Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Ostasienstudien (IZO)

Modern East Asian Studies

Summer Term 2014

written as a term-paper for a MSEAS (Modern South East Asian Studies) lecture with a topical
focus on: World War II in Southeast Asia

NOTE: paper is uploaded in the public domain and constructive comments are more than
welcome.

TITLE OF THE PAPER

Japanese diplomacy during the occupation of Java and

unexpected independence of Indonesia

AUTHOR: Stefan Sanderse

Mail: sanderse.stefan@gmail.com

Number of Words: 6 407

1
Table of contents

Title Page
1. Introduction 3

2. Change in the political status-quo of 3

Indonesia

3. Mass movements and political parties 3

3.1. Mass movements 4

3.2. Political parties in Java 5

3.3. Islamic parties 6

4. Education under Japanese rule 6

5. Prominent people of Java connected to 7

independence

5.1. Sukarno, Hatta and Empat Serangkai 8

5.2. Soetomo 9

5.3. Sjahrir and Menteng 31 9

5.4. Hitoshi Shimizu 10

6. Japanese use and abuse of groups 10

6.1. Japan’s attitude towards ethnical and 10

religious groups in Java

6.2. The pangreh praja 11

7. The Japanese spirit and military training 12

8. National awakening 13

9. Conclusion 14

Statutory Declaration 15

Citations 16,17
2
1. Introduction

During the relatively short period of occupation by the Japanese, profound social changes
occurred that were unimaginable under former Dutch colonization. This paper analyzes the
impact of Japanese actions and policies in Java during the occupation period and the schism
between the Japanese and Indonesian version of nationalism. The focus of research is on Java
because it served as the center of political activity during the Japanese occupation period. This
made Java the pivot around which the future of Indonesia revolved.

The hypothesis of this paper: The Japanese military administration on Java, underestimated
the nationalist spirit of Indonesia.

Chapter 2-8 analyze the impact of Japanese military presence on Java, and chapter 9 explains
why the Japanese underestimated the nationalist ideology.

2. Change in the political status-quo of Indonesia

After centuries of Dutch colonial activity in the Dutch-Indies (Indonesia), the Japanese
military suddenly entered the country in March 1942 and took over control. Indonesia was a
valuable colony for the Dutch at that time and provided for various resources. The Dutch
monopolized spice trade during the 17th century and oil exploitation started at the end of the 19th
century (Shell has over a 100-year history in Indonesia). Indonesia became increasingly
important during WWII because of its biodiversity and the presence of oil. Japan needed to
control the supply of Indonesian oil in order to block allied war efforts in the pacific and
therefore invaded Indonesia with an overwhelming military force. At the end of WWII, the
Japanese realized that they could not remain military dominant in Indonesia and as a result, had
to leave open the door towards Indonesian independence. Indonesia declared independence in
1945 and the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in 1949. The status-quo of political
power is now steadily in the hands of Indonesians.

3. Mass movements and political parties

The Japanese attempted to install a pro-Japanese government in Indonesia through so-

called mass movements. Three mass movement attempts were made by the Japanese to win the
political hearts of the Indonesian people. Each of these mass movements pressured the existing
political parties to the background and as a consequence Indonesian politics was polarized
between a secular and Islamic group. The Japanese depended on “intellectual” leaders of both
camps for reaching out to Indonesian society. These leaders are referred to as being intellectual,
because they possessed the power to bring great political change to Indonesia.

3
3.1. Mass movements

The Japanese attempted to rule the Indonesian people by making use of mass
organizations that aimed at spreading the Japanese spirit and that would affect the mind and body
of its members. Three attempts were made through the following mass movements listed in a
historical order: Triple- A Movement, Putera (Center of People’s Power, Pusat Tenaga Rakjat)
and Jawa Hokokai (Java Service Association) (Sato 1994: 20). The Triple-A Movement was a
propaganda organization and the first attempt to gather popular support for the Japanese cause.
The propaganda of Triple-A was considered unrealistic by the majority of Indonesians, because it
romanticized the Japanese war effort, and it was increasingly ineffective as the war advanced.
The Japanese soldiers could simply not live up to the expectations that such propaganda might
have risen. This caused a turn in the way in which the Indonesian masses thought about the
Japanese. At first many Indonesians believed that the Japanese were the most cultivated of Asians,
but when the Indonesians were confronted with the behavior of Japanese foot soldiers, this image
flipped. The reality on the ground was confrontation with an increasing desperate army that put
too much pressure on local resources. The Japanese noticed that Triple-A was not helpful as a
political instrument, as it was too focused on cultural aspects that were not helpful for building up
Japanese authority. That is why the Japanese created Putera in March 1943 (Palmier 1957: 105).
Sukarno and Hatta1 assumed leadership of this organization that had more access to Japanese
equipment and human resources; it greatly enhanced their power, but at the same time placed
them under strict Japanese evaluation. Putera with its superior facilities was still not able to bring
social stability, because the pangreh praja (ruler of the realm) opposed its leadership. The
pangreh praja was made up of Muslim leaders at the grass root level. The Japanese wanted to
please the pangreh praja by giving concessions to the Muslim community. The Japanese lost
interest in Putera. In March 1944, the Japanese dissolved Putera (Palmier 1957: 105). Already
before the dissolution of Putera, the Japanese had laid out plans for a new mass movement that
would encompass all groups of society, Jawa Hokokai. With the creation of this final mass
movement, power was transferred from the nationalists to the pangreh praja (Anderson 1972: 28).
At the end of 1944, the Japanese were facing a paradoxical situation, because the war started to
go bad and they had not yet achieved political consensus between the two most important
political blocs, the secular nationalists and the Muslim leaders. It was clear however that both of
these groups were out of Japanese control, making Jawa Hokokai a political failure. The Japanese
continued to focus on strengthening the military capability of auxiliary troops, regardless from
the political circumstances.

1
Sukarno and Hatta are discussed in subchapter 5.1.
4
3.2. Political parties in Java

Before the military invasion of the Japanese, there were many different political parties
active in Java that involved the Indonesian youth into politics (Anderson 1972: 42). The
revolutionary youth, or pemuda played a key role in Indonesian politics during the Japanese
occupation. This subchapter first describes the pre-war situation of politics and then occupation
politics.
One of the strongest political parties before the Japanese occupation was Partindo
(Indonesian Party, Partai Indonesia), which Sukarno joined in July, 1932. Under his leadership
the party grew to 20.000 members and was popular with both the Indonesian intellectuals and the
masses (Kahin 2003: 94). Under Sukarno’s leadership, Partindo’s growth started to accelerate
and form a threat against the colonial government because of its nationalist character. Sukarno
was arrested by the Dutch and Partindo faded away. Another political party that entered the main
stage of politics was Parindra (Greater Indonesian Party, Partai Indonesia Raya). It was headed
by Raden Samsudin, who was a member of the People’s Council serving the Dutch government
(Sato 1994: 37). Before the Japanese occupation, Parindra wanted to achieve its goals by
cooperating with the Dutch authorities, and in the late 1930’s its members started to cooperate
with the Japanese instead (Sato 1994: 37). Another political party that gained influence under
Dutch rule was Gerindo (Indonesian People’s Movement, Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia) (Kahin
2003: 96). This party had a leftist nationalist ideology and consisted of many former Partindo
members who wished for short-term cooperation with the Dutch in order to counter Fascism
(Kahin 2003: 96). The “fascist” Japanese invaded Java and Gerindo members had to dissolve into
other parties in order to achieve their political goals. Parindra turned out as the most important
party at the time the Japanese landed on Java.
During the Japanese occupation, Parindra cooperated with the Japanese and among all
other parties, was most strongly represented in the Commission for the Study of Customs and
Polity (hereafter simply referred to as Commission). The Commission can be seen as a Japanese
replacement for the Dutch People’s Council (Friend 1988: 92). The Commission was established
on 7 November 1942 by the Japanese, in order to make all political activity visible for the
military administration. Sukarno and Hatta joined the Commission (Sato 1994: 50), and provided
the Japanese authorities with information about Indonesian society. On August 1, 1943, the
organization was replaced by the CAC (Central Advisory Council) in which half of the members
was appointed by Indonesians and the other half by the Japanese (Friend 1988: 92). CAC allowed
for better participation in the military government of that time and more concrete measures could
be taken than was possible in the former Commission. The significance of political parties
however was belittled by the Japanese and the “political” mass movements established by the
Japanese became the center of political activity. Many Parindra members joined the first mass
movement established by the Japanese, Triple-A (Sato 1994: 37). Indonesian politicians had to
deploy their political activity either underground by joining the resistance or above ground by
cooperating with the Japanese authorities.

5
3.3. Islamic parties

Before the Japanese invaded Java, they invited leaders of MIAI (Supreme Islam Council
of Indonesia) to Tokyo to attend the first Islamic World Congress (Latif 2008: 214). MIAI was
represented by Muslims with anti-Dutch sentiments, and the Japanese therefore saw them as
possible allies. It is most likely that Japan consulted them about the overthrow of the Dutch.
MIAI was headed by the Muslim leader Wondoamiseno until its continuation was blocked by the
Japanese in October 1943 (Latif 2008: 214). The Japanese started to become afraid of MIAI,
because it took the shape of a mass organization that was from top to bottom under Muslim
control and which could not be integrated in the Triple-A mass movement. The Japanese
attempted to separate religion from politics through the Shumubu (Religious Affairs Office),
which was set up at the end of March 1942 (Latif 2008: 213). The Islamic parties PSII
(Indonesian Islamic Union Party, Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia) and PII (Partai Islam Indonesia)
were targeted by Shumubu policy when they had to close down their head offices (Latif 2008:
214). The Shumubu can be seen as the most central political institution, such as CAC, but for
religious affairs and most importantly Islamic affairs. The Shumubu was headed by a Japanese
administrator when it was just established, but the Indonesian Hoesein Djajadiningrat, who was
also involved in the Commission, took over in a later stage. After MIAI was dissolved, the
Japanese set up the Masjumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims, Majlis Sjuro
Muslimin Indonesia) in November 1943, which was headed by Hajim Asj’ari (Latif 2008: 214).
With the founding of Masjumi, the Japanese managed to integrate the most important Muslim
associations NU and Muhammadiyah. Masjumi was the new political opposition that could
challenge the secular Indonesian nationalists of Putera.

4. Education under Japanese rule

Education in the Dutch-Indies was only accessible for the elite Indonesian people,
because the Dutch had introduced a system that did not aim at educating the masses but at
educating only upper-class citizens, such as the Dutch, Eurasians and priyayi (elite Indonesians)
in Dutch language. Many of the Indonesian intellectuals had enjoyed Dutch education, and had
received degrees from universities in the Netherlands before the occupation. Dutch education was
not established in Surabaya, because this city in East-Java did not have a university or even a
senior high school for Indonesian students (Friend 1988: 226). In Jakarta (Batavia), there was
Dutch education on the university level. With the arrival of the Japanese the Dutch system got
destroyed and the official language used for instruction changed from Dutch to Bahasa Indonesia
and Japanese (Suratno 2014: 2). Faculties that had been established by the Dutch were closed
down and most of the Indonesian students could not continue their study program during the
occupation period. An exception was made for the Medical faculty, which was opened again in
1943 (Anderson 1972: 19).
Under Japanese rule, only Latin script and Japanese language was allowed for official
communication (Latif 2008: 215). The Japanese established commissions for the standardization
6
of Indonesian language, and the translation of Dutch scientific words into Indonesian (Younce
2001: 52; Abdullah 2009: 110). Religious education in Arabic language, at so-called pesantren
was forbidden by the Japanese at the beginning of the occupation. The Japanese soon figured out
that they could not deny religious education in Arab language, if they were not to aggravate the
Indonesian Muslim population (Latif 2008: 167). The importance of Muslim support, made the
Japanese take a tolerant stance towards religious education in Arab language, but for official
purposes Arab script remained forbidden. The intellectual ulama (religious scholar) were
tolerated by the Japanese and could take up official roles in Masjumi. The ulama had no
communication problems, because they had been educated in Latin script (Abdullah 2009: 108).
Another act that points at Japanese tolerance was the promise to support the establishment of an
Islamic university, modelled after the al-Azhar university in Cairo. Just a few weeks before
Japanese surrender the university doors were officially opened by a Masjumi commission, headed
by Hatta (Latif 2008: 167).
Empat Serangkai2 members Dewantara and Mansur who were in the center of politics
during the Japanese occupation, had been active before the wartime in establishing different
school branches. Dewantara established Taman Siswa (Students’ Garden) schools, which
followed the Western education model, but promoted nationalism. It was first established in 1922
as a response to hierarchical Dutch education and adopted a system that treated its teachers and
students as a big family (Shiraishi 1997: 88). Mansur was known for his involvement in
Muhammadiyah, which had in 1925 already established 55 schools, organized according to
madrasah and sekolah (Latif 2008: 164). Madrasah combined Islamic with Western education
and sekolah followed the Western model. The difference between Taman Siswa and
Muhammadiyah was that the latter did not seek political involvement, and that it had its roots in
Islamic education. The roots of indigenous education could be found in pesantren (traditional
Islamic education), which was gradually transformed and modernized by Taman Siswa and
Muhammadiyah. Pesantren education was tolerated by the Japanese, and Western schools were
mostly closed during the Japanese occupation period. The Taman Siswa schools for example
were closed during the Japanese occupation (Methold 1973: 73). Japanese occupation did not last
long enough to effectively introduce an effective Japanese education system. Therefore it can be
concluded that Japanese policies did not help to modernize Indonesian education.

5. Prominent people of Java connected to independence

This chapter talks about how Indonesian leading figures contributed to the struggle for
independence in different ways. The independence battle was fought by the pemuda, but the
preparations were made by intellectuals that had operated both above- and underground. The
Japanese Hitoshi Shimizu is also mentioned in this chapter, because he was the link between
Indonesian intellectuals Sukarno and Hatta, and the Japanese military leaders.

2
Empat Serangkai and its members are discussed in subchapter 5.1.
7
5.1. Sukarno, Hatta and Empat Serangkai

The two most well-known nationalist leaders of Indonesia, Sukarno and Mohammad
Hatta started to fight an intellectual battle for Indonesian independence well before the Japanese
occupied Indonesia. Both of them were politically active during the time of Dutch colonization.
Hatta had lived and studied in the Netherlands from 1921 until 1932, in this period the
Netherlands still had control over the Dutch-Indies. He was politically active in the Netherlands
and the Dutch government jailed him for a period of almost 6 months because of his nationalist
activities. After gaining back his freedom, Hatta returned to Indonesia in July 1932 (Kahin 1980:
114). In Indonesia, both Hatta and Sukarno had provoked the Dutch with their political activities
of nationalist character; therefore they were arrested by the Dutch authorities and remained
captured until the arrival of the 16th division of the Japanese Imperial army. Hatta was transported
to Java just before the imperial troops landed, and Sukarno was freed by the Japanese in 1942
(Palmier 1957: 105).
During the strong years of Japanese occupation, the door towards independence could not
be opened by Sukarno and Hatta, since their political power depended on the favor of the
Japanese administrator. Sukarno and Hatta reached a peak moment of political power when they
ruled Putera together with two other prominent Indonesian intellectuals: Ki Hadjar Dewantara
and Mas Mansur. Putera was formed in close talks between these four men, also known as Empat
Serangkai (Four-Leaved Clover) and Japanese administrators. Mas Mansur was an important
leader of Muhammadiyah and Dewantara was the founder of Taman Siswa, both of these
institutions focused on education (Latif 2008: 162). Sukarno was involved in leading Putera and
was the chairperson of CAC in the same year (Palmier 1957: 105; Sato 1994: 65). The activities
of Putera were strictly controlled by the Japanese and the organization was used to spread anti-
allied and pro-Japanese propaganda (Sato 1994: 57). Hatta was appointed vice-chairman of the
Putera and later vice-chairman of the Committee for Preparation for Indonesian Independence
(PPKI) (Kahin 1980: 114). Sukarno was the chairman of PPKI, which was a Japanese
organization that was supposed to materialize the Japanese promises for independence. These
promises remained unfulfilled for too long and this gave the revolutionary nationalists a sense of
urge. On 7 September 1944, the Japanese Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso promised independence
at some point in the future (Palmier 1957: 105). This was because the war was clearly going bad
for the Japanese and without enough Japanese military presence; the political system build up
during the occupation could not survive. The pemuda leaders could wait that long and kidnapped
Sukarno and Hatta in order to pressure them to declare independence earlier than scheduled by
the Japanese (Lebra 2010: 154). The duo only declared independence when it became clear that a
smooth transition of power was unattainable (Palmier 1957: 106) and spoke out the declaration of
independence on August 17, 1945. Sukarno took up the role as first president of Indonesia and
was therefore the face of a new independent Indonesia. Sukarno was charismatic and expressive;
Hatta, the new vice-president acted more on the background but conveyed authority and
possessed a deep understanding of economic problems. His Islamic background made him

8
popular with the Muslim population (Kahin 1980: 115).

5.2. Soetomo

Soetomo represents the Indonesian pemuda and had a different way of contributing to the
nationalist revolution than Sukarno and Hatta. Soetomo communicated with the rural pemuda by
using radio’s previously distributed by the Japanese. The radios were actually intended to be used
for spreading wartime propaganda, but Soetomo used them to spread nationalist ideas and
stimulate the rural pemuda to fight for their country against the Japanese and Allies. Radio
Pembarontakan (Radio Rebellion) is therefore an appropriate name and contributed in a unique
way to strengthening Indonesian nationalism, without the help of political institutions.

5.3. Sjahrir and Menteng 31

Sjahrir was concerned with the effects of Japanese indoctrination on the Indonesian youth
and led the most powerful underground resistance. At the beginning of the war, there existed an
underground that was sponsored by the Dutch and involved Indonesians with a communist, anti-
fascist ideology. This underground got rolled up by the Japanese and that was when Sjahrir
became the most powerful underground leader. Under his leadership the underground developed
branches throughout Java that drew its strength from the rural population (Kahin 1952: 112).
Sjahrir was also linked to underground students of the Medical Faculty in Jakarta, known as
Menteng 31. The Medical Faculty could still operate during occupation years under the
supervision of the Sendenbu (Japanese Propaganda Department). Menteng 31 had formed after
the Japanese had issued an order for all students to crop their hair (Latif 2008: 245). Sjahrir was
able to spread his social-democratic views to the students of this faculty during the years of
occupation (Anderson 1972: 40). The Japanese had focused on fighting communist underground
resistance and were not able to roll up the type of resistance organized by Sjahrir, who did not
want to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration in any way and shunned
involvement in public service (Anderson 1972: 40). Sjahrir also had contact with Sukarno from
whom he also received financial support (Anderson 1972: 40). Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni were
two other members of the underground resistance, and the basis for their activity was Menteng 31.
Saleh was involved in the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta (Anderson 1972: 74) and he therefore
possessed the proactive pemuda spirit of revolution that was long cherished by members of
Menteng 31. Not all members of the different branches of underground resistance trusted
Menteng 31, because it was supervised by Sendenbu (Kahin 1952: 113). The underground
infiltrated in the Japanese military organizations3 by making use of pemuda. In this way, the
underground prepared for a fight with the Japanese for independence (Kahin 1952: 114).

3
The military organizations are further elaborated in chapter 7.
9
5.4. Hitoshi Shimizu

Hitoshi Shimizu was the leader of Sendenbu, and was involved in training the pemuda
(De Graaf 1959: 310). Shimizu managed the asrama (training place/ dormitory) Menteng 31, at
which he allowed the pemuda to receive nationalist training and where lectures by prominent
Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno took place (Anderson 1972: 42). This shows that
Shimizu was quite tolerant towards Indonesians and let them free in their political activities.
Shimizu also interpreted conversations between Sukarno and General Imamura of the sixteenth
army stationed in Java. He acted as the official cultural bridge between Japanese and Indonesians.

6. Japanese use and abuse of groups

The Japanese military administration diversified their policies towards Indonesia

depending on the group of people they were dealing with. This chapter looks at how different
groups were connected to each other during the time of occupation and how they were treated by
the Japanese.

6.1. Japan’s attitude towards ethnical and religious groups in Java

As soon as the Japanese landed in Java, the whole order of society changed dramatically.
Ethnical Dutch people, who were the ruling minority, got stripped of their power and placed in
Japanese internment camps; the same faith was faced by Eurasians and Indonesians who fought
for KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger).
The majority of the Javanese were Muslims and therefore an important group that
deserved consideration in the formation of Japanese policies. The Japanese recognized those
Muslim leaders that had authority, such as Hatta and stimulated mutual cooperation. The
treatment of Muslims in Java was better compared to those on Sumatra. There are reports about
Japanese soldiers on Sumatra who were enraged by the habit of Muslims to pray five times a day,
since it often disrupted the military training (Lebra 2010: 133). The better treatment of Muslims
on Java might be linked to the importance of Muslim cooperation for achievement of Japanese
goals. This does not mean that also on Java there was cultural misunderstanding, such as in the
case of the chief Medical officer in Java, Lieutenant General Matsuura who blamed the Muslims
for having a shortage of food on the grounds that they didn’t eat pork meat (Friend 1988:145).
The largest minority group, the Chinese were treated relatively well by the Japanese
military occupation when they cooperated. Since many Chinese owned rice mills, they were able
to get their hands on enough supplies of rice and the Japanese needed them to act as food
distributers for the army (Pearson 2008: 79-81). The Chinese people formed their own economic
organization called Hua Chiao Chung Hui (The General Association of Overseas Chinese) (Sato
1994: 46) and bought themselves into the Triple-A movement. The much smaller Arab and
Indian minorities had the same economic interest as the Chinese and aligned with the Japanese by
10
forming associations and joining the mass movements. The minorities, with exception from the
Dutch minority, were better able to survive under Japanese rule owing to their preferential
treatment.
It is likely that the Japanese found it convenient to connect in a centralized manner to self-
aware groups, such as the minority groups that were willing to accept Japanese rule. The CAC
was the political instrument for the Japanese to achieve public support and both members from
majority and minority groups were assigned. The Chinese were represented with three members
in CAC (Friend 1988: 92) as well as in the mass movements such as Triple-A and Jawa Hokokai.
The representation of Chinese was strong, compared to the amount of Chinese Indonesians. This
indicates a flaw in Japanese diplomacy, because the Chinese lacked the recognition of the
Indonesian Muslim majority.

6.2. The pangreh praja

At the end of the war, the Japanese started to improve the importance of the pangreh
praja (the rulers of the realm) were the Indonesian priyayi leaders on the grass root level. The
Japanese made frequent use of them to help carry out policies that often resulted in exploitation
of the rural population (Sato 1996: 65). The pangreh praja acted out of own interest and did not
have a strong political opinion, such as the intellectuals and pemuda. This made the pangreh
praja the ideal group for carrying out Japanese policies. The exploitation took two forms; one
was linked to rice distribution and the other to the use of forced labor. Most of the rural
population consisted of people that were dependent on small-scale rice production on family
owned farms. The Japanese ordered the pangreh praja to supply more rice, and this rice had to be
taken from the rural dwellers. The rural dwellers possessed just enough to supply their own
family, and therefore the Japanese caused famine with these policies. A system that enforced
such rice deliveries was set up in 1943 (Anderson 1972: 12). East and Central- Java were the
poorer areas, which suffered most under Japanese policies (Anderson 1972: 13). From these areas,
the Japanese soldiers transported many young men, to work as romusha (forced laborers). The
romusha were also forced to serve in the auxiliary armies Peta and Heiho. Putera cooperated in
the recruitment by organizing populist rallies. As a consequence, the production of food was
negatively affected because young men that used to work in the rice fields were taken. The lack
of rice production in addition to the forced rice deliveries caused social instability, and wide-
spread suffering and discontent in the direct hinterland of Java, which induced migration to the
cities. The more wealthy people at the time could bribe the Japanese soldiers and escape from
suffering (Anderson 1972: 13). The pangreh praja started to oppose the type of populism spread
by Putera resulting in its dissolution, and the creation of Jawa Hokokai (Klinken 2003: 155).

11
7. The Japanese spirit and military training

During WWII, the Japanese propagated themselves to the Indonesians as the new Asian
leader that would bring wealth through a framework known as the Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere. The military invasion and the claim on political power were justified by the
Japanese with the argument that they came to free Indonesia from Western colonialism. Initially,
the Japanese received a hero’s welcome from the common Indonesian people that had been
oppressed by the Dutch. However, the negative consequences of Japanese occupation were most
strongly felt by exactly this group of Indonesians, and as the war advanced, dissatisfaction with
Japanese rule increasingly became the new norm.
The Japanese rendered their political power on Java from military might coming from the
th
16 division of the Japanese Imperial army and from the auxiliary armies under its control. The
Japanese had organized the auxiliary armies in a decentralized way in order to avoid a political
coup by the auxiliary armies. Military knowledge and equipment was transferred by the Japanese
to these auxiliary armies that were made up of mostly rural pemuda. Parallel to the military
training, the pemuda groups were trained to believe in the Japanese ideology. This ideology
encompasses loyalty to Dai Nippon Teikoku (Great Japanese Empire) and at the time, was most
strongly reflected by the bushido (way of the samurai) spirit. Bushido required recruits to be
“undistracted by the routine world outside” and was instilled by the use of military drills
(Anderson 1972: 22).
The first initiative to recruit pemuda for military training was in the youth corps
Seinendan, which had been established by the Japanese in April, 1943 (Abdullah 2009:111). It
had around 500 000 members who were subjected to military and ideological training (Anderson
1972: 27; Graaf 1959: 310). Keibodan was established at the same time as Seinendan, and served
as an auxiliary police force that had twice the amount of members, but was of less political
importance (Anderson 1972: 27; Friend 1988: 97). The buildup of military capability entered a
new stage with the establishment of Peta (Fatherland Defence Force, Pembela Tanah Air) and
Heiho (Support Troops). Heiho was formed in the middle of 1943 and made up of Indonesians
that assisted the Japanese soldiers; it functioned as an integral part of the 16th army division
(Anderson 1972: 25). Peta was formed after Sukarno requested it in October, 1943 and its recruits
were mostly drawn from Seinendan. Peta was organized in a decentralized manner and it had
limited mobility as opposed to Heiho troops that could be stationed in different locations. The
Japanese intended to use Peta at specific defense points to counter an allied invasion and these
auxiliary troops were supplied with Japanese rifles and ammunition. Peta was related to Putera,
this was the branch of politics represented by secular nationalists. Under Japanese rule, the
politicians of Putera were however not allowed to execute military control over Peta. The second
powerful branch of politics was Masjumi, which politically opposed Putera. Under the wing of
Masjumi, in February, 1945 the Japanese organized a religious Muslim military unit known as
Hizbullah (Friend 1988: 97). Muslim prayers and customs were emphasized in Hizbullah training
and the recruits received mainly physical training and instruction about explosives, rather than
training with rifles (Lebra 2010: 111). The Muslim specific policies were discussed by Professor

12
Benda (1983, via Lebra 2010: 131); he mentioned in his book that Japan’s Islamic policy was
most successful in Java in exploiting the Muslim concept of jihad, or Holy War.
The strength of the Japanese army started to deteriorate at the end of 1944, and the
Japanese had to make more concessions to the nationalists. This is exemplified in the formation
of Barisan Pelopor (Friend 1988: 97), which was a suicide group armed with bamboo spears
willing to die for the nationalist cause. The Jibakutai (those who dare to die) also fought with
bamboo spears, the big difference however was that the Japanese had trained this group as a
kamikaze corps willing to die for Dai Nippon (Friend 1988: 77). The common characteristic
which all of the above mentioned auxiliary armies shared was that its soldiers were preparing for
guerilla warfare.

8. National awakening

Secular nationalists were the first to start building the infrastructure for independence
from Dutch rule, by organizing nationalist parties. Dutch authority discouraged political actions
by these nationalists by arresting them and taking away their freedom. This happened for
example to the intellectual leaders Sukarno and Hatta. With the arrival of the Japanese, the
political arena was turned upside down. The secular nationalists were set free by the Japanese,
free to lead political movements. These movements could profit from popular unrest caused by
Japanese mismanagement of the economy. The characteristic of Japanese diplomacy was a carrot
and stick policy that rewarded the groups in support of the mass-movements and punished groups
that became too independent. For example, in order to counter the strength of the secular
nationalists, the Japanese supported the formation of a religious opposition, Masjumi. With the
creation of Masjumi, the Japanese awakened the political Islam that also wanted to become
independent like the secular nationalists. Therefore, the Japanese “carrots” only strengthened
political groups and the “sticks” made them want to be independent from Japanese rule.
The Japanese policies had actually created two strong political camps that were not
obeying the military administration. When the Japanese military strength started to show cracks,
they made a last desperate attempt to create political unity, the two political camps at the central
level were fused together in Jawa Hokokai. At this time it became clear that the pemuda, were not
loyal to the Japanese and they resembled the fight for independence. The nationalist politicians
and underground resistance, through their efforts, had succeeded in creating a pemuda army that
would fight for the national ideal. It must be noted that the Islamic ideal differed from the secular
ideal, but this political fight had to wait until the Japanese were defeated.

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9. Conclusion

The earliest attempts of the Japanese to gain political and ideological support from the
Indonesian people were through propaganda (171012_highlights). The propaganda started off big,
like it did in every other Asian nation that the Japanese had conquered. Gradually, the Japanese
noticed that their propaganda did not have the desired impact on Indonesia. The triple-A
movement failed. The Japanese responded with raising the importance of Indonesian intellectuals
in politics. Sukarno was an important player, and the Japanese estimated that he would help them
with spreading a pure Japanese ideology, that would lead to Indonesian freedom. The parents of
Sukarno were of aristocrat descent and had supported their son in studying architecture at a Dutch
university in the Dutch-Indies. Sukarno, unlike Hatta had not received education in the
Netherlands. The Japanese must have trusted Sukarno therefore more than they trusted Hatta, in
this respect. Hatta was not eliminated by the Japanese because he was of importance, namely for
his influence in Islamic circles. The Japanese might have trusted Hatta because they did probably
not know about his experiences in the Netherlands, meaning that Hatta might have lied about his
background. The Japanese remained confidence throughout the occupation in these two secular
“nationalists”. Nationalism was the ideology that was not fully understood by the Japanese
leadership, interestingly enough Hatta knew about nationalism because he had studied in the
Netherlands. That is why Western sources describe Putera as a nationalist organization, but it can
be expected that Japanese sources report in a totally different way about Putera. Obviously
because of the Japanese unfamiliarity with the driving forces behind nationalist organizations.
Unfamiliarity with nationalism was a strategic disadvantage for the Japanese especially because
they made leaders such as Hatta important not knowing that they were aware of nationalist power
existing in Indonesia and in which they did not let the Japanese tap into The secret knowledge of
Hatta was like a red stain on the pure Japanese spirit (171012_correction). The Japanese had
treated both the “secular nationalists”, as well as the “Muslim leaders” well, and hoped for the
best. The reality on the Javanese ground however, was that the rural population and the poor were
suffering beyond a level that would have been acceptable under Dutch rule. This deliberate
strategy of the nationalists aimed at gaining popular support from the masses. At the same time,
there was an underground resistance active, led by Sjahrir. This underground movement was able
to build up enough confidence to convince Sukarno and Hatta of declaring independence
prematurely. The Japanese underestimation exists therein that nationalism was not taken
seriously, and that the rural population did simply not receive consideration from the Japanese
administrators.

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