Engineering Failure Analysis 97 (2019) 53–60

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Engineering Failure Analysis

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/engfailanal

Fire damage of RC slab structure of a shopping center

T
Piotr Knyziaka, , Robert Kowalskia, Janusz R. Krentowskib
⁎

a
Warsaw University of Technology, Politechnika sqr. 1, 00-661 Warsaw, Poland
b
Bialystok University of Technology, Wiejska str. 45, 15-351 Bialystok, Poland

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: The investigation carried out due to the failure of a shopping center as the result of fire is pre-
Fire damage sented. The fire started inside waste material stored on the unloading ramp, then developed as a
Precast result of the burning of Styrofoam insulation along the building walls. Damage from the fire took
Damage assessment a section of the reinforced slab above the ramp on which the parking lot was located. The ele-
Reconstruction
ments of the beam-and-slab floor were partially destroyed. Precast panels of “filigree” lost ad-
Concrete spalling
hesion to the concrete overlay formed in situ.
On-site inspection and evaluation of the degree of structural element damage were under-
taken. The various concepts for repair methods for the significantly damaged structural elements
were considered. The support by the use of additional steel structure was suggested as more
efficient than the partial replacement of the damaged slab with new structure. In the case of
another fire the steel bar structure also had to be protected by claddings (using spray method or
curtains made of plasterboard). The cost of repairs was not the most important factor in this case.
Much more important was to bring the structure to safe use for a long time as soon as possible.

1. Introduction

Reinforced concrete structures (RC) in comparison with other, e.g. steel or timber ones are characterized by good natural re-
sistance to fire conditions. Concrete is a non- combustible and heat-resistant material, and due to its high diffusivity, the penetration
of heat into elements exposed to fire conditions is slowed down. The reinforced concrete structure, properly designed due to the
persistent design situation, even if during its design fire conditions were not taken into account at all, it is almost always able to
survive at least 60 min of exposure to a fully developed fire [1,2]. However, in reasonable cases, the time required by the structure to
carry its load capacity in a fire can be longer, up to 4 h.
Designing reinforced concrete structures due to fire conditions consists of adopting elements with appropriate cross-sectional
dimensions and concrete cover thickness. The structural elements of typical structures can be designed using the so-called Tabulated
data provided in [3]. In complex cases, fire resistance of the structure is obtained on the basis of analyses in which the fire is
considered as an accidental design situation and the limit states of the load capacity of the structure are checked [2–5].
Good resistance of reinforced concrete structures to fire conditions means that they rarely collapse during a fire. After the fire,
however, there is nearly always a need to assess the technical condition of the structure. As a result of such an assessment, it is
necessary to select parts of the structure (elements) that:

- have not been significantly damaged by fire and can be left in the structure only after cleaning or small surface repairs,

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: p.knyziak@il.pw.edu.pl (P. Knyziak).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engfailanal.2018.12.002
Received 12 October 2018; Received in revised form 24 November 2018; Accepted 7 December 2018
Available online 08 December 2018
1350-6307/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
P. Knyziak et al. Engineering Failure Analysis 97 (2019) 53–60

- were significantly damaged, but their repair is possible and cost efficient,
- have been damaged so much that they must be dismantled.

The phenomenon of fire temperature's influence on deterioration of concrete and steel mechanical properties is comprehensively
analyzed. Significant research results in the field of the influence of high temperature on concrete are presented by the authors of
publications [6–8]. The deterioration of strength characteristics of reinforcing steel in fire conditions is described in the model
proposed by Y. Anderberg [9] given in [3]. The possibilities of using this model in practice for analyses by simplified methods or
advanced analyses were presented by the authors in [10–12].
The behavior of construction materials in the next stage, after cooling, is significantly different than during the state of high
temperature. Reinforcing steel after cooling nearly regains its strength properties [13–15]. On the other hand, the concrete's strength
after cooling decreases significantly and is practically always lower than its strength at high temperatures [7,16]. This is a con-
sequence of damage in the concrete during cooling and the thermal inertia of concrete, as a result of the fact that the temperature of
the inner cross-sectional zones increases after the end of the exposure to high temperature [8,17]. During the structure's assessment,
the effects of concrete deformability exposed to fire conditions should be identified. As a result of thermal deformation of the concrete
during heating or during rapid cooling, considerable deformation of the structure arises which generates the occurrence of additional
internal stresses and secondary static diagrams [4,18].
Concrete heated to a temperature exceeding 500-600 °C is usually damaged so much that it is not suitable for further use in the
structure [7,8]. Consequently, during research it is important to determine the thickness of the degraded concrete external layer
intended for dismantling and utilization [7,15,19,20]. Authors of [21–27] analyzed the effects of the total lack of cover on the
reinforcement surface, resulting from thermal spalling.
Materials used to finish the surface also have an effect on the propagation of the fire and its impact on the structure.
Building materials that significantly differ in properties are used to perform insulation of structures [28–30]. Some of the ma-
terials used do not meet the requirements for reaction to fire. Requirements for technical solutions for ETICS (External Thermal
Insulation Composite System) are different than national standards requirements; it is possible to use combustible materials on the
facade of a building without special protection.
The lack of a surface's division into smaller areas makes the ETICS fire propagate until the insulation material is completely
burned out [31]. A clear example is the fire of the London Grenfell Tower, where façade materials determined the course and effects
of the fire [32].
Meanwhile, as demonstrated by a practical experiment [33] carried out on a 7-story building, a 30 cm wide vertical barrier
effectively stopped the lateral spread of flames on an exposed wall covered with Styrofoam. These types of barriers allow reducing the
area of destruction.
All structures damaged as a result of a fire require an assessment as to their possibility of further use, undertaking the necessary
repair work, or demolition of the structure [34]. The assessment of the load-bearing capacity and further suitability for the use of
reinforced concrete structures were dealt with in [35–37], after a fire in an apartment building [38], in a production building [39],
and performance of structures in fire [6,40–43], and a disaster at an industrial hall caused by an explosion of wood dust and fire [44].
Despite the fact that the phenomenon of fire in terms of its causes and the reaction of structures to fire conditions is often
analyzed, fires are still an important cause of structural disasters. Due to the safety of users exploiting the structure after the oc-
currence of a fire, each incident requires an individual solution, and the conclusions obtained are worth generalizing and bringing
discussions to specialized forums.

2. Description of the building's structure in the area of the fire

The building under consideration is a large shopping center built between 2006 and 2007. In the area of the impact of the fire, at
the ground level, it has a roofed loading ramp. Above the ramp a reinforced concrete ceiling with a monolithic structure was
constructed with a ceiling slab made using “filigree” type precast panels. On the roof there is a parking lot for cars with a char-
acteristic live load not exceeding 3.00 kN/m2. The layout of the building section with an indication of structural solutions, the
location of fire load sources and zones of fire temperature influence, and the extent of damage, are presented in Fig. 1.
The structure of the object has been designed on the basis of national standards. Reinforced concrete main beams located in the
axes 14, 15 and 16, were supported on reinforced concrete columns built in external walls in the axes K and K′ and on columns and
the main beam located in the axis L. The monolithic structure was made of concrete class C30/37. As reinforcement, bars made of
steel were used with parameters yield strength fyk = 500 MPa, class A according to the standard EC2 [45]. A one-way reinforced
concrete slab with a span of 8.00 m made on precast filigree panels was supported on the main beams. The total thickness of the
ceiling was 28 cm, and the thickness of the precast panel was 5 cm. In order to reduce the weight of the ceiling, the interior of the
monolithic ceiling slab was partially filled with non-combustible polystyrene boards.
The beams and columns have been designed with fire resistance R120, and ceilings with fire resistance REI60 [45].

3. Damage of structural elements caused by fire

3.1. Fire event and evaluation of fire severity

The structure of the building was damaged by the fire that occurred in the area of the loading ramp. The general view of the ramp

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Fig. 1. The structural schematic, location of fire load sources, fire temperature zones, and extent of damage.

and ceiling slab over which the parking is situated is shown in Fig. 2.
The fire broke out on December 31st in the late evening when the center was closed. Immediately after the fire was started, an
automatic detection system was activated. The fire department was automatically notified, whose firefighting teams appeared on
location after about 3 to 5 min. A fully developed fire in the area of the ramp influenced the structure of the building for about
40 min. The temperature of the air under the ceiling reached a value of approximately 700 to 900 °C. After about an hour the fire was
under control.
In the initial phase of the fire, the fire load was temporarily contained in the unloading ramp with baled packaging paper, used
foil from packaging, and wooden and plastic transport pallets.
As a result of the open fire, the thermal insulation of the building's walls ignited. It was made of expanded polystyrene boards
covered with a layer of 1 mm thick acrylic plaster.
The burning polystyrene was an additional source of energy for the developed fire. In the high temperatures the adjacent areas of
insulation were melted and then they evaporated, which consequently led the fire to spread to other areas. The additional fire load
was from the insulation elements of the refrigeration system located in the area of the considered ramp. Due to the high fire load and
room height (4.30 to 4.95 m) the evolution and progress of the fire was similar to the fire defined by the standard curve [46].

3.2. The on-site inspection results; non-invasive tests

The research started with the temporary closure of the damaged structure, to ensure the safety of the people working there. When
removing debris and burnt, charred or melted parts of packaging, pallets, insulation of air conditioning ducts and insulation of

Fig. 2. Part of the shopping center, appearance after the fire; new stored materials are visible in the photos; the room had to be used despite the fact
that the structure has not yet been repaired.

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Fig. 3. Damage to the external wall covering layer, a) cement adhesive residues after the Styrofoam boards are completely melted, b) the melted
surface of the boards, behind L-13 pilasters.

external walls, the residue from exploding New Year's fireworks/firecrackers was identified nearby.
After the initial inspection, the tests using a sclerometer or advanced tests like impact-echo system, sonic transmission method,
electromagnetic methods were excluded. Although these specialized methods of detailed assessment are widely known, however, the
equipment needed to make them is difficult to obtain and expensive. The methods of these tests are time consuming and require
experience in the interpretation of results. In many cases, simple methods and many years of experience with a similar result can be
used. Lack of visible, large deflections of the reinforced concrete structure indicated destructions regarding to concrete small depth
which can be evaluated on the basis of visible on surface signs of damage, direct measurements on structural elements or tapping with
a steel hammer. Especially tapping with a steel hammer allows to identify the cohesion of surface layers with deeper ones, and detect
the areas on which the concrete has been delaminated. After such examination, using the comparative analysis, based on data from
the literature, conclusions can be drawn regarding recommendations for possible strengthening of the structure.
The defects of the structural elements, caused by the effects of the considered fire, were located in the roof above the ramp, near
the walls situated in the axes K and K′ between the axes 13–16 (Fig. 1). Ceiling slabs and main beams found in zone I were seriously
damaged. The insulating layer made of expanded polystyrene boards placed on external concrete walls located in the areas where
non-combustible materials were stored in was completely destroyed as well as some areas partly outside of these. The boundary of the
destruction of concrete cover was identified at the location of the reinforced concrete column (L-13 axes) forming the pilaster visible
on the wall surface. A description of the impact of this type of barrier on the containment of fire on walls covered with Styrofoam
insulation is given in [33]. Behind the pilaster, the surface of the expanded polystyrene boards has been partially melted (Fig. 3).
However, the structure of reinforced concrete walls has not been damaged in any zone. No damage was also identified to the columns
supporting the main beams, because they were located outside the main area of the fire.

3.2.1. Floor slab damage

As a result of the research, it was found that on the lower surfaces of the precast panels there are numerous losses of concrete
cover, caused by its thermal spalling, reaching up to 3–4 cm. Places have been identified in which the reinforcement was completely
devoid of concrete cover, where some of the bars also separated from the deeper layer of concrete (Fig. 4).
During a test made by tapping the bottom of the precast panels with a steel hammer and estimating the layers of the ceiling in the
core openings, it was found that the adhesion of the concrete topping to prefabricated “filigree” panels was destroyed (Fig. 5). This
was estimated as the effect of significant deformation of the precast concrete panels, caused by temperature increase and then
cooling.
In core drilling holes it was found that concrete damages of the floor slab are limited to the cover layer. Filling elements made of

Fig. 4. Examples of damage to floor slabs: a) local defects of the cover, b) loosening the cover in the reinforcing bars zones.

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Fig. 5. A cross-section of a filigree ceiling.

expanded polystyrene boards were undamaged, which allows one to conclude that at their level, i.e. inside the ceiling slab, the
temperature at which polystyrene melts was not exceeded. Strength tests of concrete obtained from drilled cores showed that the
actual concrete class in the used structure was consistent with the designed state.
As a result of the performed tests, calculations, and analyses, it was concluded that the floor slabs exposed to the fire temperature
do not guarantee the users safety during their further use. Damaged elements required strengthening or complete reconstruction.

3.2.2. RC substructure damages

There were seriously damaged parts of main beams located in zone I in axes 14 and 15 near the walls located in the axes K and K′
(Fig. 6).
In the main beams there have been identified losses of concrete cover, located along the longitudinal edges in the support zones
and locally on the bottom surface, as the effect of thermal expansion of the reinforcing bars. The range of identified damage proved to
be greater after carrying out the test made by tapping with a steel hammer. As a result of detachment of the cover, the main
reinforcement bars were exposed.
The lack of the concrete cover, the thickness of which was about 35 - 45 mm, caused a reduction in the area of the compressed
concrete zone near the support cross-sections. After testing the main beams' zones inside the stirrups it was found that the concrete is
not damaged and its current strength corresponds to the designed class.

3.3. Assessment of construction damage

Conclusions formulated during the inspection allowed to decide not to carry out detailed research and FEM modeling. In scientific
research they are used, but in engineering practice they are too time-consuming and expensive to apply to large areas of structural
elements. In such cases, evaluation based on the assessment of symptoms, the methodology of tabulated data contained in the
literature [10,19] is sufficiently accurate. In the presented case, based on the tabulated data given in [19] has been read for cross-
sections of beams with a width of b ≥ 40 cm and fire duration t ≤ 60 min, that the temperature isotherm of 500 °C reached a depth
of 2.0 cm from the bottom surface in the middle part of the bottom of the beam and 3.0 cm in parts with reinforcement bars in the
beam's corner. This means that the destruction of the beam structure applies only to the cover layer, investigation in a greater extent
is not needed. The small extent of damage to the cover and the lack of large deformations of the structure also means that the
temperature of 400 °C has not been exceeded in the reinforcement bars. This conclusion allows based on [10] and Fig. 4.2a from [3]
consider that there has been no decrease in the strength of beams tensile reinforcement.

Fig. 6. Cover loss of reinforcement along the edges: a) support zone, b) span zone.

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Fig. 7. Isothermal lines in the cross-section of the beam 140 × 280 mm after a time of: a) 15 min, b) 30 min, c) 45 min, d) 60 min; the test lasted a
maximum of 50 min (intersections of the lines determine the position of the grid nodes located at a spacing of 1 cm) [47].

It was estimated that the temperature to which the exposed bars were heated did not exceed 450–500 °C. Due to the bars located
in the inner cross-sectional zones not being exposed, they were heated to a temperature lower than 300–350 °C. The identified
damages are compatible with the temperature distribution in the reinforced concrete beam identified in previous research works
[47]. They indicate the main beams' time of heating amounting to about 40 min (Fig. 7).
In addition, no significant deflections of the tested main beams were identified. Therefore, it was assumed that heating and then
cooling the inner bars did not significantly reduce the strength characteristics. For corner bars, the reduction of strength values
should not be > 5–10% (compare [10,48]).

4. Concept of building reconstruction

Before the demolition and removal of the effects of the fire, it was recommended to ad hoc support the structure of the reinforced
concrete ceiling in an emergency condition. Typical structural elements of a formwork system were used, enabling the support to be
set on both the driveways under the roof and the unloading ramp. Despite such protection of the structure, the separated parking
zones located on the damaged roof were excluded from use.
During the research, several concepts of strengthening works were analyzed. The basic criterion was the safety of future users of
the shopping center. On the other hand, from the investor's point of view, it was important that this would close off an important part
of the building to use, as well as the cost of the necessary repair work [49]. During the tests it was documented that the floor slab
structure located in the direct fire zone does not meet the conditions of ultimate and serviceability limits.
An attempt to repair damaged ceiling slabs with repair materials applied to the concrete surface (e.g. resins, mineral materials, or
other composites) and glued reinforcing materials (e.g. carbon fiber tapes or steel flat bars) [50] did not guarantee with 100%
certainty the ensured security for users [51]. In the case of “sticking” repair or reinforcement materials to damaged concrete or to
concrete “filigree” panels separated from the overlay concrete, there was a real danger that such reprofiled and strengthened panels
would only give the illusion of being repaired, and in fact the ceiling structure will be maintained only thanks to the “work” of its top
layer of reinforcement. Verification that the reinforced floor will meet the requirements of the limit states of carrying capacity and
serviceability should then be carried out using the trial load method.
As a repair variant, it was proposed to dismantle several precast plates with a width of 1.50 m and to make strips of a newly
designed ceiling based on existing beams. It has been suggested to make new fragments of the ceiling from prestressed prefabricated
panels or to reconstruct a previously designed structure on prefabricated “filigree” type precast panels.
Such works, although the cheapest and requiring the least time, would cause the whole car park to be shut down from use which
would lead to paralysis in regards to transportation at the shopping center.
In the next case, which was finally recommended for implementation, it was proposed to support the panels damaged during the fire
with a grate structure made of HEB 220 and square tube 80x80x5 mm steel profiles. This cross-section was accepted as a result of the
beam calculation with a span of 765 cm which is an element of the grate taking over the entire load from the weight of the damaged
structure and the live loads. On the main strengthening beams perpendicular to them transverse beams were designed. As a result of the
calculations using EC3 [52] steel beams with a 80x80x5 mm square tube cross-section have been designed, located in spacing about
120 cm. The shape of the steel strengthening structure, so that the square beams were placed perpendicular to the direction of the main
reinforcement of filigree panels, caused a reduction in the span of the load-bearing elements of the panels from 769 cm to 120 cm (the
span of the panels was reduced to 120/769, up to 16%). The effort of the basic elements of the supporting structure was 0.91%.
As a result of reducing the span of the filigree panels, in spite of existing damages, they could safely remain in the existing
structural system. The grate elements should be hung on the top surface of the main beams.
After stabilizing the position and enabling cooperation through proper “wedging”, the steel elements should have a fire resistance
of at least R60. It has been suggested to use a spray method or to make curtains made of plasterboard. Designers and contractors
should use only certified systems. In practice, calculations are not applicable, because to carry out the protective works are used
materials with a certain fire resistance. The role of the designer is to choose the right fire resistance class, which is given in catalogs in

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minutes (30, 60, 120, 240 min) as fire resistance time in reference to [46].
The reinforced concrete main beams located in axes 14 and 15 required filling in of the missing fragments of the concrete cover. In
order to ensure the correct conditions for the assembly of the existing substance and new concrete a 75 mm thick reinforced concrete
cover was planned. After removing the plaster coating layer and parts of the concrete damaged in the fire, the cleaned surfaces should
be covered with an adhesion improving agent. The installation of additional main and anti-shrinkage reinforcement bars and ad-
ditional stirrups was designed. It was planned to perform the concreting process through holes drilled in existing floor slabs. In
addition, the openings would be used for mounting the slings of the grate beams strengthening the ceiling slabs.
The surfaces of reinforced concrete walls, after cleaning, should be covered with thermal insulation boards. It was recommended
to replace the damaged polystyrene boards with a layer of non-combustible mineral wool, with a thickness corresponding to the
current requirements in the field of thermal insulation of external walls [3].

5. Discussion

Every accident of a failure or a structural disaster must be analyzed in the aspect of discussion or proposals addressed to all
participants of the process. The authors indicate important aspects of the presented case, which should be taken into account during
the design, implementation and maintenance phase:

• the fire did not lead to the collapse of any of the building's structural elements, but the structure was significantly damaged, which
confirms that it was designed in accordance with the technical standard requirements. The ceiling structure had fire load capacity
greater than the duration of the fire;
• the storage of large quantities of combustible materials under the reinforced concrete parking structure was not a safe solution;
• thermal insulation made of expanded polystyrene boards installed on reinforced concrete walls in the storage areas of combustible
materials in fire conditions is an additional fire load. The use of mineral wool insulation would make it an insulator during the fire
and the amount of damage would be much smaller;
• the use of vertical pilasters and horizontal cornices that cut the continuity of the insulation layer allowed limiting the extent of fire
damage;
• reinforced concrete slabs in which the use of filigree type panels combined with internal Styrofoam filling should be used with
care. This is especially the case in ceilings under which transportation surfaces are crucial for the operation of buildings and
additionally exposed to an increased risk of fire load (in the described case, the loading ramp is crucial for the use of the entire
shopping center);
• the proposed strengthening method could be the support of the damaged filigree panels in a way that allows their spans to be
reduced, thereby reducing their effort, e.g. by using a steel grate.

6. Conclusions

However, very specialized methods are widely known, which enable detailed examination of structures after a fire, but often the
basic criterion for their use is time. In cases where the structure requires quick protection after a fire, the method based on ob-
servation, experience and literature data makes it possible to make a decision about human work on or under a damaged con-
struction.
In the analyzed case study the accidental ignition of combustible materials accumulated on the limited surface led, from the
beginning of the fire, to the rapid spread of fire with a quickly rising temperature and open flames. As a consequence of the
temperature exceeding 500–700 °C a progressive process of melting/burning of polystyrene boards, acting as a thermal insulation
layer for the reinforced concrete external walls began. After several minutes of the fire and firefighting, the ceiling structure was
degraded to the extent that it qualified for decommissioning, which largely limited the use of the shopping center.
The analyzed case is a further confirmation of the known regularity; reinforced concrete structures are characterized by high
resistance to fire, but if a fire occurs they require a detailed assessment of their suitability for further use.
At the stage of designing public utility buildings, we should not only pay regard to the ability of the structure to safely transfer
loads in a given standard time. The social and economic functions connected with damage during the period of works consisting in
the reconstruction of degraded elements are equally important.

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