Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan

Author(s): Asaf Hussain

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 10 (Oct., 1976), pp. 918-930
Published by: University of California Press
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 ETHNICITY,NATIONALIDENTITY AND
PRAETORIANISM:THE CASE OF
PAKISTAN

Asaf Hussain*

POLITICAL CRISES CONFRONTING many new states have

inspired political and social scientiststo formulateconceptual frame-
worksfor analyzingsuch cases. While some analyseshave emphasized
the centripetal processes of "homogenization,"others have woven
elaborate schematausing multiple political variables like political de-
velopment,nation-buildingand political integrationto explain such
phenomena.
Most of the literatureexploring new perspectives,has drawn at-
tention to the familiarissues of economic developmentand political
modernization.This generalizedthesiscontendedthat if economic de-
velopmentwas stimulatedin developingcountries,democracyrestored
and political communicationincreased,new national identitieswould
crystallizein multi-ethnicsocieties.'While the contributionof thisvast
body of researchshould not be underrated,it leaves some relatively
importantareas unprobed, ignored or superficiallyexposed to multi-
disciplinaryanalyses.By concentratingon the familiarvariables men-
tioned above, it has failed to take into account the strongemotive
forceof ethnic identitiesin the social structureof some multi-ethnic
societies.
Manifestationsof ethnic nationalismhave been explained as lin-
guistic or religious conflicts,problems of class or economic develop-
ment.The resulthas been thatmore oftenthan not, such researchhas
produced"a statementof the problemratherthan an explanation."On
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting
of the Association of Asian Studies Mid-Atlantic Region, Towson State College,
Maryland, October 31-November2, 1975.
1 For an excellent critique of the work of American scholars like G. A. Almond,
L. Pye, S. P. Huntington, and F. Riggs, who have stressed modernization and eco-
nomic development, see Donald C. O'Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Ero-
sion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science," The Journal of Developing
Studies, 8:6 (July 1972), pp. 351-378.
918

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITYAND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 919

the otherhand, it has been observedthat "national identitymay sur-

vive substantialalterationsin language, religion,economic status or
any other tangiblemanifestations of its culture."2Even social changes
stimulatedby modernizationcould not eliminateethnicgroup identity
-but merelymodernizeit. Such societies,polarized by dual identities
(ethnicversusnational)whichcould cut acrosstraditionand modernity,
caused considerablepolitical strainin the new statewhen it could not
operate throughinstitutionalizedpolitical channels or the internaliza-
tion of national ideals. This often triggeredinternal political crises
threateningthe political survival of the state. Nowhere was such a
crisisso clearlymanifestedas in South Asia, wherea state(Bangladesh)
emergedout of a state (Pakistan)in 1971.
This paper focusseson such internalpolitical crises in Pakistan.
The creationof Bangladeshwas attributedto a varietyof causes such
as foreignintervention, economic disparity,geographicaldistanceand
Bengali intrigues.These issues,however,were all ensconcedin the real
problem precipitatingthe internalcrisis: that of Pakistan's national
identity.The rulersof Pakistanhave seldompaid any attentionto this
problem facingthe new state. As a result,the problem of a national
identityremainsunresolvedeven in the post-1971period. This is evi-
dent fromthe separatistsentimentsembodied in the manifestoesof
political parties,such as the banned National Awami Party (NAP),
which advocatesthe separate state of "Paktoonistan,"or the Popular
Liberation Front (PLF) guerrillasof the Azad Baluchistan Movement
engagingthe Pakistan army in effortsto liberate Baluchistan. More
specifically,then,thispaper contends:(1) that colonialismhad created
such ethnicanimositiesin Pakistan; (2) thatreligion(Islam) had failed
to nationallyintegratesuch differences; (3) that ethnic dominationby
one ethnic group over others had furtheralienated ethno-national
identities;and (4) that militaryinterventionwas inevitable as ethnic
nationalismthreatenedto break up the state.

Colonialism and the Muslim State

The questionof national identityof Pakistanhas been a complex
one since its inceptionin 1947. Like Israel it was the only other state
wherereligionplayed a crucial role in its creation,but while Judaism
has helped integratethe identitiesof the multi-ethnicJewishcommu-
nities immigratingto the Israeli state, Islam failed to integratethe
fissiparoustendenciesof the stateof Pakistan.An inquiryinto the role
of colonialismwill make it clear how ethnic identitieswere exploited
on the subcontinent.
Centuriesof Muslim rule in India were dislodgedby the British
2 Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying," World Politics,
24:3 (April 1972), p. 341.

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920 ASAFHUSSAIN
colonialistsin 1857. The dynastyof Mughal rulers (1526-1857) who
had ruled throughautocraticregulationratherthan democraticinte-
grationhad alienated the Hindu and Muslim populations fromeach
other.As a result,thesegroupsdeveloped along communal lines with
sensitively markedreligiousboundariesinsteadof projectinga national
subcontinentalperspective.The Muslims,a feudalisticand primordial
minority,identifiedwith the Muslim political centerin Delhi by vir-
tue of which theywere consideredfirstclass citizens; Hindu subjects
were second class citizens.The British colonization of India was a
great blow to the Muslims,not only in termsof any futurehopes of
regainingtheirpast ruler statusbut also of theirnational identity,as
theirlinkageswith the political centerwere severed.
The Muslims could neither identifythemselveswith their new
Christianmastersnor with their formerHindu subjects. Indeed, by
the end of the 19th centuryboth Hindus and the British converged
togetherin theirdistrustof Muslims and subjected them to political
and economic isolation.3Without a national identityrooted in the
politicalcenter,the Muslimsmade desperateattemptsto relocatethem-
selvesand salvagethe plightof theircommunities.Some soughtrefuge
in religion and religious fanatical movements (e.g., the Deoband
school), while others (like Badruddin Tayabji, 1844-1905) identified
themselvesas Indian nationalistsand joined the All India National
Congress.Yet others(like Sir SyedAhmad Khan, 1817-1898)attempted
to awake Muslim consciousnesswitha view to realign and readjust the
social status of Muslims to colonialism. This political fragmentation
of the communityresultedin the formationof the All India Muslim
League in 1906 whose prime purpose was to evolve a separateMuslim
identityand safeguardtheirinterests.
The Muslim League failed to performits role effectively during
its first27 years.It degeneratedinto an exclusivecartel of class inter-
ests of landlords, industrialistsand professionals.The Ali brothers
startedthe processof regeneratingMuslim consciousnessin the 1920s.4
They perceived the collapse of the Ottoman empire in Turkey as a
threatto the identityof Indian Muslims and in order to safeguardit
theymobilized the Muslims in the subcontinenttowardsthe religious
fanaticismand romantic idealism which characterizedthe Khilafat
Movement.Although this movementfailed to safeguardthe Turkish
empire,it provedthat Islam could be used as a powerfultool forpoli-
tical action. This factdid not go unnoticedby the new breed of secu-
larizedMuslim leaders,one of whom was M. A. Jinnah.
These Muslim leaderswere a productof colonial education.They
had internalized western democratic traditions and perceived the
3 See Rafiq Zakaria, Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics (Bombay: Somaiya Pub-
lications Ltd., 1970).
4 Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) and his brother Shaukat Ali were the
prime forcesbehind the Khilafat movement.

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITYAND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 921

plight of Muslims in termsof a minoritythreatenedby a majority.

The democraticprincipleof majorityrule leftno doubt in the minds
of theseleaders that in an electoralcontestthe Hindus could outvote
them and retainthe locus of political power.The Muslimswere there-
forepolarized into two factions:one visualized the need for a home-
land to safeguardIslam (religionbeing more importantthan the in-
dividual); the other wanted a homeland for the Muslim minority
(wheretheminorityrightsof the individualwere more importantthan
the religion). Both factions,however, perceived that the common
danger they faced came fromHindu domination and not from the
BritishRaj.
For the crystallizationof the idea of a Muslim state,two things
were necessary.First, a national identitywas essential for political
mobilization; and second, a territorialboundary which they could
claim as their homeland was necessary.For religious fanatics, this
situationwas incompatiblesince theywanted to relive theirmedieval
past. They consideredthe whole of India as their rightfulheritage,
and seemedto be totallyoblivious of theirpresentpredicamentin the
face of militantIndian nationalism.For the secular minded and Mus-
lim nationalistJinnah,on the otherhand, brilliantpolitical strategies
had to be evolved,not only to convincethe Britishof the necessityof
a homelandforthe Muslimsbut to stemthe forcesof Indian national-
ism.
In order to mobilize the polarized Muslim community,the name
Pakistan(Land of the Pure) focussedthe attentionof the Muslimson
a conceptualplane, while the Lahore Resolution of 1940 united Mus-
lim factionsbehind Jinnah's declaration that the "Muslims were a
nation by any definition."5Having observedthe forceof Islam in the
Khilafatmovement,he knew that any "movementwhich could . . .
attractthe Muslimsas Muslims" could be successful.0 As such he drew
on theresourcesof religion("Islam in Danger" typeslogans) to reach
the Muslim masses.His own charismaticinfluencewas also an impor-
tantfactorin temporarilyunifyingthe Muslim factionsfromthe Pun-
jab, Bengal and United Provinces.
While the Muslim League was busywith the politicalmobilization
of the Muslinimasses,it is well worthnotinga relevantaspectof how
the Britishcolonial administrators were politicallyoperatingin what
is now Pakistan.By creatingdiverseadministrative forms,varyingfrom
governorand chief commissionerprovincesto tribal territoriesand
princelystates,theydivided and ruled this troublesomepart of their
Empire.Furthermore, fearingMuslim revivalismin thispredominantly

5 Jinnah's Presidential address at the Lahore session of the Muslim League in

March 1940. Text in A. Ahmad and G. E. von Grunebaum, Alslimn Self Statemnents
in India and Pakistan 1857-1968 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,1970), pp. 153-155.
6 R. Russell, "Strands of Muslim Identity in South Asia," South Asian Review,
6:1 (October 1972), p. 23.

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922 ASAF HUSSAIN

Muslim area, theyencouraged the growthof ethnic identities.Such

policies createdinter-culturalalienation and inter-ethnicanimosities
byhinderingthe "developmentof tendenciestowardsintegration,unity
and cohesion."7
Those ethnicgroupspositivelydisposed towardsthe colonial cen-
ter and useful for the consolidationof the colonial empire were ex-
posed to modernizationwhile othersweredeliberatelyleftat peripheral
levels of development.The latterwas limited to building roads and
passes dependingupon the strategic,political or economicimportance
The tribalPathans of the NorthwestFrontierProvince
of the territory.
were lefton the peripherybecause the volatile tribesmen(the Afridis,
Orakzais,Utman Khels, Waziris and Mohmands) had exacted a very
high cost fromthe Britishin termsof men and money.More than 50
expeditionshad been sent againstthesetribalsbetween 1849 and 1947.
The campaignagainst the Mahsuds in 1919 and 1920 costmore than a
millionpounds and involvedmore than 80,000troops.A special North-
West FrontierInquiryCommitteerecordedin 1922 that the aim of the
BritishFrontierpolicywas the securityof India and throughtheircon-
trol of the tribes to secure life and propertyin that region.8The
Pathans thereforeremained outside the pale of modernizationand
maintaineda strongethnicidentity.9
The Britishfacedsimilartroublesin Baluchistan(fromthe Maari
and Bugti tribes)and in Sind (the Hur tribe).In the provinceof Sind,
partial urbanizationtook place due to the strategicand political im-
portanceof its seaport,Karachi. On the whole, the Sindhis,Pathans
and Baluchis were veryconsciousof theirethnicidentities.
The Muslim Punjabis on the otherhand, were patronizedby the
Britishfromthe verybeginningas theyhad directlyor indirectlysup-
portedcolonial rule. A new elite of landed aristocratswas createdby
the Britishthroughgiftsof large tractsof land. These landlords were
more interestedin servingthe interestsof the colonialiststhan their
own compatriots.'0In time theybecame so powerfulthat theywanted
to play an independentrole in colonial Muslim politics, which was
counteractedonly by the strongcharismatichold of Jinnah over the
masses." AnotherimportantreasonforBritishpolicyin thePunjab was

7 M. F. Goldman, "Political Change in a Multi-national Setting," in D. E.

Schmitt,ed., Dynamics of the Third World (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publica-
tions, 1974), p. 171.
8 Governmentof India, Report of the North West Frontier Enquiry Committee
and Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T. Rangachariar and Air. N. M. Samrath (Delhi,
GovernmentCentral Press, 1934), p. 6. Quoted in W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland
(The Hague: Mouton, 1963), p. 123.
9 F. Barth, "Pathan Identity and its Maintenance," in F. Barth, ed., Ethnic
Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), p. 119.
10 H. Gardezi, "Neo-colonial Alliances and the Crisis of Pakistan," in K. Gough
and H. P. Sharma, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (New York:
MonthlyReview Press, 1973), p. 132.
11 M. A. Jinnah's dialogues with Punjabi elites of the Punjab Unionist Party
and the Ahrarsled him to exclaim once, "I shall never come to Punjab again. It is

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITYAND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 923

thatthisprovincebecameone of theprincipalareas forthe recruitment

of soldiers.The BritishIndian Armywas "Punjabized," as almost50%
of Muslimsin it were Punjabis who had provedtheirloyaltyand valor
in the Firstand Second World Wars.12Thus, while the Hindus served
the colonialiststhroughthe Indian Civil Service,the Punjabi Muslims
servedthemas the guardiansof the BritishIndian Empire.
In orderto maintainthe peace and orderof the hostileethnicre-
gions,the colonialistsinstituteda different systemof laws, such as the
Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 under which the tribals could
settle their own disputes through"Jirgas" (assemblyof elders), and
devised a systemof rewardsthroughpaymentof regular subsidies to
Sardars, Maliks and Khans to contain tribal insurgencies.Colonial
patronagevariedwith the identificationof the ethnicgroupswith the
colonial center.The contributionof the colonized towardsimproving
theirown societywas not emphasized.As a matterof policy,the colon-
ized weremade to believe that the "sarkar"did more fortheirwelfare
and, above all, that colonial modernizationhad "civilized" them from
Ethnicgroupstherefore
the traditionalsocial structure. soughtto define
theirrelationshipwith the colonial centerentirelyin termsof moderni-
zation and the personal,social or collective privilegesto be derived
fromit.
Thus duringthe colonial period,while Muslim nationalistswere
strivingto stir Islam consciousnessand develop a national identity
amongthe Muslimmasses,the Britishhad encouragedboundarymain-
tenanceof ethnicidentitiesto suit theirpurposes.This colonial politi-
was so successfulthat,dependingon the degreeof identifica-
cal strategy
tion with the colonial center,some ethnic communitiesbegan consid-
ering themselvessuperiorto others.With the creationof Pakistan in
1947, the political elites of Pakistan believed that Islam had saved
MuslimsfromHindu dominationand given thema national identity.

InternalDualismand NationalIdentity
Afterthe euphoria of independencehad dissipated,the transfer
of citizenshipfromprimordialto national levels proved difficult.
The
demandsmade on the ethnicgroupsfortransferring theirloyaltieswas
immediateand withoutany platformfor negotiation.The important
question in the post-colonialperiod was: since Islam had been in
danger and was saved by the creationof Pakistan, was Pakistan then
going to be an Islamic state?
Differentperceptionsof this question led to a confusionof na-
such a hopeless place." Quoted by W. A. Wilcox, "The Integrationof Pakistan," in
M. A. Ahmad, ed., Proceedingsof the All Pakistan Political Science Conference1962
(Karachi: International Press, 1965), pp. 123-135.
12 See W. A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York: Walker
and Co., 1964), p. 15. S. P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: Universityof Cali-
fornia Press, 1971), p. 69.

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924 ASAF HUSSAIN

tional identityamong the people. The founderof Pakistan had stated

that religion,caste or creed would have "nothingto do with the busi-
ness of the state";13this was furtherreinforcedin the 1949 Objectives
Resolution which stated that authorityand power in the state of Pak-
istan would be exercised through the chosen representativesof the
people. On the other hand, the orthodox factionsbelieved that sov-
ereigntyrestedwith God and, in order for Pakistan to be an Islamic
state,the stateshould governas His agent throughthe Shariat(Muslim
Law) as given in the Quran by ProphetMohammad.14
This Islamic statecontroversy was debated forseveralyearsand it
left the state polarized between orthodox and secular factions.The
1956 Constitutionlabelled Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic," while
the 1962 Constitutionremovedthat label rationalizingthat the state
could not be theocraticbecause therewas no priesthoodin Islam, and
as such, it was "theocraticonly to the extent that real sovereigntybe-
longs to God."'15 The 1973 Constitution again made Pakistan an
"Islamic Republic." This label-changingwas an indication of serious
internal contradictionswithin the national identityof Pakistan and,
according to some, Pakistan has remained an "ideological state" but
with no "knownideology.'16 This crisiswas neverresolvedand the na-
tional identityof the statehas varied fromone Constitutionto another.
These contradictionsled to internal dualism-the ethno-Islamic
and the ethno-national.Within the ethno-Islamicframework,the na-
tional identityof a citizenof Pakistan fluctuatedbetween his religion
and his state: if a citizenwas a Muslim firstand Pakistani second, he
transcendednational boundariesand was sympathetic to pan-Islamism;
if he was a Pakistani firstand Muslim second,the basis of his identity
was ethnicized.As a Pakistani he could be a Punjabi, a Baluchi, a
Sindhi,a Pathan,or a Muhajir.17Within the ethno-nationalframework
the internaldualism oscillated between his ethnicityand nationality:
was he a Punjabi, Baluchi, Pathan, or Sindhi first,or a Pakistani?In
1947 the Bengalis chose to be Pakistani firstand Bengalis second; in
1971 theychose to reversethe order throughthe forceof ethnic na-
tionalism and created Bangladesh. Ethnic nationalismhad developed
strongenough dimensions to defy national identityand destroythe
state.

13 Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Speeches as Governor General of

Pakistan, 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p. 9.
14 L. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: Universityof Cali-
fornia Press, 1961), P. 142.
15 Report of the ConstitutionCommission,Pakistan 1961 (Karachi: Government
of Pakistan Press, 1962), pp. 72-76.
16 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan," Journal of
African and Asian Studies, VIII (1973), pp. 190-224.
17 The Muhajirs were Indian Muslim refugees who had migrated to Pakistan
after 1947. For an excellent study of their political role, see T. P. Wright, Jr.,
"Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan," The Journal of Common-
wealth and Comparative Politics, XII:2 (July 1974), pp. 189-205.

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITYAND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 925

Few people have seriouslytaken into considerationthe force of

ethnicitybecause of theirimplicitfaithin Islam as an integrativeforce.
There were threereasons for this. First,as a religion,it united them.
in theirbelief in one God, Prophet Mohammad and the Quran. Sec-
ond, as a social system,theywere related to its normativeand behav-
ioral forms.Third, as an ideology,some of its "westernized"praction-
ers soughtto evolve a systemof political, economic,and social values
fromwhichits objectivescould help in the modernizationof Pakistan.
But the ideologiesoffereda secularsubstituteforreligion,and, unlike
Turkey,Pakistanhad not successfully separatedreligionfrompolitics.
Furthermore, somereligiouseliteswere of theopinion that the message
of Islam was forall mankindand were thereforeopposed to any kind
of nationalismwhich confinedit within the boundaries of the state.
They believedin the unityof the Islamic communityeven acrosstrans-
national borders.This mighthave been truein the medieval ages, but
the impact of European nationalism,colonialism and modernization
on the brotherhoodof the Islamic communityhad weakened its link-
ages.
The creationof Bangladeshhad provedthat the integrativepower
of Islam had failedto overcomeethnicnationalism.This does not mean
that Islam did not possess any integrativepower, but in the face of
contradictoryforces(ethnic versus national) it was rendered almost
powerless.The political leaders of Pakistan expected too much of
Islam when theyused it as the onlyintegrativedeterminantof national
identityin a statebased on Westminstertypedemocracyand the secu-
lar ideologiesof the West.

The Role of Ethnicity

Nation-buildingin a multi-ethnicsocietyhas differentpriorities
than merelyeconomic modernization,for "a nation does not merely
happen as a resultof historicalforces;it does not merelyentail a lib-
erationfromoppressionor froma cocoon of falseidentity.It must be
designedand the plan executed.This takes precedenceover all tasks,
including economic development."19Political formulae have to be
evolvedfromcultural,ideological and structurallevels and, especially
in the case of Pakistan,thiswas not an impossibletask,as many simi-
laritieswere endemicto the culturalbase of its ethnicgroups.But the
role of one ethnicgroup(the Punjabis) in the politicsof Pakistanmakes
it evident that theydid not make any genuine attemptto make the
political systemrepresentativewith inter-ethnic recruitment.
For the Punjabis, Mohammad Iqbal (1876-1938) was the "poet of
18 Sayyed Abulala Maudoodi, Nationalism in India (U.P. Malihabad: Maktaba-
e-Jamaat-e-Islami,1948), pp. 5-11.
19A. R. Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration," The Journal of Modern
African Studies, 5:4 (1967), pp. 449-467.

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926 ASAF HUSSAIN

the East," and the state of Pakistan was the materializationof his
dreams.In 1930 he had stated that he would like to see "the Punjab,
North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan as a single
state . . ." and that the formationof such a statewas "the finaldestiny
of Muslims.'20 The East Bengalis resentedthisand preferredtheirpoet
Tagore (1861-1941), whose songs stronglyreinforcedBengali ethnic
identityand nationalism.21Punjabi ethnocentricity did not succeed in
structuralassimilationor political integrationof other ethnic groups,
but instead sensitizedPathan, Baluchi, and Sindhi ethnic boundaries.
Karl Marx had stated that the ruling ideas of any epoch are the
ideas of the ruling class.22Since the Punjabis and theircollaborators,
the Muhajirs,23occupied strategicpositions in the country'sbureau-
craticand militarysub-systems, theirruling ideas determinednational
policy making at the highestlevels. To legitimizetheirideas, western
ideologies of economic developmentand transferof technologywere
effectedthroughneo-colonial alliances, militaryand economic pacts.
As a consequenceof the latter,an influentialpolicyadvisorygroup,the
Harvard AdvisoryGroup,24became entrenchedin the Planning Com-
mission from 1954-1970 and exerted enormous indirectinfluenceon
the policy-makingbureaucrats.In some instancestheywrote out the
completedraftsof the Five Year Plans.25As a result of these policies,
mostof the developmentwas concentratedin the Punjab provinceand
Karachi, the Muhajir stronghold.Such ethnic influenceson resource
allocations strengthenedthe position of the Punjabi elites26on one
hand, while on the other hand massive doses of foreignaid led to
recolonization and encouraged the "development of underdevelop-
20 A. Levak, "Provincial Conflictand Nation-Building in Pakistan," in W. Bell
and WV.E. Freeman, Ethnicity and Nation-Building (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1974), p. 203.
21 Rabrindranath Tagore, the Hindu Bengali poet, was so popular with the
Bangladeshi's that one of his songs, "My Golden Bengal," was adopted as the
national anthem of Bangladesh.
22 Karl Marx, "On Class," in C. S. Hell, ed., StructuredSocial Inequality (Lon-
don: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 21.
23 The Muhajirs, who migrated to Pakistan from Bombay and Gujarat in
India, became well entrenched in large industrial undertakingsin Pakistan. Along
with the Punjabis they comprised the "twenty-two"families in whose hands the
wealth of the countrywas concentrated.See L. J. White, Industrial Concentration
and Economic Power in Pakistan (Princeton N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1974).
Also see H. Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism, Entre-
preneurship and Partial Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural
Change, XXI:1 (October 1972), pp. 1-32.
24 The task of the Harvard Advisory Group was to conduct research, train
staff and make "recommendations to the government on major economic policy
questions." See Design for Pakistan-A Report on Assistance to the Pakistan Plan-
ning Commission by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University,February 1965,
p. 2.
25A. Waterson, Planning in Pakistan: Organization and Implementation (Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1963), p. 34.
26 Punjabi bureaucrats like M. M. Ahmad and Said Ahmad were powerful
(formerchairmen of the Pakistan Planning Commission) as were Fida Hussain and
Altaf Gauhar (President Ayub's advisors), to mention a few.

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITYAND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 927

ment."27In its "will to be modern,"Pakistan lost sight of its basic

problem: the quest for identity.Bhutto,shrewdlyperceivingthe role
of the Punjabis, statedin one of his speechesthat theyhad emergedas
"the bastionsof power,the heart and mind, the sinews,muscles,and
arms,the brainsand brawnof Pakistan."28
By playingan ethnicizedrole in the politics of Pakistan,the Pun-
jabis had manipulatedpolitical,economicand social policies in such a
way that theirpowerwas maximized.This was distinctlyperceivedto
be an impositionof "their value systemon the remainderof Pakis-
tan."29The Punjabis could not "Islamicize" other ethnic groups be-
cause theywere alreadyMuslims; theycould only tryto "Pakistanize"
them-and this in realitymeant to "Punjabize" them.For the other
ethnicgroupsthismeant a loss of theirown ethnicidentity.
Such Punjabi "colonialism"was quickly exploited by ethnic poli-
tical elites who were denied political participation.The latter's in-
securitywas also based on structuralfactorssince the Punjabis con-
stituted57.58%/o of the population, compared with Pathans (12.94%),
Baluchis (3.71%), and Sindhis (21.92%). It followedthatin a national
election,such minorityethnic groups could never play a nationally
importantrole. Such perceptionsled to an "us" and "them" syndrome
which became symptomaticof ethnic nationalism,and such groups
were forcedto "presstheirlegitimateclaims forthe protectionof their
way of life, for a redefinitionof the relationshipbetween their own
peripheralsocietyand the center."30
The tribal politics of Baluchistan illustratesthis point. In this
region,the Sardar (tribal chief)had traditionallybeen regardedas the
fountainof all politicalpower.Attemptsmade by the centerto develop
economicallythisperipheralprovinceinfuriatedthe Baluchis because
thiswas done withoutany power sharingwith the local ethnic chiefs.
When thegovernment built roads and schoolswithoutfirstcultivating
the goodwillof the Baluchis, the tribalsperceivedit as an invasionof
theirtraditionallife-style,and an attemptto take away theirlifestock
and break the closelyknit familysystemby exposing the childrenin
the schools to "alien traditions and behaviour."31Ethnic identity
maintenancelaid the ground for tribalinsurgenciesin which "acts of
lawlessness"singularlytargeted"non Baluch personnel. "32

27 A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopmentor Revolution (New York:

Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 3-17. Also see Tibor Mende, From Aid to Re-
colonization (London: Harrup and Co., 1973).
28 Quoted in I. Azam, Pakistan's Securityand National Integration(Rawalpindi:
The London Book Co., 1974), p. 119.
29A. Levak, "Provincial Conflict," p. 206.
30 A. R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflictsin the New States of
Tropical Africa,"American Political Science Review, 62:1 (1968), p. 74.
31 Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto's speech, Morning News (Karachi), October 16,
1974.
32 See Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan (Islamabad:
Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, October 19, 1974), p. 16.

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928 ASAF HUSSAIN

Rapid modernizationin traditionalsocietiesthroughinconsiderate

disruptionof the traditionalsystemhas oftenresultedin political vio-
lence. The economic ideologies which propounded that economic de-
velopment in one part of the social systemwould automaticallyde-
velop otherpartsdid not performsuch "miracles"in Pakistan because,
as statedearlier,the controlof the resourceswas in the hands of one
ethnicgroup,thePunjabis. Thus, thedevelopmentof one ethnicregion
as opposed to anotherwas not due to chance factors,but was motivated
by deliberatedesign.Dissidentethnicelites were quick to exploit such
issues and mobilize ethnic nationalistsentimentsby stressingthat the
ethnic identitieswere being systematically eliminated.The mobilized
groups became receptive to any subversiveideas and aid from any
quarters.
Even the new ideologyof "Islamic Socialism" failed to cut across
ethnicstructures. In the electionsof 1970,Bhutto'ssupportwas mainly
fromthe Punjab and Sind, not fromBaluchistan,NorthwestFrontier
Province,or East Pakistan. Islamic Socialism did not seek to negate
Islam, but legitimizeditselfthroughIslamic economic egalitarianism.
It recognizedIslam as the state religion,democracyas its polity and
socialism as its economy.33This ideology was framedby Punjabi in-
tellectualsfromthePakistanPeoples Party(PPP) and was popular with
the Punjabi intelligentsia.Bhutto'srise to power was partlydue to his
charismabut more importantlyto the successof his ideologywith the
largestand most powerfulethnic group, the Punjabis. More recently,
when some Punjabi supportersof the PPP fell out with Bhutto over
internal political disputes,theyconstantlyremindedhim that he had
been elected to power by the strengthof their vote and not that of
other ethnicgroups.34The Punjabis have thereforeplayed a significant
role on the level of ethniccommittments to the national identityof the
new state.

and EthnicNationalism
Praetorianism
The political position of the Pakistan militarywas a delicate one.
Whenever ethnic political elites shifted loyalties from national to
ethniclevels,resultingin political violence and insurgencies,the army
was given the responsibilityof restoring"law and order." In other
words,the armyhad to crush theseinsurgenciesto "preservenational
This unwelcometask thruston the armyhad to be done,
integrity."35

33 Hassan Askari,Pakistan's Peoples Party: The First Phase 1967-1971 (Lahore:

Progressive Publishers, 1973), p. 15.
34 S. R. Ghauri, "Resignation Means Crisis for Bhutto," The Guardian (Man.
chester),September 26, 1975.
35 President Bhutto made the following statement before appointing the
Baluchi Governor (Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo) on April 26, 1972: "Every effort
should be made to preserve national integrity.Fissiparous tendencies are not only
harmful to the nation but also effectour international relations. Therefore, move-

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 ETHNICITY,IDENTITY AND PRAETORIANISMIN PAKISTAN 929

whethersuccessfully(Baluchistan 1974) or unsuccessfully(Bangladesh

1971). Such responsibilities,however,were not new to the army,forin
the Britishcolonial empiretheyhad been entrustedwith both external
defenseand internalsecurity.The latterrole of the military,necessi-
tated by the expediencyof controllingthe vast multi-ethnicempire,
promptedpolitical strategiessuch as the deploymentof ethnicmilitary
forcesby using "soldiers fromone region or ethnic group to restore
order among the population from another group."36The army was
used to maintainthe statusquo of the colonial power. In post-colonial
Pakistan, the people had implicitfaithin the national armyfor they
perceivedit as theirdefenderand not as theirdestroyer.The repetition
of the colonial principleof militaryuse of ethnicforces(predominantly
Punjabi) by political elites againstotherethnic groups (Bengalis 1971,
Baluchis 1974) not only raised grave doubts about the neutralposition
of the militaryin stateand ethnicpoliticsbut also posed seriousques-
tionsregardingits legitimacyto exerciseabsolute political power.
The Pakistan militarywas the most powerfulelite group in the
country,but had remainedin the backgrounddespite the political in-
stabilityplaguing the state. Other elite political factionshad turned
Pakistan into a praetorianstate throughtheirdirectstruggleforpoliti-
cal leadership.The praetorianconcernof the militarywas the inevit-
able outcome as elite factionalconflictsstartedlegitimizingthemselves
along ethnic lines rather than national ones. This trend threatened
the very existence of the state throughthe emergenceof ethnic na-
tionalism.
Like othermilitaries,the Pakistan militarywas by trainingsocial-
ized with a nationalisticethic,and, as such,stronglyidentifiedwith the
state. Apart from their training,the predominantlyPunjabi recruits
also identifiedwith the state.The army'spraetorianconcerncould not
contain itselfas the armybecame highlyconsciousof the role it had to
play in the maintenance of the national identityof the state. An
analysisof militaryinterventionsand their political performancebe-
tween 1958 and 1971 is beyond the scope of this paper, but it can be
said thatthepraetorianrole of themilitaryplaced it in a dilemmafrom
which it could not extricateitself.If it remained apolitical and re-
fused to suppressinternalethnic nationalism,then the countrycould
be plunged into a civil war and disintegrate;if it did intervene,as it
did in 1971 and 1974,then its own predominantly Punjabi ethniclink-
age sensitizedother ethnic groups who began to say that "not ballots
but bullets will settle the issue."37This stage can easily be reached
ments like Azad Baluchistan Movement, however nebulous, should be firmlyput
down...." Ironically, Bizenjo was dismissed from officein February 1973,when he
stated that he would "resist the induction of army units into Baluchistan." See
Governmentof Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan, pp. 10, 22.
36 S. P. Cohen, "Security Issues in South Asia," Asian Survey, XV:3 (March
1975), pp. 202-214.
37 Statement of the Leader of the Opposition, Wali Khan, of the banned

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930 ASAF HUSSAIN

wheneven themoderatePathansare leftwithno choice but to join the

ethnicnationalists.38

Conclusion
The analysisof the politics of Pakistan makes it evident that its
political systemwas a highlycomplex one, with the ethnic variable
permeatingthe entire system.Political leaders, therefore,found it
difficult to cut acrossethnic boundaries. If theydid succeed in doing
so, the task of maintainingsuch a processwithoutits posing a threat
to theirlegitimacyproved difficult. Prime MinisterBhutto has so far
retainedthe confidenceof the people but his successin restoringtheir
faithin the viabilityof the state is difficultto assess.By banning the
opposition parties and incarceratingthe Pathan and Baluchi leaders
in jails, the successof his party(the PPP), ideology(Islamic Socialism),
and leadership cannot be proved. Such political strategies,used by
formerpolitical leaders to retain their political position, had had
disastrousconsequencesforthe country.
Manypeople believe thatthe separationof Bangladeshhas created
a strongerPakistan.This may be truein the sense thatPakistanis now
made up of one contiguous territory.But whether the Punjabis,
Baluchis,Pathans, Sindhis and Muhajirs will formone political com-
munitythroughthe creationof a commonnational identityremainsan
open issue. It would thereforebe fair to state that in present day
Pakistan:

(1) The crisis of a national identity has not been resolved after
twenty-seven years of Pakistan's existence;
(2) As long as this crisispersiststhere will be a shiftingof loyalties
between ethnic and national centers;
(3) So long as ethnic identitiesare denied, the danger of ethnic na-
tionalismwill always threatenthe national identity;
(4) In the face of such ethno-nationalcleavages, the praetorian role
of the armywill be reinforcedand at times militaryintervention
will take place to hold ethnic and national identities together
throughcoercion.

These observationsare not exhaustive,but should help to illustrate

why militaryinterventionand ethnic conflictsexist in some multi-
ethnicstates.
National Awami Party, and the chief exponent of "Paktoonistan." The Pakistan
Times (Lahore), October lS, 1974.
38For a study of the views of moderate Pathans who believe that if "Pakistan
is disintegrated,we the Pathans would be the worst sufferers,"see Mohammad
Said Khan, The Voice of the Paktoons (Lahore: Ferozsons Limited Press, 1972).

ASAF HUSSAIN is Research Director of the Institute for Third World Studies,
Manchester,England.

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