Condition Monitoring Presentation

Condition Monitored Maintenance Programs
Reliability
Air CBS Training / M-008 1
EASA Legislation
Requirements

M.A.302 Aircraft Maintenance Programme

Requirements
(a) Maintenance of each aircraft shall be organised in accordance

with an aircraft maintenance programme.
(b) The aircraft maintenance programme and any subsequent

amendments shall be approved by the competent authority.

(c) When the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is managed by a continuing
airworthiness management organisation approved in accordance with Section A,
Subpart G of this Annex (Part M), the aircraft maintenance programme and its
amendments may be approved through an indirect approval procedure.
(i) In that case, the indirect approval procedure shall be
established by the continuing airworthiness management
organisation as part of the Continuing Airworthiness
Management Exposition and shall be approved by the
competent authority responsible for that continuing
airworthiness management organisation.
(ii) The continuing airworthiness management
organisation shall not use the indirect approval procedure
when this organisation is not under the oversight of the
Member State of Registry, unless an agreement exists in
accordance with point M.1, paragraph 4(ii) or 4(iii), as
applicable, transferring the responsibility for the
approval of the aircraft maintenance programme to the
(d) The aircraft maintenance programme must establish compliance with:
(i) instructions issued by the competent authority;
(ii) instructions for continuing airworthiness issued by the holders of the

type certificate, restricted type certificate, supplemental type-certificate,
major repair design approval, ETSO authorisation or any other relevant
approval issued under Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003 and its Annex
(Part-21);
(iii) additional or alternative instructions proposed by the owner or the

continuing airworthiness management organisation once approved in
accordance with point M.A.302, except for intervals of safety related
tasks referred in paragraph (e), which may be escalated, subject to
sufficient reviews carried out in accordance with paragraph (g) and only
when subject to direct approval in accordance with point M.A.302(b).
(e) The aircraft maintenance programme shall contain details, including
frequency, of all maintenance to be carried out, including any specific tasks linked
to the type and the specificity of operations.
(f) For large aircraft, when the maintenance programme is based on maintenance
steering group logic or on condition monitoring, the aircraft maintenance
programme shall include a reliability programme.
(g) The aircraft maintenance programme shall be subject to periodic reviews and
amended accordingly when necessary. These reviews shall ensure that the
programme continues to be valid in light of the operating experience and
instructions from the competent authority whilst taking into account new and/or
modified maintenance instructions promulgated by the type certificate and
supplementary type certificate holders and any other organisation that publishes
such data in accordance with Annex (Part-21) to Regulation (EC) No 1702/2003.
AMC M.A.302(f ) Aircraft Maintenance Programme – reliability programmes
1. Reliability programmes should be developed for aircraft maintenance
programmes based upon maintenance steering group (MSG) logic or those that
include condition monitored components or that do not contain overhaul time
periods for all significant system components.
2. Reliability programmes need not be developed for aircraft not considered as
large aircraft or that contain overhaul time periods for all significant aircraft
system components.
3. The purpose of a reliability programme is to ensure that the aircraft
maintenance programme tasks are effective and their periodicity is adequate.
4. The reliability programme may result in the escalation or deletion of a
maintenance task, as well as the de-escalation or addition of a maintenance task
5. A reliability programme provides an appropriate means of monitoring the
effectiveness of the maintenance programme.
6. Appendix 1 to AMC M.A.302 and M.B.301 (d) gives further guidance.
Introduction to Fleet
Reliability

TOPICS
• Fleet Reliability
• Reliability Coding
• Rate Calculations
• Assigning Alert Values
• Non-Traditional Performance Monitoring
• The Initial Technical Analysis
• Root Cause Analysis
• Corrective Action
• Component Reliability
• Fleet Reliability refers to the performance of aircraft systems
– such as air conditioning, flight controls, electrical power,
hydraulics, landing gear, pneumatics, etc. Air carriers usually
monitor fleet reliability with an alert based program. An alert
program compares incident rates – such as pilot reported
problems (Pireps) and/or Delays and Cancellations (D&Cs)
to an “acceptable” rate standard. If the incident rate exceeds
the “acceptable” rate standard, an alert is generated and a
technical analysis is conducted to determine if a reliability
issue exists – and what actions are/may be necessary to
restore fleet reliability to an acceptable level.

(1) Pilot Reports
(a) Pilot Reports, more usually known as “Pireps”, are reports of
occurrences and malfunctions entered in the aircraft Technical Log
by the flight crew for each flight. Pireps are one of the most
significant sources of information, since they are a result of
operational monitoring by the crew and are thus a direct indication of
aircraft reliability as experienced by the flight crew.
(b) It is usual for the Technical Log entries to be routed to the Reliability
Section (or Engineer/coordinator) at the end of each day, or at some
other agreed interval, whereupon each entry is extracted and
recorded as a count against the appropriate system. Pireps are thus
monitored on a continuous basis, and at the end of the prescribed
reporting period are calculated to a set base as a reliability statistic for
comparison with the established Alert Levels (see 3.8) e.g. Pirep Rate
per 1,000 hr, Number of Pireps per 100 departures, etc.
(c) Engine performance monitoring can also be covered by the Pirep
process in a Programme. Flight crew monitoring of engine operating
conditions is, in many Programmes, a source of data in the same way
as reports on system malfunctions.
(2) Aircraft Mechanical Delays and Cancellations
(a) These are normally daily reports, made by the Operator’s
line maintenance staff, of delays and cancellations
resulting from mechanical defects. Normally each report
gives the cause of delay and clearly identifies the system
or component in which the defect occurred. The details of
any corrective action taken and the period of the delay are
also included.
(b) The reports are monitored by the Reliability Section and
are classified (usually in Air Transport Association of
America, Specification 100 (ATA 100) Chapter sequence),
recorded and passed to the appropriate engineering staffs
for analysis. At prescribed periods, recorded delays and
cancellations for each system are plotted, usually as
events per 100 departures.
• On occasion, the bureaucracy of a fleet reliability program
gets in the way of swift and decisive action. On the other end
of the spectrum, an aggressive corporate culture can
sometimes create pressure for a corrective action to be
implemented - before the problem is fully understood.
Therefore, your alert program must be able to:
• quickly identify legitimate reliability issues
and
• prioritize which issues need immediate
attention.

• Most reliability programs “farm out” the technical analysis
(root cause) function of the program to other departments in
the company. For example, an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
system alert may be forwarded to the Power Plant
Engineering department for root cause analysis and
corrective action. In some respects, this process makes sense.
However, this approach can result in an extremely narrow
investigation – and cause your organization to overlook
significant contributing factors related to the system alert.
To ensure consistent technical analyses, your best bet is to
train and staff a small group of technical analysts in the
reliability department.

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

• Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Spec 100 is the
industry standard for coding manuals, Service Difficulty
reports (SDRs) and maintenance related activities. This
coding system can get very specific – as more and more digits
are used. For example:
ATA 2100: Air Conditioning

ATA 2110: Cabin Compressor (Packs)
ATA 2120: Air Distribution System
ATA 2130: Cabin Pressurization System
ATA 2131: Cabin Pressure Controller
ATA 2132: Cabin Pressure Indicator


• As you can see, the first two digits correspond to a very
general aircraft system. Our example is ATA 21 (Air
conditioning). Adding a third digit, we can expand to very
specific aircraft systems. Air conditioning is broken down
into individual, functional systems (Packs, Distribution, and
Pressurization).
• By adding a fourth digit, we can define the various

components that make up each system. Our example defines
some of the components that make up the Temperature
Control System (Controller, and Indicator).


• The most efficient and accurate coding format for an aircraft
systems alert program is the three-digit format. For example,
if a pilot write-up states that the cabin pressurization system
is erratic, you would code this Pirep as ATA 2130. If enough
Pireps related to pressurization occur on your fleet, an ATA
2130 Alert will be generated – prompting you to perform a
technical analysis of the pressurization system on your fleet.
If you were to use only two digits, you would code all air
conditioning system write-ups (Heating, cooling, control,
packs, etc) as ATA 21. In this case, if your program alerts ATA
21, you would have to analyze all of the various systems in
ATA 21 to determine if a reliability issue exists in any one of
them. This is a very inefficient way to identify system
problems.

• If you were using a four-digit coding system, you would use
the code for the component that was replaced to fix the
aircraft. For example, if you changed a controller to fix the
pressurization system, you would code the write-up as ATA
2131 (Controller). The problem with this system is that you
are simply coding component removals – not system
problems. Any seasoned maintenance professional knows
that not all component replacements fix the aircraft.
Therefore, counting component removals is not an efficient
way to identify aircraft system reliability problems.


• In review, the most effective way to code aircraft problems is
by using a 3-digit ATA code to identify the aircraft system
that is experiencing a problem. There are some exceptions to
this rule, but for the most part – 3 digits are sufficient. The
emphasis should be on coding the problem – not the fix.
Your technical analysis will determine the actual fixes for
each problem.

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

• Fleet sizes change.
• Flight schedules are seasonal.
• Stage lengths can vary from fleet to fleet - and sometimes
from aircraft to aircraft.
• For these reasons, a simple count of aircraft system problems

is not always an accurate indicator of aircraft reliability.


• The two most common event rates used in the airline
industry are:
• events per flight hour and
• events per departure.
• A less common rate is events per engine hour. Since there

are several choices, which rate is the best one to use?
The simple answer is – all of them.


• If your alert program monitors pilot reported problems
(Pireps), you shouldn’t box yourself in by choosing only one
type of rate. You should consider each aircraft system
individually – and choose a rate that best defines how the
system operates.
Consider these examples:

1. Landing Gear Systems are only used twice during a
flight – once during takeoff and once while landing.
Whether a flight is one hour or ten hours, the landing
gear will only be used twice. In this case, the only
logical rate formula would be landing gear problems
per 100 (or 1000) departures.

2. Hydraulic Systems are usually active only when the
engines are running. For the most part, hydraulic systems
operate only during a flight. Therefore, the best rate
formula would hydraulic system failures per 100 (or 1000)
flight hours.
3. Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) are often run on the ground
to supply electrical power and pneumatics (for air
conditioning) to a parked aircraft. They are also
sometimes used during overnight maintenance to power
the aircraft when performing routine maintenance
actions. Therefore, actual usage may not be representative
with either a flight hour or departure rate calculation. The
best rate would be APU failures per APU run time – which
would require the use of an hour meter on the APU.
In review, you should always try to use an

event rate that is representative of the way
the aircraft system operates.

• Fleet Reliability – Assigning Alert Values
• Alert values are developed to define an acceptable level of

reliability. You choose how many pilot reports (Pireps)
and/or flight delays and cancellations (D&Cs) you are willing
to accept each month. If the monthly rate exceeds the alert
level you have chosen, an alert notice is generated for the
affected aircraft system.

• There are several common ways to calculate and assign alert

values. Most operators use a statistical approach (standard
deviation, poisson distribution, rolling averages, etc). By
using statistics alone, you run the very real risk of setting
your alert values too high – and completely missing the start
of a negative reliability trend. It is also entirely possible that
you never even notice that performance has degraded – until
the problem is widespread and severely impacting your
operation. On the other hand, setting alert values too low
creates an undue burden on your technical analysts – and
wastes valuable time that could be spent working on more
pressing issues.
• Aviation Reliability Services recommends a graphical

approach to setting alert values. By plotting monthly event
rates (for each ATA on each separate fleet type) on a line
graph, you can visually see the reliability trends for each
separate aircraft system – and can compare the values and
trends between fleet types. With a graphical approach, you
will be able to set realistic alert values that are not too high
or too low. This approach will also enable you to quickly
readjust alert values as necessary (instead of the traditional
once a year or once every other year recalculation).

• It is also worth considering the safety and/or economic

impact of aircraft system problems when assigning alert
values. For example, a small number of brake system
problems will have a much greater impact on your operation
than a large number of broken coffee makers. The key is to
prioritize the impact of failure. Safety always takes top
priority. Economic impact is second. Convenience is a distant
third.
In review, alert values are best assigned using graphical
methods. Always consider the potential impact of reliability
issues when developing your alert system.
• Fleet Reliability – Non- Non-Traditional Performance

Monitoring
• Most operators publish monthly reliability reports that are

full of numbers, tables, rates and statistics. These reports are
very informative and detailed – but not very good at
summarizing current, significant issues.
A simple way to illustrate the most significant activity of the

month is to build a graphical version of David Letterman’s
“Top Ten” list. To do this, you simply pareto the most
significant issues for each fleet type. This type of graph
defines and quantifies the biggest reliability issues affecting
the organization.
• Fleet Reliability – Non- Non-Traditional Performance

Monitoring
• There are several different pareto charts you may want to
consider. One chart would show the top ten pilot-reported
problems. Another chart could show the top ten causes of
delays and cancellations. Yet another chart could show the
top ten reasons why aircraft were not available for the first
flight bank of the day.
Regardless of how you choose to identify reliability issues, try

to present your data in a user-friendly format.
Charts and graphs are the best way to go.

• Fleet Reliability – The Initial Technical Analysis
• Once an ATA alert notice is generated, the first question you

need to answer is:
 Is this alert due to a legitimate reliability issue?
At this point, you are not looking to identify root cause. You are
simply trying to determine if the increase in activity is the start
of an actual problem – or is simply a statistical spike.
To do this, you must try to formulate a problem statement.

• Gather your data and try to answer the following questions:
Kind of & number

1. What specific problems are being reported?
a. Are all of the reported problems the same – or
different?
b. How many occurrences of each type of problem?

Way of identification
2. How does the problem present itself?
a. A warning light or status message
b. A noise or vibration
c. Weak, sluggish or erratic operation
d. Unexpected operation
e. Operation ceases unexpectedly – or fails to operate at all
f. Intermittent or hard-failure?

Sequence & Timing

3. How many aircraft are experiencing the problem(s)?
a. Is it a chronic problem on only one or two aircraft?
b. Are most aircraft in the fleet affected by the problem?
Enviroment
4. When is/are the problem(s) occurring?
a. On the ground (at the gate, or during taxi)?
b. At takeoff or landing?
c. During flight?
d. During maintenance checks?

If you cannot define one or two specific problem statements

after answering these questions, your alert is probably just a
statistical spike – because there is no common failure mode
occurring during the reporting period.


If a problem is apparent, try to define it as specifically as
possible. This will help you identify root cause much quicker –
and implement a successful solution.
Here is an example of a strong and a weak problem statement:

1. During the reporting period, two aircraft experienced a total
of fourteen APU auto-shutdowns. Aircraft 911 had eleven
shutdowns (seven shutdowns occurred along with a low oil
pressure light). The shutdowns occurred after landing while the
aircraft was taxiing to the gate. Aircraft 909 had three
shutdowns (with an associated inlet door message). These
shutdowns occurred during preflight checks before the first
flight of the day (on three successive mornings).
2. During the reporting period, fleet 9 experienced fourteen

APU shutdowns.
A strong problem statement sets the course for a

detailed and focused root-cause analysis. With the
first problem statement, your root-cause analysis
only needs to identify what fixed the two chronic
aircraft. The second problem statement is so open-
ended that it is nearly impossible to decide where to
begin.

In summary, a fleet alert notice does not always mean that a

legitimate reliability issue exists. It simply means that higher
than normal activity has occurred with the affected system.
Therefore, an initial analysis should seek to answer:
What, When and How Many?
These questions will lead to a detailed problem statement –

if a legitimate reliability issue exists.

• Fleet Reliability – Root Cause Analysis
• The primary purpose of a root cause analysis is to understand

what went wrong. You are looking to identify something that
is broken – or not working the way it is supposed to. Your
final conclusion may not always be a broken mechanical
part. It could be an improper procedure, poor
troubleshooting, a weak preventive maintenance program, a
design issue, a life cycle issue or a human factors related
issue. In all of these cases, you have identified something
that is not working the way it is supposed to – and needs to
be fixed.

• An effective root cause analysis seeks to identify all potential

causes. Quite often, poor reliability is the result of multiple
causes. Therefore, your analysis should not end after one
cause has been identified. You should continue to review all
of your data until every potential source of trouble has been
considered. If the end result of your analysis reveals several
contributing causes, then you should address each and every
one of them.

• In general, there are several common types of fleet reliability

issues. At a minimum, your root cause analytical processes
should consider these issues:
1. Chronic Aircraft – This is when a specific aircraft

continues to have the same problem over and over again –
regardless of the maintenance actions accomplished to fix
the problem. Sometimes more than one aircraft can have
chronic problems at the same time.

2. Design Deficiency – These problems will be evident

when the aircraft are new. A design deficiency affects nearly
all aircraft in the fleet. Make sure your problems are indeed
fleet-wide before labeling your problems as a design issue.

3. Marginal Design – On occasion, an aircraft system

malfunctions when other parts of the system begin to
degrade – or the system is operated in extreme
environmental conditions. A good example of this is an air
conditioning system that performs poorly in very hot and
humid conditions – but operates well in more moderate
environmental conditions.

4. Modifications – On occasion, a modification can cause

unintended consequences. If the modification itself is the
cause, you should notice similar problems on all modified
aircraft. Sometimes a modification is inadvertently done
wrong. An example would be crossed wires, a bent pin or an
intermittent wire splice. This improperly performed
modification will reveal itself as a chronic aircraft.

5. Life Cycle Issues – Life cycle refers to an expected wear

out period. If you begin to notice an increase in component
removals – where most of the components have similarly
high Time Since Installation (TSI) – the components may be
reaching the end of their useful life. Depending on the
impact these failures have on your operation, you may want
to check the remaining life of the components on the rest of
your fleet – and remove them before they fail.

6. Chronic Components – Rogue components are known

to cause significant fleet reliability issues – especially
when multiple rogues exist in a component population.
There are other types of issues that can cause fleet

reliability issues. However, the ones mentioned above are
the most common. Your root cause analysis must be able
to identify these types of issues quickly and accurately.
This will enable you to develop and implement effective
corrective actions – to restore the inherent reliability of
your aircraft systems.

• Fleet Reliability – Corrective Action
• Once you have identified the root causes of aircraft system

reliability issues, you must choose a course of action to
correct the problems. Depending on the nature of the
problems – and the impact these problems have on your
operation – you have a variety of options to choose from.
Some of the more common corrective actions are:
1. Modifications: Should be pursued to correct design
deficiencies and to incorporate new features to existing
systems. Modifications should only be undertaken when the
whole fleet is experiencing reliability problems.

2. Maintenance Program Adjustment: You may wish to

change the content or interval of a maintenance program
task (servicing, inspection, etc) to identify and resolve
reliability issues before they begin to impact daily operations.

3. Troubleshooting Procedures: Occasionally, a chronic

aircraft is fixed when a previously unknown failure mode is
found. To ensure that similar failures do not cause future
chronic aircraft, you may want to publish troubleshooting
procedures that will help identify similar failure modes in the
future.


4. Preventive Maintenance Work Scopes: If certain
reliability issues have a negative safety or economic impact
on your operations, you may want to consider adopting
preventive maintenance actions to address these types of
problems. These work scopes may include:
 more frequent inspections,
 operational checks,
 servicing, or even
 component replacements (before the components fail).
Usually, preventive maintenance work scopes are performed

on components that have predictable life cycles.
5. New Operational Procedures: Sometimes you can work

around reliability issues by changing the way you do
business. For example, using ground air and electrical power
more frequently will allow you to use the APU less frequently
– saving fuel and reducing wear of the APU and its associated
components.


6. Nothing: Some reliability issues are only minor
inconveniences that have no effect on safety and very
minimal effect on economics. For these issues, you may
simply bite the bullet and live with the problem – or wait
until the next scheduled heavy maintenance visit to address
the problem.
Each aircraft reliability issue presents its own unique set of

circumstances and consequences. Your reliability program
should include some sort of impact measurement (safety,
cost, etc) to prioritize the extent and timeframe of
implementing a corrective action program. Above all, make
sure that the corrective actions you prescribe address all
known root causes.
Component Reliability refers to the performance of Line

Replaceable Units (LRUs) – such as actuators, radios,
computers, valves, instruments, displays, power controls, etc.
It is an accepted practice in the industry to define

component reliability with a removal rate, such as:
 Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (MTBUR),
 Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) or
 Mean Time Between Repairs (MTBR).

Removal rates do not tell you much about the actual

performance of a component population. After all, a
statistical number does not define a problem.
 It does not point to root cause.
 It does not offer a solution.
This is why your component reliability program should de-

emphasize statistical rates, and instead focus on identifying
and resolving common component issues.

Component Unscheduled Removals and
Confirmed Failures.
• At the end of the prescribed reporting period the
unscheduled removals and/or confirmed failure
rates for each component are calculated to a base of
1,000 hours flying, or, where relevant, to some other
base related to component running hours, cycles,
landings, etc.
NOTE: Reports on engine unscheduled removals, as with

reports on engine performance monitoring, are also a
source of data and are reported as part of the Programme.
Engine Unscheduled Shutdowns
(a) These are flight crew reports of engine shut-downs and
usually include details of the indications and symptoms
prior to shut-down. When analysed, these reports provide
an overall measure of propulsion system reliability,
particularly when coupled with the investigations and
records of engine unscheduled removals.
(b) As with Pireps, reports on engine unscheduled shut-
downs are calculated to a set base and produced as a
reliability statistic at the end of each reporting period. The
causes of shutdowns are investigated on a continuing
basis, and the findings are routed via the Reliability
Section to the Power-plant Development Engineer.


A. Hard Time (HT)
 Hard Time is a preventive primary maintenance process. It requires that
an appliance or part be periodically overhauled in accordance with ATA
Airlines, Inc. applicable Maintenance Specification Manual and that it be
removed from service prior to the expiration of its allowable time in
service.
• (1) The allowable time in service may be adjusted based on operating
experience, tests, airplane type certificate limitations, or
airworthiness directives as appropriate in accordance with the ATA
Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Reliability Program contingent upon FAA
approval.
• (2) Life limited units are discarded upon reaching a specific limit.
• (3) Units assigned a Hard Time maintenance process must be
removed from service and "zero-timed" by accomplishing the
overhaul procedure set forth in applicable manuals. Hard Time units
which are removed for malfunction may be repaired and returned to
service with "time continued" if time remains before the scheduled
overhaul period.
 B. On Condition (OC)
o On Condition is a preventive primary maintenance process. It
requires that an appliance or part be periodically inspected or
checked against some appropriate physical standard to determine if it
can continue in service until the next scheduled periodic inspection
or check. On Condition maintenance is applicable to components on
which a determination of continued airworthiness may be made by
visual inspection, measurements, tests or other means without a
teardown inspection or overhaul.

C. Condition Monitoring (CM)
•Condition Monitoring is a primary maintenance process for units for which
neither hard time nor On-Condition are appropriate primary processes.
(1) Condition Monitoring consists of data collection and data analysis

systems which portray information upon which judgments relative to the
safe and economic condition of the airplane can be made. Condition
monitoring is accomplished by obtaining in service information from the
whole population of a system or unit and using that information to
allocate technical resources for appropriate corrective action.
(2) Condition Monitoring is directed to both items and operating systems

with varying levels of analysis used depending on the item or system
concerned.

(3) Condition Monitoring is not a preventive maintenance process; it allows

failures to occur and relies upon analysis of operating data to determine
appropriate corrective action. Since condition monitoring allows failures to occur,
no failure mode of any condition monitoring item may have a direct adverse effect
on operating safety.
(4) Condition Monitored components do not require a scheduled overhaul,

scheduled check, or task to evaluate condition, life expectancy, or reliability
degradation. Components properly categorized CM require only repair as
necessary to correct a malfunction and return to service.






Types of Reliability













Reliability Alert Levels
A reliability alert level (or equivalent title, e.g. Performance Standard, Control
Level, Reliability index, Upper Limit) hereinafter referred to as an ‘Alert Level’, is
purely an ‘indicator’ which when exceeded indicates that there has been an
apparent deterioration in the normal behaviour pattern of the Item with which it
is associated. When an Alert Level is exceeded the appropriate action has to be
taken. It is important to realize that Alert Levels are not minimum acceptable
airworthiness levels. When Alert Levels are based on a representative period of
safe operation (during which failures may well have occurred) they may be
considered as a form of protection against erosion of the design aims of the
aircraft in terms of system function availability.
In the case of a system designed to a multiple Redundancy philosophy it has been
a common misunderstanding that, as Redundancy exists, an increase in failure
rate can always be tolerated without corrective action being taken.
Alert Levels can range from 0.00 failure rate per 1 ,000 hours both for important
components and, where failures in service have been extremely rare, to perhaps
as many as 70 Pireps per 1,000 hours on a systems basis for ATA 100 Chapter 25 -
Equipment/Furnishings, or for 20 removals of passenger entertainment units in a
like period.

Establishing Alert Levels
(a) Alert Levels should, where possible, be based on the number of events which
have occurred during a representative period of safe operation of the aircraft
fleet. They should be updated periodically to reflect operating experience,
product improvement, changes in procedures, etc.
(b) When establishing Alert Levels based on operating experience, the normal
period of operation taken is between two and three years dependent on fleet
size and utilization. The Alert Levels will usually be so calculated as to be
appropriate to events recorded in one-monthly or three-monthly periods of
operation. Large fleets will generate sufficient significant information much
sooner than small fleets.

Establishing Alert Levels
(c) Where there is insufficient operating experience, or when a programme
for a new aircraft type is being established, the following approaches may
be used.
(i) For a new aircraft type during the first two years of operation all malfunctions
should be considered significant and should be investigated, and although
Alert Levels may not be in use, Programme data will still be accumulated for
future use.
(ii) For an established aircraft type with a new Operator, the experience of other
Operators may be utilized until the new Operator has himself accumulated a
sufficient period of his own experience. Alternatively, experience gained from
operation of a similar aircraft model may be used.
(iii) A recent concept to be applied in setting Alert Levels for the latest aircraft
designs, is to use computed values based on the degree of system and
component in-service expected reliability assumed in the design of the
aircraft.
Procedures for establishing Alert Levels:
 Pilot Reports (Pireps).
For the following example calculations, a minimum of twelve months operating data
has to be available, and the resultant Alert Level per 1,000 hours is :-
Calculation 1. The three-monthly running average Pirep rate per 1,000 hours for
each system (or sub-system), as in the Table of Example 1, is averaged over
the sample operating period and is known as the Mean; the Mean is
multiplied by 1.30 to produce the Alert Level for the given system. This is
sometimes known as the ‘1.3 Mean’ or ‘1.3x’ method.
Calculation 2. The Mean, as in Calculation 1, plus 3 Standard Deviations of the
Mean (as illustrated in Appendix C - Example 1 below).
Calculation 3. The Mean, as in Calculation 1, plus the Standard Deviation of the
‘Mean of the Means’, plus 3 Standard Deviations of the Mean (as illustrated in
Appendix C -- Example 2 below).



 Component Unscheduled Removals.
● For the following example calculations, a minimum period of seven
quarters’ (21 months’) operating data has to be available, and the
resultant Alert Level rate for the current quarter may be set in
accordance with any one of the following.
● Calculation 4. The Mean of the individual quarterly Component
Unscheduled Removal rates for the period of seven quarters, plus 2
Standard Deviations of the Mean.
● Calculation 5. The maximum acceptable number of ‘Expected
Component Unscheduled Removals’ in a given quarter, as calculated
using a statistical process in association with the Poisson Distribution
of Cumulative Probabilities (as illustrated in Appendix C - Example 3).
● Calculation 6. The Number of ‘predicted Component Unscheduled
Removals (or failures)’ in a given quarter, as determined by the
Weibull or other suitable statistical method.

Component Confirmed Failures.
The period of operating experience has to be as in (ii) and the
resultant Alert Level rate for the current quarter is the ‘corrected’
Mean of the individual quarterly Component Confirmed Failure rates
for the period, plus 1 Standard Deviation of the Mean (as illustrated in
Appendix C - Example 4).


Recalculation of Alert Levels:
(a) Both the method used for establishing an Alert Level, and the
associated qualifying period, apply also when the level is recalculated
to reflect current operating experience. However if, during the period
between re-calculation of an Alert Level, a significant change in the
reliability of an item is experienced which may be related to the
introduction of a known action (e.g. modification, changes in
maintenance or operating procedures) then the Alert Level applicable
to the item would be re-assessed and revised on the data subsequent
to the change.
(b) All changes in Alert Levels are normally required to be approved by

the CAA and the procedures, periods and conditions for re-
calculation are required to be defined in each Programme.

Typical Reports

Typical Reports

Typical Reports

Typical Reports

Typical Reports

Typical Reports

Typical Reports
05 21
PIREPS - ATA Chapters 22 23
4%1%2%1%
1% 4% 1%
24 25
3% 4%
1%
2% 3% 26 27
1%
1%
5% 1% 28 29
4%
4% 30 31
4%
1% 32 33
2%
2% 34 35
10% 38 49
52 56
72 73
13% 27% 76 79
83

Typical Reports
21
Component Removals - ATA 22
23
1%2%1% 5%
1% 24
2% 4%
1% 26
4% 4%
1% 2% 28
4% 29
30
11% 2% 31
4% 32
1% 33
34
5% 38
49
56
72
73
76
45% 83

Typical Reports
MONTHLY TECHNICAL DISPATCH RATE
100.00%
99.00%
98.00%
97.00%
96.00%
95.00%
94.00%
93.00%
92.00%
91.00%
90.00%
09/08 10/08 11/08 12/08 01/09 02/09 03/09 04/09 05/09 06/09 07/09 08/09 09/09

Typical Reports
BAe146-300 RTT
600.00
500.00 489.3
454.9 440.0
427.9 415.7
400.00
300.00
200.00
100.00
0.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Monthly Rate 3Month Rate ALERT

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Condition Monitored Maintenance Programs

Air CBS Training / M-008 2

M.A.302 Aircraft Maintenance Programme

(a) Maintenance of each aircraft shall be organised in accordance

(b) The aircraft maintenance programme and any subsequent

Air CBS Training / M-008 3

(ii) instructions for continuing airworthiness issued by the holders of the

(iii) additional or alternative instructions proposed by the owner or the

Air CBS Training / M-008 8

Air CBS Training / M-008 10

Air CBS Training / M-008 13

Air CBS Training / M-008 14

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

ATA 2100: Air Conditioning

Air CBS Training / M-008 15

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

• By adding a fourth digit, we can define the various

Air CBS Training / M-008 16

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

Air CBS Training / M-008 18

• Fleet Reliability - Coding

Air CBS Training / M-008 19

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

• For these reasons, a simple count of aircraft system problems

Air CBS Training / M-008 20

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

• A less common rate is events per engine hour. Since there

The simple answer is – all of them.

Air CBS Training / M-008 21

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

Consider these examples:

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

• Fleet Reliability – Rate Calculations

In review, you should always try to use an

Air CBS Training / M-008 24

• Fleet Reliability – Assigning Alert Values

• Alert values are developed to define an acceptable level of

Air CBS Training / M-008 25

• Fleet Reliability – Assigning Alert Values

• There are several common ways to calculate and assign alert

• Fleet Reliability – Assigning Alert Values

• Aviation Reliability Services recommends a graphical

Air CBS Training / M-008 27

• Fleet Reliability – Assigning Alert Values

• It is also worth considering the safety and/or economic

• Fleet Reliability – Non- Non-Traditional Performance

• Most operators publish monthly reliability reports that are

A simple way to illustrate the most significant activity of the

• Fleet Reliability – Non- Non-Traditional Performance

Regardless of how you choose to identify reliability issues, try

Charts and graphs are the best way to go.

• Fleet Reliability – The Initial Technical Analysis

• Once an ATA alert notice is generated, the first question you

To do this, you must try to formulate a problem statement.

Air CBS Training / M-008 31

• Fleet Reliability – The Initial Technical Analysis

• Gather your data and try to answer the following questions:

Kind of & number

Air CBS Training / M-008 32

• Fleet Reliability – The Initial Technical Analysis

Air CBS Training / M-008 33

• Fleet Reliability – The Initial Technical Analysis

Sequence & Timing