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Module Title: Introduction to Ancient Philosophy

Module Code:
4AACAP01
(e.g. 5AABC123)

Assignment: 4AACAP01 Essay 1 - January

(may be abbreviated)

Assignment tutor/group: 000001/Sem01/03 Stefano Bellin

Deadline: 11/01/21

Date Submitted: 11/01/21

Word Count: 1913

 Did Zeno write arguments or paradoxes?

With any common observer, arguments against the concepts of multiplicity and motion

would go continually ignored, for the answers lay right before their eyes. Remarkably,

however, the works of a 5th century BC [1] philosopher paved a foundation for generations of

scholars to desperately attempt to unravel the various prepositions he lay before them,

regarding the credibility of our senses, and challenging our most fundamental beliefs. But

was this his true intention?

Zeno was an Eleatic philosopher, and a student of Parmenides. This is an essential aspect in

Zeno’s legacy, as many have observed how his theories appear to have been heavily

influenced by being his student, and possibly lover (Plato, Parmenides 127b), due to the

similarity in their implications. Parmenides was another Eleatic ‘revered philosopher poet’ [2],

constantly refuting principle notions that most held as the utmost truth. As with Zeno, he

‘held that the multiplicity of existing things, their changing forms and motion, are but an

appearance of a single eternal reality (“Being”)’. [3] As it is likely that there was much

backlash to these claims, this leads several modern scholars, to entertain the idea that Zeno’s

main philosophical purpose was to defend the beliefs of his teacher, suggesting that his

conclusions would align with Parmenides’ as well. Unfortunately, the fragmentary nature of

his work ‘complicates our understanding of the Presocratics’ [4], and spares us the luxury of

conclusive statements. This accommodates the possibility that other scholars pursue, that

Zeno’s ideas were deliberately left as inconclusive, simply designed to contradict the reader,

be it in defence of Parmenides, or perhaps to adopt an entirely different argument altogether.

1
https://iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/#SH1c (accessed 10/01/2021)
2
Sedley 2017: 2
3
https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy (accessed 09/01/21)
4
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presocratics/ (accessed 09/01/21)
By assessing Zeno’s paradoxes through the respective views of David Sedley, John Palmer

and Richard McKirahan, it is along this line of predicament that I intend to explore the extent

to which Zeno wrote in both argument and paradox, relatively. This is an invaluable

distinction to make, as the former relies on a predetermined destination, whereas the latter has

no such concern, and purely stands to contradict, as the word itself derives from the Greek

‘para’ meaning "contrary to" and ‘doxa’; "opinion." [5]

If there was a conclusion that Zeno was arguing towards, it would be best seen in his rebuttals

of plurality, which most resembles a completed argument, as well as being revisited in Plato’s

Parmenides. Upon observing this piece, David Sedley states that ‘commentators ancient and

modern alike generally take the passage as remaining broadly corroborative evidence that

Zeno was himself by allegiance a Parmenidean monist.’ [6] In this passage, Plato writes a

conversation between Socrates and Zeno regarding his negation of plurality, which he had

demonstrated in the paradox of large and small. In this paradox, he states that if something

exists, it ‘must have some size and thickness’ and thus means it may be divided into parts that

‘must be apart from the rest… to say this once is the same thing as to keep saying it forever’

(Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 141.2-8). Sedley breaks this paradox down

into how a finite object can divide ad infinitum, and consequently ‘each of the units of the

plurality, being the sum of infinitely many discrete parts, is of infinite magnitude’ [7], meaning

that, if an object is composed of an infinity of segments, then it must also be infinitely large.

However, if there is such a point when we must stop dividing, this must mean that there is

nothing left to divide, but ‘if each of the many had no magnitude it would not exist,’ [8]

meaning if the object were comprised of segments of no size, then it must also have no size

5
https://www.etymonline.com/word/paradox (accessed 09/01/21)
6
Sedley 2017: 4
7
Sedley 2017: 10
8
Ibid
i.e. be infinitely small. What results is a contradiction within the concept of multiplicity.

Sedley observes how, although he denies Socrates’ impression of his beliefs mirroring that of

Parmenides’, Zeno says ‘it is actually a defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who

try to make fun of it, saying that if what-is is one, the argument has many ridiculous

consequences which contradict it’ (Plato, Parmenides 127b–128d). This would suggest that

Zeno wrote arguments, as opposed to paradoxes, in favour of monism, because in refuting

plurality, the end result could easily coincide with Parmenides’ belief in ‘a whole of a single

kind, unshaken, and complete’ (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145).

Therefore, Zeno composed ‘an attack… regarding the twin issues of plurality and motion…

intended as a defence of Parmenides focused on precisely those of his contentions that

remained most in need of defence.’ [9] This is supported by Huggett, who states that ‘he

attempted to show that equal absurdities followed logically from the denial of Parmenides’

views…’ [10]

Whilst this supports the premise of Zeno writing in defence for Parmenides, the text alone

does not suffice for Zeno arguing for monism as, significantly, most of his arguments lie

open-ended. This may be due to the fragmentary nature in which his records were discovered,
[11]
but it may also have been a direct representation of Zeno’s sole goal of contradicting

pluralists alone.

Such is the view taken up by Palmer: ‘Plato’s Parmenides… does not license the

conventional view that Zeno’s arguments against plurality and motion were intended to

support the strict monism of Parmenides.’ [12] He supports this through Zeno’s correction of

Socrates’ claim, saying ‘I wrote it in this spirit of competitiveness when I was young, and

9
Caston 2017:5
10
Huggett 2018: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/#ParMot
11
Ibid: “he wrote a book of paradoxes defending Parmenides’ philosophy. Sadly, this book has not survived,
and what we know of his arguments is second-hand, principally through Aristotle and his commentators”
12
McKirahan 1999:136
then someone stole it, so I did not even have the chance to consider whether it should be

made public’ (Plato Parmenides, 128d). According to Palmer, this suggests that whilst ‘they

do nothing to disabuse his detractors of their superficial understanding of his doctrine,’ his

main intention was 'to show that the assumption that there are many things has consequences

every bit as unpalatable as those Parmenides’ critics suppose his position has.’ [13] McKirahan

supports this in viewing the paradox as ‘Zeno's challenge to pluralists: give me a coherent

account of what it is to be one of your many things and I will grant you your pluralism. He

then proceeded to demonstrate the impossibilities that result from various conceptions of

pluralism.’ [14] In this line of thought, Zeno simply combats the attacks on Parmenides’

monism by challenging our reliance on senses for fact. This is supported by the theologian

Philoponus, who notes that ‘those who introduce plurality rely on the self-evidence of

plurality; for there is horse and human and each of the individual things, and the aggregation

of these amounts to plurality. This self-evidence, then, Zeno wanted to overthrow…’

(Philoponus, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 42.18-21) Moreover, Zeno is renowned as a

founder of rectio ad absurdum, which is also demonstrated in the nature of the Socratic

elenchus [15], where he also challenges claims of one belief without necessarily gravitating

towards the other: ‘You [Socrates] are always in a state of perplexity and… you bring others

to the same state’ (Plato, Meno 80a). Consequently, Zeno’s ideas are best described as

paradoxes, but it is evident that paradoxical methods classify as arguments in its own right, in

this case intending to contradict the pluralist arguments based solely on sensory experience.

13
Palmer, J: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zeno-elea/#ZenPur (accessed 10/01/21)
14
McKirahan 1999: 137
15
https://human.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Philosophy/Book
%3A_South_and_East_Asian_Philosophy_Reader_(Levin_et_al.)/05%3A_OTHER_PARTS_OF_THE_ANCIEN
T_WORLD_AND_PARALLELS_TO_THE_EAST/5.01%3A_Pre-Socratics (accessed 10/01/2021)
This distinction can also be observed in the previous paradoxes mentioned in Plato’s text that

‘attack not plurality but motion.’ [16] The theme of division is common in the paradoxes of

motion: The Stadium; Achilles and the Tortoise; and the Dichotomy. [17] For example,

McKirahan recollects Aristotle’s observation that ‘the Achilles "is the same argument as the

Dichotomy, but it differs in not dividing the given magnitude in half" (Phys. VI.9 239bi8-2o).

Aristotle solves them both by means of his distinction between infinite in extent or quantity

and infinite by division.’ [18] In the Dichotomy, Zeno expresses how ‘there is no motion

because that which is moving must reach the

midpoint before the end. […] It is always necessary

to traverse half the distance, but these are infinite,

and it is impossible to get through things that are

Dichotomy paradox infinite.’ (Aristotle, Physics 239b9-14, 263a5-6).

McKirahan illustrates this paradox by saying ‘to get

from the starting line (A) to the finish line (B), we must first reach AI, the midpoint of the

interval AB. But in order to get from AI to B, we must first reach A2, the midpoint of AI B,

and so on.’ [19] To divulge further, Zeno exposes the concept of motion as problematic, as the

task of crossing a finite distance requires completing an infinity of steps; the fractions of the

original distance. Remarkably, McKirahan presents an interpretation where ‘Dichotomy

argues that a belief contrary to one of Parmenides' views… involves a logical impossibility.’
[20]
Admittedly, it is difficult to trace how such a conclusion was reached by McKirahan, as

Parmenides’ principles on ontological monism means that ‘what is’ does not move i.e.

‘unshaken’ (Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145). Regardless, this reveals

how Zeno’s ideas did not explicitly defend Parmenides, but rather rebelled against the belief

16
McKirahan 1999: 137
17
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/#ParMot (accessed 11/01/2021)
18
McKirahan 1999: 142
19
McKirahan 1999: 143
20
Ibid
system of sensory experience, which led to the doubt surrounding him. The debate between

logic and experience is further manifested in the receptions to this paradox. For example,

McKirahan notes the reported attempt by the Cynic Antisthenes (although sources typically

depict it to have been the Cynic Diogenes[21]) to refute it but ‘"since he could not contradict

Zeno's arguments against motion, stood up and took a step, thinking that a demonstration

through what was obvious was stronger than any opposition in arguments" (Elias, In cat.

109.20-22).’ [22] However, this was an inadequate response as ‘Zeno did not deny that our

senses tell us that there is motion (The Eleatics consequently rejected the senses as

unreliable).’ [23] This emphasises how Zeno’s paradoxes targeted the concept of taking

experience as fact, over logic.

To conclude, it is may be said that Zeno’s purpose at least partially served in defence of

Parmenides’ unconventional beliefs, considering the directions of their arguments and the

reports by Plato. However, it seems unlikely that Zeno’s purpose was consequently to argue

for the same belief, given his points that also prove problematic for ontological monism.

Essentially, Zeno’s ideas would be incomplete without their paradoxical element, which is

evident in his emphasis on refuting pluralism and motion, as those who insist on their

existence can only provide sensory proof. [24] In this respect, it has grown increasingly

apparent that whilst Zeno does write in paradox, these do not strive to contradict without

direction. Rather, Zeno has embedded the debate of logic and theory being more reliable than

the senses. Consequently, Zeno argues through rectio ad absurdum, as the most effective

method against the power of our senses, and provokes us to truly engage with the question: Is

seeing, truly believing?

21
Huggett 2019: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/#ParMot
22
McKirahan 1999: 143-144
23
McKirahan 1999: 144
24
Huggett, N. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/: notably Diogenes in an attempt to disprove
Zeno’s Dichotomy ‘by silently standing and walking’ (accessed 10/01/21)
Bibliography:

 Huggett, N. (2019), "Zeno’s Paradoxes" in “The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy”, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/paradox-zeno/
 Mckirahan, R. (1999). “Zeno” In A. Long (Ed.), in “The Cambridge Companion to
Early Greek Philosophy”. Cambridge
 Palmer, John (2017), "Zeno of Elea", in “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/zeno-elea/>
 Sedley, D. (2017), “Zenonian Strategies” in Caston, V. “In Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, Volume 53.” Oxford.

 https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy (accessed 09/01/21)

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presocratics/ (accessed 09/01/21)
 https://www.etymonline.com/word/paradox (accessed 09/01/21)
 https://human.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Philosophy/Book
%3A_South_and_East_Asian_Philosophy_Reader_(Levin_et_al.)/05%3A_OTHER_P
ARTS_OF_THE_ANCIENT_WORLD_AND_PARALLELS_TO_THE_EAST/5.01%3A
_Pre-Socratics (accessed 10/01/2021)
 https://iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/#SH1c (accessed 10/01/2021)