VICENTE SOTTO  
          January 21, 1949 respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for
In re  VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in
connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court,
which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the
locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily,
who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the
source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the
majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it
is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said
loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very
of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary.
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five
originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the
expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court
could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, because
he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in
order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the
publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument
on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the
decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted
threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this
Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress
with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in
the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent
made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of
offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in
his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or
intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth
by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of
court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers
of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64
are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the
inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among
them In re Kelly,  35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by
the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction
since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American
Jurisprudence is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court
may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is
possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the
Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several
states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction,
whether they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general
jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. In many
instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is
expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is
unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and
in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns
 the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to
act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American
Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending
to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly
in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of
the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to
influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is
punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The
summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to
the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a
part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous,
it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the
respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is
wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is
different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had
intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way
influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of
judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses
of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded
by the interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed
by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and
not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying
said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing
the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so
as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence
the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of
this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted
statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I
announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization
of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a
constant peril to liberty and democracy.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with
the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the
honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him
from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during
the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11,
alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for
contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the
instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be
protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is
the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very
appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The
administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct,
are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be
scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a
clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered
by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise
its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed
with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-
defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of
contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby
sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this
judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show
cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-
law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following
statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for
contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of
December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but
it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December 10,
1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is
degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the
Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily
Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American
Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen;"
reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court can not close
his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave
for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila
Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the
effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on
January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all
said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge
against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision
of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth
and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition
of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 82238-42 November 13, 1989
ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and GEORGE D. CARLOS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, respondent.
Antonio T. Guerrero for Himself and his co-petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Consequent to the dismissal on February 18,1987 of Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989, N-
0990, N-0991, N-0992, and N-0993 for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval by
respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of
Naval, Sub-province of Biliran, Leyte, the offended party, herein petitioner George D.
Carlos, thru his lawyer and herein co-petitioner Antonio T. Guerrero filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XXI of Cebu City an action for damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-6478, against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases.
The complaint and summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 were served on respondent
judge on December 10, 1987. On the following day, he issued in Criminal Cases Nos.
N-0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against herein petitioners, finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to
imprisonment of five (5) days and a fine of P500.00 for degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before
the court.
The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the
allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading:
12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and
0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection—
without any moral or legal basis—a case of knowingly rendering unjust
judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused
Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability
because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with
his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which
demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias...;
xxx xxx xxx
14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of
defendant Honorable Judge—not only shocking, but appalling—giving the
plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful,
distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on
this kind of reprehensible behavior ...
15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge
should also visit upon him ... for, reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his
disdain and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned
but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. 1
To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge,
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or
restraining order. On March 22, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining and restraining respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor from enforcing his
order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 in Criminal Cases Nos.
N-0989 to N0993. 2
Petitioner submits two issues for resolution in this petition: first, whether or not
respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner in Criminal
Cases Nos. N-09890993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Biliran,
Leyte by reason of the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint in Civil Case
No. CEB-6478 for damages against respondent filed in Cebu; and secondly, whether
or not the language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. 6478 against
respondent judge in another court before another judge is contemptuous and whether
the same is absolutely privileged being made in a judicial proceeding.3
Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against
respondent judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because
whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in
session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise
of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were merely words
descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the
wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged
communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are
relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous.
In his Comment dated April 14, 1988, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners
harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore
the language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the
dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the
dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as said court
was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. This, according to
respondent judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes
vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the foundation of judicial
authority and even of democratic stability, so that the absence of such proceedings
should not be made a shield to sully the court's prestige.
Determinative of the first issue is the distinction we made in the case of Delima vs.
Gallardo: 4 Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt
proceedings before the same 5 and constructive or indirect contempt is one
committed out or not in the presence of the courts. 6 It is an act done in a distance
which tends to be little, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarass the court and
justice. 7
As the terms connote, the word direct" would relate to an act stemming immediately
from a source, cause or reason and thus, the rule under the law that it be done in the
presence of or so near a court or judge while "indirect" would signify an act done not
straight to the point and thus, legally speaking would pertain to acts done out or not in
the presence of the court.
Based on the foregoing distinctions and the facts prevailing in the case at bar, this
Court sustains petitioners' contention that the alleged derogatory language employed
in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 did not constitute direct contempt but
may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be raised
by said, petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that
the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases
from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by
another judge and involving a separate action, the civil case for damages against
respondent judge, Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the
wisdom of respondent judge's act of dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993,
such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the process of
performing judicial functions in connection with the subject criminal cases so as to
constitute such criticisms as direct contempt of court. As categorically stated Ang vs.
Castro: 8 "(T)he use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect,  not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' alleged disrespectful language falling, if at all, under the classification of
indirect contempt, petitioners may be adjudged guilty thereof and punished therefor
only after charge and hearing as provided under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, thus:
Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.
—  After charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the
accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
Not only was the Order of District Contempt dated December 11, 1987 issued without
charge and hearing, it was likewise irregularly issued as an incident in Criminal Cases
Nos. N-0989 to N-0993, which had long been terminated. Said Order must therefore
be, as it is hereby set aside for being null and void.
The second issue raised by petitioners has been resolved in Lubiano vs.
Gordolla, 9 in this wise:
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of
absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used
as basis for any action, however false and malicious the statements may be.
We find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the
statements in question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be
inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of
the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves
beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the
statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature
who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech
or debate delivered ill the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature
for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally subject to this Court's
supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty
as a member of the legal profession.
While technically, to rule on whether or not the statements under consideration are
contemptuous would be premature in the absence of any contempt proceedings
against petitioners, we deem it wise to do so to avoid circuity of action in view of our
finding that the statements complained of are not contemptuous. We agree with
petitioners that the same are merely descriptive therein plaintiff's cause of action
based on his reaction what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by
therein defendant judge. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and
degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a result of the dismissal of
the subject criminal cases to justify the award of damages being sought.
We have consistently held that the power to punish for contempt should be used
sparingly, so much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the
court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal the
power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise.10 Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will
therefore be curtailed and corrected.
Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers
and ...(to) insist on similar conduct by others." 11 This respectful attitude towards the
court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." 12 And it is "through a
scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers ... 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order of
Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 is declared NULL and VOID. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on March 22, 1988 is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 8383               December 11, 2012
AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed
on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and
subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-
finding investigation on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated
September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution
dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of
Resolution4 and the records of the case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in Civil
Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer
fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he attended.
No receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid.
Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings.
On several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This
amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing
Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno
not to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to
raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in
December 1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate.
Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount,
which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on
the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case,
but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty.
Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked when a
court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case.
Atty. Rañeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered
from court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on
December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her discovery and
showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge
of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked
his client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly
asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her
aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that
Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was
then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her
(Bueno’s) presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt
but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared
to demand a receipt for sums received from them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed
to attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner  Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,
[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9  During the hearing on October 2,
2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10  declaring Atty. Rañeses in default.
Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies
of the Complaint and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty.
Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be
reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the scheduled
day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming
that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice,
Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 200012
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000.  In the same
hearing, Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty.
Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that
if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution
after the complainant submits her memorandum.13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day,
Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the
complainant’s submission of her memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who
scheduled another hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and
her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a
telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had prior
commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an
answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner
De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence
and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file
any formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as
attachments to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended
that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of
soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and
certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have
proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without
these documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner
Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations which
could not support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses
solicited money to bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco,
the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He
observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her affidavit,
while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim
before the investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and
Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive
the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card evidencing his
receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for
failure to maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from
the practice of law.19
The Court’s Ruling
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the
practice of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and
based on our own observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should
serve their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule
18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client is
entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is
expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an
appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court
even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous
mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the
DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing
his clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s
offer of evidence and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to
negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support
her allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured. This
omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty.
Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get
a favorable decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and
persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The
Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any
impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing,
the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for
one year.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below,
he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge
and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP
during the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even
lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about
the case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the
Investigating Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports
the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco
succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily
take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno
privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had
readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held before the IBP
Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even
seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any
hearings scheduled in this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners
reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that
Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court
believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of
disbarment  because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by
his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations
to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in
fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was
the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving
the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful
means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty.
Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary
proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on
the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let
this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public –
that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend
the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and
to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of
the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
A.C. No. 10135               January 15, 2014
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable
Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-
detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and
Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty.
Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was
assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the
following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all
detainees should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she
may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the
necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza
undermined his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned
that the latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for
Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s
criminal case for rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 73,
Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola
to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint
Motion for Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion
to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for
relying on the Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for
₱2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion
to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she
allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as
the latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of
Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously
detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various
charges against anybody who does not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza
contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as
one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not
proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as
a waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were
required to submit their respective position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees,
he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer.
He however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received
money from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza
were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not
the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were
attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the
Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty.
Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the
judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but
the IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013.
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final
action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she
demanded money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he
filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and
Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show
that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he
prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate
the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s statements,
especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to
acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are
PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with
Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer.
He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the
courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating
with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other
government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more
intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his
Reply19, he made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao
english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines
the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated with the way the
PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all the more should he
exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This
admission corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she
told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for
their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark
is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in
the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2)
months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when
Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice.
While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not
disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s
length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and
feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the
Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty.
Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her
main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly
baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5161             April 14, 2004
ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra
1  the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of
complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby
violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T.
Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their
parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing
an area of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by
TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No.
(T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T-
1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with
her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully
due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against,
the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam
when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole
heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of
his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for
P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and
Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against,
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she
was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even
 presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to
transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-
law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell
Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated
by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of
the Original Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering
Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by
complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the
respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the
effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of
the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of
obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the
express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to
sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the
sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even
received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false
misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested
the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot
1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released
within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To
facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the
Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts
that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his
wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam
were not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be
faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the
while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to
dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document,
it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in
LRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of
Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses
Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a
clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the
decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-
forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife.
Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution
would be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance
was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for
reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in
bombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No.
TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages";
and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly
made by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view
of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and
partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible,
since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still
minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his
siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam,
denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not
merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of
the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by
both parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law.4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the
IBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and
conclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is
morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the
legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn
pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all
lawyers that pledge; thus:
LAWYER'S OATH
I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate
themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing
law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the
lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.6 This oath is firmly echoed
and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
…
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.
When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a
solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably
failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and
thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other
siblings.7 There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to
the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of
complainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In
fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the
Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the
name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted9 regarding the falsification of
complainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right
over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that
document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear
that the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount
to falsification of a public document.12
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and
against committing falsification, he presented13 such document to the Registry of
Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife.14 He himself,
therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the
damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.15 Notably, he also admitted in an
affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of
Lot 1603.16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are
contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer,
which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and
legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession
to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.18 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to
emulate.19 He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.20 He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits
any such unbecoming act or conduct.21
Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law
Marcelina of the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title
involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the
following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and
Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the
unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent
asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter
said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps.
Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony24 in
court, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and
circumstances of the case.25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false
testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes
candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent
when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from
Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the
title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs
and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in
evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by
him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her
statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was
never in possession of the title29 and would not, therefore, know that the same was
lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the
respondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot
1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the
Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be
released within the month.30 Respondent’s information was misleading because he
presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the
letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the
respondent.
Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable
dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may
be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
 office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer,
we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.32 While the assessment of what sanction may be
imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither
be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it
should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar.33
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34 Verily,
given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that
respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law
for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies
thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC               March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this
as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the
Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar,
the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at
hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently
behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free
and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
 RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak
their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical
standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to
condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not
the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect
everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have
crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and
violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third
parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents
themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and
academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the
legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not
a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in
open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation
of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys
that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos
to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated.
On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable
Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are
virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and
constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international
human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in
the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights
of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga
omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty.
Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their
charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.
Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
 I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE
SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN
RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT
THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING
THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN
MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only
of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying
the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya
decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On
Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July
19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled
"SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak
website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19,
2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared
in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof.
Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya
decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been
plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed
yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-
supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and
citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-
authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is
that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery,
and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite.
The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court
in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya
decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few
days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as
a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human
rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my
law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s
Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230,
Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the
Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),
where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the
article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article The Honorable
was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal Chief Justice
of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust
that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in Subject: Statement of faculty
the article. from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues
raised by this letter.
Your Honors:
With respect,
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by
(Sgd.) thirty[-]eight (38)28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its
Dr. Mark Ellis20 points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc
Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed
as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to
comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A
report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as
the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board
allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court,
through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter
dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the
actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient
reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with
their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for
almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as
from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse
in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they
only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed
plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism
and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work
have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the
integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of
another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and
stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions,
including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and
expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions
were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial
system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all
judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme
Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the
ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed
them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the
circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court,
the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the
Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of
the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing
speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and
the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is
a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not
acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding
and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The
inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates,
instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a
deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and
analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with
all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal
unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and
citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence
expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the
conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main
source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the
crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained
the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same
article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of
intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with
State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of
war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against
such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an
international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered
from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of
last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this
case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths
of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added
insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the
Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous
disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming
lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal
profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and
cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed
upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very
foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent
history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further
erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of
this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the
petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond
reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the
processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond
question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually
cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection
and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher
standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which
are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is
also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final
Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity
completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of
judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed
upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme
Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty
and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his
position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may
consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions
in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of
legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July
2010.
[A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 07 : 2011]
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the following:
(a) the Motion for Reconsideration [1] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent
University of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C.
Laforteza; and
(b) the Manifestation [2] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza
relied on the following grounds:
GROUNDS
A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS
SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.
B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1)
THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA  CASE
AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING
INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND
THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND
ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE
SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE.
C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR
HAVING ISSUED THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT. [3]
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Court's Decision
dated March 8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the respondents'
Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the Court
expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., "joined by
some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law") effectively
finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo (Justice Del Castillo).  In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded their
full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the
matters subject of the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010. [4]
Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding
the docketing of this matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly
a finding that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the mention
made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly, [5] a case
involving a contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents' "contumacious
language" or "contumacious speech and conduct" and to several authorities which
dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed.  It is true that
contumacious speech and conduct directed against the courts done by any person,
whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt under
Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. -  After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal
sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both. [6]
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial
officer, if committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to
disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. [7]  In such
disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as,
disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.
Contrary to Professors Catindig and Laforteza's theory, what established
jurisprudence tells us is that the same incident of contumacious speech and/or
behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be
punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the
Court.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez, [8] for the same act of filing in court a pleading with
intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of
contempt and liable administratively.  For this reason, two separate penalties were
imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to
observe his lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court).
The full case title [9] of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen [10]  and the sanction imposed
indubitably show that the proceeding involved therein was disciplinary.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few principles and
authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical
responsibilities of lawyers, Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative
sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and no penal sanction was
imposed upon him.  Indeed, in Almacen,  the Court explicitly stated that whether or
not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and
actuations was immaterial as the sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the
Court. [11]
Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto [12]  was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless,
the Court in that case saw fit to remind Atty. Sotto that:
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability
of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. [13]
Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the
amount of P1,000.00 payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment.  The
unmistakable reference to Atty. Sotto's failure to observe his ethical duties as a
lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding.  In fact,
part of the disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the
same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should not be disbarred for his
contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.
Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan [14] involved both contempt and
disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer's act of making public statements to the media
that were offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members relating to matters
that were sub judice.  This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court
which required respondent lawyer to "explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected
to administrative sanctions." [15]  In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found that
respondent's act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the
Bar, he was only administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.
The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates
contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for
intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil
sought to be prevented is the same - the degradation of the courts and the loss of
trust in the administration of justice.  For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to
cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts)
in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a
respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the
administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not
transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents'
contrary position in their motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. 
Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by
imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We
cannot see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being
cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis
for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.
With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated
March 8, 2011, respondents continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded
in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was
relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be
granted access to the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own
defenses in the present case.  The Decision already debunked at length the theory
that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their "well founded" concerns
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be
exonerated of the administrative charges against them.  It bears repeating here that
what respondents have been required to explain was their contumacious, intemperate
and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity
Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not,
that Justice Del Castillo and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism.
To dispel respondents' misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this
Court did not call the attention of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of
the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo.  Notably, even their co-
respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism
issue. Still, he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement  and candidly conceded that he may have failed to
assess the effect of the language of the Statement.   This straightforward and honest
explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which
respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative proceedings.  This
circumstance belied respondents' justification for seeking access to the evidence and
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been
denied their due process rights.  For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the
present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of respondent law
professors in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof
that this Court has found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of
plagiarism nor is it any prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be
exonerated or none of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this
administrative case. Again, the case of Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly
considered respondents' submissions in this case before coming to a decision.
To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that
the Court erred in taking the "emphatic language" in the Statement in isolation from
the other statements evidencing the good intentions of respondents and calling for
constructive action.  Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in
the Decision dated March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here.  the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like
Suffice it to say that respondents' avowed noble motives have been given due weight
and factored in the determination of the action taken with respect to submissions of
respondents.
In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered
no substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8,
2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion.
As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged
that "they support the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents
Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1, 2011."  The rest of the
assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in
respondents' compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated
March 8, 2011.
Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors
Catindig and Laforteza's motion for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor
pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the
Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan
A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the Manifestation dated April 1,
2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.
  SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC               February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that
dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect
against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote for the
Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.1
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of
everyone else, condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses
the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To
plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas or words of
another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary, the world’s leading
English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the
"deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own."2 The presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s own
must be deliberate or premeditated—a taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of
plagiarism errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application.
For instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism
is identified not through intent but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely
attributing to one’s self what is not one’s work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is
sufficient to conclude that plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or
appeal to lack of malice are not excused."3
But the Court’s decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The
decision makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on
the originality of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of
stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and
related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original
scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and
general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.4
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis,
for instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original research,
substantiating a specific view.5 This must be so since the writing is intended to earn
for the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor
deserves it who takes the research of others, copies their dissertations, and
proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a cheat deserves
neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent
found in dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is
sufficient to prove the commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the
meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for a student to plead
ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work of others, certain schools
have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such copied work in his
paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the
student’s work shows as a whole that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a
clerical error in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so
unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an
original piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the
government for the public good. Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts
involving people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy justice or juridical beings
which have rights and obligations in law that need to be protected. The interest of
society in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that they are fair
and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality,
form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws
involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written.
But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such
laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by
precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and
apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties or property are the same."6
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite
often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting
experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or
annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal writings upon which
lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases.
And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by
practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at
times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts
it succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they
effectively place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public domain, to be
affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers
can thus freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or incurring some
liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is
everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been
expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of
the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-
aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be sought in articulations that have
been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of lawyers have together
contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and expression which is common
property and may be utilized, developed and bettered by anyone.7
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public
domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a
charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel
thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used
without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem
appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption
applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not
writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions
from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to
discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and
views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that
have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts
nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never
in the judiciary’s more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been
regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not.
Their decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the
relevant from the irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need
to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that
the parties to the case invoke. The decisions then draw their apt conclusions
regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or authorities apply to the
particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of
the judges’ creativity. It is here—actually the substance of their decisions—that their
genius, originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the
opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the
core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed
the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials
from various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the charges against
him. He compared the divergent views these present as they developed in history. He
then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of
the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions
of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his
work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines
and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by
its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like
all lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to
this. Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they
file in court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for
technical accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of
plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court,
from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous
decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judge’s words to lend
weight to a particular point either with or without attribution. The words of scholars are
also sometimes given weight, depending on reputation. Some encyclopaedic works
are given particular authority. In England this place is given to Halsbury’s Laws of
England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to
frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsbury’s. While in
many cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the author, this
is not always the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be
adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
xxxx
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the
arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template
and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it.
While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of
established expression is generally considered foolhardy.9
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism
against Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first
impression and petitioners, joined by some faculty members of the University of the
Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism,
twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages
from three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false, applying the
meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he
lifted from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya
case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows
that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision.
Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-employed
researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the
final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for
omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other
sources she cited in her research, had high reputations in international law.1awphi1
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found
in their works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not
themselves the originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del
Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of
the decision attributions of the same passages to the earlier writings from which those
authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the remaining attributions
after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya
decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del
Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners’ allegations that Justice
Del Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in
another case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.10 Petitioners are nit-picking.
Upon close examination and as Justice Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his
comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages
in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although they at times suffered in
formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the
motion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for
reconsideration-in-intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyo’s claim
of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162230               August 13, 2014
ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO,
LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA
M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA
SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON,
RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A.
GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ
B. CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M.
GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN,
JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q.
GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q.
CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA
CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M.
SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO,
PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C.
BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT,
GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO,
CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA
G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T.
SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their capacityand as members of the "Malaya
Lolas Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT,
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and
THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and
grant their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and
jurisprudential histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy
prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is a
party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether
to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the
Office of the President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that
expressly textualize international human rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives
are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated
into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit
its decisions in Yamashita v. Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni4 which have been noted
for their prescient articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision,
the Court ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity;
that in Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime
under international humanitarian law, and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if
the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of the law
of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause; that such commitment to the laws
of war and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which provides "that the Philippines…adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted
principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain
without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general
international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly
adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the
Court has said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a
consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu,7 the Court has declared that a
treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land
through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the Incorporation Clause, the
Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations arising from the jus
cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of
the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are
proscribed under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations
of jus cogensnorms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has
long become jus cogensnorms, and that international legal obligations prevail over
national legal norms; that the Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in the instant
case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford
redress and to give justice to the victims ofthe comfort women system in the
Philippines.8
Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens, especially
where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and pertain to jus
cogensnorms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that
are the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes committed against
petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that the atrocities
committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitionersare not subject to the statute
of limitations under international law.9
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1)
that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed
against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes
under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort
women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the
claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official
apology,legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.10
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly
improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three
sources without proper attribution – an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law
Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University Press in
2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western ReserveJournal of International
Law – and make it appear that such commentaries supported its arguments for
dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong
case in favour of petitioners’ claims.11
In their Comment,12 respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from
the statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed
those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such
arguments in their Memorandumof June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through
itsApril 28, 2010 decision, specifically as follows:
1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then already
lodged withthe Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court;
hence, the matter of alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved
herein.13
2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failureof
petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of
respondents,the relief of the writ of certiorariwas not warranted.14
3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda.The validity of the Treaty
of Peace was the result of the ratification by two mutually consenting parties.
Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be
carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of the parties
at the time the treaty was concluded.15
4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international
remedies against any State that violated their human rights except where
such remedies are provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither
of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations Agreement,the relevant
agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided for the reparation of
petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by the
Government of Japan and the reparation the Government of Japan has
provided through the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to
recompense petitioners on their claims, specifically:
 a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the
next 10 years as welfare and medical services;
b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the
services would be provided through organizations delegated by
governmental bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the
Republic of Korea,and Taiwan); and
c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home
helpers), housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and
medical goods.16
Ruling
The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for certiorariwas
timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives
the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To
establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed
judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial must be stated in the petition;otherwise, the petition for certiorarimust be
dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates
determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has
emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation:17
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and
third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply
with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the
Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:18
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution
sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorariwas filed forty-one (41)
days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant.
The Court of Appeals was notin any position to determine when this period
commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time
since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event
would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are
not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper
and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy ofliberal construction.19
The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:
82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women
system," approached the Executive Department through the Department of
Justice in order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort
women" stations in the Philippines;
83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused
to file a claim against the said Japanese officials and military officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file
their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers,
but their efforts were similarly and carelessly disregarded;20
The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners
approached the Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically state
when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive
Department of the Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal of the
petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for
assistance in 1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way
beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify the Court’s
acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed
out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals:21
All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained
at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or
as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if
it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorariis
neither a natural right noran essential element of due process; a writ of certiorariis a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in
the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust apply
for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and
the Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and
the requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on
the part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act
was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners did notmake such a
showing.
3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.
The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the
main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself.22 It
is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is
dependent upon the result of the main action.23 Following the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an
auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued
independently of the principal action.24
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular
act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy,25 to be granted only if the following requisites are
attendant, namely:
(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.26
In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena
City,27 we expounded as follows:
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive
right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory
remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section
3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the
exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied
that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and
in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within
these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.28
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment
of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom
of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we
cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC               March 20, 2012
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director ALEU A.
AMANTE, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 10-9-9-SC
Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman Referring the complaint of Attys. OLIVER
O. LOZANO and EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO Against Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno [ret.].
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the separate successive letter-petitions1 of Atty. Oliver O. Lozano,
addressed to the Supreme Court en banc, for the lifting of the indefinite suspension
from the practice of law imposed by the Court in its Resolution of June 15, 2010.
In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline
Lozano-Endriano guilty of grave professional misconduct when they misquoted or
misused constitutional provisions in their pleadings2 in order to impute unjust acts to
members of this Court. Subsequently, we have reinstated Atty. Lozano-Endriano in
our August 23, 2011 Resolution, because of circumstances indicating lesser
culpability on her part.
Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the
purpose of insulting Members of this Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards
that a member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with.
Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past two
years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed
his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of
law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two
years, this Court has not been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty.
Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a
penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been
served. From Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions, we discern that his suspension had
already impressed upon him the need for care and caution in his representations as
an officer of this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s letters-
petitions with the expectation that he shall now avoid going to the extreme of
employing contortions of and misusing legal provisions and principles to justify his
positions, and instead focus his energies and talents towards a lawyer’s primary aim
of promoting the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby LIFT the indefinite suspension from
the practice of law of Atty. Oliver Lozano and REINSTATE him to the status of a
member in good standing in so far as the suspension imposed him by this Court is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6732               October 22, 2013
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR
SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN
JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is
guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having
allegedly falsified an in existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court
stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional
Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a
written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United
Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997
rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled
In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose
petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the
request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special
Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court
files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled
In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose
petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a
letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court
proceedings in the UK.4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to
the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr.
Hunt to apprise him of the situation.5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate
on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on
March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the
issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of
₱60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated
by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20,
2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy
Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman
for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the
respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and
2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the
Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against
the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member
of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-
affidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy
Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage;
that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for
the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to
present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then
admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had
advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation;
that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to
people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW;
and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia
Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement
before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to
the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the
falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit
as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious
misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one
year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge
Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition
for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the
petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for
declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received ₱60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the
falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one
Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he
presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a
contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto,
Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in
Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to
explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have
made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a
mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister,
Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident.19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of
law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming
Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case
to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require the
respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days from notice;
and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days
from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was
guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of
money.
The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He
insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification
had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the
shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had
encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing
unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit
generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical
declaration on the respondent’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision,
which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s
blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and
did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his
counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005,
had required him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket
denial as nothing more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa
that declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of
the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn
statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character.
In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the
falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified
decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by
Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all
lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of
the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a
person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should
do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their
professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand
of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring
demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or
malice, and x x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x
x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession
is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court
may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the
Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for
acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but
also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private
capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders
the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29 WHEREFORE, the Court
FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this
decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be
initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7474               September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the
respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the
latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence,
the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the
ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then
pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by
complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente
Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from
entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that
Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and
the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."2
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on
February 14, 2007,3 viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal
sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the
other Courts in this province as he would like it to appear that jurisdiction over a
Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases
against this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for
utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as
not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for
inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to
appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the
first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby
DENIED. Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty.
Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being
violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip
William Arsenault is likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant
citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for
the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents
between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint,
and required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5
In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the
February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the
right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid
exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should
be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the
law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
investigation,report and recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also
indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ,
entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap
v. Judge Madrid).8
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the
administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity
of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.9
In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the
following findings and recommendation:10
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan
S. Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the
complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4)
Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-
RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed
by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and
personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that
respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose
L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who
are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable
consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the
respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by
respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the
court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before
the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo
Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent
for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No.
2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III"
for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III,
entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order,
this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case
No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our
Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party
defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of
Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H.
Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid
(RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court
against the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing
administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-
DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on
October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA
RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT
and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao
vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005
ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d)
VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled
"Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping),
and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE
LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the
dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part
of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one
executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered
by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that
respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in
the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter
case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida,
respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to
(e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of
the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures
provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of
the court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-
foregoings [sic], a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six
(6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca.
 Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and
Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and
criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the
practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of
factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the
recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of
Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its
Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of
Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed
against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a
vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high
sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be
unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the
ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his
bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients
or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety,
because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting
tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass
them.17
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any
violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or
other disciplinary action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and
keep inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath
not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the
whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so
must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against
judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the
proper administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the
unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the
workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise
ofthe right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty.
Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his
part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not
substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s
precious time and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had
the temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed
against erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even
discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have
promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant
posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain
ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions
have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the
Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute
resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution
then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the
petition, or itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its
adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute
resolutions that the Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and
decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where
the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported
by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable
laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the
early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution
denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.
xxxx
The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu
Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute
resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court,
throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe
constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood
it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the
Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the constitutional mandate was
applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was
being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis
of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the
subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the
questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s
decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited
himself" upon his motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty.
Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend the legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
pertinently state:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or haveno materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.
It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter
does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him
directly insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse
to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or
their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously
substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges
in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the
averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification
of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order
to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca
was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s
partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid
would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence
and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative
complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4,
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a
repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based
on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule
1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend
Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective
from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court,
Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A.
ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER
OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner also
contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic
argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO
OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN
AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with
petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN
REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE;
PURPOSE. — Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary
records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against
a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND
ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one
of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted
by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in
his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a
criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the
Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22,
1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged
that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had
been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted
for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August,
all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an
extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case
despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged
arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing
in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to
it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over
all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on
this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted
by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in
his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby
directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera
and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6052               December 11, 2003
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND
MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY
VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and
Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera
"from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") Regional Governors’ elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-
President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the
past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP
Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26,
2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003.
The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws,
which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. –  At least one month before
the national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-99  dated April 16,
2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of
the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board
to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion  was anchored on two
grounds viz.  (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the
election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of
the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may
otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and;
(2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP
Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31,
2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests.  - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall,
within two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor.
Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of
the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to
the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than
the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in
its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.4
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the
afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before
the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors
to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent
De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region."
The IBP Board denied the Petition  in a Resolution  issued on May 29, 2003. The
pertinent portions of the Resolution  read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the
elections for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de
Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for
the postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and
notices had already been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board
finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made
for the election of IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny
the petition.6
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition,  on the same
date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition  before this Court,
seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition  before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its
agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist
from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao.7
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of
the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting
the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying
dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years.
The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors
following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz:  Northern Luzon, Central
Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western
Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term
of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of
June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President
(EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the
election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a
chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection
process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the
incumbent EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao,
have had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will
be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional
Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to
June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e.,  from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the
EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National
President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred
his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM)
Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP
presidency.8 The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went
on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule
and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no
lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.9
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional
governor, executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that
respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them,
respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking
the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the
plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license to
practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position
of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-
24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.10
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful
Comment  11 on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the
Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want
to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-
Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera
also assails the petitioners’ legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not
have a provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of
Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under
Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an
election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further
that following the rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan
del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region
for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis
Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees.12
Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership.13 He cites
the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-
Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference
for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof,
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered
in its membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is
terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the
latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately
preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in
Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of
the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof,
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan
del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera
submits that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership
transfer was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the
Eastern Mindanao governorship.14
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited
disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against
him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment
finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory in character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the
California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated
the complainant’s money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the
investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP
National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume
that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support
his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the
petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his
handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.15
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful Comment  of
respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.17
In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this
case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition.  The IBP Board, through its
General Counsel, filed a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position
stated in its Resolution  dated 29 May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature
considering that no nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional
Governors."20
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under
the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition  is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is
not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the
IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment  respondent De Vera contends that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier,
respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an
internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the
IBP, including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935
Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution21 through all the years have
been the sources of this Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar.
The term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys."22 Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the
integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on
Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the
Philippine Bar.23 Not long after, Republic Act No. 639724 was enacted and it confirmed
the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally,
on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam  Resolution of this Court captioned "In the
Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the Integration of
the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we
promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 7725 of the
IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-
Laws, either motu propio  or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the
IBP. Also in Section 15,26 the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections,
whether local or national. Section 4427 empowers the Court to have the final decision
on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into
the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In
Bar Matter No. 491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines"  the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry
into the 1989 elections. The results of the investigation showed that the elections
were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election committing
acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the
elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly
disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the
irregularities in the elections, in order to "impress upon the participants, in that
electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering."
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of
Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it
restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the
Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section
47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the
position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it
amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be
elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position
of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the
IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present
controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of
action against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow
petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are
election protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests.  - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall,
within two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor.
Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of
the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to
the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than
the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for
questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown
later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of
nominees for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the
former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings.  - Any question relating to the eligibility
of a candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately
decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the
Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote.
Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and
the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be
had in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election
of the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the
members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other
year.29 The election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region
chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the
position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by
region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the
House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the
Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only
one nominee for Governor for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region
receiving the highest number of votes was declared and certified elected by the
Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this
Court deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional
Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e,  each Regional Governor is
nominated and elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the
rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board.  - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation
basis of one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of
Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among
the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors.  - At least one (1) month
before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated
among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it
less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally
eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is
diminished as the rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of an Integrated
Bar which is non-political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the
standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and
contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision
on disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the
instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of
the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are
not qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern
Mindanao. He argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-
Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte
are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid
section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting
forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by
petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are
qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor
of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the
aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the
Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to
be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the
petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP
Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he
has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been
nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by
the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too,
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is
not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post,
which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a
lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. -
....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic
that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or
work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he
wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he
will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his
office. The only proscription in registering one’s preference is that a lawyer cannot be
a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the
conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership  - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is
terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the
latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately
preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made
not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the
lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership
to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary
Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary
of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur
Chapter, informing them of respondent De Vera’s transfer and advising them to make
the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial
compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that
De Vera’s transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and
September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers
were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of
the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall
be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3,
2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes
respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of
the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one
who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in
good standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is
not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by
the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter
from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the
start of a new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the
House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member’s standard of morality, he is free
to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic
requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense
which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the
alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the
constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to this
Court’s Decision  dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against
Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In
this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was
imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his
remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer.  Quoted
hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Vera’s statements written
in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme
Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to
inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to
monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the
justices- considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power
grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder
Law either unconstitutional or vague," the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer
Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the
Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that
led to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People
Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong.
Sovereignty must prevail. "43
In his Explanation  submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have
made said statements but denied to have uttered the same "to degrade the Court, to
destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute."44 He explained that he
was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act
for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals."48 The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual
issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation of the
statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public
interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or
harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law.50 Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of
respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his
license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and
he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he
who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the petitioners
have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera’s moral
fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for
his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It
must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition  to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for
the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP
Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order  issued
by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP
Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP
Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and
with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA
BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the
petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people
to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these
rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because
the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the
live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate
the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live
media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can
trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a
decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage..nêt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and,
after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision
prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former
president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members,1 the Court denies the motion
for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8)
Justices,2 has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall
have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The
master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously
installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent
with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not
be held public pursuant to Rule 119, §21 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings
shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings
are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that
"the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet
esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters
of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation.
Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the
people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the
proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the
sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in
the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is
sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that
those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be
distracted from the proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility that parallel
trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even
prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that
judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can
render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it
may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of,
televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public
showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the
release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast
will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by
audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower
court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film
depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a
documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be
produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt
to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases
or causes célèbres  was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends
found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in
Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the
case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the
painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby
law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and
burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried
out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the
familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with the
safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational experiment that
I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and with suitable
commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment
that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
 Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational
system, is now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years
ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair
administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of
celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the
Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine
should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of
TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes
only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings
before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against
the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be
made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of
the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office
for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San
Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari  1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang
vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City
Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-
compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the
non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate
originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the
respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the
petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner,
moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the
amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of
the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the
payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the
duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution
dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty.
Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of
the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his
lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's
Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering
unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for
the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father
of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate
language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more,
remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was
required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or
administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty.
Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or
Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the
Justices concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the
authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show
cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as
Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order."10 Thus,
according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and
procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be
punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court
finds the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with
the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the
Court portions of which read as follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most
Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file
this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and
determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and
Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and
just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such
procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the
undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied
of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and
most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic),
being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering
unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by
him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose
common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from
innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they
will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of
our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back
the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. —
PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of
Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-
complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge
Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the
Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was
based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our
very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts
of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for
the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-
accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person
in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the
respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for
the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the
common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our
Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any
man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his
appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet
the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in
the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict
or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine
justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a
common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly
abused by Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants
and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the
beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding
Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a
righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close
relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition
did so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B.
Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his
insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one
set for the rich and another for the poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive
criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast
aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous
influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's
failure to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular
on expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but
effective January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later
filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the necessary
legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial
court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his
dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-
88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of
the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate,
the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence
excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied
with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having
been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5
of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above
requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be
shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano
irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply
because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however,
seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging
his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano
hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court,
he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to
keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his
client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not
at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo."22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is
through the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes
to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is
the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD
INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menancing language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of
powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has —
been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind
all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass
upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the
foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass
judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the
Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his
clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel
in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained
before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a
weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too
plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's
complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second
Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according
to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF
COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality
of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10)
days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he
fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law
throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes
final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt
with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's
record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals,
and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the
country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6289             December 16, 2004
JULIAN MALONSO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner;
it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no
one, not even the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them
to do so.1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any
authority entered his appearance as Malonso’s counsel in the expropriation
proceedings initiated by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he
complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally representing him in the said case,
claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the NAPOCOR by way of
attorney’s fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-owner of
Malonso’s property.3
In his Answer,4 respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan
at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa,
as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services  executed on 01 April 1997.5 The
Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their
lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its
members with the NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the
following conditions:
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to
court proceedings and other related activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees,
appearance and liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between
NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members; this forty (40%)
[percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated
depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorney’s Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and commitment
expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
 D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or
secure the best price from NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that
said member executed a special power of attorney6 in favor of Elfa, which served as
the latter’s authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized
Elfa in the following manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa 92 New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay
ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA,
nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 038 Dulong
Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda para sa
akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate)
para sa pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National Power Corp.
(NAPOCOR), na may Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng
Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan;
2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming
saan man at ano man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga
opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa aming nabanggit na
pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;
3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa
lupang nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na
nararapat, matuwid at makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay
binibigyan ng karapatan at kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng
papeles/dokumento si G. Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali
na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT AT WALA SIYANG
KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
DITO’Y AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng
karapatang kumilos at magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang
magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay iginagawad sa kanya nang
kahalintulad nang kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong
nagsasagawa, at dito’y AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin
na nasa aming naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang
Gawad na Karapatang ito.
In his Reply,7 Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf,
considering that while the Contract of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe
and Elfa was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a
much later date, 27 November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to
hire a lawyer in his behalf since he already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty.
Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into
by SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within
the coverage of the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a
later date. Likewise, as a member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the
organization’s commitments.8
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted
expropriation proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including
the complainant in this case.
On April 1, 1997, a "Contract of Legal Services" was entered into between
the law firm "Principe Villano and Clemente Law Offices" and SANDAMA,
Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng National Power
Corporation) represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the
organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings.
Complainant is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay
Kapangyarihan" in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-
in-fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPC’s Board of Directors approved the amicable
settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total
of One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos  (P103,413,200.00).
 More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and
while complainant was represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or
on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Separate
Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants."
About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees,
respondent filed his "Notice of Entry of Appearance" (dated January 28,
2000) claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a
defendant in said case.
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant
wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr.
Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the respondent’s law firm to represent
them in the expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an "Opposition" to respondent’s
entry of appearance and motion to separate legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Attorney’s Lien" claiming
40% of the selling price of the properties being expropriated by NPC.
On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Adverse Claim" before the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of
the lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of
complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property
being expropriated.
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the
decision approving the compromise agreement between the lot owners and
the NPC was delayed.9
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a
corporate being, and respondent’s law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the
expropriation proceedings instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-
ownership of the properties being expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney
was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not SANDAMA, and that said power of
attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into the Contract of Legal
Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could not be
derived from the said documents.10
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived
from the above-mentioned documents. A contract for legal services between a lawyer
and his client is personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries.
Even Elfa, the attorney-in-fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal
counsels to represent the former in the expropriation proceedings. Moreover,
SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation proceedings and thus Atty.
Principe has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both
parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to
have violated Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04.11 In
representing himself as Malonso’s and the other lot owners’ legal counsel in the face
of the latter’s opposition, Atty. Principe was found to be guilty of gross or serious
misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-owner of properties
being expropriated and his filing of several actions to frustrate the implementation of
the decision approving the compromise agreement make his conduct constitutive of
malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension from
the practice of law. 12
In its Resolution13 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v. Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon
3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum,14 respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-
241 has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure
selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply
with Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15 According to the respondent, the Investigating
Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three
months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension granted by the
Supreme Court.16 Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of
Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required
number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there were
only five (5) governors present.17 Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP
National President.18
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior
towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the
duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to
protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully
found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law
profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.19 Despite its duty to police
the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to "promote respect for the law and
legal processes" and "to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system."20 Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for their
observance.21 For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the
explanation22 of Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for
respondent’s case that:
…Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended
penalty from two years to one year suspension. Since there was already a
consensus, the Board did not hold a formal voting. A formal voting became
unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the decision of the Board
became unanimous.
I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was
observed and the Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied with by the IBP Board of
Governors.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are
spared from the wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their
just due. These rules cannot be taken lightly.23
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when
it issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere
consensus, and not through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not
secured. As to the issue of the protracted investigation without the requisite
permission from the Supreme Court to extend the investigation period, we agree with
respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the
respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed
with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be
heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months
from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the
Board of Governors upon prior application.
...
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. — (a) …
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. — the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a
Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of
Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one
Governor from each Region….
 … There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and
at such time and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of
the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business….
From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the
practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report; (2)
a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale
for this rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the
procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the
collective view of the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very
nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the
exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.24 Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Board’s
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD
Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors,
with a fellow lawyer and fellow governor’s reputation and good name at stake,
cavalierly brushed aside the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the
discipline and protection of its members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the
success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation.
Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be deplored.25 And yet the IBP Board
of Governors, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and without any remorse, even
asserted that "due process was observed and the Rules governing the Disbarment
and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied."
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the
case.26 However, on many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence
of the parties.27 In view of the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the
respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases, the Court
opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.28
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings,
there is need to dwell first on a dimension of expropriation proceedings which is
uniquely its own.
determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the
assistance of commissioners, of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken which relates to the valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final
and would dispose of the second stage of the suit, leaving nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue.29 During this stage, the main bone of contention is
the valuation of the property concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not
more, than the first stage which refers to the issue of "public purpose." But as it
frequently happens, as in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely
contested. Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair
compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the leverages of executive
power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In
this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove
to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and relies, for
most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of
the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties
subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the
NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally
resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and
NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners,
through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in
the person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the
negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its
individual stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run
its affairs.30 The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities.31 Thus, property belonging to
a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa,
the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the
former.32 Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of
SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation cases; thus
respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members.
But things are not as simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can
intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the
landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondent’s firm so as to
make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a
non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed towards the promotion of the landowners’
common interest. It presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and
represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent still dealt with the
members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA
president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract
for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to
contract his firm’s services. After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from
SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA
members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent
(40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which
was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of
SANDAMA. Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed that the same
figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked for its legal services
as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation, where
else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due to respondent and
his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondent’s legal services were disengaged by SANDAMA’s new President
Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned
and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore
fruit. With all these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he
was also about to be deprived of his lawful compensation for the services he and his
firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the prevailing attitude of the
SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw the immediate need to protect his
interests in the individual properties of the landowners. The hairline distinction
between SANDAMA and its individual members’ interests and properties, flowing as it
does from a legal fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to promote business
intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous, impractical
and even unfair in view of the circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice
justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorney’s fees against
the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court
believes that he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to
protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firm’s services and was led to
believe that he would be paid for the same. There is evidence which tend to show
that respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to
assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. They facilitated the
incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the
appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political
personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just
after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of
the compromise agreement for the court’s approval, SANDAMA disengaged the
services of respondent’s law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having
rendered legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with
the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to
SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to
protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in the remedy they sought, but
the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a
business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for
professional services rendered.33 It is but natural that he protect his interest, most
especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.34
Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was
entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR.35 Its motions for separate legal fees as
well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the
ultimate outcome of an independent action to recover attorney’s fees, the Court does
not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action against SANDAMA or any of its
members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his
services.36 Such independent action may be the proper venue to show entitlement to
the attorney’s fees he is claiming, and for his client to refute the same. 37 If respondent
could resort to such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome and
portends to be more protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason to preclude him
from filing mere motions such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of providing
what he perceives to be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not
proscribed from seeking recovery of attorney’s fees for the services he and his firm
rendered to SANDAMA and its members. As to whether he would succeed in the
quest, that is another story which obviously does not have to be resolved in this case.
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent
fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per
se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness
of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the
case.38 Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was
obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud
or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will
protect the aggrieved party.39
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B
in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132826               September 3, 2009
ROLANDO SAA, Petitioner,
vs.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY and ATTY. FREDDIE A.
VENIDA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated
that Atty. Venida’s act of filing two cases1 against him was oppressive and constituted
unethical practice.2
In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on
the complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance4 with the February
17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his
supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,5 Atty. Venida still did not file his complete
comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution.
Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution6 requiring Atty. Venida to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution.
Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment7 on September 4, 1995 which, without
doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he
was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saa’s adversaries.8
The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997,
Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit.9 It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against
Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.10
The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating
commissioner’s report and dismissed the complaint.11 Saa filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.12
Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.13 He ascribes
grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the
investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According to him, the
investigating commissioner’s report did not at all mention the dismissal of OMB 1-90-
1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by the
parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
We disagree.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.14 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.15 A
decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party
affected disagrees with it.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of
evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida.
Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless
legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.
Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venida’s blatant refusal to comply with
various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders
and processes.16 Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when
he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed
to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment
only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he
managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 1217 and
Rules 1.0318 and 12.0419 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our
May 17, 2004 resolution.20 Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum,21 he
still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually ignored our directives for
him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.22
Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But
tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had
a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a
strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full
comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies
notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal
profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his omissions.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney
for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 We reiterate our ruling
in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa:24
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.1avvphi1
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive
or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of
Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately
from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7056               February 11, 2009
PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006,
finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of
law.
To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of
Cavite (PARAD) in favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the
tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas
and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno
Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not
rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up
to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights over the land.
Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was found to have committed
intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the
execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary
restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.
The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and
served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance.1
Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period,
appealing to the Court to take a second look at his case and praying that the penalty
of suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or admonition for the sake
of his family and the poor clients he was defending.2
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of
action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision
dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and
experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him
by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were
valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo
de Guzman, et. al.3 He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The
lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de
Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very
well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel,
respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his
interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and
notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years.
Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the
rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he merely
exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under
the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of
physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant.4 He posits that he was only
being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of
his own family,5 and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro
bono.61avvphi1
Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of
law, he humbly submits that there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the
same or did he fail to dispute this, contrary to the findings of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). He was counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the
cooperative Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his
office in this cooperative, together with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the
late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano Villavert. He signed the retainer agreement with
Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-client relationship, and the complainants
were fully aware of such arrangement.7
Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of
action he took in behalf of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for
kind consideration, pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that he does not deserve
the penalty of two years’ suspension, considering that the complaint fails to show him
wanting in character, honesty, and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar
for more than 20 years, served as former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a
legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City handling detention prisoners and pro bono
cases, and is also a member of the Couples for Christ, and has had strict training in
the law school he graduated from and the law offices he worked with.8 He is the sole
breadwinner in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4) children who are in
school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. The family’s only
source of income is respondent’s private practice of law, a work he has been
engaged in for more than twenty-five (25) years up to the present.9
On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from
respondent, requesting that he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial
commission. Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the pendency of the
administrative cases10 against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet been
resolved with finality. Respondent sought consideration and compassion for the
issuance of the clearance -- considering present economic/financial difficulties -- and
reiterating the fact that he was the sole breadwinner in the family.
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.11 A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s
cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to
secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by
law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed.12 In this case, respondent may not be
wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts
complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to
protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not
unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the
cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent
should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. We
stress what we have stated in our decision that, in support of the cause of their
clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth
and justice.13 This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a
lawyer gives to his case.14 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is
enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by
misusing court processes.15
Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must
have realized with the sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court also
knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the
appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse,
family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s
advanced age, among other things, which have varying significance in the Court’s
determination of the imposable penalty. Thus, after a careful consideration of herein
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and humble acknowledgment of his
misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of leniency towards him.16 We
find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law sufficient in this case
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED.
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
said Resolution within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and
served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a
great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he
alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed
by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times  published statements attributed to
him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it
to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he
lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
 xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which
he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional
and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused
to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen
had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself,"
and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On
June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or
on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel
a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the
record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-
appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto
filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it
hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal)
does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal
was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by
this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying
for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this
case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest
case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the
Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was
issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of
promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24,
1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and
the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of
 its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of
which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case,
and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion
for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September
8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date
was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action
on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested
"that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that
since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely
and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7)
"to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation
"in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no
apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of
lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St.
Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment
you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you
measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the
speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in
thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also
to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in
his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated,
compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member
of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and
has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but
mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular
case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word,
DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished,
this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to
inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way
of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the
story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that
justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the
ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were
provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we
waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of
their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ...
.
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE,
what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses,
but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last
resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that
it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court
has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been
DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect
or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
 regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended
as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions
by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and
the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very
careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates
the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been
lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to
petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon
us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time
to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations
preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's
business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that
as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different
members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time
makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al.,  vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963
(60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated
its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within
the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood
it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts
and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari  from
the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into
accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another
hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
 probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by
the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time
and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally
articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general
by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such
notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all
the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the
motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the
movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from
himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why
lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's
integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of
justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where
those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary
is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and
as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
 An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded
to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of
the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion
or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges
than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing
and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the
courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack
and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to
become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class
is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest
in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners
in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it
their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned,
"the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all
good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language
and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer
than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40
Atl. 481)
 We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment
That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to
public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer
which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a
court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the
bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely
impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients
a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to
do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to
belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general
public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-
year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to
two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality,
or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication
by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against
the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was
observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication
by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile
and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver
character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the
better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of
justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave
the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my
name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases
involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public
interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys,
who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate
and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of
the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and
was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority
of the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's
right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech
which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this
state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from
fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible
for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an
independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender
of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he
fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the
result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the
profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the
discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of
justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties,
or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the
tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or
motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to
protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that,
as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look
for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety
and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by
insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer
who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself
with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members
to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of
prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right
thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the
bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and
with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the
health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with
the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends
his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the
court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit
by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar,
and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed
that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated
than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the
said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he
had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it
than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a
fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that
the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association,
or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law
School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or
if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement
of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before
it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded
citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the
other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry
attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not
ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor
was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever
have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to
his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods
sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile,
or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress
in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and
sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however
he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised
no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated
his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for
their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by
his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken
words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere.
Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think
entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which
are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a
cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court,
"by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel
the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by
tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment
may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of
his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133
App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is
not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80."
And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the
state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either
as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law,
wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by
due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred
in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused
had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the
judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney."
As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the
facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2
Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am.
Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186
Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for
18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of
being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude."
There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions
in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair
in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of
this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was
disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a
case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make
him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence
in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence.
Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and
calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence
of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of
his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power
and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ...
.
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper,
caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have
for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of
free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published
in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill
in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
 honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the
Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it
has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen"
into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments
of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion
for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention.
It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That
pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as
making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this
Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to
the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that,
in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now
seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much
of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first
stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking
thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption
of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated.
Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
 A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is
sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the
punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence
in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as
there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of
the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The
sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice
of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential
to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and
clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to
admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-
has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to
exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to
all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it
becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of
its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the
exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make
an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here
in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court
and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an
account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon
him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney,
attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment
to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics.
As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are
the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not
involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as
it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it
be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be
visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The
discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary
and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never
be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day,
Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the
added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that
the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely
exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of
the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it
will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may
prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be,
as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
G.R. No. 100633            August 28, 2001
SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO AND SABINO PADILLA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAVID C. NAVAL AND DEOGRACIAS
REYES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 101550 August 28, 2001
SPOUSES DEOGRACIAS R. REYES AND ROSALINA N. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OP APPEALS AND SOCORRO ABELLA SORIANO, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Cases
We decide the two petitions jointly.
G.R. No. 100633 is an appeal1 via certiorari interposed by Socorro A. Soriano and her
counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. (hereafter, Atty. Padilla) from the decision of the
Court of Appeals2 that affirmed the following orders of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
City3 :
"(a) Order dated December 16, 1988, denying petitioner's urgent ex-parte
motion for restraining order;
"(b) Order dated January 23, 1989 denying petitioner's motion to inhibit;
"(c) Order dated July 12, 1989 ordering the respondents to pay the
deficiency in the docket fees paid by them;
"(d) Orders dated September 13 and 15, 1989 denying petitioner's Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration.
"(e) Order dated September 25, 1989 directing petitioner Atty. Sabino
Padilla, Jr. to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt; and
"(f) Order dated February 9, 1990 denying petitioner's ex-parte motion to
rest; declaring petitioner in default; and resetting the scheduled promulgation
of judgment on the charge of direct contempt against Atty. Padilla, Jr. with a
warning that should he fail to appear he would be ordered arrested pursuant
to the provisions of the rules."4
and which decision annulled the orders of the Regional Trial Court5 admitting
respondents' (Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes) supplemental complaint.
G.R. No. 101550 is a petition for review on certiorari initiated by Deogracias and
Rosalina Reyes assailing the same decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
annulled the order of the Regional Trial Court6 admitting their supplemental complaint
on the ground that the trial court should not have admitted the same as it did not
merely "supplement" but entirely substituted the original pleading.7
The Facts
On October 27, 1988, Deogracias R. Reyes and Rosalina N. Reyes (hereafter,
"Deogracias" and "Rosalina") filed with the Regional Trial Court, Naga City8 a
complaint against Socorro Abella-Soriano (hereafter "Socorro")9 for "declaration and
recognition of real right under an implied contract of services, reformation of
instrument and damages."
The complaint alleged two causes of action.10
First, Deogracias and Rosalina pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as
manager and administrative assistant of her property and real estate in 1968.11 As
"payment for their services," in 1973, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina one
apartment unit12 to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime. A token
monthly rental of one hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) was imposed on them to enable
them to supposedly keep their self-respect.13 In the same building, there existed a unit
which Deogracias and Rosalina improved and converted into a pub and
restaurant14 at a cost of four hundred fifty thousand pesos (P450,000.00). For the use
of the premises, Socorro collected rent from Deogracias and Rosalina in the token
amount of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month supposedly for the
main purpose of enabling them "to keep their self respect."15 From 1968 to 1987,
Deogracias and Rosalina were able to sell and dispose of all the lots in the three
residential subdivisions16 owned by Socorro, amounting to about ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00). As real estate manager and administrative assistant, they were
also able in the course of twenty years to find qualified tenants for Socorro's
commercial buildings. They supervised the construction and maintenance of
Socorro's property and collected rent on behalf of and for the interest of Socorro.
Despite all these efforts, on October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and
Rosalina notice to vacate the two units at No. 67 Elias Angeles St., Naga City.17
Deogracias and Rosalina averred that Socorro agreed to allow them to use the two
units for the duration of their lifetime as compensation for their services.18 By now
ejecting them from the premises, Socorro reneged on her obligation.19
Second, Deogracias and Rosalina were the owners of two (2) commercial lots with
improvements.20 On May 28, 1986, Deogracias and Rosalina became indebted to
Socorro in the amount of six hundred thirty eight thousand six hundred thirty five
pesos and thirty six centavos (P638,635.36). The parties agreed that to pay for the
debt, Deogracias and Rosalina were to sell the two (2) commercial lots for two million
and five hundred thousand pesos (P2.5M) and deliver part of the proceeds of the sale
to Socorro. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the
property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. Instead of a real estate mortgage,
Socorro prepared two (2) documents, a "deed of absolute sale"21 covering Deogracias
and Rosalina's property and a "memorandum of agreement."22 Due to the ascendancy
of Soccorro over them and also because of Socorro's repeated assurance that the
documents had the same effect as a real estate mortgage, Deogracias and Rosalina
signed the same. Socorro presented the "deed of absolute sale" to the register of
deeds of Naga City and as a consequence TCT Nos. 9388 and 9424 were released
in her favor. It was only in September 1988, that Deogracias and Rosalina discovered
that they were deprived of the ownership of their property.23 Thus, Deogracias and
Rosalina pray that their true intention of entering into a real estate mortgage and not
an absolute sale be given effect, that the "deed of absolute sale" and "memorandum
of agreement" be declared void and that the T.C.T.s issued in Socorro's name be
canceled and new T.C.T.s be issued in favor of Deogracias and Rosalina.24
On October 28, 1988, Deogracias and Rosalina paid the filing fee of four hundred
forty pesos (P440.00)25 and legal research fee of ten pesos (P10.00).26 The
computation of the filing fee was based on the following amounts:27
"1. P100,000.00 representing the income of the property under litigation
received by the defendants from its tenants and which the plaintiffs prayed
to be returned and refunded to them;
"2. P50,000.00 moral damages;
"3. P10,000.00 exemplary damages;
"4. P50,000.00 attorney's fees.
"The total of which amounted to P210,000.00."
On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment
case between the same parties over the same premises and that the second cause of
action was premature.28
On December 8, 1998, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress, Socorro,
filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order.29 The motion
prayed that the trial court immediately issue an ex-parte restraining order
commanding private respondents to "desist from entering the vacant apartments of
the building subject of the case or from urging the tenants thereof to stop paying their
rentals to the defendant (Socorro)."
The Carmelite Sisters talked to respondent Judge Naval in his chambers and
requested him to immediately act on Socorro's urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. Judge Naval told the Carmelite Sisters that he could not issue the
ex-parte restraining order because a Supreme Court administrative circular required a
hearing with notice to the adverse party. To this statement, Sister Margaret Mary
retorted, "Why would Atty. Padilla (Socorro's counsel, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.) ask
for an ex-parte restraining order when according to you that is prohibited by an order
or circular of the Supreme Court? Do you mean Atty. Padilla does not even know that
there is such an order or circular, when he has a brother in the Supreme
Court (Associate Justice Teodoro Padilla)."30
On December 16, 1988, the trial court denied Socorro's urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. The trial court ruled that the issue was whether or not petitioner
Socorro may be restored to the possession of the property, which she claimed she
was deprived of by means of force, threat and intimidation. According to the trial
court, this is a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court,31 not the Regional Trial Court.32
On January 16, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion to dismiss with respect
to Deogracias and Rosalina's first cause of action but denied the same insofar as the
second cause of action was concerned.33
On the same day, January 16, 1989, Socorro, through counsel, Atty. Padilla, filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Naval praying that the ends of justice would best be served if
the case was re-raffled to another judge. Basically, the grounds cited were: First,
while still a law practitioner and politician, Judge Naval was a frequent customer of
the restaurant owned by Deogracias and was a good friend of his. Second, Judge
Naval was also a close friend of Rosalina and Deogracias' attorney, Atty. Dennis B.
Recon.34
On January 23, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to inhibit. We quote the
trial court's order:35
"The factual bases of Defendant's motion to inhibit are not true.
"This Presiding Judge while still a law practitioner and politician, was NOT a
frequent customer of the Rey-Ves Pub and Restaurant. To the best of his
recollection, this Presiding Judge has eaten and drunk (sic) in said Pub and
Restaurant for not more than five (5) times since then until the present and
has not had any personal talk with either or both plaintiffs-spouses. This
Presiding Judge has never become a 'good friend' or even a friend of said
spouses.
"Atty. Dennis B. Recon is considered by this Presiding Judge as a friend,
just like any other lawyer known to him and appearing before him, and just
like counsel for Defendant, Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. This Presiding Judge did
not notice any one of the three Regional Trial Judges assigned in Pili,
Camarines Sur to be present in the court room during the last hearing herein
on December 16, 1988, although after the hearing, this Presiding Judge met
Hon. Nilo Malanyaon, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch,32 Pili, Camarines Sur,
at the lobby of the Naga City Hall of Justice conferring with Hon. Gregorio A.
Manio, Presiding Judge, Branch 19, Naga City about the Christmas Party of
the entire Court personnel which would be held at 5:30 o'clock that afternoon
of December 16.
"The inhibition of this Presiding Judge would not have been a problem had
Defendant's counsel filed his motion before this Court had refused to issue
ex parte a restraining order despite strong representations therefor by three
(3) Sisters of Charity and their Mother Superior, allegedly upon instructions
of Counsel for the Defendant. To grant the 'motion to inhibit' at this stage of
the proceedings when this Court, after hearing, has already denied
defendant's motion for issuance of a restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, and has already partially denied defendant's motion to dismiss,
may create a bad precedent, and may even adversely affect the integrity of
the bar and of the bench because the said Sisters of Charity impressed
upon this Presiding Judge not to be apprehensive in issuing the restraining
order ex parte as the Supreme Court will sustain it, their counsel being a
brother of a Justice of the Supreme Court.
"This Presiding Judge believes that he is competent to hear this case and to
render judgment which is fair and just to both parties.
"WHEREFORE, defendant's motion 'to inhibit' is hereby DENIED.
"SO ORDERED.
"Given in Chambers, this 23rd day of January 1989, at the City of Naga,
Philippines."
On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a "motion to admit attached
supplemental complaint."36 The supplemental complaint pleaded:37
"2. That on March 30, 1989, subsequent to the filing of the above-entitled
case and conformably with the true agreement of the parties herein in their
Memorandum of Agreement which they acknowledged before Notary Public
Manuel M. Rosales on 23 June 1986 (Annex 'C', Complaint) and within the
'three (3) years' period provided therein, the herein plaintiffs tendered to the
defendant the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, SIX
HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE PESOS and THIRTY SIX CENTAVOS,
(P638,635.36) Philippine Currency, as payment to the latter of their
(Plaintiffs') obligation to herein defendant;
xxx           xxx           xxx
"5. That the failure and/or refusal of the defendant to accept said tender of
payment to her by the plaintiffs is absolutely without just cause, and which is
clearly a move on her part to let the 3-year period provided in their
Memorandum of Agreement (which will expire on May 28, 1989) elapse and
to invoke it to stonewall the recovery by the plaintiffs from her of the former's
9-door commercial building at Concepcion Grande, Naga City."
On April 28, 1989, the trial court admitted Deogracias' and Rosalina's supplemental
complaint.38
On May 22, 1989, Socorro moved to dismiss the supplemental complaint.39
On July 6, 1989, the trial court denied Socorro's motion to dismiss the supplemental
complaint.40
On July 12, 1989, the trial court ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency
in the docket fees in the amount of one thousand seven hundred twelve pesos
(P1,712.00).41
On August 3, 1989, Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive pleading to
the supplemental complaint and to reset pre-trial.
On August 7, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order of July 12,
1989, and paid the additional filing fee.42
On August 11, 1989, the trial court granted Socorro's motion for an extension of time
to file a responsive pleading and also granted the same with respect to the motion to
reset pre-trial.
On August 18, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to file a
responsive-pleading and for the resetting of the pre-trial.
The trial court granted the second motion and gave Socorro an extension of five (5)
days.
On August 23, 1989, Socorro again moved for another extension of time to file
responsive pleading and to reset pre-trial. The trial court has not acted on the motion.
On August 26, 1989, Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla filed an "omnibus motion for
reconsideration of various orders of the respondent court."43
On September 3, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition to Socorro's
omnibus motion, moved to strike out the motion and moved to declare Socorro in
default with respect to the supplemental complaint.44
On September 13 45 and 15, 1989,46 the trial court denied Socorro's "omnibus motion
for reconsideration."
On September 25, 1989, the trial court directed Socorro's counsel, Atty. Padilla to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court.47
Forthwith, on October 9, 1989, Socorro filed with the trial court an opposition to
Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to declare her in default as to the supplemental
complaint48 and an answer to the supplemental complaint.49
On October 23, 1989, the trial court denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion to
declare petitioner in default and admitted Socorro's answer to the supplemental
complaint.50 Pre-trial was reset to December 15, 1989. The court instructed the parties
to file their pre-trial briefs three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial.
On December 15, 1989, only Deogracias, Rosalina and their counsel appeared
during the pre-trial conference. The trial court postponed the pre-trial since there was
no showing that Socorro and Atty. Padilla were notified thereof. Subsequently, Atty.
Padilla admitted receipt of notice but reasoned that he received such only on the very
same date of the pre-trial.51
On January 5, 1990, the same incident occurred and pre-trial was re-set. Atty. Padilla
claimed that they did not appear during the scheduled pre-trial since they received
notice thereof five (5) days after.52
On January 17, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla were served with notice that pre-trial
and promulgation of judgment on the contempt charge against Atty. Padilla was set
on February 9, 1990.53
On February 2, 1990, Socorro, through Atty. Padilla, mailed her ex-parte motion to
reset the scheduled hearing.54 The trial court received the motion on February 7,
1990.55
On February 9, 1990, only Deogracias and Rosalina and their counsel appeared
before the court. The court declared Socorro in default. The court granted the motion
to reset the hearing for the promulgation of judgment on the charge of direct contempt
on February 27, 1990, with a warning that should Atty. Padilla fail to appear during
the scheduled hearing, he would be ordered arrested.56
On February 19, 1990, Atty. Padilla was served with notice of the scheduled
promulgation of judgment on the charge of direct contempt.
On February 27, 1990, Atty. Padilla did not appear before the court. The court
appointed a counsel-de-oficio for Atty. Padilla, promulgated judgment against him,
found him guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00).57
On March 12, 1990, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order. Socorro
assailed the following orders of Judge Naval:58
First, his insistence on exercising jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding
Deogracias' and Rosalina's failure to pay the correct filing fee on their amended
complaint. Second, his admission of Deogracias' and Rosalina's amended complaint
which they termed as a "supplemental complaint", despite the fact that it pleaded a
cause of action directly contrary to that stated in the original complaint.59 Third, his
refusal to issue an ex-parte restraining order to restrain Deogracias and Rosalina
from seizing possession of the property subject of the case on the ground that he was
prohibited from doing so by a certain Supreme Court Circular and on the ground that
the court a quo did not have authority to decide whether Deogracias and Rosalina
forcibly entered and seized occupation of the property in litigation as such issue fell
under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court, it being a question of "forcible entry
and unlawful detainer." Fourth, his refusal to inhibit himself from hearing the
case. Fifth, his unreasonable and violent reaction towards a motion for
reconsideration filed by Socorro and Atty. Padilla, which motion for reconsideration
pointed out that:
(1) the insulting accusation Judge Naval hurled at Atty. Padilla was not
supported by the facts;
(2) it was Judge Naval's version of the facts that was obviously false and
untrue;
(3) that Judge Naval has an "unusual interest" in holding on the case despite
the court's lack of jurisdiction over it.
Sixth, his citing of Atty. Padilla for contempt of court. Seventh, his order for the arrest
and incarceration of Atty. Padilla for direct contempt of court.
On June 26, 1991, the Court of Appeals decided:60
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED except the Orders dated April 28, 1989 and July 6, 1989 which
are granted. The Writ of Injunction dated June 18, 1990 is hereby
DISSOLVED. Costs against petitioners.
"SO ORDERED."
On August 17, 1991, Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the Supreme Court a petition
assailing the aforequoted decision.61
On July 25, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for partial reconsideration62 of its decision of June 26, 1991, assailing the Court of
Appeals annulment of the order of the trial court admitting their supplemental
complaint.
On August 21, 1991 the Court of Appeals denied Deogracias' and Rosalina's motion
for partial reconsideration.63
On October 16, 1991, Deogracias and Rosalina likewise filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari assailing the aforequoted decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it annulled the order of the Regional Trial Court admitting their
supplemental complaint.64
On November 6, 1991, the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.65
The Issues
1. Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to restrain or to
remedy the forcible seizure by the plaintiffs of the property subject of the litigation.
2. Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to order the
payment of the correct filing fee and upon failure to pay the same, to dismiss the
case.
3. Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to inhibit.
4. Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in admitting the "supplemental
complaint," with a theory directly contrary to the original complaint and in not
dismissing it upon motion of defendant.
5. Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of
jurisdiction in finding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of "direct contempt."
6. Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in sanctioning
the foregoing orders of the trial court (except the Order admitting the supplemental
complaint).66
The Court's Ruling
We find the petitions without merit except as hereafter stated. We shall discuss the
issues in seriatim.
Effect of Non-Payment of Filing Fees in Full
We agree with the Court of Appeals that when insufficient filing fees were initially paid
by Deogracias and Rosalina, there was no intention to defraud the government,
hence, the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals67 does
not apply. Deogracias and Rosalina merely paid the amount of the docket fees
computed by the Clerk of Court. They were in good faith and relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court. This is a finding of fact which the Court of Appeals
carefully made. In the absence of abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb the same.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,68 the issue was whether or not the court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was not sufficient. This
Court ruled that since the petitioners did not intend to defraud the government by
paying insufficient docket fees, a more liberal interpretation of the rules should apply.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltds., v. Asuncion, private respondent, like Deogracias and
Rosalina in the case at bar, demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules by paying
the additional docket fees as required. Thus, the Court concluded that the trial court
was vested with jurisdiction and consequently stated the following rules:69
"1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint of appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
xxx           xxx           xxx
"3. Where the trial court acquired jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee, but
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional filing fee (Italics ours)."
In Ng Soon v. Alday,70 this Court stated that the initial payment of the filing fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim is allowed subject to the
adjustment of what may be proved later. If what is proved (amount of claims for
damages) is less than what is claimed, then a refund may be made; if more,
additional fees will be exacted. The rule comes into play when the situation found
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (i.e., intention to defraud
the government) is absent.71
Non-Admission of the Supplemental Complaint
We find that Deogracias and Rosalina's "supplemental complaint" contains matters
entirely different from and even contrary to the cause of action stated in the original
complaint. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court should not
admit the same.
In the original complaint, Deogracias and Rosalina assailed as "void ab initio" the
memorandum agreement of June 23, 1986, while in the so-called "supplemental
complaint", they used as basis the very same memorandum agreement they initially
assailed in order to exercise an "option to repurchase" provided for therein. A
supplemental complaint is one that:72
". . . set(s) forth transactions, occurrences of events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented."
A pleading subsequently filed after an original one which states a totally different
cause of action is not a "supplemental pleading" and is not permitted. The rule
allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the cause
of action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case shall not be
altered.73
Non-Issuance of the Ex-Parte Restraining Order
A perusal of the records shows that Socorro's motion for an ex-parte restraining order
prayed that the court prohibit Deogracias and Rosalina from entering the vacant
apartments of the building subject of the litigation. The issue of whether Judge Naval
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion has become moot
and academic. The parties stipulated that Deogracias and Rosalina already entered
the premises in question. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the acts sought to be
enjoined had become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.74 It is
useless to indulge in an academic discussion of a moot question.75
Refusal of Judge Naval to Inhibit Himself
Rule 137, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court provides the grounds for the
disqualification of judges, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
For any other reason, a litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit himself.
Specifically so in this case where there is a finding of fact that "respondent judge has
not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality from impartiality."76 Besides, the test
for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant
was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.77 In this case, there was no such deprivation.
In a string of cases, this Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice.78
Charge of Direct Contempt of Court
The Court of Appeals erred when it stated79 that a certiorari proceeding assailing the
judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed
therefrom.80 Rule 71, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court provides: "A person adjudged
in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of
the remedies of certiorari or prohibition (emphasis ours)." This is exactly what
petitioners did.
The Court of Appeals also erred when it affirmed the trial court's finding of direct
contempt of court against Atty. Padilla. Rule 71, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily — A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court. x x
x"
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on direct contempt on two
grounds.81 We quote:82
"x x x 2. Pursuing relentlessly his design to embarrass this Presiding Judge
by claiming in his "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration" dated August 26,
1989 that this Presiding Judge could not correctly understand the clearly
worded Administrative Circular No. 1 of the Supreme Court.
"3. Alleging in disrespectful and insulting manner in his "Omnibus Motion for
Recommendation" dated August 26, 1989 the following:
"a. It is respectfully submitted that even a first year law student will readily
see that the last sentence of the par. 2-3 above quoted — "Restraining
orders or preliminary injunction should not be issued without prior notice and
hearing and showing of a clear right thereto" — must be read and
understood in the light of the heading and subject being discussed, namely,
"Prompt Action on Dilatory Petitions, to Delay Enforcement of Executory
Judgments." By no stretch of the imagination can it be interpreted in
isolation to mean that Courts had lost their inherent power to issue ex-parte
restraining orders.
"And this Court certainly can read and understand just what par. 3-2 of
Administrative Circular No. 1 means. (par. 9);
"b. One had a right to assume that this Court was sufficiently acquainted
with the principle in Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to the effect that: . . .(par.
14; (b);
"c. Given the foregoing conduct of this Court, undersigned counsel felt that
for reasons known only to the Court it could not really act freely on this Case
as it ordinarily would, and therefore a motion to inhibit was probably the best
way out of this situation. (par. 14 (b), sub-par. 4);
"d. But the Court obviously took the motion to inhibit in a different light. Not
only did it deny the motion; in so doing, it vented its anger at undersigned
counsel and the Carmalite Sisters.(par. 15);
"e. They were Carmelite (sic) Sisters, or if their official name is to be used,
they were Sisters belonging to the order of Discalced Carmilites. The Sisters
or Daughters of Charity, are an entirely different religious congregation. It
seems that the Court could not get correctly even this very elementary fact.
(par. 16);
"f. Fourthly, even the Court's version is not at all flattering to it. For if that
version were to be believed, the Court even went to the extent of allowing
the sisters to make representations with it, and improper representations at
that, instead of firmly telling the sisters that they were out of bounds and
should leave. It is bad enough that a Presiding Judge should allow a lawyer
to discuss the merits of a case out of court and without the presence of
opposing counsel; that he should allow non-lawyers and non-parties, who
have nothing to do with a case, to even discuss them with him is the height
of impropriety. (par. 16, sub-par. 4)
"g. All the foregoing circumstances naturally cast serious doubts on the
accuracy and truthfulness of the Court's statements above quoted. . . (par.
17).
"h. What version then is to be believed? With all due respect, it is submitted
that the foregoing version of the Carmelite Sisters is to be believed. (par.
18).
"i. When defendant pointed this out in her motion to dismiss and other
pleadings, this Court instead of dismissing both the original and the
supplemental complaint sought to remedy the irremediable. It refrained from
passing on it in ruling on the motion to dismiss; but in a separate order of
July 12, 1989, it required the plaintiffs to pay the difference between what
they had paid on the original complaint and what they should pay on the
"supplemental" complaint. In other words, instead of dismissing the
"supplemental" complaint for non-payment of the filing fee, which is all that it
could do, the Court went out of its way to save the day for the plaintiffs by
giving them an opportunity to pay the correct filing fee and thus retain
jurisdiction over the same.
But that is not all. It even gave plaintiffs credit for the inadequate filing fee
they paid under their original complaint; (par. 22); and
"j. Hence, if plaintiffs insist on their change of theory, the obvious remedy is
not by way of "supplemental" or even "amended" complaint, but by
dismissing the original complaint and filing an entirely new one. But of
course, that would mean a raffle and plaintiffs apparently do not want to risk
having their case fall into another branch or sala.
"It is respectfully submitted, however, that plaintiffs' obvious desire to keep
their case in this particular branch of the court is no excuse for violating the
rules. (par. 27). (Italics ours)"
After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padilla's
innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered
contumacious. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under
consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court
to exercise the power of contempt.83 Courts must be slow to punish for direct
contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly
contumacious behavior in facie curiae.84 The salutary rule is that the power to punish
for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,85 and on
the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.86 The courts must exercise the
power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.87
Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of
contumely actionable under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judges generally
and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or
at least pass it with simply a reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is
decided, one party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are equally
confident and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party whose action or
view fails. It is human nature that there be bitter feelings which often reach to the
judge as the source of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient,
and tolerate everything which appears as but a momentary outbreak of
disappointment.88
Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language.89 While judges must exercise patience,
lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. At this juncture, we admonish
all lawyers to observe the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
"Canon 8. Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."
A lawyer is an officer of the Court,90 bound by the law. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.91
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance.92 It is peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support the courts
against "unjust criticism and clamor."93
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the judge
who presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility,
judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on
the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.94 Malicious attacks on courts have some cases been treated
as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for
disbarment.95 However, mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated.96
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer of the
court, a lawyer may criticize the court. He must do so in a bona
fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of the judges thereof on the
other.97 Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration is proscribed.98
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 100633 is PARTLY GRANTED. The petition
in G.R. No. 101550 is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 20236, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the trial court's order finding
Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt of court and imposing on him
imprisonment for five (5) days, and ordering him to pay a fine of one hundred pesos
(P100.00) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. With admonition to the trial court and
counsel to observe strictly the strictures of the ethics of the profession.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5921             March 10, 2006
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge
Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with
violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion
("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico
Barrientos ("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered
judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the
earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000,
as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and
DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000
square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one
hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-
78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-
01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to
pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-
01137.
SO ORDERED.6
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for
Inhibition)7 dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which
read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely
DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the
Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of
Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE!
The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and
Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC
Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable
SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without
any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily
REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if
not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes
FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged
"TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an
ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the
Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That
Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable
PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must
be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and
Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and
That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that
JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the
averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in
Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s
HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold
GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the
defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line
of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court
Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be
slain on sight!8
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to
give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set
aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of
the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala
and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her
Explanation, Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor
knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that
the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this
case."12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade
the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice."13 She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and
hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and
bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of
incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious
and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment
and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to
just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big
monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters
involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a
spade. x x x14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever
mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they]
may have ‘stepped on the line and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the
allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt
and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She
recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis
Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na,
baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed
the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband
of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future."17 This pleading
turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign
because of his then suspension from the practice of law.18
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt
without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a
personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady
lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over."19 At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited
himself from the case out of delicadeza because "[Veneracion] had already filed
against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan
City and before the Ombudsman."20
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-
Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001
accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through
inexcusable negligence and ignorance21 and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the
subject of a preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On
the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed
on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing
Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing
an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or
prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating
him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later
rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by
IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite
sufficient notice.28
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,
recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six
months.29 IBP Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing]
offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and
disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom
personally, they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the
judiciary system as a whole."31
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s
Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP
Board reduced to three months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted
its recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision,
thus:33
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint
of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are
raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the
Supreme Court involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned
Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being
premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of
Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the
present complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending
resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court’s Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present
complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and
mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before
the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October
2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No.
2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order
which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge
Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court."36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the
petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge
Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s
orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint
against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to
judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same
has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the
challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to
conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The
corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first
examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30
July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section
3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had
read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the
case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from
a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only
because of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand.
Apparently, this practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing
arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is
[their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of
Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a
ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from
the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the
30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement
pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba
impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and
fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two
reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike
Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she
had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge
Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt
charge against him.41 This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed
as implied consent.43 This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship
of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the
vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the
following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in
the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect."44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in
the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be
scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge
Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is
proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use
dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest
means, thus:
Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba
assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As
we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge
Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing
of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were
intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this
Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of
law for a period of six months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery
of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by
him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative
Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to
file the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed
the penalty of one year suspension.49
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in
barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the
prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts
would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of
whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor
required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find
respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2)
years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this
Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar
infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8920               September 28, 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule 11.03, Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St., Tuguegarao
City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment2 with the Commission on Discipline of
the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated Canons 113 and 124 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing
his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the
respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for
direct contempt, the respondent shouted, "Then cite me!"5 Judge Baculi cited him for
direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!"6 Judge
Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him
for direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the hall of the
courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again shouted in a
threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a
fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building.7
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he continued
shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No.
2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which
he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision became final and
executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of finality. The respondent
filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted
that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction
of First Level Courts and the latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,9 essentially saying that it was Judge Baculi who
disrespected him.10 We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law
against him once inside the court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument because
he wanted to have an occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear
to the public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said "YOU
JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an
impression to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT,
INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion, Judge
Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion for
Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did was that he
forced me to argue so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he used
to do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner Jose de la
Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner’s Report,11 Commissioner De la Rama stated that
during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated
what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the original
copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom would be submitted for
the Commissioner’s review. Judge Baculi submitted the tape and the transcript of
stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:12
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed that the
respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of the complainant
appears to be in high pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was also observed
that indeed, the complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in
the TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are
very sorry if you do not want to appear before my court, then you better attend to your
cases and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN,
July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words – "we are very sorry" [– were] actually uttered by Atty.
Battung while the judge was saying the quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following questions when
the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure?
* Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we were asked to
present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by the
court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is why he
shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned in convinced that it
was Atty. Battung who shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for their cases to
be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact, in the joint-affidavit
submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as one in saying that it was really
Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the latter cautioned him "not to
shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of ₱100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for gross ignorance
of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like … (not finished)
Court: The next time…
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear …
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If you want to see
me, see me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag,
et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated
Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s
argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given due
consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding judge;
by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated.
What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the Office of the
Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act according to the
norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence submitted is
insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the judicial processes
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with
the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the IBP’s finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by
shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of
litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back to
harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses, cannot be allowed.
We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a
manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited
him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to
the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only
against the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the court
as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to
disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed
duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a
judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.13 that it is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer
of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution
would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s
role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated
and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of
the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to
erode the public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in
the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system
into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while
the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six (6) months
suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor,14 we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
for violating the Lawyer’s Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battung’s violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings
where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before the litigating
public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the
point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality
of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the respondent’s personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.