The Gender-Neutral Feminism of Hannah Arendt

Author(s): KIMBERLY MASLIN

Source: Hypatia , SUMMER 2013, Vol. 28, No. 3 (SUMMER 2013), pp. 585-601
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.

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The Gender-Neutral Feminism of Hannah
Arendt

KIMBERLY MASLIN

Though many have recently attempted either to locate Arendt within feminism or femin
within the great body of Arendt's work, these efforts have proven only modestly success
Even a cursory examination of Arendt's work should suggest that these efforts would pro
frustrating. None of her voluminous writings deal specifically with gender, though som
her work certainly deals with notable women. Her interest is not in gender as such, but
woman as assimilated Jew or woman as social and political revolutionary. In this paper
argue that Arendt recognized that what frequently passes for a gender question is n
essentially a matter of gender at all, but rather an idiosyncratic form of hneliness t
typically affects, though is by no means limited to, women. In her work one finds the
ceptual tools necessary to understand the "woman problem" rather than an explicit argum
or a solution to it.

In recent years feminists have gone to great lengths to uncover, recover, and discov
the latent feminism of Hannah Arendt. Feminists find in Arendt an intriguing
evasive, figure. Concerning gender, as with so much of her politics, she is not ea
labeled. Arendt both smoked cigars and suggested that certain occupations were n
very becoming to women. She warned of potential danger in any political movem
based only on shared victim status and touted the importance of finding politic
solutions to political problems. Though these apparent contradictions certainly pr
ent challenges, the perennially provocative nature of Arendt's work also rende
Arendtian scholarship a fertile ground for renewed conceptual examinations of fe
nism. These recent re-examinations have taken primarily two different approach
Some have sought to uncover the theoretical treatment of women, to identify a
implicitly feminist message, or to reveal the conceptualization of gender in Aren
work: the "woman question in Arendt" (Hertz 1984; Cutting-Gray 1993; Pitkin 19
Weissberg 1997). Others have utilized an Arendtian approach to challenge femini
perspectives and possibly carve out a new approach to politics, power, or women
issues: the "Arendt question in feminism" (Dietz 1995; Elshtain 1995; Dietz 2002).

Hypatia vol. 28, no. 3 (Summer 2013) © by Hypatia, Inc.

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586 Hypatia

It is neither surprising that feminists would attempt to claim one of the greatest
philosophical minds of the twentieth century, nor that Arendt would resist attempts
to affix a label to her politics. As an existential philosopher, she was deeply suspi
cious of most labels. As a political theorist, she rejected political movements based
only on shared victim status. Although previous efforts to reconcile Arendt's political
theory and feminism have produced a variety of fascinating re-examinations of
Arendtian themes, the results have seemed somewhat contrived for two reasons. First,
Arendt rarely addressed gender issues, even in her private correspondence, and she
never wrote systematically about feminism or the "woman problem." Second, many
of the oft-noted (perhaps flippant) comments Arendt did make regarding feminism
suggest deep skepticism, perhaps even hostility to feminism.
Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that there is an Arendtian approach to
feminism that is worthy of serious reconsideration, because throughout her work
Arendt reinforces the impossibility of divorcing the political from the ontological
aspects of human existence. Moreover, this reconsideration could benefit from an
examination of the two occasions on which Arendt thoughtfully addressed the
"woman problem"—a book review from 1933 and her 1964 interview with Giinter
Gaus. Although neither of these texts stands as prominent in the Arendt corpus, they
do complicate the readings of her major works that have failed to consider them.
Arendt was perhaps at her most provocative while offering insight into the ways in
which different facets of one's identity affect social and political opportunities. Given
her unique position at the nexus of existential and political philosophy, Arendt
recognized that what typically passes for a gender problem is not a matter of gender
at all, but a peculiar kind of loneliness. In other words, the dynamics at work in "the
woman problem" are, at their core, challenges of human existence.
In what follows, I first explore the two different approaches feminists have taken
in the attempt to claim Arendt. Neither approach is sufficiently attentive to the
intersection of ontology and politics in Arendt's work. Second, I examine her 1933
book review in conjunction with the Gaus interview and suggest that although
Arendt did not write systematically about gender and spoke about gender in a some
what inconsistent manner, she did view conventional approaches to epistemology
and power as masculine and problematic. Finally, and most important, I develop the
argument that although she never wrote systematically about the gender question,
Arendt left feminists with the conceptual framework to understand that the so-called
"woman problem" occurs most prominently when constant engagement in labor and
a lack of solitude lead to a self-denial in which loneliness becomes an ontological
condition rather than an intermittent reality, thereby precluding the kind of connect
edness necessary for political action. Although it might seem that Arendt's views on
women give rise to a problematic inconsistency in her thought, I will suggest that
since her primary focus is better understood as reflecting an intimacy between the
ontological and the political, this inconsistency is better read as a productive tension.
Accordingly, I will propose that this Arendtian feminism, which treats "the woman
problem" as an ontological struggle—a manner of being in the world—with profound
political implications, can be read as "gender-neutral."

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 Kimberly Maslin 587

The "Woman Question" in Arendt

Some have sought to uncover an implicitly feminist message in Arendt's approach,

the so-called "woman question" in Arendt. Numerous authors utilize the peculiar
biography of Rahel Varnhagen and the parallels between Varnhagen and Arendt as
an opportunity to grapple with Arendt's feminism (Cutting-Gray 1993; Pitkin 1995;
Weissberg 1997). Others look to The Human Condition (Rich 1979; Dietz 1995) as
the most natural place to understand the link between individual identity and the
way one appears to others in the world (political identity), a consideration Arendt
begins with Rahel Varnhagen.
Deborah Hertz faults Arendt for failing to deal with the heavily gendered nature
of Rahel's plight and of nineteenth-century Jewish assimilation (Hertz 1984), while
Joanne Cutting-Gray and Andrea Nye focus on arguments left implicit in the Varn
hagen text (Cutting-Gray 1993; Nye 1994). Though the Varnhagen text is most
commonly read as addressing Rahel's Jewish identity, both Cutting-Gray and Nye
find a cautionary tale regarding otherness more broadly construed. Cutting-Gray
argues that Arendt views Varnhagen as triumphing over oppression by reclaiming
her Jewishness and ultimately opting for the life of a pariah. Nye, on the other
hand, argues that Arendt views Rahel as a tragic character epitomizing the misfor
tunes of oppressed people. The gendered message for both is that women routinely
face the parvenu-pariah dilemma in coming to terms with their own political exis
tence. Moreover, according to Cutting-Gray, Arendt eschews "that form of individu
alism disguised as a sympathetic sisterhood or brotherhood and consisting only of a
collection of world alienated 'selves'" in favor of the demand for political equality
that could encapsulate many groups. Shared victim status is simply "not sufficient
for political action" (Cutting-Gray 1993, 44), since "[hjuman distinctness is not the
same as otherness" (Arendt 1958b, 176). Human distinctiveness requires a revela
tion of the "who," whereas otherness remains fixated on the "what." Although the
"what" informs the "who," it never "conditions us absolutely" (Markus 1989, 121).
Hanna Pitkin draws heavily on the parallels between Arendt's own experiences (her
relationship with Martin Heidegger and her experience at Gurs) and the Varnhagen
text, in particular the pariah-parvenu distinction (Pitkin 1995). The parvenu
"clearly resembles the stereotypical feminine role in our society: accommodating,
deferential, self-abnegating, but behind the scenes also self-centered, manipulative
and resentful" (Pitkin 1995, 78). Taken together these three authors raise the issue
of whether the underlying dynamics of gender-based oppression differs fundamentally
from "otherness."
Others have criticized Arendt for either accepting an approach to politics that
undervalues the role of and concerns of women, underestimating the problem of
women's exclusion from public life, or failing to address gendered politics explicitly
(Rich 1979; Hertz 1984; Benhabib 1993; 2000). Although it is certainly true that
Arendt does not address women's exclusion from public life, as an existential philos
opher her approach is to expose the underlying phenomena, rather than to reiterate
or reinforce a binary social construct. Moreover, her interest in creating a space for

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588 Hypatia

the political (human rights), as opposed to the social (economic issues) could be
understood as advocating an approach to politics that might be beneficial to
women.

Alternatively, some scholars have suggested that The Human C

priate source for discovering the "woman question in Arendt" (R
Adrienne Rich offers the most cutting criticism, famously labe
lack of attention to gender: "To read such a book, by a woman o
erudition, can be painful, because it embodies the tragedy of a f
on male ideologies. In fact the loss is ours, because Arendt's desi
issues is the kind of concern we need to build a common world
more than "life-styles'" (Rich 1979, 212). Although it is certa
feminists that a book devoted to the human condition barely m
fails to address women not because she is indifferent to their p
so-called "woman problem" is not, for her, an issue of gender as
self-imposed loneliness that stems from confinement to biolog
which she understands to be both dehumanizing and lacking i
Arendt neither undervalues women nor underestimates the prob
refuses, however, to accept the label—victim—either as a person
Finally as an ontological matter, Arendt illuminates the relevance
in the world for political engagement.

The "Arendt Question" in Feminism

In contrast to the authors who have argued that feminism is

work of Arendt, others have used an Arendtian approach to
perspectives and carve out a new approach to politics (Lane
1995; 2002) or women's issues (Markus 1989; Elshtain 1995).
tors find in The Human Condition a radically gendered subte
1981). Rich accuses Arendt of writing a masculine text, adopt
ogy that accepts and reinforces traditional roles for women (
argues not only that Rich's interpretation is incorrect, but al
flawed (Dietz 2002). Her argument applies a binary conceptu
certain of Arendt's works or concepts and declares that she ei
test. Either she falls on the masculine side of the dichotomy
thinks like a man—phallocentric) or she falls on the feminine
(she is a woman who thinks like a woman—gynocentric) (Di
ines the public/private dichotomy and finds Arendt insuff
women's exclusion from public life (Rich 1979). Mary O'Brien
action dichotomy, chiding Arendt that the "lack of analysis o
of women is ultimately a failure to analyse adequately the vit
1981, 100). However, Arendt rarely deals in dichotomies, and
the preferred category of human activity is not the masculine w
action, which renders both labor and work inferior. In short,

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 Kimberly Maslin 589

and O'Brien impose a binary construct that derives from difference-based feminism
onto Arendt's nonbinary "thought trains," obscuring some of her most interesting and
complex contributions, such as genderless action.
Ann Lane argues that although Rich is quite critical of Arendt, they advocate an
approach to political engagement that is strikingly similar (Lane 1983); in other
words, if one were to transfer the exhortation to political activism, which Arendt
aims at the Jews, to women, the result would be precisely the kind of feminism that
Rich accuses Arendt of withholding. Arendt's role within Zionism, for example, was
that of a pariah member. Moreover, Lane asserts "[i]f Arendt's jeremiad were adapted
for feminism, it would address not the violence against women but their unwitting
cooperation in their subordination" (Lane 1983, 111). Moreover, within the Zionist
tradition, Arendt's was the voice that warned of the dangers associated with building
a political system based on shared victim status. This warning sounds stunningly simi
lar to Rich's admonishment that the "mere sharing of oppression does not constitute
a common world" (Rich 1979, 203). In short, even as she turns from Arendt, Rich
identifies substantially the same issues for feminism that Arendt highlighted for Zion
ism (112). Although Arendt's interest in otherness is commonly accepted and often
discussed, she did not self-identify as a "feminist." In response to criticism of her essay
"Reflections on Little Rock," however, she forcefully asserted her intention to sympa
thize or identify with "all oppressed or under-privileged peoples" (Arendt 1959, 47).
This assertion, together with the few comments she actually made on the subject of
gender, renders the phallocentric interpretation of Arendt a difficult position to
sustain.

Arendt on the "Woman Problem"

Although several examinations of Arendt's feminism recount revealing anecdotes,

none have considered together the two occasions on which Arendt thoughtfully
addressed the "woman problem": a book review from 1933 and her 1964 interview
with Giinter Gaus. In the 1933 book review, Arendt addressed the systemic nature of
the "woman problem," whereas in the Gaus interviewed she spoke, in a seemingly
contradictory manner, about the issue of gender equity in her own life. In what
follows I examine these comments, as well as a revealing anecdote told by Hans
Jonas, in order to show that the lack of a systematic analysis of gender does not indi
cate either indifference to nor hostility toward gender issues.
Although Arendt focused on the issue of gender inequity as quintessentially an
issue of economic independence, an undercurrent of the political pervades her analysis.
She begins by observing that although "today's women have the same rights legally
as men, they are not valued equally by society... if they were to work on the same
pay scale, they would—in keeping with their social value—simply lose their positions
of employment" (Arendt 1933, 66). Women who work outside of the home usually
do not work on the same pay scale as men, thus "for the time being the indepen
dence of women is economic independence from men" (67). Thus, most women find

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590 Hypatia

themselves in the "paradoxical situation of having partially to renounce equality for

the sake of equality," in other words, of having to renounce social equality for the
sake of economic independence (67). Moreover, the situation of the average working
woman

is much more complicated. Not only must she accept, d

legal equality, less remuneration for her work, but also s
tinue to do socially and biologically grounded tasks tha
patible with her new position. In addition to her profession
take care of her household and raise her children. Thus,
freedom to make her own living seems to imply either
enslavement in her own home or the dissolution of her fam

Though she stops short of offering a comprehensive analysis of

equity, Arendt does lay the groundwork for an analysis that as
gender with the seemingly inescapable nature of women's labor
ical powerlessness.
In the interview with Gaus, Arendt offers some interestin
statements about the role of gender in her own life. O
acknowledges that gender equity is a collective problem, pa
professional aspirations. Arendt describes herself as old-fash
that she adhered to gender stereotypes). Moreover, she seems
to traditional roles: "I have actually been rather old-fashion
that there are certain occupations that are improper for
become them, if I may put it that way. It just doesn't look
gives orders. She should try not to get into such a situation
feminine" (Arendt 1964, 4). On the other hand, later she ass
problem" did not pose a problem for her because "[t]o put
always done what I liked to do" (4). This statement seems t
her adherence to gender stereotypes. Yet she suggests that th
intellectual differences between men and women, in which s
stakes out for herself a feminine approach to scholarship, li
tions to hearth and home.
Gaus, at one point, poses the question, "[d]o you want to a
ence with these works?" Arendt responds with a brief reproa
question... [m]en always want to be terribly influential, but
external." In drawing the gendered distinction Arendt both c
of other and offers insight into her own intellectual process:

What satisfies me is the thought process itself. As lon

succeeded in thinking something through, I am personal
fied. If I then succeed in expressing my thought process
that satisfies me also.... Do I imagine myself being influ
want to understand. And if others understand—in the sa
I have understood—that gives me a sense of satisfaction,
at home. (Arendt 1964, 5)

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 Kimberly Maslin 591

The sense of satisfaction she claims in her professional work is likened to the feeling
of being in the most feminine of spaces: the home. The masculine, scholarly aspiration
is an external one. The goal is to achieve influence over the thoughts of others, to
impose one's thoughts, thereby preempting the process of thinking in others. Success
lies not within the scholar's control, but outside; one's sense of personal satisfaction
relies on the reception and reaction of others. The aspiration of the feminine scholar,
on the other hand, is an internal one and ultimately an intimate one: to understand.
Writing and scholarship are cast as nothing more than part of the process of achieving
understanding, as part of the thinking process. In this formulation, satisfaction lies
within the scholar's control, and the ultimate satisfaction lies in promoting or provok
ing, rather than suppressing or preempting, the thinking process in others.
The question isn't whether Arendt has arrived at a distinction of any merit, but
whether she conceptualizes the binary categories masculine/feminine as having signifi
cance as such. If these categories do have significance, how does she view the distinc
tion? Hans Jonas repeated a story after her death that provides insight into Arendt's
conceptualization of gender differences.

When on occasion I demurred to her quick and often cutting judg

ments on a person, an act, or a situation, saying that I needed proof,
she used to exchange with my wife a glance of mutual understanding,
compounded by exasperation and compassion, perhaps even tender
ness, and then say, "Ach, Hans!" Only very recently I felt moved to
ask her on one such occasion, "Hannah, please tell me, do you find
me stupid?" "But no!" she answered with almost horrified eyes—and
then added, "I only think you are a man." (Jonas 1977, 26)

Jonas points to this exchange as a point of unspoken agreement between Arendt and
his wife, though it also serves as a critique of a masculine epistemology. Jonas's
request for proof draws a rebuke either because Arendt views men as less observant
than women, or she finds them hopelessly tied to a particular and limiting notion of
what constitutes legitimate evidence, perhaps an epistemological approach that is
dismissive of intuitive judgment or alternative methodologies. Jonas also suggests that
Arendt viewed men as "the weaker sex, more removed from the intuitive grasp of
reality... more prone to illusion and less perceptive of the ambiguity and admixture of
shadows in the human equation—thus actually to be protected." Moreover, Jonas
asserts that for Arendt greater "sensitivity resulted in greater toughness." It was her
sensitivity or perceptiveness that allowed her to survive imprisonment at Gurs, for
example (26).
In characteristically Arendtian fashion, her comments on gender fit neatly into
neither the phallocentric nor gynocentric categories, but rather offer a third alterna
tive that places considerable onus on the "victims." She does seem to find meaningful
gender differences, which she herself both embraces and rejects. The book review
suggests that she believed the personality traits associated with femininity derive from
the limited ability to choose and the nature of the choices one must necessarily
make. Moreover, Jonas clearly indicates that Arendt found in femininity a source of

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592 Hypatia

strength, perhaps even power: the power of perceptiveness. Power for Arendt is the
ability to choose (Arendt 1957/1997, 87); those who cannot accurately assess a situa
tion cannot meaningfully choose. She viewed intuition, sensitivity, perceptiveness,
and alternative methodologies as assets. In short, although Arendt does not address
gender in a sustained or systematic way, she has devoted considerable attention to
otherness, concluding that although otherness profoundly affects the way one encoun
ters the world, the impact is not so compelling as to be irresistible. However, resis
tance requires awareness and action. Accordingly, Arendt's work offers us a way of
conceptualizing the complex interaction between one's way of being in the world
(the ontological) and worldliness (the political). She rarely addresses the "woman
problem" explicitly since ontological questions transcend the physical. Yet Arendt's
interest is in revealing the ontological phenomena that profoundly diminish the pros
pects of political action. Thus, she explores solitude, loneliness, and the lack of
connectedness, which, taken together, not only comprise "the woman problem" but
also constitute one of the challenges of human existence. In light of and in response
to this challenge, I contend that she offers a gender-neutral feminism, a feminism
that seeks to understand "the woman problem" first and foremost as a human prob
lem, as the political manifestation of an ontological condition.

Solitude or A Room of One's Own

As early as 1933 Arendt expressed a concern with the constant nature of women's
work, though it is not until The Human Condition that animal laborans, homo faber,
and vita activa emerge as existenaals (Hinchmann and Hinchmann 1984, 197). Labor
involves all the necessary, if tedious, tasks that leave no lasting impact or sign that
they have ever been performed and begin to be undone almost immediately: house
keeping duties, such as food preparation and cleaning. She also refers to these tasks
as "unproductive labor." It is no coincidence, she argues, that the phrase "to labor
meant to be enslaved by necessity" (Arendt 1958b, 83). Work or productive labor
(homo faber) leaves a tangible, lasting product in the world. It might be a physical
product, such as a work of art, a piece of furniture, or an intellectual product, such as
a work of philosophy. Work is valued as an activity since it creates capital, wealth,
or something tangible, whereas labor does not create anything of lasting value and is
not socially valued. Finally, action is a self-revealing public performance. It is meant
to be observed and understood by others. To act is to be seen, to be heard, and to
reveal something of one's self in a public venue. One's self-actualization is complete
only as it becomes part of a public performance. In other words, one attains fully
human status only as one achieves political existence. Action requires speech since
one must proffer an explanation of the meaning of one's public revelation (179). Pre
occupation with labor carries with it the psychic byproduct of leaving nothing of
value in the world, but additionally, devoting an inordinate amount of time to labor
minimizes opportunities for solitude, which is a crucial prerequisite for thought, hence
for political action.

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 Kimberly Maslin 593

For Arendt, thinking is a dialectical and critical process, an ongoing, soundless

dialogue with oneself, a "habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or to
attract attention," that reveals the inherent duality in human nature (Arendt 1978,
5-6). Thinking reveals the disconnect or disharmony between our appearance, or
what we reveal of who we are in the public realm, and our consciousness, our true
selves, which we may or may not reveal in the public realm. Thinking requires soli
tary time and space. "To be in solitude means to be with one's self, and thinking,
therefore, though it may be the most solitary of all activities, is never altogether
without a partner and without company" (Arendt 1958b, 76). Thinking is an activity
that can only be engaged in by oneself and with oneself as the only partner, the
process of going home to face the "partner who comes to life when you are alert and
alone" (Arendt 1978, 188). Consciousness is a state of self-awareness, which is both a
prerequisite for thinking to occur and is enhanced or facilitated by the thinking
process. Understanding, on the other hand, is a lifelong attempt to "come to terms
with, reconcile ourselves to reality, that is try to be at home in the world" (Arendt
1953b, 1). It neither requires nor produces a specific body of knowledge nor tangible
results. To the degree that there is a result, it is limited to the ambiguous Arendtian
notion of being at home in the world, which may involve the ability to move between
self-reflection and worldliness. In short, thinking "actualizes the difference within our
identity" (Arendt 1978, 193). In other words, thinking provides an opportunity to
reconcile one's actions with the "who," to reconcile one's public self with one's inner
partner. Understanding, on the other hand, is an exploratory effort to derive meaning
and come to terms with the social and political ramifications of thought. In some
cases, however, neither thinking nor understanding is possible.

Self-Negation or The Forfeited Self

Arendt frequently uses the terms isolation and bneliness in conjunction with each
other (Arendt 1958a, 474; 1958b, 212-214; 1953a). In The Origins of Totalitarianism,
isolation emerges as a major theme since it is a precondition of totalitarianism. Lone
liness, on the other hand, is not mentioned until the last chapter ("Ideology and
Terror"), which first appeared in the second edition and is developed more fully in
The Human Condition. She refers to a peculiar though consequential tenet of loneli
ness in her description of the process by which solitude can become loneliness. Lone
liness is at its most profound, she proffers, "when all by myself, I am deserted by my
own self." It is a brief, often overlooked, yet significant distinction between isolation
and loneliness that is critical to understanding Arendt's existential approach to femi
nism. Some have read this to suggest that (1) isolation is a precursor of loneliness
(Kateb 1983), and (2) both isolation and loneliness are preconditions of totalitarian
ism (Benhabib 2000). Certainly, individuals who are both isolated and lonely are
vulnerable to totalitarian exploitation, which is to say, likely to seek out meaning
with such zeal that they impose that meaning and "try to remake the world in its
image with a total devotion and a total lack of restraint" (Kateb 2002, 324). Yet

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594 Hypatia

Arendt emphasizes that isolation and loneliness are two separate and distinct
phenomena. Although the absence of human companionship may be common in
existential loneliness, self-desertion is the pivotal and most poignant component:

What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one's own self

which can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only
by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals. In this situa
tion, man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that
elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make expe
riences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and experience are
lost at the same time. (Arendt 1958a, 477)

So crucial is the two-in-one partnership that the loss of "trust in himself' renders one
incapable of engaging in thought, self-reflection, even of processing the meaning of
one's experiences. Isolation involves being deserted by others, whereas loneliness
involves a form of self-desertion. As for which is worse, Arendt leaves no doubt. It is
"[b]etter to be at odds with the whole world than be at odds with the only one you are
forced to live together with when you have left company behind" (Arendt 1978, 188).
The most succinct statement regarding loneliness can found in Arendt's 1965 essay
"Some Questions of Moral Philosophy." This essay represents the culmination of
Arendt's political existentialism. In it she captures the experience of loneliness as an
ontological phenomenon and connects it to three distinct collective (that is, political)
phenomena. As an ontological experience, loneliness, she posits, "is precisely this
being deserted by oneself, the temporary inability to become two-in-one as it were,
while in a situation where there is no one else to keep us company" (Arendt 1965,
96). As an individual experience the inability to engage oneself in an inner dialogue
triggers not only a profound and uncomfortable sense of disconnectedness; the loss of
the two-in-one means that "I become one, possessing of course, self-awareness, that is,
consciousness, but no longer fully and articulately in possession of myself' (98).
Interestingly, this exploration of loneliness is the only place Arendt refers to lone
liness as a temporary experience. In fact, it directly contradicts the portrait of loneli
ness that emerges from the totalitarian context, in which "[tjotalitarianism takes care
that loneliness remains and that solitude cannot develop" (Arendt 1953a, 10). One
suspects she may be indebted to Heidegger and his distinction between an ontic real
ity and an ontological condition. An ontic reality constitutes a Heideggerian cate
gory and refers to a set of physical, intellectual, or sociohistorical characteristics,
whereas the ontological comprises an existential and conditions one's manner of
being-in-the-world. In other words, intermittent loneliness resembles an ontic reality,
in and out of which a person may move, whereas utter loneliness is a matter of how
one inhabits one's very ontological condition as a being-in-a-world, politically situ
ated. It is the ontological form of loneliness that concerns Arendt, precisely because
it affects one's political existence.
Over time, the inability to connect with one's inner partner renders thought and
the validation of one's experiences (and therefore understanding) utterly impossible.
In short, the loss of the two-in-one results in the subsequent loss of thought,

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 Kimberly Maslin 595

experience, and judgment. In other words, "the thinking of loneliness preserved] a

hollow identity through avoiding contradictions and remain[s] in contact with others
only because all others are like me literally" (Arendt 1953a, 10). Engaging only with
others who are "like me literally" ensures a hollow existence since it renders thinking
and understanding virtual impossibilities. Thinking, for Arendt, is an iterative experi
ence of recalling experiences and making sense of them in the two-in-one. Under
standing, at least in a general sense, derives from the process of reflecting on one's
experiences in conjunction with a partner (either one's inner self or another individ
ual) and placing them in some kind of larger context. Thus, in a state of loneliness
individuals not only experience a profound sense of despair and hollowness, but they
also become ineffectual politically. Metaphysically speaking they cease to be able to
divide into the two-in-one, which in turn makes thinking impossible. Moreover, they
"preserve a hollow identity"; they become utterly unable to uncover meaning in their
own life experiences and hence to attain some kind of understanding or cognizance
of the context in which those experiences occur. In short, lonely individuals lose the
ability to think, to derive understanding from their experiences and, therefore, to
judge—all of which are important components of a political existence.
Arendt explains the importance of the two-in-one with respect to thinking, but
what exactly does it mean to deny oneself to one's own self? Though she never elab
orates, in The Human Condition, on how it is that one experiences the loss of his or
her own self, she describes in "We Refugees" the means by which individuals engage
in self-denial (negation). Arendt uses the phrase "the insane optimism of assimilation
ists," which she describes as "next door to despair" (Arendt 1943, 72). She describes
the process thus: "as soon as we were saved—and most of us had to be saved several
times—we started our new lives and tried to follow as closely as possible all the good
advice our saviors passed on to us. We were told to forget and we forgot quicker than
anyone could imagine" (69). Denial of oneself to one's own self occurs when an indi
vidual is placed in the undesirable position of renouncing a component of his or her
own uniqueness, a part of the self that is crucial to recognizing his or her own
humanity. Arendt does not clearly develop how it is that the self achieves "unique
ness," though one suspects she may, again, be indebted here to Heideggerian authen
ticity. From a Heideggerian perspective, talents and experiences may be conditioned
by collective traits, but can only be understood individually. In the pursuit of authen
ticity, the individual seeks to develop his or her own talents and understand his or
her experiences. Thus the denial of either experiences or traits not only deprives the
collective of one's unique, lived experiences but renders the development of unique
ness, hence the experience of authenticity, an impossibility for the self.
Drawing on Heidegger, Arendt suggest that individuals who are placed in the
position of renouncing language, culture, or experiences cease to be able to present
themselves in the world with authenticity, cease to be able to act and speak in the
world, which is to say politically, with credibility. For example, refugees are placed in
the position of having to renounce language, culture, and even deny, as a factual
matter, the events that led to their refugee status. Similarly, women face considerable
social pressure to find in marriage and motherhood profound satisfaction, which is

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596 Hypatia

often at odds with their lived experience since tasks associated with animal laborans
are rarely deeply satisfying. Women, like refugees, face a series of paradoxical choices.
They both experience a social compulsion to deny their real experiences. These pres
sures leave both women and refugees struggling to recover their own uniqueness, in
other words, they leave them struggling to attain humanness. Women must renounce
either social equality or economic independence; they must accept either enslave
ment in their own home or the dissolution of their families; women must either be
constrained by biologically grounded tasks or renounce reproduction and family life;
women must proclaim motherhood the most satisfying experience of a lifetime,
despite chronic sleep-deprivation and the prevalence of depression. This denial of
lived experiences is often accompanied by an escape into the private realm. Though
the private realm and the activities that take place there (thinking) are important
preconditions for a public presentation, there is a profound danger in occupying
either the private or the public realm exclusively. In the case of refugees, Arendt
references the escape into astrology and palm-reading, "[t]hus we learn less about
political events but more about our own dear selves... " (Arendt 1943, 70). Eventu
ally, Arendt explicitly establishes the connection between refugees and women:

We are like people with a fixed idea who can't help trying continu
ally to disguise an imaginary stigma. Thus we are enthusiastically fond
of every new possibility which, being new, seems able to work mira
cles. We are fascinated by every new nationality in the same way a
woman of tidy size is delighted with every new dress which promises
to give her the desired waistline. But she likes the new dress only as
long as she believes in its miraculous qualities, and she will throw it
away as soon as she discovers that it does not change her stature—or,
for that matter, her status. (76)

In other words, having denied a facet of their own uniqueness, women and refugees
seek comfort in trivialities and idle chatter. Moreover, both women and refugees,
having denied something fundamental about their own uniqueness, cease to confront
the two-in-one. Finally, both women and refugees, having denied a fundamental
component of their own unique distinctiveness, turn away from the "partner who
comes to life when you are alert and alone" and busy themselves with fashion, soap
operas, and other mind-numbing experiences (Arendt 1978, 188). In turning one's
back on the two-in-one and immersing oneself in idle chatter, the individual
succumbs to a false sense of connectedness.

Lack of Connectedness or The Unlovely Yoke

There is perhaps an irony in describing the plight of women as involving a lack of

connectedness since, as any working mother will tell you, overly connected might be
a more apt description. The crucial distinction between a multitude of inane interac
tions and the kind of authentic connections required for Arendtian action lies, again,

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 Kimberly Maslin 597

in thoughtfulness. One of the challenges of the authentic life for Arendt is the neces
sity of moving back and forth between the world of thought and the world of appear
ances. The conscience is a byproduct or a result of thinking that results once one has
restored or created harmony with one's inner partner. The conscience must necessar
ily precede judgment and should precede action. It is through acts of conscience that
"the liberating effect of thinking... [is] manifest in the world of appearances, where I
am never alone and always too busy to think" (Arendt 1978, 193). As one prepares
to share the product or the results of thinking, to identify and express the useful
byproducts of the thinking activity to others, the products of one's thinking are crys
tallized in the form of thoughts, which can then be shared with others. It is in the
process of sharing thoughts with others that one not only enters into the realm of
action, but achieves the distinction of being fully human. Since for Arendt it is the
activity of being seen and heard by others that validates one's existence, this interac
tion serves as a tether of sorts between the individual and the world.
A lack of thinking is troubling to Arendt for several reasons. It increases the pros
pects of evildoing since "most evil is done by people who never made up their minds
to be or do either evil or good" (Arendt 1978, 180). In the aftermath of the Eich
mann trial, she wondered whether there might be something in the thinking process
itself that prevents evildoing. Perhaps, she suggested, evildoing represents a lack of
inner harmony: "The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the
ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this, at the rare moments
when the stakes are on the table, may indeed prevent catastrophes, at least for the
self' (193). Not all thoughtlessness results in evildoing, however. Arendt also
describes a more mundane outcome, which may be particularly applicable to the
"woman problem": "A life without thinking is quite possible; it then fails to develop
its own essence—it is not merely meaningless; it is not fully alive. Unthinking men
are like sleepwalkers" (191). Thoughtlessness or a lack of "intercourse with oneself'
may result in a nearly undetectable emptiness, a surreal existence or hollowness that
consists primarily in going through the motions of a fully human life, a shadow exis
tence or an inauthentic life.
If isolation involves being deserted by others, labor and work both require isola
tion. In order for tasks to be completed, for a play or poem to be written, one must
have time alone with his or her own thoughts and tools to create a tangible product.
In fact, isolation may be beneficial in terms of productivity. Action, on the other
hand, can never occur in isolation, since action is by nature plural. Acting, for
Arendt, requires interaction. Action requires an audience since action necessarily
takes place in the space between (Arendt 1958b, 182). Isolated individuals cannot
act; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act.
Labor is not only inherently isolated, but also inherently lonely. It is not commonly
recognized as lonely since many forms of labor are performed in physical proximity to
others. However, the performance of labor in proximity to others "has none of the
distinctive marks of true plurality. It does not consist in the purposeful combination of
different skills and callings" (Arendt 1958b, 212). Loneliness among laborers may be
yet another example of existential loneliness. In The Human Condition, Arendt uses

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598 Hypatia

the term utter loneliness to describe the experience of the physical laborer and to
explain the inability of laborers to organize effectively into a political movement:

[The] "collective nature of labor," far from establishing a recognizable,

identifiable reality for each member of the labor gang, requires on the
contrary the actual loss of all awareness of individuality and identity...
the actual experience of this sameness, the experience of life and
death, occurs not in isolation but in utter loneliness, where no true
communication, let alone association and community is possible.
(Arendt 1958b, 213-15)

Arendt uses the term utter loneliness to describe the ontological condition. Since com
munication and shared experiences are at the heart of the human experience, under
conditions of ontological loneliness, individuals cease to be fully human. In her conver
sation with Gaus, Arendt connects the experience of loneliness with consumption in a
way that is reminiscent of Betty Freidan's notion of the feminine mystique. This loneli
ness, she asserts, "consists in being thrown back upon oneself a state of affairs in which,
so to speak, consumption takes the place of all the truly relating activities" (Arendt
1964, 20), precisely the process she described afflicting refugees.
Thus, for Arendt, one's manner of being in the world is inextricably linked to the
prospects of self-governance. Fear and loneliness are fundamentally antipolitical expe
riences, rendering political engagement all but impossible: "Just as fear and the impo
tence from which fear springs are antipolitical principles and throw men into a
situation contrary to political action, so loneliness and the logical-ideological deduc
ing the worst that comes from it represent an antisocial situation and harbor a princi
ple for all human living-together" (Arendt 1958a, 478). Again, isolation is not the
same as being alone. One can be alone and not isolated. Moreover, one can be
together with others, in a physical sense, and still be deserted by them. Additionally,
the immediate, physical presence of others may render the experience of desertion,
whether by others or by oneself, all the more poignant. Work, on the other hand,
may be isolated and in no way lonely, since the critical distinction is whether or not
one has been deserted by him- or herself, whether one has denied some crucial aspect
of him- or her own self. If the worker finds, in work, an outlet for genuine self
expression, the task of working may be isolated and not lonely. Action, however, as
Arendt uses the term, a self-revealing, public presentation, is fundamentally inconsis
tent with both isolation and loneliness. An isolated individual cannot act. A lonely
individual cannot act in a self-revealing manner, having already been deserted by
him- or herself since acting requires not only engagement with other human beings,
but an authentic re-presentation of oneself. Action can propel one out of loneliness
since it is only in action that a person discloses her or his "who" nature: it is only in
action that we come to know ourselves, and are able to let ourselves be known to
others (Markus 1989, 121). Hence, the experience of the working mother may
involve both a multitude of connections and yet lack the kind of genuine engage
ment required for action, if the many interactions are lacking in authenticity, which
is to say if those interactions are characterized by a re-presentation of socially

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 Kimberly Maslin 599

appropriate roles, rather than true, lived experiences and are not accompanied by the
reconciliation of the two-in-one.

"The Woman Problem": Political Manifestation of an Ontological Condition

As a German-Jewish political thinker, indebted in many ways to Martin Heidegger,

Arendt clearly did not view gender as the most salient marker of political identity. In
thinking back over her relationship with Arendt, Elizabeth Minnich reveals, "I think
Hannah Arendt did not want to be bothered much with 'the woman question.' Being
a Jew pressed much harder on her" (Minnich 1984, 179). Arendt was mindful of the
degree to which her Jewishness limited her ability to choose. Moreover, she questioned
whether the apparent similarity of personality traits among Jews implied the existence
of a Jewish "essence" or indicated that the limitations associated with the category
"Jewish" affected personality traits. These inquiries, however, are equally valid with
respect to gender. Though Arendt never systematically develops the connection
between ethnic identity and gender identity in her written work, there are indications
in her comments on gender and femininity that she believed the personality traits
associated with femininity derive from the limited ability to choose and the nature of
the choices women must make. As an existential philosopher, Arendt's tactic is to
attempt to expose the underlying phenomena, rather than reiterate or reinforce a bin
ary social construct. In examining the body of Arendt's work, it becomes clear that she
did explore and expose the underlying dynamics of "the woman problem."
I have argued that Arendt was neither phallocentric nor indifferent to women's
oppression. She was primarily interested in the relationship between the ontological
condition and political oppression. In her work, she encouraged individuals to
embrace the role of pariah (Arendt 1957; Ring 1991). Individually, the "woman prob
lem" is a unique form of loneliness in which an individual lacks the space and solitude
necessary for thinking, and in this thoughtless existence, a hollow identity emerges.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that recent solutions have resulted in a greater
number of women working outside the home and running a household—the double
shift—which requires one to be constantly engaged in labor and renders solitude,
hence self-reflection, exceedingly rare. These concerns, particularly as ontological phe
nomena, are troubling in and of themselves. Yet for Arendt the ontological experi
ence comprises only one part of the problem. In her view, one's way of being
profoundly affects one's prospects for political engagement. Individuals who find them
selves unable to divide into the two-in-one become unable to discover meaning in
their own life experiences or in political context. Moreover, the mechanism by which
political rights can be assured is action. Yet for the individual in a state of ontological
loneliness, political action is all but impossible. Therefore if individuals in a marginal
ized group find themselves in a state of utter loneliness, the prospects of addressing a
lack of political rights are slim. Arendt's feminism is gender-neutral in the sense that
the ontological dynamic at work challenges stable notions of gender since it also
comprises an issue of human existence more broadly.

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 600 Hypatia

Note

I would like to thank Jennifer Ring, Jim Young, and Hypatia reviewers for their comments,
and especially Aaron Simmons for his timely feedback and limitless enthusiasm.

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