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COVID-19 and Housing Market Effects:
Evidence from U.S. Shutdown Orders∗

Walter D’Lima† Luis Arturo Lopez‡ Archana Pradhan§

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Initial Draft: July 9, 2020
Current Draft: October 31, 2020

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a first view on the effects of COVID-19 and subsequent shutdown and re-
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opening orders on residential real estate markets. We use micro-level data on property transactions
from a large number of multiple listing services and find moderate aggregate pricing effects in the
shutdown or re-opening periods. We also document a significant decrease in sales in the shutdown
and re-opening periods. Moreover, we show that prices in states with shutdown orders decrease
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with increases in the COVID-19 contagion rate. Our findings imply that the statistical value of
avoiding a COVID-19 related death is at least $1.15 million.
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JEL Classification: I18, R21, R28.

Keywords: COVID-19, house prices, real estate, shutdown order.
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∗
We thank virtual seminar participants at the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association and Old
Dominion University for insightful comments and suggestions. We also thank CoreLogic for providing access to the
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data. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of CoreLogic or its
management.
†
Corresponding Author. Strome College of Business, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529. Ph: 757-683-
5416. Email: wdlima@odu.edu
‡
College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago
§
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CoreLogic

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
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I. Introduction

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About a century after the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, a new respiratory disease was detected,

which became a global pandemic by early March 2020. The underlining virus is commonly known

as the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Governments worldwide responded by imposing shutdown

orders that restrict the operation of businesses and encourage (or even require) households to “stay-

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at-home” and practice social distancing to limit interactions among people and curtail the spread of

COVID-19. However, response measures triggered or abetted recessions worldwide that were made

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evident by sharp decreases in consumer spending (Chetty et al., 2020; Horvath et al., 2020), increases

in unemployment (Beland et al., 2020; Borjas and Cassidy, 2020; Koren and Pető, 2020; Dingel

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and Neiman, 2020), and volatility in equity returns (Ling et al., 2020; Ramelli and Wagner, 2020;

Milcheva, 2020; van Dijk et al., 2020; Alfaro et al., 2020; Baker et al., 2020; Hassan et al., 2020),
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which in turn motivated additional government interventions designed to reverse the economic

repercussions of pandemic mitigation efforts. Federal legislators in the United States, for example,

injected $2 trillion into the U.S. economy with passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

Security (CARES) Act of 2020. Policymakers among many other stakeholders and economists alike
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have an interest in better understanding the economic cost-effectiveness of shutdowns and related

non-pharmaceutical interventions. As a result, a rapidly growing literature on the economic effects

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of COVID-19 investigate whether recent policy interventions have been successful (e.g., Agarwal

et al., 2020; Beland et al., 2020; Capponi and Rios, 2020; Dave et al., 2020; Granja et al., 2020).
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This paper provides a first view on the effects of COVID-19 and shutdown responses on housing

markets but more generally gives a market-based estimate for the value of pandemic mitigation

efforts. Many U.S. governors implemented statewide shutdown orders between March and April
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2020. In general, shutdown orders altered consumer behavior (Alexander and Karger, 2020) and

impacted businesses that rely on face-to-face interactions (Koren and Pető, 2020), including those in

the real estate sector. From an economic perspective, shutdown orders affect the process of buyers
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and sellers matching up for prospecting properties and subsequently completing the sale. COVID-19

related factors may also introduce frictions and transaction costs to the matching process that may

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negatively affect prices and liquidity. For example, Alexander and Karger (2020) study location

data from cell phones, and find that household mobility fell slightly with increasing COVID-19

cases. However, following the first few effective days of shutdown orders, distance traveled and

visits to non-essential businesses fell by 24% and 40%, respectively (Alexander and Karger, 2020).

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Fang et al. (2020) report similar evidence of mobility shocks but from shutdown orders at the start

of the pandemic in Wuhan, China. Such frictions can be characterized as causing a demand side

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shock wherein buyers are unable to conduct an optimal search and bidding process. Thus, one

may conjecture that the contagion rate of COVID-19 and subsequent shutdowns negatively affect

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residential markets. On the other hand, activity relating to real estate transactions and closings

can be categorized as an “essential” business. Essential businesses may continue operating but with
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restrictions defined in social distancing guidelines issued by state or local governments. Hence, while

property market participants may face frictions in transacting, they could still conduct search and

bidding activity. Therefore, the effects of COVID-19 and subsequent shutdown responses on real

estate markets are uncertain and not trivial.

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We examine administrative data on nearly one million residential property transactions be-
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tween January 1, 2019 and June 19, 2020 from thirty-one U.S. states and the District of Columbia

that either imposed or did not impose statewide shutdown orders. The shutdown orders were not

implemented unilaterally in the U.S. but instead at different dates based on state level administra-
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tive decisions. We exploit the variation generated by shutdown orders across space and time in a

difference-in-difference framework to estimate pricing effects. Hence, our empirical strategy exploits

variation in property transactions in treatment states before and after the effective and expiration
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dates of shutdown orders, relative to transactions in control states with no shutdown orders that

occur during the same period. Although the expiration dates of shutdowns imply variation in the

degree of lifted restrictions, for simplicity we use the expiration dates identified by the Wall Street
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Journal as of May 5, 2020. We also exploit variation from day-to-day changes in price around the

shutdown policy dates as if in 2019 when there were no COVID-19 cases or statewide shutdowns.

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Our sample contains strong visual evidence of parallel trends in terms of price and sales leading up

to the shutdown dates.

After controlling for standard property characteristics, location, and time, we find a modest

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aggregate pricing effect during the effective and expiration dates of shutdown orders. Specifically,

after both shutdown policy dates, we find that prices decrease in affected states by about 1.3% (or

$4,610), on average. In terms of sales activity, we document that the average number of weekly sales

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in a ZIP code decreases significantly by about 3.9% during the effective shutdown periods. Weekly

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sales at the ZIP code level drop by an additional 2.7%, on average, after the initial shutdown

expiration dates. We do not observe a reversal in the average price or sales activity after the

initial expiration dates perhaps because many governors extended or did not completely reverse
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the shutdown orders at those dates.

Since shutdown orders are likely endogenous to the local contagion rate of COVID-19, we

add to our difference-in-difference specification a control for the COVID contagion rate and an
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interaction of the COVID contagion rate with the policy shutdown dates. We measure the contagion

rate as the number of new COVID-19 cases seen over the previous 30 days per capita times 100.
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Population density effects are cancelled by the inclusion of ZIP code level fixed effects in the baseline

specification. With a focus on price effects, this setup allows us to obtain rough but market-based

estimates of the average costs and possible benefits of shutdown orders. While the average effects of
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the shutdown policy dates remain negative and jointly significant in the embellished specification, we

find that prices decrease with increases in the contagion rate of COVID-19 in areas with shutdowns.
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A unit increase in the contagion rate decreases prices in affected states by about 5.1% (or $18,090)

after the effective shutdown dates. The average price decreases by 6.4% (or $22,700) for every

unit increase in the contagion rate, on average, after both shutdown policy dates or passage of
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the expiration date. We observe heterogeneous effects across demographic attributes and property

characteristics too. Neighborhoods with a high share of the population with a Bachelor’s degree

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or higher respond more negatively to shutdowns and COVID-19 cases than neighborhoods where a

college education is a rarity. Hispanic neighborhoods also respond more negatively to shutdowns and

COVID-19 cases than other neighborhoods. Furthermore, larger properties (in terms of bedrooms,

living area square-footage, and lot size) in areas where COVID-19 cases are high sell at a slight

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discount than small properties, once holding population density and other factors constant. We

observe similar discounts for larger properties during the post-shutdown period.

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Our results imply, with a simple “back-of-the-envelope” calculation, that the average value of

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a statistical life (VSL) ranges from $1.15-$1.9 million. In our context, the VSL is the market-based

revealed value of avoiding a COVID-19 related death inferred from the marginal buyer’s willingness

to pay for a unit decrease in the contagion rate and the corresponding perceived mortality risk (see
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Thaler and Rosen, 1976). Therefore, although shutdown orders appear to have negative effects on

housing markets, the behavior of housing market participants and subsequent market outcomes

reveal a sizable monetary value to reducing the spread of COVID-19.

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Our paper contributes to the literature on three fronts. First, we inform the growing literature

on the economic effect of COVID-19 on asset and capital markets. For instance, Ling et al. (2020)
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study the effect of COVID-19 on the commercial real estate market, and document a negative

relation between COVID-19 exposure and risk-adjusted returns. Landier and Thesmar (2020)

examine firm-level analyst forecasts and find evidence of significant downward revisions. Schoenfeld
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(2020) documents that the market value of firms has reduced after the onset of COVID-19. From

an exposure perspective, Pagano et al. (2020) find that firms that are more resilient to social
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distancing significantly outperformed those that were not resilient. In a similar context, Halling

et al. (2020) examine capital market effects resulting from COVID-19 and find that bond issues

increased significantly since the onset of the epidemic.

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Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of health crises on housing markets.

For example, Wong (2008) studies the effect of the 2003 Hong Kong Severe Acute Respiratory

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Syndrome (SARS) epidemic on property prices in Hong Kong. Wong (2008) finds a 1-3% decrease

in the price for properties directly affected by SARS. Ambrus et al. (2020) study the long-term

effects of a cholera epidemic that took 660 lives in a small urban parish of London in 1854 (or

modern day Soho, UK). They find that the rental value of properties in the affected area fell by

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15%, and a price depression persisted for 160 years. In another paper, Francke and Korevaar (2020)

likewise find negative, but temporary, price shocks when studying the effects of cholera outbreaks

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on housing markets in Paris during the 19th century, and multiple plagues in Amsterdam during

the 16th and 17th centuries. More recently, D’Lima and Thibodeau (2020) document a negative

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relation between the health crisis arising from prescription opioids and house prices. We follow

this line of literature that relates health crises and real estate markets, and study the effect of the
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COVID-19 epidemic on housing markets.

Finally, our paper contributes to the strand of research documenting the implied economic

trade-offs between health hazards and livelihood that households face. For example, Davis (2004)
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estimates that the statistical value of avoiding pediatric leukemia is $5.6 million using housing

transactions in two rural counties in Nevada. Gayer et al. (2000, 2002) estimate from housing
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transactions and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disclosures of hazardous waste sites that

the statistical value of avoiding cancer risk is between $5 million and $10 million. In contrast, we

estimate that the statistical value of avoiding a COVID-19 related death is between $1 million and
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$1.9 million, depending on the perceived mortality risk. Our estimates approximate the statistical

value of avoiding a SARS related death, which Wong (2008) calculates to be around $1 million.

More recently, our estimates are consistent with findings by Beland et al. (2020) who infer from
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labor data that the statistical value of avoiding a COVID-19 related death is about $1.1 to $1.6

million. Critically, our findings suggest that government disclosures on health risks allow market

participants to update their risk estimates and make informed decisions.

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II. Data

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A. Data Sources

We obtain micro-level data from Corelogic’s Multiple Listing Service (MLS) platform from

January 1, 2019 to June 19, 2020, representing major metropolitan areas in 31 U.S. states and

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the District of Columbia. The CoreLogic MLS data are directly retrieved from real estate agents

who broker transactions. Real estate agents with membership to a local association of Realtors

generally advertise residential property for sale on a MLS platform on behalf of sellers. When

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listing a property on a MLS, the real estate agent supplies information about the asking price and

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property characteristics, which are often obtained from local property records. Upon completing a

transaction, the real estate agent updates information on the listing with the final purchase price,
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close of escrow date, and other details about the transaction. MLS data are representative of the

residential market since the vast majority of sellers of single family and condominium properties

transact using a realtor (Nowak and Smith, 2020; National Association of Realtors, 2016). We

complement these transaction level data with information on shutdown orders from the New York
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Times, and COVID-19 data from John Hopkins University & Medicine’s Coronavirus Research

Center. Additional unemployment data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
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B. Shutdown Orders and Treatment Assignment

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The New York Times tracks the effective and expiration dates of shutdowns relevant to COVID-

19.1 Table I lists each state along with the effective date and expiration date of statewide shutdown

orders as of May 5, 2020. California was the first state to implement a shutdown or “Stay at Home”
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order on March 19, 2020. Over the following two weeks, all other states implemented similar

statewide shutdown (i.e., “Stay at Home” or “Shelter in Place”) orders with the exception of eight
1
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Details are available in The New York Times (2020a) and The New York Times (2020b).

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states: Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.

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For our analysis, we construct a sample of MLS transactions focusing on states that imple-

mented statewide shutdown orders and states that did not implement shutdown orders. We exclude

states that either preemptively or exclusively followed a county-by-county approach to set shut-

down orders far apart from the date of the statewide order. For instance, Texas started with issuing

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orders for specific counties and then switched to a state level directive on April 2, 2020. Meanwhile,

local governments in Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming issued countywide shutdown orders but no

statewide orders. We do not consider such states in our analyses because the choice of shutdown

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date is convoluted given multiple dates, and search related frictions in real estate markets may be

more pronounced when adjacent areas are similarly affected.2 Hence, we form a treatment group

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of properties in states with statewide shutdown orders, and a control group of properties in states

where absolutely no shutdown orders were imposed.

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To remove outlier observations from our sample, we exclude transactions of properties with a

sale price below $21,000 or above $1.5 million, more than five bedrooms, more than five bathrooms,

four-stories or higher, and a structure age above 100 years.3 Our final sample comprises of more
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than 900,000 MLS transactions, representing 31 states in the U.S. and the District of Columbia.

Out of the areas that imposed statewide shutdown orders and mostly no countywide shutdown
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orders, we have MLS transactions for all besides Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, New Mexico and

Puerto Rico. In addition, out of five states that absolutely did not impose any shutdown order,

we have transaction data from two states: Iowa and Arkansas. The far right column in Table I
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2
One exception is California where most of our transactions are located because counties in California that
preemptively issued “stay-a-home” orders did so only a couple days before the statewide order became effective.
The Health Officer of Santa Clara County, for example, issued a shutdown order on March 16, 2020, which be-
came effective two days before the effective date of the California statewide shutdown order. For more details, see
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https://www.sccgov.org/sites/covid19/Pages/order-health-officer-031620.aspx. Preemptive shutdown or-

ders at the county level remaining in our sample could create a bias in our analysis against finding a negative relation
between shutdown dates and market outcomes.
3
We also exclude observations in ZIP codes with negative COVID-19 cases that resulted from revisions or updates
to the master COVID-19 data by John Hopkins University.
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presents the distribution of our data across areas and indicates a wide geographic coverage.

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C. Summary Statistics

Table II presents an overview of several variables for all observations in our sample from

January 1, 2019 to June 19, 2020. Our sample includes details on the sale such as the price and

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transaction date along with property characteristics such as number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and

so on. The mean closing price is $355K. Properties stay on the market for an average of 40 days.

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The median number of bedrooms and bathrooms is three and two, respectively. The average age

of the properties in our sample is about 39 years. About 15% of the properties closed in the

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period after a statewide shutdown order was implemented, and 6% closed during the period when

shutdown orders expired. Overall, we have substantial variation in terms of sale dates occurring
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before and after shutdown and re-opening orders became effective and expired. Table A.1 in the

Appendix splits the summary statistics by group and across time showing observable similarity

across the treatment and control groups in terms of bedrooms, bathrooms, and square-footage.
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III. Empirical Analysis

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A. Difference-in-Difference Framework
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With the effective and expiration dates of shutdown orders varying by state, our sample of

MLS transactions inherently contains multiple treatment groups and multiple treatment periods.

Moreover, threats to identifying the effect of shutdown orders on housing market outcomes arise
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from unobserved heterogeneity in property, spatial or temporal attributes that may correlate with

both shutdown orders and housing market outcomes. Hence, to estimate the average effect of shut-

down orders on housing market outcomes, we fit the following generalized difference-in-difference
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model:

yitz = δ1 Shutdowntz + δ2 Re-opentz + Xit β + ζz + τt + εitz (1)

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where yitz is the natural log of the sale price of property i at time t located in ZIP code z, Xit is a

matrix of controls, β is a vector of corresponding coefficients, and εitz is a time-location error term.

We cluster the standard errors by location to account for spatial correlation of the error term.

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Shutdowntz takes a value of 1 if the sale date occurs after the effective date of the stay-at-home

order for the state where the property is located; it is zero otherwise. Re-opentz takes a value of

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1 if the sale date occurs after the initial expiration date of the shutdown order for the state where

the property is located; it is zero otherwise.4 For properties in the control group of states where no

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shutdown orders were imposed, Shutdowntz and Re-opentz will always take a value of 0. The δ1 and

δ2 parameters are coefficients for Shutdowntz and Re-opentz , respectively. The model includes time
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(τt ) and location (ζz ) fixed effects to account for unobserved temporal and spatial heterogeneity,

respectively. We use dummy variables for each day and every ZIP code in our sample. Specific

effective or expiration post date variables do not enter equation (1) since they are perfectly collinear

with time fixed effects. For a similar reason, we do not include a non-time varying state treatment
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indicator.
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Although time and location fixed effects account for unobservable confounding factors that

could arise from location specific sources or common time trends (e.g., nationwide increases in

COVID-19 cases), changes in the housing stock or property heterogeneity could influence prices,
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too. Hence, we include in our matrix of controls (Xit ) a robust set of property characteristics that

include the log square footage, log lot size, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories, and structure age. The

structure age is calculated as the number of years between the sale date and built date.5 Since
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4
Abouk and Adams (2013) apply a similar setup to examine the effect of statewide bans on texting while driving
on fatal motor-vehicle accidents.
5
Nonetheless, we show in the Appendix that properties sold before and after the shutdown are not too different
from each other in terms of property characteristics (see Table A.2).
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equation 1 does not eliminate the variation over time within locations, we also add to our controls

the lagged local unemployment rate.6 The unemployment rate may capture local time-varying

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changes in the economic environment that could influence the performance of housing markets. For

example, the median unemployment rate at the county level (observable in the BLS data) reached

a historical high in April 2020 at 11.8% with an interquartile range from 8.9% to 15.4%, likely

affecting counties differently over our sample period.

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An identifying assumption is that the change in the relative price between properties in affected

and unaffected states before and after the shutdown or re-open policy dates would be the same

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in the absence of shutdown policies. Another assumption is that the relative year-over-year price

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change between transactions before and after the shutdown calendar date would be the same in

the absence of shutdown policies. In other words, we assume that under stable market conditions

the relative change in price due to seasonality around the shutdown or reopening dates in 2020
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would have been about the same as in 2019. Therefore, identification relies on the inclusion of

sales in states with and without shutdown orders in 2019 and 2020. Under these assumptions and

conditions, δ1 and δ2 can be interpreted as difference-in-difference estimators of the average effect

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of statewide shutdown orders on price.

Additionally, we examine whether counties in a state with a shutdown were affected depending
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on the intensity of the pandemic (i.e., contagion rate). Although shutdowns were implemented

uniformly at the state level, counties within the same state likely have different contagion rates and

thus, react to shutdowns differently. We measure the contagion rate by using records on COVID-19
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from John Hopkins University & Medicine’s Coronavirus Research Center. We then estimate the
6
We retrieve the local (county) unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We lag the unemployment
rate by one month from the sale date.
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following model:

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yitz =δ1 Shutdowntz + δ2 Re-opentz

+ δ3 Shutdowntz × COV IDi + δ4 Re-opentz × COV IDi

+ Xit β + ζz + τt + εitz . (2)

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Our independent variables of interest Shutdown and Re-open are interacted with COV ID. The

variable COV ID is the number of new COVID-19 cases in the property’s county, during the

previous 30 days from the property’s sale date, divided by county population and multiplied by

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100. Put simply, COV ID is the local monthly contagion rate as a percent of population. For

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example, San Diego County in California with a population of about 1.43 million registered 14,314

new COVID-19 cases over 30 days on July 23, 2020, featuring a contagion rate of 100 cases per
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10,000 people, or 1% of the population, such that COV ID = 1. Hence, the parameter δ3 can be

interpreted as the percentage effect on price from a unit increase in the contagion rate following

shutdown orders, and δ4 as the additional marginal percentage effect on price from a unit increase

in the contagion rate after shutdown orders expire.

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B. Parallel Trends
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Figure 1 graphs the nationwide average weekly sale price for transactions relating to properties

in the control group - i.e. states where a shutdown order was not imposed, from January 1 to June
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19 for 2019 and 2020. Figure 2 similarly overlays the nationwide average weekly sale price for

transactions relating to properties in the treatment group - i.e. states where a shutdown order was

imposed. We note that the trends for 2019 and 2020 are relatively similar for the control group.
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In contrast, for the treatment group, Figure 2 shows that the average price for 2020 transaction

trends slightly above the 2019 transactions up until approximately week 14 (or the end of March).
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The average price in 2020 dips below 2019 levels during the weeks following the shutdown dates.

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Figure 3 overlays the nationwide weekly trend of sales frequency for the control group by year.

Figure 4 depicts the nationwide weekly trend of sales for the treatment group by year. We observe

parallel trends in the average sale price leading up to the general shutdown period. We also see a

divergence in sales for the treatment group after week 12 when shutdown orders begin to take effect

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but not for the control group. Sales in the treatment group fell to around 10,000 per week during

the 2020 summer months, which is roughly a third below the level of weekly sales in the summer

of 2019. Together, these graphs demonstrate parallel trends in market outcomes between 2019 and

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2020 transactions that exist prior to mid-March, the month when statewide shutdown orders begin

to take effect.

C. Average Treatment Effects

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Table III presents the estimated regression results using the log sale price as the dependent

variable. The standard errors are clustered by ZIP code. In column 1, we test for pricing effects
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around shutdown orders as specified by equation (1). The coefficient on Shutdown is negative with

a magnitude of about 30 basis points but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However,
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we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on Re-open. Properties that sold after the

expiration of shutdown orders transacted at a price discount of approximately 100 basis points (or

$3,550) compared to properties that sold beforehand. The combined effects of the shutdowns policy
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dates are jointly significant and indicate that property prices in affected states fell by about 1.3%

(or 0.3% + 1.0% or $4,610) below the counterfactual price, on average.7 One potential reason for a

delayed observable price discount following the expiration of shutdown orders is that the expiration
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of shutdown orders did not immediately roll back all restrictions on households or businesses, which
7
An f-test on the joint significance on the coefficients of Shutdown and Re-open yields an f-statistic of 8.50 with
a p-value of 0.0002.
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may have been a negative surprise to some market participants if state governments did not make

final announcements until very close to the initial expiration dates. Another reason is that real

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estate prices do not immediately reveal policy effects because property transactions take time due

to factors such as search, negotiations, and financing arrangements.

Before estimating the specification of equation (2), we measure the nationwide average effect

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of COVID contagion rate on home prices to provide a baseline benchmark. Column 2 replaces

the shutdown and re-open dummy variables with the COVID contagion rate. We find a negative

coefficient of 0.008 on COVID, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The point

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estimate indicates that a unit increase in the county level contagion rate decreases the price of

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properties in the same county by approximately 0.8% (or $2,840), on average. This finding is

consistent with expectations and suggests that the average buyer in real estate markets across the

United States responds to information on new COVID-19 cases and views the implied contagion
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rate as a negative amenity.

Column 3 in Table III interacts COVID with the shutdown/re-open dummy variables as spec-

ified in equation (2). We find similar price discounts around the two policy dates of shutdown
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orders as before in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance. Yet we find evidence that shutdown

orders and the contagion rate do not uniformly affect prices. Among states with effective shutdown
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orders, the average sale price decreases by about 5.1% (or $18,090) for every percentage point

increase in the COVID contagion rate. The coefficient on the interaction between Re-open and

COVID is -0.013 and not statistically significant.8 However, the coefficients on both interactions
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with COVID are jointly significant at the 5 percent level (with an f-statistic of 3.56 and p-value

of 0.0286). Among states without a shutdown order, COVID seems to positively affect the sale
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price. However, the result is difficult to interpret since states that did not introduce a shutdown

have substantially fewer COVID-19 cases than states with a shutdown.

8
In each regression, the coefficient estimates on property characteristics are in line with estimates seen in prior
housing studies (Sirmans et al., 2005).
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D. Heterogeneous Pricing Effects

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We examine whether pricing differentials around shutdown orders or the contagion rate differ

based on education, race/ethnicity, and unemployment. The American Community Survey provides

at the ZIP code level 5-year estimates (from 2011-2015) of the share of adults (25 years or older) who

hold a bachelor’s degree, and the racial and ethnic distribution. Market participants with different

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levels of education could respond distinctly to shutdowns or the contagion rate. Responses to

shutdowns or contagion may vary by race or ethnic backgrounds, too, since the coronavirus appears

to disproportionately affect racial minority groups (see Ristovska, 2020). We test for heterogeneous

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treatment effects of shutdowns and COVID-19 by interacting each ACS variable, and the lagged

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unemployment rate, with the independent variables of interest in our main model: Shutdown, Re-

open, and COVID. Note that the ACS demographic variables vary across ZIP codes, while the
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unemployment rate varies by county and over time.

Table IV reports the results. The odd columns interact the demographic variables with the

shutdown/re-open variables, and the even columns interact them with COVID. We find heteroge-
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neous treatment effects across the demographic variables but not always at economically meaningful

levels. For instance, column 1 shows that negative shutdown effects on price are trivially larger

in neighborhoods (defined by ZIP codes) with a high share of adults who hold a bachelor’s degree
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or higher. Moreover, column 2 suggests that neighborhoods with a large share of college educated

adults react more negatively towards the contagion rate than neighborhoods with fewer adults with
rin

at least a college level education. We find in columns 3-4 that the shutdown and COVID effects

are more pronounced at statistically significant levels in Hispanic neighborhoods. However, the

interactions with the proportion of Black population in the neighborhood are not statistically or
ep

economically significant. The results provide some evidence that market participants respond to

shutdowns or the contagion rate differently across demographic groups.

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 ed
In columns 5 and 6, we see that shutdown effects vary with the county unemployment rate

in a counter-intuitive direction. The negative effects of the shutdown reverse with increases in the

iew
unemployment rate. Likewise, the effects of COVID are more pronounced in counties with a low

unemployment rate than in counties with high unemployment rate.

Table V explores if the pricing effect around shutdown orders differs based on property char-

ev
acteristics. Columns 1 to 2 present the estimated results of the pricing regressions that include an

interaction between the Shutdown, Re-open, (or COVID) and number of bedrooms of the property.

We note that the coefficient of the interaction of Shutdown and number of bedrooms is not statisti-

r
cally significant. However, the coefficient of the interaction of Re-open and number of bedrooms is

er
negative and statistically significant. This implies that properties that have more bedrooms trans-

act at a discount in the re-opening period. We observe a similar, albeit statistically insignificant

pattern with the COVID interaction.

pe
Columns 3 and 4 in Table V present the estimated results of the pricing regressions that

include an interaction between the Shutdown, Re-open, (or COVID) and the log transformation of

the square footage of the underlying property. The coefficient of the interaction of Shutdown and
ot

the log transformation of the square footage is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient

of the interaction of Re-open and the log transformation of the square footage is also negative
tn

and statistically significant. This implies that properties in states with shutdowns that are larger

transact at a discount following both the effective and expiration dates of shutdowns. We observe

a consistent impact of size and the interaction with COVID rate in column 4, implying that larger
rin

properties in areas with a high COVID rate sell at a discount when compared to similar properties

in counterfactual areas without a shutdown. Columns 5 and 6 interact the natural log of the lot
ep

square footage with the independent variables of interest. We observe similar outcomes. However,

the interaction between log lot size and Re-open is statistically insignificant.

In general, we see that there is evidence of modest pricing effects from statewide shutdown
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 ed
orders. Furthermore, we highlight disproportional effects across demographic and property charac-

teristics.

iew
IV. Sales Activity

ev
To further understand the impact of shutdowns on the real estate market, we examine effects

of the shutdown orders on sales at the aggregate ZIP code level, and model the number of weekly

sales in a ZIP code log(Salestz + 1) as a function of shutdown and re-opening orders. To do so, we

r
construct a balanced weekly time-series of market performance for each ZIP code in our sample.

We then estimate the following panel model:

er
Ytz = θ1 Shutdowntz + θ2 Re-opentz + ζz + τt + εtz (3)
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where Ytz is the natural log of weekly sales for ZIP code z at time t, and εtz is the corresponding

error term. As before, the model includes location and time fixed effects to capture heterogeneity

in the temporal and spatial environment. The shutdown and re-open dummy variables retain the
ot

same definition as before. Hence, the parameters θ1 and θ2 in equation (3) provide estimates of the

average treatment effects of shutdown orders on housing market liquidity.

tn

Table VI presents the estimated regression results with log(Salestz + 1) as the dependent

variable following equation (3). Column 1 includes close week and ZIP code fixed effects. We see
rin

that the coefficient of Shutdown is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying

that weekly sales decrease by 3.9 percent during the shutdown period. The coefficient of Re-open

is also negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that weekly sales decrease by
ep

about an additional 2.7 percent during the re-opening period. The results affirm that sales have

decreased in both the shutdown and re-opening periods. Hence, besides price effects, the shutdowns

also impact the number of real estate transactions as evident by a decline in sales activity.
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 ed
V. Discussion on the Statistical Value of Life

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We infer the value of avoiding the risk of a COVID-19 related death, which is more commonly

known as the value of a statistical life (VSL). According to Thaler and Rosen (1976), the market

reveals the demand price for safety or incremental exposure to the likelihood of death, which can

be extrapolated to value human life from an insurance point of view. More precisely, the VSL

ev
is the present value of the total amount that the marginal buyer must be compensated over a

lifetime to be indifferent to an increase in the likelihood of an unfavorable health risk relative to

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the possibility of death (Davis, 2004). From a policy perspective, the VSL is useful for comparing

human life valuations across contexts and cost-benefit analyses of policy interventions (Thaler and

er
Rosen, 1976; Gayer et al., 2002, 2000; Davis, 2004).

We use a simple “back-of-the-envelope” approach that is similar to how Wong (2008) estimates
pe
the statistical value of avoiding a SARS related death in Hong Kong. In our context, the VSL can be

calculated by dividing the mean price discount for a unit increase in the COVID contagion rate by

the perceived mortality risk of COVID-19. The implicit price for the (dis)amenity of an incremental
ot

risk of a COVID-19 related death may be estimated from observed market prices and the use of

hedonic regressions (see Rosen, 1974; Thaler and Rosen, 1976). The coefficient estimates from a
tn

hedonic regression on the observed contagion rate approximate the marginal willingness to pay of

a change in the perceived risk (Gayer et al., 2002). We calculate the mortality risk of COVID-

19 perceived by the market as the product of the nationwide COVID rate and the conditional
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mortality risk. The conditional mortality risk is taken as the nationwide cumulative number of

reported COVID-19 deaths divided by the nationwide cumulative number of reported COVID-19

cases in a certain month. We stress that our COVID data is obtained from John Hopkins University
ep

& Medicine’s Coronavirus Research Center, which has been heavily cited by the popular press and

local and nationwide news broadcasters who potentially influence the perception of housing market

participants about the contagion and mortality risks of COVID-19.

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 ed
Our estimates shown previously in Table III suggest that the marginal buyer in a state with a

shutdown is willing to pay 5.1%-6.4% less for a property if the COVID-19 contagion rate increases

iew
by a unit, or 1% of the population. With the average price of properties in our sample at $354,796,

the coefficient estimates imply that the marginal buyer is willing to pay $18,095 to $22,707 less

when his or her risk of contagion increases by 100 new COVID-19 cases per 10,000 people, or $181

to $227 less for every new COVID-19 case per capita. We note that during April 2020, about 26

ev
out of every 10,000 people in the United States were infected with COVID-19, and the perceived

conditional likelihood of death stood at 6%, implying an expected 1.56 deaths per 10,000 people,

r
or a mortality risk of 0.0156% per capita. As time passes and COVID-19 cases rise in the United

States from April to June 2020, the mortality risk updates to 0.0125% per capita, representing a

er
20% decline in the perceived likelihood of a COVID-19 related death.

Table VII reports “back-of-the-envelope” estimates of the implied VSL. In April 2020, when
pe
most shutdown orders were in effect, the implied value of the average statistical life is approximately

$1.15 million.9 The implied average VSL is approximately $1.45 million in May (the second month

of shutdowns for some states) and about $1.9 million in June 2020 during the announced reopening
ot

period for many states. The higher VSL in June can be attributed to a decrease in the perceived

mortality risk and statistical change in the marginal willingness to pay for contagion rate following
tn

the expiration dates of shutdown orders. Hence, our estimates for the VSL will fall below the

true VSL if the perceived death rate is actually lower. Nonetheless, our simple estimates of the

statistical value of avoiding death from effectively a respiratory illness approximate those by Wong
rin

(2008) and more recently Beland et al. (2020).

9
Note that one must either divide the mean price discount by 100 or multiply the mortality risk by 100 for unit
consistency in the numerator and denominator of the VSL fraction.
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 ed
VI. Conclusion

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The ongoing COVID-19 epidemic has significantly impacted normal life and financial markets.

We provide a first view of the effects of shutdown orders imposed by states in response to the epi-

demic on residential real estate markets. We also study how market participants across the United

States respond to the risk of COVID-19 contagion. Shutdown orders and COVID-19 contagion

ev
rates introduce frictions in the matching process for buyers and sellers. The result may be demand

side effects as buyers may have have restrictions that inhibit optimal search. In addition, buyers

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may rationally opt to discount properties located in areas that pose significant health risks. We

find modest aggregate pricing effects in the shutdown or re-opening periods. We also document

er
that sale activity decreases significantly in the shutdown and re-opening periods. Furthermore, we

find that increases in new COVID-19 cases depress property prices, on average.
pe
Overall, our findings suggest that shutdowns have a costly impact on housing markets. How-

ever, our results also suggest that market participants price the health risks associated with COVID-

19 and reveal that the statistical value of avoiding a COVID-19 related death is above $1.15 million.
ot

Estimates of U.S. lives saved from public health measures including shutdown orders range from

913,762 to 2,046,322, according to a recent study by Yakusheva et al. (2020). Hence, a lower bound
tn

estimate for the statistical market value of U.S. lives saved from public health measures ranges from

$0.91 to $2.05 trillion. Therefore, we provide a market-based estimate for the value of saved lives,

which is useful in evaluating the cost effectiveness of government interventions designed to curtail
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the economic and health effects of COVID-19 such as the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

Security (CARES) Act of 2020 that provided $2 trillion in economic relief.

ep
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 ed
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 ed
Table I: Shutdown Orders Across States

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State Order Type Effective Date Expiration Date Observations
Alabama Stay at home 4/4/2020 5/1/2020
Alaska Stay at home 3/28/2020 4/24/2020
Arizona Stay at home 3/31/2020 5/15/2020 62,777
Arkansas No statewide order 9,358
California** Stay at home 3/19/2020 5/8/2020 169,190
Colorado Stay at home 3/26/2020 4/26/2020 62,605
Connecticut Stay at home 3/23/2020 5/20/2020
Delaware Shelter in place 3/24/2020 5/31/2020 589

ev
District of Columbia Stay at home 4/1/2020 5/29/2020 724
Florida** Stay at home 4/3/2020 5/4/2020
Georgia** Shelter in place 4/3/2020 4/30/2020
Hawaii Stay at home 3/25/2020 5/31/2020 621
Idaho Stay at home 3/25/2020 4/30/2020 17,128
Illinois Stay at home 3/21/2020 5/29/2020 72,726

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Indiana Stay at home 3/24/2020 5/4/2020 4,183
Iowa No statewide order 635
Kansas Stay at home 3/30/2020 5/3/2020 2,228
Kentucky Stay at home 3/26/2020 5/9/2020 7,663
Louisiana
Maine**
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Stay at home
Stay at home
Stay at home
Stay at home
Stay at home
er 3/23/2020
4/2/2020
3/30/2020
3/24/2020
3/24/2020
5/15/2020
5/31/2020
5/15/2020
5/18/2020
6/1/2020
1,985

3,748
2,723
68,369
pe
Minnesota Stay at home 3/27/2020 5/17/2020 53,459
Mississippi** Shelter in place 4/3/2020 4/27/2020
Missouri** Stay at home 4/6/2020 5/3/2020
Montana Stay at home 3/28/2020 4/26/2020 2,091
Nebraska No statewide order
Nevada Stay at home 4/1/2020 5/9/2020 40,669
New Hampshire Stay at home 3/27/2020 6/15/2020 9,353
New Jersey Stay at home 3/21/2020 6/9/2020 6,123
ot

New Mexico Stay at home 3/24/2020 5/31/2020

New York Stay at home 3/22/2020 5/28/2020 12,853
North Carolina Stay at home 3/30/2020 5/22/2020 117,086
North Dakota No statewide order
Ohio Stay at home 3/23/2020 5/29/2020 71,389
tn

Oklahoma* No statewide order

Oregon Stay at home 3/23/2020 5/15/2020 33,749
Pennsylvania** Stay at home 4/1/2020 6/4/2020
Puerto Rico Curfew 3/15/2020 6/15/2020
Rhode Island Stay at home 3/28/2020 5/8/2020 11,068
South Carolina** Stay at home 4/7/2020 5/4/2020
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South Dakota No statewide order

Tennessee** Stay at home 4/1/2020 4/30/2020
Texas** Stay at home 4/2/2020 4/30/2020
Utah* No statewide order
Vermont Stay at home 3/25/2020 5/15/2020 1,461
Virginia Stay at home 3/30/2020 6/10/2020 28,341
Washington Stay at home 3/23/2020 5/31/2020 61,769
ep

West Virginia Stay at home 3/24/2020 5/3/2020 979

Wisconsin Stay at home 3/25/2020 5/13/2020 35,923
Wyoming* No statewide order
Total Observations 917,066
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This table depicts the effective and expiration dates of shutdown orders across states based on data obtained from the New York
Times. The far right column depicts the distribution of MLS transactions across states in our sample. * denotes states that
only issued countywide shutdown orders. ** denotes states that issued countywide shutdown orders before statewide orders.
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 ed
Table II: Summary Statistics

N Mean P50 SD Min Max

iew
SP 917,066 354,796.29 305,000.00 221,338.51 21,023.00 1,500,000.00
Days on Market 917,066 40.33 21.00 47.58 1.00 254.00
Sq. Ft. (000s) 917,066 1.90 1.75 0.76 0.00 4.57
Bathrooms 917,066 2.31 2.00 0.85 1.00 5.00
Bedrooms 917,066 3.29 3.00 0.80 1.00 5.00
Stories 917,066 1.50 1.00 0.56 1.00 3.00
Lot Size (000s) 917,066 17.93 8.71 29.97 0.00 236.72
Age 917,066 39.45 35.00 25.03 1.00 100.00
Shutdown 917,066 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00

ev
Re-open 917,066 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
COVID 917,066 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 3.24
Percent Unemployment 917,066 5.11 3.80 4.05 1.40 34.60
Percent Bachelor 917,066 31.23 27.98 19.98 0.00 100.00
Percent Black 917,066 4.96 0.40 12.71 0.00 100.00
Percent Hispanic 917,066 8.09 2.60 14.76 0.00 100.00

r
This table presents summary statistics of variables in the MLS data. SP is the sale price. Shutdown takes a value of 1 if the
sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the stay-at-home order in the state that the property is located in. Re-open
takes a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the re-open order. COVID is the percent of new

er
COVID-19 cases per capita, in the county where the property is located, during the previous 30 days from the property’s sale
date.
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ot
tn
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 ed
Table III: Effect of Shutdown Orders and COVID-19 on Sale Price

Dep. var.: Log SP (1) (2) (3)

iew
Shutdown -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Re-open -0.010*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
COVID -0.008* 0.046*
(0.005) (0.024)
Shutdown × COVID -0.051**
(0.025)
Re-open × COVID -0.013

ev
(0.009)
Log Sq. Ft. (000s) 0.551*** 0.551*** 0.551***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Lot Size (000s) 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bedrooms 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***

r
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bathrooms 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Stories -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045***

Age

Unemployment rate
er
(0.003)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.000)
(0.003)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.000)
(0.003)
-0.003***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.000)
pe
Constant 12.011*** 12.011*** 12.010***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Close date f.e. Yes Yes Yes
ZIP code f.e. Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 917,066 917,066 917,066

This table presents the regression estimates. SP is the sale price. Shutdown takes a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs
ot

after the effective date of the stay-at-home order in the state that the property is located in. Re-open takes a value of 1 if the
sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the re-open order. COVID is the percent of new COVID-19 cases per capita, in
the county where the property is located, during the previous 30 days from the property’s sale date. Property controls include
log square footage, log lot sizes, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories, and age. Robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code level
are noted in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
tn
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 ed
Table IV: Effect of Shutdown Orders and COVID-19 on Sale Price by Demographics

Dep. var.: Log SP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

iew
Shutdown 0.003 -0.003 -0.022***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Re-open -0.005 -0.009*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
COVID 0.018** -0.004 -0.048***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.015)
Shutdown × Bachelor -0.017***
(0.005)
Re-open × Bachelor -0.017**

ev
(0.007)
COVID × Bachelor -0.070***
(0.014)
Shutdown × Hispanic 0.002
(0.006)
Re-open × Hispanic -0.018**

r
(0.009)
COVID × Hispanic -0.037**
(0.018)
Shutdown × Black 0.001

Re-open × Black

COVID × Black
er (0.008)
0.013
(0.010)
0.005
(0.018)
pe
Shutdown × Unemployment rate 0.003***
(0.001)
Re-open × Unemployment rate -0.001***
(0.000)
COVID × Unemployment rate 0.003***
(0.001)
Property Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Close date f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ot

ZIP code f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066

This table presents the regression estimates depicting heterogeneous effects across areas. SP is the sale price. Shutdown takes
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a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the stay-at-home order in the state that the property is
located in. Re-open takes a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the re-open order. COVID is the
percent of new COVID-19 cases per capita, in the county where the property is located, during the previous 30 days from the
property’s sale date. Demographic variables indicate the rate of population at the ZIP code level. Property controls include
log square footage, log lot sizes, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories, and age. Robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code level
are noted in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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Table V: Effect of Shutdown Orders and COVID-19 on Sale Price by Property Size

Dep. var.: Log SP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

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Shutdown -0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Re-open 0.019*** 0.005 -0.013***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
COVID 0.012 0.018** 0.041***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Shutdown × Bedrooms -0.000
(0.001)
Re-open × Bedrooms -0.009***

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(0.002)
COVID × Bedrooms -0.006
(0.005)
Shutdown × Log Sq. Ft. (000s) -0.009**
(0.004)
Re-open × Log Sq. Ft. (000s) -0.027***

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(0.006)
COVID × Log Sq. Ft. (000s) -0.045***
(0.012)
Shutdown × Log Lot Size (000s) -0.003**

Re-open × Log Lot Size (000s)

COVID × Log Lot Size (000s)

er (0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.022***
(0.004)
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Log Sq. Ft. (000s) 0.551*** 0.551*** 0.554*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 0.551***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Lot Size (000s) 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bedrooms 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bathrooms 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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Stories -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045***

(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment rate -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Constant 12.009*** 12.010*** 12.010*** 12.010*** 12.010*** 12.009***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Close date f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ZIP code f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066 917,066
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This table presents the regression estimates depicting heterogeneous effects across property size. SP is the sale price. Shutdown
takes a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the stay-at-home order in the state that the property
is located in. Re-open takes a value of 1 if the sale transaction occurs after the effective date of the re-open order. COVID is
the percent of new COVID-19 cases per capita, in the county where the property is located, during the previous 30 days from
the property’s sale date. Property controls include log square footage, log lot sizes, bedrooms, bathrooms, stories, and age.
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Robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code level are noted in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
 ed
Table VI: Modeling Weekly Sales

Dep. var.: Log [Weekly Sales (ZIP code) +1] (1)

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Shutdown -0.039***
(0.011)
Re-open -0.027***
(0.006)
Constant 0.437***
(0.006)
Week f.e. Yes
ZIP code f.e. Yes
R-Squared 0.79

ev
N 465,542

The dependent variable is the log transformation of the count of the number of weekly sales in a ZIP code. Shutdown takes
a value of 1 if the sale week occurs after the effective date of the stay-at-home order. Re-open takes a value of 1 if the sale
week occurs after the effective date of the re-open order. Robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code level are noted in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.

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 ed
Table VII: Implied Value of a Statistical Life

Shutdown Period Covid Rate×100 Conditional Mortality Risk Mean Price Discount @ 5.1% VSL

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April 2020 0.26 6.0% $18,095 $1,151,774
May 2020 0.21 5.8% $18,095 $1,447,796

Re-open Period Covid Rate×100 Conditional Mortality Risk Mean Price Discount @ 6.4% VSL
June 2020 0.25 4.8% $22,707 $1,912,309

This table presents “back-of-the-envelope” estimates for the implied value of a statistical life from the effects of COVID contagion
on home prices. COVID Rate represents the total number of new cases, scaled by population count, recorded in the United
States during the specified month. The conditional mortality risk is the cumulative number of COVID-19 deaths divided by the

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cumulative number of COVID-19 cases, provided by John Hopkin’s University. The mean price discount is the average decrease
in property values per 100 new COVID-19 cases in a month, estimated as the average price $354,796 times the corresponding
marginal effect from Table III. VSL is the value of a statistical life, which is estimated as the average price discount divided by
the perceived likelihood of a COVID death (i.e, COVID Rate times the Conditional Mortality Risk).

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Figure 1. Temporal Trend of Sale Price (Control Group)

This figure presents the nationwide average weekly sale price (for transactions relating to properties in the
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control group, i.e. states where a shutdown order was not imposed) from January 1 to June 19 for the years
2019 and 2020.
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Figure 2. Temporal Trend of Sale Price (Treatment Group)

This figure presents the nationwide average weekly sale price (for transactions relating to properties in the
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treatment group, i.e. states where a shutdown order was imposed) from January 1 to June 19 for the years
2019 and 2020.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
 ed
iew
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Figure 3. Temporal Trend of Sales (Control Group)

This figure presents the nationwide weekly number of sales (for transactions relating to properties in the
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control group, i.e. states where a shutdown order was not imposed) from January 1 to June 19 for the years
2019 and 2020.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
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Figure 4. Temporal Trend of Sales (Treatment Group)

This figure presents the nationwide weekly number of sales (for transactions relating to properties in the
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treatment group, i.e. states where a shutdown order was imposed) from January 1 to June 19 for the years
2019 and 2020.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
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Appendix

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Table A.1: Summary Statistics by Group

Control Treatment
2019/2020 2019 2020
Before After Before After
SP 208,290.07 337,779.43 359,380.57 353,356.14 361,996.51
(107,898.89) (216,213.98) (223,794.06) (221,320.31) (217158.95)
Days on Market 74.83 51.32 37.30 48.01 34.71

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(52.92) (52.29) (44.58) (52.46) (47.47)
Sq. Ft. (000s) 1.92 1.87 1.91 1.89 1.92
(0.73) (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76)
Bathrooms 2.29 2.30 2.31 2.31 2.32
(0.77) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.85)
Bedrooms 3.27 3.27 3.30 3.28 3.30
(0.68) (0.79) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80)

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Stories 1.31 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
(0.49) (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55)
Lot Size (000s) 26.30 17.28 17.86 17.63 18.38

Age

Shutdown (SP)
(39.86)
26.79
(21.05)
0.00
(0.00)
er
(29.14)
39.03
(25.43)
0.00
(0.00)
(29.86)
39.67
(24.85)
0.00
(0.00)
(29.58)
39.55
(25.45)
0.00
(0.00)
(30.44)
39.75
(25.07)
1.00
(0.00)
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Re-open (SP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49)
COVID 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15
(0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Percent Unemployment 3.63 4.20 3.58 4.12 13.07
(2.08) (1.08) (0.93) (1.28) (5.59)
Percent Bachelor 29.22 30.66 31.47 30.61 31.36
(22.03) (19.57) (20.05) (19.69) (20.08)
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Percent Black 19.80 4.75 4.86 4.59 4.79

(31.06) (12.13) (12.35) (11.87) (12.26)
Percent Hispanic 3.24 8.13 8.17 8.00 8.19
(5.49) (14.74) (14.89) (14.58) (14.82)
Observations 9,993 109,346 549,778 113,521 134,428
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This table presents means of variables in the MLS data by group. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The control
group includes transactions in states without a statewide shutdown order. The treatment groups is split between 2019 and 2020
transactions before and after the effective (or hypothetical 2019) shutdown dates.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252
 ed
Table A.2: Property Characteristics of Sales Around Shutdown Orders

Dep. var.: Sale After Shutdown Order (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

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Log Sq. Ft. (000s) 0.011** 0.016*
(0.005) (0.008)
Log Lot Size (000s) 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Bedrooms 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Bathrooms 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Stories -0.002 -0.005

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(0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.485*** 0.482*** 0.486*** 0.484*** 0.494*** 0.491*** 0.491***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05

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N 94,501 94,501 94,501 94,501 94,501 94,501 94,501

This table presents the estimated regression results of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is binary and
takes a value of one if the sale of the property was within 30 days after the shutdown order; it is zero if the sale of the property

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was within 30 days prior to the shutdown order. Robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code level are noted in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647252