicinity. This would be absurd given the
rationale for the legislative provision. The term 'vicinity, therefore, was taken to extend to the specified place itself.
The wider meaning applies when there is only one meaning to the provision that will result in absurdity or
repugnance. The court may then substitute an alternative meaning. This occurred in Re Sigsworth (1935) Ch 89,
DC (wide approach; affront to public policy) Under the Administration of Estates Act 1925 the estate of a
person dying intestate (i.e. without leaving a will) was to be divided among the 'issue'. Mrs Sigsworth was
murdered by her son who stood to inherit her estate. Even though there was only one possible interpretation of
the word 'issue', the court held that the son could not inherit the estate as it would be contrary to the public policy
principle that a murderer should not benefit from his crime; the golden rule was applied in preference to the literal
rule.

3. The mischief rule:

The core aim is to give effect to the purpose underlying the provision. The mischief rule was applied in Smith v
Hughes [1960] 2 All ER 859 where prostitutes were convicted of soliciting in the street under the Sexual
Offences Act 1959. Although the statute made it an offence to solicit 'in the street, the prostitutes actually solicited
men who were in the street from a window overlooking the street. The court looked towards the 'mischief" the Act
was intended to remedy - solicitation by prostitutes - and convicted the defendants. The Law Commission in 1969
commented that the mischief rule was a 'rather more satisfactory approach than the other two established rules.
While providing considerable scope for judicial interpretation of the most appropriate meaning to give to a
statutory provision, it is arguably more likely to affect the legislative purpose of a statute and, therefore, avoid
absurdity. However, it has been suggested that at the time of Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a which involves
an examination of the former law in an attempt to deduce Parliament's intention ('mischief here means 'wrong' or
'harm'). There are four points to consider:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?

2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3. What was the remedy proposed by Parliament to rectify the situation?

4. What was the true reason for that remedy?

The rule was restated in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates (1980) AC 74, HL In terms of three conditions:

1. It must be possible to determine precisely the mischief that the Act was intended to remedy

2. It must be apparent that Parliament had failed to deal with the mischief.

3. It must be possible to state the additional words that would have been inserted had the omission been drawn to
Parliament's attention.

Some examples of its application are as follows:

Barrister Salman Raffi

Bar-at-Law, LL.M., LL.B.
S t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a ti o n Page |4

In Corkery v Carpenter (1951] 1 KB 102, DC Section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 provided that a person drunk
in charge of a 'carriage' on the highway could be arrested without a warrant. The defendant was found drunk in
charge of a bicycle. Although it could be argued that a bicycle is not a carriage in the normal meaning of the word,
the Divisional Court held that a bicycle was a carriage for the purposes of the Act; the mischief here was
prevention of drunken persons on the highway in charge of some form of transportation for the purposes of public
order and safety.

In Manchester City Council v McCann [1999] QB 1214, CA Section 118(1)(a) of the County Courts Act 1984
provides that county courts may deal with anyone who wilfully insults the judge... or any juror or witness, or any
officer of the court'. The court held that a threat was an insult for the purposes of the Act: the mischief here was
protection of various participants in the civil process. Even though a threat is not necessarily an insult using
normal meanings, the ability for the court to deal with insults but not threats was contrary to Parliament's intention.

Rules of language

In addition to the rules of construction, there are also rules of language which the courts may apply. They are:

1. ejusdem generis,
2. noscitur a sociis,
3. expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Ejusdem generis:

Ejusdem generis means 'of the same type'. In other words, if a word with general meaning follows a list of specific
words, then the general word only applies to things of the same type as the specific words.

Think about the following situations:

Situation: Comments:
Does a 'house, office, room or other place include an Since the specific places are all indoors, an outdoor
outdoor betting ring? betting ring is not included. Powell v Kempton Park
Racecourse [1899] AC 143, HL.

Is a piece of (accidentally broken) glass covered by
'any gun, pistol hangar, cutlass, bludgeon or other
offensive weapon?
Noscitur a sociis:
The list contains items made or adapted for the
purposes of causing harm, so a piece of accidentally
broken glass is not included. Wood v Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis [1986] 1 WLR 796, DC.

Noscitur a sociis means that a word is known by the company it keeps'. Words in a statute derive meaning from
the words surrounding them. There is a presumption that words in a list have related meanings and are to be
interpreted in relation to each other For example, in Pengelly v Bell Punch Co Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 1055, CA, the
court held that "floors' in a statute requiring 'floors, steps, stairs, passages and gangways' to be clear did not
cover part of a floor used for storage. The other words in the list all related to passageways

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius:

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that to express one thing is to exclude others'; in other words, to list a
number of specific things may be interpreted as impliedly excluding others of the same type. In R v Inhabitants
of Sedgley (1831) 2 B & Ald 65 The poor rate levied on owners of lands, houses, titles and coal mines could not
be levied on owners of limestone mines, as these were impliedly excluded by the specific mention of coal mines.

Barrister Salman Raffi

Bar-at-Law, LL.M., LL.B.