As an advisor to the Tzar, offerS advice concerning:

Japanese strategy against Russia

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin and Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkins war strategy

How Russia should act to maximize her chances of winning.

To Your Imperial Majesty, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, as part
of my duties as an Imperial Advisors, I humbly offer His imperial Highness a three-part
analysis of the Japanese strategy that has come to be known as the Russian-Japanese war.
Also analyzed will be the strategies of our illustrious commanders Aleksey Nikolayevich
Kuropatkin and Yevgeni Ivanovich Alekseyev in combating this yellow peril. Thirdly I
will offer my humble advice on how our beloved Russia could have maximized our
strategy to bring the conflict quickly and efficiently to an end in Russia’s favor.
As your Majesty certainly knows, empires rise and fall as they walk the tightrope
of history intending to reach glory, but one false step in the journey and they become only
a footnote, soon to be forgotten. Japan become a world power by skillfully walking that
tightrope. The government of Japan, under Prime Minister Ito, had been willing to accept
a diplomatic option. This option would exchange Manchuria’s status quo in return for
accepting Korea’s status as part of the Japanese sphere of influence. Ito even envisioned a
Russo-Japanese treaty to this effect as early as 1901. He was replaced by Prime Minister
Katsura’s hardline government, who believed that an alliance with Great Britain would be
more advantageous. In February 1902, as Your Highness is aware, Japan signed a treaty
with Britain in February 1902. 1
By early 1903 Japan’s war plans were complete. The Japanese were aware of
Russia’s revolutionary factions and no enthusiasm for entering into yet another war.
Hence, they sent a special mission to Europe to support these groups operating in Mother
Russia.2 Their strategy included using the military to place Korea in Japan’s sphere of
influence as a pre-requisite for the second stage launching of military operations north of
the Yalu River. 3 These two stages were realized on February 8 th, 1904. Japan opened the
war with a surprise attack when a Japanese fleet struck Port Arthur’s harbor, effectively
bottling up our newly arrived Russian fleet stationed at the port. In parallel, a second
Japanese fleet became active in Korea, landing troops and occupied a significant portion
of the peninsula. These troops soon moved north to the Yalu River, implementing the war
plans of the previous year.

1
Koda, Yoji. "THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." Naval War College
Review 58, no. 2 (2005): 10-44. Accessed July 20, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/26394181. (p 20)

2
Koda, Yoji. "THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." (p 21)
3
Evans, David C. and Peattie, Mark R., Kaigun: Strategy and technology in the imperial Japanese
navy, 1887-194, Annapolis, MMD: Naval Institute Press, 2012, (pp 85-86)
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Japan could not hope to enter into a protracted war with Mother Russia. She does
not have the resources available to face our overwhelming superiority in manpower,
armaments, and our superior soldiers and sailors of the Imperial Army and Navy. Aware
of this fact, Japan’s primary strategy was to fight a “limited war” 4 in which a negotiated
agreement will be both possible and advisable. Permit me to remind your Highness that
our esteemed General Kuropatkin warned his Highness of the danger of “manufacturing a
threat to the Japanese.” 5 Also, if I may be so bold as to mention a letter written by Count
Witte to our foreign minister in 1901; and I quote: “in the eyes of the Russian people, a
war with Japan for the possession of distant Korea will not be justified, and the latent
dissatisfaction may render more acute the alarming phenomena of our domestic life,
which makes themselves felt even in peacetime.” 6
General Kuropatkin was always a cautious military leader, and some said he was
more concerned with his supply chain than advancing on the enemy. This fact caused the
General staff to see him as indecisive and not fully capable of modernizing the Army.
Regardless of this, you Highness appointed him the Minister of War. During his tenure
during the years before the war with the Japanese broke out, Kuropatkin, who was
previously a strong supporter of expansion in the Far East, reorganized the Army in the
West and thus weakened the Army in the East, which no longer received priority for
manpower, arms, and equipment. He reported as early as 1901 that he was convinced that
Russia did not have the resources necessary to improve the military position in the West
while at the same time preparing for war in the East. 7 This opinion was not entirely
speculation on his part. He visited Japan on the eve of hostilities in the spring of 1903. As
was the custom, he certainly met with Russian military attaches who had been stationed
there for a significant period of time. Unfortunately, these attaches did not speak Japanese
and could not paint a complete picture of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy’s
readiness, so he returned from his trip without any information that would have changed
his opinion. 8 He genuinely believed that occupying Southern Manchuria would cause a
war with Japan. By maintaining a military presence in Northern Manchuria, a needless
and expensive war with Japan could be avoided. This strategy offered several advantages,
including protecting Russian business interests in the area and of the utmost strategic
importance; it would protect the vital railroad supplying Vladivostok and create a Russian
sphere of influence that would include a security zone around the Chinese Eastern
Railroad. He further suggested carrying out a tactical withdrawal from Port Author and
abandoning the Liaotung Peninsula entirely since, without a large body of Russian troops
in Southern Manchuria, Port Arthur could not be defended at any rate. 9
This undesirable suggestion resulted in your appointing Admiral E. I. Alekseev,
the naval commander of Port Arthur, as Viceroy and Commander in Chief of all naval and
4
Hamby, J.E., Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War., Armed Forces &
Society. 2004;30(3):325-356. doi:10.1177/0095327X0403000302 (p 330)

5
Hamby, J.E., striking the Balance, (p 330)
6
White, John A., The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1964, 11.
7
Pozefsky, P. (1985). General Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin and the Imperial Russian
Army. UCLA Historical Journal, Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0gx015zj (pp 63-
64)

8
Menning, Bruce W. "Miscalculating One's Enemies: Russian Military Intelligence before the Russo-
Japanese War." War in History 13, no. 2 (2006): 141-70. Accessed February 14, 2021.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26069318.

9
Pozefsky, P. (p 66)
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ground forces in the region. Thereby he became General Kuropatkin’s superior officer.
His Majesty is aware the war broke out on January 27th, 1904, when the Japanese
destroyed our Eastern fleet in a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Had we followed General
Kuropatkin’s strategy, the fleet could have safely joined the rest of the navy stationed at
Vladivostok. Had I been consulted at that time, my advice to His Majesty would have
been to appoint only one commander because while our flag, the Double-Headed Eagle,
has two heads, there must only be one in war. The rivalry between the old General and the
Admiral impacted the proper waging of war.
On the one hand, Kuropatkin advised that Port Arthur be abandoned, and the Army
should retreat until reinforcements could be sent until parity with the Japanese Army was
reached. On the other hand, Alekseev believed that Port Arthur must be the focus of
operations and the Northern Army should move south and reinforce Port Arthur at any
cost. Your Majesty certainly sees how this weakened the command structure, as
evidenced when in December 1904 you placed Kuropatkin in full command of all
operations. If I may speak plainly, it was too late. The Japanese defeated Kuropatkin at
Muken in February, at which point you again relieved him of command. 10 This act was
followed by the naval battle between the Japanese Second Fleet and the Vladivostok fleet
in Tsushima Strait, Korea, destroying our Pacific fleet. General Nogi of the Imperial
Army occupied port Arthur in January 1905. The war was not yet lost; the Baltic Fleet
would determine the outcome. If our fleet had won the Battle of Tsushima, we would
have had control of the sea and could blockade the already starving Imperial Japanese
Army, and the war would have ended in our favor.
Conversely, if the Imperial Japanese Navy under Admiral Togo defeated the Baltic
Fleet, Russia would sue for peace. Togo won the battle, and our Baltic Fleet was no more.
As we have seen, the result was a peace brokered by the American president Roosevelt,
which cost us much of what we had gained and elevated Imperial Japan to the primary
player’s status in the Far East. 11
I believe that there were many opportunities where Russia could have
maximized her chances of winning this war “if only” she had approached the problem
differently. The most obvious was to have taken advantage of the Japanese peace efforts
before the war, which would have placed Korea solidly in the Japanese sphere of
influence, and guaranteed the Russian presence in Manchuria, both her economic and
military presence. The railroads so crucial to Russia would be secured, and the Far East
Russian fleets would remain an imposing block to further Japanese expansion. Russia
rejected compromise making war inevitable, and this was because Russia was
overconfident that the Japanese “monkeys” did not have a land army capable of defeating
the Imperial Russian Army.
Also Russia woefully underestimated Japan. The Russian High Command ignored
information being supplied by her military attaches regarding the growing potential and
modernization of the Japanese armed forces; had they listened, they would have been
forewarned and therefore forearmed.
Demoting Kuropatkin and placing all Russian land and naval formations under the
command of Alekseev virtually guaranteed that the effectiveness of the Armed forces was
reduced since General Kuropatkin and Admiral Alekseev had no common reference point
which would allow cooperation. They were opposed on war strategy and additionally
personally disliked one another. There should only have been one unquestioned
commander of the Russian forces to ensure a military victory. The political consideration
required a Russian victory. The Russian people did not support the war and were not
10
Ibid (pp73-74)
11
Koda, Yoji. (pp 32-34)
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enthusiastic about their Tzar. Therefore, Russia needed to win the war or face
dissatisfaction and revolution at home. Waging an unpopular war is terrible, and losing an
unpopular war is a political disaster for any country. Finally, if only General Kuropatkin
had been listened to and tensions in Asia were lowered in preference to concentrating on
the Western Front, the Baltic Fleet would have remained a key element in maintaining the
prestige and power of Imperial Russia in Europe. In the end, “if only” has always been
one of the most tragic phrases in military history.