PERSPECTIVES
Social Science and Democracy
An Elective Affinity
Dipankar Gupta
Social sciences need democracy,
not wealth, to prosper. It is only
in those societies that centralise
citizenship have disciplines such
as economics, sociology, political
science, as well as the humanities,
made significant advances. This
is because democracies alone
robustly satisfy the foundational
principles of social sciences,
namely, allowing for human
errors and the recognition of
others in making choices
for oneself.
I am grateful to Andre Beteille and to Deepak
Mehta for their comments on this paper.
Dipankar Gupta (dipankargupta@hotmail.
com) teaches at the Shiv Nadar University,
Greater Noida.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 23, 2016
E
ver wonder why social sciences,
including philosophy, flourish
today only in democratic socie-
ties? There are many rich countries in the
world; Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia,
for example, but their social sciences are
in a miserable condition. Interestingly,
there has been a resurgence of social
sciences with the return of democracy in
many Latin American nations, such as
Mexico, Chile, and even Colombia. Now
that Cuba is opening up somewhat, let
us see, if in the years to come, it becomes
a significant contributor to this sphere
of knowledge.
What makes this issue even more inte-
resting is that many of these rich and
powerful, but non-democratic states, have
indeed made great strides in the exact
sciences. China and Russia can match
the advances in electronics, physics,
medicine, transportation, and in a whole
lot of other associated areas, with the
best worldwide. Bring in sociology, poli-
tical science, economics, even history,
and these countries falter and fail to
make the grade. This is not an overt
defence of these disciplines; maybe
some societies are happier without them
and do not even notice their absence.
Nevertheless, it is hard to evade the
conclusion that it is only in demo-
cracies that social sciences are pursued
actively. The question then is: Why is
there such an “elective affinity” bet-
ween the two?
Neither Western Nor Eurocentric
Alongside, we must also consider the
charge that social sciences are Western-
oriented and, therefore, their categories
make little sense in Asian and African
societies. The concepts they employ, the
questions they raise, are of little meaning
to places like India, for instance. If this
were true, then to argue, as we just did,
vol lI no 4
that democracies alone have developed
social sciences could be masking a more
superficial prejudice. Democracy now
becomes just a cover for modern social
sciences to appear culture–neutral. In
actual fact, however, they are only addre-
ssing purely European or American cul-
tural and historical concerns. It is this
line of thinking that has prompted
many non-Western critics of social scien-
ces to delve into, and promote instead,
indigenous categories. In their view, a
corrective of this sort would not only be
more authentic but would also expose
the universalistic pretensions of the
social sciences.
Before we give in to this conclu-
sion, we must remember that the social
sciences are a recent development even
in Europe and America. The themes,
theories and terminologies they work
with are very removed from their
earlier indigenous, or traditional, forms
of thought. When these knowledge
systems first came about, they were
novel in those parts of the world as
well. They drew none of their analy-
tical powers from the intellectual con-
ditions of medieval, or even, late
medieval, Europe.
Take, for example, the concept of sec-
ularism. Secularism is not a term that
can be found, in its current form, in tra-
ditional Europe. The secularism of
today came to life well after absolutism
was dead and buried in that conti-
nent. This term does not simply mean
the separation of church from state, as
is popularly understood, but actually
stands for a system where an individual
is free to decide what is true. Even after
the church was spectacularly under-
mined by Henry VIII of England, secular-
ism did not come to Britain. The Pope
had been humiliated by the state, surely
that should have been the beginning of
secularism?
But, no!
Secularism had to wait for a few
more centuries before it could really
make its entry on the world stage. If at
one time, knowledge came from
the church and nobody dared chal-
lenge that source, now it was the state
31
PERSPECTIVES
that took over and did just about the
same. Those who asked questions, just
questions, nowhere near offering alter-
native points of view, were severely
persecuted and prosecuted by abso-
lutist rulers. The famous astronomer,
Tycho Brahe, advised fellow scientists
to keep their instruments light as
they may have to flee at a moment’s
notice (Koestler 1990: 290–97). There
was no telling when their patron, the
monarch, would be upset by them.
Interestingly, some of the medieval
astronomers actually masqueraded as
astrologers to win the favours of the
rulers under whom they served.
Therefore, when some Indian scholars
argue that secularism is a Western term
what they forget is that it appeared very
late even in Europe. It truly came into its
own when beliefs, knowledge, informa-
tion and viewpoints were freed from a
superior agency’s reach and did not need
its sanction. It was not enough for truth
to shift headquarters from the priest’s pul-
pit to the prince’s chamber. The transi-
tion from: “this is true because the church
or the king says so” to “this is true for me
because I believe it to be true” took a
long time to surface. It is only after this
became, more or less, standard practice,
that we might begin to accept the arrival
of secularism and, with that, of moder-
nity too.
As long as knowledge was a lump of
beliefs that was handed down from
above, whether church or state, secular-
ism was out of the question. It had to
wait in the wings till the conditions were
right for the individual to ask the all
important question: “Before I believe
what you say, prove it to me” (Mann-
heim 1936: 31). While all sciences
need secularism to thrive, the need is
the greatest in the social sciences be-
cause here we are studying people in
action. Their lives do not remain static
primarily because the contexts they live
in differ vastly across the globe and in
history. Regardless of time and place,
water always quenches thirst, rainbow
always arcs the sky and burning
fire always brings both smoke and light.
None of these require democracy to ap-
pear, nor have they changed in any way
after its arrival.
32
‘Other’ and ‘Error’ Seeking
In the social sciences the situation is vastly
different. Before democracy, the context
for the pursuit of social sciences just did
not exist. Nor were certain kinds of data,
that are the staple items in modern soci-
ology, political science, economics, and
so on, even available, or considered to be
valid. Social sciences were born when a
new context came to the surface and
when a new set of facts became relevant
for the first time. It is this twin thrust
that together propelled the growth and
advance of the social sciences.
In terms of context, it is now relevant,
no, essential, to frame observations with
the understanding that what others
do impacts on the self, even defines
it. This aspect, which is so central today,
did not actually exist with the same kind
of valency and weight in the past. In ear-
lier times you had communities, groups,
solidarities, tribes, castes, affines and
blood relatives, living, for the most part,
within their confines, but we had no
society. For that to emerge, it was neces-
sary that wide-ranging interactions hap-
pen across these primordial frontiers, on
a regular and institutionalised basis. As
this took a long time coming, it stands to
reason that social sciences, that expressly
studies such societies, too arrived only
recently in human history.
When there is society people need to
connect outside their immediate sphere
of influence where familiarity reigns on
the basis of rules that are inward-looking.
As Burckhardt, the 19th century Swiss
scholar of the Renaissance noted, the
adage: “Parma rejoices because Cassius
sleeps within its walls” (Burckhardt
1990: 107) rang true in medieval Europe
as well. With the coming of society, it is
no longer possible to remain tightly
bound within pre-existing groups and
categories. From now on, the awareness
of the “other” becomes pivotal to the
constitution of even one’s self.
In a democracy, the salience of this
context becomes all the more significant
in everyday, routine behaviour. No policy
or economic initiative can now take
place without considering a multiplicity
of interests, even those originating from
less privileged quarters. This is why it
makes eminent sense to characterise
JANUARY 23, 2016
Britain’s 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act
as a major step in the establishment of
democracy. From now on labour was no
longer confined to parish-run poor houses,
but could move freely in search of jobs.
In days when there was no “society,”
the past and the present mingled un-
problematically, only to be disturbed in
times of war. This explains why histo-
rians often argue that though India saw
many invasions, the basic structure of
society remained the same. Let us not
forget, not just wars, there were revolts
too; but even these revolts did not make a
substantial difference to routine lives,
and the past soon re-established itself. If
there was any awareness of the “other” it
was one of hostility and distance—not
one where it was necessary to make
common ground and realise freshly
negotiated relations. If truth be told, this
practice does not come easy and must be
ingrained by a democracy that is ever
vigilant and constantly on guard, lest
we fail.
So much for context, let us now turn
to how democracy brought to surface a
new, grand fact. From now on we must
accept human beings as rational goal
seeking actors, who are liable to
make “errors” (Parsons 1959: 46). This
became possible only when democracy
set in place universal laws which com-
pelled everybody to accept the general
rules of interaction, leaving actual choices
open. Therefore, an error which does
not violate the universal law, is accept-
able, even encouraged, for that is what
allows for innovation and enterprise in
all fields.
Innovations outside the context of
universal rules are more like adventu-
rism and cannot be properly integrated
within modern societies. Those who are
intrepid enough to break the norms and
bonds that conventions impose are the
only people capable of such daring per-
formances. It is only when adventurism
is normalised does innovation come into
being and for this to happen it is essen-
tial to have universal rules in place. It
is only after this universality sets the
outer limits of what cannot be done that
a new world opens up. Now we are faced
with a number of choices but we are
liable to make a number of errors too. This
vol lI no 4 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

is a welcome price to pay; it is only when
one is unafraid of making errors, do in-
novative things happen.
The best example of this is in sport. It
is hardly a coincidence that sports came
into our world only with democracy. In
tradition, people played games, frol-
icked, had fun, but did not engage in
sports. The transition from games to
sports came with the establishment of
universal rules. These were known to
everybody in advance, including the
spectators, and applied equally, to all
players, regardless of birth and social
station. This, in a microcosm, is what
democracy does across social fields on a
much wider scale. The referee blows the
whistle not when a player commits an
error and, say, fails to kick the ball into
an open net, but when the striker fouls
and trips the goalkeeper.
What does this imply? The answer is
clear but not always appreciated. As
individual errors are not penalised as
deviant behaviour, there is always scope
both for improvement and for innova-
tion. As long as the universal law is not
violated, all errors that respect its
boundaries are actually welcome. Who
knows how many errors Michael Jor-
dan made before he perfected his art of
leaping in stages? Or, take Mohammed
Ali: his famous “rope-a dope” tactic came
out of his admission of the errors he
committed against younger and stronger
boxers in the past.
It can well be the case that actors
make an error, in their own estimate, in
the selection of ends too. It is only when
errors find structural acceptance that
they can often evolve to bigger things
that the world had hitherto no inkling
of. This, in turn, forces us to accept that
there are many ways towards attaining
certain ends, provided they are allowed
for by the universal rules in place. Think
of sports again and any confusion on
this question should disappear.
With democracy, therefore, it is not as
if there is just one ordained way to doing
things and that everybody must take just
that one route. Obviously, some of the
ends and routes chosen to attain them
will be in error, and that is the name of
the game. Now there are different ways
of raising children, leading a married
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 23, 2016
life, choosing jobs and professions, mak-
ing friends, and the list goes on. In the
past, these choices did not exist; in fact,
one did not even have friends—only
relations. Notice closely the intimate
connection between allowing for errors,
even error seeking, and the awareness
of others as aspects of the self.
Errors do not affect the pure sciences
the way they do the social sciences. In a
laboratory, an error can be sequestered
and even hushed up, but this pheno-
menon would fall in the realm of the “so-
ciology of science.” The facts as seen in a
test tube or petri-dish, or particle accel-
erator, or whatever, are not in error; it is
another matter that an analyst might
make mistakes in reading them. In the
social sciences, however, errors consti-
tute the empirical material itself, and
that makes all the difference. It is, there-
fore, in this thicket of trial and error
that human beings commit that social
scientists find their facts. Making a mis-
take may be unfortunate from a perso-
nal point of view, but from a disciplinary
perspective of the social sciences mis-
takes are absolutely fundamental raw
material. It is because these “errors” and
their fallouts happen often enough that
social scientists get both their database
and their concepts.
Democracy then is the necessary con-
dition for the emergence of social sciences,
for it is only now that acceptance of
errors within universal rules becomes
unexceptional. Even when some find it
difficult to break with traditional preju-
dices, they are constrained in public life
to keep their primordial instincts on
hold. This begins, first and foremost, from
the admission that if we can make errors
ourselves and choose another route, then
such opportunities should be available
to others as well. Differences do not
just lie with other people; they often lie
within us too. This immediately reveals
the distance the present has moved
from the past; we can now, for the first
time, understand the gravitas behind the
term “tradition.”
Economics
Imagine yourself as an economist in a
pre-democratic society. You would hardly
know what to study and what concepts
vol lI no 4
PERSPECTIVES
to use. For all practical purposes, the mar-
ket was known and buyers and sellers of
commodities and services were pre-
fixed and tagged from the start. Medi-
eval karkhanas produced for a defined
category of buyers and for this, skills
were certainly needed, but not enterprise.
It is only after we acknowledge that
others contribute to the economy that
we can even conceive of something like
the gross domestic product (GDP). In
fact, it took a while for this fact to toil its
way to prominence. Though it was being
talked about from the early decades of
the last century, it was only after World
War II that economists agreed on how to
standardise and measure it. GDP is not
out there in the real world, it is an ab-
stract idea whose worth became noticea-
ble only with the awareness of “others”
in the economy (Coyle 2014: 47).
Nor was there really an option earlier
to make an “economic” error within the
system. It is for this reason the pheno-
menon of risk taking did not arise
either, because buying and selling was
either an outcome of custom or of pat-
ronage. There was no “hidden hand”, no
market disequilibrium, no errors of judg-
ment that led to economic swings and
bankruptcy. If people managed to fall on
bad times from a position of wealth and
privilege there were just about two routes
open: finance a losing war or get bested
in a game of dice. Conversely, win a war
and win a fortune and win yourself a
position at the top of the hierarchical
pecking order.
As an economist again, where is the
room to look at matters like “entrepre-
neurial skill” for that implies taking cal-
culated risks? In the past, neither was
land easily alienable, nor labour free to
move around (recall the 1834 Poor Law
Amendment Act), and status was defi-
ned from the start. If we take them
together, it is easy to realise why econo-
mics as a scholarly discipline, with its
challenges and puzzles, had no place
in pre-democratic times.
The term “hidden hand” is now used
freely, but Adam Smith employed it only
thrice. Though he had coined the term
he did not run riot with it for the time
was not yet right for its robust applica-
tion. By the early decades of the 20th
33
PERSPECTIVES
century, however, this phrase was hard
to miss. It was used all the time because
it sat well with an entrenched democracy
and, its cognate, a risk taking eco-
nomy. Not just that; when we think of
the “hidden hand” today we find that
these words have gained a symbolic
aura that spills well outside the discipli-
nary margins of economics.
As errors take place in a context where
multiple interests interact, as they should
in any true “society,” a democracy must
eventually conduct its economy with this
sensitivity. Therefore, while the market
tells us how the hidden hand operates,
occasionally the exposed hand of the
state is necessary to keep social equilib-
rium in place. If the economy rights
itself again, it is simply because the basic
principles that govern economic trans-
actions still remain firm. If the govern-
ment were to break this code and give in
to the interests of one class or the other,
then it will take that much longer for a
hurt economy to heal. In essence, this is
also what Goran Therborn argues, but
from a Marxist perspective (1978: 242–
43). This again reveals, in bold, the sali-
ence of the two all important features of
democracy, viz, awareness of others, the
cross cutting of interests, and the admis-
sibility of errors.
Even while calculating the marginal
utility of any factor of production, there
is scope for errors because every constit-
uent of the phenomena in question is
not homogeneous. Change the composi-
tion of the factors and new numbers come
up, but who makes that all important
decision on the mix of land, labour, capital
and enterprise? The error-prone business
person! That sometimes this individual
succeeds is because the system allows
for errors in its governing principle.
Economics, as a discipline, would not
have a leg to stand on if it were not for
the basic principle that people make
mistakes in judging how others will be-
have. Flip the coin and we can also find
several instances when entrepreneurs
made the right call and won. Sometimes
there will be miscalculations, sometimes,
spot-on decisions, but at every turn there
is a risk of making an error at the indi-
vidual level. This feature is present at
even the highest echelon of the economic
34
establishment in a democracy. Is this the over whelming sense of the “other” mani-
right time for quantitative easing? Should fests itself. Power can be exercised with-
the exchange rate be pegged at a certain out a true society coming into being;
level? Should that be against all major alien rulers and invaders can issue dik-
currencies, or just a few? Course correc- tats that force people to do their bidding.
tions occur on all such decisions and some- There have been countless studies to
times things may go completely wrong. suggest that in medieval and premodern
In a totalitarian economy, unlike a times, the source of power was a distant
democratic one, the scope for such in- monarch whose rule was exercised by
stances is severely restricted because local satraps. For this arrangement to be
most things are administered. That be- realised it was not required for rulers to
ing the case, decisions are taken from be aware of other people, just keeping
above and we have a replay of the domi- track of hostile potentates was enough.
nance of “objective knowledge.” Once Once we make the transition from
again, this leaves the individual with studying power, or even influence, to
little chance of contemplating an eco- examining the roots of authority, we are
nomic option with the assertion: “prove face to face with society where other
it to me.” When was the last time you people count (Weber 1946). For power to
have ever heard of a good economist become authority, it is necessary that it
coming out of dictatorial and non- be acknowledged as legitimate even by
democratic society? There are a few you those who may not have voted for the
could name, but all of them tried hard to party, or parties, that head the current
figure out if there was any scope of rec- government. Democracy not only acc-
onciling a free market within a totalitar- epts the multiplicity of interests in socie-
ian economy. ty, it also considers this fact to constitute
its necessary condition. Yet, on all occa-
Political Science sions, conflicting views and ends must
The situation with Political Science is all be expressed within the framework of
too obvious. Democracy demands that free and fair elections. This is impor-
there be universal franchise where tant, for no matter which party wields
everybody votes. That this took some authority, it does so, not in the name of
time to evolve does not take away from God, or King, but People. In order to suc-
the fact that authority comes only with ceed, any authority seeker must balance
popular mandate, freely exercised. the conflicting interests of the agricul-
Political Science, as we understand it, turists, industrial labourers, the white
would lose its entire raison d’être if collar class, and so on.
the first categorical distinction between The list is actually very long, for al-
power and authority were not to be most all of these fractions have sub-
made. Look closely, for it is here that the fractions, which, in their totality, compel
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JANUARY 23, 2016 vol lI no 4 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

those in politics to pay attention to “oth-
ers.” Botch that up, make mistakes with
these numbers, then you are done for
now and can, at best, live to fight another
day. This brings us directly to the issue
of error admissibility in democracies.
This feature is writ large in the very na-
ture of popular elections. Regardless of
how charismatic a leader may have ap-
peared in the past rounds at the polls,
the future of such people is never certain.
In a democracy those in authority can
never take their elevation for granted.
As voters can change their minds, and
are even encouraged to do so (error cor-
rection), you can be on the saddle one
day, and unseated the next. Once again,
for political science, it is imperative
that errors be admissible within the sys-
tem so that people can make and un-
make mistakes, but within a bounded set
of rules. Without democracy, no choices,
no elections, no recanting and no anti-in-
cumbency factor, either. In fact, if one is
not allowed to make mistakes and then
correct them subsequently, elections
would be a total farce—something of
the kind that happens in North Korea, or
in monarchies and theocratic societies.
Let us take a further step. Why is it
that only in democracies the study of
the constitution is so absorbing and that
there are so many experts who devote
their life’s work to this subject? The
answer, very simply, is because these
documents are, at the very least, open
to amendments. This is a clear admis-
sion that even hallowed founding fig-
ures can make mistakes, and big ones at
that. They too can commit errors,
hence the amendments. These changes
too are not final and can be subjected to
further rethinking. If the constitution
were written in stone, like the tablet of
Moses, then there would be only wor-
ship and no political science. This is
why constitutions make it a point to
leave enough room, and procedural
directions, for amendments. Obviously,
the authors of these texts realise that
they too are prone to committing err-
ors, and these might well be spotted by
later generations.
While all democratic constitutions al-
low for amendments, in no case will they
tolerate a dilution of their foundational
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 23, 2016
principles. Democracies often present
these binding constraints under differ-
ent rubrics. If in the United States (US)
they are called “inalienable rights,” in
India they are clubbed as “basic struc-
ture of the constitution.” But, no matter
what the term, it is almost certain that
such restrictions will always be there. It
is, therefore, within these constraints
that amendments are allowed, but in
every case, after considerable discus-
sions at a number of levels. As the consti-
tution lays down the basis of universal
laws, care must be taken that any
amendment to it does not affect the
sanctity of its being.
Sociology
Let us now turn to sociology. This disci-
pline’s primary objective is to refract
phenomena through classes, categories,
genders, occupational groups, and so
on. If we are discussing marriage, then
we must look at it in terms of its actual
practice by refracting it through cate-
gories, such as those mentioned above.
Depending upon the theoretical point
that is being pursued, different layers
will become important: sometimes caste,
at other times class, or even religion,
occupation, and so on. This demands an
awareness of “others” in the first place,
or else such an exercise in refrac-
tion could never be conducted.
It is on account of refraction, of the
kind just mentioned, that sociology is
able to resist popular conceptions of
reality, more specifically, the aura of
essentialism (Berger and Luckmann
1967). If sociology were not to conduct
such exercises, fixity in form and presen-
tation would have characterised all
social phenomena, rendering them un-
workable as scientific variables. Further,
essentialisms allow biases of all sorts to
thrive unchecked, which is why the first
enemy of sociology is everyday, lay theo-
rising. Consequently, sociology is a sci-
ence that self-consciously digs deep
into the comparative method (Beteille
2002: 102). In doing so, it is not just vari-
ations in space, but those over time, too,
that become relevant for examina-
tion. This forces the scholar to be dispas-
sionate and critical, especially towards
what is closest to one’s heart.
vol lI no 4
PERSPECTIVES
Take away this method from socio-
logy and we will immediately be gro-
unded by such stark relativism that it
would be impossible to converse across
contexts. It is through comparative studies
we get to the understanding of the gen-
eral features of a social phenomenon,
whether religion, marriage or social pref-
erence. Alongside a new standard has
also come in place and that is the aware-
ness of how context makes for the differ-
ence in the manifestation of social facts.
This is why it is not difficult either to
demonstrate sociology’s link with demo-
cracy. As can be easily surmised, it is in
the awareness of “others”, the context,
that this discipline most ostensibly de-
fines itself. In this case, it is not the realm
of authority, or wealth creation, that is up-
permost, but how people interact within
and across cultural borders and eco-
nomic boundaries. It is this attribute of
deliberate refraction that allowed socio-
logy to be a pacesetter in a number of
areas, most notably, the study of social
mobility. Briefly put, sociology is a subject
where relations between people matter
because the whole is, very explicitly,
greater than the sum total of its parts.
However, if we are not living in a
democracy, where is the freedom to
refract and ask those questions most rel-
evant to the discipline? In a monarchi-
cal, dictatorial or theocratic dispensa-
tion, those in power would wonder why
such an exercise was being carried
out in the first place. Without the free-
dom that democracy allows, any enquiry
along these lines runs the risk of being
labelled as subversive. A democracy, on
the other hand, finds nourishment from
such investigations. This is because all
aspirants to authority must compete
against one another in trying to gauge
how best to represent multiple interest
groups. A misreading can happen here.
Sociology might create the impression
that it is activist in orientation, or that
it is prompted by policymakers and their
immediate interests. Nothing could be
more incorrect. At the same time, it is
also true that those in democratic politi-
cal circles can profit from sociology.
They can learn about the tensions inher-
ent in a social setting and also apply the
results of refraction that sociologists
35
PERSPECTIVES

are so adept at performing. If policy-
makers want a complete picture of the
nature of the problem they are dealing
with, they can turn to sociology. If, on
the other hand, sociologists are tempted
to work at the behest of activists, they
would taint the refracted data to suit
non-­academic interests.
Whether or not activists are attr­a­
cted to sociology, this discipline is
best equipped to handle the all-impor-
tant question regarding the direction of
change. This issue always succeeds
in generating red-hot contestations on
all sides and that, more often than not,
obscures the view. It is here that socio­
logy can help in plotting out the options
available such that we move steadily
­towards being a more inclusive society.
In operational terms, this translates into
greater participation, and greater toler-
ance of differences and errors.  sent. We do not look at the past for upon Hegel to first raise the issue of civil
At the very heart of sociology, it may
be recalled, nests the proposition that
people make errors, but also try to cor-
rect them, in seeking goals through
means not predetermined, as best seen
in a democracy. This is especially signifi-
cant when we examine the phenomenon
of social change which, paradoxical as it to the democratic context. It is this
may sound, is a perpetual condition of that makes it possible for us to accept
modern times. Consequently, choosing flaws of the past and how earlier epochs
between, or adjusting to, or even resist- have influenced social relations in the
ing alternatives is now a quotidian, com- present. Without this, history would be
monplace sociological reality. This is why a colourless chronicle, or a colourful
sociology is replete with exami­nations of hagio­­graphy—in both cases academi-
trial, error and correction when studying cally ­useless.
social change which, as we have just Philosophy, likewise, went through a
mentioned, is a pre-eminent aspect of tremendous transition with the coming
modern life, especially in a democracy. of democracy. Even till the late 19th cen-
tury, the major problem that concerned
History and Philosophy thinkers like Immanuel Kant was to fig-
The point, by now, has been made and ure out what makes the “self” a “self.”
there is little advantage in labouring this How does the self perceive, acquire con-
issue by bringing in history and philo­ sciousness, appreciate art, think abst­
sophy. In essence, the same argument ract, think aesthetic, and so on. However,
holds, with some nuances, of course, from the time of Hegel there was a spir-
that take into account the particularities ited emphasis on the relationship bet­
of these disciplines. History, properly ween “self” and “other.” As society and
speaking, is an obsession with the pre- democracy began to matter, it fell
past’s sake, but from the vantage point society as a complement of ethics (Hegel
of our finite lifetimes. In this process  1945). By doing this Hegel showed us
we realise that all heroes have feet of how ethics was a contemporary pheno­
clay, and no era, or age, however trium- menon and vastly different from what
phant, is actually golden. The critical we take morality to be. 
mind inflicts itself on our scrutiny of Ethics is primarily about giving digni-
­bygone periods and forces us to bend ty to those we interact with even when

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36 JANUARY 23, 2016  vol lI no 4  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly

we have not been properly introduced.
Regardless of a person’s origin or cir-
cumstance, the “other” is always an as-
pect of the self. Nor can a man any lon-
ger look at his wife and children as prop-
erty; he must now consider them as free
citizens. After Hegel, the self was no
longer alone because the “other” became
its constant complement. This then set
the framework for debates about what
was “correct” practice as far as citizen-
ship was concerned. This concern domi-
nates contemporary philosophy even
today. Habermas, for example, believes
that the only real context for today’s life-
world is the public space (1987). Or,
think of Levinas (1998) for whom ethics
was always about the “other people.”
The “self” which, in isolation, ruled
Western philosophy from Descartes to
Kant, now has had to make room for the
“other.” This transformation should not
be read as accommodative, but rather as
constitutive, because philosophy today
clearly admits that there really is no self
without the other.
Not Eurocentric
but Citizen-centric
It is time now to tie in the various
strands. If we accept that a democracy
signifies a concern for “others” and all-
ows for errors being committed, then we
are really talking of “citizenship.” Citi-
zenship is really ethics writ large and it
is this aspect that forms the cornerstone
of the basic statutes of democratic law and
governance. Our constitution and our
penal codes are premised on the accept-
ance of “others” as being ethical agents,
ontologically similar to ourselves and
complements of our being.
By the same token, if a citizen com-
mits an error that does not impinge on
the citizenship freedoms of others, then
there is room for self-correction. Law
swings in only when freedom of “others” is
trampled upon by the wilful activity of
those who seek goals with means that
are contrary to the tenets of citizenship.
Social scientists, however, go further.
They try to strengthen citizenship for
they realise that in doing this they
would also consolidate their respective
disciplines. This is why one reads with
appreciation Jurgen Habermas because
Economic & Political Weekly EPW JANUARY 23, 2016
we find in his writings ways of advan-
cing the cause of the public via a congre-
gation of citizens. Or, when John Rawls
advises policymakers to hypothetically
go behind a “veil of ignorance” and try
to imagine how the worst off could be
best served (1971: 1055–56; 142–45).
Can we say, in fairness, that these are
concerns that are “Western”? It is true
that scholars in Europe and America may
have first raised such issues; perhaps,
they also worked on them with great
vigour. Yet, when we read their contri-
butions why is it that they make sense
to us? India may be backward, may be
poor, but because we are democratic we
can see the first glimmers of citizenship
and, without consciously willing it, we
want to acquire it in full.
We satisfy this urge by enquiring into
issues such as that of urban and rural
existence, of life in factories and fields,
and how diverse linguistic groups and
castes interact. These investigations are
based on an indefinite range of actions
that are “error”-prone because they strive
to integrate the self with the “other.” An
ambitious exercise of this sort would be
impossible if fallibility, at every step,
were not allowed for. It would then be
fair to suggest that our social sciences
are not West-oriented, or Eurocentric,
but are designed to enquire into social
conditions that only democracy can
create. By the same token, it is demo-
cracy that allows economics, political
science and sociology to coexist happi-
ly and with profit. All of them depend on
the same context, namely, society; and
all of them must accept the grand fact of
errors across all relevant social actions.
It is not surprising then that we, in
India, have several world class socio-
logists, economists, historians and poli-
tical scientists in our ranks. This is be-
cause we function under conditions, and
with concerns, similar to our counter-
parts in the west; why, we ask very simi-
lar questions too. Now, what is wrong
about that? And why should that be
Eurocentric at all? When the “other”
becomes so central, and when the
acceptance of “errors” is routine, then
we are actually talking about citizen-
ship. In other words, the strength and
depth of a democracy can be judged
vol lI no 4
PERSPECTIVES
from the strength and depth of its social
sciences. Take away democracy and
watch sociology, economics and political
science get wasted as if on barren soil.
Without going into detail on this sub-
ject, it is indubitable that democracy and
citizenship are of a piece and you cannot
have one without the other. Perhaps,
autocratic societies can boast of a higher
standard of living for those over whom
they rule. Let us also grant that on some
fronts such societies are richer, stronger
and the health status of their population
is enviable. However, if we are thinking
of freedom of choice, the openness to-
wards “errors” and the ground level rea-
lisation that others impact the self, then
these conditions are available only to
citizens in a democracy. Consequently,
it would be incorrect to characterise
the social sciences as either Western or
Eurocentric. If anything, they should be
seen as citizen-centric, perhaps even
“citizentric,” disciplines.
[This article was earlier published on the inter-
net in the Global Dialogue, the internet journal
of the International Sociological Association.]
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37