RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis
Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy), Respondents.
G.R. No. 129029, EN BANC, April 3, 2000, PARDO, J.
The policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. The injured
party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.

FACTS:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for Short) from the latter's San Fernando,
Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck
trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the Corporation's
memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each trip, the SMC's
Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989. In
addition to a professional driver's license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before
they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San
Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat
beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00 o'clock that
same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran,
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane
going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes
were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by
Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on
coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce
wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a
result, Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a
ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two passengers,
namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly from external and internal haemorrhage and
multiple fractures.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident may be held subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a
separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver.

2. Whether the Court may award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil
action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property.

RULING:
1. No. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate
civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil
action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil
action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission
of the accused. Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the
separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the
accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of
accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter
based on quasi delict. We rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the
dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial
court so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence.

2. No. With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil
action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for
the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The
action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed
against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending
his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only
insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was
invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil
liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action. As a final note, we reiterate that "the
policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. 36 The injured party must choose
which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.

Manliclic v. Calaunan | Chico-Nazario

G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007| 512 SCRA 642
FACTS
• Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) while driving his bus going to
Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.
• Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI.
• According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane
of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit
bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to
overtake another jeep in front of it.
• Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his
employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil case?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
SINCE THE CIVIL CASE IS ONE FOR QUASI DELICT, MANLICLIC’S ACQUITTAL DOES NOT AFFECT THE CASE.
MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
• A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal
of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi delict.
• In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from
the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis
that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based
on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than
the delict complained of.
• As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
 Air France v. Carascoso and CA
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
FACTS
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of
the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding
the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for
an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfil? We have long learned that, as a rule, a
written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a
better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad
faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to
establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Calalas vs. CA |Mendoza

GR 122039| 31 May 2000
FACTS
• At 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the
“distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Closed reduction of the fracture,
long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon,
certified she would remain on a cast for a period of 3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during
said period.
• On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas before the RTC of Dumaguete City
(Branch 36), alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment, against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
• On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-
party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro
pay Sunga (1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3)
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and (5) to pay the costs. Calalas’
motion for reconsideration was denied 11 September 1995. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the CA erred in reversing the TC’s ruling?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
The Supreme Court affirmed the 31 March 1991 decision and the 11 September 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals, with the modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.
1. Res Judicata does not apply
Sunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict, as she was never a party to that case. Further, the issues in Civil Case 3490 and in the present case
are not the same. The issue in Civil Case 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-
delict for the damage caused to Calalas’ jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the present case is whether
Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. The principle of res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
2. Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, and culpa contractual
Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of contract or culpa contractual is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
3. Common carriers presumed at fault unless they observed extraordinary diligence; Burden of proof
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.
4. Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict, not in breach of contract
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function
of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
5. Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting
the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. “On the other hand, Article 1755 of the Civil Code
provides that “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” Article
1756 provides that “In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
by articles 1733 and 1755.”
6. In violation of traffic rules; Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic)
Herein, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about 2 meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the RA
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides in Section 54 (Obstruction of
Traffic) that “No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway. “
7. In violation of traffic rules; Section 32(a) (Exceeding registered capacity)
Herein, the driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of
Section 32(a) of the same law. Section 32 [a] (Exceeding registered capacity) provides that “No person
operating any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its
registered capacity.” The fact that Sunga was seated in an “extension seat” placed her in a peril greater than
that to which the other passengers were exposed.
8. Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very cautious persons
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
Calalas to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The driver of
jeepney did not carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances” as required by Article 1755. Not only was
Calalas unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga,
but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
9. Taking of “Extension seat” cannot be considered an implied assumption of risk
Sunga’s taking an “extension seat” did not amount to an implied assumption of risk. Otherwise, iIt is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.

Common carrier; breach of contract of carriage. There existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner
and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle.   As a common carrier, G &
S is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.  However, Jose Marcial was not
able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. “In a contract of carriage, it is
presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.  In fact, there is
even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.
This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence.  Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption.  Both the trial court and the CA
found that the accident which led to Jose Marcial’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence
of G & S’ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for breach of contract of
carriage.
That the driver was acquitted in the criminal case for reckless imprudence is immaterial. Article 31 of the Civil
Code provides, viz:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of contract
of carriage allegedly committed by G & S.  Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract which is
separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs
against Padilla by reason of the same incident.  Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said
criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case.  Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely:
Ruby B. Ochoa, et al. v. G & S Transport Corporation/G & S Transport Corporation v. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa,
namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 170071 & G.R. No. 170125,  March 9, 2011.
Damages; loss of earning capacity.  Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground that
the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and unreliable.  On the contrary, we find said
certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity just like in Tamayo v. Señora where we based the victim’s gross annual income on his pay slip from the
Philippine National Police.  Hence, we uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al. v. G & S Transport Corporation/G & S
Transport Corporation v. Heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al.,  G.R. No. 170071 & G.R. No.
170125, March 9, 2011
Damages; moral. While we deemed it proper to modify the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court as
discussed below, we nevertheless agree with the heirs that the CA should not have pegged said award in
proportion to the award of exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based on different jural
foundations.  They are different in nature and require separate determination.  The amount of one cannot be
made to depend on the other. In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammad we awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral damages
to the husband and three children of the deceased, a 39-year old Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, to compensate said heirs for the grief caused by her death.  This is pursuant to the provisions of
Articles 1764 and 2206(3) which provide:
 Art. 1764.  Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book,
concerning Damages.  Articles 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a
common carrier.

Art. 2206.  x x x

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Here, there is no question that the heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages pursuant to the above provisions,
considering the mental anguish suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcial’s untimely death. Heirs of Jose
Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al. v. G & S Transport Corporation/G & S Transport Corporation v. Heirs
of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, namely: Ruby B. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 170071 & G.R. No. 170125,  March 9, 2011

FACTS

 On February 2, 1930, a collision happened between a passenger truck and a private automobile while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the Municipality of Las
Pinas, Province of Rizal
 Chaffeur Abelardo Velasco drove the truck. Saturnino Cortez owned the truck.
 Bonifacio Gutierrez, 18 years old, drove the automobile. His parents, Mr. and Mrs. Gutierrez,
owned it. Only the mother and several other members of the Gutierrez family, except the father, was
in the automobile at the time of the incident.
 As a result of the accident, plaintiff Narciso Gutierrez, a truck passenger, suffered a fractured right leg.
At the date of the trial, such injury has not yet healed properly.

In a case which was appealed from CFI Manila involving a collision between a passenger truck and automotive,
wherein the lower court ruled for the plaintiff who suffered a fractured right leg, the Supreme Court upheld the
determination of facts of CFI Manila and ruled on the legal obligations of the defendants. Using a common law
rule from the United States together with Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the Court ruled that it was the father and
not the son or mother that was liable for the son’s negligent acts. The damages were deemed too excessive
however; thus the judgment was modified and the awarded damage reduced.

ISSUE

 Whether the father is liable for the acts of negligence of his son, defendant Bonifacio Guiterrez?

HELD

 Yes. At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we can take cognizance of the
common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house,
the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and
being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner’s family than the child
driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the
 family is within the scope of the owner’s business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child
because of the relationship of master and servant.

NEGLIGENCE – Whether or not Defendants are guilty of negligence

FACTS:

- a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments (Gutierrez – Win) -Filed a case against Defendants to recover damages in the
amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of a bus, where Plaintiff is a passenger, and an
automobile collision -Argued that there was a collision among the Respondents because of their negligence. The bus
was driven by the chauffeur Respondent Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Respondent Saturnino Cortez. The
automobile was being operated by Respondent Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by
Respondent Bonifacio's father and mother, Respondent Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision,
the father was not in the car, but the mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in
all, were accommodated therein -Lower court rendered a decision in his favor b) Defendant-Appellant’s Arguments
(Gutierrez, et al. – Lost) - Appealed to SC the decision of the lower court

ISSUE:

- Whether or not Defendants are guilty of negligence

RULING:

Conclusion: - Defendants are guilty. Defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, are
ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances. Rule: -
Application: - In this case, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was
driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant
to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable
for the damages caused by the minor. - The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the bus, and of his chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think, has been sufficiently
demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this
conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the bus on the bridge, the speed in
operating the machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. - All facts considered, including actual
expenditures and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which may cause him permanent lameness, in
connection with other adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000
would be fair and