550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of

Habeas Corpus

*
G.R. No. 154598. August 16, 2004.

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD
BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO
THORNTON, respondent.

Habeas Corpus; Jurisdiction; Nothing in RA 8369 that

revoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.—The Court of
Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing
in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
Same; Same; Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot
seek redress from

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

551

VOL. 436, AUGUST 16, 2004 551

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective

territorial jurisdictions.—The Court of Appeals opines that RA
8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs
of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word “exclusive”
apparently cannot be construed any other way. We disagree with
the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do
not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place
to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when
they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.
Same; Same; RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors.—The primordial consideration is
the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that
RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.
Same; Same; Family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for
habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.—The
provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,
it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP
129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and
BP 129—that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas
corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Urbano, Palamos & Fabros for petitioner.

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

CORONA, J.:

 
This is a petition to review, under Rule
1
45 of the Rules
of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 70501
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of
lack of 2jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive
portion read:

“WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas

corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not
sufficient in substance.”

 
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino,
were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic
Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A
year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they
named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless
and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to
her old job as a “guest relations officer” in a nightclub, with
the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often
out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the
househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with
her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She
told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok
Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the
child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to
ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the
barangay office
3
of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there.

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by

Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Regalado E. Maambong.
2 CA Decision, p. 3.
3 Rollo, p. 49.

553

VOL. 436, AUGUST 16, 2004 553

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus
 
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of
respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila
and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition
for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire
country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over
the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts
Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate

Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902
(1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This
jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court.—The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

x x x      x x x      x x x
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and
RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of
habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple
answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the
word “exclusive” than to constitute the Family Court as the sole
court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family
Court also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of
the former is not exclusive but concurrent—and such an
interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA
8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a
respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus
on him or her by just moving out of the region over which the
Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction.
That may be so but then jurisdiction is

554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such

jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is
demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
authority of this Court—or any court for that matter—to
determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the
exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived
defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts
but only from the legislature.

 
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that
Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No.
03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the
issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition4
for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the5 writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.
The petition is granted.

_______________

4 Article VIII. Section 5. “The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction . . . over petitions for . . . habeas
corpus.
x x x      x x x      x x x.”
5 Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.—A verified petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the
Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to
which the Family Courts belong.
x x x      x x x      x x x
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be returnable to a
Family Court or any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the
merits.
 555

VOL. 436, AUGUST 16, 2004 555

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

 
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly
repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue
writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word
“exclusive” apparently cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will
result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts
whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be
the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not
have been the intention of the lawmakers when they
passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the
Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the
State is to “protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children.” The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding children’s welfare cases,
as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the
law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive
and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as
well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the
case remains protected.

 
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best
interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did
not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of
the situations that the legislature

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount.

Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not
result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-
being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will
result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the
child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

 
This is not the first time that this Court construed the
word “exclusive” as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor
6
General, in
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the heirs of miners
killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in
the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General
that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the

case at bar, it supports petitioner’s submission that the word
“exclusive” in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote
automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that
the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is
concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other
hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the
enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the
Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout
the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or

any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of
Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if
so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be
made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a
Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on
the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)

 
In ruling that the Commissioner’s “exclusive”
jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for
damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it
was merely applying and

_______________

6 136 SCRA 141 (1985).

557

VOL. 436, AUGUST 16, 2004 557

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social

justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-
established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and
intent, not the letter, of the law:

“Idolatrous reverence” for the law sacrifices the human being.

The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. In
the words of Shakespeare, “the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life.”
x x x      x x x      x x x
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions
of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the
fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.

 
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be
incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is
not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its
literal interpretation may render it7 meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a
literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in
grave injustice and negate the policy “to protect
8
the rights
and promote the welfare of children” under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction
that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear

finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied re-

_______________

7 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986, p. 98.

8 SEC. 2. State and National Policies.—The State shall protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of
the Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. x x x

558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus

peal, and all efforts should be exerted 9

in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject.”

 
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to
the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of
habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony
with RA 7029 and BP 129—that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.—A verified

petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
x x x      x x x      x x x
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,
the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor
may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis
Ours)

 
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction
with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search
for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable
availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as
a ground for dismissing
10
the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:

_______________

9 Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 (2000).

10 Ibid., at p. 120.

559

VOL. 436, AUGUST 16, 2004 559

Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. vs. Mangudadatu

That the serving officer will have to “search for the child all
over the country” does not represent an insurmountable or
unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from
or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant
of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within
the Philippines.

 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R. SP No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
  

Panganiban (Chairman) and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,

concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Leave.

Petition granted.

Note.—The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of

illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 322
SCRA 518 [2000])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.