Chapter 1: Safety Management: 1. Content Index

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SAFETY MANAGEMENT
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 CHAPTER 1: SAFETY MANAGEMENT
3. Chapter 2  Definition Of Management

4. Chapter 3  Principles of management
 Managerial Skills
5. Chapter 4  Communication Skills
 Human Skills
 Computer Skills
 Time-management Skills
 Technical Skills
 Management Thought
 Classical Thought
 Behavioral Management Thought
 Contemporary Management Thought
 Closed Management Systems
 Open Management System
CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGES IN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT
 Meeting the Challenges in Industrial Safety Management

 Key drivers for Effective Industrial Safety Management
Safety Organization
 Job hazard analysis (JHA) and work procedures
 Safety training
 Safety related deficiency management
| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 1

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 Use of near misses and experience feed-backs

1. Content Index  Safety provisions and personal protective equipment (PPE)
2. Chapter 1  Safety meetings
 Safety enforcement by line managers
3. Chapter 2  Other key drivers
4. Chapter 3  Road Infrastructure Safety Management on the Trans-European Networks
1. Problem Definition
5. Chapter 4 2. Envisaged Objectives of Community Action
3. Comparing Policy Options
4. Measures Used in EU Member States
CHAPTER 3: SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR AN OUTDOOR ORGANIZATION

Program analysis
Participants
Leaders & Leader Training
Pre-Trip Information
Participant Screening
Trip Planning
Participant Training
Policies, Procedures & Guideline
Incident Data Collection & Analysis
 Quality and Safety Concerns in Construction
 Organizing for Quality and Safety
 Work and Material Specifications
 Total Quality Control
 Experience with Quality Circles
 Quality Control by Statistical Methods

1. Content Index CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES

2. Chapter 1
1. Main Findings
3. Chapter 2 2. Main Recommendations
4. Chapter 3 3. Aim
4. Background
5. Chapter 4 5. Methodology
6. Literature Review
 Applicability of Techniques to Different Phases of a Project
 Review of Techniques
 Comparison of Techniques
 How to develop your influencing skills

CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 A Definition of Management
3. Chapter 2
Some would define management as an art, while others would define it as a science. Whether
4. Chapter 3
management is an art or a science isn't what is most important. Management is a process that
5. Chapter 4
is used to accomplish organizational goals; that is, a process that is used to achieve what an
organization wants to achieve. An organization could be a business, a school, a city, a group
of volunteers, or any governmental entity. Managers are the people to whom this management
task is assigned, and it is generally thought that they achieve the desired goals through the
key functions of (1) planning, (2) organizing, (3) directing, and (4) controlling. Some would
include leading as a managing function, but for the purposes of this discussion, leading is
included as a part of directing.
The four key functions of management are applied throughout an organization regardless of
whether it is a business, a government agency, or a church group. In a business, which will be
the focus here, many different activities take place. For example, in a retail store there are
people who buy merchandise to sell, people to sell the merchandise, people who prepare the
merchandise for display, people who are responsible for advertising and promotion, people
who do the accounting work, people who hire and train employees, and several other types of
workers. There might be one manager for the entire store, but there are other managers at
1. Content Index
different levels who are more directly responsible for the people who perform all the other jobs.
2. Chapter 1
At each level of management, the four key functions of planning, organizing, directing, and
3. Chapter 2
controlling are included. The emphasis changes with each different level of manager, as will
4. Chapter 3
be explained later.
5. Chapter 4
Planning: Planning in any organization occurs in different ways and at all levels. A top-level
manager, says the manager of a manufacturing plant, plans for different events than does a
manager who supervises, say, a group of workers who are responsible for assembling
modular homes on an assembly line. The plant manager must be concerned with the overall
operations of the plant, while the assembly-line manager or supervisor is only responsible for
the line that he or she oversees.
Planning could include setting organizational goals. This is usually done by higher-level
managers in an organization. As a part of the planning process, the manager then develops
strategies for achieving the goals of the organization. In order to implement the strategies,
resources will be needed and must be acquired. The planners must also then determine the
standards, or levels of quality, that need to be met in completing the tasks.

In general, planning can be strategic planning, tactical planning, or contingency planning.

1. Content Index
Strategic planning is long-range planning that is normally completed by top-level managers in
2. Chapter 1
an organization. Examples of strategic decisions managers make are who the customer or
3. Chapter 2
clientele should be, what products or services should be sold, and where the products and
4. Chapter 3
services should be sold.
5. Chapter 4
Short-range or tactical planning is done for the benefit of lower-level managers, since it is the
process of developing very detailed strategies about what needs to be done, who should do it,
and how it should be done. To return to the previous example of assembling modular homes,
as the home is nearing construction on the floor of the plant, plans must be made for the best
way to move it through the plant so that each worker can complete assigned tasks in the most
efficient manner. These plans can best be developed and implemented by the line managers
who oversee the production process rather than managers who sit in an office and plan for the
overall operation of the company. The tactical plans fit into the strategic plans and are
necessary to implement the strategic plans.
Contingency planning allows for alternative courses of action when the primary plans that
have been developed don't achieve the goals of the organization. In today's economic
environment, plans may need to be changed very rapidly. Continuing with the example of

building modular homes in the plant, what if the plant is using a nearby supplier for all the
1. Content Index
lumber used in the framing of the homes and the supplier has a major warehouse fire and
2. Chapter 1
loses its entire inventory of framing lumber. Contingency plans would make it possible for the
3. Chapter 2
modular home builder to continue construction by going to another supplier for the same
4. Chapter 3
lumber that it can no longer get from its former supplier.
5. Chapter 4
Organizing: Organizing refers to the way the organization allocates resources, assigns tasks,
and goes about accomplishing its goals. In the process of organizing, managers arrange a
framework that links all workers, tasks, and resources together so the organizational goals can
be achieved. The framework is called organizational structure, which is discussed extensively
in another article. Organizational structure is shown by an organizational chart, also discussed
extensively in another article. The organizational chart that depicts the structure of the
organization shows positions in the organization, usually beginning with the top-level manager
(normally the president) at the top of the chart. Other managers are shown below the
president.
There are many ways to structure an organization, which are discussed extensively in the
articles referred to previously. It is important to note that the choice of structure is important for
the type of organization, its clientele, and the products or services it provides—all which

influence the goals of the organization.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Directing: Directing is the process that many people would most relate to managing. It is
3. Chapter 2 supervising, or leading workers to accomplish the goals of the organization. In many
4. Chapter 3 organizations, directing involves making assignments, assisting workers to carry out
5. Chapter 4 assignments, interpreting organizational policies, and informing workers of how well they are
performing. To effectively carry out this function, managers must have leadership skills in
order to get workers to perform effectively.
Some managers direct by empowering workers. This means that the manager doesn't stand
like a taskmaster over the workers barking out orders and correcting mistakes. Empowered
workers usually work in teams and are given the authority to make decisions about what plans
will be carried out and how. Empowered workers have the support of managers who will assist
them to make sure the goals of the organization are being met. It is generally thought that
workers who are involved with the decision-making process feel more of a sense of ownership
in their work, take more pride in their work, and are better performers on the job.
By the very nature of directing, it should be obvious that the manager must find a way to get
workers to perform their jobs. There are many different ways managers can do this in addition

to empowerment, and there are many theories about the best way to get workers to perform
1. Content Index
effectively and efficiently. Management theories and motivation are important topics and are
2. Chapter 1
discussed in detail in other articles.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3 Controlling: The controlling function involves the evaluation activities that managers must
5. Chapter 4 perform. It is the process of determining if the company's goals and objectives are being met.
This process also includes correcting situations in which the goals and objectives are not
being met. There are several activities that are a part of the controlling function.
Managers must first set standards of performance for workers. These standards are levels of
performance that should be met. For example, in the modular home assembly process, the
standard might be to have a home completed in eight working days as it moves through the
construction line. This is a standard that must then be communicated to managers who are
supervising workers, and then to the workers so they know what is expected of them.
After the standards have been set and communicated, it is the manager's responsibility to
monitor performance to see that the standards are being met. If the manager watches the
homes move through the construction process and sees that it takes ten days, something
must be done about it. The standards that have been set are not being met. In this example, it

should be relatively easy for managers to determine where the delays are occurring. Once the
1. Content Index
problems are analyzed and compared to expectations, then something must be done to
2. Chapter 1
correct the results. Normally, the managers would take corrective action by working with the
3. Chapter 2
employees who were causing the delays. There could be many reasons for the delays.
4. Chapter 3
Perhaps it isn't the fault of the workers but instead is due to inadequate equipment or an
5. Chapter 4
insufficient number of workers. Whatever the problem, corrective action should be taken.
Principles of management
Principles of management are flexible, not absolute, and must be usable regardless of
changing and special conditions, listed below are fourteen. They are summarized in the
perspective.
1. Division of work. This is the specialization that economists consider necessary for
efficiency in the use of labor. Fayol applies the principle to all kinds of work, managerial
as well as technical.
2. Authority & responsibility. Here Fayol finds authority and responsibility to be related,
with the latter arising from the former. He sees authority as a combination of official
factors, deriving from the manager‘ position and personal factors.
3. Discipline. Seeing discipline as ―respect for agreements which are directed at

1. Content Index
achieving obedience, application, energy, and the outward marks of respect. Fayol
2. Chapter 1
declares that discipline requires good superiors at all levels.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3 4. Unity of command. This means that employees should receive orders from one
5. Chapter 4 superior only.
5. Unity of direction. According to this principle, each group of actives with the same
objective must have one head and one plan.
6. Subordination of individual to general interest. This is self explanatory when the two
are found to differ, management must reconcile them.
7. Remuneration. Remuneration and methods of payment should be fair and afford the
maximum possible satisfaction to employees and employer.
8. Centralization. Without using the term ―Centralization of authority.‖ Fayol refers to the
extent to which authority is concentrated or dispersed. Individual circumstances will
determine the degree that will give the best overall yield.
9. Scalar chain. Fayol thinks of this as a chain of superiors from the highest to the lowest

ranks, which, while not to be departed from needlessly, should be short circuited when
1. Content Index
to follow it scrupulously would be detrimental.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 10. Order. Breaking this into material and social order, Fayol follows the simple adage of a
4. Chapter 3 place for everything and everything in its place.
5. Chapter 4
11. Equity. Loyalty and devotion should be elicited from personnel by a combination of
kindliness and justice on the part of managers when dealing with subordinators.
12. Stability of tenure. Finding unnecessary turnover to be both the cause and the effect
of bad management, Fayol points out its dangers and costs.
13. Initiative. Initiative is conceived of as the thinking out and execution of a plan. Since it
is one of the keenest satisfactions for an intelligent man to experience.
14. Esprit de corps. This is principle that ―in union there is strength‖ as well as an
extension of the principle of unity of command, emphasizing the need for teamwork and
the importance of communication in obtaining it.
Managerial Skills

To be an effective manager, it is necessary to possess many skills. Not all managers have all
1. Content Index
the skills that would make them the most effective manager. As technology advances and
2. Chapter 1
grows, the skills that are needed by managers are constantly changing. Different levels of
3. Chapter 2
management in the organizational structure also require different types of management skills.
4. Chapter 3
Generally, however, managers need to have communication skills, human skills, computer
5. Chapter 4
skills, time-management skills, and technical skills.
Communication Skills: Communication skills fall into the broad categories of oral and
written skills, both of which managers use in many different ways. It is necessary for a
manager to orally explain processes and give direction to workers. It is also necessary for
managers to give verbal praise to workers. Managers are also expected to conduct meetings
and give talks to groups of people.
An important part of the oral communication process is listening. Managers are expected to
listen to their supervisors and to their workers. A manager must hear recommendations and
complaints on a regular basis and must be willing to follow through on what is heard. A
manager who doesn't listen is not a good communicator.
Managers are also expected to write reports, letters, memos, and policy statements. All of

these must be written in such a way that the recipient can interpret and understand what is
1. Content Index
being said. This means that managers must write clearly and concisely. Good writing requires
2. Chapter 1
good grammar and composition skills. This is something that can be learned by those aspiring
3. Chapter 2
to a management position.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 Human Skills: Relating to other people is vital in order to be a good manager. Workers
come in about every temperament that can be imagined. It takes a manager with the right
human skills to manage this variety of workers effectively. Diversity in the workplace is
commonplace. The manager must understand different personality types and cultures to be
able to supervise these workers. Human skills cannot be learned in a classroom; they are best
learned by working with people. Gaining an understanding of personality types can be learned
from books, but practice in dealing with diverse groups is the most meaningful preparation.
Computer Skills: Technology changes so rapidly it is often difficult to keep up with the
changes. It is necessary for managers to have computer skills in order to keep up with these
rapid changes. Many of the processes that occur in offices, manufacturing plants,
warehouses, and other work environments depend on computers and thus necessitate
managers and workers who can skillfully use the technology. Although computers can cause
headaches, at the same time they have simplified many of the tasks that are performed in the

workplace.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Time-Management Skills: Because the typical manager is a very busy person, it is
3. Chapter 2 important that time be managed effectively. This requires an understanding of how to allocate
4. Chapter 3 time to different projects and activities. A manager's time is often interrupted by telephone
5. Chapter 4 calls, problems with workers, meetings, others who just want to visit, and other seemingly
uncontrollable factors. It is up to the manager to learn how to manage time so that work can
be completed most efficiently. Good time-management skills can be learned, but managers
must be willing to prioritize activities, delegate, deal with interruptions, organize work, and
perform other acts that will make them better managers.
Technical Skills: Different from computer skills, technical skills are more closely
related to the tasks that are performed by workers. A manager must know what the workers
who are being supervised are doing on their jobs or assistance cannot be provided to them.
For example, a manager who is supervising accountants needs to know the accounting
processes; a manager who is supervising a machinist must know how to operate the
equipment; and a manager who supervises the construction of a home must know the
sequence of operations and how to perform them.

Management Thought
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 There are many views of management, or schools of management thought, that have evolved
3. Chapter 2 over the years. What follows is a brief discussion of some of the theories of management that
4. Chapter 3 have greatly affected how managers manage today.
5. Chapter 4
Classical Thought: The classical school of management thought emerged throughout the
late 1800s and early 1900s as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Since the beginning of
time, managers have needed to know how to perform the functions discussed earlier. The
Industrial Revolution emphasized the importance of better management as organizations grew
larger and more complex. As industry developed, managers had to develop systems for
controlling inventory, production, scheduling, and human resources. It was the managers who
emerged during the Industrial Revolution, many who had backgrounds in engineering, who
discovered that they needed organized methods in order to find solutions to problems in the
workplace.
Classical management theorists thought there was one way to solve management problems in
the industrial organization. Generally, their theories assumed that people could make logical
and rational decisions while trying to maximize personal gains from their work situations. The

classical school of management is based on scientific management which has its roots in
1. Content Index
Henri Fayol's work in France and the ideas of German sociologist Max Weber. Scientific
2. Chapter 1
management is a type of management that bases standards upon facts. The facts are
3. Chapter 2
gathered by observation, experimentation, or sound reasoning. In the United States, scientific
4. Chapter 3
management was further developed by individuals such as Charles Babbage (1792–1871),
5. Chapter 4
Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915), and Frank (1868–1924) and Lillian (1878–1972) Gilbreth.
Behavioral Management Thought: It was because the classical management theorists were
so machine-oriented that the behavioralists began to develop their thinking. The behavioral
managers began to view management from a social and psychological perspective. These
managers were concerned about the well-being of the workers and wanted them to be treated
as people, not a part of the machines.
Some of the early behavioral theorists were Robert Owen (1771–1858), a British industrialist
who was one of the first to promote management of human resources in an organization;
Hugo Munsterberg(1863–1916), the father of industrial psychology; Walter Dill Scott (1869–
1955), who believed that managers need to improve workers' attitudes and motivation in order
to increase productivity; and Mary Parker Follett (1868–1933), who believed that a manager's
influence should come naturally from his or her knowledge, skill, and leadership of others.

In the behavioral management period, there was a human relations movement. Advocates of
1. Content Index
the human relations movement believed that if managers focused on employees rather than
2. Chapter 1
on mechanistic production, then workers would become more satisfied and thus more
3. Chapter 2
productive laborers. Human relations management supported the notion that managers should
4. Chapter 3
be paternalistic and nurturing in order to build work groups that could be productive and
5. Chapter 4
satisfied.
The behavioral science movement was also an important part of the behavioral management
school. Advocates of this movement stressed the need for scientific studies of the human
element of organizations. This model for management emphasized the need for employees to
grow and develop in order to maintain a high level of self-respect and remain productive
workers. The earliest advocates of the behavioral science movement were Abraham Maslow
(1908–1970), who developed Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and Douglas McGregor (1906–
1964), who developed Theory X and Theory Y. These theories are discussed in depth in other
articles.
Contemporary Management Thought: In more recent years, new management thoughts

have emerged and influenced organizations. One of these is the sociotechnical system. A
system is a set of complementary elements that function as a unit for a specific purpose.

Systems theorists believe that all parts of the organization must be related and that managers
1. Content Index
from each part must work together for the benefit of the organization. Because of this
2. Chapter 1
relationship, what happens in one part of the organization influences and affects other parts of
3. Chapter 2
the organization.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 Another contemporary approach to managing involves contingency theories. This approach
states that the manager should use the techniques or styles that are most appropriate for the
situation and the people involved. For example, a manager of a group of Ph.D. chemists in a
laboratory would have to use different techniques from a manager of a group of teenagers in a
fastfood restaurant.
Closed Management Systems: Within the classical and behavioral approaches to

management, the managers look only within the organization to improve productivity and
efficiency. This is a closed system—the organization operates as though it is in its own
environment. Outside influence and information are blocked out.
Open Management Systems: Another perspective is the open system. As one would expect,
here the organization functions in conjunction with its external environment, acting with and
relying upon other systems. Advocates of an open system believe that an organization cannot

avoid the influence of outside forces.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 CHAPTER 2 - CHALLENGES IN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT
3. Chapter 2
Meeting the Challenges in Industrial Safety Management
4. Chapter 3
In India the construction industry is the second largest employer next to agriculture whereas it
5. Chapter 4
is next to the road accidents in our country. The annual turnover of the construction industry in
India is about 4000 Billion Rupees, which is more than 6% of the National GDP employing a
large work force. The construction works in NPCIL, are enormous. The number of fatalities
occurring from construction work in the industry is quite disturbing and fall of person from
height and through openings are the major causefor serious accidents.
For the last several years, NPCIL has been executing massive construction activity. During the
past seven years, NPCIL has taken up construction of 8 reactors at 4 locations namely
Tarapur, Kaiga, Rajasthan and Kudankulam. A faster pace of project execution with parallel
construction activities in civil, electrical, mechanical and other jobs for reducing the gestation
period through mega package contract employing more than 25,000 construction workers
have been very successful. The mobile nature of work force poses challenge in ensuring that
all of them are adequately trained.
After the completion of 2 units of Tarapur and one unit at Kaiga, at present the workforce at
construction sites is about 12,000. While successfully completing projects under construction,
NPCIL gained valuable experience in meeting several challenges in Industrial Safety
management. Construction safety management indeed is a challenging task due to the
dynamic nature of construction activity coupled with involvement of unskilled, illiterate and
mobile work force. Since the projects are located in remote regions of the country the
| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 20
surrounding population involved in construction activities is substantial. These personnel are

1. Content Index generally from an agricultural background, speaking and understanding local languages only.
2. Chapter 1 This poses additional challenge due to limitation in communication. Construction hazards are
rated as eight times more risky than those from manufacturing sector. NPCIL, proactively, has
3. Chapter 2 been conceiving, developing and implementing unique safety programs and mechanism to
4. Chapter 3 overcome this. The implementation of feedback mechanisms and developing wider
appreciation of safety among executing agencies on a continual basis, since the inception of
5. Chapter 4 nuclear power programme, has indeed paid rich dividends in achieving higher appreciation of
Industrial Safety requirements and effective implementation of the same in NPCIL.
With strong planning, effective implementation and continual training with focussed safety
management a good safety record could be achieved comparable to international level. The
average Fatal Accident Frequency Rate (FAFR) in NPCIL during last five years is 0.22
incidents / 1000 employees /year as against an estimated value of 15.8 for Indian
Construction Industries. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that FAFR for construction
industry in the US as per data published US Dept. of Labor for the year 2005 is 0.23.
However, we are not complacent and efforts to achieve the next level of excellence are being
invested on a structured manner. Therefore we need to focus on the following aspects,
• Innovation in the training methodologies to achieve higher effectiveness of training among

the contractor employees.
•
Developing and implementing Behaviour Based Safety Program to improve orientation of work
force towards safety in work.
•
Implementation of innovative engineering measures to strengthen the safety requirements at
design stages to achieve safe working environment during construction.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Training and certification, in Industrial Safety requirement, of line managers and others
responsible for construction activity essentially to enhance their perception and appreciation
3. Chapter 2 for industrial safety.
4. Chapter 3
The role of line managers and safety professionals in preventing the safety-related incidences
5. Chapter 4 is quite important. Therefore, it is necessary that safety requirements are assured on regular
basis by scrupulous field rounds and the deficiencies identified are attended to promptly.
Further, the attributes and requirements to achieve effective management of safety right from
the design stage to execution and operation must be identified and addressed appropriately
through a structured program. To achieve this prime objective, it is imperative to recognize the
important elements of the safety management system and strengthen the same at each stage.
"Key drivers for effective Industrial Safety Management"
Safety Organization
A well designed safety organization for contractors, sub-contractors and interface with
department is are very essential. Implementation of Safety is a line management function;
therefore its ownership lies with them. These line managers are to be backed up by competent
persons in Industrial safety that provide expertise and supervision of work environment and
equipment such as lifting tool, tackles, scaffolding, ladders etc used in construction. The
principles and procedures for effective safety management in NPCIL have been evolved over
a period of time and are based on the experience feedback of 170 reactor years of

construction. Scrupulous implementation and adherence to the industrial safety procedure and
1. Content Index requirements is needed to be observed at all levels as an on-going program. Some of these
2. Chapter 1 systems to identify areas of improvement and achieve enhanced industrial safety status are
enumerated below:
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3 •Safety surveillance and Safety Related Deficiency Management system
• Area-wise Task Force for enforcing safety at construction Project
5. Chapter 4 • Contractors Safety surveillance and correction programme
• Entry passes to the work site only after Induction Safety training etc.
• Periodical Safety Audits
Since the concept of mega package contract is implemented for construction activities in
industry in general and specifically in NPCIL the interface between the Safety officer of the
contractor and departmental Safety organization, for ensuring a regular communication
between them, is essential. One of the administrative controls in this regard needs to be that
contractor safety professionals functionally report to Head Industrial (Safety), of the
department. This will help in implementing safety during work.
Appreciation of Industrial Safety requirements and their implementation takes a priority

for all of us. Hence, we must develop and institute procedures, work plans and programs that
are implemented with a common understanding of utility and contractor team. In this context,
the regulatory requirements are equally important which need to be understood and
implemented in clear and unmistakable terms by all concerned including the contractor
organization.

Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and Work Procedures

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 The dynamicity, complexity and parallel activities in construction are unavoidable at
times. These activities, though planned, are carried out by the work force which is skilled in the
3. Chapter 2 execution of work but lack of awareness of safety requirements overconfidence, complacency,
4. Chapter 3 at times, leads to breach in safety requirements. Hence, a regular monitoring and surveillance
program along with coaching & mentoring of employees during execution becomes necessary
5. Chapter 4 to correct the aberrations in safety implementation. The personnel are to be given required
induction training and PEP talks.
Our objective is to ensure safe working conditions to prevent accidents, hence it is

necessary to understand and implement proactive control measures at work place prior to
execution of the work. Training to the executing team members needs to be imparted on risk
management. Therefore, risk assessment/hazard analysis has to be carried out for all
significant works. NPCIL has made a good progress in this regard. Generic JHAs have been
evolved after Risk Assessment studies for construction and O&M activities. Several
workshops have been conducted by NPCIL HQ and Sites. These JHAs need to be further
evolved at site and rigorously implemented. I am happy to note that the construction and
O&M groups are preparing detailed JHAs for all significant hazardous jobs and the risk
management measures, which emerge, are being implemented in the work procedures and
supervisory checklists. This will go a long way in further enhancement of industrial safety in
our projects and stations.
SAFETY TRAINING

1. Content Index The importance of training cannot be undermined. Over a period of time standard training
2. Chapter 1 modules have been evolved. In addition to this Pre Job Briefing and PEP talk also are given to
bring in requisite awareness to the contract and departmental employees. However for
3. Chapter 2 enhanced effectiveness of training, it is necessary to develop such training modules and
4. Chapter 3 methodology in a lucid manner, which can provide the required safety to these personnel. The
use of modern pedagogical teaching aids such as audio-visuals, mobile training with will
5. Chapter 4 improve the performance of training. I still feel that there is a scope of further improvement in
our training methodology. Hence, I suggest that the training to such a large work force should
be organized in a more structured and job specific manner through interactive methodology.
The workers who demonstrate good safety behavior and practices should be motivated by
way of rewards. Enhanced field visit by the line managers and interacting with the workers
with the philosophy of ―each one teach one‖ will go a long way in strengthening our objective
of achieving safety and desired safety culture.
Safety Related Deficiency Management:
Even with all things in place, while the construction work is in progress; Safety Related
Deficiencies (SRD) emerges either due to change in status at work floor or multiple agencies
working in parallel. SRD also get generated due to decline in safety culture. It is therefore
required that SRDs are detected and corrected promptly on a routine basis. Presently a LAN
based system of communicating SRD is in practice in our plants. The system is called ―SRD
Management System‖. In this system, the detected SRD‘s are communicated through e-mail
and reminders are automatically sent depending upon the severity assigned to the SRD. The
safety professionals/safety group is also able to get prompt feed back of corrective actions,
which are verified to close the SRD. It is intended that no SRD remains for more than 24 hrs

and thus safe work conditions and safety culture would be ensured.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
Use of Near Misses and experience feed-backs:
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3 As could be seen from the various accident dominos, before a serious or fatal accident
occurs, we get number of opportunities to correct the unsafe conditions or unsafe practices
5. Chapter 4 from the minor accidents or near misses, which occur as a precursor. These need to be
recorded, reported and analyzed as this provides immense experience feed backs for
improvement. NPCIL has a system at each site to review these feed backs and use the
lessons learnt. This is a proactive method to prevent the accident rather than investigating the
accidents once they occur. Regular campaigns for sharing in house and outside near miss
accidents should be organized. The findings of root causes through analysis of Near Miss
Accident (NMA) should be addressed by incorporation in pre job briefing or improvement of
control measures. The near miss accident identification and reporting should further grow as it
will provide us with an opportunity to further improve safety and safety culture.
It is very important that the site management and senior people during their field visits
encourage individuals to look for the error likely situations and near misses.
Safety Provisions and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Construction sites are having many types of hazards as explained earlier due to
complexity of the work environment. Even after the implementation of the safety requirements
through engineering means during design, there would be always residual risk to worker.
Thus, as a good safety culture, all workers should be ensured to use the required PPE. At
times some workers may feel some inconvenience in using the PPE, but we should

scrupulously enforce the use of PPE right from day one and each worker should be made to
1. Content Index consider these as last defense in depth to save his life. Broadly these are Safety helmets,
2. Chapter 1 Safety belts, Safety shoes, hand gloves, goggles, fall arrester etc. Personal protective
equipment should be made available near the work spot for ease of use by workers.
3. Chapter 2 I am happy to note that the use of PPE in our projects has improved to near cent
4. Chapter 3 percent. However we should not relax due to changing scenarios in work or manpower on a
day to day basis. The monitoring and correction through field visits should continue to be the
5. Chapter 4 way of life.
Safety Meetings
In order to ensure proper coordination and communication on safety aspects on a

periodical basis, it is necessary to have regular exchange of views and experience as given
below:
1. Daily interaction between Contractors‘ Safety Officer and departmental Safety in charge.
2. Monthly Safety meetings by each Works Manager of the contractor along with his Safety
Officer with departmental Safety Group.
3.Sectional Safety meetings for the departmental and contractor employees.

In addition to this the oversight of corporate safety organisation on contractor and utility
1. Content Index as a peer review mechanism when in place could identify the latent areas of improvement in
2. Chapter 1 functioning of the above systems. Recognizing this, oversight by NPCIL HQ Safety group has
been strengthened. Several periodic campaigns like cooperative campaigns, peer review
3. Chapter 2 processes has been instituted. This has indeed supported the Industrial Safety in our
4. Chapter 3 construction projects.
5. Chapter 4
Safety enforcement by line managers:
In order to achieve practical solutions and active involvement in accident prevention

safety has to be integrated with the line function. Accordingly, the line mangers should
supervise and enforce safety requirements in the works. It is the line functionaries who know a
hazard as soon as it is created. He has the power and resources to take an immediate
corrective action. Safety personnel should act as a catalyst to enable the line managers to
timely remove these hazards and any deficiency in a pro active manner.
Other key drivers.
In order to enhance the safety standards and safety culture it is imperative that the
existing programs and processes in safety implementation is to be pursued religiously.
Additionally, the following need to be taken up as a consolidated program.
a. Evolving and implementing engineering solutions such as safe access to work locations and
mechanization

1. Content Index b. Industrial Safety clauses in contract conditions which are formulated need to be pursued for
2. Chapter 1 effective implementation.
3. Chapter 2 c. Field surveillance through a structured checklist and prompt addressal of deficiencies.
4. Chapter 3
d. Ensuring administrative control of construction activities through institution of work permits,
5. Chapter 4 height pass and other work procedures.
e. Encouraging the mock exercises by performing model and mock up for complex works.
f. Certification of line managers in Industrial safety.
g. Development of a pool of line managers having Industrial Safety diploma as a long term
measure bring in still greater appreciation and regard for industrial safety.
While concluding my talk on this important topic of construction safety, I would like to
refresh you all that each site poses its own unique challenges in terms of industrial safety
requirements which have to be tackled by sincerity and professionalism. Modern management
and machinery are helpful in achieving these objectives when used in a disciplined way.
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON THE TRANS-EUROPEAN

NETWORKS
With this consultation paper, the services of the inland transport directorate of the
Directorate General for Energy and Transport of the European Commission are calling for
comments on their approach to road infrastructure safety management, with a view to

preparing a proposal for a Council and Parliament Directive on this matter.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
3. Chapter 2
In 2001 the European Union set itself the ambitious objective of halving the number of
4. Chapter 3
fatalities on European roads by 2010 (from 50 000 to 25 000). While progress is being made,
5. Chapter 4
road accidents have still caused 41.600 deaths on EU roads in 2005. This large number of
accident related deaths causes high costs to society. Besides action on behaviour and the
vehicle, infrastructure is the third pillar of the EU road safety action programme. Therefore, it is
now time to integrate the three lines of action and to address in a comprehensive way
infrastructure measures on Community level.
Present road designs result from many decades of construction and maintenance, in a time
when safety issues were not always considered to the same extent. Today, several road
features no longer meet the latest safety requirements. Moreover, traffic conditions may have
changed since the road was designed and built. While roads are usually designed according
to criteria concerning urban or regional planning, travel time, user comfort and convenience,
fuel consumption, construction cost and environmental impact, safety is often implicitly
assumed to be achieved by simply adhering to prescribed standards of alignment and layout.
Experience shows that abiding by those standards is not sufficient to avoid hazardous

features.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Many lives could be saved and many accidents avoided if the existing road
3. Chapter 2 infrastructure was managed according to the best practice of safety engineering. Action needs
to be taken on the selection of high risk road sections or black spots on the basis of local
4. Chapter 3
accident records. The thematic network EURORAP II has shown how affordable and well-
5. Chapter 4
designed engineering and enforcement measures applied in the right place can reduce the
risk that a particular type of crash might lead to death or severe injury of the occupants of the
vehicle. For instance, appropriate new signals at junctions can reduce the risk of fatal side
impacts by up to 75%; pedestrian crossings at dangerous junctions can lead to a potential
reduction of the risk of collisions with vulnerable users by up to 85%.
The thematic network IMPROVER is currently undertaking research on road traffic

signing. In a study aimed at identifying potential signing harmonization areas, experts from 17
EU Member States were asked about official traffic signs in their countries. Preliminary results
show that some signs were not recognized by more than 50 % of the experts as part of their
Official traffic signs collection, though those signs were prescribed by the ―Convention on road
signs and signals‖ of 8 November 1968 (the Vienna Convention).
In 2004, the thematic network RISER undertook a research on single vehicle crashes.
According to this study, road turns out to be a major contributing factor in one out of three fatal
1. Content Index
accidents. 27% of the accidents are the result of an impact against unfenced road side
2. Chapter 1
objects, such as trees, sign posts or poles, while impacts against safety barriers represent
3. Chapter 2
only about 24% of all impacts.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 2. ENVISAGED OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNITY ACTION
In order to tackle the problem, the Commission‘s services propose to ensure that safety
is integrated in all phases of planning, design and operation of road infrastructure on the trans-
European network. Safety should be regarded in its own right and separately from economic
and environmental analysis.
Therefore, the main objectives of Community action should be:
a) To provide road authorities and road managers with the instruments necessary to
strengthen safety to maximize the benefit to road users and the public at large, to make
safety implications of decisions more transparent and to optimise use of limited funds
for more efficient construction and maintenance roads;
b) To increase the safety of new roads through continuous adaptation to the latest
safety requirements and through a regular risk assessment;

c) To bring about a common high level of safety of roads in all EU Member States;
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 d) To create safety awareness in order to achieve informed decisions on planning and
3. Chapter 2 design;
4. Chapter 3 e) To establish a constant exchange of best practice in terms of infrastructure safety

5. Chapter 4 management; to allow the collection and the distribution of the available expertise in
order to exploit research results.
3. COMPARING POLICY OPTIONS
The services of the Commission have envisaged three options for the problem defined
above.
Option 1: No policy change.
The advantage of maintaining the status quo would be that it does not involve any direct cost
or effort for the management of infrastructure safety from the Community budget. On the other
hand, this option does not offer any guarantee that road safety will be further enhanced by
Member States.
Moreover, experience has shown that the simple exchange of best practice is not enough to

ensure appreciable results towards the objective of higher road infrastructure safety.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Option 2: To provide for Community legislation requiring the adoption of guidelines on
3. Chapter 2 infrastructure safety management, leaving the details of their implementation to Member
4. Chapter 3 States.
5. Chapter 4
Leaving Member States the freedom to adopt their own legislation on infrastructure safety
management will have several positive impacts:
it would involve significantly lower costs than the harmonisation option, since unsuitable
and expensive approaches would be avoided by Member States;
the knowledge of their already adopted road safety management approaches will
enable Member States to adopt the appropriate guidelines to implement the minimum
requirements prescribed by the Directive; more efficient and effective infrastructure
safety management instruments would be adopted all over the European Union in a
shorter time and would immediately contribute to saving lives on the European roads;
comparing the different approaches adopted by the Member States and their effects will
allow the Commission and the Member States to identify best practices and to possibly
adopt further harmonised guidelines which can be progressively extended to Member

States.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 Option 3: To provide for stringent Community legislation aimed at introducing defined and
4. Chapter 3 harmonised common infrastructure safety management standards in the Member States.
5. Chapter 4
The harmonisation of Member States legislation on road safety assessment, audits,
management and inspections, would provide common instruments to strengthen safety to
maximise the benefit to road users and the public at large. These instruments would be
coherent and homogeneous and would guarantee that common minimum safety requirements
are reached on the Trans European Road Network.
However, obtaining an extended harmonisation could face the opposition of Member States,
creating many difficulties for them:
most of the Member States would have to reorganize their road safety
practices and legislation, even if already adopted and effective; this would
involve huge investments for Member States;
The large differences between the already existing road safety approaches
would create political conflicts among Member States and the Commission;

common harmonised guidelines would not take into account organisational

1. Content Index
and socio-cultural differences between the Member States, as well as
2. Chapter 1
differences in the size, the quality, the use and the need for safety
3. Chapter 2
improvement of road networks. As a consequence, their effectiveness could
4. Chapter 3
not be assured; the harmonisation process would require time to be finalized;
5. Chapter 4
the consequent number of lives saved would only be appreciated years later
and would only partially justify the huge efforts and costs for Member States.
4. MEASURES USED IN EU MEMBER STATES
Four basic types of measures are currently in use in EU Member States and, if found to
correspond to best practices, could be considered to improve road infrastructure safety in the
European Union as a whole.
Road safety impact assessment
Approval procedures of new roads or reconstruction works take into account economic
data, environmental effects and traffic impacts, but they frequently fall short of understanding
the safety implications of a project. Through road safety impact assessments, one could

ensure that the safety impacts (especially on surrounding networks and other transports) are
1. Content Index
fully assessed, documented and transparent before a choice is made between alternative
2. Chapter 1
projects.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3 Road safety impact assessments could take place at an early planning stage to allow
5. Chapter 4 the results of the assessment to influence the further planning process, as in the case of
environmental impact assessment. Moreover, one could consider carrying them out on all
transport policy measures having an influence on road safety, including e.g. infrastructure
investments, standardisation, pricing etc.
The results of a safety impact assessment could be taken into account in the decision,
which of the alternative scenarios should be selected. When a decision has been taken, the
competent entity might inform the public and the authorities concerned of the content of the
decision and the reasons and considerations on which the decision is based, in application of
regulation on public access to document.

Road safety audits

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Once a road design has been chosen, possibly dangerous road elements could be
3. Chapter 2 identified and rectified, to ensure that no safety requirement had been underestimated in the
4. Chapter 3 previous planning. Road safety audits provide the tools and know-how to identify possible
5. Chapter 4 mistakes before the road is cast in concrete. Introducing early improvements and corrections
at the planning and design stages may allow the social and economic costs of accidents to be
reduced.
The auditors could be required to have experience in road design, road engineering
and accident analysis and not be involved in the conception or operation of the concerned
infrastructure project. Where the design has not been rectified following an observation in the
audit report, the infrastructure manager may be asked to state the reasons.
Network safety management
Network safety management analyses networks to find measures that have the highest
accident reduction potential, i.e. it will consider the parts of the network where most can be
gained in relation to the cost. Identification of high-risk road sections or black spots may be
done to target action on stretches of road where high numbers of fatal and severe accidents

happen or can be expected. Safety gains expected could be quite high during the first years of
1. Content Index
a high-risk site management programme. This is why infrastructure providers could be asked
2. Chapter 1
to mobilise the critical resources in staff, know-how and finance to substantially and quickly
3. Chapter 2
reduce the number of serious and fatal road accidents.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 Once high-risk road sections or black spots have been dealt with, the safety quality of
the whole network may be improved. Assessments could range from identifying and treating
accident patterns at single high-risk sites or black spots to understanding and managing safety
over whole routes.
Safety inspections
One may also consider inspecting and remedying safety deficits in locations without a
past record of high accident numbers. Such safety inspections may then be carried out
periodically. They would be undertaken in the context of a safety programme and target
sensitive points like road works, level crossings, signing, tree lines and night visibility. Regular
inspections would also help identify transient changes affecting the condition and visibility of
the signs and markings, for example.
The inspections could enable a risk analysis to indicate both where accidents are likely

to happen and which action is appropriate. The risk analysis approach could be used to
1. Content Index
establish links between certain design elements and accident occurrence in order to compare
2. Chapter 1
route sections with desired safety principles. Accident reports can play a crucial role in
3. Chapter 2
improving road infrastructure. They should identify relevant accident types. This information
4. Chapter 3
would be made available to allow the identification of high-risk sites or black spots, as well as
5. Chapter 4
the selection and ranking of effective remedial measures.
CHAPTER 3
SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR AN OUTDOOR ORGANIZATION
This article is designed to provide a short outline of the areas that should be evaluated
in order to develop a comprehensive Safety Management Program for your organization.
I prefer the term Safety Management over Risk Management (which has a number of
connotations). Safety Management has the more positive connotation of taking an active role
to manage the safety of your program. At the same time, you cannot have a safe program
without being aware of the potential risks and managing them as well as possible. No matter
how well prepared we are, there will be accidents. By having a thorough Safety Management
Program, you can significantly reduce the Accident Potential and the number and severity of
accidents.
| CHAPTER 3 40
1. Content Index
Every program is different-College and University outdoor programs, secondary school
2. Chapter 1
programs, professional outfitters, and recreational activity. Some have paid staff while others
3. Chapter 2
are all volunteer. Each organization will need to determine the amount of resources that can
4. Chapter 3
be reasonably allocated to a Safety Management Program. In order to determine the type of
5. Chapter 4
Safety Management Program to implement, every outdoor/adventure-based organization
needs to do a thorough Risk Assessment Analysis. Some might question the need for such an
assessment. A recreational activity club might say, we only inform people about trips and all
our folks are experienced, they sign a waiver and the club assumes no responsibility for them.
My answer to that would be one still needs to do a thorough Risk Assessment. If, after that
assessment, the club feels that it‘s current policies and practices are sound, so be it. However,
many clubs have simply adopted such practices by tradition without doing a thorough analysis.
As an outdoor program director, I feel that offering outdoor activities to client groups entails a
responsibility to provide as safe an environment for enjoying that activity as possible. This is
as true on a paid trip as it is with a free club trip, as it is when we go out with friends. I believe
that those with greater knowledge and experience about the wilderness have an ethical
obligation to share this knowledge with others to improve their capabilities to enjoy the
wilderness safely.
| Safety Management Program for an Outdoor Organization 41

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
1. Program Analysis
Safety Management begins with an in-depth program analysis to identify the areas of possible
risk. This analysis should be performed on each activity that is offered. [In some cases, you
might decide to do the analysis of your leaders first and then, based on the skill levels of your
leaders, determine what activities you can offer at what levels . The analysis should include:
• Activities - the types of program activities (canoeing, hiking, rock climbing, etc.) will all have
different types of Environmental Hazards and potential accidents
• What are the risk management factors in the activity? Which can be controlled and which
cannot be controlled?
• What skills are needed by participants?
• What skills are needed by leaders?

• What equipment is needed?

1. Content Index
• What training in the use of the equipment is needed by leaders, participants?
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
• Populations - there are a number of factors in the populations that you program for that can
4. Chapter 3
have impacts on safety. These include:
5. Chapter 4
• Age of participants
• Previous experience - programs that are introducing new people to outdoor activities versus
programs that are providing activities for experienced outdoors persons or program with a mix
of both.
• Physical condition
• Mental & emotional conditions
• Willingness to participate - voluntary (free or paying to attend) versus required to attend.
• Locations - the location of the activity is also an important factor
• How much travel and what type of travel are required to get to the activity and return?
• How will the participants or group travel? Individual cars, group vehicle, who is driving?

• How remote is the activity? Activities that are more remote may require additional support
1. Content Index
and have less chance for rescue in an emergency. This may require the group to operate at a
2. Chapter 1
lower level of difficulty than in an area closer to ―civilization.‖ For example, paddlers on remote
3. Chapter 2
whitewater rivers will often increase the rating of a rapid by one class because of the
4. Chapter 3
remoteness.
5. Chapter 4
• Weather - typical weather for the activity, location, and season will be a significant factor in
determining the experience level, physical condition, age, and experience level of those who
are appropriate to go on a trip.
2. Participants
Who participates in the trip is important. There are a number of factors that define
different levels of ―relationship‖ between the participant and the sponsoring organization. As a
result, there are different levels of responsibility both from an educational and ethical
perspective and from a legal/contract perspective that develop between the participant and the
sponsoring organization. These include:
• Is the participant paying a fee to go or is someone else paying (such as a parent), or is the

person going at no cost?

1. Content Index
• Is the person providing all their own equipment or is the sponsoring organization providing
2. Chapter 1
some or all equipment?
3. Chapter 2
• How was the program advertised? Was it announced in some official publication or
4. Chapter 3
newsletter? Did the participant have to sign up or register in some way?
5. Chapter 4
• Does the participant sign a waiver or release?
• What, if any, implied or explicit contract exists between the participant and the sponsoring
organization?
3. Leaders & Leader Training

Who ―leads‖ a trip varies greatly from program to program. In some cases there is a
paid leader, in others the leader is a volunteer, and in some there is no leader, everyone just
meets some place and goes. The common adventurer model is a format often used by
recreational activity clubs where no one is designated as a leader or officially in charge. In
some cases, where the experience level of all participants is high, the common
adventurer model works extremely well. All of the participants have the knowledge and
experience to do the activity safely and clearly understand and accept the potential risks. For
many clubs however, the club serves to introduce beginners to the outdoors and I believe this

creates at least an ethical obligation to structure activities to provide a safe environment for
1. Content Index
participants who do not have the experience and judgment (yet) to understand and protect
2. Chapter 1
them from potential risk. This means that the organization is not just the activity, it is about
3. Chapter 2
educating people about how to do the activity and do it both safely and with proper respect for
4. Chapter 3
the wilderness. This is the role taken on by the trip leader, teaching skills to those with less
5. Chapter 4
experience and managing safety for the group.
In any activity in which a designated leader is provided, one can identify certain base skills
that that individual(s) should have in order to safely lead the trip. Clearly, individuals who are
paid for leading trips can be considered professionals and can be required by the organization
to meet certain standards for training and certification in order to lead trips. However, what
happens when the individual is a volunteer? How much training can you ask or require that
volunteer to have? This becomes a real issue of balance. The volunteer is a paraprofessional
who cannot reasonably be required to have the same skills as a professional. However, if
someone breaks their leg on a trip, the volunteer may need a similar range of skills to be able
to deal with the situation. Each program will need to determine the reasonable balance of
skills and training necessary to lead trips safely. It is essential to balance the difficulty level of
the trip with the level of experience and training of the leaders. Also, organizations should
always be striving to improve the quality of leader skills and training. Finally, there are some

basic skills and equipment that should be present on any excursion into the outdoors (first aid
1. Content Index
knowledge, first aid kit, experience with the particular activity, etc.). If the participants don‘t
2. Chapter 1
have the knowledge to do this, someone has to take responsibility to provide these things,
3. Chapter 2
which falls back to the sponsoring organization, and, ultimately, an identified trip leader. Based
4. Chapter 3
on these arguments, if a group is going to provide leaders on an activity, you need look at the
5. Chapter 4
Base Skills that are required. These include:
• Activity Skills - hiking, canoeing, backpacking, climbing, etc.,

• First Aid & Emergency Procedures
• Knowledge of the Dynamics of Accidents Model & Safety Management
• Leadership & Group Dynamics Skills
• Understanding the Philosophy of the Organization - an understanding of the goals and
philosophy of the organization is important for trip leaders to both articulate why things are
done a particular way and to effectively enforce policies, procedures and guidelines of the
organization (see below).
In addition there are other issues that you will need to deal with when working with a
pool of leaders.
• Leader Skills Records - maintaining records on each leader including such things as first

aid and CPR training and/or certifications, other trainings, field experience, and trips led
1. Content Index
• Ongoing leader assessment - some form of feedback/assessment is important both to the
2. Chapter 1
growth and development of the individual leader and to the overall safety of the program.
3. Chapter 2
When an individual is doing well, they need positive feedback about their performance. If
4. Chapter 3
someone is doing a poor job of leading, they cannot be expected to improve without honest,
5. Chapter 4
constructive feedback and direction. Following that, if the person does not improve, someone
in the organization may need to tell them that they cannot lead until they improve. This can be
a difficult step, especially with volunteers. However, failure to address a safety problem in
leader behavior could lead to an accident.
• Skill Updates - skills get rusty if not used on a regular basis so some method of skill
review/practice
• Manuals - providing manuals and reference material to take into the field for additional
information can be extremely valuable.
4. Pre-trip Information
Participants need to be informed about a number of things before a trip goes out.
• Activity - type of activity, location, duration
• Skill level/Difficulty level of the activity - a measure of the difficulty of the activity. Having

some rating mechanism, either universal, or developed by your organization

1. Content Index
or a detailed description of the trip is essential to help participants select a trip appropriate to
2. Chapter 1
their physical abilities and their experience level. It is also invaluable in screening participants .
3. Chapter 2
In some cases the difficulty of the trip is not determined until the participants sign up in which
4. Chapter 3
case you will need to do a careful screening to determine what level of trip you can safely run
5. Chapter 4
with those participants.
• Equipment Needed - what the participant needs to provide and what if anything the
organization will provide. In some cases, participants who do not have the proper equipment
would not be permitted to go.
• Policies - participants need to be informed in advance of policies of the organization (such
as no alcohol or drugs, no non-members, etc.)
• Waivers, Assumption of Risk forms, etc. - any such documents used but the organization
should be administered to participants before the activity begins when they have an
opportunity to read and carefully consider it and to decide whether to sign or not. If they
choose not to sign, the organization‘s policies may indicate that the person cannot attend.
Clearly it is best for this to happen beforehand not at the trailhead.
5. Participant Screening

Pre-trip screening of participants is important both to maintain safety for the individual and also
1. Content Index
for the rest of the group. If someone has a problem on the trail, the other group members may
2. Chapter 1
be called on to deal with it that could place them at risk. Part of the screening process is to
3. Chapter 2
educate the participate to decide whether a particular activity is right for them. If your obese
4. Chapter 3
brother wanted to get in shape by running in a road race, you would not suggest that he start
5. Chapter 4
by running a marathon. Rather you would guide him to work up at a reasonable pace of
running until he was ready for a short race like a 5K. Self-screening is very useful which is why
pre-trip information and a rating system can be very important. Screening also means that you
need to be able to ―just say no‖ if you believe that person is not ready for the activity at that
level or that their participation could create an unacceptable level of risk for other participants.
Participant screening should include:
• Medical History Information - in order to get accurate information from participants it must
be understood that this information will be kept confidential. As a trip leader, I may need to
know that someone has a seizure disorder and understand what to do if they have a seizure
on the trip. At the same time, the individual may not wish the entire group to know about their
condition. This is another reason why a designated leader is useful. It establishes someone in
the group who has responsibilities including the need to maintain confidentiality.

Some of the things you may need information on include:

1. Content Index
• Health History
2. Chapter 1
• Allergies
3. Chapter 2
• Medications
4. Chapter 3
• Dietary restrictions
5. Chapter 4
• Required Immunizations
• Physical Condition - it is important to have an assessment of the participant‘s current
physical condition (basic aerobic condition). This serves as a check on whether the person is
physically capable of safely participating in the activity at the indicated difficulty level or, if the
activity itself is based on the participants who sign up, what level of trip should be planned.
• Previous Experience - a check on previous experience with the activity, how much, how
frequently, at what level of difficulty and how recently is important. If someone signs up for a
Class IV paddling trip and they haven‘t paddled Class IV in over 5 years, only a few Class II
runs, you may want to really check out that person before letting them go on the trip, or ―just
say no.‖ The most positive way to do this is to have the person go on a Class II warm-up trip
first and see how s/he does.
• Other Information -
• Address and phone

• Medical Insurance Provider

1. Content Index
• Who to contact in an emergency
2. Chapter 1
• Permission for medical treatment
3. Chapter 2
• Equipment Needs
4. Chapter 3
• Special Needs
5. Chapter 4
6. Trip Planning
Trip planning is essential to operating a safe program. There are a number of issues
• Route
• Weather
• Equipment Needed
• Personal Equipment - what does the individual provide, what (if anything) does the
organization provide.
• Group Equipment - what (if anything) does the organization provide such as first aid kit.
• File a Trip Plan - whenever a trip goes out, a trip plan indicating the planned route and
planned time of return should be filed with someone. This person should be contacted when
the group returns. If the group does not return by a designated time, a procedure should be in
place for what to do (call the rangers, etc.)

• Who is in Charge? - it is important that everyone understand who is in charge and under
1. Content Index
what circumstances. In the case of a trip with designated leaders they would typically be in
2. Chapter 1
charge unless someone else in the group has more experience (for example, a participant
3. Chapter 2
with more medical experience such as a EMT or physician might be the most appropriate one
4. Chapter 3
to take charge in the case of a medical emergency). In the case of a ―common adventurer‖ trip
5. Chapter 4
there should be discussion about who is generally in charge for the trip and/or who is in
charge in an emergency. All serious expeditions consider this an essential part of running a
safe trip.
• Emergency Protocols - there should be some understood protocols for dealing with
common emergencies.
7. Participant Training
Whenever some of the participants are less experienced than the leaders or others in the
group, education becomes an important role for the trip leaders and an essential part of a
Safety Management Program. Your goal is to have the participants be looking out for their
own safety. One of the important things to do is to teach the Dynamics of Accidents Model to
all participants. There are a number of things to think about when teaching
skills:

• Teach the Dynamics of Accidents Model - this encourages participants to actively manage
1. Content Index
their own safety.
2. Chapter 1
• Utilize a Teaching Plan - develop a teaching plan that presents skills in a logical an orderly
3. Chapter 2
manner, building on skills that came before. This is important for successful skill mastery by
4. Chapter 3
the participants.
5. Chapter 4
8. Policies, Procedures, & Guidelines

An important part of a Safety Management Program is defining policies, procedures, and
guidelines for operation.
These are defined below in descending order of strictness:
• Policy - a statement that establishes definitive parameters for program operation. For
example, all participants and leaders on kayaking trips must where a life jacket or all trip
participants must sign an Assumption of Risk form. In general, something which is important
enough to be considered a policy should be adhered to uniformly and consistently. Liability
often arises from inconsistent application of policies.
• Procedure - a method for acting in a particular situation. Procedures are typically less
mandatory than policies. For example, when doing a stream crossing with a backpack, the hip

belt should be undone. Having this as a procedure gives some of the decision-making to the
1. Content Index
trip leaders. If the stream has only 6 inches of water in it, this procedure may not be
2. Chapter 1
necessary.
3. Chapter 2
• Guidelines - a recommendation for how to proceed in a situation. For example, food should
4. Chapter 3
be hung in bear bags at night (sometimes this may not be possible). There should be policies,
5. Chapter 4
procedures, and guidelines for each activity the organization engages in (hiking, canoeing,
kayaking, rock climbing, etc.,). What policies, procedures, and guidelines to use varies greatly
from organization to organization. What one organization might use as a policy (ex. there must
be two leaders with first aid certification on each trip) might be a guideline for another
organization. In terms of specific activities such as hiking, canoeing, kayaking, rock climbing,
etc., there are a number of policies, procedures, and guidelines that are generally accepted
within the outdoor industry. It is important for all organizations to understand that many of
these exist as published standards. Regardless of whether your leaders are paid or volunteer
or common adventurers, if you are doing an activity you will be held to that standard. For
example, if an Outward Bound group goes top rope climbing and next to them on the cliff a
Boy Scout group is climbing the accepted industry standards for setting up and operating both
climbs would be the same regardless of the fact that the Outward Bound leader is paid and
the Boy Scout leader is a volunteer. The most complete documentation for these standards is

found in The Manual of Accreditation Standards for Adventure Programs published by the
1. Content Index
Association for Experiential Education. There are also a number of agencies and
2. Chapter 1
organizations that provided similar standards such as the American Camping Association and
3. Chapter 2
the Girl Scouts of America for a broad range of outdoor activities, and groups that set
4. Chapter 3
standards for specific activities such as the American Canoe Association, the British Canoe
5. Chapter 4
Union for paddling. You should also seek out organizations similar to yours to determine what
they are doing and how successful (or not) their policies, procedures, and guidelines have
been to their Safety Management Program.
9. Incident Data Collection & Analysis

When an accident occurs, it is essential to collect detailed information about what happened,
analyze it carefully, and determine if there are changes that need to be made in the program
to reduce the possibility of a similar incident occurring in the future.
• Accident Reporting - there needs to be a reporting structure that includes a written report of
the incident. There also needs to be an established threshold for what should be reported
(obviously every Band-Aid or piece of Moleskin applied in the field does not require a written
report).
• Close Call Reporting - there are more close calls and near misses than there are actual

accidents. If you only analyze accidents, you are missing the big picture and may be leaving
1. Content Index
important safety issues unresolved. There should be a reporting structure that may include a
2. Chapter 1
written report. For example, a kayaking boat pin where no one was injured counts as a near
3. Chapter 2
miss and should be carefully analyzed.
4. Chapter 3
• Data Analysis - a structure should be developed for routinely examining accident and close
5. Chapter 4
call reports to evaluate Environmental Hazards and Human Factor Hazards that contributed to
the incident and to determine if there are policies, procedures, guidelines, training, or
equipment which could help either prevent the incident in the future or give leaders a better
ability to respond to it if it happens again. In the kayaking pin example above, this might mean
that although pins cannot be prevented, leaders could be trained in river rescue techniques to
extricate a person from a pin. Often the data analysis is performed by a Safety Officer or
Safety Committee.
• Implementing Program Change - following data analysis there needs to be structure for
implementing the recommendations into the trip operation. The implementation of program
change may be done by a Safety Officer, Safety Committee, or another body within the
organization. The information provided here is designed for educational use only and is not a
substitute for specific training or experience. Princeton University and the author assume no
liability for any individual‘s use of or reliance upon any material contained or referenced

herein.
1. Content Index
Quality and Safety Concerns in Construction
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 Quality control and safety represent increasingly important concerns for project
4. Chapter 3 managers. Defects or failures in constructed facilities can result in very large costs. Even with
5. Chapter 4 minor defects, re-construction may be required and facility operations impaired. Increased
costs and delays are the result. In the worst case, failures may cause personal injuries or
fatalities. Accidents during the construction process can similarly result in personal injuries and
large costs. Indirect costs of insurance, inspection and regulation are increasing rapidly due to
these increased direct costs. Good project managers try to ensure that the job is done right
the first time and that no major accidents occur on the project.
As with cost control, the most important decisions regarding the quality of a completed
facility are made during the design and planning stages rather than during construction. It is
during these preliminary stages that component configurations, material specifications and
functional performance are decided. Quality control during construction consists largely of
insuring conformance to these original design and planning decisions.
While conformance to existing design decisions is the primary focus of quality control,
| Quality and Safety Concerns in Construction 58

there are exceptions to this rule. First, unforeseen circumstances, incorrect design decisions
1. Content Index
or changes desired by an owner in the facility function may require re-evaluation of design
2. Chapter 1
decisions during the course of construction. While these changes may be motivated by the
3. Chapter 2
concern for quality, they represent occasions for re-design with all the attendant objectives
4. Chapter 3
and constraints. As a second case, some designs rely upon informed and appropriate decision
5. Chapter 4
making during the construction process itself. For example, some tunneling methods make
decisions about the amount of shoring required at different locations based upon observation
of soil conditions during the tunneling process. Since such decisions are based on better
information concerning actual site conditions, the facility design may be more cost effective as
a result. Any special case of re-design during construction requires the various considerations
discussed in Chapter 3.
With the attention to conformance as the measure of quality during the construction
process, the specification of quality requirements in the design and contract documentation
becomes extremely important. Quality requirements should be clear and verifiable, so that all
parties in the project can understand the requirements for conformance. Much of the
discussion in this chapter relates to the development and the implications of different quality
requirements for construction as well as the issues associated with insuring conformance.

Safety during the construction project is also influenced in large part by decisions made
1. Content Index
during the planning and design process. Some designs or construction plans are inherently
2. Chapter 1
difficult and dangerous to implement, whereas other, comparable plans may considerably
3. Chapter 2
reduce the possibility of accidents. For example, clear separation of traffic from construction
4. Chapter 3
zones during roadway rehabilitation can greatly reduce the possibility of accidental collisions.
5. Chapter 4
Beyond these design decisions, safety largely depends upon education, vigilance and
cooperation during the construction process. Workers should be constantly alert to the
possibilities of accidents and avoid taken unnecessary risks.
Organizing for Quality and Safety
A variety of different organizations are possible for quality and safety control during
construction. One common model is to have a group responsible for quality assurance and
another group primarily responsible for safety within an organization. In large organizations,
departments dedicated to quality assurance and to safety might assign specific individuals to
assume responsibility for these functions on particular projects. For smaller projects, the
project manager or an assistant might assume these and other responsibilities. In either case,
insuring safe and quality construction is a concern of the project manager in overall charge of
the project in addition to the concerns of personnel, cost, time and other management issues.

Inspectors and quality assurance personnel will be involved in a project to represent a

1. Content Index
variety of different organizations. Each of the parties directly concerned with the project may
2. Chapter 1
have their own quality and safety inspectors, including the owner, the engineer/architect, and
3. Chapter 2
the various constructor firms. These inspectors may be contractors from specialized quality
4. Chapter 3
assurance organizations. In addition to on-site inspections, samples of materials will
5. Chapter 4
commonly be tested by specialized laboratories to insure compliance. Inspectors to insure
compliance with regulatory requirements will also be involved. Common examples are
inspectors for the local government's building department, for environmental agencies, and for
occupational health and safety agencies.
The US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) routinely conducts site
visits of work places in conjunction with approved state inspection agencies. OSHA inspectors
are required by law to issue citations for all standard violations observed. Safety standards
prescribe a variety of mechanical safeguards and procedures; for example, ladder safety is
covered by over 140 regulations. In cases of extreme non-compliance with standards, OSHA
inspectors can stop work on a project. However, only a small fraction of construction sites are
visited by OSHA inspectors and most construction site accidents are not caused by violations
of existing standards. As a result, safety is largely the responsibility of the managers on site
rather than that of public inspectors.
While the multitude of participants involved in the construction process require the
1. Content Index
services of inspectors, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that inspectors are only a formal
2. Chapter 1
check on quality control. Quality control should be a primary objective for all the members of a
3. Chapter 2
project team. Managers should take responsibility for maintaining and improving quality
4. Chapter 3
control. Employee participation in quality control should be sought and rewarded, including the
5. Chapter 4
introduction of new ideas. Most important of all, quality improvement can serve as a catalyst
for improved productivity. By suggesting new work methods, by avoiding rework, and by
avoiding long term problems, good quality control can pay for itself. Owners should promote
good quality control and seek out contractors who maintain such standards.
In addition to the various organizational bodies involved in quality control, issues of

quality control arise in virtually all the functional areas of construction activities. For example,
insuring accurate and useful information is an important part of maintaining quality
performance. Other aspects of quality control include document control (including changes
during the construction process), procurement, field inspection and testing, and final checkout
of the facility.
Work and Material Specifications

1. Content Index Specifications of work quality are an important feature of facility designs. Specifications
2. Chapter 1 of required quality and components represent part of the necessary documentation to describe
3. Chapter 2 a facility. Typically, this documentation includes any special provisions of the facility design as
4. Chapter 3 well as references to generally accepted specifications to be used during construction.
5. Chapter 4
General specifications of work quality are available in numerous fields and are issued in
publications of organizations such as the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM),
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), or the Construction Specifications Institute
(CSI). Distinct specifications are formalized for particular types of construction activities, such
as welding standards issued by the American Welding Society, or for particular facility types,
such as the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges issued by the American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials. These general specifications must be modified
to reflect local conditions, policies, available materials, local regulations and other special
circumstances.
Construction specifications normally consist of a series of instructions or prohibitions for

specific operations. For example, the following passage illustrates a typical specification, in
this case for excavation for structures:

Conform to elevations and dimensions shown on plan within a tolerance of plus or

1. Content Index
minus 0.10 foot, and extending a sufficient distance from footings and foundations to permit
2. Chapter 1
placing and removal of concrete formwork, installation of services, other construction, and for
3. Chapter 2
inspection. In excavating for footings and foundations, take care not to disturb bottom of
4. Chapter 3
excavation. Excavate by hand to final grade just before concrete reinforcement is placed. Trim
5. Chapter 4
bottoms to required lines and grades to leave solid base to receive concrete.
This set of specifications requires judgment in application since some items are not
precisely specified. For example, excavation must extend a "sufficient" distance to permit
inspection and other activities. Obviously, the term "sufficient" in this case may be subject to
varying interpretations. In contrast, a specification that tolerances are within plus or minus a
tenth of a foot is subject to direct measurement. However, specific requirements of the facility
or characteristics of the site may make the standard tolerance of a tenth of a foot
inappropriate. Writing specifications typically requires a trade-off between assuming
reasonable behavior on the part of all the parties concerned in interpreting words such as
"sufficient" versus the effort and possible inaccuracy in pre-specifying all operations.
In recent years, performance specifications have been developed for many construction
operations. Rather than specifying the required construction process, these specifications

refer to the required performance or quality of the finished facility. The exact method by which
1. Content Index
this performance is obtained is left to the construction contractor. For example, traditional
2. Chapter 1
specifications for asphalt pavement specified the composition of the asphalt material, the
3. Chapter 2
asphalt temperature during paving, and compacting procedures. In contrast, a performance
4. Chapter 3
specification for asphalt would detail the desired performance of the pavement with respect to
5. Chapter 4
impermeability, strength, etc. How the desired performance level was attained would be up to
the paving contractor. In some cases, the payment for asphalt paving might increase with
better quality of asphalt beyond some minimum level of performance.
Example 13-1: Concrete Pavement Strength
Concrete pavements of superior strength result in cost savings by delaying the time at
which repairs or re-construction is required. In contrast, concrete of lower quality will
necessitate more frequent overlays or other repair procedures. Contract provisions with
adjustments to the amount of a contractor's compensation based on pavement quality have
become increasingly common in recognition of the cost savings associated with higher quality
construction. Even if a pavement does not meet the "ultimate" design standard, it is still worth
using the lower quality pavement and re-surfacing later rather than completely rejecting the
pavement. Based on these life cycle cost considerations, a typical pay schedule might be:

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Load Ratio Pay Factor
5. Chapter 4
<0.50 Reject
0.50-0.69 0.90
0.70-0.89 0.95
0.90-1.09 1.00
1.10-1.29 1.05
1.30-1.49 1.10
>1.50 1.12
In this table, the Load Ratio is the ratio of the actual pavement strength to the desired
design strength and the Pay Factor is a fraction by which the total pavement contract amount
is multiplied to obtain the appropriate compensation to the contractor. For example, if a
contractor achieves concrete strength twenty percent greater than the design specification,

then the load ratio is 1.20 and the appropriate pay factor is 1.05, so the contractor receives a
1. Content Index
five percent bonus. Load factors are computed after tests on the concrete actually used in a
2. Chapter 1
pavement. Note that a 90% pay factor exists in this case with even pavement quality only 50%
3. Chapter 2
of that originally desired. This high pay factor even with weak concrete strength might exist
4. Chapter 3
since much of the cost of pavements are incurred in preparing the pavement foundation.
5. Chapter 4
Concrete strengths of less then 50% are cause for complete rejection in this case, however.
Total Quality Control
Quality control in construction typically involves insuring compliance with minimum

standards of material and workmanship in order to insure the performance of the facility
according to the design. These minimum standards are contained in the specifications
described in the previous section. For the purpose of insuring compliance, random samples
and statistical methods are commonly used as the basis for accepting or rejecting work
completed and batches of materials. Rejection of a batch is based on non-conformance or
violation of the relevant design specifications. Procedures for this quality control practice are
described in the following sections.

An implicit assumption in these traditional quality control practices is the notion of an

1. Content Index
acceptable quality level which is a allowable fraction of defective items. Materials obtained
2. Chapter 1
from suppliers or work performed by an organization is inspected and passed as acceptable if
3. Chapter 2
the estimated defective percentage is within the acceptable quality level. Problems with
4. Chapter 3
materials or goods are corrected after delivery of the product.
5. Chapter 4
In contrast to this traditional approach of quality control is the goal of total quality
control. In this system, no defective items are allowed anywhere in the construction process.
While the zero defects goal can never be permanently obtained, it provides a goal so that an
organization is never satisfied with its quality control program even if defects are reduced by
substantial amounts year after year. This concept and approach to quality control was first
developed in manufacturing firms in Japan and Europe, but has since spread to many
construction companies. The best known formal certification for quality improvement is the
International Organization for Standardization's ISO 9000 standard. ISO 9000 emphasizes
good documentation, quality goals and a series of cycles of planning, implementation and
review.
Total quality control is a commitment to quality expressed in all parts of an organization

and typically involves many elements. Design reviews to insure safe and effective construction

procedures are a major element. Other elements include extensive training for personnel,
1. Content Index
shifting the responsibility for detecting defects from quality control inspectors to workers, and
2. Chapter 1
continually maintaining equipment. Worker involvement in improved quality control is often
3. Chapter 2
formalized in quality circles in which groups of workers meet regularly to make suggestions for
4. Chapter 3
quality improvement. Material suppliers are also required to insure zero defects in delivered
5. Chapter 4
goods. Initally, all materials from a supplier are inspected and batches of goods with any
defective items are returned. Suppliers with good records can be certified and not subject to
complete inspection subsequently.
The traditional microeconomic view of quality control is that there is an "optimum"

proportion of defective items. Trying to achieve greater quality than this optimum would
substantially increase costs of inspection and reduce worker productivity. However, many
companies have found that commitment to total quality control has substantial economic
benefits that had been unappreciated in traditional approaches. Expenses associated with
inventory, rework, scrap and warranties were reduced. Worker enthusiasm and commitment
improved. Customers often appreciated higher quality work and would pay a premium for good
quality. As a result, improved quality control became a competitive advantage.
Of course, total quality control is difficult to apply, particular in construction. The unique

nature of each facility, the variability in the workforce, the multitude of subcontractors and the
1. Content Index
cost of making necessary investments in education and procedures make programs of total
2. Chapter 1
quality control in construction difficult. Nevertheless, a commitment to improved quality even
3. Chapter 2
without endorsing the goal of zero defects can pay real dividends to organizations.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 Experience with Quality Circles
Quality circles represent a group of five to fifteen workers who meet on a frequent basis to
identify, discuss and solve productivity and quality problems. A circle leader acts as liason
between the workers in the group and upper levels of management. Appearing below are
some examples of reported quality circle accomplishments in construction:
1. On a highway project under construction by Taisei Corporation, it was found that the
loss rate of ready-mixed concrete was too high. A quality circle composed of cement
masons found out that the most important reason for this was due to an inaccurate
checking method. By applying the circle's recommendations, the loss rate was reduced
by 11.4%.
2. In a building project by Shimizu Construction Company, may cases of faulty reinforced
concrete work were reported. The iron workers quality circle examined their work

thoroughly and soon the faulty workmanship disappeared. A 10% increase in

1. Content Index
productivity was also achieved.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 Quality Control by Statistical Methods
4. Chapter 3
An ideal quality control program might test all materials and work on a particular facility.
5. Chapter 4
For example, non-destructive techniques such as x-ray inspection of welds can be used
throughout a facility. An on-site inspector can witness the appropriateness and adequacy of
construction methods at all times. Even better, individual craftsmen can perform continuing
inspection of materials and their own work. Exhaustive or 100% testing of all materials and
work by inspectors can be exceedingly expensive, however. In many instances, testing
requires the destruction of a material sample, so exhaustive testing is not even possible. As a
result, small samples are used to establish the basis of accepting or rejecting a particular work
item or shipment of materials. Statistical methods are used to interpret the results of test on a
small sample to reach a conclusion concerning the acceptability of an entire lot or batch of
materials or work products.
The use of statistics is essential in interpreting the results of testing on a small sample.
Without adequate interpretation, small sample testing results can be quite misleading. As an

example, suppose that there are ten defective pieces of material in a lot of one hundred. In
1. Content Index
taking a sample of five pieces, the inspector might not find any defective pieces or might have
2. Chapter 1
all sample pieces defective. Drawing a direct inference that none or all pieces in the
3. Chapter 2
population are defective on the basis of these samples would be incorrect. Due to this random
4. Chapter 3
nature of the sample selection process, testing results can vary substantially. It is only with
5. Chapter 4
statistical methods that issues such as the chance of different levels of defective items in the
full lot can be fully analyzed from a small sample test.
There are two types of statistical sampling which are commonly used for the purpose of
quality control in batches of work or materials:
1. The acceptance or rejection of a lot is based on the number of defective (bad) or

nondifective (good) items in the sample. This is referred to as sampling by attributes.
2. Instead of using defective and no defective classifications for an item, a quantitative
quality measure or the value of a measured variable is used as a quality indicator. This
testing procedure is referred to as sampling by variables.
Whatever sampling plan is used in testing, it is always assumed that the samples are
representative of the entire population under consideration. Samples are expected to be

chosen randomly so that each member of the population is equally likely to be chosen.
1. Content Index
Convenient sampling plans such as sampling every twentieth piece, choosing a sample every
2. Chapter 1
two hours, or picking the top piece on a delivery truck may be adequate to insure a random
3. Chapter 2
sample if pieces are randomly mixed in a stack or in use. However, some convenient sampling
4. Chapter 3
plans can be inappropriate. For example, checking only easily accessible joints in a building
5. Chapter 4
component is inappropriate since joints that are hard to reach may be more likely to have
erection or fabrication problems.
Another assumption implicit in statistical quality control procedures is that the quality of
materials or work is expected to vary from one piece to another. This is certainly true in the
field of construction. While a designer may assume that all concrete is exactly the same in a
building, the variations in material properties, manufacturing, handling, pouring, and
temperature during setting insure that concrete is actually heterogeneous in quality. Reducing
such variations to a minimum is one aspect of quality construction. Insuring that the materials
actually placed achieve some minimum quality level with respect to average properties or
fraction of defectives is the task of quality control.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 CHAPTER 4
4. Chapter 3 REVIEW OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES
5. Chapter 4
The objective of this project was to gain an overview of the hazard identification
techniques commonly used at sites that will fall within the COMAH Regulations. This
has been achieved by:-
(i) Performing a comprehensive literature review of hazard identification techniques and

summarising in a document.
(ii) Reviewing the relative strengths and shortcomings of current hazard identification
techniques with a view to providing advice to CHID and identifying where further advice is
required.
Main Findings
This report has provided a useful overview of the majority of the hazard identification
techniques that will be found in COMAH reports and other high hazard industries. It has also
| 74
given an indication of the applicability of each technique for SME‘s, offshore and nuclear
1. Content Index
facilities. There are a wide range of hazard identification techniques available most of which
2. Chapter 1
have many examples published. In total, 40 techniques have been identified in this study.
3. Chapter 2
However with the notable exception of HAZOP there are few formal guidance documents on
4. Chapter 3
the application of such techniques. The most common method of learning to apply a technique
5. Chapter 4
is attendance at one of the many training courses or working with a more experienced
colleague. The lack of formal guidance is to be expected with a range of techniques that need
to be very flexible to allow application to a wide range of circumstances without discouraging
free thinking. The guidance available appears to concentrate on providing a description of the
technique rather than setting any standards relating to the quality of its application.
Main Recommendations
(i) Feedback on this work should be sought from both industry and the regulators of
experience gained from applying hazard analysis to satisfy the COMAH Regulations. This
report should be updated to take into account any significant comments.
(ii) A small number of techniques that are most commonly used on COMAH installations
should be reviewed in greater detail. This detailed review should provide guidance on the
| REVIEW OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES 75

information required for COMAH reports and assessment criteria.

1. Content Index
The chemical and process industries have been using a variety of hazard identification
2. Chapter 1
techniques for many years, the most well known of which is HAZOP. Each technique has its
3. Chapter 2
own strengths and weaknesses for identifying hard (e.g. mechanical) and soft (e.g. computer
4. Chapter 3
controls) failures. Establishments that will be top tier sites under the forthcoming COMAH
5. Chapter 4
Regulations are required to demonstrate that they have identified all major hazards of their
facilities and Inspectors will be expected to have some expertise in evaluating these
techniques and identifying weaknesses. There has been little investigation into the
effectiveness and evaluation of these different hazard identification techniques and guidance
is required for both Inspectors and SME‘s.
Aim
The objective of this project is to gain an overview of the hazard identification
techniques
used at sites that will fall within the COMAH Regulations. This will be achieved by:-
(i) Performing a comprehensive literature review of hazard identification techniques and

summarising them in a document.

(ii) Reviewing the relative strengths and shortcomings of current hazard identification
1. Content Index
techniques with a view to providing advice to CHID, and identifying where further advice is
2. Chapter 1
required.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
This report examines various aspects of the hazard analysis. It covers the importance
5. Chapter 4
of
choosing an appropriate hazard identification technique (section 2), how the review of the
techniques was performed (section 3), details of the literature review (section 4), the phases of
the process life cycle (section 5), summarises the hazard identification techniques (section 6),
makes a comparison of the applicability of each techniques for various types of installation
(section 7). The information provided in the report was then discussed (section 8), and a
number of conclusions (section 9) and recommendations (section 10) were made.
Background
Hazard analysis involves the identification of hazards at a facility and evaluating

possible
scenarios leading to unwanted consequences. The hazard analysis stage is a very important

part of the risk management process, as no action can be made to avoid, or reduce, the
1. Content Index
effects of unidentified hazards. The hazard analysis stage also has the largest potential for
2. Chapter 1
error with little or no feedback of those errors. Hazard analysis relies on a structured and
3. Chapter 2
systematic approach to identify potential hazards. There are a large number of techniques that
4. Chapter 3
can be used to perform this task at various stages during the life cycle of the process. These
5. Chapter 4
vary from a concept safety review, which is
performed as early as possible in the concept stage of the process, to a HAZOP study which
can be performed on a fully operational plant. As well as being performed at different stages
during the life cycle of the process, the level of detail for the different techniques is significant.
Concept safety review can only be used to provide insight in to the potential major hazards of
the process, and hence steer the design of the plant to be more inherently safe. In contrast a
HAZOP study is a systematic review of the process and should be able to identify the causes
and consequences of deviations from the design intent. It is important to choose the most
appropriate identification technique, as this not only provides the appropriate level of detail,
but can also be aimed at identifying hazards relating to specific areas. There are many factors
to consider when choosing a technique. Many techniques have similar objectives and applied
correctly should give comparable results. The hazard identification techniques are structured
processes to identifying fault conditions that lead to hazards, and reduce the chance of

missing hazardous events. They all require considerable experience and expertise.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
Methodology
3. Chapter 2
This review of the hazard identification techniques commonly used at major hazard
4. Chapter 3
sites is a desk top study with most of the information extracted from references after a
5. Chapter 4
literature review. There are already several references available that list hazard identification
techniques, however none of these are comprehensive, and many only
provide a brief listing of methodologies. Considerable effort has been made to identify the
original documents that describe each technique described here plus any reported experience
of applying it. The hazard identification techniques have been divided into four categories
depending on the area in which they are predominantly applied:-
(i) Process hazards identification;
(ii) Hardware hazards identification;
(iii) Control hazards identification;
(iv) Human hazards identification.
The methodology for each of the hazard identification techniques is briefly described,
preceded by a table summarising the phase of the project to which it is usually applied and the

nature of the results, and ranking its applicability to COMAH installations and SME‘s, as well
1. Content Index
as a guide to the time and cost requirements of the technique. The resources required for
2. Chapter 1
each technique were ranked on a scale of 1 to 3, with one being quick and inexpensive and
3. Chapter 2
three being time consuming and expensive. The applicability of the techniques to SME‘s,
4. Chapter 3
COMAH, offshore and nuclear installations were ranked using a four point scale, with one not
5. Chapter 4
being applicable and four very applicable. Additional work comparing the various hazard
identification techniques is given in section 8. Bullet points giving the advantages and
disadvantages for each technique are provided at the end of each description.
Literature review
A literature review was carried out by HSE Information Services for references on
hazard
identification techniques. Over 1,000 relevant references were identified by the search.
Additional references were taken from text books such as ―Loss Prevention in the process
Industries‖ and an earlier HSL project on machinery safety.
These sources of information were valuable in identifying the various techniques, but
details of each technique were generally taken from specific references describing the

development and application of the technique. In total, 40 techniques were identified. These
1. Content Index
are listed in Table 1 along with their commonly used acronyms/abbreviations.
2. Chapter 1
Table 2 shows the specific references identified for each technique. Many of the references
3. Chapter 2
contain details of more than one of the techniques and where possible these reviews have not
4. Chapter 3
been used as a basis to describe the technique. For some of the techniques there is a large
5. Chapter 4
supply of reference material to aid in their understanding and performance.
Examples of these are HAZOP, fault tree analysis, safety audit, failure mode and effect
analysis, CHAZOP, and task analysis. These techniques are all popular for identifying
hazards, though are complex to perform to the appropriate standard, and have been used for
a long time. The newer hazard identification technique, and the common techniques which are
less complex (i.e. ‗what if?‘ analysis, checklists), have less reference material available, and
for checklists it mainly consists of lists of questions to be applied to various processes.
APPLICABILITY OF TECHNIQUES TO DIFFERENT PHASES OF A PROJECT
The cost of alterations to the plant, to produce an inherently safer process, corresponds
to the stage in the process life cycle in which they are performed. Generally the earlier in the
process life cycle the hazard is identified, the lower the cost of improving the safety of the

process is, as it allows simple alterations to be performed before any of the items have been
1. Content Index
built. However, expense though is balanced with the inability of techniques performed early in
2. Chapter 1
the process life cycle to identify all the hazards associated with the process allowing the
3. Chapter 2
potential for hazards to be missed. Hazard identification studies can be performed at seven
4. Chapter 3
stages during key stages in the life cycle of a new process. Not all of the hazard identification
5. Chapter 4
techniques are suitable for all stages in the life cycle. Some of the techniques may be suitable
to more than one stage in the life cycle, but others have been specifically developed for one
stage and it would be inappropriate to apply these in some of the other stages. The reviewed
hazard identification techniques and indicates their appropriateness for each of the seven
stages. To offset the various limitations of the techniques, two separate techniques can be
incorporated. This often occurs for checklists and ‗What if?‘ analysis. The checklist speeds up
the normal ‗What if?‘ technique which is used to bolster the checklist by identifying any missed
hazards, and allowing it to be applied to new processes.
REVIEW OF TECHNIQUES
Process hazards identification
These methods are used to evaluate possible hazards due to mal-operations
associated with the process, and to identify any potential hazards. The techniques

predominantly deal with hazards due to deviation from the normal operating conditions (e.g.
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temperature, pressure), and the presence of harmful materials.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
HAZOP
4. Chapter 3
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) can be used at varying times during the life
5. Chapter 4
cycle of the process, from process development through to the closure of the plant, including
hazard assessment of any modifications proposed during its operational life span. The degree
of detail produced by the study increases as the process is developed, requiring P&I drawings,
flow charts, process description, and for batch/semi-batch processes an operating guide, to
produce the maximum detail.
The study is usually performed by 4-6 people led by a chairman with experience in
performing safety studies. One of the other members is generally designated secretary and
records all the finding of the group. The remainder of the group are usually comprised of
additional specialists with specific knowledge of the process, engineering, and safety. To
produce a comprehensive evaluation of the process a number of guidewords (typically
no/not/none, more, less, part of, reverse, other than, as well as) are combined with parameters
(flow, pressure, temperature, reaction, level, composition) and systematically applied to each
pipe and vessel of the process. The records produced by the study group should indicate:-

(i) The design intent of the pipe or vessel.

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(ii) Any viable deviations from the intent.
2. Chapter 1
(iii) Possible causes of the deviation.
3. Chapter 2
(iv) Possible consequences of the deviation if it occurs.
4. Chapter 3
(v) Additional action that can be performed to minimise the hazard associated with the
5. Chapter 4
deviation, if practicable.
Many companies have modified the guidewords and parameters they use during
HAZOP to better define the process that is to be investigated. This is especially true in the
nuclear
industry where additional terms are required to evaluate the specific hazards due to radiation.
For batch/semi-batch processes, where the process is not at a steady state, a HAZOP should
be performed at discrete time intervals during the operation of the process. The operating
manual, as previously mentioned, is required to produce a complete assessment of the
process. Help is also now available through a number of computer packages that can aid in
the performance of the HAZOP. These packages produce a similar layout for the results as
the manual approach, and allow the whole team to see the minutes as they are produced in
the meeting.

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Advantages of HAZOP
2. Chapter 1
• Systematic and comprehensive technique. A detailed plan for performing the
3. Chapter 2
technique is available which systematically applies guide words and parameters to all
4. Chapter 3
the pipes and vessels in the process.
5. Chapter 4
• Examines the consequences of the failure. Thought should be given by the assessment
team to the consequences of the deviations identified. This aids in the production of
recommendations for methods to minimise or mitigate the hazard
.
Disadvantages of HAZOP
• Time consuming and expensive. Most plants contain a large number of pipes and
vessels each of which need to be examined by the application of the various
guidewords and parameters.
• Requires detailed design drawing to perform the full study. To fully perform the study the
process has to be designed to such a level that all the pipes and vessels are detailed with
their operating conditions, and control instrumentation.
• Additional guide words are required for unusual hazards. For specific dangers that will not be
covered by the general guide words, further words (such as radiation for the nuclear industry)

will need to be applied.

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• Requires experienced practitioners. Experienced team members are required to identify all
2. Chapter 1
possible causes and consequences of the deviations, as well as producing realistic
3. Chapter 2
recommendations.
4. Chapter 3
• Focuses on one-event causes of deviation only. Only the hazards associated with single
5. Chapter 4
deviations can be studied. Hazards that are caused by two or more separate deviations
cannot be identified by the technique.
‘What if?’ analysis

―What if?‖ analysis uses a creative brainstorming methodology, and can be used to
evaluate any aspect of a process. For a simple project only 1 or 2 people are required, though
with increasing complexity the group size will need to be increased. The examiners are all
required to be experienced in performing such studies as it can be easy to miss hazards, and
hence the evaluation would be incomplete. The assessment asks a number of questions that
begin with ―What if‖ to attempt to identify any associated hazards. These answers can then be
further developed by examining specific conditions i.e. ―What if the raw material is the wrong
concentration?‖ could be further developed by evaluating what would happen if the
concentration was doubled. Before the examination begins a certain level of process

information is required. This includes a description of the process, the process drawings, and
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the operating procedure. If the review is to be performed on an existing plant then interviews
2. Chapter 1
with the operating staff can be performed along with a site visit. A list of preliminary questions
3. Chapter 2
should be formed by one of the team members to act as an aid in the initiation of the review.
4. Chapter 3
The results are often documented in a table format and will often contain the ―What if‖
5. Chapter 4
question asked, the hazard or consequence related to the question, safeguards present in the
process at that time, and recommendations if applicable.
Advantages of ‘What if?’ analysis

• Easy to apply. The principle behind the technique is simple and therefore can be
easily applied to a process.
Disadvantages of ‘What if?’ analysis

• Experienced assessors are required or hazards can be missed. The principle is simple
though experience is required to ask all the appropriate questions or hazards might
be overlooked.
• Time consuming for complex processes. Complex processes will contain many items
that are required to be assessed. Each one needs to have the appropriate questions

applied to it and the results need to be recorded with associated hazards and
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consequences.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Concept Hazard Analysis (CHA)
4. Chapter 3
Concept hazard analysis consists of a literature review of previous incidents, allowing
5. Chapter 4
identification of areas of the process of specific concern. It is performed during the concept
and early design stages, and requires the process flow diagram, with any main add-on safety
systems. Each plant section should be evaluated, with perceived dangers noted with
suggested safeguard. The methodology is usually structured as:-
(i) Assemble a team.
(ii) Define the objectives and scope of the study.
(iii) Agree a set of keywords.
(iv) Partition each process flow diagram or block diagram into reasonably sized sections.
(v) Identify the dangerous disturbances and consequences generated by each word.
(vi) Determine if the hazard can be designed out, or the hazard characteristics reduced.
(vii) Determine any protections and safeguards.
(viii) Determine comments and safeguards.
(ix) Report the results and recommendations.

A preliminary study can also be performed before the more detailed evaluation, and is
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called a concept safety review.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Advantages of CHA
4. Chapter 3
• Good basis for a more detailed study. The study is able to identify areas of concern
5. Chapter 4
that should be evaluated in greater detail later in the life cycle of the process when
more detail is available.
• Aids in the production of a more inherently safe process. Hazards identified in the
early concept stages can be easily evaluated, and either designed out or additional
safety measures added.
Disadvantages of CHA
• Concentrates only on major hazards. Due to the minimal information available while
performing this study only major hazards that are evident from the low level of detail
can be identified and examined.
Concept Safety Review

A concept safety review should be performed as soon as possible

during the concept phase of the process. It should define the objectives and scope of the
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project, and identify the main hazards present (i.e. hazards associated with the chemicals
2. Chapter 1
present). The review should also establish all criteria that the plant must adhere to fulfill
3. Chapter 2
specific legislation.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of concept safety review

• Good basis for further studies. This study identifies areas that require additional investigation
early in the life cycle of the process to aid in the development of a more inherently safe plant.
• Aids in the production of a more inherently safe process. The identification of hazards early
in the life cycle of the process allows either the hazard to be designed out, or the addition of
extra safety measures.
Disadvantages of concept safety review

• Initial review identifying major hazards only. The technique is performed when only minimal
information is available and only major hazards will be evident to the investigators.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Preliminary hazard analysis is used as an early means of hazard identification during

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the design and development of the process. The method is often used to follow-up on the
2. Chapter 1
hazards that have been identified during concept hazard analysis. It follows an approach
3. Chapter 2
similar to HAZOP, though splits the process into larger sections, generally major process
4. Chapter 3
items and associated lines and heat exchangers. The technique requires a minimum level of
5. Chapter 4
knowledge before it can be performed:-
(i) Notes on dangerous reactions and side reactions.

(ii) Data on hazardous materials.
(iii) A process flow diagram showing control measures and safeguards, or an initial P&ID.
(iv) Equipment specification sheets.
(v) Notes on inventory levels.
(vi) Any available operating information.
The assessment starts with the examination of ‗dangerous disturbances of the plant‘, which
include:-
(vii) Disturbances resulting in rupture or exceeding mechanical limits.
(viii) Critical defect in construction.
(ix) Flow through abnormal openings to the atmosphere.

(x) Adverse change in a planned product or other release.

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The disturbance should be further developed until the immediate causes can be identified
2. Chapter 1
(e.g. human error, process item defect, design defect, control defect, change of design intent,
3. Chapter 2
or external threats). The study can then be widened to evaluate the consequence of the
4. Chapter 3
deviation, and to assign a potential risk to it.
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of PHA
• Facilitates the building of fault trees and event trees. The technique can be used to identify
the events from which the fault trees and event trees can be developed.
• Systematically identifies the accident scenarios. A systematic plan is applied to the process
to identify possible deviations leading to potential hazards.
• Easy to perform. Due to the systematic plan and the low level of detail available for its
performance little expertise is required to apply the technique.
• Aids in the production of a more inherently safe process. Hazards identified in the early
concept stages can be easily evaluated, and either designed out or additional safety
measures added.

Disadvantages of PHA
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• Will not identify all the causes. Due to the initial evaluation of the plant enough information
2. Chapter 1
might not be available to fully identify all the causes of the hazards.
3. Chapter 2
• Will only identify and examine the major hazards. When the technique is generally applied
4. Chapter 3
only minimal information is available and so only major hazards can be identified.
5. Chapter 4
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Fault tree analysis a graphical representation of the combination of faults leading to a
predefined undesired event. The methodology uses logic gates to show all credible paths from
which the undesired event could occur. The fault tree is developed from the top down (i.e.
from the undesired top event to the primary events which initiated the failure) and the logic
gates indicate the passage of the fault logic up the tree. The event should be traced back until
it cannot be developed further, either due to lack of knowledge or because no other causes
can be identified. The logic gates predominantly consist of AND and OR gates (or modified
versions) to indicate if the preceding event requires either one or a number of failures to occur.
Once the fault tree has been fully developed frequencies/probabilities can be designated to
each primary event, and by following the logic in the diagram the risk associated with the top
event can be calculated.

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The assessment is usually completed in six stages:-
2. Chapter 1
(i) Definition of the scope of the analysis. It defines the purpose and extent of the assessment,
3. Chapter 2
as well as the basic assumptions made.
4. Chapter 3
(ii) Familiarisation with the design, functions, and operations of the process. The process
5. Chapter 4
should be described so that all of the members of the assessment team understand it.
(iii) Identification of the top event. An event appropriate to be assessed using the fault tree
methodology should be identified, and is usually the onset or existence of a dangerous
condition, or the inability of the system to provide the desired performance.
(iv) Construction of the fault tree. This consists of the breakdown of the top event to identify
the primary events.
(v) Analysis of the fault tree. The addition of frequencies and probabilities into the fault tree for
the primary events to quantify the risk of the top event.
(vi) Documentation of the results. This should include documentary evidence of all of the work
performed by the assessment team, the information required for its performance, as well as
the results produced by the team with any associated conclusions.
• It is able to produce quantitative results. Probabilities or frequencies can be allocated to the

initiating conditions, and using the logic present in the developed tree the probability or
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frequency of the event can be calculated.
2. Chapter 1
• Shows a logical representation of the sequence of events. A pictorial representation of the
3. Chapter 2
failure path is produced which indicates the logical sequence of events leading to realisation of
4. Chapter 3
the hazard.
5. Chapter 4
• Can be used to assess a wide range of failures. Hardware, software, human, and process
failures can all be easily incorporated into the logic of the process.
Disadvantages of FTA
• Time consuming and expensive for complex systems. Each event has to be broken down to
its initiating conditions, values for these conditions are then required to be identified and the
logic followed to quantify the hazard.
• An experienced assessment team is required or errors in the logic can be made. The
connection between the initiating conditions are required to be properly identified or errors can
occur in the logic and from that to the quantification of the hazard.
• Some top events might be missed. Time and effort is required to identify all the top events
that are required to be studied. A preliminary study might need to be performed to fulfill this
criteria, as this technique can not easily identify these events.

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Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA)
2. Chapter 1
Cause-consequence analysis combines the hazard identification and quantification
3. Chapter 2
methodology of fault tree analysis with event tree analysis. With the use of the event tree
4. Chapter 3
methodology cause-consequence analysis is able to investigate the incident past the hazard
5. Chapter 4
(e.g. item rupture) to the possible consequences (e.g. fire). The methodology is graphical, and
once completed the consequences can be related back to their causes. The technique is split
into 6 stages:-
(i) Select the event or type of accident. Choose an event suitable for development as a
top event in fault tree analysis, and as an initiating event in event tree analysis (e.g. loss of
cooling).
(ii) Identify the safety functions that influence the course of the incident resulting from
the event. Identify any safety functions that are available after the event has occurred, and
how they can affect the outcome.
(iii) Develop the accident path resulting from the event (Event tree analysis). The accident
paths are constructed based on the success or failure of the safety functions. A different
symbol is used than that for event tree analysis and it contains a description of the safety
function that can be answered by either yes or no, and produces two output relating to either

outcome.
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(iv) Develop the initiating event and the safety function failure event to determine their basic
2. Chapter 1
causes (Fault tree analysis). This follow the techniques used in fault tree analysis, and
3. Chapter 2
produces similar results.
4. Chapter 3
(v) Evaluate the accident sequence minimal cut sets (the smallest group of events which can
5. Chapter 4
occur, in the appropriate sequence, for the top event to occur). This is used to replace the
previously developed diagram produced for after the event, with a more fault tree like diagram
so that the risk can be quantified. This is performed by connecting all the failures of the
original diagram with the use of AND and OR gates.
(vi) Document the results. All the information used and results produced should be supplied
along with a discussion of the consequences, evaluation of the significance of accident
sequences, and any recommendation that were produced.
Advantages of CCA
• Able to produce quantitative results. The probabilities or frequencies of the initiating events
are used to quantify the consequences by applying the logic present in the diagram.
• Examines both the causes of the event and its consequences. The technique develops the
logic backwards and forwards from the events to identify their causes and consequences.

• Can be used to assess a wide range of failures. Most causes for the hazard (i.e. human,
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process, hardware, and software) can be evaluated by the technique.
2. Chapter 1
• Produces a logical representation of the sequence of events. Produces a graphical
3. Chapter 2
representation of the sequence of the logical stages leading to the event and on to the
4. Chapter 3
consequence.
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of CCA
• Time consuming and expensive for complex systems. For complex processes there will be a
large number of events to be studied. Each event must be fully investigated by the technique
so that it can be quantified and the causes identified.
• An experienced assessment team is required or errors in the logic can be made. Experience
is required to identify the appropriate relationship and logic between the causes, or errors can
be made in the diagram producing errors in the quantification of the event.
• Initial events can be missed. Care must be taken to identify all the events associated with the
process, if appropriate safeguards are not present some of the events can be missed.
Pre-HAZOP
Pre-HAZOP uses a top down approach, and is performed during the early design and

development stages of the process where it would be impracticable to perform a full HAZOP
1. Content Index
study. The study team uses more wide ranging guide words to complete the study (such as
2. Chapter 1
fire, explosion/detonation) and evaluates the process to establish whether the terms are
3. Chapter 2
appropriate and if any redesign is required. This method is predominantly used to identify
4. Chapter 3
potential hazards as soon in the design and development phase of a process as possible so
5. Chapter 4
that safety precautions can be easily and relatively cheaply incorporated into the process.
Advantages of pre-HAZOP
• Relatively quick. The technique uses broad guide words that can be quickly applied to the
process. The low level of detail also minimises the number of items over which the guide
words need to be applied.
• Aids in the production of a more inherently safe process. Hazards identified early in the
design phase can be either designed out or mitigated through the addition of extra safety
systems.
• Good basis for further studies. The technique identifies areas of the process that require
additional study by more detailed hazard identification techniques.
Disadvantages of pre-HAZOP

• Is unable to identify all hazards. The use of the broad guide words allows more complex
1. Content Index
hazards to be missed.
2. Chapter 1
• Concentrates on the major hazards only. Limited knowledge of the process when the
3. Chapter 2
technique is performed, and the wide ranging guide words applied means that only major
4. Chapter 3
hazards can be identified.
5. Chapter 4
Standards/Codes of practice/Literature review

These methods can be used to ensure that the design criteria meets the minimum
safety requirements that have been identified for the process. Possible sources of such
guidelines can be standards and codes of practice which have been produced by
international/national legislation, or more stringent in-house requirements. In addition a
literature review of previous related incidents can be performed to identify hazards that have
occurred, and their failure route. This methodology is often incorporated into many of the
hazard identification techniques which can be used early in the concept and design phase of
the process.
Advantages of standards/codes of practice/literature review
• They provide authoritative guidance on design criteria and possible hazards. The standards

and codes of practices will provide minimum safety considerations for the process and
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recommended working practices.
2. Chapter 1
• Can be used as a start to a more detailed technique. They can provide evidence of areas
3. Chapter 2
that require significant evaluation with more detailed techniques.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of standards/codes of practice/literature review
• Careful consideration is required to identify if they apply. There are a wide range of
standards and codes of practice with many of them irrelevant to the process under
consideration.
• Can be time consuming to understand. It can be time consuming reading and identifying
information of use which then needs to be fully understood or errors can occur in their
application.
• Often already incorporated into other techniques. Most techniques will incorporate this within
the wider frame work of their assessment.
• Standards and codes of practice can change. Legislation can change with time and the
retrofit of equipment to meet these new requirements can be time consuming and costly.
• Little help might be available for new processes. For new processes the appropriate
standards might not be available to detail the minimal safety requirements

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Functional Integrated Hazard Identification (FIHI)
2. Chapter 1
Process phase the technique is used during and after the design phase Applicability to
3. Chapter 2
COMAH sites 2 Nature of the results Qualitative Applicability to SMEs 1 Time and cost
4. Chapter 3
requirements 2 FIHI [Rasmussen 1997] requires a functional model of the system to be
5. Chapter 4
formally defined in terms of:-
(i) Intents. A single statement describing the purpose of the function.
(ii) Methods. A list of statements describing how the intent is to be satisfied.
(iii) Constraints. A list of statements describing any restrictions on how the intent can be
achieved. Any methods or constraints which contain additional intents should be further
detailed in a similar fashion to fault-tree or hierarchical task analysis. HAZOP like guide words
are then applied to each intent, and possible causes and consequences for each deviation are
discussed, with records kept on a suitable record sheet.
Advantages of FIHI
• Uses a functional approach which allows the assessment to be performed earlier in the
process life cycle. The function of the various items are used as the basis for the technique
allowing it to be performed before they are fully designed.

• Can be used to assess a wide range of failures. Due to its functional approach the cause of
1. Content Index
the failure (i.e. hardware, software, human or process) can be treated the same and so can be
2. Chapter 1
easily assessed.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Disadvantages of FIHI
5. Chapter 4
• Time consuming. The process has to be split into suitable functional units, and the guide
words have to be applied to all of them.
• Requires experienced practitioners. Experience is required to split the process into
appropriate functional units and then to identify the hazards from the use of the guide words
.
Checklists
Process phase the technique is used Any time during and after the design phase
Applicability to COMAH sites 2 Nature of the results Qualitative Applicability to SMEs 4 Time
and cost requirements 2 Checklists produce a detailed examination of the process plant by
applying experience of everyday operations and previous incidents in similar plants. If an
assessment of a process is to be performed with the aid of a checklist, it is believed that the
use of a detailed list early on will minimize the inventiveness of the team members, and so
only a coarse list should be used to aid in the direction of the work. Once the brainstorming

has been completed the detailed checklist can then be used to identify areas that have been
1. Content Index
overlooked.
2. Chapter 1
The main task for the assessment team is to identify the potential hazards of the
3. Chapter 2
process.
4. Chapter 3
Once a hazard has been identified, recommendations should be made of possible methods for
5. Chapter 4
it to be minimized. When the assessment has been completed a report should be produced, in
co-operation with the people who have to perform the modifications, giving the alterations
required as well as an appropriate timescale for completion. There are a large number of
checklists available to aid in hazard identification, and a list of
sources is provided in Lees (1996). An example of an appropriate checklist for the chemical
industry is reported by Balemans (1974).
Advantages of checklists
• Easy to apply. The principle behind the technique is simple, compares a list of predefined
questions to the process to aid in the identification of hazards.
• A simplistic assessment can be performed by inexperienced practitioners. Little experience is
required to perform a simplistic assessment consisting of checking the list against existing
conditions.

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Disadvantages of checklists
2. Chapter 1
• The assessment will only be as complete as the list used. The methodology will only ask
3. Chapter 2
questions stated in the checklist; if this is not comprehensive areas might be left unevaluated,
4. Chapter 3
leaving possible hazards unidentified.
5. Chapter 4
• Not easy to apply to novel processes. A check list is generally formulated from past
experience. For new plants there is no past experience limiting the information available for
the preparation of an appropriate checklist.
Critical Examination of System Safety (CEX)

Time and cost requirements 3 CEX was the precursor to HAZOP, and uses
brainstorming techniques to formulate a series of questions (such as What, When, How and
Where) which can be related to a particular activity or operation. The answers to these
questions can then be further enhanced by the appropriate use of other questions (such as
Why, Why then, Why that way, and Why there). The methodology requires a statement for the
design intent describing what is to be achieved. The significant aspects of the achievement
can then be questioned to identify strengths and weaknesses. Alternatives can then be
assessed if required to help minimize the associated

hazards.
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2. Chapter 1
Advantages of CEX
3. Chapter 2
• Encourages innovation and inherent safety by design. If the technique is used early in the
4. Chapter 3
design phase then any major hazards identified could be either designed out or the risk
5. Chapter 4
reduced.
• Can be used as a start for more detailed techniques. The technique identifies events that can
be carried on to fault tree and CCA, and can also identify areas requiring greater study later in
the design phase.
Disadvantages of CEX
• Needs experienced practitioners. Experienced practitioners are required to formulate
appropriate questions for the study.
• Hazards can be missed. If all appropriate questions are not asked then the associated
hazards might be missed.
Method Organized Systematic Analysis of Risk (MOSAR)

MOSAR uses a series of steps to examine the safety of the process. The process is taken as
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a series of interacting subsystems, and tables are filled out by the members of the assessment
2. Chapter 1
team covering:-
3. Chapter 2
(i) Hazard identification.
4. Chapter 3
(ii) Adequacy of prevention.
5. Chapter 4
(iii) Interdependency.
(iv) Operating safety study using FMEA or HAZOP.
(v) Logic trees.
(vi) Severity table.
(vii) Linking severity with protection objectives.
(viii) Technological barriers (no human intervention).
(ix) Utilization barriers (with human intervention).
(x) Acceptability table for residual risk.
Advantages of MOSAR
• Systematic risk analysis technique. The framework of the methodology systematically
evaluates the process for hazards and then quantifies the associated risk.
• Will have the additional advantages applicable to the hazard identification technique applied

to the process.
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Disadvantages of MOSAR
2. Chapter 1
• Time consuming. The technique incorporates time consuming hazard identification
3. Chapter 2
techniques as part of its methodology, and then the risk of the hazards identified
4. Chapter 3
needs to be calculated.
5. Chapter 4
• Will have the additional disadvantages applicable to the hazard identification
technique applied to the process.
Goal Oriented Failure Analysis (GOFA)

Process phase the technique is used after the design phase
Applicability to COMAH sites 2 Nature of the results Qualitative
Applicability to SMEs 1 Time and cost requirements 2
(i) GOFA [Reeves 1989] uses a system analysis approach to develop a system diagram
which is then used in the hazard identification process. It uses a top-down technique which is
a hybrid of failure mode effect analysis and fault tree analysis. A number of steps are used in
the evaluation:-
(ii) Define the failure goal.

(iii) Draw up and agree the system diagram.

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(iv) Determine the fault modes for each component in each subsystem of the system
2. Chapter 1
diagram, using checklists for support.
3. Chapter 2
(v) Choose a component for detailed study.
4. Chapter 3
(vi) Choose a fault mode for this component.
5. Chapter 4
(vii) Identify failure mechanisms for the chosen fault mode.
(viii) Choose a failure mechanism.
(ix) Identify the failure causes for this failure mechanism. These may be external to the
systems diagram or internal if caused by the other components.
Advantages of GOFA
• Provides a practical approach to identifying the factors that can lead to the realization of the
hazard. It uses practical knowledge of the failure of equipment to identify the hazards.
• A wide range of causes can be evaluated. Process, hardware, software and human errors
can all be evaluated by the technique.
Disadvantages of GOFA
• Time consuming. A large number of failure modes and process items are required to be

investigated for a comprehensive assessment.

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• Difficult to learn. The method performs a number of tasks which require experience
2. Chapter 1
practitioners in order to perform them properly.
3. Chapter 2
• Scope of the application is limited to the failure goals considered. The technique will only
4. Chapter 3
assess hazards that occur from the failures considered, and so hazards might be missed if
5. Chapter 4
some of the failures are omitted.
Matrices
During the early stages of process design and development, matrices [Clark 1997] can
be
used to identify potential hazards. The technique can be performed to varying levels of
complexity, and cross-references a number of aspects of the plant. The most complex
matrices can be used to identify interactions between :-
(i) The various chemicals present in the process. This should include all reactants,
intermediates, and products. Any interaction between these chemicals should also be listed.
(ii) Materials of construction. This should be a list of all of the materials of construction used in
the plant.

(iii) Operator. This is present to aid in the identification of specific hazards to the operator.
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(iv) Utilities. This should be a list of all utilities used in the plant, and should also include
2. Chapter 1
possible cleaning solutions and lubricants.
3. Chapter 2
(v) Energy source. This covers a wide range of sources, such as kinetic and potential energy,
4. Chapter 3
electrical energy, and radiation.
5. Chapter 4
(vi) Air, land, and sea. This can be used to help identify the effects of the process on the
environment and surrounding life.
Generally, using this technique produces a large, complex, matrix and care is required to
ensure that all results are taken into consideration as well as that a proper recording method is
used.
Advantages of matrices
• Can be used as a start to more detailed techniques. The technique can identify hazards or
areas that require further evaluation by a more detailed hazard identification technique.
Disadvantages of matrices
• Will only identify hazards due to the interaction of two components. The technique only
examines what occurs when two components come into contact.

• Can miss some of the hazards of the process. Due to the limited information available, and
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to only examining the interaction between two components hazards can be missed.
2. Chapter 1
• The presentation of the results in the matrix can be confusing, unless proper precautions are
3. Chapter 2
taken. For a complex process the size of the matrix produced can be extremely large, and
4. Chapter 3
unless proper precautions are taken can become confusing.
5. Chapter 4
Inherent Hazard Analysis

Inherent hazard analysis [Hawksley 1987] should be performed early in the design and
development phase of the process. It is used to minimise the inherent danger of the process
due predominantly to the presence of hazardous reactants, intermediates, or products. The
process is initially divided into basic process items, and each item is evaluated with the help of
a few basic questions :-
(i) Are there significant hazards associated with the unit?
(ii) Can the need for the unit be avoided?
(iii) Can less hazardous chemicals or subsidiary materials be used?
(iv) Can the hazardous inventory be reduced?
(v) Can the operation be carried out under more moderate conditions?
(vi) Can the hazardous inventory be contained chemically or physically?

(vii) Can the operation be carried out safer, more simply?

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Any other consideration should then be reviewed that could aid in minimising the potential
2. Chapter 1
hazards.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Advantages of inherent hazard analysis
5. Chapter 4
• Can be used as a start to more detailed techniques. The methodology identifies
hazards and areas that should be further evaluated by more detailed hazard identification
techniques.
• Aids in the production of an inherently safer process. The identification of major hazards
early in the design phase means they can be either designed out or additional safety
measures added to produce an inherently safer process.
Disadvantages of inherent hazard analysis

Can miss some of the process hazards. The limited information available when the
assessment is being performed will mean that some of the hazards might be missed.
Hardware hazards identification

Hardware tools have been classified as the techniques that predominantly evaluate the

hazards due to failures in the process equipment. They assess the possible failures of the
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process plant items, and the knock-on effects for the rest of the process.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Safety audit
4. Chapter 3
A safety audit should subject all areas of a company to a critical examination to help
5. Chapter 4
minimize loss. It can be performed at a number of stages during the life cycle of a process:
(i) Pre authorisation study.
(ii) In depth study. Carried out when the process package plan is complete.
(iii) Insurance study. Usually undertaken as soon as agreement of stage 2 has been
reached.
(iv) Follow up studies. Carried out at regular intervals during construction.
(v) Pre start-up study. Carried out within one month of start-up.
(vi) Safety review. Carried out within six months of start-up and subsequently regular
audits of defined areas and activities, which can also be performed for existing plants. A safety
review generally consists of an on-site walk-through inspection of the plant, and can vary from
an informal routine function (which is primarily visual) to a formal in-depth evaluation. The
informal walk-through of the plant can be used to identify lapses in safety procedures, while
the in-depth review should be used to ensure that the plants, as well as the operating and

maintenance procedures, comply with the design intent and standards. The review should
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include interviews with employees working on the process plant (including operators,
2. Chapter 1
managers and maintenance workers), as well as applying additional techniques such as
3. Chapter 2
checklists and auditing areas such as :-
4. Chapter 3
(vii) Management policy.
5. Chapter 4
(viii) Attitudes training.
(ix) Features of both the process and design.
(x) Layout and construction of the plant.
(xi) Operating procedures.
(xii) Emergency plans.
(xiii) Personal protection standards.
(xiv) Accident records.
Once the review has been performed recommendations should be made of areas
where action is needed, along with a justification and a completion date. A follow-up visit
should then be performed to assess whether the recommendations have been performed to
the required standard.
The technique can also be referred to as process safety review, design review, or loss
prevention review.

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Advantages of safety audits
2. Chapter 1
• The technique can be easily tailored to evaluate one specific area. The technique can be
3. Chapter 2
tailored to examine most areas of the plant from management and accounting to the plant
4. Chapter 3
itself.
5. Chapter 4
• Parts of the review can be performed at regular intervals using inexperienced personnel. A
cursory audit of the plant can be performed at regular intervals by inexperienced personnel
and often comprises a walk through of the plant with a check list to identify hazards.
Disadvantages of safety audits

• Can be time consuming, and expensive. The safety audit often incorporates the use of other
techniques to aid in the identification of hazards, and a large number of areas of the plant can
be examined.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
The purpose of FMEA is to identify potential hazards associated with a process by
investigating the failure modes for each process item. FMEA has difficulty in identifying
hazards that require the failure of more than one process item, due to the complex interaction
of the failures. The following steps [BS5760:5 1992] are performed during the analysis :-

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(i) Describe the system. A detailed description of the process is initially required so that it can
2. Chapter 1
be broken down into either a functional, hierarchical or reliability block diagram. The
3. Chapter 2
assessment team also needs a detailed description of the various actions performed by each
4. Chapter 3
section, including a description of their modes of success or failure.
5. Chapter 4
(ii) Establish the basic principles and purposes of the study. The purpose and scope of the
assessment needs to be stated, along with how the results will be displayed, and whether
there will be any interaction between the results and any further studies to be performed.
(iii) Carry out the study. Initially all items should be identified in the various systems or
subsystems produced by the graphical breakdown of the process. All the possible failure
modes of these items should then be collated. The most likely failures caused by the failure
modes can then be identified, and their effects on the process evaluated.
(iv) Report the results. The report should include the diagram produced in stage 1, a detailed
record of the analysis, a summary, recommendations indicating possible improvements,
failures which have significant effect on the process, as well as those that produce none.

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Advantages of FMEA
2. Chapter 1
• Performs a systematic review of the process. A detailed methodology is available to assess
3. Chapter 2
the plant item by item.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of FMEA
• Can be time consuming and expensive. For complex processes there will be many items to
be investigated each with a complex series of failure modes to be examined.
• Difficulty identifying hazards due to more than one failure. It is hard to combine the effect of
multiple failure modes of different items to identify combined hazards.
• Difficulty finding all the failure modes. Most items have been investigated to identify their
various failure modes, newer equipment might be less well documented and some of the
failure modes might have been missed.
• Requires a large amount of data. The plant needs to be well developed before the technique
can be performed, and the various failure rates for each item also needs to be known.
Functional FMEA
Functional FMEA uses the FMEA methodology, and breaks down the process into a

functional diagram instead of either hierarchical or block reliability diagrams. All possible
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failure modes for these functions are then analysed along with possible causes and
2. Chapter 1
consequences (as with FMEA). A discussion of possible recovery mechanisms may also be
3. Chapter 2
included, and should be recorded in a suitable table.
4. Chapter 3
Because a functional approach has been adopted, all aspects of the design can be
5. Chapter 4
examined with no distinction made between whether the function is implemented by hardware,
software or human action. This is particularly helpful as informed decisions on how to
implement each function can be made with a better understanding of the associated hazards.
Advantages of functional FMEA

• A wide range of errors can be evaluated. The technique only examines the function of the
plant, and so process, hardware, software and human errors can be evaluated.
Disadvantages of functional FMEA

• Can be time consuming and expensive. For complex processes there will be many items to

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multiple failure modes of items to identify combined hazards.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
can be performed, and the various failure rates for each item is also needs to be known.
Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

FMECA also uses the same methodology as FMEA though two additional steps are
required to be performed:
(i) Determine the severity of the effect caused by the failure. The severity of the failure is
generally classified as being in the range of; complete loss of capability with loss of life, to
negligible effect on success with no injuries.
(ii) Evaluate the frequency of the effect caused by the failure. The easiest method for
evaluating the event frequency is to examine previous data for similar processes to that under
consideration, operating at similar conditions. If no appropriate data is available then

additional factors can be used to convert frequencies from unrelated processes.

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Once the appropriate data has been compiled, the severity and frequency of the event
2. Chapter 1
caused by the failure can be compared producing a criticality rating. The most critical failures
3. Chapter 2
would cause an event that produced very severe results very often, while the least critical
4. Chapter 3
would produce negligible results very infrequently.
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of FMECA
• A wide range of errors can be evaluated. If the technique applies a functional approach
towards the plant process, hardware, software and human errors can be evaluated.
• It semi-quantifies the hazards by ranking them with respect to their frequency and effect. A
criticality ranking is placed on all the hazards identified to indicate where additional safety
measures are required.
Disadvantages of FMECA
• Can be time consuming, and expensive. For complex processes there will be many items to

1. Content Index
multiple failure modes of items to identify combined hazards.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
can be performed, and the various failure rates for each item also needs to be known.
Maintenance and Operability study (MOP)

A MOP study [Chastain 1997] is performed during the early stages of the design, and
requires a team composition similar to that for HAZOP studies. A suitable team might consist
of a leader, engineer, operator (if a similar plant is in operation), mechanic and technical
scribe, with additional members depending on the process under evaluation. Initially the P&ID
is split into a number of sections consisting of separate process items. The intent of each
section is then fully defined to the satisfaction of the team present, and the P&ID altered if any
changes or errors are identified. The leader then asks a list of questions for each process item
such as:-

(i) Can the equipment be properly isolated for maintenance?

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(ii) Can the equipment be properly drained for maintenance?
2. Chapter 1
(iii) Are there plans to deal with mechanical failure of equipment?
3. Chapter 2
(iv) Are there plans for critical spare parts to be available?
4. Chapter 3
There are a number of other general questions that are asked, as well as those that are item
5. Chapter 4
specific. From these questions, areas that require additional thought to minimise hazards are
identified, and recommendations can be made.
Advantages of MOp
• Investigates the hazards related to the maintenance of plant items. The technique can be
used to identify hazards, or poor design leading to hazards, during the maintenance of the
various plant items.
Disadvantages of Mop
• Can only be applied to maintenance. The technique cannot be used on other areas of the
plant except for maintenance procedures.
• Experienced practitioners are required. Experience is required to identify the appropriate
questions to be asked of the plant items.

Maintenance Analysis
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Maintenance analysis is usually used to identify equipment availability, and can also be
2. Chapter 1
used to identify particular hazards associated with maintenance. A number of questions are
3. Chapter 2
asked of each piece of equipment, such as:-
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
(i) What failure can occur?
(ii) How a fault would be identified/detected?
(iii) How the underlying failure could be diagnosed?
(iv) What preparations are required for repair?
(v) What resources are required for repair?
(vi) How the failed part should be removed, repaired if possible, and replaced?
(vii) What checks are required after maintenance?
(viii) How normal operations should be restored?
The review can identify failures in maintenance procedure, and also if additional
backups are required to minimize any hazards identified.
Advantages of maintenance analysis

• Problems with maintenance are examined systematically. Each piece of equipment is

examined to identify the potential hazards due to maintenance or availability.

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• Can produce frequencies as well as identify hazards. Frequencies of maintenance or
2. Chapter 1
availability can be identified by the process.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Disadvantages of maintenance analysis
5. Chapter 4
• Can be time consuming and expensive. Most plants have a large number of pieces of
equipment which can be examined by the technique.
• Requires personnel experienced in the procedure. Experience is required to know the
appropriate questions that should be asked for the various pieces of equipment.
Sneak Analysis
Process phase the technique is used once the design phase has been completed
Applicability to COMAH sites 3 Nature of the results Qualitative
Applicability to SMEs 2 Time and cost requirements 2
Sneak analysis was first developed in the aerospace industry to identify why spacecraft
rockets would accidentally fire, or not fire when required. It is split into a number of separate
paths for error :-

(i) Sneak flow. The unintended flow of material, energy or information from one area to
1. Content Index
another. This is often due to either human error, performing tasks in the wrong order, or the
2. Chapter 1
failure of equipment. The sneak flow of material through utility lines (such as drains) is
3. Chapter 2
common.
4. Chapter 3
(ii) Sneak indication. This is when the indicators for the processes condition are wrong or
5. Chapter 4
ambiguous. This can occur if an indicator is taken to read a value at one point, though in fact
is linked to a slightly different area in the system, and indicates a wrong value only during
certain mal-operations.
(iii) Sneak label. Due to either wrong or ambiguous labelling of indicators, chemicals, or other
equipment. This can lead to the wrong conditions being applied to the process, or the wrong
material being added.
(iv) Sneak energy. Unintended presence or absence of energy. This is often due to the
presence of unreacted materials in the process, and can be caused by agitation failure, or the
formation of layering in batch reactors.
(v) Sneak reaction. Unintended reaction. This can be due to unanticipated changes in the
process conditions, or the presence of a material in the process that could catalyse the
reaction.
(vi) Sneak procedure or sequence. The occurrence of events in either an unintended or

conflicting order. This often occurs when no procedure is available for the operators to follow,
1. Content Index
and they perform the task to the best of their ability. Information can also be lost, or
2. Chapter 1
misunderstood, during shift changes leading to possible hazards.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
The identification of sneak flows can be performed by one of two methods. The first is
5. Chapter 4
by the addition of coloured lines onto a P&ID to indicate possible sneak paths, and once this
has been completed the additional lines can be evaluated to identify if, and how, a sneak path
could occur. The second method is by the use of a tree diagram, which produces a clearer
assessment. Tracing the possible sneak flows is performed by choosing each material present
in the process (including utilities) and (by assuming all the pumps are turned on and all the
valves are open) identifying all their possible flows through the process and where they can
go. The process should then be checked for any incompatible substances coming together,
and then if the associated flow paths are practical. A table is also produced indicating all the
different valve and pump settings during the various operations of the process (this is of
special interest in batch/semi-batch processes where the valve and pump settings can alter
regularly). The table can then be assessed by assuming one valve is set in the wrong
condition, and evaluating the hazards produced.
Identification of the other sneak paths is generally performed by the use of check lists, which

are often called sneak clue lists. These aids in the identification of the sneak paths by
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specifying possible causes that can then be checked to see if they can occur.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Advantages of sneak analysis
4. Chapter 3
• Systematic evaluation of the process. A well defined methodology is available which can be
5. Chapter 4
applied to all parts of the plant in a systematic order.
Disadvantages of sneak analysis

• Requires experienced personnel to perform the review. Experience is required to aid in the
identification of possible sneak paths.
• Time consuming and expensive for complex systems. For complex plants there will be many
plant items increasing the number of possible sneak paths that are required to be examined.
Reliability Block Diagram

A reliability block diagram is a pictorial representation of the reliability of a process. It is
used to indicate the required functioning components for the process to perform, and is
applied primarily to systems without repair, and where the order of failure does not matter. For
this technique it is assumed that there are only two possible states for each component,

operational or faulty.
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2. Chapter 1
To successfully apply the technique the operation of the process is required to be
3. Chapter 2
described in detail. There should also be statements concerning:-
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
(i) Functions to be performed.
(ii) Performance parameters and possible limits.
(iii) Environmental and operating conditions.
The process is then divided into blocks, which can be further divided into separate
reliability block diagrams if required. Each block should be, where possible, independent of the
other blocks, and contain no redundancy. The system definition is then used to organize the
block diagram, where the output of one block is used as the input to the next. If there is no
redundancy present, the reliability block diagram drawn will be linear indicating that the failure
in any of the blocks will cause the entire process to fail. If redundancy is present within the
process then where it is present blocks can be drawn in parallel, indicating that with the failure
of one of these blocks a path for the process to work is still available.
Advantages of reliability block diagrams

• Often used as a starting point for other techniques. Can be used to identify areas where
1. Content Index
reliability is of concern and should be further evaluated by a more detailed technique.
2. Chapter 1
• Can identify where redundancy is required. It specifically examines the plant to identify
3. Chapter 2
where inbuilt redundancy would aid in safety.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of reliability block diagrams
• Trivial except for complex systems. The technique will be of little use on simple systems
were only a small number of functions are performed.
• Limited to investigating reliability. The technique can not be easily applied to identify hazards
that are not associated with reliability.
Structural Reliability Analysis

The method examines the structures associated with the process to identify their in-built
safety margins. It can also be used to assess the effect of a partial failure on the overall
structure, and the process.
Advantages of structural reliability analysis

• Identifies hazards relating to the infrastructure. The technique is used solely to identify

potential hazards related to the failure of the infrastructure of the plant.

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2. Chapter 1
Disadvantages of structural reliability analysis
3. Chapter 2
• The study is only applicable to buildings and structures. The technique cannot be applied to
4. Chapter 3
identify hazards in other areas of the plant
5. Chapter 4
.
Vulnerability Assessment
The vulnerability assessment is used to evaluate the safety of plant items if a failure
occurs in a nearby item. Initially the locations of all plant items need to be identified. This is
usually performed by placing a 3D grid over the layout of the plant, and specifying a grid co-
ordinate for all of the process items, providing an indication of the distances between items.
The possible hazards of the various process items need to be identified, along with their effect
on the other process items (e.g. debris, heat). The hazard is significant if it can directly
impinge on the required safety systems needed for its mitigation, or will cause a secondary
hazard in adjacent items.
Advantages of vulnerability assessments

• Investigates secondary hazards to the process. The technique does not evaluate the

hazards due to failure of equipment but evaluates the additional hazards caused once the
1. Content Index
incident (e.g. explosion) has occurred.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Disadvantages of vulnerability assessments
4. Chapter 3
• Requires knowledge of the consequences of incidents. The area of effect and consequences
5. Chapter 4
of the initial incident are required to be known to identify how it impinges on the remainder of
the plant.
DEFI method
This method is used to evaluate the possible failures relating to a piece of equipment. It
is often use in the computer industry to test prototype hardware as it is developed. A computer
is used to send failure inputs to the piece of equipment, and the consequence and failure rates
can be calculated.
Advantages of DEFI
• Can be used to examine equipment before it is fitted to the plant. The technique is usually
applied to prototypes to aid in assessing its reliability and identifying possible failure modes

which can be used in other hazard identification techniques.

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• Produces frequencies for failure. Due to the significant testing regime that the equipment
2. Chapter 1
undergoes, failure frequencies can be identified.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Disadvantages of DEFI
5. Chapter 4
• It is more applicable to assessing reliability than hazard identification. The technique is
geared to the identification of reliability and failure frequencies and these values can be
incorporated into other hazard identification techniques.
• Hardware needs to be constructed before testing can be performed. The hardware needs to
be available as either a prototype or a production model for the technique to be performed.
Control hazards identification

The increased use of computers within safety systems allows for significant hazards to
occur due to their mal-operation. Computers have the additional problem that many of their
operations share the use of the same component, hence if this component fails all the
operations routed through it will also fail, producing Common Mode Failures. Software tools
are applied to control systems and critical applications to identify hazards.

A number of techniques described elsewhere can be used to identify the hazards associated
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with the failure of the software, these are FMEA, checklists, ‗What if?‘ analysis, and fault tree
2. Chapter 1
analysis. There are a number of additional techniques that are specific to identifying hazards
3. Chapter 2
in computer systems. These are still mainly in their development stage and are still subject to
4. Chapter 3
improvements, and are described below.
5. Chapter 4
Computer HAZOP (CHAZOP)

CHAZOP is based on the methodology used in HAZOP studies. As with HAZOP it can
be performed at a number of stages in the process development, and is split into two formats
which can be performed in conjunction with the appropriate stage of HAZOP. The preliminary
study is used to define critical features early in the design, and consists of :-
(i) Proposals on the system architecture.

(ii) A review of safety related features.
(iii) Review of performance after system failure.
(iv) Review of performance after utilities failure.

The full study goes through the programmable electronic systems building up a detailed view
1. Content Index
of how the system is intended to work, and what will happen if they fail. A number of areas are
2. Chapter 1
considered :-
3. Chapter 2
(v) Random failure in the computer system environment. For each failure the following should
4. Chapter 3
be considered: what should happen, will the operator know, what should he do, and if there
5. Chapter 4
are any changes needed.
(vi) Input / output signals. For each signal it should be identified where it is used for a safety
related function, and then a number of guide words (such as low signal, high signal, invariant
signal, drifting signal, bad signal) should be applied. The questions does it matter, will the
operator know, is there any action required by the operator or other systems, and any
modifications required, should also be asked.
(vii) Complex control schemes. For each scheme its function and method of operation should
be given. The schemes should then be systematically reviewed for signals used, operator
access, limits applied, interaction, controller tuning, relationships, performance monitoring,
actions on a process mal-operation, protection against unauthorized changes, safety
functions, and other ideas identified by the assessment group.
(viii) Batch systems. All the same points as for complex control systems should be considered,
though they should be performed at each stage of the batch process.

(ix) Protective systems. Again the same points as for complex control systems should be used
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where applicable.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
As with HAZOP, the assessment team should record all the hazards identified by the
4. Chapter 3
technique, and provide recommendation for possible improvement.
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of CHAZOP
• Methodical study of errors within the software. Systematically applies a set of guide words to
the software and process control systems.
Disadvantages of CHAZOP
• Can be expensive and time consuming. For a complex process there will be a large number
of computer systems that need to be evaluated.
• Can only be applied to software and control systems. The technique is specifically designed
to identify hazards in computer systems, and cannot be easily applied outside this area.
Structured methods
Structured methods are predominantly used to identify the appropriate software structure that
needs to be developed, and should be performed early in the design and development phase
of the process.

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Structured English
2. Chapter 1
Structured English is mainly used to expand ideas and functions from vague
3. Chapter 2
generalities, to precise statements in a hierarchical fashion. The method is given in terms of a
4. Chapter 3
set of logical conditions. Each function of the computer control system is written up as a
5. Chapter 4
restricted set of nouns and verbs, but in a format of the user's own design, which resembles a
computer program.
The technique begins by stating the purpose of the instrumentation system and then proceeds
to define what equipment that is to be used and how often the process needs to be performed.
Once this is done, the process is then described indicating how to achieve the control
system's objectives.
Advantages of structured English

• Helps to produce an inherently safer control system. The technique identifies hazards early
in the design phase allowing alterations in the system architecture so that they can be either
removed or minimized.
Disadvantages of structured English

• Can only be applied to the computer system. The methodology is geared towards examining
1. Content Index
software and cannot be readily used to identify hazards in other areas of the process.
2. Chapter 1
• Can only identify major hazards. The technique is performed before the computer
3. Chapter 2
architecture is fully developed and the limited information available means that only major
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Specification language
This method is similar to that of structured English and incorporates a graphical format
Known as "requirements net" (network), and uses more restrictive verbs and nouns. The
requirements net diagram is constructed first to show the flow of data and actions through the
control system, and various symbols are used to indicate alternate paths and events taking
place. This type of method includes tools for checking the specification for completeness,
consistency, and such tasks as compiling a data dictionary.
Advantages of specific language

in the design phase allowing alterations in the system architecture so they can be either
removed or minimized.

1. Content Index
Disadvantages of specific language
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Structured Analysis and Design Techniques (SADT)

SADTs are another way of expressing the activities of a control system by the use of
diagrams that resemble conventional engineering blocks. The technique incorporates a
graphical language and a set of methods and management guidelines. The SADT model
consists of an ordered set of diagrams, which themselves contain 3-6 nodes with their
respective arcs. There are two basic types of diagram:-
(i) Activity diagram. The nodes specify activities, while the arcs specify data flow between the
activities. The arcs denote control data, input data and processor leading into the node, and
output data leading out.
(ii) Data diagram. The nodes specify data objects and the arcs activities. The arcs denote

control activity, generating activity and storage devise leading into the node, and using activity
1. Content Index
leading out. The technique uses a top-down technique to breakdown high level nodes into
2. Chapter 1
further diagrams.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Advantages of SADT
5. Chapter 4
in the design phase allowing alterations in the system architecture so that they can be either
removed or minimised.
• Produces easily understandable results. The technique produces a graphical representation
of the software, which is split into easily understood blocks.
Disadvantages of SADT

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State-transition Diagrams
2. Chapter 1
The state-transition diagram is one of the oldest graphical methods for indicating state
3. Chapter 2
machines. It represents the sequence of operation of programmable electronic systems
4. Chapter 3
through control loop diagrams.
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of state-transition diagrams

• Easily understandable. Once the diagram is drawn the operations performed can be easily
followed.
Disadvantages of state-transition diagrams
• Can only be applied to the control system. The methodology is geared towards examining
control systems and cannot be readily used to identify hazards in other areas of the process.
• The diagram can be difficult to draw. The diagram can become complex if the system under
evaluation is large, and simultaneous parallel operations cannot be represented.
Petri-nets
Petri-nets applies a graphical methodology, and utilizes a number of bubbles and arcs
to represent the process. The bubbles identify places, while the arcs indicate transactions that

occur. They can easily represent the flow structure of a computer control program which
1. Content Index
incorporates such constructs as If-Then-Else, Do-While, or Goto.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Advantages of petri-nets
4. Chapter 3
• The graphical representation assists understanding of the program. The graphical results
5. Chapter 4
can easily be understood and produces a simplistic representation of the computer program.
• The methodology can be either bottom-up, or top-down. The methodology allows either
specific causes to be developed to provide their consequences, or specific consequences can
be broken down to identify their causes.
Disadvantages of Petri-nets
• Mainly applicable to computer systems. Petri-nets have mainly been developed to aid in the
identification of hazards within computer programs, and are not easily converted to evaluate
other sections of the plant.

GRAFCET
1. Content Index
Grafcet [PSLP Mod 9 1998] is a graphical method of specifying control sequences, and
2. Chapter 1
was developed in France in the 1970‘s. It defines the orders of the actions to be executed, and
3. Chapter 2
the actions themselves. It is tailored towards batch processes as it will show the sequence of
4. Chapter 3
events (in terms of control operations such as opening and closing valves) that are to be
5. Chapter 4
performed to complete a process cycle.
Advantages of GRAFCET
• Produces easily understandable results. The graphical results show the sequence of
operations that need to be performed in an easily understandable way.
Disadvantages of GRAFCET
• Can only be applied to the control system. The methodology is geared towards examining
control systems and cannot be readily used to identify hazards in other areas of the process.
Human hazards identification

Human tools assess the hazards associated with the interaction of the human operators
with the process. They are used to identify hazards occurring due to human error while

performing standard procedures, and also improper safety measures if an initial hazard
1. Content Index
occurs.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
Task Analysis
4. Chapter 3
Task analysis is a systematic method for analyzing a task in terms of its goals,
5. Chapter 4
operations and plans. The task is a set of operations/actions required to achieve a set goal.
The goal represents the required outcome of the actions, the operation represents the various
stages required to implement the goal; while the plans are methods and conditions under
which the stages are performed. Task analysis assesses what people might do while
performing the operations, and asks questions such as:-
(i) What actions do the operators perform?

(ii) How do operators respond to different cues in the environment?
(iii) What errors might be made and deviations caused in plant operations?
(iv) How might any errors be recovered, or any deviations be controlled?
(v) How do operators plan their actions?
To perform task analysis a certain level of data is required:-

(vi) The general operating procedure including job descriptions, process diagrams, and
1. Content Index
operating manual.
2. Chapter 1
(vii) Output from a hazard review.
3. Chapter 2
(viii) Plant records.
4. Chapter 3
(ix) A number of interviews with people who have experience of the process and plant.
5. Chapter 4
(x) Observations of the general operation of the plant. These can also be augmented by
standards, exposure limits and data from previous incidents. The analysis itself is then
performed in a number of stages
(xi) Goals of the analysis. The operation to be investigated should be fully described to the
agreement of all of the assessment team, and the requirements of the study defined.
(xii) Breakdown of the operation into steps. The original operation should be broken down to a
level appropriate to the detail of the study. This is generally the individual steps required to
perform the operation, but can often have nonessential information removed.
(xiii) Creating a plan. The methods and conditions under which the various stages are
performed should be defined.
(xiv) Analyzing the plan. The plan created in stage 3 should be fully analyzed, to identify
hazards to the equipment, the environment, lack of controls and protection etc.. Possible
deviations should also be examined along with their likelihood.

(xv) Modifying the plan. The modifications to the plan should improve the method of working,
1. Content Index
safety, and minimize any deviations. The plan should also give advice on possible actions if
2. Chapter 1
deviations do occur. The plan can then be fully reported along with a description of the work
3. Chapter 2
performed to identify the appropriate method and conditions.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Advantages of task analysis
• Allows complex tasks to be analyzed in detail. The technique splits complex tasks into a
number of more simplistic ones to allow detailed examination and to allow them to be easily
understood and followed.
Disadvantages of task analysis

• Only applicable to human interaction with the process. The technique is applied to tasks
performed by the plant operators and maintenance workers, and can not be easily applied to
other areas.
• Time consuming and expensive. A large number of tasks will be required to be performed for
complex processes, and each needs to be fully developed to provide detailed information to
whoever has to perform the task.

Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA)

1. Content Index
Hierarchical task analysis uses the same methodology as task analysis, though a
2. Chapter 1
hierarchy is placed on the order of the tasks to be investigated. A complex task is broken
3. Chapter 2
down into a number of simpler sub-tasks, which can then be further split until they become
4. Chapter 3
only individual tasks. The methodology produces either a tree structure, with the most complex
5. Chapter 4
task on the top and the simplest on the bottom, or a list of steps that are required to be
performed in order to produce the required goal. The procedure for the task can then be easily
assessed, and any possible human errors can be identified with appropriate consequences.
Advantages of HTA
• Allows complex tasks to be analysed in detail. Tasks performed by humans on the plant are
split-up by the technique to provide a detailed guide to whoever is to perform them.
• Provides an easily understandable procedure for the task, which can also be used in a
number of other assessment techniques. The technique provides an easily understandable
breakdown of the tasks which are listed in order of when they should be performed. The
results are often incorporated into other human hazard identification tools.
Disadvantages of HTA

• Only applicable to human interaction with the process. The technique is designed to evaluate
1. Content Index
human tasks and cannot be easily applied to other areas of the process.
2. Chapter 1
• Time consuming and expensive. A complex process will contain a large number of tasks that
3. Chapter 2
need to be examined by the technique to the appropriate level of detail.
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4
Action Error Analysis (AEA)
Action error analysis uses the output from a hierarchical task analysis as its starting
point. Each step is then analysed to identify all the errors which the human operators can
commit, and their effects on the process can be evaluated. Action error analysis can easily
identify hazards produced by single actions, though for large processes it is impracticable to
attempt to identify hazards occurring from more than one wrong action. The errors are broken
down into a number of categories :-
(i) Unconscious slips.

(ii) Mistakes in planning or understanding.
(iii) Conscious violation of the operating procedure.
(iv) Sabotage.
The most common violations are usually due to poor equipment design which allows the task

to be performed more easily in a different way to that stated in the operation manual.
1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
Advantages of AEA
3. Chapter 2
• Allows complex tasks to be analyzed in detail. It incorporates hierarchical task analysis that
4. Chapter 3
splits the required tasks into their components.
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of AEA
the errors made by human operators and maintenance workers and is not easily related to
other areas of the process.
• Time consuming and expensive. There are a large number of tasks that need to be
evaluated and a large number of possible errors for each task.
• Difficult identifying hazards occurring from more than one error. The technique becomes very
complex when attempting to identify hazards occurring from multiple errors during the
performance of one or more tasks.
Human Reliability Analysis

Human reliability analysis is used to quantify the human errors. The assessment is

performed in a number of stages:-

1. Content Index
(i) Define the system failures of interest.
2. Chapter 1
(ii) List and analyse the related human operations.
3. Chapter 2
(iii) Estimate the relevant error probabilities.
4. Chapter 3
(iv) Estimate the effects of human errors on the system failure rate.
5. Chapter 4
(v) Recommend changes to the system and recalculate the system failure probabilities.
The first two stages are performed during task analysis, and the results from such a study can
be incorporated into the final stages of the technique. It is unknown how accurate the values
produced by human reliability analysis are, so the results should only be regarded as
estimations.
Advantages of human reliability analysis

• Allows complex tasks to be analyzed in detail. The technique incorporates task analysis, and
so allows a detailed assessment of complex tasks.
• Quantitative technique allowing limited predictions of human error. Probabilities are assigned
to the human errors identified by the technique, and this can produce an overall probability of
human error while the task is being performed.

Disadvantages of human reliability analysis

1. Content Index
• Only applicable to human interaction with the process. The technique is specifically tailored
2. Chapter 1
to assess human errors in performing tasks, and cannot be easily applied to other areas of the
3. Chapter 2
process.
4. Chapter 3
• Time consuming and expensive. There are a large number of tasks and human errors that
5. Chapter 4
need to be evaluated by the technique, and each error has to be allocated a probability.
• Relies on availability of human failure rate data for the lowest level individual task. The
probabilities assigned to the various errors are often estimated which can lead to errors in the
calculation of the probability of an overall error.
• Requires skilled practitioners. Skilled team members are required to produce realistic
probabilities for these errors, as well as splitting the task into its components.
Pattern search method

The pattern search method is used to identify hazards due to a number of errors. It
attempts to look for a common cause which could lead to the appropriate errors, and identifies
areas of importance for safety considerations.
Advantages of pattern search method

• Can identify hazards due to more than one error. The technique examines common causes
1. Content Index
that can lead to more than one error within the process, which when combined can lead to a
2. Chapter 1
hazard.
3. Chapter 2
4. Chapter 3
Disadvantages of pattern search method
5. Chapter 4
• Time consuming and expensive. All the causes need to be examined as well as how they
interact between each other. A possible common cause would also need to be identified.
Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA)

PHEA uses hierarchical task analysis to plan the task. It then systematically analyses
them for:-
(i) Task type.
(ii) Error type.
(iii) Task description.
(iv) Consequences.
(v) Recovery.
(vi) Error reduction strategy.

Advantages of PHEA
1. Content Index
• Allows complex tasks to be analysed in detail. The technique applies hierarchical task
2. Chapter 1
analysis to split the complex tasks into component parts.
3. Chapter 2
• Assesses the consequences of the hazards. The technique examines the consequences of
4. Chapter 3
the human errors if they occur within the process.
5. Chapter 4
Disadvantages of PHEA
human error on the plant and can not be easily applied to other areas of the process.
• Time consuming and expensive. Each task has to be evaluated or hazards might be missed.
COMPARISON OF TECHNIQUES
It is impossible to compare hazard identification techniques and come to any conclusion
as to which is the best. Each technique has been developed for a specific range of
circumstances taking many factors into account including the resources required to undertake
the analysis, expertise available and stage of the process. This project has attempted to
classify the resources required for each technique on a scale of 1 to 3 with one being quick
and inexpensive and three being time consuming and expensive. Further comparisons of their

applicability to SME‘s, COMAH, offshore and nuclear installations have been made using a
1. Content Index
four point scale with one not being applicable and four very applicable.
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2
The literature review has provided an overwhelming source of information on hazard
4. Chapter 3
identification techniques. Many of the references are themselves a comparison of hazard
5. Chapter 4
assessment schemes to a particular application. Whilst there is a wealth of information on
examples of applying hazard identification techniques, there is little guidance available on how
to apply them. Whilst the literature was wide ranging it is impossible to claim that every
technique has been listed. Many of the techniques have been developed for particular
applications and renamed. No attempt has been made to sort out this ‗family tree‘ of
techniques but where they are obviously similar they have been grouped together as a single
technique The most difficult aspect of this review was deciding on the amount of detail to be
included for each technique: too little and the review becomes little more that a list, too much
and it becomes an unreadable tome. A subjective assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages is given, but the real question about hazard identification is related to its ability
to carry out the task of identifying all the relevant hazards. This question can only be
answered on a case by case basis. Most techniques can be applied in any circumstances
provided enough resources and expertise is available. The most suitable technique will not

only depend on the application but also the available resources. It would be nonsensical to
1. Content Index
embark upon a HAZOP without access to an experienced chairman. Other less applicable
2. Chapter 1
techniques could probably be undertaken with more chance of success by utilizing available
3. Chapter 2
expertise. The comparison has attempted to match techniques with various types of
4. Chapter 3
installations taking into account not only the probable availability of resources to carry out the
5. Chapter 4
assessment but also the magnitude of the hazards present. This report has provided a useful
overview of the majority of the hazard identification techniques that will be found in COMAH
reports and other high hazard industries. It also gives an indication of the applicability of each
technique for SME‘s, offshore and nuclear facilities. There are a wide range of hazard
identification techniques available most of which have many examples published. With the
notable exception of HAZOP there are few formal guidance documents on the application of
such techniques. The most common method of learning to apply a technique is attendance at
one of the many training courses or working with a more experienced colleague. The lack of
formal guidance is to be expected with a range of techniques that need to be very flexible to
allow their application to a wide range of circumstances without discouraging free thinking.
The guidance available appears to concentrate on providing a description of the technique
rather than setting any standards of quality for applying the technique.

How to develop your influencing skills

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1
Step up your influencing powers to realise their career-building potential
3. Chapter 2
In organisational life, influence is a key skill. It helps earn co-operation from colleagues,
4. Chapter 3
ensures your voice is heard and makes you a better leader. We all influence at minor levels
5. Chapter 4
every day without even knowing it, but step your influencing powers up a notch, and you‘ll
begin to realise their career-building potential very quickly. Remember that the real skill is
learning how to influence through commitment, loyalty and trust, rather than through mere
compliance or, at worst, coercion. ―At most organisational levels, ‗making things happen‘
depends as much on influencing sideways and upwards as it does on managing through the
hierarchy,‖ says Ceri Roderick, assessment and development specialist at occupational
psychologist Pearn Kandola. ―Change processes in particular are best achieved through
influence rather than imposition.‖
Where do I start?
Be clear in your mind about the end result you want to steer towards. Then identify the key
stakeholders who you need to influence. Try to discover as much as you can about them and
where they are coming from by asking open-ended questions that will encourage them to talk.
Understanding the motivation, priorities and concerns of the individuals involved will help you

connect with them and build influential relationships.

1. Content Index
2. Chapter 1 Learn more about yourself
3. Chapter 2 A heightened sense of self-awareness and the effect you have on other people is vital. Ask
4. Chapter 3 yourself some frank questions: are you viewed as ‗head-led‘ and analytical, or more of a
5. Chapter 4 sensitive, creative type? Do you have a reputation for taking risks, or are you a safe-bet
decision-maker? Are you a strategic visionary or a down-to-earth pragmatist?
If you find such self-assessment difficult, ask close colleagues what they think, or take an
emotional intelligence test.
What qualities do I need?
The more well-rounded your skill set is and the more respected you are for your abilities; the
more people will listen to you. Roderick stresses the importance of ‗content‘ skills, such as
expertise or eminence building and becoming the ‗go to person‘ for a particular topic. Process
skills including researching, planning and facilitation are fundamental to constructing a well-
timed and systematic approach.
Get volunteering
Voluntary work provides an excellent opportunity to advance people skills such as influencing,

as well as building confidence. You can become a school governor, get involved with your
1. Content Index
organisation‘s community-based projects, or sit on the board of a charity. Joining a
2. Chapter 1
professional body or volunteering for tasks that take you into new areas will also give you a
3. Chapter 2
chance to practise getting people on side.
4. Chapter 3
Work on your leadership skills
5. Chapter 4
The success of any influencing strategy ultimately rests on leadership talent, so use every
opportunity to practise, test and improve your skills. A carefully selected mentor can help you
reach higher levels of self-awareness, and give insight on how you might become more
influential.
Act out scenarios
Role-playing with colleagues can be highly beneficial when it comes to learning how different
management styles and approaches can work under challenging circumstances. Feedback
from these sessions can highlight whether you‘re using the right tone, as well as any
weaknesses in your body language or listening skills.
Build relationships
Raising your profile and maintaining a high visibility is critical to gaining support and co-
operation for your ideas from subordinates and peers. Spending more time socialising with the
individuals you are trying to influence will also help cultivate trust and get people on side.
1. Content Index
Drum up additional behind-the-scenes support by forming alliances with other key influencers
2. Chapter 1
outside the department.
3. Chapter 2
If you only do five things
4. Chapter 3
5. Chapter 4 1 Be clear about what you are seeking to achieve
2 Find out what makes key stakeholders tick
3 Understand your impact on others
4 Look for common ground
5 Be flexible and adapt your strategy for different audiences
How should you best manage the influencing process?
Assuming that influencing is more than 'selling' an idea, and that it implies a strategic intent
and a sustained campaign, and then the important stages are:
- Surveying the organisational landscape - is the time right for your concept?
- Preparing the ground - are there dependencies in getting your concept accepted?

- Implementing your campaign - bringing your argument to bear on the right individuals or
1. Content Index
groups
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 - Monitoring progress - where are you winning commitment or meeting resistance?
4. Chapter 3
What tactics would you personally use when influencing?
5. Chapter 4
Identify an influential person who is a stakeholder in the issue you are seeking to influence.
Research this individual to understand their values, motives and personality. For example,
what kind of arguments do they respond to? What are their current priorities? Who do they
listen to, and why? Build a targeted campaign and a relationship based on the answers to all
these questions.
What should you refrain from?
People don't like to feel manipulated, brow beaten or rail-roaded. Avoiding these perceptions
depends on how your influencing approach interacts with strong personality features of the
individual, such as their degree of openness and their degree of suspicion. People will always
be assessing your motives, so be open and clear about your goals. If they are seen as worthy,
then people will value your commitment and are more likely to forgive any clumsiness.

< Previous Page
1. Content Index
What is the latest thinking on the subject?
2. Chapter 1
3. Chapter 2 Individual differences are critical. There is strong evidence that a small number of underlying
personality factors is a major influence on how we send and receive messages. Deep
4. Chapter 3
understanding of your own impact on others and the interpersonal sensitivity to read others
5. Chapter 4
well are the precursors to developing strong relationships. It is within such relationships that
the most powerful influence occurs.

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3. Chapter 2  Definition Of Management

CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGES IN INDUSTRIAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT

 Meeting the Challenges in Industrial Safety Management

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 1

 Use of near misses and experience feed-backs

CHAPTER 3: SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR AN OUTDOOR ORGANIZATION

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 2

1. Content Index CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 3

CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 5

In general, planning can be strategic planning, tactical planning, or contingency planning.

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 6

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 7

influence the goals of the organization.

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 8

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 9

3. Discipline. Seeing discipline as ―respect for agreements which are directed at

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 11

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 12

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 13

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 14

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 15

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 16

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 17

Contemporary Management Thought: In more recent years, new management thoughts

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 18

Closed Management Systems: Within the classical and behavioral approaches to

| CHAPTER 1 - SAFETY MANAGEMENT 19

avoid the influence of outside forces.

surrounding population involved in construction activities is substantial. These personnel are

• Innovation in the training methodologies to achieve higher effectiveness of training among

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 21

"Key drivers for effective Industrial Safety Management"

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 22

Appreciation of Industrial Safety requirements and their implementation takes a priority

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 23

Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and Work Procedures

Our objective is to ensure safe working conditions to prevent accidents, hence it is

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 24

Safety Related Deficiency Management:

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 25

Safety Provisions and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 26

In order to ensure proper coordination and communication on safety aspects on a

3.Sectional Safety meetings for the departmental and contractor employees.

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 27

Safety enforcement by line managers:

In order to achieve practical solutions and active involvement in accident prevention

Other key drivers.

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 28

f. Certification of line managers in Industrial safety.

ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE SAFETY MANAGEMENT ON THE TRANS-EUROPEAN

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 29

preparing a proposal for a Council and Parliament Directive on this matter.

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 30

The thematic network IMPROVER is currently undertaking research on road traffic

Therefore, the main objectives of Community action should be:

| CHAPTER 2 - Challenges in Industrial Safety Management 32

4. Chapter 3 e) To establish a constant exchange of best practice in terms of infrastructure safety

3. COMPARING POLICY OPTIONS

Option 1: No policy change.