Maria Apiag et.

al v Judge Esmeraldo Cantero

AM No. MTJ-95-1070 [February 12, 1997]

Reyes, J.B.L.

FACTS:
The wedding of Maria Apiag (one of the complainants) and Esmeraldo Cantero
(respondent-judge) took place on August 11, 1947. They begot two children, Teresita and
Glicero (complainants). Thereafter, Esmeraldo left the conjugal home and abandoned his wife
and children without any means of support. Later on, the complainants learned that Esmeraldo
contracted another marriage with Nieves Ygay and they have 5 children of their own. In all the
documents filed by Esmeraldo such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, personal
data sheet, income tax return, and insurance policy with GSIS, he misrepresented himself as
being married to Nieves. Herein complainants charged Esmeraldo with gross misconduct for
allegedly having committed bigamy and for falsifying public documents.

In his comment, Esmeraldo denied the validity of the marriage alleging that it was
dramatized and that his parents called him to appear in a certain drama marriage and was
forced to sign a duly prepared marriage contract. He pressed the idea that his consent was not
freely given. The fact, however, is undisputed that he and Maria were engaged in a love affair
which resulted in the pregnancy of the latter prior to the marriage. It is only for the
preservation of the family name that their parents agreed to their marriage but not to live
together as husband and wife.

To bolster his defense, Esmeraldo alleged that Maria has been living with another man
during her public service as a teacher and have begotten a child, named Manuel Apiag. He
argued the “he who seek justice must seek justice with clean hands.” He didn’t file any
annulment or judicial declaration of the alleged marriage because he believed that said
marriage was void from the beginning. Thus, nothing is to be nullified because the marriage
never existed. However, in view of the complainants’ request in their letter to the respondent
dated September 21, 1993, both parties have agreed that Teresita shall: (1) get ¼ of the
retirement that Esmeraldo will receive from GSIS; (2) be included as one of the beneficiaries in
case of the latter’s death; (3) inherit the properties of the latter; and (2) receive and collect Php
4000 monthly as support.

The issues presented and decisions held by the investigating judge and court
administrator are as follows:

1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
No. Respondent knows that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of
death. Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was
contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.

2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the
presumption that she is already dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;
No. There’s still a need for judicial declaration presumptive death and of nullity of marriage.
 3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the
offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
No. We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable
for misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained
of were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in
1960 to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989.

4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;

No. On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges,
Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he
had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had)
eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he
had two (2) children.

5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law.

No. Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the
imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed against him. "A judge's actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting — his wife having been
allegedly absent for four years only — constitutes gross immoral conduct" (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr.,
249 SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Esmeraldo committed gross misconduct for abandonment, failing to give

support, marrying for the 2nd time without having first obtained judicial declaration of
nullity, and falsification of public documents.
2. W/N Esmeraldo’s 2nd marriage with Nieves Ygay is valid, notwithstanding that there
was no judicial nullity of the former’s marriage with Maria.

HELD:

1. No. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law. It
only covers such performance of duties as an officer and not such only affects his
character as a private individual. The acts imputed to Esmeraldo clearly pertain to his
personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. It is necessary to
separate the character of the man from the character of the officer.

2. Yes, the second marriage is valid. Article 40 or the NCC provides that marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of nullity before any party can remarry. This was
enunciated in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy. However, prior decision of the Supreme Court in
Odayat v. Amante states that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
void marriages. The latter case is applicable to the foregoing because the second
marriage of Esmeraldo to Nieves took place before the promulgation of the Wiegel case
and before the effectivity of the Family Code.
 In line with this, the charge of falsification of public documents will not prosper because
the bigamy complaint was not found. Esmeraldo believed in good faith that the first
marriage was void and it in this belief that shows his lack of malice in filling up the
public documents.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE

HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F.
RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
G.R. No. 124893
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK)
FACTS:
Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of
respondent COMELEC en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the
SK of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
– On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3
[b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
– On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter”
with the MCTC. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and
ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.
– On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos
Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner,
however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Asperin who set aside the order of
respondent Rios and allowed petitioner to run.
– On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be
disapproved.
– Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G.
Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy”
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of
candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the
Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent Rios issued the memorandum
to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the
event she won in the election.
– On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s
votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
– On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for
the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation
was “without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other
interested party.”
– On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the
elected officials of the Pederasyon.
ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or
cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)
2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age
requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid
HELD:
1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK
elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus
Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official
designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and
that the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC
sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the
COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon
receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply
with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every
pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond
paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper
Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the
petition were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution
on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang
Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who were at
least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337
at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered
by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are
elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member
of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years,
unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from
office.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c)
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang
Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official
of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter must be born between
May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be
a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able
to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No.
2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra
vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She
contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on
election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still
twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further
provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section
428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the day of his
election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election” is an additional qualification.
The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21
years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code
itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts
and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the
day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor
days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on
the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his
birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the
first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. The
phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means
21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not
equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that
the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate possess the
age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he
can be declared ineligible.
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the
vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen
shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall
discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared
ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member
voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan
Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO
Civil Law | Divorce | Legal Separation
See full text

Plaintiff-Appellant: Pastor B. Tenchavez
Defendants-Appellees: Vicenta F. Escaño, et al.
15 SCRA 355
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
Ponente: J. J.B.L. Reyes
FACTS:
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic
chaplain. Upon discovery of their daughter’s marriage, spouses
Mamerto and Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested
that the marriage be recelebrated. However, the recelebration did not
take place and the newlyweds eventually became estranged. Later,
unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she filed
a complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and
an absolute divorce was granted by the Court of Nevada. She later
sought for the annulment of her marriage from the Archbishop of
Cebu. Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada and
acquired American citizenship.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against Vicenta and her parents whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged their daughter from joining him and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church for
having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages.

Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid

marriage to her American husband; while her parents filed a
counterclaim for moral damages, denying that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts.

The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to her exclusion. It
granted the counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the
extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid
and binding in the Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to

moral damages.

RULING:
1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage
between Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which was already in force at the time expressly provided that “Laws
relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was
then still subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute
divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.

2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and
considerations that Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal
separation on the basis of adultery as provided under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does not recognize
Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her marriage and
cohabitation with the American is technically “intercourse with a
person not her husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her
refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of her husband also constitute in law a wrong for which
the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus, the latter
is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine
law.
As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a
million pesos as unreasonable, taking into account some
considerations. First, the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its
failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on his
part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is evidence
that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against
public policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry
under our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the
union that he entered into voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore,
he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and
attorney’s fees.

LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23,

2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived
together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties
will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his
special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of
whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained
by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the
divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed
divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985
ANIANO OBAÑA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts:

The petitioner seeks a review of the decision of the respondent Appellate Court ordering
him in an action for replevin to return to Aniceto Sandoval the 170 cavans of rice or the
amount of P37.25/cavan. With legal interests from the filing of the Complaint until fully
paid.

Sandoval is the owner manager of Sandoval and Son’s rice mill located at Rosales,
Pangasinan. He is engaged in buying and selling of palay.

November 21, 1964, Sandoval is approached by Chan Lin who offered to purchase from
him 170 cavan’s  of rice for P37.25/ cavan to be delivered to petitioner’s store in San
Fernando, La union. Payment will be made thereat by Chan Lin to Sandoval’s
representative.

The following day the 170 cavans of rice were transported to the petitioners store in San
Fernando La Union and Chan Lin accompanied the shipment. After the goods were
unloaded the driver attempted to collect the purchased price to Chan Lin but he Lin was
nowhere  to be found then he tried to collect to the petitioner but refuses stating that he
purchased the 170 cavans for P33.00/cavan and it was already paid to Chan Lin.

At the MTC replevin was filed by Sandoval and won the case. Appealed was made at
Court of First Instance in La Union, after trial de novo  the  case was  dismissed in favor
of the petitioner. Then on the appeal on the respondent Appellate Court, Sandoval
obtained reversal on his favor.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is unjustly enriching himself in the acquisition of the
170 cavans of rice?

Held:

From  the evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that this is a simple case of
swindling perpetuated by Chan Lin at the expense of the petitioner
and defendant.The act of Chan Lin in purchasing plaintiff’s rice at the price of P 37.25
per cavan and thereafter offering the same goods to defendant at a much lower price is
an indication that it was never his intention to comply with his obligation to plaintiff. It is
clear that Chan Lin’s only purpose in entering into said contract with plaintiff was to
acquire the physical possession of the goods and then to pass them on to defendant on
the pretext that he is the owner thereof. Premises considered, therefore, Chan Lin
cannot be considered as the owner of the goods at the time the same was said to have
been sold to the defendant- appellee. Considering that defendant acquired the 170
cavans of rice from a person who is not the owner thereof, it is therefore clear that he
acquired no greater right than his predecessor-in-interest.

Finally, on principle of equity, it is but proper that plaintiff-appellant be allowed to

recover the one-hundred and seventy cavans of rice or its value. Being the undisputed
owner of the above mentioned goods, the appellant cannot be deprived of its ownership
without the corresponding payment.

We agree with petitioner-defendant that there was a perfected sale. Article 1475 of the
Civil Code lays down the general rule that there is perfection when there is consent
upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered.

The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

Ownership of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, Chan Lin, upon its delivery to
him at San Fernando, La Union, the place stipulated 3 and pursuant to Articles 1477 and
1496 of the same Code:

Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.

Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it
is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to
the vendee.

At the very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods for the non-payment of
the purchase price, but which had not been rescinded at the time of the sale to
petitioner.

However, from petitioner-defendant’s own testimony before the Court of First Instance,
he admits that three days after the delivery, he was repaid the sum of P5,600.00 by
Chan Lin, who was then accompanied by SANDOVAL’s driver, and that he had
delivered the rice back to them. On rebuttal, however, the driver denied that the rice had
ever been returned. The driver’s version is the more credible, for, as SANDOVAL’s
counsel had manifested in open Court, if return of the rice had been effected, they
would have withdrawn the complaint.

Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had
been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby divested of any claim
to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the rice to Chan Lin, but since even
the latter, again from petitioner-defendant’s own testimony above-quoted, was ready to
return the rice to SANDOVAL, and the latter’s driver denies that the rice had been
returned by petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another by holding on to property no longer belonging to him.   In law and in
equity, therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, since he was not paid the
price therefor

G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988

ELADlA DE LIMA, POTENCIANO REQUIJO, NEMESIO FLORES, REYNALDO
REQUIJO, DOMINADOR REQUIJO and MARIO REQUIJO, petitioners,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS CO., CLARO SAMONTE, SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., (SEVEN-
UP BOTTLING CO., OF THE PHILIPPINES) and PORVENIR ABAJAR
BARRETO, respondents.

Leon O. Ty, Gesmundo and Gesmundo and Renato B. Vasquez for petitioners.

Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for respondents. 

GANCAYCO, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision De Lima vs. Laguna
Tayabas Co. of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the court a quo with
modification to include an award of legal interest on the amounts adjudged in favor of
the petitioners from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the time of actual
payment.

FACTS:

On June 3, 1958 a passanger bus of Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and a delivery
truck of Seven Up Bottling Co., Philippines collided causing the death of Petra Dela
Cruz and serious physical injuries to Eladia De Lima and Nemesio Flores. Three suits
were filed against the respondents before the Court of First Instance of Laguna (San
Pablo City)
On December 27, 1963, the court a quo rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiffs
specifying the indemnity afforded to them. However, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration on the decision by the court a quo seeking award of legal interest on the
adjudged amount in their favour from the date of the said decision but their motion was
not acted upon by the said court.

All of the plaintiffs desisted from appealing with the hope that the defendant will comply
with the indemnity. But instead, the defendant filed an appeal in contrary to the motion
for reconsideration raised by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals. This appeal was
pending for around 30 years.

On December 1971, the petitioners filed a motion before the court of Appeals seeking
the grant of legal interest from the date of the decision of the Court a quo and increasing
the civil indemnity for the death of Petra Dela Cruz. The appelatte court denied the
motion on the contention that the petitioners failed to make an appeal on the error on
lower court’s ruling for not awarding the legal interest and damages. The Supreme
Court after thorough review  and analysis of the case GRANTED the petition of the
petitioners with modifications on the amounts previously specified by the court  a quo.

ISSUE:

Whether  the Supreme Court’s decision through its liberal stance manifested vigilance in
favor of the indigent litigants

HOLDING:

YES.  Article 24 provides that “In all contractual, property and other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantages on the account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
for his protection.”  The petitioners were litigating as paupers.  By reason of their
indigence, they failed to appeal but petitioners De Lima and Requijo had filed their
manifestation making reference to the law and jurisprudence upon which they base their
prayer for relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief.In the liberal stance of the Supreme
Court seeing the case pending for 30 years, it shall an exemption to the rule that it
should not be entertained because of its failure to make an appeal on the lower court’s
decision. The heirs though they failed to do such should be afforded with equitable relief
by the courts as it must be vigilant for their protection. The claim for legal interest and
increase in indemnity should be entertained in spite of the claimant’s failure to appeal
the judgement. Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be construed liberally in order
that the litigants may have ample opportunity to pursue their respective claims and that
a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided.
G.R. No. 179736 : June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER

CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-
5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and
Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot
1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent
to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a
case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo
claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that
the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for
preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;that, in order to
get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-
up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents, through their employees
and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
construction;and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to
privacy.Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install
the video surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take
pictures of petitioners construction.They also clarified that they are not the
owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its
Orderdated February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari.
The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse
of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to
an injunctive writ.The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence. The CA alsosaid that since respondents are
not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.Thus, they are not the proper parties.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined

as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right of an individual "to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public
in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply put, the right
to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them
against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of
the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case
of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and
only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to
privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter."The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy.
As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence."
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy,
because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same
privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are
allowed to enter may come in.
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has
the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the
privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code only to residences.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to

determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation
of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must
be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation
of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy
of anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction,
ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary
restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it
were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who
are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on
respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development
and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of
petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was
so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to
monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a
portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting
up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the
camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents
camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the
right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of

privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance
of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance
of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking
cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is grave
abuse of discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any
grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not
entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties
to this suit.

REMEDEIAL LAW: A real party defendant

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former."

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since
they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance
cameras. Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are
not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they
did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video

surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against
petitioners in another case.During the hearing of the application for Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video
surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care,and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and
eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.He also
admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his
family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective
properties.With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents
are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the
Choachuy family.

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that
they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of
Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured
Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions
regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of
the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if
the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.Noticeably, in these
instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that

respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield
to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find
that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest

Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional
rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito
Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE:
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of
respondeat superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the
person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the
writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual
liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal
and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however,
the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires
added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the
widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible
for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29,

1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct
the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander
to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.  2 So, on
July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without
his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully
well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property;
that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to
Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor
launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had
been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had
become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and

as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil
Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken
with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya
without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge
of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely
obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of
counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless
filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services
of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00
each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00.

ISSUES/HELD:

whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure
of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same
was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or

magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant

whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages

allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required
that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who was
merely acting under orders.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant,
they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable
search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or

magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that
recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt
to justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of
the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the
seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act
No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations,
but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing
the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.  8

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded

the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be
held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain
circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show
that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June
15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from
his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce
de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the
necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the
launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he
impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer
of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to
impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in
the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the
above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

Geluz vs. CA; Juridical personality

8/5/2013

0 Comments
 

July 20, 1961

Facts: Nestor Lazo’s wife obtained an abortion from petitioner Geluz for 3 times. Lazo hinged his
claim for damages against petitioner on the third abortion. The RTC and CA upheld the claim of
Lazo, basing their decision on initial paragraph of Article  2206 of the Civil Code, which provides
that-

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Issue: whether or not Lazo can recover damages against Geluz.

Held: No, the court ruled that an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could
be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity
as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.

Moreover, this is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of
the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise
aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to
have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,
000.00 damages and P3, 000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances
of record, was clearly exaggerated
Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations.  Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent.  As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying.  Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorney’s fees.  The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the
ground lack of cause of action.  Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action”. 

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held  that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines”.  The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights.  Thus, she is entitled to
claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.

Art. 43

JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO

FACTS:

Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela
Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German
Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three
daughters who fell.  Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left
with his son, his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was
hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club
collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and
Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10,
1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela
were hit and killed.

Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that
son outlived his mother.

ISSUE:

Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.

HELD:

Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of
the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges
prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption
shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the
other shall take place.

In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died
before his mother.  The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence.  Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.

Evidence of survivorship may be

(1) direct

(2) indirect

(3) circumstantial or

(4) inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed
each other as to which of them died first.  In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights
from one to another.  In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of
survivorship

Mercado v. Mercado
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

RULING:

Yes. Mercado is guilty of bigamy.

The law provides that: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” A judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by the
statute as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after
Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college.  Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the
latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January
1996.  It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and
jobless.  Her persistence, however, made him relent.  They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license.  Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle.  After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents.  Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode.  In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then
parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped
in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally

examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.  Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

 Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most
of his important decisions (such as where to live).  As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in
life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. 
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

Philippine Telegraph v. National Labor Relations

Commission
G.R. No. 118978, 23 May 1997

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods. De Guzman was again asked to join
PT&T as a probationary employee. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.

When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy including a reminder about the company’s
policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company and
Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed de Guzman, who
had already gained the status of a regular employee. It was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.

RULING:

No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not be a ground to terminate her
services.

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is
free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and
best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by
our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in
the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right
of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the
nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively
required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should
be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.