Received: 20 May 2016 Revised: 1 December 2016 Accepted: 31 January 2017

DOI: 10.1002/for.2464

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Understanding algorithm aversion: When is advice from

automation discounted?

Andrew Prahl | Lyn Van Swol

Department of Communication Arts,

Abstract
University of Wisconsin–Madison,
Wisconsin, USA Forecasting advice from human advisors is often utilized more than advice from
automation. There is little understanding of why “algorithm aversion” occurs, or
Correspondence
Andrew Prahl, Department of
specific conditions that may exaggerate it. This paper first reviews literature from
Communication Arts, University of two fields—interpersonal advice and human–automation trust—that can inform
Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53706, our understanding of the underlying causes of the phenomenon. Then, an experi-
USA.
Email: aprahl@wisc.edu ment is conducted to search for these underlying causes. We do not replicate the
finding that human advice is generally utilized more than automated advice. How-
ever, after receiving bad advice, utilization of automated advice decreased signifi-
cantly more than advice from humans. We also find that decision makers describe
themselves as having much more in common with human than automated advisors
despite there being no interpersonal relationship in our study. Results are discussed
in relation to other findings from the forecasting and human–automation trust fields
and provide a new perspective on what causes and exaggerates algorithm aversion.

K EY WO R D S
advice, algorithm aversion, automation, computers, trust

1 | INTRODUCTION
Computers, robots, algorithms, and other forms of automa-
tion are quickly becoming a fundamental part of many deci-
sion‐making processes in both personal and professional
contexts. From forecasting product sales (Fildes, Goodwin,
Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009) to informing medical and
management decisions (Esmaeilzadeh, Sambasivan, Kumar,
& Nezakati, 2015; Inthorn, Tabacchi, & Seising, 2015; Prahl,
Dexter, Braun, & Van Swol, 2013), people frequently seek
and receive advice from nonhuman (automation) sources
when facing important decisions. Yet, despite seeking advice
from automation, decision makers frequently discount advice
obtained from it, especially when compared to advice from a
human advisor (Önkal, Goodwin, Thomson, Gönül, &
Pollock, 2009).
The irrational discounting of automation advice has long
been known and a source of the spirited “clinical versus actu-
arial” debate in clinical psychology research (Dawes, 1979;
Meehl, 1954). Recently, this effect has been noted in forecast-
ing research (Önkal et al., 2009) and has been called algo-
rithm aversion (Dietvorst, Simmons, & Massey, 2015). A
developing area of research is trying to identify interventions
that increase trust in automation advice, such as providing
confidence intervals or allowing human judges to slightly
modify automation forecasts (Dietvorst, Simmons, &
Massey, 2016; Goodwin, Gönül, & Önkal, 2013). This
research is important, but more research is needed on the
underlying psychological processes that affect the
discounting of automation advice, especially in comparison
to human advice. This paper examines trust as a factor that
may underlie differences in use of advice. First, we summa-
rize literature in two related fields that can inform forecasting
research about algorithm aversion: interpersonal advice and
human–automation trust.
In addition to providing a new perspective on automated
advice, both the advice field and human factors provide the-
oretical frameworks that we use to generate hypotheses and

Journal of Forecasting. 2017;36:691–702. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/for Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 691
692
conduct a simple experiment to compare human versus auto-
mation forecasting advice. We begin with a review of advice
research in order to understand how the process of receiving
advice from automation differs from receiving advice from a
human, specifically by examining trust in advice and the
effects of receiving advice of varying quality from either a
human or automated, computer forecast. In turn, we will
relate advice research to findings from the human factors
and forecasting fields.
1.1 | Advice: The message and the advisor
The interpersonal process of giving and receiving advice has
received considerable attention from communication scholars
over the past 20 years (for a review, see Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006; MacGeorge, Guntzviller, Hanasono, & Feng, 2013).
Yet, advice from automation sources such as computers and
robots has been largely overlooked by communication
scholars. Advice response theory (ART) has emerged and
been developed as the main theory of interpersonal advice
(Feng & Feng, 2013; Feng & MacGeorge, 2010; MacGeorge
et al., 2013; Van Swol, MacGeorge, & Prahl, 2015). Key
aspects of ART include message‐related characteristics (such
as the politeness of the message), advisor‐related characteris-
tics (such as expertise), and receiver‐related characteristics
(such as emotional state). Advice research prior to ART
was largely focused on aspects of the advisor such as exper-
tise, trustworthiness, and confidence (Sniezek, Schrah, &
Dalal, 2004; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol, 2009).
One of the most important contributions of ART is the
assertion that message characteristics are more closely related
to the receiver's evaluation of advice than advisor characteris-
tics. While this is an important consideration when studying
interpersonal advice, it may not generalize to the domain of
automated advice. For example, a sales forecast derived from
a computer algorithm may simply take the form of a number
presented to a decision maker. Furthermore, forecasts from
more than one software program may be presented in this
simple format (Goodwin et al., 2013). In this case, source
factors (such as the perceived sophistication of the software
program) would be more salient for advice utilization
because there is essentially no variation in message character-
istics (i.e., politeness). Because of this, we focus more on
advisor characteristics in determining differences between
how people may react to human or computer advice.
1.2 | Advisor characteristics: Credibility
Previous advice research has frequently focused on character-
istics of the advisor, such as trust, as a predictor of advice uti-
lization (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Snizek,
2005). Consistent with research on trust (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995), the credibility of an advisor is largely
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
determined by their perceived competence, which is often
related to the advisor's expressed confidence. The relation-
ship between competence and advice utilization is so strong
that it is common for advice literature to use a two‐dimen-
sional model of advice utilization, which differentiates advi-
sor competence from all other factors such as intentions and
integrity (Jodlbauer & Jonas, 2011; Schrah, Dalal, &
Sniezek, 2006). This is particularly important for the research
presented here because frequently in human–computer inter-
action research computers are conceptualized as only being
evaluated on competence‐related factors and nothing else
(Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003; Paravastu, Gefen, &
Creason, 2014). Furthermore, because of the computer‐
mediated format of advice from algorithms, the emotional
and nonverbal cues that make up many message‐based char-
acteristics, besides competence (such as intention and emo-
tion) are not likely to be salient (Derks, Fischer, & Bos,
2008; Whittaker, 2003). Also, social cues like integrity and
benevolence are likely unimportant for forecasting advice
because most forecasting tasks are not interpersonal in nature
(as opposed to an interpersonal advice situation involving
romantic or career advice).
Therefore, this study will primarily examine advisor
characteristics, rather than message characteristics, in deter-
mining advice utilization, and the study will focus specifi-
cally on perceived advisor competence to investigate the
process of receiving advice from a computer versus a human.
There is a large and developed body of research on interper-
sonal advice. Therefore, we use research on human‐to‐human
advice as a theoretical background, and then examine how
computer‐to‐human advice differs both in advice evaluation,
advisor competence, and advice utilization.
1.3 | Human factors: Automation trust
Although there is far less research on automation–human
advice than interpersonal advice, there is a large and active
research effort to understand human–computer (human–
automation) trust. Fortunately, many trust studies, especially
those concerning forecasting support systems, use methods
analogous to advice studies. For example, studies have exam-
ined a sales team incorporating the output from statistical
forecasting software in their sales projections or supply chain
managers using decision support software to optimize opera-
tions (Asimakopoulos & Dix, 2013; Fildes et al., 2009).
Therefore, these studies examine advice utilization as a proxy
to trust, similar to interpersonal advice research. Because
using another's advice involves making oneself vulnerable to
the advisor, advice utilization is a behavioral measure of trust
(Mayer et al., 1995). For example, research in interpersonal
advice has consistently used advice utilization as a behavioral
measure of trust (Mayer et al., 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol,
2001; Van Swol, 2011; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005).
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
While the forecasting discipline has conducted research
with similar methods to interpersonal advice scholars, the
largest research effort to understand advice between a human
and automation comes from the human factors and ergonom-
ics field (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007b). Literature in this
area is largely concerned with low levels of automation as
opposed to sophisticated predictive or forecasting software.
Examples of low‐level automation include the autopilot in an
aircraft or an automatic reactor monitoring system in a nuclear
power plant. These forms of automation are distinctly different
from something like a forecasting support system or medical
diagnosis aid that provide the human with advice (which we
will henceforth call a judgmental system), as low‐level auto-
mation in ergonomics is simply there to take workload off of
the human and not advise human judgment. A judgmental sys-
tem, on the other hand, is meant to supplement and inform
(and perhaps supersede) human judgment or intuition.
It is still informative to explore the extensive body of
research on human–automation trust to inform hypotheses
for the current study. One overarching theme in human–
automation trust research is that humans generally expect
automation to be “perfect” (i.e., with an error rate of zero),
whereas a human is expected to be imperfect and to make
mistakes. While this perfection may be expected of an auto-
mated safety alert system or a plane autopilot, this is a diffi-
cult principle to apply to a judgmental forecasting system,
as the future outcome is inherently unknowable and neither
a system nor human could achieve perfection. Nevertheless,
the idea that advice recipients may generally utilize automa-
tion advice more than human advice has found support in pre-
vious experimental work (Dijkstra, Liebrand, & Timminga,
1998; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, & Dawe, 2002; Madhavan &
Wiegmann, 2007b). However, this research primarily deals
with lower‐level automation systems. Other research on judg-
mental systems, like forecasting systems, tends to show that
humans are more trusted than computers (Dietvorst et al.,
2015; Önkal et al., 2009). Despite the word “trust” being
used, we are careful only to cite studies that use methods in
which trust is measured behaviorally as advice utilization.
The tasks used in the study in this paper are predictive in
nature, and require the use of a judgmental system. Therefore,
we seek to replicate the findings of forecasting research that
human advice is utilized more than computer advice:
H1. Advice from humans will be utilized more
than advice from computers.
This study compares advice from two different sources
(human or algorithm) in a unique way, because the format
of the advice contains no content besides a numerical predic-
tion. As reviewed above, scholars studying advice from the
“message paradigm” of ART are typically focused on manip-
ulations in the advice message content that change utilization
693
(MacGeorge, 2016). In the study below, there is no variation
in message content, so we expect to see differences in advice
utilization based on qualities that the participant assumes the
advisor has. Furthermore, ART predicts that source charac-
teristics change the perception of message features—but the
proposed study has essentially no message features, at least
in the traditional categories of message characteristics like
supportiveness or politeness. Therefore, interpersonal advice
research lacks insight into how participants evaluate an auto-
mated advisor, but automation trust literature from the human
factors field provides some insight, albeit in regard to non-
judgmental systems, and we review it below.
The perceived competence of an automated aid is
strongly predicted by the automation error rate (e.g., false
positive alerts when there is no problem). Even if a machine
is wrong only a small fraction of the time, there is a tendency
for human decision makers to exaggerate the perceived error
rate of the automation (Dzindolet et al., 2002; Hoff & Bashir,
2015). In the forecasting field, feedback about computer per-
formance is also a large predictor of future use of such judg-
mental systems (Alvarado‐Valencia & Barrero, 2014; Fildes
& Goodwin, 2013). In human factors research, errors cause
a more rapid decline in advice utilization from computers
compared to human advisors (Madhavan & Wiegmann,
2007b). Evidence is weak for any differing effects of perfor-
mance feedback between human advisors and computer advi-
sors for judgmental systems, but we would expect to see the
same trend as in automation research if advice recipients
see that the computer advice was poor. Such a result would
be consistent with the “perfections schema” framework pro-
posed by Madhavan and Wiegmann (2007b), which suggests
that decision makers expect automation to be perfect,
whereas humans are fallible. Thus an error from automation
is not only an error—it is an unexpected error that leads to
harsher “punishment” of the advisor.
H2. After receiving bad advice, participants will
have a larger decline in use of advice from com-
puter advisors than from human advisors.
2 | PS YCH OLOGI CAL PROC ES SES
D R I V I NG AUT O M AT I O N A DV I C E
D I S C O U N T I NG
In addition to advisor characteristics, recipient factors like
emotional reactions and feelings of similarity to the advisor
(MacGeorge et al., 2013) are also important to investigate
because, if humans experience different emotions when
receiving advice from a nonhuman, it can affect differences
in advice utilization. When told that advice is from a human,
people may engage in a parasocial relationship with the advi-
sor, where they imbue the advisor with some of the same
emotions as an actual social relationship (Horton & Wohl,
694
1956; Kumar & Benbasat, 2002). Preliminary research with
fMRI imaging has shown differences in the response of
reward regions of the brain when advice recipients choose
to use the advice of human advisors as opposed to automated
advisors, even when there is no actual relationship between
advisor and recipient (Parasuraman, de Visser, Wiese, &
Madhavan, 2014). In other words, just knowing that advice
came from a human, rather than from a computer, may create
a parasocial relationship between the advisor and advisee that
would not occur with advice from a computer.
Thus, we propose:
H3a. Advice recipients will experience greater
positive emotions when receiving advice from
a human advisor than a computer advisor.
H3b. Advice recipients will experience fewer
negative emotions when receiving advice from
a human advisor than a computer advisor.
Lastly, even if advice recipients were to engage in a
parasocial relationship with a computer advisor, there will
still be a greater sense of similarity with human advisors.
Research on automated sales agents and other forms of auto-
mation such as robots has shown that automated agents are
generally perceived as not having human attributes such as
emotions or intentions (Kahn, Ishiguro, Friedman, & Kanda,
2006). In recent research regarding interaction with robots,
about half of participants considered a robot to be “in‐
between” a living being and a technology, and no respon-
dents stated that the robot was a living being; further, most
respondents reported that the robot could never be an
intimate friend (Kahn et al., 2012):
H4. Advice recipients will report they have
more in common with human advisors than with
computer advisors.
To summarize, we seek to deepen our understanding of
why human or automated advice will be utilized more in a
forecasting situation. We also seek to extend findings from
human factors research to determine if automated forecasting
advice is punished more severely than human forecasting
advice when the advice is of poor quality. Furthermore,
because both human and automated advice will be presented
in identical formats, we aim to identify perceived advisor
characteristics and recipient characteristics that may explain
differences in advice utilization.
3 | METHOD
3.1 | Participants
A total of 160 participants completed the study (computer
advice, n = 91; human advice, n = 69). Participants were
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
undergraduates at a large Midwestern university in the USA
and received extra credit in communication classes for their
participation. Three participants who failed the manipulation
check by stating that the advice was from the incorrect source
were removed—one from the computer condition and two
from the human condition—resulting in a total computer
group n = 90 and human n = 67 (N = 157). The participants
were 75% female in the computer advice condition and 73%
female in the human advice condition; 98% were between
the ages of 18 and 23, with two participants' ages unreported.
3.2 | Task
Participants completed 14 forecasting tasks consisting of a
graph of past data for a variety of issues related to operating
room management in a hospital setting. An example would
be to forecast the mean time an orthopedic surgery would
take 6 months in the future, given a line chart of the past
2 years' worth of monthly mean orthopedic surgery times;
see the Appendix for screenshots of the task. A judgmental
forecasting task was used so results could easily be related
to the large amount of previous research on forecasting
support systems.
Hospital forecasting tasks were used in order to control
for participants having personal intuition for what the out-
comes would be. The assumption was (and checked via
postquestionnaire items) that participants would have little
knowledge of operational research management issues and,
therefore, would only make forecasts based on the data and
advice. Previous studies of stock price forecasting has often
used students enrolled in economics classes, which may lead
to personal bias and underweighting of advice as the partici-
pants consider themselves experts, or the participants have
specific knowledge about the shortcomings of forecasting
support systems (Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, &
Nikolopoulos, 2007; Önkal et al., 2009). This lack of partic-
ipant domain knowledge is a key consideration when contex-
tualizing the findings due to the different ways recipients
utilize advice when they do/do not have domain knowledge
(Lawrence, Goodwin, O'Connor, & Önkal, 2006).
3.3 | Procedure
Participants signed up for the study online. After digitally
signing a consent form, participants read a short introduction
about the types of tasks they would be given. The manipula-
tion was simple and similar to past studies (Dzindolet et al.,
2002; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007a; Önkal et al., 2009).
Participants were told at the opening that the advice would
come from “an advanced computer system,” or “Steven, a
person experienced in operating room management issues.”
We named the human advisor because we felt that making
the advisor a nameless “person” felt unnatural and in any
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
real‐world scenario a decision maker would at least know the
name of their advisor. We settled on the name Steven after
informally asking some colleagues their ideas for generic
human names. In order to incentivize accuracy, participants
were informed that they could win $100 based on their per-
formance if they finished all of the tasks with the lowest
mean percentage error among all participants. There was no
performance history given or implied for either advisor
because performance history may cause participants to start
the experiment with an exaggerated level of trust and
expectations (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007b).
When completing the forecasting tasks, after viewing the
graph of past data, participants first entered an initial forecast
(text entry) and reported their confidence (using a 0–100
“slider” widget) in their assessment. Then the screen
advanced to an “advice” screen in which the advice of either
the human expert or computer forecasting support system
was presented. The advice was presented as both an extended
trend line on the supplied graph of past data as well as a point
forecast format. Participants entered a revised forecast on this
screen and reported their confidence in the revised estimate.
After each task was complete, participants received feed-
back on the accuracy of their forecast. A screen appeared that
showed the absolute percentage error of the participant's
postadvice forecast. Furthermore, the participant's mean
absolute percentage error across all previous revised forecasts
was computed and displayed on the feedback screen in a very
large red font. Participants were reminded on the feedback
screen that the participant with the lowest mean absolute per-
centage error would win $100. Thus it is expected that the
participants will feel some degree of frustration/gratitude if
the advice caused them to decrease/improve their forecast
accuracy.
Participants were walked through the process of making a
forecast and entering their confidence during two “familiari-
zation” forecasts. During this process, directions appeared
on the screen reminding participants of the proper format
for entering forecasts and also directing their attention to
where and when the advice would appear. After the two
“familiarization” forecasts, participants were informed that
the next 14 forecasts would be the ones that counted towards
the competition to win $100. Pilot‐tested advice was used on
the forecasting tasks such that the advice given over the first
five trials was excellent and likely much better than what
advice recipients would estimate alone. For example, for the
third trial, pilot testing revealed that most participants would
forecast a value of about 100, whereas the “correct” forecast
was 105. Thus the given advice was 104, meaning the error
percentage of the advice was far less than most participants
forecast. On the sixth trial, recipients were given advice that
(if they followed it) was very poor and caused their forecast
accuracy and overall chance of winning the $100 to decrease.
For the very poor advice, we also utilized pilot testing to
695
determine where most participants would place their forecast.
We gave advice that was not only worse than the participants'
forecast but actually would pull the participants away from
the correct value, making it so that any utilization of the
advice would make their forecast worse (e.g., in the afore-
mentioned example, the very poor advice would be 95
instead of 104). After this bad advice intervention, advice
returned to being excellent, based on pilot testing, for the
remaining eight trials.
3.4 | Measures
To measure advice utilization, a “SHIFT” variable used in
previous forecasting studies was used to directly compare
human–human versus human–computer advice utilization
(Önkal et al., 2009). We chose to use this measure first to
maximize commonality with previous forecasting research
that used it as a measure of trust and (Önkal et al., 2009) also
because the shift variable is a variant of the “weight of
advice” (WOA) variable commonly used in advice research
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). SHIFT is computed via the
following equation:
Judge revised forecast−Judge initial forecast
Advisor forecast−Judge initial forecast
Although it has been suggested that this variable only be
measured in absolute value and only has a theoretical range
of 0–1, we did not make any adjustments to shift after it
was calculated; this resulted in some negative shift values
being used in analysis. Negative shift values were used
because this study includes an intervention where there is
poor advice given; it is therefore theoretically reasonable to
expect that negative shift values indicate a distrust of the
advisor that goes beyond simply not taking the advice into
account—participants may be actively shifting away from
the advisor.
Confidence was measured after each trial. Asking partic-
ipants for their confidence in the initial and revised forecast is
not entirely consistent with earlier forecasting research,
which asked participants to rate their trust in the advice at
the time of decision (Goodwin et al., 2007; Önkal et al.,
2009). The use of pre‐ and postconfidence ratings is, how-
ever, consistent with advice research that finds a strong rela-
tionship between confidence and trust in advice (Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol, 2009; Van Swol & Sniezek,
2005). Ratings of trust at the time of decision and in
postquestionnaires have not been consistent with actual
advice utilization or a good predictor of advice utilization
in forecasting research (Alvarado‐Valencia & Barrero,
2014). Therefore, this study adopts the confidence measure
because past research has found it is strongly related to
696
advice utilization (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol,
2009).
A postquestionnaire was administered after the forecast-
ing tasks. The questionnaire measured recipient impressions
of feelings or thoughts they have in common with their advi-
sor and their emotions when receiving advice. The survey
was constructed from items from previous advice literature
(MacGeorge et al., 2013; Van Swol et al., 2015). Positive
emotions were measured with six Likert questions on a 1
(not at all) to (5 (extremely) scale for six positive emotions:
Appreciative, Happy, Grateful, Thankful, Satisfied, Glad.
The six questions produced sufficient reliability (α = 0.94),
and the mean was used as an index of positive emotion.
Negative emotions were measured on the same scale, and
four negative emotions were measured: Mad, Frustrated,
Annoyed, Irritated. The four questions produced sufficient
reliability (α = 0.93), and the mean was used as an index of
negative emotion. Feelings in common with the advisor were
measured with a 1–7 Likert question: “I have very little in
common with my advisor.”
4 | RESULTS
Hypothesis 1 posited that human advice would be utilized
more than computer advice. A multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) on all 14 shift scores showed a margin-
ally significant main effect of advisor, F(1, 14) = 1.67,
p = 0.07, η2 = 0.15. Descriptive statistics showed that the
human advice group shifted less (i.e., utilized the advice less)
than the computer advice group (computer group: M = 0.63,
SD = 0.20; human group M = 0.62, SD = 0.21). Indeed, this
seems exceedingly small, and an independent samples t‐test
conducted on the average amount of all shift between condi-
tions was insignificant, t(155) = 0.02, p = 0.99. Means of tri-
als were calculated to test the amount of advice utilization
prior to, during, and after the bad advice intervention. All
three were also insignificant between conditions, (prior to
intervention) t(155) = 0.59, p = 0.56; (during intervention)
t(155) = 0.78, p = 0.44; (after intervention) t(155) = 0.26,
p = 0.79. Hypothesis 1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2 stated that, after receiving bad advice,
advice from computers advisors would be utilized less than
advice from human advisors. Initial evidence for a significant
difference when the poor advice intervention occurred was
evident earlier during the MANOVA for all shifts, as the only
individual trial contrast that was significant was for the
seventh (intervention/postfeedback on bad advice) trial
(p = 0.049). To properly assess this hypothesis, a 14 × 2
repeated‐measures ANOVA was conducted on the 14 shift
values with advisor as a fixed factor. Mauchly's test of sphe-
ricity indicated that the sphericity assumption was violated,
Mauchly's W = 0.178, p < 0.001. Using the Huynh–Feldt
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
adjustment, the repeated‐measures ANOVA indicated a
significant effect of time, F(1, 13) = 9.681, p = 0.002; and
a significant interaction between time and advisor, F(1,
13) = 1.892, p = 0.034. “Repeated” contrasts (repeated con-
trasts test one trial vs. the previous trial) revealed a significant
interaction between time 6 versus 7 and advisor, F(1,
149) = 6.693, p = 0.011. This indicates that the change in
advice utilization between both groups was significantly dif-
ferent after receiving bad advice. By visually inspecting the
graph of estimated marginal means (see Figure 1), it is clear
that between trial 6 and 7 the computer advisor group had a
larger decrease in advice utilization than the human advisor
group. Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Hypothesis 3a stated that advice recipients will experi-
ence greater positive emotions when receiving advice from
a human advisor than a computer advisor. Hypothesis 3b
was similar, suggesting the human advice group would expe-
rience fewer negative emotions. There was no significant dif-
ference between the advisor groups on either positive
emotions, t(155) = −0.779, p = 0.436; or negative emotions,
t(155) = 0.257, p = 0.743. Hypotheses 3a and 3b were not
supported.
Hypothesis 4 stated that participants would rate that they
had more in common with human advisors than computer
advisors. Hypothesis 4 was supported: Participants in the
human advice group reported they had significantly more in
common with their advisor than participants in the computer
advice group, t(155) = −1.935, p = 0.053, d = 0.253 (com-
puter group: M = 4.090, SD = 1.640; human group:
M = 4.470, SD = 1.420). Post hoc analysis did not reveal
any other significant relationships between the “in common
with” question and any other survey question; thus we were
unable to determine to what exactly this feeling of having
something “in common” refers.
5 | DISCUSSION
This study addressed violations of trust when receiving advice
from a nonhuman (computer) or human advisor and percep-
tions of advice from these two different sources. To our
knowledge, this is the first study using a judgmental system
to replicate the automation research finding that recipients
use computer advice much less than human advice immedi-
ately after receiving bad advice. Thus the penalty for automa-
tion violating high expectations was replicated in a forecasting
task with advice from a computer algorithm. Earlier findings
from automation or forecasting research indicating that one
type of advisor is utilized more was not supported; there were
no differences in utilization between type of advisor. Finally,
participants perceived that they had more in common with a
human advisor, despite all factors, besides the label, being
kept constant between the two types of advice.
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
FIGURE 1 Advice utilization decrease
after receiving bad advice from advisor
(trials 6 and 7)
5.1 | Reactions to bad advice
It is unclear what aspect of computer advice is driving the
larger decrease in computer advisor advice utilization com-
pared to human advice when the recipient is presented with
poor advice. Although we urge caution in using automation
research to inform research on judgmental systems, the idea
of the “perfection schema” may be applicable here
(Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007b). The perfection schema
states that advice recipients generally expect automated advi-
sors to be perfect, and when they commit an error this feels
especially negative to the advice recipient and they lose trust
rapidly in the advisor. On the other hand, errors from human
advisors are expected because humans are imperfect; thus
advice recipients are not surprised by a human advisor error
and are more likely to give the human advisor another
chance. While technically there cannot be a “perfection”
schema in our study given that the system forecasted future
performance that is unknowable and impossible to perfectly
predict, participants may have expected a more consistent
amount of accuracy (or error) from the computer advisor,
especially if recipients assumed the computer was following
a statistical algorithm. When that consistency was broken,
participants reacted by “avoiding” the automation with
greater decrements in advice utilization. Human advisors,
on the other hand, might have been expected to be inconsis-
tent with the accuracy of their advice. An alternative explana-
tion for the decreased utilization of the computer advice may
be that participants did not necessarily have different initial
expectations, but saw an error by the automation as indicative
of a fundamental flaw that would be certain to reoccur,
whereas they expect that humans have the ability to notice
their error and then correct themselves so as to improve
future performance.
697
This is an important area for future research in both auto-
mation and judgmental forecasting research, especially as
more judgmental systems and algorithms make their way into
our personal and professional lives. Forecasting‐support sys-
tems are no longer just aiding humans in routine stock price
or product inventory forecasting—they are also being used
in very high consequence domains, such as forecasting med-
ical outcomes. Even self‐driving cars or other forms of tech-
nological driver assistance use large amounts of data to
predict uncertain future states and make decisions based on
those forecasts. Thus understanding how human decision
makers react to advice that comes from such automation is
critical, especially understanding reactions to bad advice;
after all, no system can be perfect all of the time. By under-
standing some of the causes of inappropriate disuse of auto-
mation, we not only advance our understanding of
forecasting‐support system use, but also we gain insights
about broader human tendencies when using related technol-
ogies. Will a doctor begin to distrust a helpful forecasting
system due to one poor forecast? Will drivers ever be able
to trust an autonomous car that does something unexpected?
Understanding the psychology of human decision makers
when interacting with automation also uncovers potential
theoretical explanations for trust in forecasting systems. For
example, Ring's (1996) concept of fragile and resilient trust
suggests that people's trust in human advice may be more
resilient when they are provided with bad advice because
people have a long history with human advisors, but trust
in automation and algorithms may be more fragile because
people have less experience from which to make generaliza-
tions, so one bad example is more salient. Decision makers
may also interact with automated systems with fundamentally
different expectations than when interacting with humans
(Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007b). Moving forward, we
698
encourage researchers to continue to study differing reactions
of advice between humans and automation and additionally
examine whether trust restoration differs for automated
advice. Finally, our results in this study are limited in that
they may only be generalized to domains in which trust
may be measured behaviorally via advice utilization.
Although this measure of trust is commonly used in automa-
tion and forecasting research (e.g., Hoff & Bashir, 2015;
Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007a; Önkal et al., 2009), it may
not be applicable to other conceptualizations of trust such
as self‐reported “stated” trust (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2013)
or situations in which a human decision maker does not
receive advice from an automated system (such as fully
autonomous systems). Going forward, researchers should
carefully choose the operationalization of trust as to
maximize the generalizability of their findings and their
contribution to the overall trust literature.
5.2 | Differences in utilization based on
advisor
Earlier forecasting research that used a very similar method to
ours and almost identical tasks found that human advice
generally is utilized more than computer advice (Önkal
et al., 2009), but we did not replicate this finding. This study
used a sample that had no knowledge of forecasting methods
and strategy, and this difference from previous research may
explain the failure to replicate. In Önkal et al. (2009), the
participants were students in a forecasting and economic
related field and could have been educated on the pitfalls or
weaknesses of statistical computer forecasting. An additional
reason may be that our study included performance feedback
after each individual trial. This aspect of our design was
required so that participants would be aware that the advice
they received was good or bad before proceeding to the
subsequent trial, but this aspect also limits comparisons to
previous studies that did not include performance feedback
after each trial.
A possible theoretical explanation for our failure to repli-
cate some previous studies is provided by ART. ART sug-
gests that impressions of the advisor are largely formed
through message characteristics (Feng & MacGeorge,
2010), and there was no variation on message characteristics
in this study, which could account for the lack of differences
in utilization of advice from a human or computer. The
aspects highlighted above suggest that for researchers going
forward sample characteristics, performance feedback, and
message factors are important variables that can increase or
limit comparisons to previous work.
This study also highlights the need to be careful when
using human–automation trust research to inform an under-
standing of judgmental systems that operate at a high level
of automation. We replicated some findings from previous
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
human factors (the perfection schema) research but failed to
observe others, such as automation being trusted more during
the initial trials. Therefore, we suggest that judgmental
systems are not only qualitatively different but also must be
studied as a different type of advisor than lower, simpler
forms of automation like signal detection software.
5.3 | Perception of advisor
Recipients reported that they had more in common with the
human advisor, but there were no significant differences in
the emotional reactions to receiving either type of advice.
Given that the advice was given over the computer and not
face‐to‐face from a human, it may have lacked enough emo-
tional and social cues (Walther, 1996) to elicit a strong affec-
tive response from recipients. Alternatively, the affective
elements of trust and advice utilization take time to develop
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), and there may simply
have not been enough trials for recipients to develop a rela-
tionship with the advisor. Although introducing face‐to‐face
or synchronous mediated communication between a human
advisor and advice recipient would introduce many potential
confounds, doing so would simulate how advice is received
in natural settings and present an opportunity to see how
the relationship between advisor and advisee develops
differently between human and computer advisors.
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the fairly weak
manipulation and mediated format of the advice, recipients
were cognizant of whether their advisor was a human or a
computer. Recipients reported that they had more in common
with the human than the computer advisor. Although it is
admittedly vague (what is it recipients feel they have “in com-
mon”?), this perception has the potential—if further studied
—to explain differences in advice utilization. If it is a shared
sense of humanity that recipients perceive, this would have
large implications for areas such as medical advice, where
perceived advisor morality is of great concern (Berner &
Maisiak, 1999; Hoffman, 2003). We hoped that the item mea-
suring feelings in common with the advisor would correlate
with other survey measures and therefore give us a more
complete answer to Hypothesis 4 but no analyses indicated
a significant relationship. Furthermore, this study lacked
any form of open‐ended questions or exit interview, so we
could not determine what the “in common” feeling is. This
is a limitation in the current study but represents an important
research question that scholars should address in future
research.
People today are encountering judgmental advice systems
in highly consequential contexts—from the doctor's office to
online dating websites which all have proprietary “matching”
algorithms. Two decades ago, it was hardly fathomable that
computers would be matching ideal marriage “partners” on
dating websites, influencing our reading choices, or
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
suggesting what movie we would enjoy most (Van Swol,
2011). Advice from computer algorithms and forecasting
systems is only likely to increase in the next decade (Tetlock
& Gardner, 2015), and understanding how people trust, uti-
lize, and perceive this advice, especially when it disappoints,
is imperative to encouraging high‐quality decision making.
R E F E RENC E S
Alvarado‐Valencia, J. A., & Barrero, L. H. (2014). Reliance, trust and
heuristics in judgmental forecasting. Computers in Human
Behavior, 36, 102–113. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2014.03.047
Asimakopoulos, S., & Dix, A. (2013). Forecasting support systems
technologies‐in‐practice: A model of adoption and use for product
forecasting. International Journal of Forecasting, 29(2), 322–336.
doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2012.11.004
Berner, E. S., & Maisiak, R. S. (1999). Influence of case and physician
characteristics on perceptions of decision support systems. Journal
of the American Medical Informatics Association, 6(5), 428–434.
Bonaccio, S., & Dalal, R. S. (2006). Advice taking and decision‐
making: An integrative literature review, and implications for the
organizational sciences. Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 101(2), 127–151. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.07.001
Dawes, R. M. (1979). The robust beauty of improper linear models in
decision making. American Psychologist, 34(7), 571–582.
doi:10.1037/0003‐066X.34.7.571
Derks, D., Fischer, A. H., & Bos, A. E. R. (2008). The role of emotion in
computer‐mediated communication: A review. Computers in
Human Behavior, 24(3), 766–785. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2007.04.004
Dietvorst, B. J., Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2015). Algorithm aver-
sion: People erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(1), 114–126.
doi:10.1037/xge0000033
Dietvorst, B. J., Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2016). Overcoming algo-
rithm aversion: People will use imperfect algorithms if they can
(even slightly) modify them (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID
2616787). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2616787
Dijkstra, J. J., Liebrand, W. B. G., & Timminga, E. (1998). Persuasive-
ness of expert systems. Behaviour & Information Technology, 17(3),
155–163. doi:10.1080/014492998119526
Dzindolet, M. T., Pierce, L. G., Beck, H. P., & Dawe, L. A. (2002). The
perceived utility of human and automated aids in a visual detection
task. Human Factors, 44(1), 79–94. doi:10.1518/0018720024494856
Esmaeilzadeh, P., Sambasivan, M., Kumar, N., & Nezakati, H. (2015).
Adoption of clinical decision support systems in a developing coun-
try: Antecedents and outcomes of physician's threat to perceived
professional autonomy. International Journal of Medical
Informatics, 84(8), 548–560. doi:10.1016/j.ijmedinf.2015.03.007
Feng, B., & Feng, H. (2013). Examining cultural similarities and differ-
ences in responses to advice: A comparison of American and
Chinese college students. Communication Research, 40(5),
623–644. doi:10.1177/0093650211433826
699
Feng, B., & MacGeorge, E. L. (2010). The influences of message and
source factors on advice outcomes. Communication Research,
37(4), 553–575. doi:10.1177/0093650210368258
Fildes, R., & Goodwin, P. (2013). Forecasting support systems: What
we know, what we need to know. International Journal of
Forecasting, 29(2), 290–294. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2013.01.001
Fildes, R., Goodwin, P., Lawrence, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2009).
Effective forecasting and judgmental adjustments: An empirical
evaluation and strategies for improvement in supply‐chain planning.
International Journal of Forecasting, 25(1), 3–23. doi:10.1016/j.
ijforecast.2008.11.010
Gefen, D., Karahanna, E., & Straub, D. W. (2003). Trust and TAM in
online shopping: An integrated model. MIS Quarterly, 27(1), 51–90.
Goodwin, P., Fildes, R., Lawrence, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2007). The
process of using a forecasting support system. International Journal
of Forecasting, 23(3), 391–404. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2007.05.016
Goodwin, P., Gönül, M., & Önkal, D. (2013). Antecedents and effects of
trust in forecasting advice. International Journal of Forecasting,
29(2), 354–366. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2012.08.001
Hoff, K. A., & Bashir, M. (2015). Trust in automation: Integrating
empirical evidence on factors that influence trust. Human Factors,
57(3), 407–434. doi:10.1177/0018720814547570
Hoffman, S. (2003). Unmanaged care: Towards moral fairness in health
care coverage. Indiana Law Journal, 78(2), 659–721.
Horton, D., & Wohl, R. (1956). Mass communication and para-social
interaction; Observations on intimacy at a distance. Psychiatry,
19(3), 215–229.
Inthorn, J., Tabacchi, M. E., & Seising, R. (2015). Having the
final say: Machine support of ethical decisions of doctors.
In S. P. V. Rysewyk, & M. Pontier (Eds.), Machine Medical Ethics
(pp. 181–206). Berlin, Germany: Springer Retrieved from http://
link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978‐3‐319‐08108‐3_12
Jodlbauer, B., & Jonas, E. (2011). Forecasting clients' reactions: How
does the perception of strategic behavior influence the acceptance
of advice? International Journal of Forecasting, 27(1), 121–133.
doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.05.008
Kahn, P. H., Ishiguro, H., Friedman, B., & Kanda, T. (2006). What is a
human? Toward psychological benchmarks in the field of human–
robot interaction. In 15th IEEE International Symposium on Robot
and Human Interactive Communication, 2006 (pp. 364–371).
doi:10.1109/ROMAN.2006.314461
Kahn, P. H., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., Gill, B. T., Ruckert, J. H., Shen, S.,
… Severson, R. L. (2012). Do people hold a humanoid robot mor-
ally accountable for the harm it causes? In 2012 7th ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human–Robot Interaction (HRI)
(pp. 33–40).
Kumar, N., & Benbasat, I. (2002). Para‐Social presence and communi-
cation capabilities of a web site: A theoretical perspective.
E‐Service Journal, 1(3), 5–24.
Lawrence, M., Goodwin, P., O'Connor, M., & Önkal, D. (2006). Judg-
mental forecasting: A review of progress over the last 25 years.
International Journal of Forecasting, 22(3), 493–518.
doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2006.03.007
700
MacGeorge, E. L. (2016). Advice: Expanding the communication para-
digm. Annals of the International Communication Association, 40,
213–243.
MacGeorge, E. L., Guntzviller, L. M., Hanasono, L. K., & Feng, B.
(2013). Testing advice response theory in interactions with friends.
Communication Research, 43(2), 211–231. doi:10.1177/
0093650213510938
Madhavan, P., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2007a). Effects of information
source, pedigree, and reliability on operator interaction with
decision support systems. Human Factors, 49(5), 773–785.
doi:10.1518/001872007X230154
Madhavan, P., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2007b). Similarities and differences
between human–human and human–automation trust: An
integrative review. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 8(4),
277–301. doi:10.1080/14639220500337708
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative
model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review,
20(3), 709–734. doi:10.5465/AMR.1995.9508080335
Meehl, P. E. (1954). Clinical versus statistical prediction: A theoretical
analysis and a review of the evidence. Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minnesota Press.
Önkal, D., Goodwin, P., Thomson, M., Gönül, M., & Pollock, A.
(2009). The relative influence of advice from human experts and sta-
tistical methods on forecast adjustments. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 22(4), 390–409. doi:10.1002/bdm.637
Parasuraman, R., de Visser, E., Wiese, E., & Madhavan, P. (2014, Octo-
ber). Human trust in other humans, automation, robots, and
cognitive agents: Neural correlates and design implications. Pro-
ceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual
Meeting, 58(1), Chicago, IL, 340–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1541931214581070
Paravastu, N., Gefen, D., & Creason, S. B. (2014). Understanding trust
in IT artifacts: An evaluation of the impact of trustworthiness and
trust on satisfaction with antiviral software. SIGMIS Database,
45(4), 30–50. doi:10.1145/2691517.2691520
Prahl, A., Dexter, F., Braun, M. T., & Van Swol, L. (2013). Review of
experimental studies in social psychology of small groups when an
optimal choice exists and application to operating room
management decision‐making. Anesthesia & Analgesia, 117(5),
1221–1229. doi:10.1213/ANE.0b013e3182a0eed1
Ring, P. S. (1996). Fragile and resilient trust and their roles in economic
exchange. Business & Society, 35(2), 148–175. https://doi.org/
10.1177/000765039603500202
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An integrative
model of organizational trust: Past, present, and future. Academy
of Management Review, 32(2), 344–354. doi:10.2307/20159304
Schrah, G. E., Dalal, R. S., & Sniezek, J. A. (2006). No decision‐maker
is an island: Integrating expert advice with information acquisition.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(1), 43–60.
doi:10.1002/bdm.514
Sniezek, J. A., Schrah, G. E., & Dalal, R. S. (2004). Improving judge-
ment with prepaid expert advice. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 17(3), 173–190. doi:10.1002/bdm.468
Sniezek, J. A., & Van Swol, L. (2001). Trust, confidence, and expertise
in a judge–advisor system. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 84(2), 288–307. doi:10.1006/obhd.2000.2926
Tetlock, P. E., & Gardner, D. (2015). Superforecasting: The Art and
Science of Prediction. New York, NY: Crown.
Van Swol, L. (2009). The effects of confidence and advisor motives on
advice utilization. Communication Research, 36(6), 857–873.
doi:10.1177/0093650209346803
Van Swol, L. (2011). Forecasting another's enjoyment versus giving the
right answer: Trust, shared values, task effects, and confidence in
improving the acceptance of advice. International Journal of Fore-
casting, 27(1), 103–120. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.03.002
Van Swol, L. M., & Sniezek, J. A. (2005). Factors affecting the accep-
tance of expert advice. British Journal of Social Psychology,
44(3), 443–461. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466604X17092
Van Swol, L., MacGeorge, E. L., & Prahl, A. (2015). The effects of
advice solicitation, confidence, and expertise on advice utilization.
Presented at the International Communication Association Confer-
ence, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Walther, J. B. (1996). Computer‐mediated communication impersonal,
interpersonal, and hyperpersonal interaction. Communication
Research, 23(1), 3–43. doi:10.1177/009365096023001001
Whittaker, S. (2003). Theories and methods in mediated communica-
tion. In A. Graesser, M. Gernsbacher, & S. Goldman (Eds.), The
handbook of discourse processes (pp. 253–293). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
How to cite this article: Prahl A, Van Swol L.
Understanding algorithm aversion: When is advice
from automation discounted?. Journal of Forecasting.
2017;36:691–702. https://doi.org/10.1002/for.2464
PRAHL AND VAN SWOL 701

A P P E N D IX SC R E E N S H O T S O F FO R E CA ST ING TA S K
702 PRAHL AND VAN SWOL

After entering an initial forecast, advice is given.

Finally, error is shown before moving to the next trial.