Title: People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Judge Ruben Ayson (RTC Branch 6 Baguio City) and Felipe Ramos
Case No: G.R. No. 85215
Date: July 7, 1989
Nature of the Action: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Doctrine/Principle Involved:
Right against self-incrimination or to be compelled to be a witness against himself
Rights under custodial investigation (to remain silent and to counsel & to be informed of such right)
FACTS
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight Whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for
clerk of PAL. There was an allegation against him that respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane Exhibits A and K.
tickets. PAL management notified him and conducted
an investigation in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA). On the day before
the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note to communicate his intention and
willingness to settle the irregularities charged. The
investigation was conducted by the PAL Branch
Manager Edgardo Cruz in the presence of Station
Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo.
His answers in response to the questions were taken
down in writing. In Ramos' answers, he admitted he
had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he
had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he
was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the
amount would be known in the next investigation;" that
he desired the next investigation to be at the same
place Baguio City Ticket Office, and that he should be
represented by Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;
and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in
fact afterwards did). However, it would seem that no
compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About 2 months later, an information was filed against
Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa.
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered
a plea of not guilty and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of
ISSUE/S: RULING
Right Against Self-Incrimination
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The
right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other
time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate
him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on
the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, it does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation,
any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his
right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the
well-known axiom that everyone is presumed to know
the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. The
right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection
does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim
it at the appropriate time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what
PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
The private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence which included "the statement of accused
Felipe J. Ramos taken during the investigation
(February 9, 1986) which had been marked as Exhibit
A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on
February 8, 1986," which had been marked as Exhibit
K.
The defendant's attorneys filed an objection regarding
Exhibits A and K stating that said document, which
appears to be a confession, was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer. The
respondent judge admitted all the exhibits “as part of
the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth,"
except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. He declared
Exhibit A inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that the
statement of accused Felipe Ramos was taken in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager and it
does not appear that the accused was reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave
his statement, it was not with the assistance actually of
a counsel. He also declared inadmissible Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J.
Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 for the same reason
stated in the exclusion of Exhibit A since it does not
appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when
he made said admission.
Private prosecutors filed a MR but was denied because
rights in custodial investigations cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The
respondent judge pointed out that the investigation of
Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one for
the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds
of the tickets issued to him and therefore clearly fell
within the coverage of the constitutional provisions; and
the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the
investigation was administrative in character could not
operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
makes these rights different from that against self-
incrimination which indiscriminately applies to any
person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.
Whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"— (before the case is filed
in court or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation):
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right;
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Miranda v. Arizona:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have
been given, such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under
preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any
there had been would already have been ended at the
time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the
public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court
(or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion
to speak of his right while under "custodial
interrogation" for the obvious reason that he is no
longer under "custodial interrogation." But
unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor),
in common with all other persons, possesses the right
against self- incrimination, i.e., the right to refuse to
answer a specific incriminatory question at the time that
it is put to him.
Additionally, under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others –
(after the case is filed in court):
1) to be exempt from being a witness against
himself; and
- this signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or
produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is
the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process
or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a
witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused,
or even for himself. In other words — unlike an ordinary
witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right
to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question
at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal
action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to
take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question.
And, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him.
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he
offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him.
- If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however,
he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify,
then he "may be cross- examined as any other
witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters
stated in his direct examination, or connected
therewith. He may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that the answer
that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would
have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with
which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in
a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is
charged, but for some other crime, distinct from
that of which he is accused, he may decline to
answer that specific question, on the strength of the
right against self-incrimination. Thus, assuming that in
a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in
his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that he might be
implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline
to answer any particular question which might implicate
him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.

In conclusion, respondent Judge has misapprehended

the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has
taken them as applying to the same juridical situation,
equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly
erred and thus, his Orders were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion, and should be annulled and set
aside.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that

Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, prior to and during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of
no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been
marked during the trial of the criminal action
 subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is
obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that
he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day
before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded
on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos.

The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any

statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But
if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the
accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his
statements, whether at the administrative investigation,
or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making
and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence
and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which,
to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations.
Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer,"
etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may
be admitted and duly considered by the investigating
officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his
liability. However, any admission or confession wrung
from the person under interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect
vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on
the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary
or coerced statements may not in justice be received
against the makers thereof, and really should not be
accorded any evidentiary value at all.

Title: People of the Philippines v. Joel Yatar alias “KAWIT”

Case No: G.R. No. 150224
Date: May 19, 2004
Nature of the Action: Automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
Doctrine/Principle Involved:
FACTS ISSUE/S: RULING
June 30, 1998 (1) Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in (1) The issue regarding the credibility of the
9:00 a.m. – Judilyn and her husband, together with giving much weight to the evidence presented prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
Isabel Dawang, left for their farm and left her 17-year by the prosecution notwithstanding their appellant. This Court will not interfere with the
old cousin, Kathylyn as she intended to go to
Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to
leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes
or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn
was left alone in the house (Isabel’s house).
10:00 a.m. – Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng stopped
by the house and saw appellant at the back of the
house. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there,
and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to
the house of his mother.
12:30 p.m. – While Judilyn was on her way home, she
saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor
of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house. She later noticed appellant, who
was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did
not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
1:30 p.m. – Judilyn again saw appellant when he called
her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black
shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her
that he would not be getting the lumber he had
stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that
appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant
asked her where her husband was as he had
something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then
arrived and appellant immediately left and went
towards the back of the house of Isabel.
Evening - Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that
the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. She went up the ladder
to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was
upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope,
so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in
the dark, she saw Kathylyn’s dead and naked body
with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers
that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere,
denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a
dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters
from the house of Isabel. When questioned by the
police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
doubtfulness.
(2) Whether or not the trial court seriously erred in
not acquitting the accused-appellant of the
serious crime charged due to reasonable
doubt.
judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if
not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that
the former is in a better and unique position of hearing
first-hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial
judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be
appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the
crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven
(11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were
found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a
portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.
Based on the medical report, the estimated time of
death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within
which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the
house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
The report also indicates no hymenal lacerations,
contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,
however, the doctor discovered the presence of semen
in the vaginal canal of the victim and that during his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of
semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim. In addition, it
Kathylyns’s death, however, he was placed under
police custody. After trial, appellant was convicted of
the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly,
sentenced to Death.
is apparent from the pictures submitted by the
prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right
forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault
on her virtue.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that DNA of
the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was
identical to the semen to be that of appellant’s gene
type. In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In
the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria
was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined
that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical with the semen taken from the victim’s vaginal
canal.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could
be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Under
Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test
to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s
semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living
in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the
house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant
received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998;
(4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly
Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely
and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white
shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black
shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of
Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming
down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day
Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was
tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked
in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from
her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel
Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and
shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory
examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina
(Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white
shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive
with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he
was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a

conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to
a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime.
To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial
evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the

appellant contends that the blood sample taken
from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted
in violation of his right to remain silent as well as
his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12
and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. This contention
is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature. The right against
self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence. Hence, a person may be compelled to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood
and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion
involved. The accused may be compelled to submit to
a physical examination to determine his involvement in
an offense of which he is accused.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted

by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on
the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the
application of an ex-post facto law. This argument is
specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case
at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA
profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be

sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his
presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time
when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to
the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not
demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an
impossibility to be in two places at the same time,
especially in this case where the two places are located
in the same barangay. He lives within a one hundred
(100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five-minute walk to reach one house
from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

(2) Generally, courts should only consider and rely

upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of
evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary
relevance must contain a "plus value." This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being
satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant
but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon
the trial court to balance the probative value of such
evidence against the likely harm that would result from
its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only

when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to
sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding
and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt. This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole,
to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, the Court
ruleed that the present case passes the test of moral
certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the
purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction
when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first

cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the
house of Isabel Dawang. She witnessed the appellant
running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and
proceeding to the back of the same house. She also
testified that a few days before the victim was raped
and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came from the school."
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of
the appellant to rape her five days before her naked
and violated body was found dead in her
grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998. In addition,
Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang
Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband,
"this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family." According
to Judilyn, who was personally present during an
argument between her aunt and the appellant, the
exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the
Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your
family and your relatives x x x." These statements were
not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the
victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts
or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason
for committing it may be inferred.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with

homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and
(3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation,
appellant killed the woman. However, in rape
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father,
step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation. The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact
does not negate a finding that rape was committed as
mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. The strength
and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be
so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of
tender age.

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the

victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated,
appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the
separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from
his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity
within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the
victim.