Expert Opinion Admissibility in Medical Malpractice Cases

Evidence Atty.
Jelyne Guadalupe
Atty
STUDY GUIDE NO. 5

EVIDENCE
6. OPINION RULE
Section 51. General rule. — The opinion of a witness is not

admissible, except as indicated in the following sections.
1. Why is opinion of a witness inadmissible as evidence?
Generally opinions are not admissible because:
a. The making of an opinion is the [proper function of the court.

The witness is supply the facts and for the court to form an
opinion based on these facts.
b. Opinions are not reliable because they are often influenced by
his own personal bias, ignorance, disregard of truth, socio-
cultural background, or religion, and similar personal factors.
Thus there may be as many diverse opinions as there are
witnesses.
c. The admission of opinions as evidence would open the
floodgate to the presentation of witnesses testifying on their
opinion and not on facts.
SECTION 52. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness

on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training or education, which he or she is shown to possess, may
be received in evidence.
2. Who is deemed an “expert” under Section 52 of Rule 130

of the Rules of Court?
He is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the

subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special
1|PeejayNotes
Evidence Atty. Jelyne Guadalupe
Atty
knowledge on questions on which he proposes special knowledge

to express an opinion. (Regalado, 2008)
Before one may be allowed to testify as an expert witness, his

qualification must first be established by the party presenting him.
(People vs. Fundano, G.R. No. 124737, June 26, 1998)
3. Read and digest the case of Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 91114.
September 25, 1992.
FACTS:
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly on
the ground that the latter has been allegedly suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." During trial, Juan's counsel
announced that he would present as his next witness Dr. Lydia
Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on
the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since the latter had examined the Nelly in a
professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Juan's counsel contended, however, that Dr.
Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would
not testify on any information acquired while attending to Nelly in
a professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and
allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness
stand, was qualified as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither
revealed the illness she examined and treated Nelly for nor
disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she
had prescribed.
ISSUE:
2|PeejayNotes
Atty
Whether privileged communication was violated by permitting

Dr. Acampado to give expert opinion testimony.
HELD:
No. The rule on this point is summarized as follows: „The

predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that
the statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed, is
not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a
lawsuit involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom
he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly
upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any
personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such
patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient
privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must
base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the
question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of
the patient acquired through the physician and patient
relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration
his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he
should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.”
4. When is expert evidence admissible?
Expert evidence is admissible in the following case:
1. The use of an expert is becoming more frequent in order to

explain how and why things happened the way they did or
didn’t happen the way they were supposed to.
2. Traditional areas where expert opinion is used:
a. Questions involving handwriting
b. Questioned documents
c. Fingerprints
d. Ballistics
3|PeejayNotes
Atty
e. Criminal cases involving injuries and death

f. Drug cases
g. Value of properties
h. Blood groupings
i. DNA Profiling
j. Forensics
5. Read and digest the cases of:

a. Casumpang, et al, v. Cortejo, G.R. No. 171127, March 11,
2015
FACTS:
On morning of April 22, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever
that lasted for one day; a few hours upon discovery, she (Mrs Jesusa
Cortejo, Mother) brought Edmer to their family doctor Dr. Livelo and two
hours after administering medications, Edmer’s fever had subsided. Dr.
Livelo diagnosed Edmer with "bronchopneumonia. " Edmer’s blood was
also taken for testing, typing, and for purposes of administering
antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an antibiotic medication
to lessen his fever and to loosen his phlegm.
At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the

doctor’s diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer
had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang merely
told her that her son’s "blood pressure is just being active," and
remarked that "that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no
phlegm." Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer in the
morning the following day. Still suspicious about his son’s illness, Mrs.
Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang’s attention and stated that Edmer
had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs.
Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer’s
sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang
simply nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs.
Cortejo that Edmer’s illness is bronchopneumonia.
4|PeejayNotes
Atty
In the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood
streak" prompting the respondent (Edmer’s father) to request for a
doctor at the nurses’ station. 45 minutes later, Dr. Sanga, one of the
resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although aware
that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to
examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it away.
She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for
examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering

Edmer’s head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found
that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were
not typical of dengue fever. Her medical findings state:
the patient’s rapid breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the
patient’s nose is flaring which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory
distress; the abdomen has negative finding; the patient has low grade
fever and not continuing; and the rashes in the patient’s skin were not
"Herman’s Rash" and not typical of dengue fever.
In the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon seeing Dr.
Sanga, the respondent showed her Edmer’s blood specimen, and
reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and
difficulty in moving his right leg.
Dr. Sanga then examined Edmer’s "sputum with blood" and noted
that he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue,
she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his
stomach with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction
not to pull out the tube, or give the patient any oral medication.
Dr. Sanga thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out

to be negative. She likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient’s
blood pressure and some blood tests. Edmer’s blood pressure was later
found to be normal.
5|PeejayNotes
Atty
Dr. Sanga called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about
Edmer’s condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered
several procedures done including: hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood
typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests.
Dr. Sanga advised Edmer’s parents that the blood test results showed
that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour
later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer’s room and he recommended his
transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to
the respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however,
insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the
last time, checked Edmer’s condition, found that his blood pressure was
stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The respondent requested
for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to
be found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him
₱600.00.
At midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.

Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the

patient’s clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination,
the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was
already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.24 His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an action
for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang
6|PeejayNotes
Atty
and Dr. Sanga (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the

RTC of Makati City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in considering Dr. Rodolfo
Tabangcora Jaudian as an expert witness.
RULING:
The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the trial court to
decide upon in the exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject matter of the
investigation, and the fitness of the expert witness. In our jurisdiction,
the criterion remains to be the expert witness' special knowledge
experience and practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly
technical medical matters to the Court.
In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court found the expert witness,

who is a pulmonologist, not qualified to testify on the field of
anesthesiology. Similarly, in Cereno v. Court of Appeals, a 2012 case
involving medical negligence, the Court excluded the testimony of an
expert witness whose specialty was anesthesiology, and concluded that
an anesthesiologist cannot be considered an expert in the field of
surgery or even in surgical practices and diagnosis.
Interestingly in this case, Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was

admittedly not a pediatrician but a practicing physician who specializes
in pathology. He likewise does not possess any formal residency training
in pediatrics. Nonetheless, both the lower courts found his knowledge
acquired through study and practical experience sufficient to advance an
expert opinion on dengue-related cases.
b. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198 (1999).
FACTS:
7|PeejayNotes
Atty
In the morning of June 17, 1985, Erlinda Ramos was brought into the
operating room of the Delos Santos Medical Center for a cholecystectomy.
She was then a robust woman, normal as any other except for occasional
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of
stones in her gall bladder. At around 3:00 p.m. of that day, Erlinda was
taken to the Intensive Care unit of the hospital, comatose. On January 8,
1986, Erlinda's husband filed a civil case for damages against said hospital
and Drs. Orlino Hosaka and Perfecta Gutierrez. The Regional Trial Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision of the lower court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
RULING:
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well
testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as, the
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances,
and manifest conditions which are observable by any one. This is precisely
allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of
expert witnesses is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert
testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence in non-technical
matters or those of which an ordinary person may be expected to have
knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to
render expert testimony unnecessary.
The provision in the rules of evidence regarding expert witnesses states:

Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown
to possess, may be received in evidence. Generally, to qualify as an expert
witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter
about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized
authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora
does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since
he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of
anesthesiology.
6. What are the criteria to qualify as an expert witness?
8|PeejayNotes
Atty
There is no definite standard in determining the degree of skill

or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an
expert as long as the following are present:
1. Training and education;
2. Particularity, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case;
and
3. Presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion
is based. (People v. Abriol, G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001)
7. Read and digest the case of Cebu Shipyard v. William

Lines, G.R. No. 132607 May 5, 1999.
FACTS:
Private respondent William Lines, Inc. was the owner of M/V
Manila City, a luxury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire
and sank while undergoing dry-docking and repairs within the
premises of petitioner Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc.
(CSEW) on February 16, 1991. The subject vessel was insured
with private respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance
Company, Inc. for P45 million. William Lines, Inc. sued CSEW for
damages and impleaded Prudential as co-plaintiff, after the latter
had paid William Lines, Inc. the value of the hull and machinery
insurance on the M/V Manila City. As a result of such payment
Prudential was subrogated to the claim of P45 million,
representing the value of the said insurance it paid. The trial court
rendered a decision against CSEW. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by
the appellate court. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner faulted
the Court of Appeals for adjudging it negligent and liable for
damages to the respondents, William Lines, Inc. and Prudential for
the loss of the vessel. Petitioner maintained that it did not have
9|PeejayNotes
Atty
exclusive control of the vessel and the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the
testimonies of the fire experts.
RULING:
Neither is there tenability in the contention of petitioner that
the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled on the inadmissibility of the
expert testimonies it (petitioner) introduced on the probable cause
and origin of the fire. Petitioner maintains that the Court of
Appeals erred in disregarding the testimonies of the fire experts,
Messrs. David Greyand Gregory Michael Southeard, who testified
on the probable origin of the fire in M/V Manila City. Petitioner
avers that since the said fire experts were one in their opinion that
the fire did not originate in the area of Tank Top No. 12 where the
JNB workers were doing hot works but on the crew
accommodation cabins on the portside No. 2 deck, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals should have given weight to such finding
based on the testimonies of fire experts; petitioner argues. But
courts are not bound by the testimonies of expert witnesses.
Although they may have probative value, reception in evidence of
expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. Section 49,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness

on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence. The word "may" signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness as evidence is a prerogative of the courts. It is
never mandatory for judges to give substantial weight to expert
testimonies. If from The acts and evidence on record, a conclusion
is readily ascertainable, there is no need for the judge to resort to
expert opinion evidence. In the case under consideration, the
10 | P e e j a y N o t e s
Atty
testimonies of the fire experts were not the only available

evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were
witnesses who were actually onboard the vessel when the fire
occurred. Between the testimonies of the fire experts who merely
based their findings and opinions on interviews and the
testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of more
probative value. Verily, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did
not err in giving more weight to said testimonies.
8. Is the opinion of an expert witness binding with the

court?
Courts are not bound as the opinions do not produce

conclusive effect but are regarded as persuasive and advisory
which the court may or may not consider.
9. Read and digest the case of Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R.

No. 171127, March 11, 2015.
FACTS:
On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Jesusa
Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the
Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of
difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever.
Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined

Edmer. In her testimony, Mrs. Cortejo narrated that in the morning of April
20, 1988, Edmer had developed a slight fever that lasted for one day; a
few hours upon discovery, she brought Edmer to their family doctor; and
two hours after administering medications, Edmer's fever had subsided. 5
After taking Edmer's medical history, Dr. Livelo took his vital signs,
body temperature, and blood pressure. Based on these initial examinations
and the chest x-ray test that followed, Dr. Livelo diagnosed Edmer with
"bronchopneumonia." Edmer's blood was also taken for testing, typing, and
Atty
for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave

Edmer an antibiotic medication to lessen his fever and to loosen his
phlegm.
Mrs. Cortejo did not know any doctor at SJDH. She used her Fortune
Care card and was referred to an accredited Fortune Care coordinator, who
was then out of town. She was thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel Casumpang
(Dr. Casumpang), a pediatrician also accredited with Fortune Care.
At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang for the first
time examined Edmer in his room. Using only a stethoscope, he confirmed
the initial diagnosis of "Bronchopneumonia."
At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the

doctor's diagnosis. She immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer
had a high fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang merely
told her that her son's "blood pressure is just being active," and remarked
that "that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the

morning the following day. Still suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs.
Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had
a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo
also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum.
Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply
nodded, inquired if Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that
Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited

"phlegm with blood streak" prompting the respondent (Edmer's father) to
request for a doctor at the nurses' station.
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one

of the resident physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that although
aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she failed to
Atty
examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it away. She
then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering

Edmer's head, eyes, nose, throat, lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that
Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that were not
typical of dengue fever. Her medical findings state: the patient's rapid
breathing and then the lung showed sibilant and the patient's nose is
flaring which is a sign that the patient is in respiratory distress; the
abdomen has negative finding; the patient has low grade fever and not
continuing; and the rashes in the patient's skin were not "Herman's Rash"
and not typical of dengue fever.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon

seeing Dr. Miranda, the respondent showed her Edmer's blood specimen,
and reported that Edmer had complained of severe stomach pain and
difficulty in moving his right leg.
Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted
that he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue,
she inserted a plastic tube in his nose, drained the liquid from his stomach
with ice cold normal saline solution, and gave an instruction not to pull out
the tube, or give the patient any oral medication.
Dr. Miranda thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out

to be negative. She likewise ordered the monitoring of the patient's blood
pressure and some blood tests. Edmer's blood pressure was later found to
be normal.
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his

clinic and told him about Edmer's condition. Upon being informed, Dr.
Casumpang ordered several procedures done including: hematocrit,
hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests.
The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.
Atty
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results
showed that Edmer was suffering from "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One
hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he recommended
his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent
consented. Since the ICU was then full, Dr. Casumpang suggested to the
respondent that they hire a private nurse. The respondent, however,
insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the
last time, checked Edmer's condition, found that his blood pressure was
stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The respondent requested for
an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be
found. This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him
P600.00.
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.

Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center.
Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the

patient's clinical history and laboratory exam results. Upon examination,
the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was
already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death
Certificate indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic
Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
RULING:
A close scrutiny of Ramos and Cereno reveals that the Court primarily
based the witnesses' disqualification to testify as an expert on their
incapacity to shed light on the standard of care that must be observed by
the defendant physicians. That the expert witnesses' specialties do not
match the physicians' practice area only constituted, at most, one of the
considerations that should not be taken out of context. After all, the sole
function of a medical expert witness, regardless of his/her specialty, is to
Atty
afford assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to explain the

medical facts in issue.
Furthermore, there was no reasonable indication in Ramos and

Cereno that the expert witnesses possess a sufficient familiarity with the
standard of care applicable to the physicians' specialties.
US jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial

courts' wide latitude of discretion in allowing a specialist from another field
to testify against a defendant specialist.
In Brown v. Sims, a neurosurgeon was found competent to give

expert testimony regarding a gynecologist's standard of pre-surgical care.
In that case, the court held that since negligence was not predicated on
the gynecologist's negligent performance of the operation, but primarily on
the claim that the pre-operative histories and physicals were inadequate,
the neurosurgeon was competent to testify as an expert.
Frost v. Mayo Clinic also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify

against a neurologist in a medical malpractice action. The court considered
that the orthopedic surgeon's opinion on the "immediate need for
decompression" need not come from a specialist in neurosurgery. The
court held that:
It is well established that "the testimony of a qualified medical doctor

cannot be excluded simply because he is not a specialist . . . ." The matter
of ". . . training and specialization of the witness goes to the weight rather
than admissibility . . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a

specialist in neurosurgery to express the opinions permitted to be
expressed by plaintiffs' doctors, e.g., the immediate need for a
decompression in the light of certain neurological deficits in a post-
laminectomy patient. As stated above, there was no issue as to the proper
Atty
execution of the neurosurgery. The medical testimony supported plaintiffs'

theory of negligence and causation.
In another case, the court declared that it is the specialist's

knowledge of the requisite subject matter, rather than his/her specialty
that determines his/her qualification to testify.
Also in Evans v. Ohanesian, 91 the court set a guideline in qualifying

an expert witness:
To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the

witness (1) has the required professional knowledge, learning and skill of
the subject under inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority
on the subject; and (2) is familiar with the standard required of a physician
under similar circumstances; where a witness has disclosed sufficient
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to the jury, the
question of the degree of his knowledge goes more to the weight of the
evidence than to its admissibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Nor is it critical whether a medical expert is a general practitioner or

a specialist so long as he exhibits knowledge of the subject. Where a duly
licensed and practicing physician has gained knowledge of the standard of
care applicable to a specialty in which he is not directly engaged but as to
which he has an opinion based on education, experience, observation, or
association wit that specialty, his opinion is competent. (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, Brown v. Mladineo adhered to the principle that the witness'

familiarity, and not the classification by title or specialty, which should
control issues regarding the expert witness' qualifications:
The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice

actions is that "a specialist in a particular branch within a profession will
Atty
not be required." Most courts allow a doctor to testify if they are satisfied
of his familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though he may not
practice the specialty himself. One court explained that "it is the scope of
the witness' knowledge and not the artificial classification by title that
should govern the threshold question of admissibility.
SECTION 53. Opinion of ordinary witness. - The opinion of a

witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding —
a) The identity of a person about whom he or she has adequate
knowledge;
b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity;
and
c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he or she is
sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the

emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
10. Read and digest the case of People v. Bulasag, G.R. No.
172869, July 28, 2008.
FACTS:
Michael Bascuguin testified that at around 10:30 p.m. of July 27,
2000, he was watching television inside their house with his mother and
cousin, Luisito Besas. When his mother was about to close the door of their
house, the lights suddenly went off and somebody kicked the door open.
Three men wearing bonnets over their faces entered their house. One
man, later identified as the appellant, had a gun while another carried a
kitchen knife. Together they held Estelita. Although Michael tried to get out
of the house, appellant chased and hogtied him. Appellant then demanded
money from Estelita threatening to kill Michael if she refused. Estelita gave
appellant an undetermined amount of money. Since appellant refused to
release Michael, Estelita ran out of the house and told Michael to run also.
Appellant shot Estelita while one of his companions stabbed her.
Atty
Thereafter, appellant and his companions fled. Michael sought help from
their neighbor, Jenneath, the appellant’s wife, but she initially refused since
there was no available vehicle. Later, they found a vehicle and went to the
house of Tatay Pecto, Estelita’s common-law husband, and informed him of
what happened to Estelita. They then proceeded to the police station to
report the incident.
On the hand, appellant Donato Bulasag denied the accusations

against him. He testified that on the date of the incident, he attended the
birthday celebration of his nephew, Jorge Bautista.
RTC finds the accused Donato Bulasag y Arellano alias "Dong"

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court. It observed

that all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide were present in
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently prove appellant’s identity
as the author of the crime.
RULING:
Yes. identification by the sound of the voice16 as well as familiarity with
the physical features17 of a person are sufficient and acceptable means of
identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had
known each other personally and closely for a number of years.
Noteworthy, Michael was able to recognize the gun used by the

malefactor. Michael testified that he had previously seen appellant carry it
three times before the incident. He also saw appellant fire the gun once in
front of their house. Worth stressing, appellant never denied ownership or
possession of such gun.
Atty
Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, this Court finds
credible and sufficient Michael’s identification of appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. When there is no evidence to indicate that the
witness against the accused has been actuated by any improper motive,
and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony
given by a witness is ordinarily accorded full faith and credit.
11. Is identification of the accused, through the sound of his

voice, acceptable in criminal cases?
Where it was established that the witness and the accused had
known each other personally and closely for a number of years,
identification by the sound of the voice of a person is sufficient and
acceptable means of identification.||| (People v. Prieto, G.R. No.
141259, [July 18, 2003], 454 PHIL 389-409)
12. When the subject of inquiry is the authenticity of

signatures/handwriting, is the testimony of the
handwriting expert indispensable?
The testimony of a handwriting expert is not indispensable to

the examination or the comparison of handwritings in cases of
forgery. The judge must conduct an examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity.
The opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon

courts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those
of the currently existing ones (Pontaoe v. Pontaoe, G.R. Nos.
159585 & 165318, April 22, 2008).
13. Read and digest the cases of:
Atty
a. Mendoza v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 177235, July 07, 2014.
FACTS:
Leonardo G. Mendoza, who died on November 25, 1986, is married
to petitioner Serconsision R. Mendoza. His legitimate and eldest daughter,
respondent Aurora Mendoza Fermin, was appointed as one of the
administratix in the testate proceedings of her father’s estate. In March
1989, petitioner submitted to probate court the inventory of her husband’s
properties including Lot 39, Block 12 of the consolidation and subdivision
plan Pcs-04-00250 in Parañaque City. In 1990, respondent discovered the
sale of this property to certain Eduardo c. Sanchez through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated on September 22, 1986 for an amount of Php150, 000.
However, the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Parañaque
City only on April 30, 1991, five (5) years after the alleged transfer. The
information as to the new owner was unknown to the tenants and the
petitioner continued to collect rentals after the alleged sale.
Convinced that the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale
was forged, respondent filed for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and
Transfer Certificate of Title and Damages praying that:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
52593 registered in the name of Eduardo C. Sanchez be declared null and
void.
2. Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria, in her capacity as the Register of Deeds
of Parañaque City, be ordered to revive and reinstate TCT No. 48946 in the
name of Leonardo G. Mendoza and Serconsision R. Mendoza.
3. Petitioner and Eduardo Sanchez be ordered to pay respondent the
sum of Php 50,000 as moral damages, Php 20,000 as corrective damages,
and Php 50,000 as attorney’s fees, as well as the cost of suit.
In support of her allegation, the respondent:
1. Claimed that she is familiar with her father’s signature, having
worked as his private secretary when the latter is still a Mayor of San
Pascual, Batangas.
2. Presented witnesses in the names of:
Atty
a. Noel Cruz (NBI Document Examiner) who testifies that the sample
signatures of the respondent’s father are different from that of the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
b. Teresita Rosales (Tenant of Subject Property until July 11, 1990) who
testifies that petitioner forged the signature of her husband in her request
for a marriage contract and also in the payment of rental receipt dated
November 24, 1986. She added that, the petitioner even boasted that she
was the one signing documents for her husband because of the latter’s
poor eyesight.
In addition, respondent had also, at hand, the Certifications from

Office of the Clerk of Court of Pasay City and City of Manila as evidences to
show that Atty. Julian Tubig was not commissioned as notary public of
Pasay City at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized.
In view of these claims, the petitioner denied by presenting an expert

in the name of Zacarias Semacio, Document Examiner III of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City who testified that there
was no forgery in the signature of petitioner’s husband on the Deed of
Absolute Sale compared to the latter’s sample signatures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent had the right to seek for the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of her father’s estate.
HELD:
YES. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the
spouses as it can be gleaned from TCT No. 48946 wherein it states that it
is owned by “Leonardo G. Mendoza & Serconsision R. Mendoza, both of
legal age”. Although Aurora has not adduced any proof to substantiate her
allegation that Serconsision was just the common-law wife of her father.
The applicable provision in governing the property relations of the

spouses is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that
the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s
consent. However, in Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, the Supreme Court
Atty
ruled that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by
the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable as supported by
Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the
husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are
annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned. However, the same article does not guarantee
that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will
be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, the Court ruled that as a result of the forged
signatures, the sale should be annulled for lack of consent on Leonardo’s
part since it was executed on September 22, 1986, one month after the
latter died.
Since the Deed of Absolute Sale is concluded before the Family Code
took effect, the transaction could still be governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code.
Article 173 provides the remedy available to Leonardo in this case

wherein his wife disposed their conjugal property without his consent:
Article 173. “The wife may, during the marriage, and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of the property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.”
In view of the fact that Leonardo is already dead means he can no

longer exercise this right and this death led to the dissolution of their
marriage. Therefore, as one of the heirs and administratix of her father’s
estate, the respondent had the right to seek for the annulment of the Deed
Atty
of Absolute Sale as it deprived her and other legal heirs of their hereditary
rights.
b. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010.
FACTS:
In a Complaint, appellant was charged by AAA, assisted by her
mother, BBB, with the crime of rape.
At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and the defense

failed to make any stipulation of facts.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private

offended party; Dr. Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas (Dr. Antillon-Malimas),
the doctor in Gingoog District Hospital who examined AAA; BBB, the
mother of AAA, who was also presented as rebuttal witness; and Myrna
delos Reyes-Villanueva, the Guidance Psychologist at the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center who conducted psychological tests on AAA to
determine her mental capacity.
RTC Convicted the appellant and CA affirmed.
Appellant contends that the records are bereft of any evidence that
would conclusively show that AAA was suffering from mental retardation.
BBB’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish
AAA’s mental retardation. Further, the "expert witness qualification" of the
prosecution’s supposed expert witness is highly questionable because she
had not acquired any doctorate degree in the field of psychology or
psychiatry. More so, the psychological tests administered by her on AAA
were inadequate to establish AAA’s mental capacity.
Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of

the prosecution to establish AAA’s mental retardation to make him guilty of
rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
concludes that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Atty
ISSUE:
The court a quo gravely erred in finding that [aaa] is a mental
retardate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove such mental
retardation.
RULING:
Accused posits that the prosecution was unable to prove that the
victim was a mental retardate. In rejecting this contention, the Court ruled
that a mental retardate, in general, exhibits a slow rate of maturation,
physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity. The
mental retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be manifested
by their overt acts, appearance, attitude and behavior, e.g., their manner
of walking, ability to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene,
dependency on others for protection and care and inability to achieve
intelligible speech, may be indicative of the degree of mental retardation of
a person which may be testified on and proven by ordinary witnesses who
come in contact with an alleged mental retardate. Moreover, for purposes
of determining the mental capacity of a person, the personal observation of
the trial judge suffices even in the absence of an expert opinion. Finally,
the admission made by accused’s father that he knew the victim to be
feeble-minded and retarded militates against the claim of the accused. The
victim’s condition was so apparent to people who have had an opportunity
to interact and deal with her that accused cannot deny the victim’s mental
condition.
8. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Section 54. Character evidence not generally admissible;

exceptions
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not

admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
Atty
(a) In Criminal Cases:
a. The character of the offended party may be proved if it

tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged
b. The accused may prove his or her good moral character,

pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or
her bad moral character unless on rebuttal.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is

admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved
in the case.
(c) In Criminal and Civil Cases
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until

such character has been impeached. In all cases in which
evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or
by ...or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances
of conduct.
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an

essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.
14. Read and digest the case of People v. Lee, G.R. No.
139070 May 29, 2002.
FACTS:
Atty
At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46

years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the living room
of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent
lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was an alley leading to General
Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and
activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other
was a store catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son
were watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an
armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a
sofa against the wall and window of their house and the television was to
his right. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her
son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out
of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-
appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed
at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the
window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph's head.
Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as
accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more-
two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were
fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue
sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son,
dragged his body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her
neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital
where he later died.
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the

shooting incident. Herminia told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee.
From the hospital, Herminia went to the St. Martin Funeral Homes where
Joseph's body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the Caloocan
City Police Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the
shooting.
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a)

Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and (b) himself. He denies the killing of
Atty
Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening of

September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He was having some drinks with his
neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson Columba. They were
enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also, in the
house were his wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando
and Nelson went home and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up
at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned that Joseph
Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To appellant's surprise, he was
tagged as Joseph's killer.
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their

houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their
neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death, on
September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying
to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victim's
bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten by his mother,
Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent
through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia
was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was
hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared
that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in
their household because of his drug habit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in hastily tagging the accused-
appellant, Noel Lee, as the assailant based merely on the biased
declaration of the mother without considering the shady character of the
victim against whom others might have an axe to grind.
RULING:
No. Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph's bad reputation in
their community. He alleges that the victim's drug habit led him to commit
other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom
he had stolen. As proof of Joseph's bad character, appellant presented
Atty
Herminia's letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph's

rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote
such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her son's thievery.
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the

Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:

--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain

qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the
opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the common report
of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. "Good moral
character" includes all the elements essential to make up such a character;
among these are common honesty and veracity, especially in all
professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among
people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the
standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of
good behavior and upright conduct.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as

legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating
thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed
to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties,
the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather
Atty
than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of
the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may
have a righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and
Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides

that the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents
proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of
innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an
inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This
view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high
reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him.
Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the

bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such
evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might
otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person
of bad character. The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a
privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the
failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. Once the defendant
raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal,
offer evidence of the defendant's bad character. Otherwise, a defendant,
secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a
false character upon the tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to

character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be "pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged," meaning, that the
character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act
charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of
assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. Sub-paragraph (3) of
Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party.
Atty
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be

proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged." Such evidence is most commonly
offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or
a claim of consent in a rape case.
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended

party is applied with frequency in sex offenses and homicide. In rape and
acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an unchaste act
perpetrated by a man against a woman where the willingness of a woman
is material, the woman's character as to her chastity is admissible to show
whether or not she consented to the man's act. The exception to this is
when the woman's consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape or rape
with violence or intimidation. In the crimes of qualified seduction or
consented abduction, the offended party must be a "virgin," which is
"presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation," or a "virtuous
woman of good reputation." The crime of simple seduction involves "the
seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over
twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x." The burden of proof that
the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and
the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of
bad reputation.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is

admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased's aggression;
and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious,
quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness,
gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.
When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent
character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a
justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
Atty
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is
irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing.
Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that
the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceased's drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands
of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the
claim that because of the victim's bad character he could have been killed
by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.
15. What is “character” in light of Section 54 of Rule 130 of

the Rules of Court?
The aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and

distinguish an individual person; the general result of one’s
distinguishing attributes. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004)
16. Discuss proof of moral character in sex offenses such as

rape and acts of lasciviousness.
In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution

involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a
woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the
woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to show
whether or not she consented to the man’s act. The exception
to this is when the woman’s consent is immaterial such as in
statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation. In the
crimes of qualified seduction or consented abduction, the
offended party must be a “virgin,” which is “presumed if she is
unmarried and of good reputation,” or a “virtuous woman of
good reputation.” The crime of simple seduction involves “the
seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good
reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x.”
The burden of proof that the complainant is a woman of good
Atty
reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may

introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad
reputation. (People vs. Noel Lee, G.R. No. 139070. May 29,
2002)
17. Discuss proof of moral character in homicide cases.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim

is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the
deceased’s aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind
of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-
seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness
and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in
determining whether the deceased or the accused was the
aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the
known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to
show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger
in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary. (People vs. Noel Lee,
G.R. No. 139070. May 29, 2002)

Expert Opinion Admissibility in Medical Malpractice Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Expert Opinion Admissibility in Medical Malpractice Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Evidence Atty.

STUDY GUIDE NO. 5

Section 51. General rule. — The opinion of a witness is not

1. Why is opinion of a witness inadmissible as evidence?

Generally opinions are not admissible because:

a. The making of an opinion is the [proper function of the court.

SECTION 52. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a witness

2. Who is deemed an “expert” under Section 52 of Rule 130

He is one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the

knowledge on questions on which he proposes special knowledge

Before one may be allowed to testify as an expert witness, his

Whether privileged communication was violated by permitting

No. The rule on this point is summarized as follows: „The

4. When is expert evidence admissible?

Expert evidence is admissible in the following case:

1. The use of an expert is becoming more frequent in order to

e. Criminal cases involving injuries and death

5. Read and digest the cases of:

At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the

Thereafter, Dr. Sanga conducted a physical check-up covering

Dr. Sanga thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out

At midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the

and Dr. Sanga (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court found the expert witness,

Interestingly in this case, Dr. Jaudian, the expert witness was

b. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198 (1999).

The provision in the rules of evidence regarding expert witnesses states:

6. What are the criteria to qualify as an expert witness?

There is no definite standard in determining the degree of skill

7. Read and digest the case of Cebu Shipyard v. William

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness

testimonies of the ﬁre experts were not the only available

8. Is the opinion of an expert witness binding with the

Courts are not bound as the opinions do not produce

9. Read and digest the case of Casumpang v. Cortejo, G.R.

Dr. Ramoncito Livelo (Dr. Livelo) initially attended to and examined

for purposes of administering antibiotics. Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave

At that moment, Mrs. Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the

Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the

At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited

Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one

Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering

At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Upon

Dr. Miranda thereafter conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out

At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his

The blood test results came at about 6:00 in the evening.

At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.

Dr. Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the

afford assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to explain the

Furthermore, there was no reasonable indication in Ramos and

US jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial

In Brown v. Sims, a neurosurgeon was found competent to give

Frost v. Mayo Clinic also allowed an orthopedic surgeon to testify

It is well established that "the testimony of a qualified medical doctor

xxx xxx xxx

It did not appear to the court that a medical doctor had to be a

execution of the neurosurgery. The medical testimony supported plaintiffs'

In another case, the court declared that it is the specialist's

Also in Evans v. Ohanesian, 91 the court set a guideline in qualifying

To qualify a witness as a medical expert, it must be shown that the

xxx xxx xxx