OCT

2012

Taliban Attack on
Camp Bastion: 14
September
2012

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity

(TRISA)

Complex Operational Environment and

Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

[Type the author name]

United States Army
6/1/2012
 OEA Team Threat Report

Purpose

 To inform the Army training community of the insurgent attack that took place at
Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, on 14 September 2012.
 To examine the insurgents’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used to carry
out the assault.
 To determine if the attack could actually be called an insider attack, also known as a
green-on-blue attack.

Executive Summary

 While some media reports call this raid a green-on-blue attack, this is not the case.
The insurgents impersonated U.S. Soldiers, NOT Afghan National Security Force
(ANSF) personnel, and the attack was carried out as a normal military raid.
 The insurgents attacked in three 5-person teams and appeared to be well trained,
well rehearsed, and very motivated.
 Two U.S. Marines were killed in the action, including a Marine Squadron
Commander, along with nine casualties from at least two countries.
 ISAF personnel killed or captured all 15 assailants.
 The insurgents successfully destroyed six Marine Harrier jets, damaged two
additional planes, wiped out three aircraft refueling stations, and torched several
temporary aircraft shelters.

Cover photo: USMC Harrier jets lined up one next to another on the tarmac at Camp Bastion,
Helmand Province, Afghanistan

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Maps

Camp Bastion’s location in Afghanistan Camp Bastion’s location in Helmand Province

More detailed map of Camp Bastion and Helmand Province

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Introduction
On Friday night, 14 September 2012, insurgents dressed in U.S. military uniforms breached the
outside wall of Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, and used hand-held explosives to attack the
USMC Harrier jets parked on the tarmac and tertiary equipment nearby. Marines and other
military personnel from the multi-national base responded to the attack and killed or captured
all of the assailants.

Before the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel regained control of the
situation via a 2 ½ hour firefight, the insurgents managed to destroy six USMC Harrier jets and
heavily damage two more. In addition, the insurgents badly damaged three refueling stations,
set fire to three to six (sources vary) soft-skin aircraft hangers, and razed a maintenance tent
located near the tarmac.

USMC Guard Post at Camp Leatherneck, the USMC section of Camp Bastion (photo by SGT
Sheila Brooks, USMC)

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Map of the Attack

Camp Bastion Attack Schematic

Camp Bastion
Camp Bastion is one of the largest ISAF military bases in Afghanistan. It consists of
approximately 20 square miles with about 28,000 Soldiers, civilians, and contractors located
inside the facility. The base houses a combination of U.S., British, Danish, and Estonian
personnel. The Americans are primarily Marines living at Camp Leatherneck, a sub-base located
inside Camp Bastion. Most military personnel live in tents. The camp is like a medium-sized city
with a field hospital and several gyms, and even a bottling plant that produces over 15,000
gallons of drinking water a day.

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Runways
In 2006, the only airstrip at Camp Bastion was just 300 feet long, but the camp now operates
two runways of 11,481 feet and 7,707 feet. The longer runway can land almost any type of
military aircraft to include the C-17 Globemaster. Over 600 flights a day, fixed and rotary wing,
take off or land at Camp Bastion.

Helicopter Base
Northwest of the runways and very close to them is a designated helicopter area where
helicopters can not only take off and land, but where at least 28 helicopters in a 7 X 4
configuration can park. The Royal Air Force (RAF) operates Chinook and Merlin helicopters at
Camp Bastion while the U.S. military operates Chinooks, Blackhawks, Apaches, and until
recently the Sea Stallions shown in the photo below. The USMC also operates Ospreys that can
take off and land vertically.

USMC CH-53s lined up side-by-side on tarmac at Camp Bastion similar to the way other
helicopters were lined up at the time of the attack

Camp Leatherneck
Most U.S. Marines live in a sub-base composed of approximately 1,600 acres located on the
west side of Camp Bastion, almost exactly opposite from where the insurgents penetrated
Camp Bastion’s perimeter. At the time of the attack, most of the Marines belonged to the 2nd
Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.

Security
ISAF leaders chose the site for Camp Bastion due to its location with a long distance line of sight
in any direction. The ISAF then added three additional rings of security. The outer ring consists

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of a 30-foot high fence topped with 6-foot high coils of concertina wire. The inner ring, also
called the inner concrete blast wall, is also 30 feet high and stretches for more than 24 miles in
circumference with watch towers and search lights manned by armed Soldiers. In between
these two fences lies a layer of razor wire six feet in height. Camp Bastion also uses a
combination of radar, cameras, and motion sensors to detect movement on the ground and in
the air up to 20 miles away from the base.

The Attack
The attack was very organized from the start. The unarmed insurgents wearing local clothing
passed through several checkpoints in pick-up trucks. Somewhere near Camp Bastion, the
insurgents found a cache of U.S. uniforms, explosives, small arms, and rocket propelled grenade
(RPG) launchers. The insurgents then climbed back into their vehicles and stealthily made their
way to Camp Bastion’s exterior fence on the east side of the compound through the efficient
use of wadis – dry river beds that run through the desert terrain.

The fifteen insurgents dressed in an ill-fitted mishmash of various American military uniforms
and divided into three 5-person teams to execute a well planned and rehearsed suicide attack
on Camp Bastion. The insurgents arrived at the outside fence at approximately 2215 hours and
somehow avoided detection by any electronic device or human guard. Many of the insurgents
wore suicide vests, carried explosives, and carried either a light machine gun or RPG. In several
cases, the insurgents often could only be identified as imposters by their bearded faces and the
tennis shoes on their feet instead of boots.

The insurgents chose one of the most unsecured areas of the base that was also as far away as
possible from where most personnel slept. While some analysts speculated that the insurgents
may have received inside help to choose their entry location, there is no evidence to support
that claim at this time. According to reports, one of the attackers probably used his suicide vest
to create a five-foot hole in the outer wall. Open sources do not state how the assailants
penetrated the second and third barriers to reach the runway area.

After reaching the parked Harrier jets, the three teams of insurgents began to systematically
destroy the USMC aircraft with RPGs and possibly other explosive devices. After initially
targeting the lined-up planes, the insurgents changed their focus to the refueling stations and
the temporary aircraft shelters along the runway. Some reports indicated that the attackers
may have also received mortar support during the attack.

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The ISAF Response

ISAF personnel responding to the insurgent attack included the British 5 RAF (Royal Air Force)
Force Protection Wing of the 51 Squadron and U.S. Marines, both stationed on Camp Bastion.
The ISAF response force isolated the attackers, so the insurgents could not move beyond the
runway area. Over the next 2 ½ hours (some other reports state the time ranged from 4 ½ to 5
hours), the insurgents and ISAF personnel exchanged small arms fire until the coalition forces
captured one of the attackers and killed the remainder. Two Marines were killed in the firefight
including the USMC aviation squadron commander. Nine other ISAF personnel suffered
wounds, including one civilian contractor. Initial reports indicated that there were 19 attackers,
but the number was later revised to only 15 – 14 dead and one captured after daylight, when
ISAF forces could better assess the situation. Some of the insurgents died by ISAF gunfire, but
others possibly died when the attackers detonated their suicide vests. Armed American
helicopters killed the three insurgents who refused to give up and took refuge behind a
concrete blast wall.

Post-Attack Results
ISAF Casualties
 2 U.S. Marines dead
 8 other ISAF Soldiers slightly injured, including several British airmen
 1 civilian contractor wounded

Insurgent Casualties
 14 dead
 1 wounded and captured by ISAF personnel

Major ISAF Equipment Losses

 6 USMC Harrier jets destroyed
 2 USMC Harrier jets heavily damaged
 3 fueling stations heavily damaged/destroyed
 3-6 soft aircraft shelters damaged/destroyed
 1 maintenance tent damaged
 Security fence damaged
Note: at $30 million for each Harrier, this was significant financial loss

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Taliban Reaction
 Claimed the attack was in retaliation for the anti-Muslim video that initially debuted in
Hollywood on 23 June 2012 that attracted less than ten viewers, but gained much notice
when it was uploaded to the Internet in early September.
 Claimed that they attacked Camp Bastion because Prince Harry of Great Britain was
stationed there as an Apache helicopter pilot.
 The Taliban released a video that supposedly demonstrated the attackers in their
training. The video shows one insurgent taking over a minute to cut through a chain-link
fence with dull wire cutters so that the insurgents could pass through standing up. None
of the insurgents depicted in the training video were wearing anything other than
fatigues, and less than a handful carried weapons. The briefing supposedly showed the
leader using a white board map with Camp Bastion on it, but the perimeter outline does
not appear to match the section of the fence through which the insurgents gained entry
to the base.

ISAF Reaction and Investigation Results

 ISAF stated that despite the damage, there would be no impact on ground or air
operations at Camp Bastion. Within hours of the attack, the Camp Bastion runways
became operational once again.
 At $23 to $30 million for each Harrier jet, the damage occurred to the equipment
exceeded $300 million.
 Two replacement Harrier jets have already arrived and four additional planes will arrive
in the near future.
 The USMC transported the two Harrier jets not destroyed in the attack back to the
United States for extensive repairs.
 The Taliban may have conducted surveillance on Camp Bastion’s eastern side as they
posed as farmers working in a nearby corn plantation.
 The Taliban may have also received inside information about a “blind spot” in the base’s
security. An Australian general later stated that it did not appear that the attackers
received any inside help.
 The British stated that Prince Harry was never in danger, was over a mile from the
firefight, and was taken to a safe place as a precaution.
 On 18 September 2012, ANA and ISAF members arrested one of the Taliban leaders
behind the attack and two of his underlings.

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Analyst Assessment
Despite several media sources calling this insurgent raid an insider (green-on-blue) attack, this
is not the case. The insurgents initially dressed in local garb to make it through the checkpoints,
not in Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) uniforms. While the insurgents did wear U.S.
uniforms when they made their attacks, it was not as a means to impersonate American
Soldiers but most likely to confuse any ISAF responders during the firefight.

The insurgents relied on a combination of excellent reconnaissance, good planning, rehearsals,

and fanaticism to carry out the attack. First, the insurgents carried out the raid in one of the
weakest spots in the perimeter. Second, the spot chosen was as far away from any sleeping
quarters as possible, so it would take longer for ISAF forces to react. Third, the insurgents not
only avoided all the electronic surveillance equipment possessed by Camp Bastion, but were
also not spotted by any of the guards on the towers. Lastly, almost all of the insurgents were
willing to die for the cause, as only one Taliban member survived the ISAF response to the
attack by eventually surrendering. To breach the outer wall, one insurgent probably detonated
his suicide vest to put the hole in the wall so the follow-on forces could reach the airplanes on
the tarmac. Other insurgents, when finally cornered, supposedly blew themselves up with their
suicide vets rather than become prisoners.

Training Implications
 No static facility is ever totally secure, especially for an attacker who is willing to die in
their attack.

 Good reconnaissance, detailed planning, and extensive rehearsals increase the

likelihood of the success of an insurgent attack.

 The insurgents do not obey the Law of Land Warfare or other international treaties, as
demonstrated by their use of American uniforms in the attack.

 Just because an insurgent is wearing a uniform, it does not always mean that the assault
is an insider attack.

 The enemy will take advantage of the failure of electronic surveillance devices or human
security lapses.

References
____. “2 Marines killed in attack on air base in southern Afghanistan.” AP Via Chicago Sun-Times. 14 September
2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).

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Ardolino , Bill and Bill Roggio. “Taliban release video of planning for Camp Bastion assault.” The Long War Journal.
24 September 2012 (accessed 24 September 2012).
____. “Camp Bastion attack ‘aimed at harry’ – Taliban.” 4 News. 15 September 2012 (accessed 17 September
2012).
Beale, Jonathan. “Camp Bastion assault: Two US marines die in ‘Taliban revenge’.” BBC News, 15 September 2012
(accessed 17 September 2012).
th
Carlson, Derek SGT. “Elements of 26 MEU Come Ashore in Support of ISAF.” 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. 19 January
2011 (accessed 18 September 2012).
CIA Factbook. “Afghanistan.” 10 September 2012 (accessed 18 September 2012)
____. Camp Bastion Attack. CNN News. Undated (accessed 18 September 2012)
Farmer, Ben. “Taliban fighters wore US Army uniforms in attack on Prince Harry’s base.” The Telegraph. 16
September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).
____. “ISAF provides additional detail son Camp Bastion attack.” International Security Assistance Force News
Release. 16 September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).
____. “Prince Harry in peril: SAS whisked Royal to safety during deadly Taliban attack at Camp Bastion.” The Mirror
News. 17 September 2012 (accessed 18 September 2012).
Rayment, Sean. “I’ve been inside Camp Bastion – and it seemed like the safest place on earth.” The Telegraph. 15
September 2012 (accessed 18 September 2012).
Rayment, Sean. “Prince Harry targeted in fatal Taliban attack on ‘impregnable’ military base.” The Telegraph. 15
September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).
Rayment, Sean and Ben Farmer. “British troops help fight off Taliban attack on Afghan military base housing Prince
Harry.” 14 September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).
Roggio, Bill. “6 Harrier jets destroyed, 2 damaged in Taliban assault on Camp Bastion.” The Long War Journal. 16
September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).
Rubin, Alissa J. “Audacious Raid on NATO Base Sows Taliban’s Reach.” The New York Times. 16 September 2012
(accessed 17 September 2012).
Sommerville, Quentin. “Camp Bastion assault: Details emerge of Taliban attack.” BBC News. 24 September 2012
(accessed 24 September 2012).
____. “Taliban Leader Behind Camp Bastion Attack Arrested.” RTT News. 18 September 2012 (accessed 18
September 2012).
____. “Taliban strike hits 8 US jets.” FirstPost, 17 September 2012 (accessed 21 September 2012).
Todd, Brian. “Camp Bastion attack details.” CNN. 17 September 2012 (accessed 24 September 2012).
Urquhart, Conal. “At least two US marines killed in attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan.” The Guardian. 14
September 2012 (accessed 17 September 2012).

Related Products

Follow these links to view related products:

 Information Environment Assessment

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 Insider Attack Handbook Update

See also the Red Diamond Newsletter, which contains current articles on a variety
of topics useful to both soldiers and civilians ranging from enemy TTP to the latest
news on cyberspace developments.
For detailed information on weapons and equipment, see the Worldwide
Equipment Guide.

AKO: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp

POCs

OEA Team
913-684-7920 (COMM)

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552-7920 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

700 Scott Ave, Bldg 53
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

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