Monday 4th may

Criminal Mock 2 2021 By : Sanjar

Part A
1 (a) Fraud by failure to disclose information (Section 3 of Fraud Act 2006)
(b) Jade ( J) fails to disclose information by not saying her full name to the to the
chauffeur service where she had a legal duty to disclose (s 1(2)(b).She was dishonest
and she wanted to make a gain for herself as didn’t have to pay the fare and moreover
exposed the Fabco to risk of loss. The reason for choosing this charge was because
there was a legal duty between J and the company.
(c) When i told my name as J Price which is my real name so I provided all the
information and moreover I didn’t intend to make a gain or cause or expose loss to
Fabco.
(d) Fraud by false representation (Section 2 of Fraud Act 2006)
(e) J made a false representation by signing as “J Pryce” so she likely represented
herself as the MD of the company impliedly (Idrees v DPP). She knew the
representation was as false as to fact as it is obvious for a reasonable person to know
her name’s spelling. She was dishonest as she asks the hotel to charge the price from
her company (Ghosh, Ivey). She intended to make a gain for herself as the bill is to be
paid by the company so she is keeping the money she has and she exposes Fabco to
risk of loss. The reason for charging her on this particular offence is because she falsely
represented herself as the Jocasta.
(f) When I wrote the signature I was in a hurry so wrote in a mistake and I had no
intention to make a gain to me or loss to Fabco.
(g) Fraud by false representation (Section 2 of Fraud Act 2006)
(h) She made a false representation by wearing the dress of J Price as per Barnard
(1837). She knew she was not Jocasta and moreover she was dishonest (Ghosh, Ivey)
as ask to pay the hotel bill and she intended to gain by not keeping money with her and
expose Fabco to risk of loss.
(i) Making off without payment (Section 3 Theft Act 1968)
(j) A payment was required on spot which was expected from J and she was dishonest
and she had no intention to pay later (Allen)
(k) Theft
(l) When I appropriated the property it belonged to me (J) as I stayed in the room. Also
the appropriation was not dishonest as believed had the legal right and moreover the
owner consent if knows (s.2 (1) (a) and (b).
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Part B

2. This particular question arises the discussion of the offence of murder. Here Alice (A)
is likely to be charged for murder of her husband Nate (N). To begin with the definition
of murder as given Sir Edward Coke is ‘the unlawful killing of human being under
Queen’s peace with intention to kill or grievous bodily harm (GBH). The actus reus for
murder is ‘’an unlawful killing of human being under the Queen’s peace”. Firstly there is
no evidence of self defence so the murder is unlawful (R v Beckford), Secondly N is a
human being (A.G’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) and the murder wad during Queen’s
peace. Then the causation is likely to established in relation to causation in relation to
causation fact ‘but for’ A not throwing the electric fire into the bath , N wouldn’t have
died(R v White).The fact scenario doesn’t address potential legal causation and there
are no novus actus interveniens to break the chain of causation. A has the actus reus of
the murder. Her actions are cause of death and there is no break in the chain of
causation that can be traced.
The mens rea of murder is intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm Vickers
(1957).It is likely that she has the men reas of murder, moreover as per Woolin (1998)
she had the intention as it was virtually certain death or serious injury would occur to N
if electric fire is thrown into his bath so it can be seen her act was life –threatening. This
is sufficient to establish that A as the mens rea though it is up to the jury.
However given the fact scenario A is likely to get defence. She is likely to get defence
under voluntary manslaughter as she has the mens rea. She is likely to rely on loss of
control under s.56 of Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (CJA). As s.54 (6) the burden of
proof is on the defendant here A to satisfy three requirements and the prosecution has
to prove beyond reasonalbe doubt.
At first A has shown that she had a loss of control which resulted in her to do the act. It
is not necessary that she had complete loss of control (Richens). Here the loss of
control occurred when she got to learn about the secret bank account she had suddenly
lost control (R v Duffy).
Then She needs to show that her loss of control had a qualifying trigger, the first trigger
fear of serious violence is unlikely to apply here (s. 55 (3). The trigger of justifiable
sense of being seriously wronged (Anger Trigger) is likely to apply here which defined
s.55(4) of CJA 2009 which provides where D’s loss of control results from things said or
done or said (both) which (a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character
and (b) caused D to have justifiable sense of being seriously wronged, here the secret
bank account containing 100,000 pounds and secret lover’s issue can be said to be the
things done to A which constituted her to be an extremely grave character and
moreover given the fact she was deprived from many things and bullied could also be
taken into account as per Ahluwalia loss has to be sudden but it did not have to
immediately following the provoking acts or words. and it caused her to be a sense of
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being seriously wronged that she was being seriously wronged .This is an objective test
where A needs to show that a reasonable person in her age ,sex, with a normal degree
of tolerance and self-restrain would have acted in the same way as she did (s.54(1)(c)).
It is likely that a person in position is likely to do the same thing. Though it will depend
upon the Judges and the jury
To conclude, A is likely to get the defence of loss of control under s.56 of CJA 2009
where it is provided in s. 54(7) that if successfully pleaded a person who would
otherwise be guilty of murder will be convicted of manslaughter. However it depends
upon the Judge and the jury.

THE END.

1.The question requires discussion on non-fatal offences under Offences Against

Person Act (OAPA) 1861 where Imran (I) is likely to be charged under Sections 18, 20
of OAPA 1861 for causing harm to Sameet(S) and Gilou (G).
First of relation to Sameet is likely to be held under Section 18 the actus reus for this
offence is that of wounding or infliction of grievous bodily harm. Here discussion of
wounding is not required. It needs to been seen whether fractured skull is GBH or not
as per DPP v Smith GBH means really serious bodily harm later in Janjua it was held
that only ‘serious harm’ is enough a fractured skull is likely to be a serious harm as it
caused disfigurement, as per Bollom (2004) the jury should take into account the age
and physical fitness of the victim, as well as the extent and nature of harm. Given the
scenario of repeated punching it is likely to cause serious harm and it would have a
notable impact on S‘s life.
However I might argue S consented to fight and he didn’t fight back so this is not likely
to be s.18 but as per Coney boxing is good reason for consent but street fighting
(Attorney –general reference (No. 6 0f 1980).
The mens rea for Section 18 must be an intentional act (Taylor (2009), here it is likely
that I had the intention to cause harm to S as he confronted him and challenged for a
fight however I might argue he had no intention to break his skull but as per Belfon,
Purcell he is likely to fail as he not only intended to do he was doing but specially
intended to cause S grievous bodily harm.
The causation is also likely to be satisfied first of factual causation but for I not punching
S he would not have fell and break his skull. There is need of discussion of legal
causation
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Moreover, I could be liable under Section 20 which provides that a person is guilty of the
offence when they unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm
upon any other person, with or without any weapon. The analysis of actus reus mirrors
Section 18. Therefore, I could have the actus reus for both these offences.
The mens rea is intentions and recklessness. As per Mowatt, it is not necessary for I
comprehend the full extent of the potential harm provided there was some harm
approved in R v Parmenter (2012). It can been seen from the scenario I punching S
could carries an objective risk of harm. From this it can be determined he has the men
reas for both the charges.
In relation to G Section 20 is likely to be applied the actus reus is wounding or grievous
bodily harm here G’s harm is likely to be wounding as defined wounding means to it
requires more than a scratch or a graze even though blood may show, it requires
penetration of both layers of skin –namely the dermis and epidermis as there is a
serious cut it is likely to be a wounding (Mcloughin, Eisenhower)
Then the mean rea is intention or recklessness. Applying Mowatt it can be seen that I
pushing G is likely to cause some form harm and I do not need foresaw the degree of
harm. So the mens rea is likely to be satisfied. However, I might argue he did it in self
defence (Beckford v R, Donnelly v Jackman), this unlikely to apply as there was no
unlawful force such as battery or assault was used against him by the police officer.
To conclude, I have both the actus reus and mens rea for all of the proposed charges
and he is likely to be charged under Section 18 and 20 respectively for causing harm to
S and G. However it will depend on the judge and the jury.