DOCTRINE:

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.  Subject to the following exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged

Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan
(SB) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case
No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." As the
lawyers allege that they have no interest with the stocks and was only transferred to their clients.
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the
identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant
the same treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their clients.
ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion:
 In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application of the law of agency
 In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore,
deserving of equal treatment.
 In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
 In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and
just grounds and with due consideration to equal protection of the law

- Mostly, the PCCG is offering this deal because they want the lawyers to identify Cuanco as their
principal or as the “big fish”, requiring the disclosure of the following:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.

ISSUE:
WON the disclosure of the client’s name is within the ambit of privilege communication

RULING:
YES taking consideration the circumstances of the case. (The court cited the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the RULES OF COURT with regard to privilege communication.)

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is."  He cannot be obliged to grope in
the dark against unknown forces.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be not attorney-client relationship).
DOCTRINE:

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them

Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

FACTS:

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at
around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila.
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced
and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told
him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda
and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After conducting an preliminary
investigation an information was filed leading to the arrest of Columna, whereby he executed an
affidavit stating that he was merely an lookout and two other persons killed the deceased and that
the masterminds were Licerio and Lylod Antiporda who are political enemies of the deceased.
Pursuant to such affidavit a complaint was filed against those implicated by Columna. During the
preliminary investigation an unsolicited handwriting was shown stating that Columna was tortured
and those implicated was never involved which caused for the dismissal of complaint. Petitioner filed
an appeal to the DOJ which was granted causing for the filing of information but reversed again
stating that the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against respondents and even if it is
admissible, it was not corroborated by evidence. However, the presiding judge did not grant the
motion to withdraw of the information based on the recommendation of the prosecutor causing for
the filing of certiorari which was granted. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON there is probable cause against the respondents taking consideration the extrajudicial
confession which was uncorroborated.

RULING:
NO.

The judge did not took into consideration using its independent assessment and evaluation of the
merits considering that the extrajudicial confession relied upon was in doubt. Futher, Judge Daguna
failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not
admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. 1avvphi1

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission
relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating
their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine
them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value
and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it
would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through
a full blown court case
DOCTRINE:

In many decided by this courts and other related foreign jurisprudence, an expert witness need not
to be specialized in the matter so long as he exhibits knowledge of the subject. Where a duly
licensed and practicing physician has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a
specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion based on education,
experience, observation, or association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.

Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015

FACTS:
Mrs. Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11- year old son, Edmer to the Emergency Room of San Juan de
Dios Hospital because of difficulty of breathing, chest pain, stomach pain and fever.

Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined Edmer. In her testimony, Mrs.
Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April 20, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted
for one day; a few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor; and two hours
after administering medications, Edmer's fever had subsided.

Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia." Edmer's blood was also taken. Afterwards,
Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.

Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune Care card. She was thereafter
assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang (Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune
Care. Dr. Casumpang confirmed the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia."

At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She
immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but
Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son's "bloodpressure is just being active," and remarked
that "that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."

Still suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention, but
simply nooded. Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood streak" prompting the respondent (Edmer's
father) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station.

Dr. Sunga, although aware failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it
away. Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up.

The blood test results came, Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed
that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." By request Edmar was to be
transported to Makati Medical Center.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's clinical history and laboratory
exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that
was already in its irreversible stage.

Edmer died.  Parents Filed a case against  SJDH and the Doctors particularly. The trial court and CA
ruled that the doctors are liable of medical practice based on the expert opinion of Dr. Jaudian but
challenged such finding because he is not an expert of pediatrician but a practicing physician who
specializes in pathology.
ISSUE:

WON the testimony of Dr. Jaudian is credible

RULING:
YES

A determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of care involves
a question of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly technical in
nature, requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to the court on matters
clearly falling within the domain of medical science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating
the expert testimonies, and guided by medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common
knowledge, ultimately determines whether breach of duty took place. Whether or not Dr. Casumpang
and Dr. Sanga committed a breach of duty is to be measured by the yardstick of professional
standards observed by the other members of the medical profession in good standing under similar
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the professional standards observed in the medical community, but also that the
physician’s conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard

In many decided by this courts and other related foreign jurisprudence, an expert witness need not
to be specialized in the matter so long as he exhibits knowledge of the subject. Where a duly
licensed and practicing physician has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a
specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as to which he has an opinion based on education,
experience, observation, or association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent.

In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to testify on the standard
of care in dengue fever cases.1avvphi1

Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial that he had attended not less
than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing
medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50 dengue related cases.

As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and relevant exposure
in pediatrics and dengue related cases, we are convinced that Dr. Jaudian demonstrated sufficient
familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever cases. Furthermore, we agree that
he possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the
subject.