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Ashley Chico

PHI3323-21 Spring 0W61

14 March 2021

Paper 1

There has been a long-standing debate among cognitive scientists as to which tools and

methods can best accurately evaluate mental representations. Since its conception, alternative

theories and assumptions have been theorized to help alleviate some of the ongoing challenges

faced in the philosophical hemisphere of science. One particular approach within the early phase

of Cognitive Science, CRUM, was developed to assist cognitive scientists in understanding the

framework of the human brain. However, I argue that CRUM does not adequately explain the

linguistic functions of the human mind. First, I will show this with the examination of CRUM’s

representational aspect through logic, rules and conceptual theories. Secondly, I will be

analyzing how the representational component of CRUM fails in evaluating the linguistics

element of the mind through Von Eckardt’s Substantive Assumptions followed by Pierce’s

triadic theory. Finally, I will disprove the accuracy of CRUM as an equal demonstration of

human intelligence with Searle’s claims on Artificial Intelligence.

The term CRUM, or Computational-Representational Understanding of the Mind, was

extended by Thagard as a method that holds two fundamental commitments: that the human

mind is representational and computational (Thagard, pg. 10). Within it, Thagard claims three

hypotheses: Hypothesis 1 assumes that knowledge in the mind consists of mental representations

(Thagard, pg. 5). Hypothesis 2 suggests that humans operate on representations through mental

procedures known as computations (Thagard, pg. 5). The third hypothesis, known as the Central

Hypothesis, combines the two ideas by stating that human mental operations conduct ‘thinking’
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through computational procedures operating upon mental representations (Thagard, pg. 10). If

CRUM is an example of how the human mind ‘thinks’ through representation and computation,

then both elements should not fail. However, CRUM falls short of demonstrating the human

mind representationally within logic, representations and concepts.

CRUM is representationally powerful within logic because it can compute an unlimited

amount of ideas, symbols, concepts, etc. using similar deductive structures. The issue where

representation through logic falls short is that it is not possible to input representations that do

not exist within the system. For example, if I required CRUM to compute a representation for

‘moment’, it would not be possible because a ‘moment’ is an interpretive mental representation.

Similarly, rule-based structures allow for interpretations of exceptions for logical deductions that

are necessary, but fail to representationally account for linguistic suggestions such as with the

use of sarcasm. Furthermore, CRUM representationally weak conceptually under the majority of

Thargard’s Concepts, Classical views, and the probabilistic/prototype argument.

Under Thagard’s Schema of Concepts, he indicates four theories of how CRUM could

equal mental representations of the human mind. Concept 1 holds that an idea is inclusive of all

that is associated with it, for example, H20 is the scientific term, chemical components, and other

relevant information of H20. Yet, if the term to be computed were a new concept, such as

‘yertum’, it cannot provide a representation since holds no meaning it can interpret. This is

different from say Concept 3 which accounts for content yet to be determined, to which

representation also falls short, because under Concept 1, I have given ‘yertum’ a definition that is

simply unknown to CRUM, but is in existence. Since CRUM is unable to interpret the notion

that I have come up with this concept and cannot represent it in a sentence using non-computable

‘context clues’, then CRUM fails in representationally capturing human linguistics.

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Concept 2 argues that concepts are representations of categories in the mind. If applied to

the term ‘pet’ for ‘an animal that is domesticated and sniffs the ground’, both a dog and a cat

would qualify and most likely be represented under CRUM. If, however, I was to reverse the

computational demand of CRUM and ask for it to represent a result for, “a domesticated animal

with fur, whiskers, and paws that frequently pounces”, CRUM could not produce one answer of

a dog over a cat because anatomically both could pounce. Even if additional exceptions were

provided by rules with ‘sniffing the ground’, ‘hairless’, ‘playful’, it would only revert to larger

concepts such as ‘pet’ and fail to deliver a linguistic equal than if I were to communicate with a

human for which ‘cat’ would be the most likely answer by word-association by ‘pounce’. As

with Concept 4, I believe this function could be possible if CRUM possessed the linguistic

capability to translate across languages, such as with “car” and “carro” which would both fall

under the original language represented for ‘automobile’. This would explain how similarly a

human brain of a bi-lingual person can interchange representations for multiple versions for ‘car’

and still understand it to translate to ‘automobile’.

The Classical Theories do not provide answers to the unresolved cases left by some

words unable to be represented via CRUM. One requirement of the first Classical View is that

every category has a necessary and sufficient condition which, as stated in (Lecture 3, pg. 32), is

not always possible. An example of this would be trying to define the categories of “explorer”,

“abstract”, or “astounding”. With regards to the remaining two Views, the linguistic issues are

the same; not all concepts have definitions. Furthermore, concepts do not necessarily require

definitions for the human mind to communicate linguistically as with, for example, the

understanding of the basic action ‘drink water’ if I wrote ‘drink the water inspiringly’. CRUM

could function under the view of the Probabilistic/Prototype View because instead of a strict
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definition of a category, it is based upon the degree of characteristics surrounding the term.

However, since the Probabilistic/Prototype View was invented in direct response to the Classical

Views and remains unable to explain specific interpretations of concepts e.g. scaling levels of

pain, it sustains itself as an unreliable mechanism for CRUM to rely on when it comes to the

accurate representation of the human mind linguistically.

Accordingly, CRUM operates with several Assumptions that, if included, constitute

CRUM as a viable and reliable source of how the human mind represents mental representations.

Two sub-assumptions are critical for CRUM to function as studied by Von Eckardt. The first is

the Substantive Assumption R2.2 which states that representations have semantic properties that

include meaning behind each representation (Eckardt, pg. 51). Secondly, R2.4 focuses on the

inclusion of an interpreter that focuses on mental representations being significant for those

whom the mind resides (Eckardt, pg. 51). When analyzed under how CRUM functions under

linguistics, both of these assumptions are necessary for CRUM to be viable. This is because

anything that is a mental representation must have meaning to work in instances where other

theories fall short, e.g. drinking water inspiringly, and make representational sense to the

interpretant such as with ‘yertum’.

Furthermore, if CRUM were to operate under Pierce’s triadic relation in which something

is a representation if it is a representation of an object concerning an interpretant, then it could

work (Eckardt, pg. 145). This is because it is up to the interpretant, object, and sign relationship

to determine if something is a mental representation rather than on disconnected conceptual

elements. However, CRUM is unable to explain the human mental representations of linguistics

under this theoretical framework because it is theoretically assumed, in line with multiple

competing theories of CRUM, and requires that the two aforementioned assumptions to exist for
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CRUM to function representationally. There is a final theory that could determine whether

CRUM can explain how the human mind represents human linguistics or not through Artificial

Intelligence.

Searle and the Churchlands featured competing views on the viability for CRUM to

operate in relation to the Turing Machine. The machine possesses the capability to represent

‘things’ (representations) and compute them (computational) to carry out an activity (concepts).

The argument of the Turing Machines is that if it operates using CRUM, and the machine is

successful, then CRUM is successful in explaining the human mind. To test this theory, the

imitation game was invented in which the Turing Test is passed if the human interacting with the

device believes they are interacting with another human. On multiple occasions, the test has been

passed, but fails at another key Turing Test scenario known as the Chinese Room argument.

Searle gives an example of a room in which the goal of the machine is to translate Chinese

characters to English and if successful proves that it has semantic capabilities (Searle, pg. 27).

Since it fails at hosting semantic properties when tested, Artificial Intelligence, then, is not a

proper channel to evaluate how the human mind explains representations.

Recalling that one of the assumptions needed for CRUM was R2.2 in which mental

representations have semantic properties that have meaning behind them. Since the assumption is

theoretical and since there was no meaning behind the exchange of symbols, it was simply

computing without purpose and failed to regulate any meaning similar to that of a human brain.

Thus, it fails linguistically in demonstrating the mental representations of humans. The

Churchlands disagreed with Searle under the argument that simply because the syntax is

immeasurable, it should not discount the presumption that the ability to produce semantic

properties as an Artificial Intelligence does exist (Churchlands, pg. 33). Moreover, they
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suggested that an equal measure of the biology-based human mind would be an equal technology

based on biology thus equalizing the measurement through the same architecture (Churchlands,

pg. 36). A primary issue with this stance is that since the technology has yet to be invented to

conduct this measurement and therefore cannot be supported. Thus, both Artificial Intelligence

and CRUM fail to explain the human mind linguistically through mental representations.

In conclusion, CRUM does not explain the human mind. The first defense for this point

was cited through the examination of logic, rules and conceptual theories. Within each, CRUM’s

mental representations were proven to be an inadequate source of explaining the human mind

when analyzed under Thagard’s Schema of Concepts, the Classical Views and

Probabilistic/Prototype theories. The second defense was introduced with Eckardt’s Substantive

Assumptions that proved CRUM was unable to function without representational assumptions.

Pierce’s Triadic theory was introduced as a potential method for CRUM to work, but failed

because of its lack of cohesive support from cognitive scientists and reliance of assumptions. A

final defense for Artificial Intelligence being a potential method for CRUM to work was

disproven under the Chinese Room argument by Searle. A lack of semantic capability was the

primary reason for this result. A counter-argument was examined by Churchland’s argument for

testing representations under similar bio-technology, but failed because it has yet to be tested. It

is for all these reasons that CRUM cannot explain how the human mind represents linguistics.