There could be no extrinsic fraud where the alleged

fraudulent act came after the parties were allowed to

present their evidence, or were given the opportunity to do
so. (Leonardo vs. S.T. Best, Inc., 422 SCRA 347 [2004])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009.*

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Bigamy; Husband and Wife; Prejudicial

Questions; Penalties; He who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency
of a civil case for declaration of nullity.—It is true that right after
the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of
the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question.
In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground
for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (336 SCRA 747 [2000]), the Court
categorically stated that: x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 237

Jarillo vs. People

case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency

of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x x x x x x x x The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case
at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage
with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Marriage; The moment a
person contracts a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
is already consummated because at the time of the celebration of
the second marriage the previous marriage which has not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction is
deemed valid and subsisting.—The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo
cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to
Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s
marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x  x  x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.”

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238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

       Same; Same; Penalties; Prescription; Crimes punishable

by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.—Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by
prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as
an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that “[c]rimes
punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years,” while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Evidence; The party
who raises a fact as a matter of defense, such as prescription, has
the burden of proving it.—Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of
her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription
began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact
as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant
or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense;
otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.
Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was
incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year
1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period for the
crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the
said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage.—As ruled in Sermonia v.
Court of Appeals (233 SCRA 155 [1994]), “the prescriptive period
for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day
on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being
counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.
Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of
prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.

239

VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 239

Jarillo vs. People

        Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The

Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound
discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long
as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided.—The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the
accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound
discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long
as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Nelson A. Clemente for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.

PERALTA, J.:
 This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of

_______________

1  Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate

Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 8-
21.

240

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal
Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses
VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo,
being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M.
Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.”

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during

arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the
CA, are as follows.

“On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were
married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico
C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. “A,,”“A-

_______________

2  Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices

Mariano C. del Castillo and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-23.

241

VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 241

Jarillo vs. People

1,” “H,” “H-1,” “H-2,” “O,” “O-1,” pp. 20-21, TSN dated November
17, 2000).
 On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN
dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant
begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs.
“F,” “R,” “R-1”).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of
Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on
November 26, 1979 (Exhs. “D,” “J,” “J-1,” “Q,” “Q-1,” pp. 15-18,
TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged
marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. “E”).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case
No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
x x x x
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on
October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil
Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court
hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor, as maximum.

242

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of

this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous
marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.”3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and
1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because
Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2)
her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void
for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had
prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as
far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was
affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA
held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at
that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s
contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring
petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and
void

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 9-10.

243

VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 243

Jarillo vs. People

ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological

incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on
July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated
July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4
denied reconsideration and ruled that “[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not
without legal consequences, among which is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy.”5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS
PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES
OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE
IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN
EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

_______________

4 467 Phil. 723; 423 SCRA 272 (2004).

5 CA Rollo, p. 404.

244

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

  V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely

related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after
the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner
moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of
the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also
asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion
for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated
that:

“x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second

marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the
ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. x x x

_______________

6 391 Phil. 648; 336 SCRA 747 (2000).

245

VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 245

Jarillo vs. People
x x x x
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
x x x”7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.

People,8 where it was held thus:

“The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the

first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay
the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a

_______________

7 Id., at pp. 655-657; 754-756. (Emphasis supplied.)

8 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.

246

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually

obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.”9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted

cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must
be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared null and
void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither
would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s
marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro,
“[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x  x  x A plain
reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”11
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to
fail.

_______________

9 Id., at pp. 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)

10 Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 4, at p. 752.
11 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 742; p. 292.

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VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 247

Jarillo vs. People

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is

punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under
Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90
thereof provides that “[c]rimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years,”
while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents x x x.”
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous
marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to
run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as
a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in
support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the
same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s
defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon
her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy
already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals
that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence
to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her
own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already
married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court
correctly observed that:
“x  x  x She did not call to the witness stand her mother—the
person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirma-

_______________

12  Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines,

Inc., G.R. No. 151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411, 433.

248

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jarillo vs. People

tory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any

act which she allegedly did is hearsay.”13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 “the

prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their [agents],” as opposed to being counted from the date
of registration of the bigamous marriage.15 Since petitioner
failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription
began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA
imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal
Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the
accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty,
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to
determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are considered only in the

_______________

13 Records, p. 383.
14 G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
15 Id., at p. 161.

249

VOL. 601, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 249

Jarillo vs. People
 imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty
imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision
correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the
trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the
duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the
prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in
its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum
penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering
that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been
declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account
of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which,
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court
deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower
courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004

_______________

16 Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at p. 568.

17 See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case
No. 00-1217, CA Rollo, pp. 343-347.

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