SECOND DIVISION and interests of said corporation subject of the Deed of
and -
[Adm. Case No. 5764. January 13, 2003]
REUBEN M. PROTACIO, complainant, vs.  ATTY. ROBERTO M.
MENDOZA, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Roberto
M. Mendoza for his alleged failure to require the parties to a
document which he notarized to appear personally before him.
Complainant Reuben M. Protacio alleged that, as president
of Jumping Jap Trading Company, Inc. (JJTC, Inc.), he filed in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on March 7, 2001 a
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents
against the spouses Nobuyasu and Carmencita Nemoto and the
Metropolitan Land Corporation. He claimed that respondent
Atty. Roberto M. Mendoza, who served as counsel for the
spouses Nemoto in that case, had presented in the investigation
a resolution of the JJTC, Inc., dated March 30, 1998, which
purported to have been signed by him (the complainant), as
president/director of JJTC, Inc., and Nobuyasu Nemoto, as
director thereof. The resolution had been notarized by
respondent. It reads:
RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED THAT Jumping Jap
Corporation/Jumping Jap Company transfers, conveys and
assigns unto Carmencita I. Fradejas, all of the said corporations
rights and interests over a parcel of land with a residential house
erected thereon, located at #167 (#112) Pili Drive Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa City covered by TCT No. 205572 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Makati registered in the name of
Metropolitan Land Corporation with an area of 618 sq. m.
RESOLVED FINALLY that Reuben Protacio, President of Jumping
Jap Trading Corp./Jumping Jap Company whose specimen
signature appears hereinbelow be authorized and empowered
for and in behalf of said corporation to execute the Deed of
Assignment transferring, conveying and assigning all of the rights
- 
Conditional Sale dated 1 December 1997, in favor of Carmencita
I. Fradejas.
APPROVED, Manila, 30 March 1998.[1]
Complainant claimed that he did not sign the board
resolution nor did he attend a board meeting of the corporation
on the date stated therein (March 30, 1998), and therefore the
signature purporting to be his was a forgery. He alleged that the
Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Manila had in fact
certified that it did not have a copy of the board resolution in
question because respondent had not submitted his notarial
report for March 1998. Furthermore, according to complainant,
the records of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
showed that Nobuyasu Nemoto was out of
the country on March 30, 1998, having left the Philippines on
March 26, 1998 and having returned only on March 31,
1998. Hence, complainant claimed, it was impossible for
Nobuyasu Nemoto to have attended the supposed board
meeting on March 30, 1998 and to have signed the resolution on
the same date. Complainant charged that respondent knowingly
and maliciously notarized the said board resolution without the
presence of the party allegedly executing it.
In addition, another document entitled Deed of
Assignment, dated April 2, 1998, appeared to have also been
notarized by respondent, purporting to have been signed by
complainant as one of the parties therein. The Deed of
Assignment reads:
Know All Men By These Presents:
This Deed of Assignment made and entered into on this 2nd day
of April 1998 at Manila by and between:
Jumping Jap Trading Corporation/Jumping Jap Company, a
corporation existing under and by virtue of Philippine law, with
business address at No. 310 Galeria de Magallanes
Condominium, Magallanes Village, Makati City, here represented
by its President, Reuben Protacio, hereinafter referred to as
ASSIGNOR;
1
Carmencita I. Fradejas, Filipino, of legal age, single and with
residence at #167 (#112) Pili Drive, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa City, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE.
WITNESSETH That
The parties have agreed as follows:
The ASSIGNOR for value received, hereby transfers, conveys,
and assigns unto the ASSIGNEE, her heirs, and successors-in-
interest, all of the formers rights and interests over a parcel of
land with a residential house erected thereon, located at #167
(#112) Pili Drive, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City, covered
by TCT No. 205572 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati
registered in the name of Metropolitan Land Corporation, with
an area of 618 sq.m. and subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale
dated 1 December 1997.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their
signatures on this 2nd day of April, 1998, in Manila. [2]
Complainant denied that he had signed this deed of
assignment. He pointed out that the Notarial Section of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila had certified that there was no
such document on file in that office as respondent had not
submitted a notarial report for April 1998.[3]
Complainant alleged that respondent should not have
notarized any document without first requiring the presence of
the parties to attest to him that it had been duly executed, made
voluntarily and with the knowledge of the parties involved. He
asked that respondent be held accountable, and respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law. [4]
In his answer,[5] respondent insisted that on March 30,
1998, the JJTC, Inc. had adopted a board resolution authorizing
the transfer of its rights over some property in favor of one
Carmencita Fradejas, who subsequently married Nobuyasu
Nemoto. He insisted that the resolution, dated March 30, 1998,
had been signed by complainant and Nobuyasu Nemoto and
later notarized by him (respondent). Respondent said that the
document was dated March 30, 1998 because it was prepared
on that date, but it was actually signed by the parties therein
only on March 31, 1998, upon the arrival of Nobuyasu Nemoto
from Japan. It was alleged that, through inadvertence,
respondent failed to change the date. Respondent maintained
that the signature appearing on the board resolution was that of
complainant, who participated in the board meeting. He
explained that he failed to submit his notarial report for 1998
because it was lost when he transferred his residence from Sta.
Cruz, Manila to Makati City.
With regard to the Deed of Assignment, respondent
claimed that it was executed by complainant in the presence of
respondent and other witnesses. As proof of the authenticity of
complainants signature in the Deed of Assignment, he furnished
a letter addressed to the Metropolitan Land Corp., dated April
20, 1998, allegedly prepared by complainant, in which he
(complainant) appeared to be confirming a request he had
previously made for the substitution of the JJTC, Inc.
by Carmencita I. Fradejas as vendee in the Deed of Conditional
Sale, pursuant to the Deed of Assignment dated 30 March
1998. The letter reads:
20 April 1998
METROPOLITAN LAND CORP.
Penthouse JMT Corp. Cond.
ADB Ave., Ortigas Center
Pasig City, Philippines
Attention: JOSE MA. V. LAMUG
Managing Director
Dear Mr. Lamug:
This will formalize my request for the change of the
name of the Vendee in the Deed of Conditional Sale
between Metropolitan Land Corporation and Jumping
Jap Trading Corp/Jumping Jap Company dated 1
December 1997 from Jumping Jap Trading
Corp/Jumping Jap Company to Carmencita I. Fradejas,
pursuant to the Deed of Assignment dated 30 March
1998, executed by said corporation in favor of the
latter. Enclosed are copies [of] said Deed of
Assignment and Board Resolution authorizing such
Deed of Assignment, for your ready reference.
With the aforesaid Deed of Assignment, Jumping Jap
Trading Corp/Jumping Jap Company, through the
undersigned, hereby releases Metropolitan Land
Corporation from any and all present and future
claims arising from the execution of the above-
mentioned Conditional Deed of Sale.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
REUBEN PROTACIO
President[6]
Respondent stated he was ready to submit the original
of the Board Resolution and Deed of Assignment to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for analysis and comparison of the
signatures therein with complainants signature in his Complaint-
Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to
prove the authenticity of complainants signatures in the
questioned documents.
In his report, dated November 27, 2001, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) found respondent to have been negligent in the
performance of his duties and obligations as a notary public and
recommended the revocation of his notarial commission for a
period of two years.[7] The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that respondents
2
commission as notary public be suspended and that he be
disqualified from appointment as notary public for two years.
The findings of the IBP are supported by the evidence in
the record.
Act No. 2103[8] provides:
SECTION 1. (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a
notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country
to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
It is necessary that a party to any document notarized by a
notary public appear in person before the latter and affirm the
contents and truth of what are stated in the document. [9] The
importance of this requirement cannot be gainsaid. The
acknowledgement of a document is not an empty meaningless
act. By it a private document is converted into a public
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. For this reason, it behooves every notary public
to see to it that this requirement is observed and that formalities
for the acknowledgment of documents are complied with. [10]
In this case, Nobuyasu Nemoto, who was allegedly a
signatory to a resolution of a corporation, allegedly notarized by
respondent, could not have signed the document on March 30,
1998, the date indicated therein, since he was not then in the
Philippines. Respondents explanation that Nemoto actually
signed the document on March 31, 1998, after arriving from
Japan, cannot be accepted. Documents must speak the truth
if their integrity is to be preserved. That is what a notary public
vouches for when he states in the jurat that the parties have
appeared before him at the time and in the place he (the notary
public) states and that the document is then a free act and
deed. It is for this reason that public documents are given full
faith and credit, at least as to their due execution.
 Even more serious than the failure of respondent to
indicate the true date of the resolution is his failure to file a copy
of the document with the Regional Trial Court of Manila as
required by law. Chapter 11 of Act No. 2657 (Administrative
Code), as amended, provides:
SEC. 245. Notarial register. Every notary public shall keep a
register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record
shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply
a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any
person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefor.
Such register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the
Attorney-General to any notary public upon request and upon
payment of the actual cost thereof, but officers exerci
sing the functions of notaries public ex officio shall be supplied
with the register at Government expense. The register shall be
duly paged, and on the first page, the Attorney-General shall
certify the number of pages of which the book consists.
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall
enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him,
the person executing, swearing to or acknowledging the
instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of
the execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument, the
fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection
therewith, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep
a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise
enter in said records a brief description of the substance thereof,
and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning
with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall
also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries.
....
A certified copy of each months entries as described in this
section and a certified copy of any instrument acknowledged
before them shall within the first ten days of the month next
following be forwarded by the notaries public to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of the province and shall be filed under
the responsibility of such officer: Provided, That if there is no
entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a
statement to this effect in lieu of the certified copies herein
required. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents failure to comply with the duty to file a copy
of the resolution with the Regional Trial Court of Manila and to
send to it the entries in his notarial register constitutes a
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission.[11]
However, we think that the suspension of respondent for
one year as a notary public would be more appropriate
considering that there is no competent proof that complainants
signature in the documents notarized by respondent was forged.
What was clearly established in this case was respondents failure
to submit a copy of the Board Resolution and the Deed of
Assignment notarized to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In Doughlas v. Lopez, Jr.,[12] the Court suspended the respondent
therein from his commission as notary public for one year,for
notarizing the verification of a motion to dismiss when three of
the affiants thereof did not appear before him and for notarizing
the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. In
another case, Coronado v. Felongco,[13] the Court, in
suspending the respondent for two months as a notary public
considered the fact that it was his first offense and that he
expressed remorse for his negligence in notarizing a document,
not knowing that one of the affiants thereof has died a few days
before the date of notarization
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Roberto M. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from his commission as a
notary public for a period of one (1) year with WARNING that a
repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-
Martinez, and  Callejo, Sr., JJ.,  concur.
3
 THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994
ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,  my Pacto de Retro. Findings showed that many
vs.
ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.
MELO, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag
charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and
notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein
complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit, which
accompanied her letter-complaint, alleged that respondent:
. . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE
RETRO sale with me as the Vendee-a-Retro last
January 21, 1987 in this City using Original
Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office
of the Register of Deeds herein in Iligan as a
result of which I was swindled in One hundred
eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00) because
the said land sold to me by Pacto de Retro  was
already sold ahead of time to another party,
using the owner's duplicate copy of the title.
That during our pacto de retro sale, as I was
suspicious already of the appearance of the
Original Certificate of Title, having many
annotations and old patches thereof, when I
brought the matter to the attention of Atty.
Jose A. Grageda, notarizing the same, he
simply answered me that the title was all right
and that he told me further not to worry as he
is an attorney and besides he knew very well
the Vendor-a- Retro  whose business
transactions especially notarial matter has
been and in fact always handled by him
(Attorney Jose A. Grageda).
That said stolen Original Certificate of Land
Title was confiscated by Iligan City Register of
Deeds, Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on the
occasion when I applied for registration of
other cased of stolen original certificates of
land titles have taken place in the said office
but the said Attorney as the Register of Deeds
did not prosecute the thieves thereof.
I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-
Retro  together with her accomplices to include
said Attorney Jose A. Grageda, coursing it
through the local Barangay Captain last May
1987 yet, then forwarded to the City Fiscal
through the Police Station Commander in June
1987 but that and until the time of this Report
was not tried in Court yet but that the
Information did not include said Atty. Jose A.
Grageda, hence this report.
(p. 2, Vol. I, Record.)
Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, 1989,
pertinently alleging:
6. That they showed me a copy of the title
which I examined and found out the title was
clear and there was no annotation or entry so I
told them that as far as the title was concern
there was no encumbrances or annotation and
can be the subject of the Pacto de Retro;
7. That they insisted that I notarized the
document so I proceeded to translate the
document in Cebu, Visayan dialect to make
sure that the parties understood the deed and
they replied that they understood this and I
asked then further if they have any more to
add or delete; they answered that there was
no more and they will sign the same;
4
8. That I told them to sign the document above
their typewritten name which they did and
witnessed by the other person with them who
were present, so after their signature in good
faith based upon their documents I notarized
the same.
(p. 10, Vol. II, Record.)
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution
of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled hearings for
reception of evidence but complainant manifested that she
cannot proceed to Manila and attend to her case due to financial
constraints. Upon the other hand, respondent could no longer
be located, having moved without leaving any forwarding
address.
Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the complaint and
the supporting affidavit, as well as the counter-affidavit of
respondent, found that "there is reason for disciplining the
respondent" premised upon the following observations:
Respondent first admits that he was consulted
by the vendor-a-retro and the complainant
(vendee-a-retro) on the matter of the title
when he was asked to notarize the Deed of
Sale a Retro. He admits that he rendered an
opinion based on the title that was presented
to him. It turns out that the title presented to
him is the Original Certificate of Title which
only the Register of Deeds has custody of and
he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity.
As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should
have been alerted and should have reported
the irregularity of an Original Certificate of
Title, which should be in the exclusive
safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the
 possession of unauthorized persons. Even if it
were the photostat copy of said Original
Certificate of Title that was presented to him,
the same did not bear any certification by the
Register of Deeds which could have alerted
him of the irregularity. The testimony that the
Original was shown to him has not been
controverted. The Vendee was in fact in
possession of the Original because it was
testified that when the Register of Deeds
found that respondent was in possession, the
original certificate was confiscated by the
Register of Deeds.
The Commission takes special note of a notary
public acting more than a notary public and
goes beyond mere certification of the presence
of the signatories, their having signed, and
having contracted. By transcending these
bounds, such notary public has entered the
realm of giving "legal advice" — thus "acting
also as counsel aside from notary public" to
the parties to the contract.
Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the
legal duty to advice him properly of the
irregularities and the dangers of holding the
Original Certificate which should have been in
the custody of the Register of Deeds.
Respondent had acted recklessly at the least,
in his advise of the vendee. He rendered an
opinion that was irresponsible that his client
relied upon — which recklessness is
censurable.
(pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol.
Record.)
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation
of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the
public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal Feliciano, J., Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by Bidin, J., is on leave.
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA
1 [1992]).
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in
seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction
for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the
avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have
fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the
subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an
informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent
upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.
After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a
private document converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.
ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the
warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct
will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be
spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly
circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
5
 SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 3324           February 9, 2000
PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and
BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR., complainants,  best of our knowledge and belief.
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BUENA, J.:
Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and
Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative sanctions be
imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having
observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his
duties as notary public.
In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through
their counsel Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint
against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI
Davao Extension Office, Davao City.
Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With
Answer To Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and
Exchange Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:
V E R I F I C AT I O N
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.
WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL
DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI PAGUNSAN,
ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having
been sworn in accordance with law depose and say:
1. That we were the one who caused the above writings
to be written;
2. That we have read and understood all statements
therein and believed that all are true and correct to the
IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures
on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan
de Oro, Philippines.
By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz           (Sgd.) Camagay           (Sgd.)
M Donato
By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate
(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan           (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named
affiants on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.
Notary Public3
Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not
his, but that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the
signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty.
Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent
Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said persons participated in the
said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants averred
that respondent's act undermined the public's confidence for
which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed
against him.
In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi
Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the correctness of
the allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC
through their authorized representatives known by their names
as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B.
6
Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every
signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed
for and in the interest of his client backed-up by their
authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in
behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written
authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the said
authorizations he notarized the said document.
Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his
client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by
the word "By" which suggests that he did not in any manner
make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside
from the fact that his clients authorized him to sign for and in
their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence
to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing
said pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further
alleged that the complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil
motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court
losses, for respondent is only a lawyer defending a client and
prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for
damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a
consequence thereof.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of
the Philippines recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto
Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public
for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the said
recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent's
Commission for six (6) months for failure to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss With
Answer prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in
behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian
Diaz signed for her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the
respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their
signatures, because he was their counsel in said case and also
because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation
represented by the respondents-Pastors.
But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good
faith, the fact remains that the same cannot be condoned. He
failed to state in the preliminary statements of said
motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by
their designated attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having signed the
Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared
before himself as Notary Public.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 7 That function
would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested
in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself
and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be
thwarted.8
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary
public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state.9
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public
should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The acts of
affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated
therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to
the same personally and not through any representative.
Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the
said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is
only the time they can affix their signatures and personally
appear before the notary public for notarization of said
document.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with
public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the
legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate
consequences of his professional indiscretion. 10
That respondent acted the way he did because he was
confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all.
As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all
times.11 For notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss
With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before
him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one
of the signatories, he failed to exercise due diligence in
upholding his duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the
Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a period
of one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
7
 EN BANC
(which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a
court that issued his notarial commission for Cotabato City and petition for notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A.C. No. 7036
the Province of Maguindanao) since certain Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted
A. LAQUINDANUM,
Complainant, Present: documents[3] notarized by him had been reaching her office. upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged that
  the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction was that she
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA,
Respondent. June 29, 2009 However, despite such directive, respondent questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the
x------------------------------------------------ continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a
x
Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
DECISION [4]
Card executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of
 
of Drivers License[5] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes. this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his
PUNO, C.J.:   petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from
 
  Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend his notarial acts because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary

Quintana) stemmed from a letter[1] addressed to the Court filed beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanaobecause Public[10] issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the

by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.

Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of  

requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for the Province of Cotabato. The City within Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by

performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is the province of Cotabatois Kidapawan City, and Judge Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued

beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court not Cotabato City. notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking for so

that issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge

do notarial acts in his absence. of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty. Quintanas wife Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings;

In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office communicated with his clients; and disseminated information

to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely

[7]
as attested to by the Joint Affidavit  executed by Kristine C. through letters, pronouncements, and directives to court clerks

monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes. and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow

bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public   lawyers.

shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,[8] we required  

authority. Hence, she wrote a letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum. Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in

him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial   his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of

jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate

8
any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he
was equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he
did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes
documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that
as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal
profession in the entire Philippines.
 
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum
had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive
Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and
the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
the Province of Cotabato.
[11]
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,  we referred
this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
 
[12]
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing  before the OBC
presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge
Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, which was [13]
notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004. [14] Honorata Rosil appears as
one of the signatories of the document as the donors
wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as
[15]
shown by the Certificate of Death  issued by the Civil Registrar
of Ibohon, Cotabato.
 
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana
continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007
despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in
the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had
expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the
same.[16] To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented
[17]
the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of] Title  executed by Betty
G. Granada with subscription dated April 8,
[18]
at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy  of Mr. Elias
Diosanta Arabis with subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3)
[19]
Affidavit of Loss [of] Drivers License  executed by Anecito C.
Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss [20] executed by Santos V.
Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at
Midsayap, Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the
signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits of
Judge Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1)
Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card [21] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and
[22]
(2) Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License  executed by Elenita D.
Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss [23] executed by Santos V.
Magbanua. He explained that those documents were signed by
his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of
Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them
notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a
lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents.According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to
stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
9
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum
already did not act on his petition, because he did not comply with her
requirements for him to transfer his membership to the
Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
President.
2006  
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that
she was only performing her responsibility and had nothing
against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his
petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, [24] which is a
requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She
told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP,
but she did not return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he
enclosed in his Response the certification of good standing and
payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was
examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to
oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send
them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.
 
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he
had done and promised not to repeat the same. He also asked
that he be given another chance and not be divested of his
privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his
family.
 

On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC
the documents[25] issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to
prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
 
In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge
Laquindanum  the commissioning court is
submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty.
Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9,
2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381.Likewise, the arrears
of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003
were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No.
610387. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial
commission in 2004, he had not yet completely paid his IBP
dues.
 
In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC
recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being
appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his
notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for
two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised
by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended
his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan,
Cotabato, which is already outside his
territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary
Public.
 
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides, thus:
 
Jurisdiction and
Term A person
commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial
acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of
January of the year in which
made, unless earlier revoked
[or] the notary public has
resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court.
 
Under the rule[,] respondent may
perform his notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive
Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and
the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But
definitely he cannot extend his commission as
notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in
any place of the province of Cotabato as he is
not commissioned thereat to do such
act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of
either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North
Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that
he can exercise his notarial commission in
Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is
part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely
devoid of merit.
xxxx
 
Further, evidence on record also
shows that there are several documents which
the respondents wife has herself
notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot
be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not
authorize the latter to notarize documents in
his absence. According to him[,] he even
scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore
as it would affect his profession.
10
 
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et
al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the
Court held, thus:
 
A notary public is
personally accountable for
all entries in his notarial
register; He cannot relieve
himself of this responsibility
by passing the buck to their
(sic) secretaries
 
A person who is commissioned as a
notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register. Respondent
cannot take refuge claiming that it was his
wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife
to notarize documents. He is personally
accountable for the activities in his office as
well as the acts of his personnel including his
wife, who acts as his secretary.
 
Likewise, evidence reveals that
respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of
Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata
Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants
therein, was already dead at the time of
notarization as shown in a Certificate of
Death (Rollo, p.80)  issued by the Civil Registrar
General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
 
A person shall not perform a notarial
act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known
to the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
 
 Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of
Donation without even determining the
presence or qualifications of affiants therein,
respondent only shows his gross negligence
and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
 
xxxx
 
Furthermore, respondent claims that
he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the
right to practice his profession including
notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This
statement is barren of merit.
 
While it is true that lawyers in good
standing are allowed to engage in the practice
of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not
every lawyer even in good standing can
perform notarial functions without having
been commissioned as notary public as
specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted
himself to the commissioning court by filing his
petition for issuance of his notarial (sic)
Notarial Practice. The commissioning court
may or may not grant the said petition if in his
sound discretion the petitioner does not meet
the required qualifications for [a] Notary
Public. Since respondent herein did not submit
himself to the procedural rules for the issuance
of the notarial commission, he has no reason
at all to claim that he can perform notarial
act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority
to do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of
respondent, complainant being the
commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato
has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the
duties and responsibilities including liabilities,
if any, of a notary public commissioned or
those performing notarial acts without
authority in her territorial jurisdiction. [29]
 
xxxx
 
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months and
revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial
commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the
gravity and number of his offenses.
 
After a careful review of the records and evidence,
there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized
documents outside the area of his commission as a notary
public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired
commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his
absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.
 
The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of
commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a
violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also
partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.[30] Notarizing
documents with an expired commission is a violation of the
lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing
that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
11
proscribes.[31] Notarizing documents without the presence of the
signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,[32] Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which
unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any
falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for
the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He
cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his
wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
 
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his
obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole
source of income for his family will not serve to lessen the
penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel
that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should
not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege
granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties
imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several
occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those
not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general. It must be underscored that notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of the authenticity thereof.[33]
 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty.
Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING
that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt
of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.
 
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal
records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

12
 SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5436. May 27, 2004]
ALFREDO BON, complainant, vs. ATTYS. VICTOR S. ZIGA and
ANTONIO A. ARCANGEL, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On May 9, 2001, Alfredo Bon (complainant) filed
a Complaint[1]  dated April 3, 2001  for disbarment against the
respondents, Attys. Victor S. Ziga (Ziga) and Antonio A. Arcangel
(Arcangel). Allegedly, the respondents, conspiring with each
other and with the use of fraud, intimidation, stealth, deception
and monetary consideration, caused Amalia Bon-Padre Borjal,
Teresa Bon-Padre Patenio, Felecito Bon and Angelina Bon
(collectively, the Bons) to sign a document entitled Waiver and
Quitclaim. According to the complainant, the Bons signed
the Waiver and Quitclaim  because of Zigas representation that
the document was merely a withdrawal of a previously executed
Special Power of Attorney. As it turned out, the document was a
waiver in favor of Ziga of all the properties which the Bons
inherited from their parents and predecessors-in-
interest. Attached to the Complaint  are Affidavits[2]  executed by
the Bons renouncing the Waiver and Quitclaim.
Moreover, the complainant claims that the Bons are
residents of Manila and did not appear before Arcangel who was
then in Albay to acknowledge the Waiver and Quitclaim. Despite
this fact, Arcangel notarized the document and even made it
appear that the Bons personally appeared before him to
acknowledge the same.
On November 20, 2001, the respondents filed their Joint
Comment[3] dated October 6, 2001. According to them, the
allegations in the Complaint that the Bons did not understand
the contents of the Waiver and Quitclaim and that they did not
personally appear to acknowledge the same before Arcangel
indicate that the cause of action is based on alleged intrinsic
defects in the document. As such, only the parties to the
document, i.e.,  the Bons, whose rights were violated can file
the Complaint.  Being a stranger to the allegedly defective
document, the complainant cannot file the Complaint. Besides,
Maria Bon Borjal and Rafael Bon-Canafe who are co-signatories
to the Waiver and Quitclaim both declared in their Joint
Affidavit[4] that Ziga thoroughly explained the contents of
the Waiver and Quitclaim  to the Bons before they signed the
document. The subscribing witnesses, Rogelio Bon-Borjal and
Nida Barrameda, also declared in their Joint Affidavit[5] that the
contents of the document were explained to the signatories.
The respondents also aver that it is difficult to believe that
the Bons did not understand the contents of the document they
were signing since Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high school
graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college graduate. [6] Further, the
fact that the Bons admit having accepted P5,000.00 from Ziga to
sign the Waiver and Quitclaim precludes them from questioning
the document.
For Arcangels part, he explains that assuming that he
notarized the Waiver and Quitclaim in the absence of the
signatories, his act is merely a violation of the Notarial Law but
not a ground for disbarment. He further avers that he was able
to talk to Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe, both co-signatories
to the document, over the phone. Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-
Canafe allegedly declared that they signed the Waiver and
Quitclaim. The two, in fact, personally delivered the document
for notarization in his office. Thus, he posits that there was
substantial compliance with the Notarial Law since a notary
publics primordial undertaking is merely to ensure that the
signatures on a document are genuine. As long as they are so,
the notary public can allegedly take the risk of notarizing the
document although the signatories are not present.
In conclusion, the respondents aver that the complainant
must first prove that the Waiver and Quitclaim is defective
before he can file an administrative case against them.
The complainant filed a Reply, Opposition and Comment to
Joint Comment of Respondents [7] dated April 5, 2001 asserting
that he has a right to complain over the acquisition of the
13
properties subject of the Waiver and Quitclaim having been
mentioned therein. He also avers that he has the right to inform
the Court of the deception committed by the respondents. He
further states that the Bons signed the document after having
been deceived and intimidated by Ziga who, he claims, exercises
moral ascendancy over the Bons. That the Bons are educated
does not necessarily mean they could not have been intimidated
and deceived. He maintains that the Bons were misled into
believing that what they were signing was a withdrawal of a
previously issued Special Power of Attorney and were
given P5,000.00 each to induce them to sign the Waiver and
Quitclaim.
Even assuming that the signatures appearing on
the Waiver and Quitclaim are genuine, he asserts that it was still
highly irregular for Arcangel to notarize the document by
telephone when it could have been notarized in Manila where
the signatories reside. Lastly, he avers that it is not necessary for
a court to declare that the Waiver and Quitclaim  is defective
before the instant administrative case can proceed.
The respondents filed their Comment on Complainants
Reply[8]  dated April 12, 2002 alleging that in his reply, the
complainant changed his cause of action from fraud and
deception to intimidation and moral ascendancy. According to
them, the complainant is incompetent to charge Ziga with
intimidation as he was not a party to the document and was not
even present when it was executed. The respondents insist that
the only instance when anyone can file a disbarment complaint
against a lawyer is when the ground therefore is a public offense
like immorality, misbehavior, betrayal of trust and the
like. When, as in the instant case, the parties to the alleged
defective document have not formally impugned the document
themselves, no one else can.
In the Courts Resolution[9]  dated July 22, 2002, we referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Citing the Report
and Recommendation[10]  dated November 7, 2002 of its
Investigating Commissioner, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-604[11]  on December 14, 2002 dismissing the Complaint  for
lack of merit. According to the Report and Recommendation, the
Bons failure to file the appropriate action to set aside
the Waiver and Quitclaim  casts doubt on their claim that Ziga
misled or deceived them into signing the document. As regards
Arcangel, the IBP concluded that while he may have been remiss
in his duties as a notary public, the same does not constitute a
ground for disbarment.
The complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[12] dated February 24, 2003 which the IBP denied
in Resolution No. XV-2003-149[13]  issued on March 22, 2003 since
it no longer has jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter
already endorsed to the Supreme Court. The complainant then
filed with this Court a Motion for Re-Examination of the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines[14] dated September 10, 2003
mainly rehashing his claim that the respondents induced the
Bons to sign the Waiver and Quitclaim by means of deceit and
abuse of moral ascendancy.
We are hard put to ascribe to Ziga the fraud, intimidation,
stealth and deception with which the complainant labels his
actuations. The fact that Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high
school graduates, while Teresa Bon is a college
graduate[15] makes it difficult to believe that they were deceived
into thinking that the contents of the Waiver and
Quitclaim  were other than what they themselves could have
easily ascertained from a reading of the document. As held by
the Court in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals:[16]
The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its
contents has been applied even to contracts of illiterate persons
on the ground that if such persons are unable to read, they are
negligent if they fail to have the contract read to them. If a
person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to
procure some reliable persons to read and explain it to him,
before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he signed it if
he were able to do so and his failure to obtain a reading and
explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from
avoiding it on the ground that he was ignorant of its contents [17]
Besides, the Waiver and Quitclaim is plainly worded. It
does not contain complicated terms that might be misconstrued
by anyone who has half the education attained by Amalia,
Angelina and Teresa Bon. Moreover, the Bons admitted therein
that in 1930, their predecessors sold to the Ziga family the
properties to which they now lay claim. They also declared in the
document that it was only their brother, Alfredo, the
complainant in this case, who still claimed rights over the
properties. The relevant provisions of the Waiver and
Quitclaim  state:
1. We are heirs and direct descendants of the late Santiago Bon
of Tabaco, Albay;
2. We had been named as formal parties in DARAB Case No. V-
RC-010, Albay Branch 11 99 entitled Virginia Desuyo, et al. vs.
Alfredo Bon, et al.;
3. We admit that, we the descendants and relatives of the late
Santiago Bon do not have any right or interest anymore over
Lots No. 1911, 1917-A, 1917-B, 1970, 1988, all of Tabaco,
Cadastre, because the above lots had been already sold by our
predecessor in favor of the Ziga Family, predecessor of Ex-
Senator Victor Ziga since 1930, and that the above family had
been continuously in possession thereof, thru their tenants since
1930, or for more than 70 years already, to our exclusion;
4. It is only our brother, Alfredo Bon, who adamantly refuses to
admit the above fact and still claim rights over said properties
despite the explanation of our ancestors that the above
mentioned lots had been long sold by our predecessor to the
Zigas[18]
Significantly, as pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the Bons have not filed the appropriate action to
set aside the Waiver and Quitclaim.  The complainant, however,
explains that they will pursue that the Waiver and Quit Claim be
annulled by the court[19] in Civil Case No. T-2163 pending with
the Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tabaco City. That they have
yet to do so almost four (4) years after the execution of
the Waiver and Quitclaim diminishes, if not totally discredits,
their position that they were defrauded, intimidated and
deceived into signing the document.
At this time, all that the complainant offers to boost his
claim that Ziga employed deceit in procuring the Bons signatures
14
are the latters bare allegations to the effect that Ziga told them
there was nothing wrong with the document except that they
were withdrawing the Special Power of Attorney. These
allegations are belied by the Joint Affidavit[20] of Maria Bon-Borjal
and Rafael Bon-Canafe, the Bons co-signatories, and the Joint
Affidavit[21]  of Rogelio Bon Borjal and Nida Barrameda, the
subscribing witnesses to the Waiver and Quitclaim,  both of
which assert that the contents of the document were sufficiently
explained to the Bons.
Given these circumstances, the presumptions that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns; [22] that private transactions
have been fair and regular;[23] and that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law or fact[24] have not been sufficiently overcome.
However, we do find the act of Arcangel in notarizing
the Waiver and Quitclaim  without requiring all the persons who
executed the document to personally appear before him and
acknowledge that the same is their free act and deed an
unpardonable breach of his duty as a notary public.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public
or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done.The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same
is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.[25]
The Acknowledgement contained in the Waiver and
Quitclaim  executed in Zigas house in Manila specifically states:
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in the above mentioned
locality personally appeared[26] However, the Bons did not
personally appear before Arcangel to acknowledge the
document. Arcangel himself admits as much but posits that he
was able to talk to the Bons co-signatories over the
phone, i.e., Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe, and that the two
promised to bring the document to Albay for
notarization. Hence, Arcangel claims that there was substantial warrant disbarment, which is the severest form of disciplinary
compliance with the Notarial Law. He adds that as long as the sanction.
signatures on the instrument are genuine, the notary public can
In Ocampo v. Yrreverre,[32] the Court, taking note of the
take the risk of notarizing the document although the signatories
remorseful attitude of the respondent who was found guilty of
are not present.
breach of the notarial law for notarizing a document in the
Arcangel seems to be laboring under a misguided absence of the signatories, revoked his notarial commission for a
understanding of the basic principles of the Notarial Law. It is period of two (2) years and suspended him from the practice of
well to remind him that notarization is not an empty, law for six (6) months.
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
WHEREFORE, the Complaint  filed against Atty. Victor S.
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
Ziga is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus making that document As regards Atty. Antonio A. Arcangel, his commission as
admissible in evidence without further proof of its Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith from being commissioned as such for a period of two (2)
and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement months effective immediately, with a WARNING that a repetition
executed by a notary public and appended to a private of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.He is
instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with further DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their this Decision  to the Court within five (5) days from such receipt.
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
this form of conveyance would be undermined. [27] The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately
circularize this Decision  for the proper guidance of all concerned.
Thus, a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and recorded in the personal files of the respondents.
truth of what are stated therein. The acts of the affiants cannot SO ORDERED.
be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of
which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-
document personally and not through any Martinez, and  Callejo, Sr., JJ.,  concur.
representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
appear in the said documents as the one who executed the
same. That is the only time the representative can affix his
signature and personally appear before the notary public for
notarization of the said document.[28] Simply put, the party or
parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to
personally appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the
document.[29]
From his admission, we find that Arcangel failed to exercise
due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public. He
violated Rules 1.01[30] and 10.01[31] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well. However, his transgression does not

15
 THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA
SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDWIN A.
HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,
[1]
 spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused
respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991,
they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The
deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and
was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No.
19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred
that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a
dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafa through falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an
affidavit executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his
signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his
notarial signature on said deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact
that the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities
of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were
learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses
contended that they could not have forged the signature of
herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his
notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any
imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of
sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the
allegations against him. He denied having notarized any deed of
sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent,
he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob
Law Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial
commission. While he admitted that he notarized several
documents in that office, these, however, did not include the
subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office
procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers
and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization
was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in
the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior
associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law
firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to
exhibit their community tax certificates and made them
personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary
public. He would have remembered complainants had they
actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing
complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters husband
and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six
years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of
sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his
alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged;
the strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was
responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent
stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly
notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He
surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office
and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the
senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a
victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a report[5] it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the
alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was
different from his signatures in other documents he submitted
during the investigation of the present case. [6] However, it ruled
16
that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the
office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the
safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register. [7]It thus
recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondents commission as notary public be
revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he
should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2)
years upon receipt hereof.[8]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties,
complainants did not categorically state that they appeared
before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their
appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as
he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves
were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what
they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared
thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who
actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents
contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six
years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale.
Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy
in an affidavit executed on November 17, 2001 [9] wherein she
stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent
to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since
the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting
between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was
arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally
acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that
the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial
functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is
sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and
cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise
he should not have been commissioned as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other

mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary
there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the
secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case
herein.

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed

notarization but foremost in having allowed the office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry
which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and
should not have relied on somebody else.[10]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby

found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as
notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as
a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned,
or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary
public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution,
with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-
Morales,  and Garcia, JJ.,  concur.

17
 THIRD DIVISION  School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for SY
[G.R. No. 187104 : August 03, 2010]  85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required rating
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EVANGELINE C.
COBARRUBIAS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by
petitioner Saint Louis University, Inc. (SLU), to challenge the
decision[2] and the resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101708.[4]
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor
of the petitioner's College of Human Sciences. She is an active
member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis
University (UFESLU).
The 2001-2006[5] and 2006-2011[6] Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the
following common provision on forced leave:
Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the
yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one
(1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them
shall be suspended.[7]
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of
2002-2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007, with the rating of
of 87 points.
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought
recourse from the CBA's grievance machinery. Despite the
conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,
prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or
illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board of the Department of Labor and Employment, Cordillera
Administrative Region, Baguio City. When circulation and
mediation again failed, the parties submitted the issues between
them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA)
Daniel T. Fariñas.
Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced
leave issue in a prior case between the parties, CA-G.R. SP No.
90596,[8] ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their
evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be
coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year
period.[9]
SLU, for its part, countered that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90596 cannot be considered in deciding the present case
since it is presently on appeal with this Court (G.R. No. 176717)
[10]
 and, thus, is not yet final. It argued that the forced leave
provision applies irrespective of which CBA is applicable,
provided the employee fails her evaluation three (3) times in five
(5) years.[11]
The Voluntary Arbitrator Decision
On October 26, 2007, VA Daniel T. Fariñas dismissed the case.
[12]
 He found that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596 is not
yet final because of the pending appeal with this Court. He noted
that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its teaching
employees on forced leave when they fail in the evaluation for
three (3) years within a five-year period, without a distinction on
whether the three years fall within one or two CBA periods.
Cobarrubias received the VA's decision on November 20, 2007.
[13]
18
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but failed to pay
the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the
material portions of the record.[14]
Thus, on January 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition
outright for Cobarrubias' procedural lapses. [15]Cobarrubias
received the CA resolution, dismissing her petition, on January
31, 2008.[16]
On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the ground cited is technical. She,
nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material
portions of the record and the postal money orders for
P4,230.00. She maintained that the ends of justice and fair play
are better served if the case is decided on its merits. [17]
On July 30, 2008, the CA reinstated the petition. It found that
Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying the
appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her
motion for reconsideration.[18]
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for
Cobarrubias' failure to pay the docket fees on time.
The CA Decision
The CA brushed aside SLU's insistence on the finality of the VA
decision and annulled it, declaring that the "three (3) cumulative
years in five (5) years" phrase in Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011
CBA means within the five-year effectivity of the CBA. Thus, the
CA ordered SLU to pay all the benefits due Cobarrubias for the
first semester of SY 2007-2008, when she was placed on forced
leave.[19]
When the CA denied[20] the motion for reconsideration that
followed,[21] SLU filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.[22]
The Petition

SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal
since Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within the
prescribed period, and rendered the VA decision final and
executory. Even if Cobarrubias' procedural lapse is disregarded,
SLU submits that Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA should
apply irrespective of the five-year effectivity of each CBA. [23]
The Case for Cobarrubias
Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue, in its
July 30, 2008 resolution, when it found that she had substantially
complied with the rules by subsequently paying the docket fees
in full. She submits that the CA's interpretation of Section 7.7(a)
of the 2006-2011 CBA is more in accord with law and
jurisprudence.[24]
The Issues
The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in reinstating
Cobarrubias' petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee
within the reglementary period, and in reversing the VA
decision. To state the obvious, the appeal fee is a threshold issue
that renders all other issues unnecessary if SLU's position on this
issue is correct.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus,
appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision
set by law.[25] Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals
from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a
petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice of judgment.[26] Furthermore, upon the filing of the
petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the
docketing and other lawful fees;[27] non-compliance with the
procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the
petition's dismissal.[28] Thus, payment in full of docket fees within
the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional.[29] It is an essential requirement, without which,
the decision appealed from would become final and executory
as if no appeal has been filed.[30]
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres,[31] we
stressed that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In Lee v.
Republic,[32]we decided that even though half of the appellate
court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed
perfected where the other half was tendered after the period
within which payment should have been made. In Aranas v.
Endona,[33] we reiterated that the appeal is not perfected if only
a part of the docket fee is deposited within the reglementary
period and the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the
period.
The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in
subsequent cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[34] Pedrosa v.
Spouses Hill,[35] Gegare v. Court of Appeals,[36] Lazaro v. Court of
Appeals,[37]Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de Leon,[38] La Salette College v.
Pilotin,[39] Saint Louis University v. Spouses Cordero,[40] M.A.
Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,[41] Far Corporation v.
Magdaluyo,[42]Meatmasters Int'l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev't.
Corp.,[43] Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,[44] Enriquez v. Enriquez,[45] KLT
Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc.,[46] Tan v. Link,[47]  Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-
Yap,[48] and most recently in Tabigue v. International Copra
Export Corporation (INTERCO), [49] and continues to be the
controlling doctrine.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on
December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of the VA
decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full
only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her motion for
reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached the postal
money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were
paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees,
Cobarrubias' appeal was not perfected within the reglementary
period.
Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate
Court Docket Fees not applicable
19
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants;
the rules were established primarily to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. [50] While
procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they
are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. [51]
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are
required to be followed. However, there are recognized
exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of
the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances.[52] Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of
the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced.
Other than insisting that the ends of justice and fair play are
better served if the case is decided on its merits, Cobarrubias
offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full
when she filed her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias'
omission is fatal to her cause.
We, thus, find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias'
petition for review despite the nonpayment of the requisite
docket fees within the reglementary period. The VA decision had
lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA
had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except to order its
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101708 are hereby DECLARED VOID and are consequently SET
ASIDE. The decision of the voluntary arbitrator, that the voided
Court of Appeals decision and resolution nullified, stands. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

20