HIST20034 Research Essay

Patrick Bligh 1263301 HIST20034 Research Essay Word Count: 2472
Why did different groups in society engage in either collaboration with or resistance to the
Japanese during the period of occupation? Discuss with reference to one occupied country (note the
most substantial English-language literature covers Indonesia, the Philippines and
Malaya/Singapore)
Indonesian social groups negotiated with the Japanese occupation to ultimately advance national self-
determination, collaborating with, or resisting Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to strengthen
their political autonomy and cultural identity. Japan’s invasion of the Dutch East Indies replaced the three-
hundred-year-old European colonial regime with a military occupation from 1942 to 1945, enabling
Indonesian nationalist, religious and ethnic leadership groups to form new power centres that aligned with
or against Imperial Japan in pursuit of self-determination. Indonesian nationalists primarily empowered the
Japanese occupation out of sympathy for their anti-Western, pro-Asian stance, viewing imperial expansion
as a mechanism to erode Dutch hegemony and achieve national independence. Furthermore, Indonesian
leaders further collaborated with Japan to expand their administrative authority, exploiting Japan’s man-
power requirements to enlarge their control of state instruments and resisting the occupations limits to their
political empowerment. Religious groups’ substantially cooperated with the occupation to amplify Islam’s
influence in Indonesia, rationalising the Pacific War as a jihad in defence of “Easterness”, whilst resisting
Japanese cultural advances. Japan’s system of corruption simultaneously incentivised rural elements to
collaborate to improve their socioeconomic standing and resist the occupation’s repressive agricultural
policies that mirrored Dutch colonialism. Hence, this essay will argue that Indonesia’s elite groups most
consequentially collaborated with the occupation to strengthen their political authority, cultural influence
and material wealth. This marks an intrinsic divergence from rural groups’ primarily forced relationship
with Japan that instrumentalised repression to deter resistance. Indeed, an organised insurrection to
Japanese military rule, such as the Malayan Communist Party, did not materialise in Indonesia.1 Therefore,
1
Anthony Reid and Shiraishi Saya, “Rural Unrest in Sumatra, 1942 a Japanese Report,” Indonesia, no. 21 (1976): 121.
1
Indonesian social groups principally collaborated with the Japanese occupation to pursue national
independence, social and religious empowerment and to a lesser extent resisted Japan’s militant and
economic supremacy.
The objective of achieving Indonesian independence was nationalist politicians’ most consequential
motive to collaborate with Japan. Indigenous leader’s belief that obtaining national sovereignty was only
possible through regime change predisposed political groups to participate in the occupation’s restructuring
of the Indonesian state. Indeed, Japan’s promise to gift Indonesia with independence represents the
penultimate motivation for Indonesian politicians to collaborate.2 The impetus for nationalists to cooperate
was additionally compounded by the Japanese invasions analogous conflation with complete
decolonisation. The pre-war anti-Dutch animus originated from the colonial government’s opposition to
self-determination and subsequently intensified Japan’s popular image as an alternative, Asian hegemon.3
Certainly, Japan’s geopolitical standing as Asia’s only industrialised power substantially encouraged
Indonesian affiliation. Collaboration was viewed as a mechanism to reproduce Japan’s rapid modernisation
in Indonesia and construct an independent state able to combat Western exploitation.4 Accordingly, the
Dutch demolition corps’ role in dismantling Indonesia’s critical infrastructure (primarily oil refineries)
strengthened the attractiveness of regime change as Indonesians interpreted the colonial strategy as a
“scorched-earth policy” spitefully directed towards Indonesians.5 The occupation capitalised on colonial
tensions to secure greater political support by elevating Indonesian as Indonesia’s official language.6
Furthermore, the occupation banned all colonial emblems and publicly burnt Dutch flags, regal portraits
and orders of knighthood.7 Clearly, these public demonstrations leveraged prevailing anti-Dutch sentiment
2
Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, “The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese ‘Liberation’ of Indonesia: Visions and Reactions,”
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (1996): 1.
3
Adrian B. Lapian, “Personal Reflections on the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (1996):
220.
4
S. M. Gandasubrata, An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945
(Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, August 1953), 9.
5
Touwen-Bouwsma, “The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese ‘Liberation’ of Indonesia: Visions and Reactions,” 8.
6
Lapian, “Personal Reflections on the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia,” 220.
7
Gandasubrata, An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945, 5.
2
to distinguish the occupational regime from European colonialism to ultimately enlarge Japan’s popular
appeal. However, the extent to which these symbolic gestures are the outcome of proactive government
patronage or an Indonesian proclivity for revenge underscores the nuanced interplay between popular and
political power in Southeast Asian history. Continuing, the most consequential collaborative nationalist
group before the occupation involves the Parindrists. The Parindrists simultaneously collaborated with the
Dutch and Japanese by participating in the colonial parliament (the Voksraad), whilst covertly preparing
Indonesia for a Japanese invasion.8 The Parindrists were financially incentivised to cooperate with Japan
as Tokyo provided the party funds.9 Furthermore, the Parindrists’ partnership with Japan was inspired by
their conviction that Indonesia alone lacked the power to depose the Dutch.10 Hence, a radical
transformation of international politics, such as a World War, was required to establish the contextual
conditions for regime change and thus independence. As such, Parindrists encouraged soldiers to assist the
Japanese campaign of liberating Indonesia from European Imperialism.11 After the invasion, however,
Japan banned all forms of political organisation and officially dissolved the Parindrist group.12 Instead,
Tokyo elevated Sukarno, the exiled colonial leader of non-cooperative nationalist elements, as their
preferred Indonesian figurehead. Significantly, Sukarno’s claim that independence was only achievable by
collaborating with Japan likely impelled his appointment.13 Hence, Indonesian nationalists’ groups, whilst
divergent in their partnership to the Dutch regime, nevertheless converged in their cooperation with Tokyo.
Nevertheless, Sukarno’s compliance with Japan is largely attributed to his strong inclination for personal
empowerment.14 The extent to which Sukarno’s partnership with Japan accelerated his political career is
8
Yannick Lengkeek, “Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on ‘Cooperative’ Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia,
1935–1942,” Facism 7, no. 1 (2018): 129.
9
Susan Abeyasekere, “Partai Indonesia Raja, 1936-42: A Study in Cooperative Nationalism,” Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies 3, no. 2 (1972): 274.
10
11
12
Lengkeek, “Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on ‘Cooperative’ Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935–
1942,” 129.
13
Theodore Friend, “Expectation and Mobilization in Java and Luzon,” in The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan against the West in
Java and Luzon, 1942-1945, (Princeton University Press, 1988), 84.
14
Michael Laffan, “The Forgotten Jihad under Japan: Muslim Reformism and the Promise of Indonesian Independence,”
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 64, no. 1–2 (March 16, 2021): 129.
3
evidenced by his statement; “I addressed 50,000 at one meeting, 100,00 at another […] I have the Japanese
to thank for that.”15 Thus, the most consequential collaborative group involves Indonesia’s nationalist elite,
who assisted Japan to expand their control over the political institutions leading to independence.16 Hence,
the occupation’s instrumentalization of its promise to supply Indonesia with modernity greatly stimulated
political elites to collaborate as resistance was framed as antithetical to national patriotism and a constraint
to political authority.
Expanding upon Indonesian’s collaboration with Japan to pursue national sovereignty, militaristic
groups partnered with the occupation to establish a national defence force and a sense of liberating
patriotism. However, Indonesian armed groups simultaneously emerged as the most consequential source
of resistance to the Japanese by combating the occupation’s oppression. PETA17 was an Indonesian
volunteer army setup in 1943 to reinforce Japan’s defence of Southeast Asia, which had 37,500 members
by wars end.18 PETA was the outcome of a Japanese-Indonesian partnership striving to organize an island
defence force. An indigenous army fulfilled Indonesian desires to control a powerful state instrument,
encompassing a national army, that was prohibited by the Dutch and additionally the IJA’s need for
manpower.19 PETA’s collaboration with the occupation was stimulated by Japan’s premier prestige as the
only uncolonized Southeast Asian nation. As such, Indonesians hoped Japan could help their nation by
recreating a hierarchically militant society able to withstand European imperialism.20 This is evidenced by
PETA officers’ capacity and desire to earn a katana - indicating Japanese militarism’s particularly powerful
attraction to Indonesia’s armed groups.21 Conversely, Gatot Mangkoepradja22 explains that avoiding
universal conscription was the primary reason for establishing PETA, revealing a divergent historical
15
Anthony Reid, “Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword,” in Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, eds. Alfred
McCoy, (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980), 22.
16
17
PETA is also commonly recognised as Giyūgun (Pembela Tanah Air in Indonesia, Defenders of the Homeland in English and
Kyōdo Bōei Giyūgun in Japanese)
18
Friend, “Expectation and Mobilization in Java and Luzon,” 98.
19
Laffan, “The Forgotten Jihad under Japan: Muslim Reformism and the Promise of Indonesian Independence,” 147.
20
21
Reid, “Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword,” 28.
22
An Indonesian nationalist hero and deviser of PETA
4
perspective that prioritised saving Indonesians over aggressive patriotism.23 Therefore, active collaboration
was employed as a method of resistance whereby immediate Japanese demands for manpower were met
whilst circumventing national mobilisation to ensure Indonesians were not ‘cannon fodder for the Allied.’24
Regardless, PETA’s collaboration was heavily motivated by Japanese militarism that intrinsically deviated
from the colonial policy of maintaining Indonesia’s marshal weakness to ensure regime survival.25
Exemplifying this, Kemal Idris26 described PETA’s militant organisation as a liberating experience, with
the Japanese ‘[teaching] us that that we were men, neither more nor less than the Westerners.’27 The
attractiveness of collaboration was further bolstered by Japanese propaganda, which seduced young
Indonesian’s with romanticised narratives of self-sacrifice for national glory. Consequently, Indonesians
were convinced that national progress was only possible by collaborating with Japan, as, during the Dutch
regime, social mobility was only possible to those with a European education.28 Significantly, Japan’s
wartime instructions enabled Indonesian national groups to resist the Dutch post-war return, revealing that
PETA’s recreation of Japanese militarism essentially facilitated decolonisation.29 Evidently, PETA’s
young, lower ranked officer core who created the Pemuda branch group that was instrumental in
establishing Suharto’s post-war “New Order”.30 Nevertheless, a substantial degree of resistance within
Pemuda emerged from the Japanese’s sense of superiority, with occupational officers’ refusal to treat the
Indonesians as equals (by not saluting their nominal superiors) generating strong anti-Japanese sentiment.31
Resentment moderately materialised with Pemuda members adopting civilian dress and bullying Japanese
23
Gatot R. Mangkupradja, Harumi W. Evans, and Ruth McVey, “The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction
of Sukarno’s Autobiography,” Indonesia, no. 5 (1968): 106.
24
25
26
Kemal Idris was a PETA member during the occupation, a nationalist geurilla fighter during decolonisation and is now an
Indonesian general
27
Anthony Reid and Oki Akira, The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Press, 1986), 56.
28
29
Lengkeek, “Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on ‘Cooperative’ Nationalist Circles in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1935–
1942,” 115.
30
László Sluimers, “The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1
(1996): 31.
31
Sluimers, “The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence,” 31.
5
servicemen in Indonesian crowds.32 Tensions further escalated to outright resistance on 14th February 1945,
wherein PETA soldiers killed Japanese servicemen in Blitar.33 Thus, the still-present ‘inferiority complex’
permeating through Indonesian society provided a motive for resisting foreign colonisation.34 Therefore,
Indonesian armed groups represent the most nuanced and consequential cases of collaboration and
resistance. Cooperation was stimulated by Indonesia’s desire for a characteristically patriotic military which
simultaneously resisted Japan’s inclination for universal conscription and sense of dominance that mirrored
colonial relationships.
Religious factions substantially cooperated with the Japanese to magnify Islam’s - and consequently
their own - influence over Indonesian society. However, limited religious resistance did materialise to the
occupation’s attempt to “nipponise” Islamic spirituality that would constrain religious leaders’ authority.
Significantly, the Joyoboyo prophecy predicted the arrival of North-eastern, yellow-skinned men who
would temporarily replace white overlordship before gifting Indonesians with complete national
sovereignty. 35 The foretelling predisposed Indonesian Muslims to accept Japanese dominion, rationalising
the Dutch defeat as indicative of imminent independence, and thus reason to collaborate. However, the
Kenpeitai saw the prophecy as a potential stimulant for resistance as a literal or figurative interpretation of
“temporarily” could encourage rebellion to expediate the process of independence.36 This did not
materialise likely due to Japan’s marshal power that disincentivised outright confrontation. Indeed, the
religiously militant Hizbullah group assisted the occupation by integrating itself into Japan’s defence of
Indonesia.37 Hizbullah collaborators, predominantly young, radical Muslims, resonated with Japanese
propaganda that characterised Indonesia’s occupation as part of a wider holy war to liberate Asia from
32
33
Sluimers, “The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence,” 33.
34
35
36
37
Hizbullah was formed in late 1944 as PETA’s explicitly Islamic derivation
6
Western Islamophobia.38 Thus, collaboration was encouraged by the Japanese through the conflation of
nationalism and religion, which positioned militaristic partnership as a patriotic act of Pan-Islamic-
Asianism. However, Hizbullah members defied the Japanese mandated Saikeirei39 due to its insulting
resemblance to praying towards Mecca.40 Thus, Indonesian resistance surfaced to Japan’s attempt to
assimilate Islamic ritual with Japanese custom. Hizbullah’s noncompliance compelled an occupational
policy reversal, with the Banzai being replaced with the Allahu Akbar. Thus, a limit to religious
collaboration is evident considering Indonesians did not permit Japan to change indigenous cultural norms.
Japan’s retrogression, however, is more likely attributed to the deteriorating war condition that demanded
greater militant collaboration. As such, Japan compromised to Hizbullah demands and construed the Pacific
War as a jihad to opportunistically amplify anti-American zeal and reinforce Indonesia’s security
perimeter.41 The last collaborative religious group involves the Ulama,42 whose cooperation was predicated
on their personal aggrandizement. The most significant Ulama group was PUSA,43 established in 1939 to
spread Islam across Indonesia.44 PUSA’s pro-Japanese leaning is evident considering that the group
resolved to revolt against the Dutch during their first conference in 1940.45 Furthermore, a PUSA letter
intercepted before Japan’s invasion called for the “liberation from taxation and obligatory feudal labour, as
promised by the Japanese.”46 Considering that the ulèëbalangs – hereditary aristocrats during Dutch
colonialism - collected taxes, PUSA members interpreted Japanese assurances as a promise to replace the
colonial system with new power centres that benefited “true” Indonesians.47 Significantly, the ulèëbalangs
simultaneous courting of the occupation highlights the internal competition of Indonesian groups aspiring
38
39
The ceremonial bow towards the Emperor in Tokyo
40
Mangkupradja, Evans, and McVey, “The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno’s
Autobiography,” 127.
41
42
Islamic teachers
43
Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh which means the All-Aceh Religious Scholars' Association
44
Anthony Reid, “The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942,” The Journal of Asian
Studies 35, no. 1 (1975): 50.
45
Reid, “The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942,” 54.
46
Reid and Akira, The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945, 67.
47
7
to monopolise Japanese patronage.48 Japanese concessions to the ulèëbalangs prompted a minimal PUSA
revolt in late-1942, which saw a hundred Indonesians die assaulting an occupation barrack.49 However, the
subsequent power transfer from the ulèëbalangs to the Ulamas secured the latter’s complete collaboration
in order to protect their expanded authority.50 Therefore, the reallocation of power determines Indonesian
groups’ relationship to the Japanese as religious element’s collaboration and resistance to occupation was
derived from the extent of their personal aggrandisement.
Japan’s instituted system of corruption encouraged rural social groups to either collaborate or resist
the occupational government. The nature of Indonesians’ association to the Japanese regime was thus
dependant on collaboration’s capacity to improve living standards. Certainly, opportunism constitutes a
primary reason for cooperation, as the social groups who did partner with Japan enjoyed greater allowances
and privileged access to rations.51 Assuredly, collaborative administrators received more coffee, rice and
cigars for assisting the Japanese occupation.52 However, it is vital to recognise the contextual attractiveness
of collaboration considering that the average Indonesian’s ration of two-hundred grams of rice a day would
pressure cooperation in return for more food.53 As such, Japan’s forceful monopolisation of agricultural
production surfaced as a central impetus for rural resistance. Primary accounts describe Japanese
infantrymen moving from train carriage to carriage, assaulting every passenger until rice was discovered
and then requisitioned.54 Hence, groups of already destitute Indonesian peasants opposed Japanese war-
objectives by hiding their produce.55 Therefore, basic survival represents a motive to collaborate or resist
the occupation depending on which approach provided more food. This explains why PETA soldiers who
48
49
Amry Vandenbosch, “Review,” review of The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese
Occupation 1942-1945, Institute of Pacific Relations, U.S.A, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (January
1960): 259.
50
Vandenbosch, review of The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945,
258.
51
52
Indrus and S. U. Nababan, “Two Stories of the Japanese Occupation,” Indonesia, no. 2 (1966): 128.
53
Indrus and Nababan, “Two Stories of the Japanese Occupation,” 126.
54
Indrus and Nababan, “Two Stories of the Japanese Occupation,” 131.
55
8
attacked the Japanese responsible for rice requestion were lionised as protectors of the people.56 However,
PETA members nevertheless benefited from engaging in the occupation’s system of corruption. Soldiers
valued their complete uniform and ‘full stomachs’ that elevated their living standards above the majority
of Indonesia’s population.57 Additionally, Japanese propagandas promise to abolish the colonial tax system
and return the Dutch aristocracy’s agricultural land to their indigenous owners dually instigated
collaboration and resistance.58 The Aron group interpreted Tokyo’s promise as authorisation to seize
control of colonial enterprises such as the ulèëbalangs’ plantations.59 In reaction, upper-class groups
characterised lawless Aron activity as resistance to Japanese authority.60 The occupation’s response to this
perceived anarchy, with five Aron leaders being publicly decapitated, further exposes Indonesian inter-
group rivalry which competed for Japanese protection by positioning their enemies as rebels.61 The
executions, however, undermined Japan’s ‘elder brother’ reputation with Indonesian peasants increasingly
regarding the occupation as a substitute coloniser.62 However, the occupation was “not distressed” about
increasing rural resistance due to Indonesian elites’ successful collaboration that ensured the loyalty and
functionality of the state’s coercive apparatus.63 Certainly, the collaboration of Indonesia’s upper class, that
was acquired through corruption, enabled the forced recruitment of five million Rōmusha. The Rōmusha
institution epitomises Japan’s policy of coerced collaboration wherein ‘volunteers’ were misinformed by
propaganda that portrayed the ‘employment’ as highly rewarding and indicative of Asian patriotism.64 In
reality, the Rōmusha represented slave labour who were assaulted, starved and overworked.65 Thus,
collaboration with the occupation was not invariably an active, conscious decision for rural groups who
56
57
58
59
60
61
Reid and Saya, “Rural Unrest in Sumatra, 1942 a Japanese Report,” 119.
62
63
64
65
9
lacked the political prestige to be “co-opted” into Japan’s corrupt system. Interestingly, Indonesian official
histories have prioritised celebrating PETA’s role in defeating the Dutch return over the Rōmusha’s abuse.66
This exposes the historiographical complexity in interpreting Indonesian national narratives that
deemphasises the extent to which Indonesian elites’ collaboration enabled the occupation’s abuse of power.
Overall, Japan’s systematic patronage synchronously pressured rural Indonesian elements to collaborate or
resist the occupation to expand or protect the groups’ socioeconomic conditions.
Ultimately, Indonesian social groups collaborated with Japan to further their national, political and
religious sovereignty whilst simultaneously resisting the occupation’s brutal control over the state’s
instruments of coercion. Collaboration primarily emerged from Indonesia’s social elite who embraced
partnership with Japan as an avenue to expand their administrative and cultural control. Conversely,
resistance materialised from a multitude of social groups who opposed Japan’s repressive colonial policies
that limited their capacity for material aggrandizement. Therefore, Indonesians’ relationship to the Japanese
occupation was intrinsically derived from either collaborations or resistances capacity to improve the
groups’ social standing.
66
10
Bibliography
Primary
Gandasubrata, S. M. “An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942
to August 1945. Translated from the Indonesian by Leslie H. Palmier.” Report. Southeast Asia
Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, August 1953.
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/57479.
Indrus, and S. U. Nababan. “Two Stories of the Japanese Occupation.” Indonesia, no. 2 (1966): 125–34.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3350757.
Lapian, Adrian B. “Personal Reflections on the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia.” Southeast Asian
Studies 34, no. 1 (1996): 211–23.
Mangkupradja, Raden Gatot, Harumi Wanasita Evans, and Ruth McVey. “The Peta and My Relations
with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno’s Autobiography.” Indonesia, no. 5 (1968): 105–34.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3350766.
Reid, Anthony, and Oki Akira. The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945.
72. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1986.
Reid, Anthony, and Shiraishi Saya. “Rural Unrest in Sumatra, 1942 a Japanese Report.” Indonesia, no. 21
(1976): 115–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/3350959.
Secondary
Abeyasekere, Susan. “Partai Indonesia Raja, 1936-42: A Study in Cooperative Nationalism.” Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 3, no. 2 (1972): 262–76.
Friend, Theodore. “Expectation and Mobilization in Java and Luzon.” In The Blue-Eyed Enemy, 75–104.
Japan against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945. Princeton University Press, 1988.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zttvq.12.
11
Laffan, Michael. “The Forgotten Jihad under Japan: Muslim Reformism and the Promise of Indonesian
Independence.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 64, no. 1–2 (March 16,
2021): 125–61. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341532.
Lengkeek, Yannick. “Staged Glory: The Impact of Fascism on ‘Cooperative’ Nationalist Circles in Late
Colonial Indonesia, 1935–1942.” Facism 7, no. 1 (2018): 109–31. https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-
00701003.
Reid, Anthony. “Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword.” In Southeast Asia under Japanese
Occupation, by Alfred McCoy, 16–32. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1980.
Reid, Anthony. “The Japanese Occupation and Rival Indonesian Elites: Northern Sumatra in 1942.” The
Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (1975): 49–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/2054039.
Sluimers, László. “The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence.” Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies 27, no. 1 (1996): 19–36.
Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly. “The Indonesian Nationalists and the Japanese ‘Liberation’ of Indonesia:
Visions and Reactions.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (1996): 1–18.
Vandenbosch, Amry. “Reveiw.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2, no. 2 (January 1960):
257–61. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500000694.
12

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Patrick Bligh 1263301 HIST20034 Research Essay Word Count: 2472

most substantial English-language literature covers Indonesia, the Philippines and

PETA’s recreation of Japanese militarism essentially facilitated decolonisation.29 Evidently, PETA’s

derived from the extent of their personal aggrandisement.

dependant on collaboration’s capacity to improve living standards. Certainly, opportunism constitutes a

resist the occupation to expand or protect the groups’ socioeconomic conditions.

groups’ social standing.

Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, August 1953.

Studies 34, no. 1 (1996): 211–23.

72. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1986.

(1976): 115–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/3350959.

Southeast Asian Studies 3, no. 2 (1972): 262–76.

2021): 125–61. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341532.

Colonial Indonesia, 1935–1942.” Facism 7, no. 1 (2018): 109–31. https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-

Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (1975): 49–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/2054039.

Studies 27, no. 1 (1996): 19–36.

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