The Dynamics of Intuition and Analysis in Managerial and Organizational Decision Making

THE DYNAMICS OF INTUITION AND ANALYSIS IN MANAGERIAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING
Gerard P. Hodgkinson
University of Manchester, UK
(gerard.hodgkinson@manchester.ac.uk)
Eugene Sadler-Smith
University of Surrey, UK
(e.sadler-smith@surrey.ac.uk)
1
ABSTRACT
This article contributes to the growing body of research and scholarship in management
and organization studies (MOS) concerning the dynamics and impact of conscious and
nonconscious cognitive processes on individual and collective behavior in the workplace. Dual-
process theories have occupied the center ground of this literature. However, in recent years, the
field of psychology, in which these theories originated, has differentiated two fundamentally
different categories of dual-process theory—default-interventionist and parallel-competitive.
These alternative conceptions are predicated on incommensurable assumptions but MOS
researchers are seemingly oblivious of this important distinction, risking the development of a
body of work that is fundamentally incoherent, being predicated on psychological foundations
that are untenable. Whereas default-interventionist accounts have tended to dominate MOS, we
argue that parallel-competitive formulations offer a more nuanced and realistic depiction of
organizational decision makers, as thinking and feeling beings, as reliant on inspiration and the
skillful management of emotion and intuition, as on cold, calculative cognition. We explore the
implications of our arguments for multiple streams of research, spanning strategic management,
entrepreneurship, organizational behavior, and human resource management, united by the desire
to explicate more comprehensively the behavioral microfoundations and neural substrates of
managerial and organizational decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years managerial and organizational cognition (MOC) researchers have devoted
increasing attention to the study of ‘nonconscious’ processes (Pratt & Crosina, 2016), in a
concerted attempt to unpack the inner workings of the ‘intuitive mind’ (Sadler-Smith, 2010),
with a view to understanding its attendant impact on individual and collective behavior in the
workplace (see, e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007; Healey, Vuori, & Hodgkinson, 2015; Sadler-Smith &
Shefy, 2004; Salas et al. 2010) and identifying the competency requirements that will enable
organizations to thrive in this period of unprecedented economic and social change (Hodgkinson
& Healey, 2011; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; Miller & Ireland, 2005). Across a diverse range
of management and organization studies (MOS) subfields, from strategic management
(Hodgkinson et al., 2009a) and entrepreneurship (Baldacchino, Ucbasaran, Cabantous, &
Lockett, 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2015), to organizational behavior (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012)
and human resource management (Sadler-Smith, 2016), scholars have variously challenged
conventional wisdom (e.g. Hodgkinson et al., 2008, 2009a; Sadler-Smith, 2010), posited new
theory (e.g. Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2016; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Healey, Vuori, &
Hodgkinson, 2015; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011), and advanced new research methods and
empirical findings (e.g. Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012; Hodgkinson et al., 2009b; Huang &
Pearce, 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2016; Sinclair, 2011; Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014). Given
the scale of these developments, the time is ripe for a critical analysis and appraisal of the
literature in order to render these more recent, but hitherto disparately located advances,
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accessible to a broader readership, and highlight what we consider to be the major conceptual,
theoretical, empirical, and methodological challenges that lie ahead. To that end, the present
article is aimed at readers with a general interest in reasoning, judgment, and social cognition,
spanning the aforementioned subfields of MOS. Our primary goal is to offer a succinct overview
of recent advances in a manner that will provoke a reconsideration of theoretical conceptions that
have hitherto dominated the research domains encompassed by our review.
Our review centers on recent advances in dual-process theories of reasoning, judgment,
and social cognition, and their attendant implications for advancing understanding of MOC. One
issue in particular that has occupied the center ground of this body of work is the interplay
between intuition and analysis in reasoning, judgment, decision making, and social cognition
(Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012; Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007;
Hodgkinson et al., 2009a) and it is this issue that forms the focus of this article.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that managerial and organizational decision
making are inherently complex, multilevel processes, influenced variously by a host of
contingent intra, inter-, and extra-personal factors that lay beyond the scope of this review (for
comprehensive overviews see Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; Hodgkinson & Starbuck, 2008).
Reflecting this complexity, the “microfoundations movement” in strategy and organization
theory (Barney & Felin, 2013; Foss, 2011; Felin & Foss, 2005; Gavetti, 2005; Teece, 2007) has
gathered momentum over the past decade, a major development that “broadens micro research
because it places an emphasis on not just individuals, but individuals in particular macro
contexts: firms, organizations, institutions, and markets” (Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015, P. 599).
In so doing, a fundamental aim of this body of work is to enrich understanding of work-related
behavior on a more systemic basis, circumventing the twin ontological dangers of reductionism
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and reification (Healey &Hodgkinson, 2014). Against this backdrop, the dual-process theories at
the center of our review are playing an increasingly prominent role in explicating the
microfoundational mechanisms that variously support and impede individual, team, and
organizational functioning and effectiveness (cf. Healey & Hodgkinson, 2017; Healey, Vuori, &
Hodgkinson, 2015; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011, 2014; Teece, 2007).
The pivotal development to be explored in this article is the rise in the field of human
psychology of two distinctive classes of dual-process theories, namely, ‘default-interventionist’
(e.g. Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West 2000) and
‘parallel-competitive’ (e.g. Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, 2000, 2007; Sloman, 1996, 2002) theories,
first highlighted in psychology by Evans (2007, 2008). To the extent that MOS researchers are
oblivious of the importance of this crucial development, there is a risk that they might conflate
these distinctive theoretical perspectives, resulting in a body of work that is conceptually
incoherent and psychologically untenable.
The article is structured as follows. Following this short introduction, the second section
outlines what, in general, dual-process theories seek to accomplish. It then reviews what we
consider to be the most salient recent conceptual debates and advances pertaining to dual-process
theories, focusing in particular on the distinction between default-interventionist and parallel-
competitive accounts of dual-processing (e.g. Evans, 2007, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013) and
explains the fundamental significance of this crucial distinction for MOS. In the third section the
central tenets of default-interventionist and parallel-competitive accounts of dual-processing are
explored in terms of important exemplars (heuristics and biases research in the case of default-
interventionist accounts, and Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and selected developments in
social cognitive neuroscience (SCN) in the case of parallel-competitive accounts) and their
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theoretical and practical significance for MOS are critically appraised. The fourth section
considers the implications of our critical assessment for the future development and testing of
MOS theory and outlines methodological challenges that will need to be confronted in order to
meet the multidisciplinary agenda envisaged. The fifth and final section outlines our
conclusions.
DUAL-PROCESS THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY: ORIGINS, BASIC CONCEPTS, KEY
DEBATES, AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In view of the well-documented information processing constraints arising from the
cognitive limitations of human decision makers (Simon, 1956), information overload and
decision making under uncertainty pose a potentially serious challenge for organizations (Cyert
& March, 1963; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hodgkinson & Starbuck, 2008; March & Simon,
1958; Walsh, 1995). Left unchecked, such overload and uncertainties can result variously in
“paralysis by analysis” and “extinction by instinct” (Langley, 1995, p. 63). Two sorts of
cognitive competency (Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002) or capability (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) are
required to deal with this fundamental problem. Analytical skills are needed in order to process
detail, while a second, complementary set of skills is required to enable decision makers to
monitor the ‘bigger picture’ in a more holistic fashion, thereby mitigating the risks associated
with over-reliance on ‘instinct’ and ‘analysis’ respectively (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007;
Langley, 1995; Louis & Sutton, 1991).
Cognitive (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1989; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977) and social (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) psychology has long recognized
the importance of this twin imperative of having to process information deliberatively and in
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detail, but also being able to cut through such detail with minimal cognitive effort in order to
perform tasks more efficiently. Accordingly, dual-process theories of reasoning, judgment, and
social cognition have emerged in an attempt to account for the ways in which this duality of
processing is skillfully accomplished (for representative examples, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans, 2003, 2007; Sloman, 1996; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000; Stanovich & West, 2000). This duality was captured succinctly by Evans
(2003) when he referred to it metaphorically as “two minds in one brain” (p. 454). These ‘two
minds’ developed at different stages in human phylogeny: the “old (intuitive) mind” comprises
an autonomous set of sub-systems—sometimes referred to as ‘the autonomous set of sub-
systems’ (TASS) that evolved relatively early in human evolution, while the “new (reflective)
mind” is a powerful general purpose reasoning system that “evolved recently and is distinctly
human” (Evans, 2010, p. 316). Table 1 summarizes the various distinctions drawn by
psychologists between the two systems.
__________________
Insert Table 1 here
__________________
Management intuition researchers, almost without exception, have seized on the
architecture of dual-process—also known as ‘dual-systems’ (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002)—
theory to explain intuition’s role in a wide variety of organizational decision processes (see, e.g.,
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Dane & Pratt, 2007, 2009; Pratt & Crosina, 2016; Salas et al., 2009).1 Although dual-process
theories come in a number of forms and “flavors” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 51)—as
illustrated in Table 1—they share the core assumption that human information processing is
accomplished in two dissimilar but complementary ways: a level of processing that lies largely
beyond conscious awareness and control (i.e. automatic processing), and a deeper level of
processing that lies within the realms of conscious awareness and control (i.e. controlled
processing). Automatic processing enables individuals to cut rapidly and effortlessly through
large quantities of information, whereas controlled processing entails detailed analysis and is
volitional in nature.
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) first advanced the basic notions of controlled and automatic
processing (which they referred to as a “2-process theory”, p. 1) in the study of automatic
1 There are, of course, some high profile exceptions. For example, the work of Gigerenzer and colleagues deviates
markedly from the dual-process view, maintaining that: (a) intuitive processing and deliberative processing are both
rule-based; (b) a common set of rules underpin intuition and deliberation; and (c) the important question is one of
rule selection (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). This ‘fast-and-frugal heuristics’ stream of research aligns with a
single-system view. For a succinct and compelling contestation of Gigerenzer and colleagues’ perspective see
Kahneman (2011, pp. 457-458, endnote 99). A related body of work in the field of Naturalistic Decision Making
(NDM), epitomized by the work of Klein and colleagues (e.g., Klein et al., 2010), views intuition as a process based
on comparisons of the situation at hand with stored expertise-based repertoires, acquired over many years of
experience. Again, this perspective, known as ‘recognition-primed decision making’ (RPD), is predicated on a
conception of information processing which is at variance with the dual-processing theories that form the focus of
the present article (for an overview and accompanying critiques, see Hodgkinson & Healey 2008; Hodgkinson et al.,
2008; Salas et al., 2010).
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detection and controlled search (see also Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Over the four decades that
have elapsed since the publication of Schneider and Shiffrin’s proposals for a general
automatic/controlled framework for the analysis of human information processing, the number of
dual-process theories has risen markedly, as researchers across all the major branches of human
psychology (pure and applied) have sought to build on the insights of this foundational work as a
basis for explicating the basic processes underpinning reasoning, judgment, and social cognition,
and to inform interventions with a view to enhancing those processes in varying contexts of
application (for selected overviews see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008; Evans & Frankish,
2009; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008; Lieberman,
2007; Stanovich & West, 2000).
Such is the overall degree of similarity among many—but by no means all—of the theories
comprising this body of work (illustrated selectively in Table 1) that Stanovich (1999), in order
not to show a preference for any one particular theory, introduced the overarching nomenclature
of ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ (see also Stanovich & West, 2000). Unfortunately, however, as
illustrated in Table 1, construct proliferation ensued and has continued apace, thereby violating
the fundamental scientific principle of elegance and parsimony. Given the confusion and
redundancy of terms that has inevitably arisen, Evans and Stanovich (2013) recently called on
researchers to abandon the System 1-System 2 (i.e. dual-systems) distinction with immediate
effect, favoring instead the earlier, more general distinction between Type 1 and Type 2
processes (i.e. dual-types).
__________________
Insert Table 2 here
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__________________
Table 2 summarizes the essential similarities and differences between ‘dual-systems’ and
‘dual-types’. At root, the reason Evans and Stanovich (2013) have shifted back in favor of types
over systems is that:
“First, the term dual systems is ambiguous as it can sometimes act as a
synonym for a two minds hypothesis but has been used by other authors
to convey little more than a distinction between two types of
processing… Second, this terminology may appear to suggest that
exactly two systems underlie the two forms of processing, which is a
stronger assumption than most theorists wish to make. For these reasons,
we both have recently discontinued and discouraged the use of the labels
System 1 and 2...we both have recently reverted to the older terminology
of Type 1 and 2 processing. These terms indicate qualitatively distinct
forms of processing but allow that multiple cognitive or neural systems
may underlie them.” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, pp. 224-226)
In keeping with this logic, in the remainder of this article, we ourselves will adopt the more
appropriate terminology of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Furthermore, as outlined in Table 2, a
second important distinction has arisen in the psychological literature over recent years, namely,
the aforementioned distinction at the center of the present article between ‘default-
interventionist’ and ‘parallel-competitive’ variants of dual-process theory (Evans, 2007, 2008).
The crux of this distinction centers on the crucial question regarding the interplay of Type 1 and
Type 2 processes in reasoning, judgment, and social cognition and, as far as the main purpose of
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this article is concerned, the dynamics of these fundamental processes in the accomplishment of
intuitive judgment and decision making in managerial work.
Default interventionist theories (e.g., Evans, 2007; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002;
Stanovich & West, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) are predicated on the assumption that a
basic default position in human information processing is to rely on less costly Type 1 processes,
so as to conserve the scarce cognitive resources required for Type 2 processes, deploying the
latter only as and when essential (see also, Kahneman, 2011). In other words, volitional (i.e.
controlled) Type 2 processes may or may not intervene on default (automatic) Type 1 processes,
dependent on the demands and requirements of the task at hand, relative to the processing
capacity of the decision maker. Parallel-competitive accounts (e.g. Barbey & Sloman, 2007;
Epstein, 1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj & Heier, 1996; Sloman, 1996;
Smith & DeCoster, 2000), in contrast, assume that Type 1 and Type 2 processes operate in
parallel, and, in the event of conflicts between them, they literally compete for the control of
thinking and behavior.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: RE-
THEORIZING THE ROLE OF INTUITION AND ANALYSIS
Having set out the background conceptual controversies and advances in dual-process
theories that have arisen in psychology over recent years, we turn now to illustrate their attendant
implications for MOS, highlighting selectively how an appreciation of these key developments is
beginning to challenge and transform extant MOC theory and research. In the field of
psychology the jury is still out regarding the relative merits of default-interventionist and
parallel-competitive accounts, the advocates of each theoretical approach (and their detractors)
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seeking to defend their respective positions on the basis of the overall weight of behavioral,
neurological, and psychometric evidence (see, e.g., Alos-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Barr et al., 2017;
Elqayam, 2009; Evans, 2008; Epstein, 1994; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Gurcay & Baron, 2017;
Lieberman, 2007; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Nevertheless, the importance of this distinction
and its attendant implications for the advancement of MOC theory and research are far reaching,
and the fact that MOS researchers have, in the main, been largely insensitive to it is a significant
shortcoming that needs to be addressed.
As noted recently by Pratt and Crosina (2016), and illustrated abundantly in Table 1, the
number of dual-process theories in psychology is now considerable, each characterized by its
own particular assumptions. Accordingly, at minimum, MOS researchers need to be clear about
which particular perspective on dual-process theory they are adopting in a given piece of work
(default-interventionist or parallel-competitive) and defend it accordingly when operationalizing
their empirical work.
In MOS intuition has been defined in a variety of ways (for a historical overview, see
Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012) and many of the definitions that guided earlier work in
psychology and MOS alike are incompatible with more recent conceptions. One reason for this
incompatibility, we suggest, is that earlier work was predicated on the psychological foundations
of default-interventionist accounts of dual-process theory that are incommensurate with parallel-
competitive alternatives, as outlined in the previous section. We now turn to a more detailed
consideration of the default-interventionist, parallel-competitive distinction and its significance
for advancing understanding of judgment and decision making in managerial work.
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The influence of default-interventionist theories in MOS: Heuristics and biases in
organizational decision making
In this section we explicate the strengths and limitations of default-interventionist accounts
of dual-processing in MOS with reference to the highly influential heuristics and biases research
program. Instigated in the 1970s by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, this body of work,
concerned primarily with the study of intuitive errors in judgments of probability (Gilovich et al.,
2002), was arguably the seminal contribution to the (then) emergent field of behavioral decision
theory (BDT) (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977).2 It is, predicated on the following
principles, which are in essence default-interventionist:
1. Heuristic, and seemingly correct, judgments emanate quickly and
effortlessly from Type 1 processing;
2. Slower and more effortful analytical reasoning (i.e. Type 2) processes may
intervene to endorse, correct, or override Type 1 processes (Evans, 2007;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002);
3. Usually, however, Type 2 processes do not intervene; hence, errors and
biases accrue. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called
2 In recognition of the achievements of this work, in 2002 Kahneman was awarded a Nobel prize for “having
integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and
decision-making under uncertainty” (Tversky passed away in 1996). This body of work and its development is
reviewed in depth and commented on elsewhere (e.g. Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Lewis, 2016); here we
summarize briefly its salient features with specific reference to dual-processing.
13
intuitive “if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without much
modification” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 51).
To summarize, according to this perspective, intuitions are thoughts and preferences that
come to mind quickly and automatically, emanate from the adoption of Type 1 processing
heuristics, and are retained without much reflection or modification by Type 2 processes
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). A potential downside consequence of this arrangement, is that
an excessive reliance on Type 1 processing heuristics per se can result in an accrual of
systematic errors and biases, exemplified by the representativeness heuristic (focusing on only
‘what is typical,’ resulting in a representativeness bias), the availability heuristic (focusing on
‘what comes easily to mind,’ resulting in an availability bias), and the adjustment and anchoring
heuristic (misdirecting attention disproportionately on ‘what happens to come first’) (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
The heuristics and biases program of research favored a skeptical attitude toward intuitive
judgment and its influence soon reached well beyond the confines of psychology laboratories,
with applications across the full spectrum of the social and behavioral sciences. MOS
researchers writ large adopted this body of work as a foundation for analyzing, and intervening
in, strategic decision processes (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barnes, 1984; Busenitz &
Barney,1997; Das & Teng, 1999; Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; Keh,
Foo & Lim, 2002; Maule & Hodgkinson, 2002; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000; Schwenck,
1986, 1988; Stubbart, 1989; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001) and organizational decision
processes more generally (Bazerman, 1984; Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Hodgkinson & Starbuck,
2008; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). In short, mainstream MOS intuition research became default-
interventionist by default, so to speak.

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A considerable volume of work in the field of strategic management has demonstrated that
many of the biases identified in the heuristics and biases program of research are highly
applicable in the context of strategic decision making in work organizations (see, e.g., Barnes,
1984; Das & Teng, 1999; Maule & Hodgkinson, 2002; Schwenck, 1984). As observed by
Schwenk (1984), different biases tend to come to the fore d uring different stages of the decision
process. For instance, early on, when identifying the problem at hand, individuals seek
information that confirms their initial beliefs. When generating alternatives they use these
beliefs to anchor or restrain their judgments. Feelings of personal responsibility can also lead to
group convergence, in an attempt to diffuse such responsibility. The effectiveness of decision
makers’ initial judgments are affected by the representativeness of the analogies that they draw
in relation to other, (dis)similar situations. Consequently, some alternatives tend to be preferred
from the outset, whereas others are discussed in negative terms. It is easy to then justify
preferred alternatives on the basis that they do not involve trad e-offs. In the final evaluation
stage of a group decision, decision makers use analogies to justify their point of view, but this
can lead variously to an overestimation of the extent to which past experiences are applicable,
partial descriptions of strategic alternatives, and the devaluation and dismissal of vitally
important information by the group.
The practical implications arising from this body of work as a whole are that organizational
decision makers, like all decision makers, should be encouraged to engage in effortful thought in
a relatively detailed, structured, and systematic fashion (thereby stimulating Type 2 processes),
prior to selecting a given course of action. To the extent that judgmental biases can be attenuated
in this way, practitioners would have at their disposal a readily available intervention technique
for enhancing the quality of the strategy process. To that end, Hodgkinson and his colleagues
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investigated whether the well-documented framing bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) could be
eliminated using structured decision aids (Hodgkinson et al., 1999, 2002; Hodgkinson & Maule,
2002). This bias arises when trivial changes to the way in which a decision problem is
presented, emphasizing either the potential gains or the potential losses, lead to reversals of
preference, with decision-makers being risk averse when gains are highlighted and risk seeking
when losses are highlighted. To overcome this bias, decision-makers are encouraged to adopt
procedures ‘that will transform equivalent versions of any problem into the same canonical
representation’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 344) in order to bring about the normatively
desirable state of affairs in which individuals’ preferences conform to the basic axioms of
rational choice. In other words, decision makers need to develop more elaborate models of
problems, taking into account both the potential gains and losses involved, to ensure that trivial
features of the decision context do not unduly influence choice behavior. One technique in
particular, causal cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976; Huff, 1990), was examined by
Hodgkinson’s team, on the basis of a growing body of evidence suggesting that more effortful
thought prior to making decision choices can eliminate this particular bias (e.g. Maule, 1995;
Smith & Levine, 1996). Both in student and managerial samples, the application of causal
mapping prior to choice eliminated the framing bias, providing supporting evidence for its
efficacy as an intervention technique for use in practical settings. (For a discussion of related
proposals to address additional biases, beyond framing bias per se, see Sadler-Smith & Shefy,
2004). Despite the undoubted significance of these contributions, the central prescriptions arising
from this body of work run counter to the prescriptions arising from parallel-competitive
accounts of dual-processing and it is to this alternative body of work that we now turn.
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The influence of parallel-competitive theories in MOS: Re-thinking behavioral strategy and
team cognition
In advancing the distinction between default-interventionist and parallel-competitive accounts of
dual-processing, one of Evans’ (2007) main concerns was to clarify the fact that each type of
theory was developed to address fundamentally different sorts of problems. Specifically, default-
interventionist accounts were devised to explain the apparent “conflict between System 1
(heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes” (p. 321) in basic thinking and reasoning tasks,
whereas parallel-competitive theories were advanced to address basic problems in social
cognition (e.g. attribution, influence, and persuasion). Evans (2007) singles out the classic
theories of Chaiken (1980), Epstein (1994) and Sloman (1996) as exemplars of parallel-
competitive accounts. In Sloman’s (1996) theory of associative versus rule-based processing
systems, for example, the modus operandi of the two systems is interactive in that they lend different
computational resources to the task at hand, working variously on a competitive or cooperative basis to
compute “sensible answers” (Sloman 1996, p. 383). In default-interventionist theories, in contrast, as
explicated in the preceding sections, Type 1 processes cue default (intuitive) responses and Type
2 (analytic) processes may or may not intervene. Regardless, however, intuition and analysis “do
not compete as parallel processes” (Evans, 2006, p. 328, our emphasis); instead, a behavioral
response must be “controlled either heuristically or analytically” (Evans, 2007, p. 322, our
emphases). This view was echoed and reinforced by Evans and Stanovich (2013) who—on the
basis of the evidence that humans are by nature “cognitive misers,” heavily reliant on “rules-of-
thumb,” and prone to substituting easy-to-evaluate attributes for harder ones—concluded that
most decision making behavior “will accord with [heuristic] defaults” (p. 237); hence they
favored a “dual-process theory that [is] default-interventionist in form” (ibid, original emphases).
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The veracity of Evans and Stanovich’s (2013) arguments is highly questionable in the
context of managerial and organizational decision making. Indeed, even within Evans’s own
field of cognitive psychology, Handley, Newstead and Trippas (2011, p. 41) proposed a parallel-
competitive explanation for belief biases, whereby Type 1 and Type 2 processes operate in
competition with one another and “the process that completes first cues a response,” which may
then be inhibited by the alternative, less rapidly-cued process.
To illustrate parallel-competitive principles in action, we focus on two particular accounts,
namely, Epstein and colleagues’ Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST), one of the earliest
parallel-competitive theories to emerge in personality and social psychology (Epstein, 1985), and
Lieberman’s X- and C-system formulation (e.g. Lieberman, 2007), which has emerged from a
major program of research in the emerging field of SCN. In recent years, both of these
contributions have gain considerable traction in MOS (see, e.g., Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2013;
Baldacchino, Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Healey, Vuori,
Hodgkinson, 2015; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011, 2014; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-
Smith, 2008; Hodgkinson et al., 2009a, 2009b; Sinclair, Ashkanasy, & Chattopadhyay, 2010).
Having reviewed the essential features of each of these parallel-competitive formulations, we
will then demonstrate how in combination they offer a richer interpretation of the dynamics of
intuition and analysis in MOC than can be achieved by adhering to the default-interventionist
accounts of dual-processing that have, until comparatively recently, tended to dominate MOS.
The features of CEST and Lieberman’s X- and C-system formulation are summarized in Table 3.
__________________
Insert Table 3 here
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Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
According to Epstein and colleagues, human information processing is the product of an
intuitive ‘experiential system’ and an analytical ‘rational system’ (Epstein, 1985, 1994, 2008,
2010; Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This theory is predicated on the assumption
that: (1) the experiential system and the rational system operate in parallel; (2) the two systems
are bi-directionally interactive; (3) behaviors are influenced by a combination of both systems;
(4) behaviors are “experientially or rationally determined if they are determined primarily by one
system or the other”; and (5) the relative contribution of either system is a function of the person
and the situation (Epstein, 2008, p. 25). CEST aims to be a broad theory capable of accounting
for a wide variety of phenomena; as such it has a high degree of elegance and parsimony that sets
it apart from, and affords it advantages over, multiple narrower theories, each of which
encapsulate comparatively fewer postulates and attributes capable of accounting for fewer
phenomena (Epstein & Pacini, 1999, p. 479).
CEST considers intuition to be a manifestation of the experiential system. Moreover, in
contrast with “several influential” dual-process theories—it is not correct to equate intuition with
‘lazy thinking’, short-cut rational processing, or degraded deliberative processing; nor should the
notion of intuition be restricted to heuristic processing. Instead, intuition is viewed as a
“different kind of thinking,” representing a “prudent voice” (Epstein, 2008, p. 32-33) well-
capable of outperforming analysis in some situations, a point echoed by Lieberman (2000, p.
109) in his observation that: “intuitions are sometimes as good or better than judgments arrived
at through deliberation.”
19
Within the CEST formulation, Type 1 and Type 2 processes sometimes operate in conflict,
manifesting as a “struggle between feelings and thoughts” (Epstein et al., 1996, p. 391), but
“under most circumstances” (Pacini & Epstein, 1999, p. 972) their joint operation is synchronous
and the rational and experiential systems integrate seamlessly, harmoniously and synergistically.
For example, their synchronous operation can (and often does) introduce associative, imagistic,
and holistic components into information processing and for this reason CEST accounts better
(in our view) than default interventionist alternatives) for “more complex behavior such as
creativity and wisdom” (Epstein, 2008, p. 35).
The timing of the interaction between experiential and rational processing can be
sequential or simultaneous (Epstein & Pacini, 1999, p. 474-475), depending on the situation at
hand, and/or individual differences in preferences for experiential and/or rational processing
(Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In sequential interaction, nonconscious, automatic
processing can influence conscious reasoning, and “there is ample evidence attesting to the
operation of such a process,” including, for example, studies of priming (Epstein & Pacini, 1999,
p. 474). 3 Nonconscious influences can also occur in the opposite direction, as when thoughts
that occur in the rational system trigger associations in the experiential system, and when the
slower-acting rational system acts in a corrective fashion toward the more rapid experiential
system. The simultaneous operation of the two systems can manifest as direct reports of
conflicts of reasons and feelings (‘head-versus-heart’ dilemmas) or compromises between the
3 Epstein and colleagues use the term ‘unconscious’ rather than ‘nonconscious’ (e.g. Epste in (1994, p. 709).
However, In the MOC literature these terms are seen as broadly equivalent and so for consistency with the preferred
nomenclature adopted within that literature (reviewed in Pratt & Crosina, 2016), we shall favor the latter term.
20
two forms of processing (Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Even when a person attempts to be
completely rational, the fast-acting and autonomous experiential system continues to influence
thoughts and behavior in a compelling, often affectively-charged, way. And even if it were
possible to be completely rational this “would not be desirable,” since some of the advantageous
outcomes of experiential processing (such as creativity and wisdom) would be lost (Epstein &
Pacini, 1999, p. 477). The ‘ideal state’ is a high level of functioning in both the experiential
(intuitive) and rational (analytical) processing modes (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Hodgkinson &
Clarke, 2007; Louis & Sutton, 1991).
These observations highlight a salient and significant point of difference between the
precepts of CEST and the default-interventionist models championed by Evans and colleagues;
the latter assume that Type 1 and Type 2 processes necessarily conflict and compete, whereas in
Epstein’s model experiential and rational processing can interact not only on a competitive basis,
but also cooperatively and collaboratively. Epstein’s theory accommodates both possibilities
explicitly. In developing this line of argument we turn now to a more recently-developed
parallel-competitive theory, which has shed light on the neural correlates of two systems
corresponding to an intuitive and analytical distinction and offers further compelling and more
fundamental insights into the mechanisms of their co-action.
Lieberman’s X- and C-systems: Insights from social cognitive neuroscience (SCN)
SCN is a comparatively new field that uses research tools such as neuroimaging to examine
social psychological phenomena and processes (Lieberman, 2007). Social intuition is a focal
object of study in SCN (Lieberman, 2000; Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004) and two of its
basic precepts are relevant to our endeavors:
21
1. Intuition is a physiological and behavioral correlate of implicit learning. However, it is
impossible to directly associate intuition with implicit learning; therefore, it is necessary
to examine the neuroanatomical bases of each process (Lieberman, 2000);
2. Different parts of the brain working together on different tasks are referred to as
“systems” (Reynolds, 2006, p. 738) and a division of neural processes into ‘automatic’
and ‘controlled’ social perception has been proposed, corresponding respectively to a
‘reflexive’ system (X-system) and a ‘reflective’ system (C-system), which operate in a
dynamic interplay (Lieberman, 2000, 2005, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).
The attributes of the X-system and C-system were summarized earlier in Table 3, but in
brief the X-system, among other things, is fast operating, slow to learn, functions on the basis of
non-reflective consciousness, processes information in parallel, is sensitive to subliminal
presentations and spontaneous, facilitated by high arousal, its influence on behavior is unaffected
by cognitive load, its outputs are experienced as reality, and it is the phylogenetically older of the
two systems. The C-system, in contrast, among other things, is slow operating, fast learning,
functions on the basis of reflective consciousness, processes information on a serial basis, is
insensitive to subliminal presentations, intentional in its actions, implicated in the regulation of
pre-potent responses, typically linguistic, its relation to behavior is altered by cognitive load, its
functioning is impaired by high arousal, its outputs are experienced as self-generated, and it is
phylogenetically newer than its X-System counterpart (Lieberman, 2007, p. 261). Whereas some
social cognitive phenomena are exclusively a function of automatic (e.g. feeling rejected) or controlled
(e.g. self-reflection) processes, others (e.g. reappraisal, affect labeling) involve comparisons of controlled
processes with spontaneous ones (Lieberman, 2007, p. 276).
22
This core dual-processing X-system/C-system distinction is supported by distinctive
patterns of neural activation across a complex array of brain regions. As depicted in Figure 1,
the neural regions associated with the operation of the X-system are the amygdala, basal ganglia,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC), whereas the neural regions associated with the C-system are the lateral
prefrontal cortex (LPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), lateral parietal cortex (LPAC),
medial parietal cortex (MPAC), medial temporal lobe (MTL), and rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (rACC). To illustrate the neural functioning of the X- and C-systems, albeit on a selective
basis, we summarize the role played by the basal ganglia, VMPFC, and mirror neurons in
intuitive cognition and social judgment in Table 4 (for further details, see Lieberman, 2007;
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002).
__________________
Insert Figure 1 here
__________________
__________________
Insert Table 4 here
__________________
Implications for the analysis of behavior in organizations
We commented earlier that the body of research demonstrating the efficacy of intervention
techniques for overcoming selected decisional dysfunctions highlighted by BDT researchers,
despite its undoubted successes, runs counter to the prescriptions arising from parallel-
23
competitive accounts of dual-processing reviewed immediately above. What, then, are the
theoretical and practical implications of these alternative dual-process conceptions for the
nascent field of behavioral strategy (Powell et al., 2011)?
Within this view, intuition is not merely a function of Type 1 processing heuristics,
deployed on a default basis, with inevitable attendant shortcomings (as classically conceived by
BDT-oriented strategy researchers wedded to the heuristics and biases tradition). Rather,
intuitions have the potential to both inhibit and facilitate analysis (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011).
For example, Reynolds (2006) describes two ways in which the X- and C-systems interact and
regulate behavior productively: first, the X-system is dependent on the C-system for the supply
and refinement of prototypes; second, the anterior cingulate cortex—a brain region linked to both
reflexion and reflection—allows the X-system to signal its inability to automatically and
adequately match a particular stimulus to a known prototype, thereby cueing C-system
processing (p. 740). A description of the interaction between reflexive (X-system) and reflective
(C-system) processing as a “dynamic interplay” (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011, p. 1503) is apt
and, in aligning well with the precepts CEST, outlined above, offers a unity of view that provides
a firm foundation for further theoretical advances in MOS and attendant practical application.
Inevitably the question arises from the foregoing analysis as to whether or not the
mechanisms and processes encapsulated within this integrated model of social cognition are
fundamentally different from those involved in non-social cognition. Processes of social
cognition rely on operations that are symbolic and associative and therefore share “fundamental
computational similarities” with non-social cognitive processes (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006, p.
94). This model, therefore, stands well-placed to provide a “computational bridge” (ibid.) that is
capable of shedding light on important aspects of social and non-social cognition in the context
24
of managerial and organizational decision making (see also Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2013;
Hodgkinson et al., 2009a).
The recent conceptual contributions of Hodgkinson and Healey (2011, 2014) and Healey,
Vuori, and Hodgkinson (2015) attest to the veracity of this fundamental claim. In the first
contribution, Hodgkinson and Healey (2011, 2014) revisited the psychological foundations of
Teece’s (2007) highly influential and widely cited dynamic capabilities framework, challenging
directly the default-interventionist assumptions underpinning his prescriptions for enhancing
strategic adaptation. Dynamic capabilities are at the core of organizational learning and innovation
(see, e.g., Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Gavetti, 2005; Kaplan, 2008; Teece
et al., 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). According to Teece, dynamic capabilities are the mechanisms
(‘skills, processes, procedures, organizational structures, decision rules and disciplines’) that enable
learning and innovation at the organizational level by first ‘sensing’ (and shaping) opportunities and
threats, ‘seizing’ those opportunities (and mitigating the threats), and then
‘transforming/reconfiguring’ the organization in the light of what has been learned via sensing and
seizing. However, the psychological microfoundations of this framework, like much of strategic
management theory in general, are predicated on a ‘cold cognition’ model of the strategic decision
maker and are thus incompletely specified (see also Healey & Hodgkinson, 2017). Teece’s dynamic
capabilities formulation is underpinned by a set of default-interventionist assumptions that tend
to downplay the potential role of affect and emotion as the fundamental (‘hot’) inhibitors or
enablers of individual and collective ability to respond to the adaptive behavioral challenges of
radical innovation and change. Like the behavioral strategy research reviewed in earlier sections
of this article, Teece (2007) privileged effortful forms of reasoning and dispassionate analysis as
a means of overcoming bias and inertia in strategic thinking, predicated on the assumption that
25
the mere effortful processing of information inconsistent with prevailing mental representations
disconfirms expectations and jolts decision makers into conscious reflection, thereby forcing
them to revise their beliefs (see also Dutton, 1993; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Reger & Palmer,
1996). Building on the alternative psychological foundations of Lieberman’s work (e.g.
Lieberman, 2000, 2007; Lieberman et al., 2001, 2002), reviewed above, together with related
work in the emerging field of neuroeconomics (e.g. Karlsson, Loewenstein, & Seppi, 2009;
Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008), Hodgkinson & Healey (2011, 2014)
demonstrated how the development and maintenance of dynamic capabilities requires firms to
harness managers’ reflexive and reflective abilities in a complementary fashion, thereby ensuring
that implicit and explicit cognitive and emotional processes emanating from the C- and X-
systems function in harmony, to facilitate sensing, seizing, and reconfiguration. The result of
this endeavor, we suggest, is a more realistic depiction of organizational decision makers as
thinking and feeling beings who are fired by affect, and often as reliant on inspiration and the
skillful management of emotion and intuition as on cold, calculative cognition.
In the second contribution highlighting the benefits of parallel-competitive, dual-process
formulations for MOS, Healey, Vuori, and Hodgkinson (2015) outlined a new typology—again
on the basis of Lieberman’s (2007) X- and C-system framework and related parallel-competitive
dual-process formulations (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Smith & De Coster, 2000; Strack &
Deutsch, 2004)—for analyzing shared cognition in workgroups and teams, differentiating
reflective (i.e., C-system) mental models pertaining to the team, the team’s goals, and attitudes to
team work, formed through reasoning and deliberation from reflexive (i.e., X-system)
representations that are more automatic, intuitive, and affective in nature. Their analysis
demonstrated how team members’ X-system representations can compete with shared C-system
26
mental models in terms of their respective effects on team functioning. They considered at some
length the consequences for intra-team coordination when team members have similar C-system
mental models but dissimilar X-system representations (‘illusory concordance’) and when team
members have similar X-system representations but dissimilar C-system mental models (‘surface
discordance’). This, the first ever, dual-process formulation of team cognition has laid the
foundations for a more nuanced understanding of the nature and effects of shared cognition in
workgroups and teams. Hitherto, the voluminous body of work on team mental models has been
predicated on the assumption that cognitive sharedness is unimodal—that is, it operates at a
single level of deliberative cognition. In other words, researchers have assumed that when team
members possess shared (i.e., similar) explicit mental models of their tasks and the team’s
attributes, it follows automatically that they coordinate their activities more effectively (cf.
Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Marks, Sabella,
Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).
However, as observed by Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton (2010, p. 902), “mixed and
contradictory findings have plagued research” on shared mental models in teams. In
documenting how competition for behavioral control between the X-system and C-system within
individuals (cf. Lieberman, 2007, p. 276) can create contradictions across team members’
actions, Healey, Vuori, and Hodgkinson (2015) have thus paved the way for future empirical
work to expand current understanding of the socio-cognitive dynamics underpinning team
functioning.
In sum, we maintain that, in comparison with default-interventionist accounts of dual-
processing, parallel-competitive accounts—exemplified by the works reviewed above—afford
MOC researchers a considerably more insightful generative framework for theorizing and
27
studying empirically the interplay of conscious and nonconscious processes in the workplace (cf.
Pratt & Crosina, 2016).
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Having questioned the legitimacy and veracity of default-interventionist accounts as the
pre-eminent dual-process formulation in MOS, in this section we outline future opportunities to
build on the foundations of the alternative parallel-competitive conceptions surveyed in the
previous section. In the light of the developments we have surveyed, we maintain that the time
has come for researchers in MOS to position their work more clearly and explicitly in alignment
with one or other of the default-interventionist and parallel-competitive camps; alternatively they
might pit these fundamental alternatives against one another in a program of empirical work
directed toward teasing-out in what circumstances and in respect of which particular sorts of
work-related tasks each variant fares best (cf. Pratt & Crosina, 2016). We envision that
pluralism and diversity could well prove a more productive way forward at this stage. We also
speculate, given that default-intervention and parallel-competitive theories offer somewhat
different insights into the nature of thinking, judgment and decision making in the business and
management domain, that perhaps each variant might prove more or less influential in particular
topic areas over the longer term.
In the first instance, however, it will be most instructive to undertake a program of
empirical work that tests competitively the more recent parallel-competitive variants of dual-
process formulations against their more conventional default-interventionist counterparts. In the
emerging subfield of behavioral strategy, for example, researchers might investigate the relative
efficacy of decision-aiding techniques predicated on the cold cognition logic of default-
28
interventionist accounts (e.g. Hodgkinson et al., 1999) as an aid to sensing, seizing, and
transforming (Teece, 2007) versus hot cognition enhancing alternatives (e.g. Hodgkinson,
Wright, & Anderson, 2015), predicated on logic of parallel-competitive accounts. It follows
from the work reviewed in the previous sections that adapting cognitive mapping techniques in
accordance with hot cognition design principles (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011, 2014) should, in
the face of shifting contingencies, accelerate appropriate changes in strategists’ mental
representations of the situation at hand, thus attenuating cognitive inertia at a faster rate relative
to decision aiding techniques predicated on conventional cold cognition principles (cf. Dutton,
1993; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Reger & Palmer, 1996). As an aid to seizing, such techniques,
suitably adapted in accordance with hot cognition design principles, should prove relatively
efficacious in attenuating decisional dysfunctions well documented the behavioral strategy
literature such as escalation of commitment and threat-rigidity (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton,
1981) and the host of related misperceptions and blind spots arising as a function of the dynamic
interplay among (emotionally-laden) Type 1 and Type 2 processes (cf. Teece, 2007; Hodgkinson
& Healey, 2011, 2014). Such work demands a combination of laboratory and field studies.
More generally, MOS researchers should examine the extent to which our claims
regarding the relative superiority of parallel-competitive accounts over the historically more
dominant default-interventionist variants hold up in respect of entrepreneurial decision making
(Baldacchino, Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015; Sadler-Smith, 2015). Similarly, it will be
interesting to consider the implications of the foregoing review for the analysis of decision
making in the context of personnel selection and assessment. Within this domain, Highhouse
(2008) has noted that in spite of the advances made in the development of decision aids in I/O
psychology, managers still adhere to a “stubborn reliance” on intuitive judgment in the belief
29
that “good hiring is matter of experience and intuition” (p. 334). If this is the case—and if it is as
inevitable as is being claimed—what are the downsides to this ‘stubborn reliance,’ how can the
weaknesses of intuition (for example, as a source of bias or prejudice) be safeguarded against,
how can the strengths of intuition and analysis be leveraged in the selection arena, and how can
managers be convinced of the value of combining these approaches to decision making, and
become more skilled in their joint application? How, for example, do intuition and analysis
interact when experienced decision makers are confronted by scenarios that are in their domain
of expertise (Klein et al., 2010; Salas et al., 2010) but which are sufficiently novel that the
requisite prototypes and scripts are unavailable and hence their expert judgment is confounded
(cf. Highhouse, 2008)? The use of phenomenographic techniques could illuminate such decision
makers’ lived experiences, revealing how they make sense of the competing cognitive and
affective facets of intuitive episodes, when confronted with such breakdowns. Ethnographic
techniques and related approaches such as verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993),
i.e., ‘thinking aloud’ techniques, offer a potentially valuable means for eliciting such first-person
accounts (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2011).
Another potentially profitable line of inquiry might be to examine the veracity of our
arguments concerning how intuition and analysis interact in respect of moral judgment and in
resolving ethical dilemmas in the workplace. A particularly pressing issue in this research
domain is the question as to whether the claims of the highly influential social intuitionist model
of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001) stand up to empirical scrutiny in the light of the foregoing
review. According to this model, in a sequence that bears close resemblance to the default-
interventionist principles enumerated earlier, moral judgments are informed by rapidly-occurring
intuitions, followed-up only as and when required by slower, retrospective reasoning. This
30
account is at variance with the parallel-competitive alternatives outlined in the previous section,
which, at first glance, seem to resonate more closely with the cognitive dissonance commonly
experienced by decision makers confronted by significant ethical dilemmas in the workplace (cf.
Epstein, 1994). Opportunities also exist to re-theorize extant bodies of intuition research that
have been developed largely isolation from mainstream dual-process theory, more particularly
the recognition-primed decision (RPD) theory of intuitive expertise (Klein et al., 2010).
The self-reporting of analytical and intuitive thinking (cognitive) styles has been a
mainstay of much intuition research in MOS (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2014). However, we
advocate supplementing such self-reports of individual differences with other approaches that
can objectively assess intuitive expertise (e.g. cognitive task analysis, tacit knowledge tests),
recover decision episodes in order to study close-up the co-action of intuition and analysis (e.g.
the aforementioned phenomenological approaches), and observe intuition and analysis in situ
(e.g. ethnographic approaches, and digital ‘eye-ware’), as well as mapping the physiological and
neural correlates of intuitive and analytical processing (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2011).
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that MOS researchers have yet to acknowledge with requisite
clarity and precision the nature of the interrelationship between intuitive (reflexive) and
analytical (reflective) processing. In consequence, attempts to address the fundamental question
posed by Herbert Simon almost three decades ago in the pages of The Academy of Management
Executive (Simon, 1987, p. 59), namely, ‘how is intuition accomplished in managerial [and
organizational] decision making?’ have thus far largely floundered (our addition). The mounting
evidence from a wide range of sources suggests that to claim that most decision making behavior
31
will accord with Type 1 processing and that a dual-process theory that is “default-interventionist
in form” is to be preferred (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 237) is unwarranted in MOS. Instead , a
more nuanced, but potentially more profound, conceptualization is required, recognizing that
‘strict’ default-interventionist principles only hold sway under highly particularized sets of
conditions, ones that bear little resemblance to the true complexities and attendant richness of
MOC. Accordingly, we have proposed that notwithstanding the key role that default-
interventionist accounts of dual-processing have played in the earlier development of MOC
theory and research, it is time to embrace the potential of parallel-competitive accounts, to
explicate more comprehensively the behavioral micro-foundations and neural substrates of
managerial and organizational decision making. We hope that this more encompassing and far
reaching view of the dynamics of intuition and analysis will spark further fundamental research
and foster significant practical applications.
32
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Table 1. Alternative dual-process/dual-systems information processing nomenclatures (selected
examples)
Nonconscious information Conscious information Source
processing processing
Automatic processing Controlled processing Schneider & Schiffrin (1977);
Shiffrin & Schneider (1977)
Heuristic Systematic Chaiken (1980); Chen & Chaiken
(1999)
Implicit inferences Explicit inferences Johnson-Laird (1983)
Heuristic processing Analytical processing Evans (1984, 1989)
Implicit/tacit Explicit Reber (1993)
Experiential Rational Epstein (1994)
Associative Rule-based Sloman (1996)
Intuitive cognition Analytic cognition Hammond (1996)
Tacit thought processes Explicit thought processes Evans & Over (1996)
Automatic Intentional Bargh & Chartrand (1999)
System 1 (TASS) System 2 (analytic) Stanovich (1999, 2004)
Holistic Analytic Nisbett, Peng, Choi, &
Norenzayan (2004)
Impulsive Reflective Strack & Deutsch (2004)
Reflexive (X-system) Reflective (C-system) Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute
(2004)
48
Unconscious Conscious Dijksterhuis & Nordgren (2006)
Old mind New mind Evans & Stanovich (2013)
49
Table 2. Glossary of important terms (Source: Adapted from Evans & Stanovich, 2013)
Term Definition
System 1 and System 2 Generic dual-process framework wherein the key difference
(dual-systems) lies in the properties of the two systems: (a) System 1
functions automatically, largely on an unconscious basis, and
is relatively undemanding of computational capacity,
conjoining properties of automaticity and heuristic
processing; (b) System 2 orchestrates processes of analytic
intelligence, conjoining various characteristics typifying
controlled processing (Stanovich, 1999, p. 144)
Type 1 and Type 2 Two qualitatively different forms of processing that compete
processes (dual-types) or combine in order to produce observed behavior,
corresponding to the familiar distinctions between intuition
(Type 1 processing) and reflection (Type 2 processing); this
distinction allows for the possibility that multiple cognitive or
neural systems underpin Type 1 and Type 2 processes.)
Default-interventionist A class of dual-process theories united by the assumption that
theories fast Type 1 heuristic processing generates intuitive default
responses on which subsequent (slow) reflective Type 2
processing may or may not intervene (Evans, 2007, p. 328;
Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 227)
Parallel-competitive A class of dual-process theories united by the assumption that
50
theories Type 1 and Type 2 processing proceed in parallel, each
having their say with conflicts resolved if necessary; conflict
resolution occurs after heuristic and analytical processes have
each proposed a response (Evans, 2007, p. 327; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013, p. 227)
51
Table 3. Comparison of features of selected parallel-competitive models: (a) Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory (Epstein, 1994, 1999); (b) reflexive (X) and reflective (C) systems
theory (Lieberman, 2007)
Source and modus Type 1 processing Type 2 processing
operandi
Epstein (1994, 1999) Experiential Rational
Behavior and conscious Holistic Analytic
thought are a joint Automatic, effortless Intentional, effortful
function of the two Affective (what feels good) Logical (what is rational)
systems. Normally the Behavior mediated by ‘vibes’ Behavior mediated by
two systems engage in from past events conscious appraisal of events
seamless, integrated Encodes reality in concrete Encodes reality in abstract
interaction, but sometimes images, metaphors and symbols, words and numbers
they conflict (Epstein, et narratives
al., 1996, p. 391). More rapid processing; Slower processing; oriented
Operating in parallel, they oriented towards immediate towards delayed action
can influence each other action
with respect to content and Slower and more resistant to Changes more rapidly and
process (Epstein & Pacini, change easily
1999, p. 465) Self-evidently valid Requires justification via
logic
Lieberman (2007) X-system C-system
52
Core processing Automatic social cognition Controlled social cognition
distinction supported by system system
distinct neural regions; Parallel processing Serial processing
some social psychological Fast operating Slow operating
processes consist Slow learning Fast learning
exclusively of either Non-reflective consciousness Reflective consciousness
automatic or controlled Sensitive to subliminal Insensitive to subliminal
processes, whereas other presentations presentations
processes involve Spontaneous processes Intentional processes
comparisons of controlled Prepotent responses Regulation of prepotent
processes with responses
spontaneous processes Typically sensory Typically linguistic
(Lieberman, 2007) Outputs experienced as Outputs experienced as self-
reality generated
Unaffected by cognitive load Altered by cognitive load
Facilitated by high arousal Impaired by high arousal
Phylogenetically older Phylogenetically newer
Ventromedial prefrontal Lateral PFC; medial temporal
cortex (PFC); basal ganglia; lobe; medial parietal cortex;
amygdala; lateral temporal lateral parietal cortex; rostral
cortex; dorsal anterior ACC; medial PFC;
cingulate (ACC) dorsomedial PFC
53
Table 4. Neural substrates of selected cognitive processes
Neural substrates Cognitive processes
Basal ganglia A core mechanism by which intuitions are learned.
A group of nuclei located in the limbic Representations formed in the basal ganglia play an
system, deep beneath the cerebral cortex important role in associative learning processes,
(Thibaut, 2016). doing so by capturing temporal rather than
conceptual associations, predicting rewards,
forming associations incrementally, without
conscious awareness, and functioning
automatically (Lieberman, 2000, p. 126).
Ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) Activations in the VMPFC are associated
A major anatomical structure of the consistently with automatic social cognition (e.g.
prefrontal cortex. cooperation, trust and fair play, implicit attitudes,
schematic self-knowledge, automatic affective
processes, and empathic judgments (Lieberman,
2007). The VMPFC somatically ‘marks judgments
in decision making under conditions of risk;
impairment of decision making is associated with
VMPFC damage as a result of lesions and organic
disease (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).
Mirror neurons Lieberman (2007) speculates that mirror neurons in
A class of neurons discovered in studies of humans pay an important role in non-verbal
54
primates performing goal-directed actions, communication; for example, the complex,
which were also found to be active when the reciprocal non-verbal “dance” that occurs
experimental subjects were observing the automatically in social interactions may form a
experimenter performing those same actions basis for intuitive social judgments (p. 271).
(di Pellegrino et al, 1992).
55
Figure 1. The neural substrates implicated in Lieberman’s X-system and C-system parallel-competitive processing model (Views: A,
Lateral; B, Ventral; C, Medial)
56
Source: Lieberman, M.D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 58: 259-289.
Copyright © 2007 by Annual Reviews. All Rights Reserved
57
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Gerard P. Hodgkinson (gerard.hodgkinson@manchester.ac.uk) is Vice-Dean for Research (Faculty of Humanities) and Professor of
Strategic Management and Behavioural Science (Alliance Manchester Business School) at the University of Manchester. He received his
Ph.D. at the University of Sheffield and his DSc (higher doctorate) at the University of Warwick. His research centers on managerial and
organizational cognition, the psychological foundations of strategic management, and the nature and significance of management and
organizational research for academia and wider publics.
Eugene Sadler-Smith (e.sadler-smith@surrey.ac.uk) is Professor of Organizational Behavior (Surrey Business School) at the University
of Surrey. Before becoming an academic he worked in a major public utility organization. His research interests are intuition (in
decision making) and hubris (in leadership). He is the author of two books on intuition in management and organization: Inside intuition
(Routledge 2008); The intuitive mind: Profiting from the power of your sixth sense (John Wiley and Sons 2010), shortlisted for the
Chartered Management Institute’s Management Book of the Year in 2011 and translated into Japanese, Korean, Portuguese and Russian.
58

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THE DYNAMICS OF INTUITION AND ANALYSIS IN MANAGERIAL

AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING

AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING

different categories of dual-process theory—default-interventionist and parallel-competitive.

These alternative conceptions are predicated on incommensurable assumptions but MOS

body of work that is fundamentally incoherent, being predicated on psychological foundations

to explicate more comprehensively the behavioral microfoundations and neural substrates of

managerial and organizational decision making.

AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING

of management and organization studies (MOS) subfields, from strategic management

(Hodgkinson et al., 2009a) and entrepreneurship (Baldacchino, Ucbasaran, Cabantous, &

have hitherto dominated the research domains encompassed by our review.

Our review centers on recent advances in dual-process theories of reasoning, judgment,

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that managerial and organizational decision

making are inherently complex, multilevel processes, influenced variously by a host of

Reflecting this complexity, the “microfoundations movement” in strategy and organization

In so doing, a fundamental aim of this body of work is to enrich understanding of work-related

psychology of two distinctive classes of dual-process theories, namely, ‘default-interventionist’

these distinctive theoretical perspectives, resulting in a body of work that is conceptually

incoherent and psychologically untenable.

theories, focusing in particular on the distinction between default-interventionist and parallel-

central tenets of default-interventionist and parallel-competitive accounts of dual-processing are

interventionist accounts, and Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and selected developments in

DUAL-PROCESS THEORY IN PSYCHOLOGY: ORIGINS, BASIC CONCEPTS, KEY

DEBATES, AND CONTRIBUTIONS

In view of the well-documented information processing constraints arising from the

Langley, 1995; Louis & Sutton, 1991).

an autonomous set of sub-systems—sometimes referred to as ‘the autonomous set of sub-

psychologists between the two systems.

Insert Table 1 here

Management intuition researchers, almost without exception, have seized on the

architecture of dual-process—also known as ‘dual-systems’ (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002)—

processing (which they referred to as a “2-process theory”, p. 1) in the study of automatic

2008; Salas et al., 2010).

2007; Stanovich & West, 2000).

processes (i.e. dual-types).

Insert Table 2 here

over systems is that:

“First, the term dual systems is ambiguous as it can sometimes act as a

to convey little more than a distinction between two types of

processing… Second, this terminology may appear to suggest that

exactly two systems underlie the two forms of processing, which is a

of Type 1 and 2 processing. These terms indicate qualitatively distinct

forms of processing but allow that multiple cognitive or neural systems

may underlie them.” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, pp. 224-226)

appropriate terminology of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Furthermore, as outlined in Table 2, a

interventionist’ and ‘parallel-competitive’ variants of dual-process theory (Evans, 2007, 2008).

intuitive judgment and decision making in managerial work.

thinking and behavior.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES: RE-

THEORIZING THE ROLE OF INTUITION AND ANALYSIS

shortcoming that needs to be addressed.

number of dual-process theories in psychology is now considerable, each characterized by its

(default-interventionist or parallel-competitive) and defend it accordingly when operationalizing

their empirical work.

of default-interventionist accounts of dual-process theory that are incommensurate with parallel-

consideration of the default-interventionist, parallel-competitive distinction and its significance

for advancing understanding of judgment and decision making in managerial work.

organizational decision making

In this section we explicate the strengths and limitations of default-interventionist accounts

principles, which are in essence default-interventionist:

1. Heuristic, and seemingly correct, judgments emanate quickly and

effortlessly from Type 1 processing;

intervene to endorse, correct, or override Type 1 processes (Evans, 2007;