1. Luxuria Homes v.

CA and Bravo/ 302 SCRA 315

 Aida Posadas assigned the property to Luxuria Homes.
 To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established. It cannot be presumed. This is elementary. Thus in Bayer-Roxas v. Court of
Appeals, we said that the separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded only when the
corporation is used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, or where necessary
for the protection of the creditors. Accordingly in Del Rosario v. NLRC, where the Philsa International
Placement and Services Corp. was organized and registered with the POEA in 1981, several years before the
complainant was filed a case in 1985, we held that this cannot imply fraud.
 Obviously in the instant case, private respondents failed to show proof that petitioner Posadas acted in bad
faith. Consequently since private respondents failed to show that petitioner Luxuria Homes, Inc., was a party to
any of the supposed transactions, not even to the agreement to negotiate with and relocate the squatters, it
cannot be held liable, nay jointly and in solidum, to pay private respondents. In this case since it was
petitioner Aida M. Posadas who contracted respondent Bravo to render the subject services, only she is
liable to pay the amounts adjudged herein.
2. Cruz v. Dalisay / 152 SCRA 482
 Sheriff
 The tenor of the NLRC judgment and the implementing writ is clear enough. It directed Qualitrans Limousine
Service, Inc. to reinstate the discharged employees and pay them full backwages. Respondent, however, chose
to "pierce the veil of corporate entity" usurping a power belonging to the court and assumed improvidently
that since the complainant is the owner/president of Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., they are one and the
same. It is a well-settled doctrine both in law and in equity that as al entity, a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members. The mere fact that one is president of a
corporation does not render the property he owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since
the president, as individual, and the corporation are separate entities.

3. Umali v. CA / 189 SCRA 529

 Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when valid grounds therefore exist, the legal fiction
that a corporation is an entity with a juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or stockholders
may be disregarded. In such cases, the corporation will be considered as a mere association of persons. The
members or stockholders of the corporation will be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will attach
directly to the officers and stockholders. The doctrine applies when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the
legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the
corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
 The mere fact, therefore, that the businesses of two or more corporations are interrelated is not a justification
for disregarding their separate personalities.