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Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

Article  in  European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online · January 2009

DOI: 10.1163/22116117-90000139

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 Ijaz Khan*

Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

The model of the ‘modern’, ‘Westphalian’ or ‘nation-state’ contains within it an

inherent bias towards conflict. Premised on the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, it
requires the unity of all persons within its territorial boundaries and demands com-
plete loyalty from all its inhabitants. However, human society is made up of myriad
identities based on language, culture, race and religious beliefs that also demand loy-
alty. Consequently, citizens are subject to more than one set of demands, and this
can create friction between different ethnic, national or cultural groups. If there is no
clash between identities, then the impetus for conflict is minimized; however, as is the
case in most states, when different identities enter into contradiction with one another
this can give rise to conflict and tension, with varying degrees of intensity. Moreover,
conflict can spill over from the territorial limits of the state and affect other states in
the region and, by extension, international peace and stability. Some states, through a
variety of approaches and policies, have been able to accommodate and contain such
conflicts; others by contrast, have failed. The central question is thus how to manage
these differing and at times conflicting identities.
This essay focuses on Pakistan’s management of its ethnolinguistic mosaic. First,
a theoretical section outlines the debate surrounding the concepts of nation-state,
state-nation and multinational state, and contextualizes the case of Pakistan within
it. That is followed by an analysis of Pakistan’s development as a unitary state, with an
identity based on religion that negates its ethnolinguistic mosaic. The concluding sec-
tion discusses briefly the Pakistani federal system, and suggests that its unitary rather
than federal structure further negates ethnolinguistic diversity rather than protecting
it.

I. Theoretical Foundations

In simple terms, the ‘nation-state’ refers to a state within the boundaries of which there
is only one nation. This is an ideal situation, and very rare; most of the states in exist-

* Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar,

North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan.
European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol 8, 2009, isbn 978 90 04 19521 9, 387-397.
©  2011  Koninklijke Brill nv. Printed in The Netherlands.
Ijaz Khan

ence today comprise multiple identities. Then there is the ‘state-nation’ approach, by
which the state precedes the nation, and a national identity gradually evolves within
its boundaries. Historically speaking, the idea of the modern state was based on that
of the nation-state. As a consequence, most state-builders believe that having a single
national identity is a prerequisite for stability in a given state.
Most studies of the state also revolve around the idea of a single national iden-
tity. Even the most democratic approaches are aimed at the ultimate goal of achiev-
ing a unitary national identity. Nation-state policies represent a political–institutional
approach that attempts to privilege one sociocultural identity over other potential or
actual sociocultural cleavages that might be mobilized politically. Historically, that
approach has been realized through a variety of routes: (1) by creating or arousing a
special kind of allegiance or common cultural identity among those living in a state;
(2) by encouraging the voluntary assimilation of those who do not share the initial
allegiance to, or cultural affinity, with the national identity; (3) by exerting various
forms of social pressure for assimilation, and preventing or destroying alternative cul-
tural identities; and (4) by coercion that might, in the extreme, even involve ethnic
cleansing.
By contrast, ‘state-nation policies’ represent a political–institutional approach
that respects the legitimate public and even political expression of active sociocultural
cleavages, and develops mechanisms for accommodating competing or conflicting
claims between them without privileging or imposing any one claim. State-nation
policies involve creating a sense of belonging (or ‘we-feeling’) with respect to the state-
wide political community, while simultaneously creating institutional safeguards for
respecting and protecting politically salient sociocultural diversities. The ‘we-feeling’
may take the form of defining a tradition, history and shared culture in an inclusive
manner, with attachment to common symbols of the state and/or inculcating some
form of “constitutional patriotism”.1 Unlike India, Pakistan has adopted nation-state
policies, using ‘various forms of social pressure and coercion to achieve this and to pre-
vent or destroy alternative cultural identities’, and thereby denying diversity, notably
on ethnolinguistic grounds.
From the very beginning, the Pakistani leadership adopted a nation-state policy,
basing the claim to national identity on the religion of Islam, negating language, eth-
nicity, culture or history as sound basis for any claims for any political or economic
rights. Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of Pakistan movement and the first
Governor General of Pakistan, underlined that policy very clearly when he refused
to accept the demands of Bengalis that Bengali be recognized as a national lan-
guage, in parallel with Urdu.2 The Pashtuns were faced with similar rejections when

1 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan and Yogendra Yadav, “‘Nation State’ or ‘State Nation’? Con-
ceptual Reflections and Some Spanish, Belgian and Indian Data”, background paper for
the Human Development Report Office (UNDP, 2004), at <http://hdr.undp.org/docs/
publications/background_papers/2004/HDR2004_Alfred%20_Stepan.pdf>.
2 During a visit to Dhaka University in 1948, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah flatly refused to
accept the demands of Bengali students for recognition of Bengali as a national language,
which led to riots on the streets of Dhaka, considered the first language riots in Pakistan,
led by Sheikh Mujib Ur Rehman. Sheikh Mujib Ur Rehman, then a student leader, later

388
 Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

they demanded that their province, the North West Frontier Province, be renamed
‘Pashtunistan’ to reflect their ethnolinguistic identity.3 This laid the foundations for a
unitary state structure and the undemocratic development of Pakistan. It also provided
the basis for a ruling elite composed of Muhajirs (refugees from India after the 1947
partition), military personnel, and bureaucrats. Gradually Punjabis replaced Muhajirs4,
and later still alliances with the religious right became a useful policy tool.
The ideological basis for the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was the construction of
an identity rooted in religion, namely, Islam. As such, the state was founded on the
denial that anything other than religion could serve as the basis for identity. For the
Muslim League leadership, which made up most of Pakistani elite after 1947, during
the struggle for Pakistan the real opponent was not British imperial rule, but the
Indian National Congress, which they perceived as representing Hindus. This experi-
ence, along with the tragic events of partition, became the basis of a strong perception
that Indian leadership had not accepted the division of the sub-continent and would
not miss any opportunity to undo it. The controversy over what Pakistan considered
to be its fair share of assets within a united India was seen as further indication of
Indian plans to strangle the new state economically at its inception.5 The fact that most
of the Muslim League leadership came from territories that did not become part of
the state for which they had struggled, and in which they became refugees, was also
a significant factor in the evolving India-centric threat perceptions of the newborn
state. Security policy became the central concern, and determined the content and
contours of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policy. This dominance of security policy
also paved the way for the superior position of the military within state establishments
and society.
Thus, identity founded on religion led to a denial of other identities rooted in eth-
nolinguistic characteristics, a development that was also attuned to the mindset and
interests of the colonial bureaucracy. As a result, it generated a preference for a unitary
state structure and slogans of one religion, one language and one nation.

became the leader of Awami League that successfully led the War for the secession of East
Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971.
3 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Pashtun nationalists, first articulated the demand for
renaming the NWFP ‘Pashtunistan’ in 1948 in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.
However, rather than as accepting his proposal, the state reacted by dismissing his party’s
elected government in the NWFP and incarcerating him, along with thousands of his
followers. Many Pashtuns lost their lives and were injured in the riots that ensued.
4 Ian Talbot, “The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality”, in Christophe Jaffrelot
(ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation (Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 2002),
51-62.
5 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Economy of Defence (Van-
guard, Lahore, 1991), 25-48.

389
Ijaz Khan

II. Religious Identity, Security Perceptions, Unitary State

Structure and Identity

Against this background, the Pakistan Army began a gradual journey towards near
total domination of Pakistan’s decision-making elite, especially but not exclusively in
the context of security policy. The prioritization of security concerns was also evident
in foreign and domestic policy:

The primary reason for military’s emergence as the most influential element in […]
decision-making lies in its significance in the country’s power politics. It assumed
the responsibility of guarding the Islamic ideological identity and frontiers of the
country. The threat perception from India, viewed as a Hindu power, which cannot
bear the existence of an Islamic Pakistan, has provided a certain ideological justi-
fication to the argument that it is only the military establishment that can provide
security to this ideological state. Projection of threat from India is fundamental to
the survival of the Pakistani establishment that even views internal insecurity as
a continuation of the external threat. Islamabad has always looked at the internal
political turmoil as the doing of a ‘foreign hand’ (insinuating India). It is in this
background that Army has always kept the Kashmir issue on the hot burner.6

Under Pakistan’s first military ruler, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958-69), the
military vowed to build a modern, pro-Western Islamic state that would serve as a
bulwark against Soviet communism. Although religious parties disapproved of some
of the liberalizing domestic programme of Gen. Khan, they shared with the military
the perception that communism was the main threat faced by Islam. The military and
the mullahs regarded those Pakistanis who professed communism, socialism, ethnic
and cultural nationalism and/or secularism, as their common enemy.
During the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis of 1971, the religious lobby, led by
the Jamaat-I-Islami’s (JI) youth wings, actively joined the war alongside Pakistani
troops to fight their secular Bengali opponents; the Razakars (volunteer) force organ-
ized by the Pakistan Army was manned by such individuals.7 The crisis resulted in
independence for Bangladesh in December 1971, after military intervention by India.
This important episode from Pakistan’s history illustrates the basic convergence of
perception between an essentially secular state and religious forces that regarded
nationalists as adversaries. Similarly, the fact that religious Afghan opposition groups
and their leaders were welcomed in the 1970s clearly underscores the point that the
otherwise secular Pakistani establishment found common cause with religious groups,
especially when it came to dealing with Pashtun nationalists and in areas of foreign
policy. It should be noted that, even though Pakistan was under the leadership of a

6 Ayesha Sadiqua Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-1999: In
Search of a Policy (Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2003), 56.
7 Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan (Oxford University Press, Kara-
chi, 1998), 78-79.

390
 Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

civilian government, the supervision of the Afghan groups in the 1970s was under-
taken by the military.8
This nexus between the centrist state establishment and the religious forces
reached its peak during the period of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), who
joined forces with the religious parties prior to overthrowing the elected government.
Gen. Zia Ul Haq and the religious parties had a common domestic enemy: secular
mainstream political parties. Zia’s personal proclivities also matched those of his reli-
gious strategic partners. Rigid interpretations of Islamic injunctions and jurisprudence
were introduced during his 11-year rule9 His legacy still haunts the state and society
of Pakistan.

III. Pakistani Federalism

“The more a formal federal system operates in practice as a unitary system, the less is
[the] system’s capacity to accommodate ethnic and territorial cleavages”10. Structurally,
Pakistan has been a federation throughout its existence, and has undergone a number
of constitutional experiments. The federal superstructure is based on a very strong
centralized ideology, and civil and military bureaucracy. The federating units are not
demarcated on the basis of ethnolinguistic realities, even if there is one major eth-
nolinguistic identity in each of them. Pakistan has retained the colonial provincial
demarcations, which were drawn mainly on the basis of administrative considerations.
Though one must acknowledge, except for NWFP, all the names do have a historical
reference and represent the majority ethnolinguistic group of that province.

The minority syndrome that had characterized Muslim politics in British India, in
both theory and practice, continued to cast its shadow on the politics of Pakistan.
The state forming character of Muslim nationalism in British India was transformed
into a nation-forming agenda in post-independence Pakistan. The fact that the
Pakistan movement was lacking in policy content only meant that the state elite

8 The individual responsible were the then Inspector General (IGFC) of the Frontier Con-
stabulary (a paramilitary force, with regular army officers as commanders), Major General
(Retd.) Naseerullah Babar (then a brigadier), joined PPP after retirement and contin-
ued his interests in Afghanistan. General Babar, who became interior minister in the
first Benazir Bhutto government (1993-1997), is considered responsible for the rise of the
Taliban in Afghanistan. C.f., inter alia, Interview of Afzal Khan, Pashtun nationalist
leader from Swat in daily ‘Dawn’ Karachi, 4 May 2009, at <http://www.dawn.com/wps/
wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/afzal-khan-lala-says-
swati-girl-was-flogged-publicly-459>; also Najmuddin Sheikh, former foreign Secretary
of Pakistan, in “Daily Time”, Lahore, 28 August 2008, at <http://www.dailytimes.com.
pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C08%5C29%5Cstory_29-8-2008_pg3_2>.
9 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military”, 49 Asia Report
(2003), 2-3.
10 Atul Kohli, “India: Federalism and Accommodation of Ethnic Nationalism”, in Ugo
Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (eds.), Federalism and Territorial Cleavages (Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 2004).

391
Ijaz Khan

increasingly pressed Islamic ideology into serving the need for national integration
at the cost of addressing the pluralist character of the society.11

The unnatural focus on national unity premised on Islamic identity kept any attempts
to create a federal Pakistan at bay. The new state, dominated by Muhajirs (in politics
and the bureaucracy) and Punjabis (in the army), paid little attention to the aspirations
of minorities, and did not accord them fair representation in the institutions of the new
state. Dr. Waseem states that:

An obvious casualty in the way the establishment in Karachi developed a self-sus-

taining machinery of government in the immediate post-partition years was the
political representation of various ethnic communities from East Bengal and the
smaller provinces of the western wing. The leadership of these communities was
either not the visible and significant part of the Pakistan movement, such as the
political leadership in the Baluchistan states of Kalat, Mekran and Lasbela, or was
on the other side of the political divide such as the NWFP’s Congressite leadership
and the leadership of the Hindu community in general.12

There are four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
and Balochistan and the two special administrative regions of the Pakistan Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Federally Administered Northern Areas
(FANA). These divisions are dominated and thus politically coloured by one or the
other ethnolinguistic group. Thus, we note the dominance of Punjabi identity in
Punjab, Sindhi identity in Sindh, Balochi identity in Balochistan. Although Pashtuns
dominate the North West Frontier Province, significantly, that province unlike the
other three is not named after them.
In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Federally Administered
Northern Areas (FANA). Only historic continuity (not local but British colonial)
and strategic and political considerations are at work. FATA, consists of almost 100%
Pashtuns and is adjacent to NWFP. It is principally administered by the bureaucracy
and the governor of the NWFP, although the elected government of the province
has nothing to do with its administration.13 Thus FATA further divides the Pashtuns
administratively. FANA, historically part of Kashmir, is kept separate from the gov-
ernment of (Pakistani-held) Kashmir, but does not occupy a normal constitutional
position within Pakistan, be it as a separate province or as part of an existing one. This
ambiguity is maintained because the territory forms part of the Kashmir territory,
where since 1948 various UN resolutions have called for a plebiscite, and on which

11 Mohammad Waseem, “Affirmative Action Policies in Pakistan”, XV(2) Ethnic Studies

Report (1997), at <http://www.ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jul97/Esr-Waseem.PDF>.
12 Mohammad Waseem, “Pluralism and Democracy in Pakistan”, 5(2) Interna-
tional Journal on Multicultural Societies (2003), at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001387/138797E.pdf>, 164.
13 See National Bureau of Asian Research, “Challenges Facing Pakistan’s Federally Admin-
istered Tribal Areas (FATA), 19(2) NBR Analysis Report (2008), at <www.nbr.org/publi-
cations/analysis/pdf/vol19no3.pdf>.

392
 Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

Pakistan has based its rationale for the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan has administratively
separated this territory from the part of Kashmir held by it, but has not formally incor-
porated it within Pakistan, believing that this would weaken its position on Kashmir.
The current government has held elections for a local assembly and given the title of
governor to the federal minister responsible for the territory, which gives it the sem-
blance of a province without actually making it one; for example, no provisions are
made for representation of the territory in the federal parliament. This, while recent
government action does represent a small step forward, it does not change the consti-
tutional status of the territory 14.
The Stanford encyclopedia cites two ways in which independent regions can
form a federation: they “may come together by ceding or pooling sovereign powers
in certain domains for the sake of goods otherwise unattainable, such as security or
economic prosperity” (examples include the United States of America, Switzerland
and Australia); or they can form a “holding together” federation, developed “from
unitary states, as governments’ response to alleviate threats of secession by territori-
ally clustered minorities” (examples include India, Belgium, Canada and Spain). The
particular way in which a federation takes shape explains why it is that in some federal
systems the centre is more powerful than the state or the provinces, while in others
states or provinces have greater authority than the central government. The ‘coming
together’ federations are based on a bottom-up approach where the centre does not
possess any powers to begin with. Its authority is the sum total of all the powers ceded
to it or pooled willingly by the constituent units. On the other hand, the ‘holding
together’ federations come into being as a result of transformations in unitary states
that are trying to hold their own in the face of separatist or secessionist tendencies
among their constituent parts. By contrast, a top-down mechanism is one whereby a
strong centre gradually allows the constituents parts to gain power at its own expense.
The ‘coming together’ federations are arranged in such a way that power is not
concentrated in the centre or the majority, thereby preventing these from overriding
the smaller constituent parts or minorities. That said, however, the ‘holding together’
federations “often grant some subunits particular domains of sovereignty e.g. over lan-
guage and cultural rights in an asymmetric federation, while maintaining broad scope
of action for the central government and majorities”.15
The Pakistani federation does not fit into either of these two classifications; it is
neither a ‘coming together’ nor a ‘holding together’ type. Arguments have been put
forward in favour of both. Historically at least two provinces, Balochistan and NWFP
opted to become part of Pakistan. Similarly, FATA’s merger with Pakistan was also
the result of that option being exercised by them. NWFP decided through a referen-
dum, Baluchistan decided in a Tribal Jirga headed by the Baloch ruler, ‘Khan of Kalat’,
and the people of FATA gave their consent through their tribal elders. However, the
method by which these and other federating units became part of Pakistan is not

14 Institute of Policy Studies, “Northern Areas of Pakistan: Facts, Problems and Recom-
mendations Policy Perspectives”, 1(1) Policy Perspectives (2010), at <http://ips-pk.org/con-
tent/view/187/259/>.
15 Badar Alam, Federalism in Pakistan: The Liberal Perspective (Liberal Forum Pakistan,
Islamabad, 2006).

393
Ijaz Khan

illustrative of its status as ‘coming together’ federation. The Pakistani state also failed
to exercise the ‘holding together’ path as it did not give any substantive powers to the
federating units or recognize any diversity in culture or language, as well as did not
grant constituent units any substantial economic or political rights.
The federal structure has been retained in each of the three constitutions of
Pakistan (1956, 1962 and 1973). However, the 1956 and 1962 constitutions denied fed-
eralism in the then West Pakistan (since 1971, the whole or remaining Pakistan). Both
these constitutions described the Pakistani federation as having only two provinces:
West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Both these units were accorded “parity” of repre-
sentation in the federal legislature. This may appear to be an ideal federal arrangement
from the point of view of minority federal units. However, the truth is that the provi-
sion was not incorporated to protect the rights of smaller units but to deny rights to the
majority Bengalis. It was also based on an outright denial of the ethnolinguistic divi-
sions of West Pakistan. This arrangement did not work and Pakistan split in two, with
East Pakistan becoming the new state of Bangladesh in 1971. In 1969, the unit created
through merger of the three provinces and the territory of Baluchistan (Baluchistan
was not given the status of a province earlier) was dissolved. From that date, Pakistan
has comprised four provinces and two special territories.
The 1973 constitution claims to be the most federal constitution that Pakistan has
ever had. Although it retains most of the weaknesses of its predecessors, for the first
time in the country’s history it did take steps towards creating some sense of federal-
ism. A bicameral legislature was introduced, a National Finance Commission was set
up to distribute financial resources between the provinces, and a Council of Common
Interests was constituted to oversee the management of natural resources as well as
strategic economic and industrial assets.
However, a number of anomalies continue to favour the central government
at the expense of the provinces. These were rendered more prominent by the erratic
behavior of Bhutto while in power, and subsequent amendments to the constitution.
The unitary substance of the 1973 constitution was further strengthened by the 8th
Constitutional amendment introduced by President Gen. Zia Ul Haq in 1985. This
was undone by parliament in 1997 under Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif. The
next military ruler, General Musharraf, who came to power with the idea of devolving
powers, actually reintroduced most of Zia Ul Haq’s centralizing amendments through
the 17th amendment (a parliamentary committee is currently trying to develop a con-
sensus on how to undo this amendment). As a result of the 17th amendment, executive
power rests with the president and the governors of the provinces, rather than with the
prime minister and the chief ministers. The appointment of the governors is within the
discretionary powers of the president. Ultimately, therefore, gubernatorial powers are
exercised with the blessing of the president, giving the latter near absolute powers over
the provinces. This is true even in those few areas of competence that are still reserved
to the provinces, the most important being the power of the governor to dismiss the
provincial government and the provincial assembly at his or her discretion.
In fact, on the issue of lists of respective legislative competences, the constitu-
tion was a major step backwards. The Government of India Act 1935, which Pakistan
adopted as its first working constitution gave the federation 96 items which were
reduced to 49 by the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. However, the 1973 constitution

394
 Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

enlarged it to a massive 114. Also in the 1956 constitution, unlike the 1973 constitution,
there were separate federal, provincial and concurrent lists. There were 30 items on
the list of federal powers, 94 items on the list of provincial powers and 19 items on the
list of concurrent powers. Furthermore, when the 1973 constitution accorded superior
status to federal legislation on the concurrent powers list, the legislative autonomy of
the provinces was reduced even more.
The imbalance of powers between the two houses of parliament practically nul-
lified the positive impact of overrepresentation of smaller provinces in the senate.
For example, finance bills, especially the national budget, could only be introduced
through the National Assembly. Second, the centre continued to control the federal
legislative competences, as well as the concurrent legislative competences, and no list
of provincial powers was even provided in the 1973 constitution. In fact, that constitu-
tion made no changes at all to the underlying bureaucratic structure of the state, which
is unitary rather than federal. Against the backdrop of the Bangladesh debacle, the
ruling elite (more specifically the political elite now led by the Pakistan People’s Party
of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, president and then prime minister between 1973 and 1977)
realized that the issue of ethnic diversity needed to be addressed. However, even then
it did not constitutionally recognize the multiethnic plural fact of Pakistan, and failed
to restructure the units of the Pakistani federation to represent the reality of diversity.
A crucial unitary feature of the Pakistani federation is its centralized bureaucracy,
which continues the tradition of the colonial Indian Civil Service, originally designed
to control the people and keep them in check. All senior bureaucrats, even those in
the provinces, belong to this unitary bureaucracy. So for example, the provincial chief
secretary and the police inspector general look to the central government for their
career decisions and appointments, rather than to the provincial government. This
bureaucracy is so well entrenched that no action, on the part of either the military
or the civilian governments, has been able to check its powers and privileges. It is
this bureaucracy which ultimately prevails and no reforms, be they constitutional or
administrative, has ever resulted in any fundamental change to the unitary charac-
teristic of the Pakistani state. Once in power, political parties that initially strug-
gled for change have always tended to rely on these centralized mechanisms to stay
there. To date, the current government has undone only one reform introduced by the
government of the former military dictator, Gen. Musharraf, whereby administrative
powers were removed from the bureaucracy at district levels and given to local elected
bodies. The current provincial governments, with the support and active prodding
of the central government, have since restored those powers. It should be added that
Gen. Musharraf ’s devolution plan was criticized, but for undermining the provinces
not the bureaucracy. Similarly, it is this bureaucracy that has prevailed over the elected
government to postpone the implementation of the (not very impressive) reforms in
FATA, announced by President Asif Ali Zardari on 14 August 2009.

395
Ijaz Khan

IV. Making the Pakistani Federation a Federation

Kennedy argued for “bold policies to reorganize Pakistan’s federal structure” to handle
ethnic diversity. To manage difference, Kennedy has argued for “redesign[ing] territo-
rial boundaries of the constituent units to make them accord more closely with the
ethnic landscape of the state”.16 He also approved more devolution of authority for the
proposed homogenous constituent units.
The first step towards making Pakistan a true federation has to be acceptance of
the fact of the plurality of its people, and direct acknowledgement of that fact in the
constitution. Ensuring that such recognition becomes meaningful must become the
basis for restructuring the state. The federating units must be restructured and some
new ones created. The special territory of FATA, the Pashtun territory of Baluchistan
and the NWFP must be joined together to form a new province with a name reflecting
their identity. FANA has to be given the status of a full province. Punjab must also be
divided along ethnic lines between Saraikis and Punjabis. A system of special regions
for some of the smaller groups like the Chitralis and Hazarawals in the NWFP, the
Brohis in Baluchistan, etc. must be created so that these smaller but separate ethno-
linguistic identities are also protected. This restructured Pakistan must then amend
its constitution to become a federation in reality and not just in name. The bureau-
cratic framework between the federal and provincial authorities must be clearly deline-
ated, with each accorded responsibilities in its own areas. All provincial departments
must be headed and manned by provincial bureaucracies. Provinces must have control
over their resources and any revenue generated by such resources, and should not be
dependent on the federal government for financial survival.

V. Conclusions

Pakistan has the distinction of being the only state with a successful secessionist move-
ment that led to its breaking up during the Cold War era (Bangladesh 1971). It has
continuously faced crises of governance which, according to some, are actually crises
of survival. The most significant underlying cause for this perpetual insecurity has
been Pakistan’s failure to manage its ethnic diversity. That failure has been blamed by
some on foreign intervention, primarily from India; others claim that it is the unitary
militarist and undemocratic growth of Pakistani state which is primarily responsible.
The conclusions of this study are that Pakistan’s failure to build a viable democracy
and face the challenges of peaceful governance at home is a direct result of its denial
of the pluralist nature of its society, and its failure to restructure the state accordingly.
So, in Pakistan, the struggle for democracy and ethnolinguistic-based restructuring
are inseparable.17 A restructured Pakistan would not only be able to contribute more
positively to regional peace, but would be more at peace with itself. It is the opinion

16 Charles H. Kennedy, “Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan”, 3(1) Regional
and Federal Studies (1993), 123-143.
17 Ijaz Khan, “Contending Identities of Pakistan and the Issue of Democratic Governance”,
2(1-2) Journal of Peace and Democracy (2006), at <http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/col-
lections/journals/pdsa/pdf/pdsa_02_01_03.pdf>.

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 Pakistan: Nation-State, State-Nation or Multinational State?

of the author that Pakistan’s way out of its present crisis is through reconceiving itself,
not as a nation-state or a state-nation, but as a multinational state.

Annex: Pakistan by mother tongue (1998)18

Linguistic group Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
Urdu 7.8 4.5 21.1 0.8 1.6
Punjabi 45.4 75.2 7.0 1.0 2.9
Pashto 13.0 1.2 4.2 73.9 23.0
Sindhi 14.6 0.1 59.7 0 6.8
Balochi 3.5 0.7 2.1 0 58.5
Siraiki 10.9 17.4 1.0 3.9 2.6
Others 4.8 0.9 4.9 20.4 5.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Population 127.5 73.6 30.4 17.7 5.7
(in millions)

18 Muhammad Mushtaq, “Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan”, 33(2)

European Journal of Scientific Research (2009), 279-294, at 281.

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