G.R. No.

75112 August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN,
SR., respondents.

Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute.

He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every
morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same
time he was the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at
about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to
the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that
he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live
in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a
student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While
Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Potenciano Kapunan,
Sr. which led in his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal
case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against
Funtecha.

In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is
subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to
pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed
the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment
coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer
and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence
only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being
the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court
agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs
cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section
14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide
guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any
way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR
cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is
merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There
is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the
decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person
during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and
against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the
patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by
an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions
of the Civil Code.

Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official

appointment for a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the
act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of
Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is
beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school
transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was
not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial
duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in
the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him.
Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.