1.

LIM vs CA

Facts:
 Respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that petitioner has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia “before, during and
after the marriage and until the present.”
 Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the witness stand
himself to testify on his own behalf.
 Private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the
Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a
Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel orally applied for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify.
 Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be
elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
 Petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend
the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.
 Before Dr. Acampado took the witness, the court heard this urgent motion. Movant
argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr.
Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-
patient relationship.
 Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
 The trial court denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify.
 Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by counsel for private
respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her
field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated the
petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
 Petitioner filed with CA a petition 2 for certiorari and prohibition to annul the aforesaid
order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with
the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.
 CA denied.

ISSUE: WON the information given by the physician in her testimony is an expert opinion.

Held: Yes.
 The rule on this point is summarized as follows: “The predominating view, with some
scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient privilege, though
duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
 physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where
his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such
patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is
asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts
hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of
the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or
does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the
patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.”
 A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment,
when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer
solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question.

 Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion
for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the
petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any
question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would
violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony “once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.” The particular portions of the
stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition
and Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show
that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.

2. PEOPLE vs. GALLENO

DOCTRINE
 As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions.
It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the
facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890).
However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the
special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in
reaching a judgment

Facts
 At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused was on his way to his Lola Esing to have
his pants tailored.
 Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found the two children
 left to themselves.
 Accused took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering
her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. Then he forcibly inserted his penis
into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-years old while accused was a fully-grown man,
the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain.
 Accused tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de
cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and
crying in pain.
 Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The Spouses were laborers in a
sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their house. They arrived to find
Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was
pressing a rug against her genital organ.
 A quack doctor initially treated the victim. Afterwards she was brought to the hospital.
Several doctors examined the victim.
 Prior to the confinement of the victim in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on
August 19, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station
on August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same
day, accused was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary School and
brought to the police station.
 The defense of the accused is denial. He testified that when he arrived at the Obligar
residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and
Eleazar. While seated at the balcony, accused was approached by Evelyn, who knew
him. He cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and
his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring
finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was long
and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry
because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the
house and got some bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the
child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused
went home.
 RTC: guilty of the crime of rape
 Hence, the appeal.
 Accused contends that the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the
prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr. Machael
Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended
party, is not impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of
spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the
victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada herself testified that Evelyn told her that it was the
finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition, accused banks on
the victim's testimony on cross-examination, that it was the finger of accused-appellant
which caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to accused-appellant's
father, Raul Galleno.
Issue/s
  Whether or not the testimonies of the medical doctors can be admitted
Ruling:
Yes.

 As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions.
It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the
facts proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890).
However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the
special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject
matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in
reaching a judgment
 In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the
expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of
the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial court's inference
is wrong.

1. CEBU SHIPYARD

FACTS:
 Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of dry-docking and repairing of marine vessels. The private respondent
Prudential is a domestic corporation is in the non-life insurance business. William Lines,
Inc. is in the shipping business.
 William Lines is the owner of M/V Manila City which caught fire and sank while
undergoing dry docking and repair with Cebu Shipyard.
o The vessel was insured with Prudential for P45,000,000.00 pesos for hull and
machinery. The policy covers loss of or damage to the vessel through the
negligence of, among others, ship repairmen.
o Cebu Shipyard was also insured by Prudential for third party liability under a
Shiprepairer’s Legal Liability Insurance Policy.
  William Lines filed a complaint for damages against Cebu Shipyard, alleging that the fire
which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by Cebu Shipyard’s negligence and lack
of care.
o The complaint was amended to implead Prudential as co-plaintiff after it had
paid William Lines the P45,000,000.00 claim.
 TRIAL COURT: Ruled in favor of William Lines.
 On appeal, Cebu Shipyard submitted expert testimonies as to the origin of the fire.
The “fire experts” said that the fire did not originate from the area of Cebu Shipyard.
 COURT OF APPEALS: Affirmed Trial Court’s ruling.
o It also ruled that the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented by Cebu
Shipyard were inadmissible.

ISSUE: W/N the testimonies of expert witness are inadmissible – YES

 Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.—The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

 The word “may” signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as evidence is a
prerogative of the courts. It is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to
expert testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily
ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence.
o IN HERE, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available evidence
on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses who were
actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. Between the testimonies of
the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and
the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of more probative
value.
 Courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have
probative value, reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of
the court.

Neither is there tenability in the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled
on the inadmissibility of the expert testimonies it (petitioner) introduced on the probable cause and
origin of the fire. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the testimonies
of the fire experts, Messrs. David Grey and Gregory Michael Southeard, who testified on the
probable origin of the fire in M/V Manila City. Petitioner avers that since the said fire experts were
one in their opinion that the fire did not originate in the area of Tank Top No. 12 where the JNB
workers were doing hotworks but on the crew accommodation cabins on the portside No. 2 deck, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals should have given weight to such finding based on the
testimonies of fire experts; petitioner argues.
But courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses. Although they may have probative
value, reception in evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. Section 49,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring

special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence.

The word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness as evidence is a
prerogative of the courts. It is never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert
testimonies. If from the facts and evidence on record, a conclusion is readily ascertainable,
there is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence.

In the case under consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only
available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were witnesses who
were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire
experts who merely based their findings and opinions on interviews and the testimonies of
those present during the fire, the latter are of more probative value. Verily, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals did not err in giving more weight to said testimonies.

1. LEE vs CA

FACTS

MICO through its president obtained credit lines from PBCOM, which were secured not only by
real estate mortgage but also by petitioners, as sureties. When the maturity for the loans
became due however, MICO failed to pay their debt, so PBCOM filed a collection suit against
MICO and petitioners, where the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners.

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of herein petitioners and dismissed the
complaint filed by PBCom. The trial court likewise declared the real estate mortgage and its
foreclosure null and void. In ruling for herein petitioners, the trial court said that PBCom failed
to adequately prove that the proceeds of the loans were ever delivered to MICO, because the
documents did not mention that cash was delivered. The trial court pointed out, among others,
that while PBCom claimed that the proceeds of the Four Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) loan
covered by promissory note TA 094 were deposited to the current account of petitioner MICO,
PBCom failed to produce the ledger account showing such deposit. The trial court added that
while PBCom may have loaned to MICO the other sums of Three Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱348,000.00) and Two Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱290,000.00), no proof has
been adduced as to the existence of the goods covered and paid by the said amounts. Hence,
inasmuch as no consideration ever passed from PBCom to MICO, all the documents involved
therein, such as the promissory notes, real estate mortgage including the surety agreements
were all void or nonexistent for lack of cause or consideration. The trial court said that the lack
of proof as regards the existence of the merchandise covered by the letters of credit bolstered
the claim of herein petitioners that no purchases of the goods were really made and that the
letters of credit transactions were simply resorted to by the PBCom and Chua Siok Suy to
accommodate the latter in his financial requirements.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, saying that the latter committed an
erroneous application and appreciation of the rules governing the burden of proof. Citing
Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which provides that "Every negotiable
instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for valuable consideration and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value", the
Court of Appeals said that while the subject promissory notes and letters of credit issued by the
PBCom made no mention of delivery of cash, it is presumed that said negotiable instruments
were issued for valuable consideration. The Court of Appeals also cited the case of Gatmaitan
vs. Court of Appeals31 which holds that "there is a presumption that an instrument sets out the
true agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration".
The appellate court noted and found that a notarized Certification was issued by MICO’s
corporate secretary, P.B. Barrera, that Chua Siok Suy, was duly authorized by the Board of
Directors of MICO to borrow money and obtain credit facilities from PBCom.

RULING:

During the trial of an action, the party who has the burden of proof upon an issue may be aided
in establishing his claim or defense by the operation of a presumption, or, expressed differently,
by the probative value which the law attaches to a specific state of facts. A presumption may
operate against his adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut the presumption. The
effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting
evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which if
no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains
where it is, but by the presumption the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being
from introducing evidence in support of his averment, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence unless rebutted.

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court the following presumptions, among others, are
satisfactory if uncontradicted: a) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract and b)
That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for sufficient consideration. As observed by
the Court of Appeals, a similar presumption is found in Section 24 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which provides that every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to
have been issued for valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon
to have become a party for value. Negotiable instruments which are meant to be substitutes for
money, must conform to the following requisites to be considered as such a) it must be in
writing; b) it must be signed by the maker or drawer; c) it must contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money; d) it must be payable on demand or at a fixed
or determinable future time; e) it must be payable to order or bearer; and f) where it is a bill of
exchange, the drawee must be named or otherwise indicated with reasonable certainty.
Negotiable instruments include promissory notes, bills of exchange and checks. Letters of credit
and trust receipts are, however, not negotiable instruments. But drafts issued in connection
with letters of credit are negotiable instruments.

The documents presented have not merely created a prima facie case but have actually proved
the solidary obligation of MICO and the petitioners, as sureties of MICO, in favor of respondent
PBCom. While the presumption found under the Negotiable Instruments Law may not
necessarily be applicable to trust receipts and letters of credit, the presumption that the drafts
drawn in connection with the letters of credit have sufficient consideration. Under Section 3(r),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court there is also a presumption that sufficient consideration was
given in a contract. Hence, petitioners should have presented credible evidence to rebut that
presumption as well as the evidence presented by private respondent PBCom. The letters of
credit show that the pertinent materials/merchandise have been received by MICO. The drafts
signed by the beneficiary/suppliers in connection with the corresponding letters of credit
proved that said suppliers were paid by PBCom for the account of MICO. On the other hand,
aside from their bare denials petitioners did not present sufficient and competent evidence to
rebut the evidence of private respondent PBCom. Petitioner MICO did not proffer a single piece
of evidence, apart from its bare denials, to support its allegation that the loan transactions, real
estate mortgage, letters of credit and trust receipts were issued allegedly without any
consideration.

Petitioners placed too much reliance on the rule in evidence that the burden of proof does not
shift whereas the burden of going forward with the evidence does pass from party to party. It is
true that said rule is not changed by the fact that the party having the burden of proof has
introduced evidence which established prima facie his assertion because such evidence does
not shift the burden of proof; it merely puts the adversary to the necessity of producing
evidence to meet the prima facie case. Where the defendant merely denies, either generally or
otherwise, the allegations of the plaintiff’s pleadings, the burden of proof continues to rest on
the plaintiff throughout the trial and does not shift to the defendant until the plaintiff’s
evidence has been presented and duly offered. The defendant has then no burden except to
produce evidence sufficient to create a state of equipoise between his proof and that of the
plaintiff to defeat the latter, whereas the plaintiff has the burden, as in the beginning, of
establishing his case by a preponderance of evidence.47 But where the defendant has failed to
present and marshall evidence sufficient to create a state of equipoise between his proof and
that of plaintiff, the prima facie case presented by the plaintiff will prevail.

In the case at bar, respondent PBCom, as plaintiff in the trial court, has in fact presented
sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence that proved by preponderance of evidence its
subject collection case against the defendants who are the petitioners herein. In view of all the
foregoing, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its appealed Decision.

2. RIVERA vs. CA
FACTS
Petitioner filed complaint for ejectment against private respondents, alleging that they have
encroached upon his land by building their houses therein
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, which was reversed by the CA

RULING:

Basic is the rule in civil cases that "the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence." 12 By "preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it." 13 In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving that the
houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his
favor, petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.

Petitioner points out that the field survey, verification and measurement of his land by his
privately hired geodetic engineer, Ildefonso Padigos, "found that private respondent's houses
are situated inside the same." 14 Insisting on the findings of this private survey, petitioner assails
the Respondent Court of Appeals for considering the same "undeserving of credence and
belief" and insufficient to prove his case. 15

This Court is not persuaded. The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determine
with certainty whether the private respondents' houses were inside the petitioner's entitled
property. As noted by Respondent Court, private respondents' claim that their houses were
built on public land, which Attorney Salcedo applied for, is not convincing because petitioner
has a transfer certificate of title over the same parcel of land. Likewise unconvincing is the
private survey commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of private
respondents encroached on his property. The reliability of the survey would have indubitable
had it been properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands or by officials thereof. 16

Moreover, the field survey ordered by the Metropolitan Trial Court was never conducted.
Neither was an ocular inspection of the premises held in the presence of both parties. As
correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals, the absence of both processes precluded the final
determination of the main issue.

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates[,] the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue." 
Therefore, as "neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause
of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they
proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they
are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions."

In any event, we are here called upon essentially to review the public respondent's assessment
of the weight of the evidence presented by both parties. This factual question, however, may
not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule is subject to
well-recognized exceptions,19but petitioner failed to prove that this case falls under one of
them. If for this reason alone, the petition should be denied.

3. HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA vs. HEIRS OF MENDOZA

FACTS: 
On September 7, 2001, the heirs of Syquia filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of free
patent, re-conveyance, and damages against Teresita Villanueva (Villanueva). They claimed that
they are co-owners of Lot No. 5667 in Tamag, Vigan City, supposedly with an area of around
5,913 square meters. They likewise alleged that their title originated from their predecessors-
in-interest, Gregorio and Concepcion Syquia, through a partition in 1950, and that they have
been in open, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of said parcel of land in the concept of an
owner for more than thirty (30) years. However, sometime in 1992, Villanueva caused the
survey and subdivision of the property into Lot Nos. 5667-A and 5667-B. 

Then in 1994, Villanueva obtained a Free Patent over Lot No. 5667-B and later, was issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- 38444. The heirs of Syquia asserted that Villanueva had
no registrable right over Lot No. 5667-B and that she obtained the free patent through fraud
and misrepresentation. The heirs of Syquia elevated the case to the CA. On November 29, 2011,
the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the" December 14, 2006 RTC Decision.
Consequently, the heirs of Syquia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. And, on August 29, 2013,
they finally obtained a favorable decision when the CA reversed itself and ruled against the
heirs of Villanueva. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Syquia are entitled to validly recover the subject property
from the heirs of Villanueva. 

HELD: No. The heirs of Syquia never adduced evidence tending to prove that Lot No. 5663
refers to Maria Angco, that Lot No. 5666 or that Lot No. 5667-A pertains to the heirs of
Esperanza Florentino, that Quirino Boulevard is Provincial Road, and that Lot No. 6167 is Colun
Americano. The CA, in its Amended Decision, tried to justify its new ruling by explaining that
since Lot No. 5667 had already been subdivided into two (2) lots, the boundaries and size of the
property, as reflected in the tax declaration, would no longer match the boundaries and size of
the lot covered by the free patent, which is Lot No. 5667-B, to wit; resultantly, with the
subdivision of plaintiffs-appellants' Lot No. 5667 into two (2) lots, the boundaries and area as
stated in plaintiffs-appellants' Tax Declaration would no longer match with the boundaries and
area as stated in the Free Patent No. 38444 subsequently issued in favor of defendant-appellee
Villanueva. The heirs of Syquia failed to adequately prove that the area of their property in the
tax declaration coincides with the area of either Lot 5667-B which is 4,497 square meters or Lot
5667 which is 9,483 square meters. They likewise failed to show, based on the boundaries that
the lot they claim to have inherited is actually either Lot 5667-B, the property in dispute, or Lot
5667, the cadastral survey of which lists the Syquias as claimants. Certainly, the Syquias were
not able to identify their land with that degree of certainty required to support their affirmative
allegation of ownership. Simply put, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party
to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law. In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved
lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. 

The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number. As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition
to it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its non-existence. In the instant case, aside from the tax declarations
covering an unirrigated riceland in Tamag, Vigan, the Syquia heirs failed to present any other
proof of either ownership or actual possession of the lot in question, or even a mere
indication that they exercised any act of dominion over the property. 

In fact, they were not able to show that they have been in actual possession of the property
since they allegedly inherited the same in 1992. The Syquias' own evidence would reveal that
several houses have been constructed on the lot and third persons have actually been
occupying the subject property, despite the presence of their supposed caretaker.

1. MIDWAY MARITIME vs. CASTRO

Given the existence of the lease, the petitioner’s claim denying the respondents’ ownership of
the residential house must be rejected.

According to the petitioner, it is Adoracion who actually owns the residential building having
bought the same, together with the two parcels of land, from her father Tomas, who, in turn,
bought it in an auction sale.
It is settled that "[o]nce a contact of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the lessee
cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the lessor has a
valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the lessee." Section
2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. In Santos
v. National Statistics Office,16 the Court expounded on the rule on estoppel against a tenant and
further clarified that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is
alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply.

In this case, the petitioner’s basis for insisting on Adoracion’s ownership dates back to the
latter’s purchase of the two parcels of land from her father, Tomas. It was Tomas who bought
the property in an auction sale by Union Bank in 1993 and leased the same to the petitioner in
the same year. Note must be made that the petitioner’s president, Manglicmot, is the husband
of Adoracion and son-in-law of Tomas. It is not improbable that at the time the petitioner
leased the residential building from the respondents’ mother in 1993, it was aware of the
circumstances surrounding the sale of the two parcels of land and the nature of the
respondents’ claim over the residential house. Yet, the petitioner still chose to lease the
building. Consequently, the petitioner is now estopped from denying the respondents’ title over
the residential building.

More importantly, the respondents’ownership of the residential building is already an

established fact.

"Nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally." 18 It must be pointed
out that what Tomas bought from Union Bank in the auction sale were the two parcels of land
originally owned and mortgaged by CCC to Bancom, and which mortgage was later assigned by
Bancom to Union Bank. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the property subject of the
mortgage and consequently the auction sale pertains only to these two parcels of land and did
not include the residential house. This was precisely the tenor of Castro, Jr. v. CA19 where the
Court nullified the writ of possession issued by the trial court insofar as it affected the
residential house constructed by the respondents on the mortgaged property as it was not
owned by CCC, which was the mortgagor

1. CELEDONIO vs. PEOPLE

This case involves a robbery with force upon things committed by Celedonio. The neighbor,
Marquez witnessed the robbery and pointed to Celedonio as the culprit and the latter was
arrested. Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery
because 1) he was not caught in exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search
conducted on him was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the
witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.
RULING – failed to overcome presumption that he was the taker of the stolen goods when he
was found in possession

First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when
the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to
give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.

Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were
found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption
of being the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but
he failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that
could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.

Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the
stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-
up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the
stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that
the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing
either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the
inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he
was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it. 20 The police officers,
therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation.
At that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the
robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking
into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to
immediately act on it.

Third, contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also
tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by
ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.21

In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a
water meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant
that it could not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus,
posited:

xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.1âwphi1 However, a witness cannot be
impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous
conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe
shown to impeach him.

More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere
say so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water
meter. Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for
truth, honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution
witness Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant
Celedonio.22

Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims
that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De
Guzman's house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses
cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence.23

Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the R TC and the CA
overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court
will not disturb their factual findings.24

2. DIAZ vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
 An information for estafa was filed against petitioner for her alleged failure to remit the
proceeds of various merchandise received by her on consignment basis from
respondent
 The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of respondent who alleged that she
was a businesswoman who consigned merchandise to agents who either remitted to her
the proceeds or returned the unsold goods
 Respondent alleged that she turned over umbrellas and bath towels worth 35k to
petitioner, as evidenced by an AR, but the latter was only able to remit 3k and in spite of
demands, was unable to remit the rest or return the goods
 Petitioner denied being an agent of respondent, but only claimed that she was actually a
client, who used to buy gift checks on installment basis and that during each transaction,
she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of the gift cards.
Petitioner stated that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, and denied having
received the umbrellas and bath towels worth 35k on February 1996
 RTC acquitted petitioner of estafa but ordered her to pay 32k. In this relation, it further
considered the relationship of respondent and petitioner as in the nature of a principal-
agent which renders the agent civilly liable only for damages which the principal may
suffer due to the non-performance of his duty under the agency.
 The CA upheld the civil liability

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in holding petitioner civilly liable
RULING: No, the CA is correct in upholding petitioner’s civil liability

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank31 during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve
after paying her obligations,32 is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-
settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence."33

On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance
of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of
the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case
such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt34 dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes,
shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their
corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not
sold.35

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences.36 Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same
Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. 37 This
behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he
signs and delivers it.38 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the
need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no
contrary proof is offered, will prevail.39 In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to
controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to
the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
extinguished.40Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence.41 All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly
preponderates in respondent's favor.

In fine, the CA's ruling on petitioner's civil liability is hereby sustained. In line, however, with the
amendment introduced by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular
No. 799,42 series of 2013, there is a need to partially modify the same in that the interest
accruing from the time of the finality of this Decision should be imposed at the lower rate of six
percent (6%) p.a., and not twelve percent (12%) p.a. as imposed by the CA.

3. PEOPLE VS GODOY
 Danny Godoy was charged in two separate infos before the RTC with rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, arraignment pleaded not guilty, joint trial on
both cases
 Mia Taha – going to cousin’s boarding house, as she was about to enter, Godoy grabbed
her and pinned her to the ground and raped her, recognizing that it was her physics
teacher at school, after she went to her boarding school. The ff day she went to her
parents house but did not tell her parents and landlady, Godoy went even to her
parents house and asked permission for her to accompany him to solicit funds for Ms
PNS Pulot – she was constrained to agree, they went to Sunset Garden were she was
detained and raped for three days, and then for another two days she was released to
her parents in exchange for settlement (willing to become muslim so could marry Mia) –
later wife went to house of Taha and offered 50k for settlement of case – affidavit of
dessistance executd 
 Defense – they were lovers (Godoy fell in love with Mia after her constant I love yous)
 Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since
January 27, 1994 but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and
that he did not submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty.
Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an
affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary
Investigation" in connection with these cases. 
 several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this
Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the
charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for
redress of an actual wrong 
 acquitted 
 where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction 
 It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis
for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and
entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence
of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. 
 The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of
justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by
mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime;
nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do so. This is in consonance with the rule
that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than
upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so
   The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not
charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount
constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants
can testify as to its occurrence. 14This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the
prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its
burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be
acquitted.15

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused
is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against
him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense.
The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is
clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things.

XXX

The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina
will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded
the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until
proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption
and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine
which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must,
however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself
destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with
all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
 In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the
complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse her
attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her accusation
will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak up
exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also
irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a
cheapened woman, never mind that she did not submit to her humiliation and
has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of
lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor
was defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the
most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue that she
was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will
be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her
purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape
victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather
than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides
instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts 
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its
consequences. . . .85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of
justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere
suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would
otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all
the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in
evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt
when it is possible to do so.88

On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in
concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in
this particular indictment.

1. PEOPLE VS. SALVERON

A woman was raped by several men. These men were killed during the pendency of the case,
where one was able to point to the woman’s husband as the killers. In turn, the woman’s
husband was also shot death allegedly by accused Salveron, who is the principal rape suspect’s
son. The suspect is now objecting to the paraffin test done on him, saying it violated his right
against self-incrimination.

The paraffin test did not violate the appellant's right against self-incrimination as it involved
only an examination of a part of his body. As Justice Holmes said in Holt v. United States: 9

[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against

himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material.

2. PEOPLE vs. MALIMIT

Malaki was discovered by his houseboy struggling for his life, with Malimit feeling the scene
with a blood-stained bolo. A customer, Rondon, also saw Malimit fleeing the scene. Trial
ensued and Malimit was convicted by the lower court. Malimit is objecting to the trial court’s
appreciation of the testimonies of the witnesses since they allegedly only identified him 5
months after the incident. He is also objecting to the admission of his belongings, as violating
his right against self-incrimination.

a. Not delayed, the two witnesses immediately went to the CAFGU to report what they saw.
The delay was in the execution of the affidavits. Non-disclosure by the witness to the police of
the accused’s identity immediately after the occurrence is not entirely against human
experience. In fact, natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions
against immediate neighbors is of judicial notice.
The two exceptions to the rule that assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function
best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in light of his demeanor in
court, were not found in this case. (Exceptions: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at
are clearly unsupported by the evidence

b. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no
application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States,  ". . .
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips,
against his will, admission of his guilt.  It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control
of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form
exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
 house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law
to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing
his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a
clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is
the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion 

1. BACHRACH MOTOR vs. CIR

Bachrach motor wanted to dismiss one of its drivers, Maximo Jacob, from its service due to the
alleged fault of the driver in the total destruction of one of Bachrach’s buses. During the hearing,
Bachrach had only one witness, Mr. Kaplin, the general manager, who was able to conclude his
direct testimony. However, Jacob was not able to cross-examine the witness because of the
continued postponement, due to Kaplin’s absence. Kaplin went abroad. So the CIR dismissed the
petition and ordered the reinstatement of Jacob.

- A party, even in a labor suit, who was deprived of his right to cross-examine a
witness who left for abroad, is entitled to have the latter’s testimony stricken off
the record.
- Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against
driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for
his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been
deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent
association Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case
against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad.
Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine
Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the
witness stricken off the record.

2. PEOPLE vs. PADERO

Jocelyn charged her uncle with rape in an information. During the trial, the accused offered
witnesses who testified that the two actually had an illicit, consensual relationship. the lower
court gave credence to the version of the prosecution.

The supreme court ruled that the lower court erred in appreciating only the prosecution’s
testimony, without the prosecution rebutting the testimony of the defense. The accused gave
positive testimony about their relationship but the complainant was never called to the witness
stand to rebut these new facts. The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel,
counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary. 25 Its office is "to meet the new facts put in
by the opponent in his case in reply" and is "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new
subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive
facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponent's
witnesses have been offered." 26 While the presentation of rebuttal evidence is discretionary with
the prosecution in a criminal action, 27 in the instant case, the overwhelming import of the new
facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the complainant's version made
it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating the complainant to the
background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters brought out in the
evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story.

*the rebuttal witnesses brought forth were only made to testify on trivial matters (did not order
maid to get plate, did not see the conversation etc, but not to rebut the testimony on alleged
affair)

1. PEOPLE vs. CAPARAS

Caparas convicted of murder, in conspiracy with Diamsay. In his MR, Caparas is seeking to
review testimonies of two principal witnesses to the murder, Salvaror and Posadas. Caparas is
saying that the testimony of Salvador was extracted through leading questions. So he is saying
that his conviction was procured through leading questions.

Q Do you know the purpose of Carlos Gregorio in coming to your house? 

A Yes, sir. 
Q What was his purpose? 
A Regarding the landholding I was farming and his help I requested. 
Q Did you go to any place with Carlos Gregorio after that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Where? 
A To his house. 
Q You are referring to the house of Carlos Gregorio? 
A Yes, sir. 
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived at the house of Carlos Gregorio, who were with you? 
A Carlos Gregorio, sir. 
Q Who were the persons, ff any, that you have seen at the house of Carlos Gregorio? 
A Eufemio Caparas and Diamsay, sir. 
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you arrived in that house, what happened?
A We talked regarding the landholding, sir.
Q You said, 'we' to whom are you referring? 
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
Q What did you talk about that landholding? 
A Regarding the landholding which he said would be given to me. He said there is already one. 
Q And what did you answer when this was said to you by Eufemio Caparas? 
A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he said that the land he was giving me had some trouble. 
Q And what did you say? 
A I said' that seems hard',but he said,'that is easy'. 
Q What else transpired? 
A I asked him what he meant by easy and he said 'it is easy under this condition', and I asked him what condition, and he said you
kill him. 
Q During all that time, who were present inside that house? 
A Tisio Diamsay. 
Q Who else? 
A Eufemio Caparas, sir. 
Q Anybody else? 
A Carting Gregorio, sir. 
Q And you? 
A I was present.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog Language that you have been testifying, you said, 'Patayin n'yo, means plural, do
you know to whom this word 'n'yo' referred to? 
A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio Diamsay,sir. 
Q Ordering to what? 
A To kill.
Q To kill Simeon Paez? 
A Yes, sir.

- We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed

conspiracy was elicited by means of leading questions, the probative value of
which, according to accepted legal authorities, is thus diminished or lessened.

- The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is

obtained by leading questions which are so put that the witness merely assents to
or dissents from a statement or assertion of an examining consul put with such
vocal inflection as to be question.

1. GAW vs. CHUA

Doctrine: A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by
his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but
merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from
impeaching him .

FACTS:
 Sps. Chua were the founders of three business enterprises, one of which is Hagonoy
Lumner
 They had seven children, three of of which are Concepcion Gaw (petitioner herein), Suy
Ben (respondent herein) and Sioc Huan.
 When the father died, the surviving heirs executed a deed of partition, dividing and
settling their interest in Hagonoy Lumber among themselves, and renouncing their
shares in favor of Sioc Huan.
 Meanwhile, petitioner Gaw and her husband asked Suy Ben to lend them 200k. 2 years
later Sioc Huan executed a deed of sale over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of respondent
Suy Ben.
 The spouses Gaw failed to pay back the money they borrowed, and also failing to heed
the demand of respondent, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against the
spouses Gaw.
 On the other hand, the spouses Gaw answered that the 200k was not a loan, but was
actually their share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber. She alleges that when she and her
husband asked for their share in the profits of the family businesses, Suy Ben persuaded
them to temporarily forego first their demand as their mother wanted to remain in
 control of the business. To insure that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly
gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.
 To this, respondent answered that Sioc Huan became the sole owner, as evidenced by
the deed of petitioner, and in turn, he became the sole owner when he bought it from
Sioc Huan by virtue of the deed of sale.
 During the trial, petitioner called respondent to testify as an adverse witness where he
testified that he was the owner of Hagonoy.
 The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, saying that the transaction was a loan.
 The petitioners are assailing such ruling, saying that the lower court erred in considering
as evidence the testimony of respondent when he was called as an adverse witness,
particularly “Petitioner contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTC's
treatment of the respondent's testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination
by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness'
testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the
calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent as adverse witness did
not make him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony, particularly during
cross-examination by his own counsel”

ISSUE: Whether or not the caller of an adverse witness is bound by the latter’s testimony? NO
but the testimony may still be given weight.

RULING:
Copy paste from ruling of SC:
We do not agree that petitioner's case was prejudiced by the RTC's treatment of the
respondent's testimony during cross-examination as her evidence. 
If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent's
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitutes a
harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case. 
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or
the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the
burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. 
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not
be bound by the former's testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his
adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may
impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
party,32except by evidence of his bad character.33 Under a rule permitting the impeachment of
an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness' veracity, he is
nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted. 34
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony
only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of
facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.35 A rule that provides that the party calling an
adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may
not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from
rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.36 This, the petitioner failed to do.
In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondent's
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having
signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok
Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was
executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary
arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action
concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first
time, she raised a claim over the business.

ADDITIONAL, IN RE BEST EVIDENCE RULE IN THIS CASE:

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here,
there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in
evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution
and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.50 As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in
effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the
manner required by the rules.51 The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not
express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.52Apparently, the petitioner does not contest
the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the
transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.

DISPOSITIVE: CA affirmed; Petitioner ordered to pay respondent.

1. PEOPLE VS. RELUCIO

in this case, the appellant is assailing the testimony of the prosecution witness in implicating
the appellant in the crime, saying that the testimony of Angeles, the prosecution witness, is
entirely different from the sworn statement given to the detective.

In brief, in court, Angeles' account of the participation of appellant in the shooting of Talastas
was vague and inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and
specifically to appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and
categorically referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones

RULING –

As may be seen, the material discrepancies between the contents of the above-quoted statement,
on the one hand, and the testimony of Angeles in open court, on the other, are so irreconcilable
that even if the proper predicate had been laid upon proper objection of the fiscal it is doubtful, if
any believable reconciliation could have been given by him
It results, therefore, that at least insofar as herein appellant Velasco is concerned, the testimony
of Angeles has been completely impeached or discredited.

It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be truthful and
perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are evinced in parts of
his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be exerted before any
adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations lie at the base of the familiar
rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means simply that it is the duty of a
party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or, for that matter,
subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a chance to
reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when no reasonable explanation is
given by him that he should be deemed impeached. Thus, Section 16 of Rule 132
provides:ClubJuris

"Section 16. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness
can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and
places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before
any question is put to him concerning them." clubjuris

In United States v. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, at pp. 406-407, the Court made a clear exposition of
the universal rule of laying a predicate as follows:ClubJuris

"In order that we may not be misunderstood, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the practice
in such matters, a few words may here be properly said in respect to the proper mode of
proceeding in a case where a party wishes to get before the court contradictory statements made
by a witness who is testifying for the adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for the
accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a
sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given in his testimony before the
court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his
attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such statement before the
fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court. If the witness
admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission,
while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if
the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove
that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to
produce the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This
process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in
the practice of the American courts ‘laying a predicate’ for the introduction of contradictory
statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-
examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

But it, as in the instant case of the witness Angeles, the prosecution did not object to the
presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for impeachment purposes,
notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the opportunity to give his own
explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the trial judge and the appellate
courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can, possible reconciliation on the basis alone
of logic and common experience. The omission to object on the ground of failure to lay the
predicate is waived by the omission to interpose the same when the impeaching contradictory
statement is offered. (Evidence, [Rules of Court] Vol. VII, 1973 ed. by Vicente Francisco, p.
398.) On this score, We find the inconsistencies in the two versions of Angeles utterly beyond
possible rational explanation. The various discrepancies We have pointed out above - and there
are still others We have not mentioned - are so disparate that there can be no other conclusion
than that the witness must have lied in either of them. Accordingly, We have to reject both of
them.

2. PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN

- Respondent was charged with the rape of Jovelyn, to which the lower court convicted
respondent. Winston now pleads for the reversal of the judgment of the trial court
because:

o Jovelyn stated in her complaint and in her testimony given during preliminary
investigation that he committed the crime of rape through the application of
odorous chemicals over her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep. This fact
was not repeated in the trial court but she merely claimed the crime was
consummated through force and intimidation. Such inconsistency therefore
destroys Jovelyns credibility, thus warranting a reversal of the lower courts
judgment of conviction.

HELD: ALTHOUGH SEEMINGLY INCONSISTENT, SUCH WAS NOT BROUGHT UP DURING THE
TRIAL, BUT ONLY NOW UPON APPEAL.

No. Jovelyn was never confronted during the proceedings in the trial court with her answers
allegedly given in the same testimony at the preliminary investigation regarding Winston’s
resort to sleep-inducing chemicals. No sub-markings for such particular answers as exhibits
were made in the records of her testimony in the preliminary investigation, much less offered
by the Winston’s counsel for that purpose during the trial of the case.

General Rule: a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent

statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been duly laid by the party against
whom said witness was called.

Rule 32, SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. - Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary examination was
offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court, complainant cannot now be
discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which were not brought to her
attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged
contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a
witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an
opportunity to explain them.

The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of
inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect
the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enables
him to explain the statements referred to, and to show that they were made under a mistake,
or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.

Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the
supposed differences in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible
or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is
only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached. As things stand before us and the court a
quo, therefore, complainants credibility remains unimpeached.

We now take up the other document relied upon by appellant, that is, the complaint executed
by complainant. A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that said complaint
was never introduced in evidence for the consideration of the trial court nor shown to
complainant during the trial so that she could explain the alleged discrepancies in accordance
with the foregoing rule. The complaint is not even included in the folder of exhibits as part of
the documents admitted in evidence by the trial court. It is only attached to the original record
of this case together with the other records of the preliminary investigation forwarded to the
trial court. Under the revision in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, those records of the
preliminary investigation do not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.

Hence, no impeaching evidence having been properly brought before it for its consideration
during trial, the lower court was perfectly justified in disregarding the supposed inconsistent
statements of complainant in her complaint and her testimony during the preliminary
investigation. 

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

1. JOSON vs. BALTAZAR

DOCTRINE: Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.

FACTS:

 Marciano Joson instituted a case for disbarment against Gloria Baltazar for:
o grave malpractice as lawyer: for notarizing even though notarial commission expired.
 Baltzar argued that: while she did not deny that her commission as notary public expired she
maintained that she had applied for renewal of her commission prior to its expiration in 1956; that
she forgot about the matter and in good faith continued to act as notary public in the honest belief
that her commission had been renewed with the filing of the petition which she considered a
routine formality; and that when she learned in August 1956 that her petition for renewal had not
been filed, she applied anew for renewal of her commission and was in fact re-commissioned as
notary public on 7 September 1957

Baltazar’s conduct must be similarly characterized as malpractice and falsification of a public document.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial
degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to
act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.

Since only one instance of unauthorized notarization is here involved, rather than repeated, and
considering the circumstances of this case, the Court considers that suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) months would be an adequate administrative penalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Gloria M. Baltazar-

Aguirre from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt of this
Resolution.

2. SALES vs. CA

Facts:

Severo Sales mortgaged his unregistered parcel of land to the spouses Agpoon to secure the
payment of a loan. More than a year passed, Sales and his wife donated a portion of the property to
their daughter, in which the tax declaration was replaced by two tax declaration, one under their
daughter’s name and the other under Sales’ name for the remaining portion. Sometime later, the
mortgage was set for foreclosure, so to prevent it, Sales requested Ernesto Gonzales to pay his
indebtedness to the Agpoon. On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between
Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. The
document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land described under Tax Declaration No. 5861
in consideration of the amount of P4,000 to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.
Petitioner Sales is denying the due execution of the deed of sale on account of fraud. On the other
hand, defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is valid, it having been properly
executed and notarized, and is therefore a public document, and carries weight as provided for in
Section 31, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.The bare and naked assertions of the plaintiff Severo
Sales and his wife, could not offset the presumption of regularity as to the execution of the Deed of
Sale, especially so, that the ratifying officer was, and still is, a municipal judge. 

Relevant ruling → More revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial
acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its executors were known to the notary public to
be the persons who executed the instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary public) of the
contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public that the instrument was freely and
voluntarily executed.  When he testified at the hearing, notary public Arturo Malazo stated, "I know
Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before me when I notarized that document." Later, he added that
"the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were there and those were the persons present"
(sic). Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale
pales in the face of Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys greater
credence than that of an ordinary witness. The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by
the fact that while the property subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the vendors
also resided, the document was executed in San Miguel, Tarlac. What is important under the
Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction.  A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to
the document concerned.  It also vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is
impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof.  Such kind of proof has not been presented by
the petitioners.

3. LUCENTA vs. EVANGELISTA

Records disclose that Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. admitted having certified true copies of the Deed of
Quitclaim executed on May 7, 1977 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 7, 1972. His late
father, Atty. Cleto P. Evangelista, notarized the subject deeds.

By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. engaged in an unlawful and
deceitful conduct. He was not the notary public before whom said documents were acknowledged and he
was neither the custodian of the original copies thereof. The Records Management and Archives Office,
Manila, certified that there was no copy on file of the Deed of Quitclaim notarized by respondent’s father.
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is broad enough to cover any form of misconduct of a lawyer in his professional and personal
capacity.

In this connection, we have consistently held that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
the authenticity thereof. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is found guilty of gross misconduct.
Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately, with a warning that another infraction shall be dealt with more severely.