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TOPIC: Offer of Compromise (CRIMINAL CASES-except Quasi-Offenses and those allowed to be

compromised)

G.R. No. 180915               August 9, 2010

12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
CHARLIE NAZARENO Y MELANIOS, Accused-Appellant.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Based on the eyewitness, he was awakened from his sleep by a noise from outside his
house wherein he peeped through his door to look what is happening. He saw how Nazareno killed
Romeo de Guzman who was then sleeping using a bladed weapon about 20 inches long and thrust
to his chest. The eyewitness saw everything because he was just an arm’s length from the victim
and Nazareno and the doors of houses of victim and him are adjacent and only a wall separates the
two houses. After stabbing the victim, Nazareno hurriedly left the scene and the witness called the
police, after which, he helped bring the victim to the nearest hospital.

Meawhile Nazareno was arrested by the responding barangay tanod who saw him with blood all
over his clothes and holding a bladed weapon.

Nazareno denied the allegations of the eyewitness and claimed that while having drinking spree with
the victim, the latter provoked him first who was then holding the bladed weapon. They started
fighting and grappled for the weapon, the victim suddenly fell.

RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications in the civil indemnity.

Hence, this appeal by Nazareno contending the inconsistencies of the testimony of the eyewitness.

ISSUE: W/N the accused admitted the authorship of the crime against the victim.

RULING: Yes

Not only was appellant positively identified by an eyewitness as the assailant, but no less than
appellant himself, on two occasions, admitted authorship of the crime:

First, 14 October 2001, while in detention, appellant wrote a letter 21 to the victim’s brother asking the
latter’s forgiveness for the killing of Romeo de Guzman. In a long line of cases, 22 the Supreme Court
held that appellant’s act of pleading for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise, which in turn, can be received as an implied admission of guilt under Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Then, second, on 26 September 2005, while on re-direct examination on the witness stand,
appellant admitted having killed Romeo de Guzman.
Appellant’s testimony amounts to a judicial admission of guilt which may be given in evidence
against himself under Section 26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Considering the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, the guilt of appellant was clearly proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

TOPIC: Declaration against interest vs Admission against interest

G.R. No. 152364               April 15, 2010

21. ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D.


SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her
husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN,
PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO
AGUSTIN, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

TOPIC: RULE 130, Sec. 40. Declaration against interest. –

G.R. No. 152364               April 15, 2010

35. ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D.


SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her
husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN,
PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO
AGUSTIN, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

DOCTRINE: Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity
with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness. On the other hand, declarations against interest are those made by a person
who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness.

FACTS: Petitioners and defendants are the descendant of the Simeon Santos who died intestate
leaving the subject parcel of land. All the children of Simeon consented that the parcel of land be
titled in the name of Basilisa Santos who was the eldest among them but does not necessarily mean
that she is the sole owner of the land.
However, without the consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot was transferred into another title in
the name of Modesta Agustin et. al who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos and defendants
in this case.

During the lifetime of Basilisa Santos, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed her sister Basilia,
that the transfer of the title lot in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would
erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by her children, but Basilisa Santos-
Agustin replied not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and
specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot.

When the children of Simeon Santos initiated a partition in the barangay, but it was opposed by the
children of Basilisa Santos claiming that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the lot.

Hence, the plaintiffs filed a partition of the lot in accordance with the law on intestate succession and
partition of land before the MTCC. Again it was opposed by the children of Basilisa contending that
there was never an agreement between Basilisa and the petitioners as to the ownership of the lot.

MTCC denied the petitioners claim on the ground that no evidentiary value could be given to the
affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of
the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not
presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC, but it affirmed with modifications the judgment of the
MTCC.

Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA and it also affirmed with modifications the decision
of the RTC.

Hence, the instant petition based on ground that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her
siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which is one of the
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.

ISSUE: W/N Basilia’s sworn statement is a declaration against interest.

RULING: No.

At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn
statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an
admission against interest.

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against
interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with
or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is
available as a witness. 

Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a
party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are
admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 
In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with
the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should
be considered as an admission against interest.

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