IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

49 SCRA 22

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on
the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as
well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax.
The Court held:

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a
member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc.
The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to
be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the state”

Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer may be
used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every
government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections
to positions taken by the integrated bar.

The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
Case Digest: In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion | A.M.
No. 1928, 3 August 1978

December 20, 2017

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion

A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Facts:

The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court
139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing
to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this,
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he
is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held:

The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is
not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues.
 The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.