INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT VOLUME 13 NUMBER 1 MARCH 2005

Self–Other Agreement:
Comparing its Relationship with Performance
in the U.S. and Europe
Leanne Atwater * and Cheri Ostroff
David Waldman Columbia University
Arizona State University

Chet Robie Karin M. Johnson

Wilfrid Laurier University Minneapolis MN

The use of multi-source feedback has proliferated in the United States in recent years;
however, its usefulness in other countries is unknown. Using a large sample of American
managers (n 5 3793), this study first replicated earlier studies demonstrating that
simultaneous consideration of self and other ratings of leadership skills is important for
managerial performance ratings. In addition, the impact of self–other agreement on
performance was investigated among 2732 managers in five European countries (U.K.,
Germany, France, Denmark, Italy). Results indicated that the effect of self and other
ratings in the prediction of performance differs between the U.S. and the European
countries in that the simultaneous inclusion of both self and other ratings is generally
less useful in those countries than in the U.S. Further, the effect of self–other agreement
varies among the European countries. Implications for multi-source feedback
interventions as well as multi-national personnel management are discussed.

W ith the advent of multi-source feedback processes,

there has been a growing concern about the extent
of agreement between an individual’s self-evaluation and
work behavior (Warr, 1987), it would be useful to assess the
relevance of self–other agreement in countries outside the
U.S. In this study, we examine the relevance of self–other
evaluations of that individual made by others (e.g., agreement in the U.S. and five European countries.
subordinates or peers). Research has demonstrated that
self–other agreement is related to individual outcomes
such as performance and promotability (McCaulley &
Self-Awareness, Self–Other Agreement,
Lombardo, 1990; McCall & Lombardo, 1983; Bass
and Performance
& Yammarino, 1991; Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, &
The theoretical rationale underlying self–other agreement
Fleenor, 1998). However, to our knowledge, self–other
and its relationship with performance and other outcomes
agreement and its relationship with outcomes has only
(e.g., promotions) stems from control theory. Control
been systematically studied in the U.S. Given the vast
theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981) proposes that individuals
differences in cultural values and their potential impact on
are continuously matching their behavior to goals or
standards. In the organizational domain, that goal or
The authors would like to thank Paul Bly and Chris Carraher from
Personnel Decisions International for their assistance with data standard could be the perceptions others have of the
analyses. individual. For example, a leader may want to be seen by
*Address for correspondence: Leanne Atwater, Arizona State Uni- his supervisor as technically competent. If she recognizes,
versity, West Campus, 4701 W. Thunderbird Rd, School of Global
Mgt and Leadership, P.O. Box 37100, Phoenix AZ 85069-7100, USA. given the attitudes and behavior of the supervisor toward
E-mail: Leanne.atwater@asu.edu her (e.g., tasks he assigns her), that the supervisor does not

r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 25
26 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
perceive her as technically competent, she may make
behavioral changes in an attempt to modify her supervisor’s
perceptions. According to control theory, individuals must
do three things to bring their behavior in line with goals.
First, they must have a goal they are trying to achieve (e.g.,
positive perception by one’s supervisor that they are
technically competent). Second, they must recognize that
their behavior, or the individual’s perception is not in line
with that goal. Third, they need to enact behavior in an
attempt to meet the goal. In this case, if the leader is self-
aware and realizes that her goal to be viewed as technically
competent by her boss has not been achieved, she may
decide to pursue training opportunities, or to take time to
demonstrate her technical competence to her boss. If the
leader has a goal to be seen as technically competent,
recognizes this has not been achieved and enacts behavior
to achieve this goal, the three steps to bring behavior in line
with goals have been achieved. The relevance of self–other
agreement in this process is that the individual who does
not recognize the discrepancy between his/her and others’
perceptions will not see the need to alter behavior to change
others’ perceptions. In this case, the leader will continue to
get assignments that are not at the level she is capable of
achieving. To take another example, perhaps the leader
wants his subordinates to perceive him as considerate,
recognizing that leaders who are perceived positively have
more effective workgroups. If the leader does not recognize
that the subordinates do not perceive the leader as
considerate he will make no effort to become more
considerate or to change the subordinates’ perceptions.
The leader will be less effective because he will not be
treating subordinates in a way to maximize their motiva-
tion and performance.
Ashford (1989) pointed out that employees need to
develop proficiency in observing and evaluating their
behavior in a manner that is consistent with how others
perceive and evaluate it. Accurate (or in-agreement) self-
assessments should be associated with more positive
outcomes because they help employees correct mistakes
and help them tailor their behavior to the demands of the
organization. Smircich and Chesser (1981) suggested that
self and other ratings or perceptions that are in-agreement,
are preferable because it indicates a degree of mutual
understanding. Self-awareness has also been noted as
an important element of emotional intelligence, which,
in turn, has been associated with effective leadership
(Megerian & Sosik, 1996).
While self-awareness and self–other agreement are
desirable, self-enhancement bias is common when indivi-
duals are asked to rate themselves (Paulhaus, 1986;
Sackheim, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Thus, self-
ratings are often inflated when compared with ratings
provided by others (Mabe & West, 1982; Harris &
Schaubroeck, 1988). By themselves, high self-ratings may
be positive since they may coincide with fewer negative
thoughts and strong self-confidence. However, self-diag-
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
nosis is influenced by the way in which one views his
or herself. Self-perception is a key element in the self-
regulation process (Ashford, 1989; Taylor & Brown,
1988). As noted by Bass and Yammarino (1991), high
self-ratings when coupled with low ratings from others
(i.e., overestimation) can lead to ignoring criticism and
discounting failure, which, in turn, would be expected to be
associated with poorer performance.
In 1993, Yammarino and Atwater presented a model of
self-perception accuracy whereby individuals whose self-
ratings were in agreement with others were purported to
have superior individual and organizational outcomes, those
who overestimated their competencies would have lower
outcomes, and under-raters would have a mix of positive
and negative outcomes. This model was later expanded
to include four categories of agreement: in-agreement good
(or high ratings from both self and other); in-agreement poor
(or low ratings from both self and other); under-rater; and
over-rater (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). Different out-
comes were theorized to be associated with each type of
agreement. Outcomes for those with in-agreement good
ratings are expected to be the highest because both self and
other believe the individual is doing well; over-raters are
expected to have the lowest outcomes because problems seen
by others are not recognized by the self-rater and therefore
not addressed; those with in-agreement poor ratings are also
expected to have very low outcomes because the individual,
while recognizing weaknesses, has not addressed them; and
under-raters are expected to have a mixture of positive
and negative outcomes because they are likely doing well and
trying hard to improve, but may not accurately recognize
their own strengths and weaknesses. To go back to the
control theory example, over-raters see no discrepancy
between their behavior and goal. In-agreement poor raters
see the discrepancy but do not enact behavior to change the
discrepancy. In both cases, performance suffers. Interestingly,
while not the focus of this paper, 360 (multi-rater) feedback
is designed to make over-raters aware of these discrepancies,
thereby motivating change in their behavior. Consistent with
control theory notions, earlier work has shown that it is the
over-raters who demonstrate the most improvement follow-
ing 360 feedback (Atwater, Roush, & Fischthal, 1995).
The increasing use of 360 feedback processes has led to
increased interest in self–other agreement and its outcomes.
Feedback interventions such as 360-degree feedback have
experienced rapid proliferation in the U.S. (Bracken,
Timmreck, & Church, 2001) with estimates that over one-
third of U.S. companies are using some type of multi-source
feedback process for managers. The goal of these feedback
processes is to increase managers’ awareness of performance
deficiencies and to give managers information about how
others view them, thereby increasing their self-awareness.
The presumption is that increased self-awareness, or self–
other agreement as it has been operationalized (e.g., Church,
1997), will ultimately benefit performance and organiza-
tional outcomes. However, the extent to which self–other
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
agreement is related to performance is still being debated.
Additionally, to our knowledge, while 360-degree feedback
is beginning to spread to countries outside the U.S.,
empirical research on the relevance of self–other agreement
outside the U.S. has not been conducted.
There are a variety of individual and contextual factors
that impact self and other ratings and ultimately self–other
agreement (Atwater & Yammarino, 1992). One such factor
may be the cultural context. Given the differences in cultural
values and job contexts across cultures (Warr, 1987), the ways
in which self and others provide ratings of a manager,
the degree of agreement among sources of ratings, and the
relationship between self–other agreement and performance
could vary across cultures. The primary purpose of the
present research was to examine the effects of self–other
agreement in a cross-cultural sample. We selected a sample of
five European countries where 360-degree feedback was
currently being used. This was done for practical reasons (i.e.,
relevant data could be obtained) and because we believe that
organizations using 360-degree feedback have at least some
belief that self-awareness (self–other agreement) is advanta-
geous or they would not have adopted a 360 process that
included self-ratings. However, we also believe that it is
important not to assume that the same phenomena (e.g., self-
awareness) have the same importance or relevance across
cultures. As has been noted in recent leadership theory (e.g.,
Dorfman, 1996; House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman,
Javidan, Dickson, & Gupta, 1999), factors that lead to one
result in one culture may not necessarily have the same result
in another culture. Further, the theory of self–other agreement
and its effects has been developed in the U.S., by U.S.
researchers using U.S. samples (e.g., Atwater & Yammarino,
1997). Thus, ethnocentric basis is likely to be inherent in the
theory and its relevance to other cultures can be questioned.
Given that the self–other agreement literature has
developed largely in the U.S., we use the U.S. model and
theory as a ‘‘benchmark’’ and explore the extent to which
self–other agreement and its relationship with performance
holds in other cultures, specifically in the U.K., Germany,
Italy, Denmark, and France. We first provide an overview
of the U.S. model, detailing the effects of over- and
underestimation with regard to self–subordinate and self–
peer comparisons. We then explore self–other agreement
across cultures using the literature on cultural values to
help predict whether self–other agreement is culture
specific or culture universal. In so doing, we address the
potential impact of cultural differences across countries on
self–other agreement and its outcomes.
Self–Other Agreement in the United States
Based on analytical procedures described by Edwards
(1994), recent research in the self–other agreement area has
shown that the relationship between self-ratings, other
ratings (e.g., subordinates and peers), and outcomes should
be conceptualized and modeled in three dimensions using
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
27
polynomial regression procedures (e.g., Atwater et al.,
1998; Johnson & Ferstl, 1999). As such, it is important to
delineate the functional form of self–other agreement
effects, explicating the direction of agreement (in agree-
ment, self greater than other, self less than other) as well as
the degree of agreement and level of associated attributes as
rated by self and other.
Atwater and her colleagues (Atwater et al., 1998)
supported a largely additive model whereby both self and
other ratings were related to outcomes (although there
were some nonlinear trends in the relationships found as
well). Along the line of perfect agreement (i.e., when self-
ratings equal other ratings), agreement at higher levels of
rated leadership attributes was associated with higher
performance than agreement at lower levels of rated
attributes. That is, it is not merely agreement that is related
to outcomes, but rather whether self and others agree that
leader’s behavior is good or poor. Further, Atwater et al.
(1998) reported additional effects for over- vs. under-
estimation. Lack of agreement when self-ratings were
lower than other ratings (underestimator) was related to
higher performance than lack of agreement when self-
ratings were higher than other ratings (overestimator).
That is, to underestimate one’s leadership behaviors is less
problematic than to over-rate one’s leadership. This
supports the findings of McCall and Lombardo (1983)
that arrogance is a factor that derails careers. These results
are consistent with prior research (e.g., Atwater &
Yammarino, 1997; Atwater et al., 1998; Van Velsor,
Taylor, & Leslie, 1993; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993).
Although the functional form described above and the
effects of in-agreement, overestimation, and underestima-
tion have been documented in a number of U.S. samples,
the extent to which aspects of this model are generalizable
across cultures has not been investigated. In the following
section, we explore rationales for the generalizability and
differences in this model across different cultures.
The Effects of Self–Other Agreement across
Countries
As noted above, self–other agreement is generally prefer-
able to disagreement (i.e., under- or overestimation)
because it indicates some level of understanding between
self and other (Smircich & Chesser, 1981). This will be
the case particularly when self and other ratings are in
agreement and favorable. At a general level, we propose
that overall, self–other agreement will be relevant to
performance across cultures because both self-awareness
and high ratings should contribute to better performance
regardless of the organizational context or cultural norms.
H1a: Across cultures, self–subordinate agreement in
ratings will be associated with managerial performance.
H1b: Across cultures, self–peer agreement in ratings will be
associated with managerial performance.
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
28 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
However, despite the general importance of agreement
across cultures, the nature of the agreement effect may vary
across cultures. Specifically, we are interested in examining
whether self–other comparison adds to ratings provided by
others differentially across cultures in the prediction of
performance. That is, the degree to which over- or under-
estimation is a problem may vary according to certain
cultural dimensions. In some cultures, the negative effects of
overestimation may be accentuated. We describe the cultural
dimensions that may influence these phenomena below.
Cultural Dimensions, Ratings from Others,
and Self–Other Agreement
Cultural typologies can be complex and multi-faceted.
Hofstede (1980, 1993) put forth one of the more popular
classification schemes. As noted by Schwartz, ‘‘Hofstede
sought dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the
responses of more than 117,000 employees of multi-
national business corporations in 40 nations. Based on an
approach that takes the national sample rather than the
individual person as the unit of analysis, Hofstede delivered
what he calls . . . culture-level dimensions’’ (Schwartz,
1994, p. 86). Hofstede’s four dimensions (masculinity/
femininity (MF), power distance, individualism/collecti-
vism, and uncertainty avoidance) are widely accepted and
have been used by numerous researchers to compare
different cultural groups (e.g., Bond & Forgas, 1984;
Gabrenya, Wang, & Lantane, 1985; Leung, 1988b).
In using culture as an explanatory variable, it is
preferable to view it as a multi-dimensional structure
wherein differences in the strength of cultures on multiple
dimensions are used in combination to explain differences
in work behavior (Dorfman, 1996; Clark, 1987). We
propose that two of Hofstede’s dimensions, masculinity/
femininity (MF) and individualism, may be especially
relevant to understanding self–other agreement across
cultures.
The MF dimension has been defined as:
tough values like assertiveness, performance, success and
competition, which in nearly all societies are associated
with the role of men, prevail over tender values like the
quality of life, maintaining warm personal relationships,
service, care for the weak, and solidarity, which in nearly
all societies are more associated with women’s roles
(Hofstede, 1993, p. 90)
and similarly as
a preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and
material success as opposed to a preference for relation-
ships, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life
(Schwartz, 1994).
In addition, in describing the masculinity societal norm,
Hofstede (1980) indicates that in countries low on
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
masculinity, leveling is the norm. Individuals do not try
to be better than others. In high masculinity countries the
norm is to try to be the best.
As evidence of the robustness of Hofstede’s MF measure,
the U.S., Italy, and Germany also score high on a similar
dimension labeled ‘‘mastery’’ in Schwartz’s (1994) new
cultural dimensions. The mastery dimension emphasizes
active mastery of the social environment and self-assertion.
In cultures high on mastery, emphasis is placed on
competition and getting ahead of other people. This
measure correlates .56 with Hofstede’s masculinity mea-
sure. Additionally, Hofstede (1998) cites other evidence of
the construct validity of the MF measure. For example, MF
correlated with LV Gordon’s survey of interpersonal values
measured across 17 countries. Students in masculine
countries expressed a greater need for recognition and less
benevolence. Masculinity was also highly negatively
correlated with the % of GNP the country donated to
poor countries as well as with a preference for higher
salaries over shorter working hours.
The U.S., U.K., Germany, and Italy are all high on
masculinity, according to the work of Hofstede (1980,
2001), with scores for these countries above the median.
The scores of both Denmark and France on masculinity
are, according to Hofstede, below the median.
Hofstede (1980) defined individualism as a focus on
concern for oneself over others, and an emphasis on
personal autonomy, accomplishment, and self-fulfillment.
Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, and Yoon (1994)
suggested that individualism also includes a component
of self-focus and egocentrism.
While the cultures studied in the present research are
all above the median on individualism as measured
by Hofstede (1980), a closer inspection reveals potential
differences. On Hofstede’s dimension of individualism, the
U.S. scores higher than any of the other 39 countries
studied. In the meta-analysis of studies carried out in
individualism and collectivism conducted by Oyserman,
Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002), the U.S. again was found
to be more individualistic than any of the other countries
studied. France and Denmark were lower on individualism
than Germany and Italy.
Taken together, France and Denmark can be considered
more feminine/less individualistic, relative to other coun-
tries in our sample while the U.K., Germany, and Italy can
be considered more masculine/more individualistic. The
U.S. can be considered masculine and highly individualis-
tic. These differences in cultural values are expected to
affect how self and other ratings are viewed as a managerial
tool. For example, as a result of the extreme individualism
in the U.S. coupled with the fact that 360-degree feedback
and theorizing about self–other agreement were developed
in the U.S., the relationship between self–other agreement
and performance is expected to be different in the U.S. than
in other countries. Specifically, given the large use of 360
feedback processes in the U.S. managers in the U.S. may be
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
more accustomed to receiving feedback from multiple
sources and recognize the need to adjust their self-
perceptions accordingly in order to succeed. Further, the
notion that self-regard and accomplishment are paramount
in the U.S. with its highly individualistic culture coupled
with the value placed on assertiveness and individual
success inherent in the high masculinity cultures suggests
that managers’ self-evaluations may be particularly rele-
vant in the U.S. In contrast, when individualism or
masculinity are lower, self-regard and assertiveness are of
lesser importance and the relationship between self and
other ratings may be less relevant. As such, we propose that
both individualism and masculinity and their degree of
extremity are relevant to self–other agreement.
We propose the following:
H2: The pattern of relationships between self and other
(subordinate and peer) ratings and managerial perfor-
mance in the U.S. (highest on individualism; high on
masculinity) will differ from that of European countries.
H3: The pattern of relationships between self and other
(subordinate and peer) ratings and managerial perfor-
mance in European countries high on masculinity (U.K.,
Germany, Italy) will differ from the U.S. and from
European countries relatively lower on individualism and
low on masculinity (France, Denmark).
The above hypotheses indicate that the overall pattern of
relationships between self–other ratings and performance
should differ for different countries. Below, we explore this
notion more specifically by delineating how over- and
under-rating effects should differ based on different
cultural dimensions.
Culture and Over- and Underestimation
The theoretical evidence pertaining to the potential effects
of overestimation is somewhat mixed. On the one hand,
in cultures high on masculinity (or mastery), overestima-
tion may not be as likely to be associated with poor
performance when compared with more feminine cultures.
The emphasis on assertiveness and competition may foster
at least a degree of appreciation for, or tolerance of, the
overestimator. Stated another way, the arrogance that
could potentially be attributed to an overestimator might
be ‘‘forgiven’’ more in a masculine country because of
values that stress self-confidence and assertiveness. The
poor relationships with others that are likely to accompany
overestimation may not be as problematic in masculine
countries in terms of relationships with effectiveness as a
manager. Maintaining a sense of humility is important in
feminine cultures (Adler, 1991; Sabath, 1999). These
cultures discourage bragging or boasting (i.e., self-en-
hancement) because such behavior is considered immature,
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
29
a sign of weakness, and, in reality, a sign of low self-esteem
on the part of an individual (Morrison, 1994). These
qualities, together with an emphasis on workplace relation-
ships, suggest that self-enhancement bias (i.e., overestima-
tion) will be especially counter to effective leadership.
That is, a leader who over-rates him/herself in relation to
others is likely to be viewed as out-of-touch and arro-
gant, qualities that are highly unacceptable in such a
culture. Accordingly, it follows that overestimators may be
especially ineffective in feminine (or less masculine) coun-
tries, as compared with overestimators in more masculine
cultures.
While we believe MF may be relevant to the effects of
overestimation of one’s leadership, the degree of individu-
alism must also be considered. Markus and Kitayama
(1991) distinguish the U.S. from other countries on a
dimension similar to individualism that they label inde-
pendence/interdependence. They propose that a sense of
‘‘self’’ is more important to those in cultures characterized
by independence. To have a sense of self is to have an
appreciation of how one differs from others and how others
perceive one’s self. Markus and Kitayama also suggest that
in independent cultures, the self must be responsive to the
social environment. However, that responsiveness is not so
important for the sake of responsiveness per se – as may be
the case in interdependent cultural contexts. Instead, they
propose that social responsiveness is necessary in order to
best assert one’s sense of self in the social context of
independent cultures. Thus, perceptions of others are
important, but primarily as ‘‘standards of reflected
appraisal’’ (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 226). In other
words, in order to perform effectively in a social context
in independent cultures, one must have an accurate sense
of self in relation to perceptions maintained by others.
It follows that especially in independent cultures, over-
estimators may be at a particular disadvantage. These
results support previous theory and empirical results that
overestimation tends to be associated with poorer perfor-
mance than in-agreement good ratings and underestima-
tion (e.g., Atwater et al., 1998).
In sum, the theoretical evidence appears to be somewhat
mixed with regard to our cultural combinations. For
example, although arguments relevant to masculinity
would suggest that overestimation is less of a problem in
the U.S., the arguments of Markus and Kitayama (1991)
would suggest the opposite for an independent/individua-
listic culture for which the U.S. can also be characterized.
While our analyses must be considered somewhat explora-
tory in nature, on balance we feel that the following
predictions are warranted:
H4a: Self-subordinate overestimation will be associated
with poorer managerial performance in European low
masculinity/lower individualism countries as compared
with the U.S. and as compared with European high
masculinity/higher individualism countries.
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
30 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
H4b: Self-peer overestimation will be associated with
poorer managerial performance in European low mascu-
linity/lower individualism countries as compared with the
U.S. and as compared with European high masculinity/
higher individualism countries.
The same cultural values also may be used to explain the
impact of underestimation. When the norm is one of
assertiveness, competition, and trying to be the best, as in
countries with high masculinity and individualism, rating
oneself lower than others may be seen as a sign of weakness
or low self-confidence. Hence, underestimators are likely
to have lower performance (compared with those whose
self-ratings are characterized by agreement with others) in
countries with high masculinity and individualism. In more
feminine/less individualistic countries, where the norm is
one of leveling or not trying to be better than others,
underestimation may either be related to higher perfor-
mance or may be unrelated to performance. Humility and
modesty are valued; hence, underestimating one’s perfor-
mance may be viewed as consistent with leadership
effectiveness in more feminine/less individualistic countries
such as France and Denmark.
In sum, we hypothesize the following:
H5a: Self–subordinate underestimation will be associated
with poorer managerial performance in European high
masculinity/higher individualism countries and the U.S. as
compared with European low masculinity/lower individu-
alism countries.
H5b: Self–peer underestimation will be associated with
poorer managerial performance in European high mascu-
line/higher individualism countries and the U.S. as com-
pared with European low masculinity/lower individualism
countries.
Method
Sample and Procedure
Data were collected from managers in the U.S. and five
European countries (Germany, U.K., Italy, France, and
Denmark) who participated in a leadership development
program. As part of each program, a multi-rater feedback
instrument was completed by the manager, his/her boss,
peers, and subordinates. Bosses also rated the manager’s
competence or overall performance. Of the managers who
had performance rated by their boss, 3793 U.S. managers
had data from subordinates; 3896 had data from peers. For
the European managers, of those who had performance
ratings made by their boss, 2732 had data from sub-
ordinates; 2855 had data from peers. In the U.S. sample,
87% had performance rated by one boss, 11% by two
bosses, and less than 2% by more than two bosses. In the
European sample, 83% had performance rated by one
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
boss, 15% by two bosses, and less than 2% by more than
two bosses.
Respondents were given the leadership surveys by their
focal manager in a sealed packet and they were mailed back
directly to the consulting company that scanned and scored
them. Respondents were told that the surveys were for
gathering feedback for the manager’s development and
they were confidential. That is, they were told that only the
manager being rated would see the results. In addition, peer
ratings and subordinate ratings were aggregated for each
source so no individual responses were included in the
feedback. Respondents (except bosses) were guaranteed
anonymity. All questionnaires were translated and back
translated into the native language of the respondents using
a standard procedure by a professional translation organi-
zation in each host country. Feedback reports were
prepared for each manager and discussed with them in
small group meetings.
In both samples, the average number of subordinate
surveys received per manager was four. The average
number of peer surveys received also was four. The range
of number of surveys was 1–20 per manager. The per-
centage of managers receiving only one survey from a peer
or subordinate ranged from 3% to 7%.
In the U.S. sample, 69% of the managers were male, the
average age was 41 years, 92% were white, 65% were at
the level of middle management or higher, and 71% had
been a manager for 3 or more years. In the European
sample, 78% were male, the average age was 40 years,
68% were at the level of middle management or higher, and
70% had been a manager for 3 or more years. Because there
were some managers (less than one percent) working
outside their native or home country, only those for whom
their country of origin matched their current work location
were included in the sample. Most managers (roughly 2/3)
worked for large companies (over 10,000 employees) in
both the U.S. and the European countries.
Measures
R
PROFILOR , a multi-rater feedback instrument that
collects ratings of managerial skills (Hezlett, Ronnkvist,
Holt, & Hazucha, 1997), was used to assess measures of
leader behavior and performance. We used data from peers,
subordinates, and self who provided ratings on 196 items
across nine dimensions (e.g., analyze issues, drive for
results, influence others). For the purposes of this study, we
used items from the seven dimensions that assess leadership
(i.e., directing, influencing, motivating, leading coura-
geously, fostering teamwork, coaching, and developing
and championing change). Items are assessed on a 5-point
scale indicating the frequency with which the manager
engages in each behavior. The response scale ranges from
1 5 not at all to 5 5 to a very great extent. Sample items
include ‘‘Provides clear direction and defines priorities for
the team,’’ ‘‘Rewards people for good performance,’’ and
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
‘‘Negotiates persuasively.’’ In the sample as a whole,
correlations among the dimensions were quite high (all
were above .7) and a factor analysis produced a one-factor
solution; hence, dimensions were combined into a single
scale of overall leadership behaviors (i.e., the average of the
44 items). Scale reliabilities were computed for each rater
group (self, peer, and subordinate) and ranged from .96 to
.99 in all countries.
The performance measure used was a one-item measure
rated by the manager’s boss, and was collected on a
separate survey. Where a manager had more than one boss
rating, the ratings of performance were averaged (although
in most cases there was only one boss rating of
performance). The performance item was ‘‘How would
you rate this manager’s competence in his/her current
position?’’ It was evaluated on a 7-point scale ranging from
1 5 Outstanding; one of the best to 7 5 Very weak; one of
the worst. (For the purposes of analyses, this item was
reverse scored.) While we would have preferred a multi-
item performance measure, only this one-item competency
measure was collected in all countries. However, in the
U.S., a five-item performance measure was also collected. It
included items such as ‘‘gets the job done’’, ‘‘is an effective
manager overall,’’ and ‘‘produces high quality work.’’
These items were rated on a 5-point scale. When averaged
into one performance score and correlated with the
competence measure used in this study, the correlation
was .58 (n 5 3981). We therefore have confidence that our
one-item competence measure adequately taps managerial
performance.
To justify aggregation across raters for a manager,
intraclass correlations (ICCs) were computed for the 44
items across four raters per manager. ICCs for subordinates
on the leadership dimension ranged from .57 to .67 across
countries. ICCs for peers ranged from .54 to .64 across
countries. These ratings are adequate to justify aggregation
(Van Velsor & Leslie, 1991), and similar to those found in
other studies using 360-degree feedback instruments (see
Fleenor, McCauley, & Brutus, 1996; Atwater et al., 1998).
Thus, each manager received an aggregated (mean) leader-
ship score across subordinates and across peers as well as a
self-score and a performance score.
Data Analysis
Analyses of variance were conducted for the demographic
and background variables (sex, age, organizational level,
and time as a manager) to determine whether differences
existed by country. For all variables, results of the analyses
of variance were significant. All subsequent analyses were
conducted with and without demographic and background
variables as controls. Including these variables as controls
did not change any of the results, and because demographic
and background characteristics were missing for approxi-
mately 20% of the sample, results reported are based on the
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
31
full sample, without inclusion of demographic and back-
ground characteristics.
The use of difference scores or categories to represent
agreement as has been done in much past multi-source
research does not allow for testing the functional form
underlying agreement, and further, these indices are
substantially flawed from a statistical perspective (e.g.,
Edwards, 1994). Therefore, to test the relationship
between self and other ratings and performance, poly-
nomial regression procedures with moderators (Edwards,
1994; Edwards & Parry, 1993) were used. In a hierarchical
manner, bosses’ ratings of performance were regressed on
self-ratings and other ratings in the first step (main effects),
and the product of self times other ratings, the square of
self-ratings and square of other ratings in the second step
(higher order effects). Self, subordinate, and peer ratings,
were also centered at the same value, based on the midpoint
of their shared scale (Edwards, 1994).
Examination of the surfaces corresponding to the
polynomial regression equations aids interpretation. Sev-
eral salient features of the surfaces were also examined. The
slope of the line of perfect agreement, or the S 5 0 line (self
equals other), is given by a1 5 b11b2 where b1 is the b for
self-ratings and b2 for other (peer or subordinate) ratings.
A curve along the S 5 0 line is indicated by a2 5 b31b41b5
(where b3 is the b for self squared, b4 is the b for the cross-
product of self and other, and b5 is the b for other squared).
If a1 differs significantly from zero and a2 does not, there
is a linear slope along the line of perfect agreement. A
negative value for a2 indicates a concave surface along the
line of perfect agreement, while a positive value indicates a
convex surface. The impact of over- and underestimation
can be examined through the reverse of the S 5 0 line,
or the line perpendicular to the line of perfect agreement
(e.g., when self 5 5, other 5 1, or centered self 5 2 and
other 5
2). Here, if the quantity a3 5 (b1
b2) differs
significantly from zero and the quantity a4 5 (b3
b41b5)
does not, there is a linear slope along the S 5
0 line. A
curve along the S 5
0 line is indicated by the quantity
(b3
b41b5) such that a negative value indicates a concave
surface along the line of complete disagreement.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients
among self, subordinate, and peer ratings of leadership and
the manager’s performance rating are presented across all
countries and by country in Table 1. Generally, self-ratings
were higher than other ratings. Peer ratings tended to
correlate most strongly with performance ratings as
compared with self and subordinate ratings. It is also
interesting to note the correlations among ratings and
performance across countries. The relationships between
self-ratings and performance, and between other ratings
and performance are very similar across countries and
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
32 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON

Table 1. Means, standard deviations (SD), and correlations for self, subordinate, and peer ratings of leadership skills
and boss ratings of performance (perf) by country1
n Mean SD Self Sub Peer
All countries
Self 6751 3.70 .41
Sub 6525 3.62 .49 .27**
Peer 6751 3.56 .40 .26** .43**
Perf 6751 5.39 1.02 .08** .23** .31**
U.S.
Self 3896 3.72 .41
Sub 3793 3.65 .52 .23**
Peer 3896 3.59 .41 .22** .41**
Perf 3896 5.34 1.13 .09** .22** .31**
U.K.
Self 788 3.60 .41
Sub 745 3.56 .45 .23**
Peer 788 3.46 .38 .19** .43**
Perf 788 5.37 .94 .04 .25** .35**
Germany
Self 437 3.86 .42
Sub 403 3.85 .48 .35**
Peer 437 3.73 .40 .24** .44**
Perf 437 5.61 .83
.02 .14** .29**
France
Self 533 3.60 .38
Sub 509 3.48 .43 .27**
Peer 533 3.48 .39 .23** .43**
Perf 533 5.49 .82 .09 .31** .34**
Denmark
Self 897 3.65 .36
Sub 896 3.49 .41 .34**
Peer 897 3.44 .34 .21** .45**
Perf 897 5.35 .89 .08 .26** .28**
Italy
Self 201 3.85 .23
Sub 178 3.72 .19 .17*
Peer 201 3.61 .22 .18* .26**
Perf 178 5.52 .90 .06 .17* .43**

**po.01, *po.05.

country groupings. In particular, the degree of relationship
between rating sources does not significantly vary by
country grouping (e.g., the correlations between subordi-
nate and peer, self and peer, self and subordinate ratings)
are very similar. Further, relationships between behavior
ratings and performance are also similar across countries
for subordinates and peers. However, the relationship
between self-ratings and performance is somewhat differ-
ent in that self-ratings are not significantly related to
performance in countries other than the U.S. These
patterns imply that there are many similarities in relation-
ships across countries between ratings of a manager’s
behaviors and performance ratings. That is, ratings from
peers and subordinates are significantly related to perfor-
mance ratings, and are of essentially the same magnitude
across countries. This suggests that how behaviors are
viewed and their relationship with supervisory ratings of
performance shows some similar patterns across countries.

International Journal of Selection and Assessment r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005

SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
However, there were differences in the patterns of relation-
ship between self and other ratings, which are discussed
below.
Omnibus Relationships
Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that self and other ratings
were both important for understanding performance
across all countries, while Hypotheses 2–3 refined this
prediction by focusing on differences in these relationships
by country groupings. As a first omnibus test, we
conducted a polynomial regression for self–subordinate
and self–peer ratings across all countries combined. For
self-subordinate agreement, the overall R2 from the
polynomial regression was .23 (F 5 74.75, po.001) and
was .32 (F 5 145.13, po.001) for self–peer ratings.2
Examination of the response surfaces indicated a signifi-
cant curve along the line of perfect agreement for self–other
(peer and subordinate) ratings such that a sharper decrease
in performance is observed at lower levels of rated
behaviors. That is, when self and other ratings of the
leader’s behavior went from moderate to high, perfor-
mance ratings did not increase sharply. However, when self
and other ratings were low and decreasing, performance as
rated by the supervisor dropped sharply. Further, along the
S 5
0 line performance was inverted U-shaped, with the
turning point near self equaling other. That is, for a severe
overestimator performance was lowest; then it began to
increase as the overestimation became less severe. It should
also be noted that the slope of the line of perfect agreement
as well as the slope of the line S 5
0 line were significant
for each country separately, indicating that agreement at
high levels of rated behaviors was related to higher
outcomes than agreement at low levels of rated behaviors.3
The findings from the omnibus test support Hypotheses
1a and 1b that self and other ratings are related to perfor-
mance outcomes across cultures. Detailed results are not
fully presented because Hypotheses 2 and 3 focused on more
explicit relationships by country groupings and it is more
meaningful to examine these moderated relationships.
Differential Patterns by Country Grouping
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted that the pattern of relation-
ships between self and other (subordinate and peer) ratings
and managerial performance in the U.S. would differ from
that of European countries. First, moderated polynomial
regressions and follow-up tests supported the notion that the
U.S. differed significantly from European countries
as a whole (combined) as well as from each of the other
European countries.3 Therefore, the U.S. was retained
separately and three country groupings were created based
on the cultural values for masculinity–femininity and
individualism scores. The three groups were: (1) U.S. – high
masculinity/highest individualism; (2) high masculinity/high
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
33
individualism European– U.K., Germany, Italy; and (3) low
masculinity/relatively lower individualism European –
France and Denmark. (Please note that our designation of
low individualism is in relation to the other countries in the
study. France and Denmark did not receive individualism
scores that were below average in Hofstede’s analyses.)
Moderated polynomial regression procedures were used
to test Hypothesis 3 that the pattern of relationships
between self and other (subordinate and peer) ratings and
managerial performance in European countries high on
masculinity/individualism would differ from the U.S. and
from European countries low on masculinity/individual-
ism. In a hierarchical manner, supervisory ratings of
performance were regressed on self-ratings and other
ratings (peer or subordinate) in the first step, the product
of self times other ratings, the square of self-ratings, and
square of other ratings in the second step, a set of dummy
variables representing country grouping (U.S., European
high masculinity, European low masculinity) and 10 cross-
product terms between the country dummy variables and
the terms in the equation. A significant increase in R2 when
the set of cross-product terms for country are entered in the
equation indicates a significant difference in the response
surfaces between the country groupings.
For self–subordinate agreement, the overall R2 from
the moderated polynomial regression was .25 (F 5 24.13,
po.001). This analysis also revealed that a significant 1%
additional variance (p  .01) was accounted for by the set
of cross-product terms for country and self–subordinate
ratings, beyond that accounted for by the prior terms in the
equation. For self–peer agreement, the overall R2 was .33
(F 5 45.14, po.001) and the set of cross-product terms of
country and self-subordinate ratings accounted for a
significant 1% (p  .05) additional variance in perfor-
mance, beyond that accounted for by self and other ratings
and country dummy variables. Thus, at a general level,
Hypothesis 3 was supported.
To facilitate interpretation, regression coefficients for
each country grouping are presented separately. These are
the resultant coefficients from the moderator analyses
when country grouping is taken into account and are the
same as when each country group is treated separately in
regressions (standard errors, however, differ slightly
between the omnibus test and separate regressions by
country). Results are presented in Table 2. Significant
differences between b’s for each term by country grouping
are contained in the last column of Table 2 based on the
results of the moderated regression analyses. For both self–
subordinate and self–peer agreement, significant differ-
ences between country groupings were found, and the
significant interaction terms between country grouping
based on masculinity/individualism and self–other rating
variables provide specific support for Hypothesis 3.
As can be seen in Table 2, results for the relationship
between self–subordinate agreement and performance
varied across country groupings. Figures 1a (U.S.), 1b
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
34 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON

Table 2. Regression of managerial performance on self–other ratings based on country groupings

U.S. highest individuality EHM ELM
High masculinity U.K., Germany, Italy France, Denmark
Self–other agreement b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) Significant comparisons
Self–subordinate
Self .16(.04)** .00(.08)
.05(.08) US 6¼ EHM, ELM
Subordinate .43(.03)** .45(.06)** .46(.08)**
Self squared
.16(.07)*
.07(.12) .25(.16) US, EHM 6¼ ELM
Self * subordinate .02(.08)
.12(.16) .01(.19)
Subordinate squared
.06(.04)
.09(.10)
.40(.11)** US, EHM 6¼ ELM
Self–Peer
Self .11(.04)**
.08(.07) .00(.08) US 6¼ EHM
Peer .79(.04)** .81(.07)** .63(.08)** US, EHM 6¼ ELM
Self squared
.19(.07)**
.01(.11) .16(.14) US 6¼ ELM
Self * peer .08(.10)
.06(.18) .17(.21)
Peer squared
.22(.06)**
.37(.12)**
.33(.13)*

For self–other: US (n 5 3793); EHM (n 5 1326); ELM (n 5 1406).

For self–peer: US (n 5 3896); EHM (n 5 1426); ELM (n 5 1429).
EHM, European high masculinity/individuality; ELM, European low masculinity/individuality. *p  .05, **p  .01.

(European low masculinity) and 1c (European high mascu-
linity) display the results graphically for self–subordinate
agreement, while similar graphs are presented in Figures 2a,
2b, and 2c for self–peer agreement. The results between
country groups show differences in several areas. First, the
results in Table 2 indicate that self–other agreement is
relevant in the U.S. but not in other countries (significant
differences in self and self-squared b’s were found between
the U.S. and the other country groups). Second, in both high
and low masculinity/individualism countries in Europe, only
other ratings are significant (see Table 2).
Pattern of Relationships in U.S. For self–subordinate
ratings, self–other agreement was significantly related to
performance in the U.S. (see Table 2 and Figure 1a).
Examination of surface features revealed that, for the U.S.,
a1 was .59 (po.01) and a2 was
.20 (po.05), indicating a
slope along the line of perfect agreement for self–
subordinate that is curved such that a sharper decrease in
performance is observed at lower levels of rated behaviors.
Along the S 5
0 line, performance is inverted U-shaped,
with the turning point near self equaling other (a3 5
.27
and a4 5
.24, po.05) such that performance is lowest for
a severe overestimator, begins to increase as the over-
estimation becomes less severe, and then decreases slightly
as underestimation increases. The quantity (b2
b1)/
2(b3
b41b5) was
.56, indicating a small shift toward
the self less than the other region of about one-half unit
along the line of S 5
0, further evidence that over-
estimation is worse in relation to performance than
underestimation.
A similar pattern emerged when examining self–peer
agreement and its relationship with performance in the U.S.
Salient features of the surfaces were again examined to aid
interpretation. For the U.S., as can be seen in Table 2 and
Figure 2a, results indicated a significant slope along the line
of perfect agreement (a1 5 .88, po.01) with a concave
curve such that a sharper decrease in performance occurs as
rated behaviors become lower (a2 5
.33, po.01).
Further, a3 was
.68 (po.01) and a4 was
.49
(po.01), indicating a concave trend such that performance
is lower for underestimators than for those in agreement,
and performance also decreases as overestimation becomes
more severe. In addition, the quantity (b2
b1)/
2(b3
b41b5) 5
.69 indicating a shift toward the self
less than other region relative to peer ratings is important
for understanding the relationship between over- and
underestimation and performance. Thus, performance is
highest when self and peer ratings are similar and high,
while they are lowest when self and peer ratings are similar
and low. Performance decreases somewhat as under-
estimation increases and performance decreases more
substantially as over-rating becomes more severe.
This pattern is similar to that found in previous multi-
source feedback studies (cf., Atwater et al., 1998; Johnson
& Ferstl, 1999). For self–peer ratings, overestimation had a
more detrimental effect than for self–subordinate ratings.
Comparison of European Countries. Hypotheses 4a
and 4b predicted that overestimation would be more
detrimental (related to lower performance) in countries
lower in masculinity/individualism and Hypotheses 5a and
5b suggested that underestimation would be more detri-
mental in countries higher in masculinity/individualism.
However, because only other ratings were important in
European countries (see Table 2), over- and underestima-
tion issues are not particularly relevant. Thus, Hypotheses
4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b were not supported (although as

International Journal of Selection and Assessment r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005

SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT 35

a U.S. a U.S.

7.00 7.00

6.00 6.00
performance

performance
5.00 5.00

4.00 4.00
3.00 3.00
2.00 2.00
1.00 1.00
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
subordinate −1 −1 self peer −1 −1 self
−2 −2 −2 −2

b Low Masculinity / Indiv European b Low Masculinity / Indiv European

France, Denmark France, Denmark

7.00 7.00
6.00 6.00
performance

5.00

performance
5.00
4.00 4.00
3.00 3.00
2.00 2.00
1.00 1.00
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
−1 −1 −1 −1
subordinate −2 −2 self peer −2 −2 self

c High Masculinity / Indiv European c High Masculinity / Indiv European

Germany, UK, Italy Germany, UK, Italy

7.00 7.00
6.00 6.00
performance

5.00
performance

5.00
4.00 4.00
3.00 3.00
2.00 2.00
1.00 1.00
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
subordinate −1 −1 self peer −1 −1 self
−2 −2 −2 −2

Figure 1. Relationship between self and subordinate Figure 2. Relationship between self and peer ratings and
ratings and performance. performance.

indicated above, overestimation is related to lower
performance than underestimation in the U.S.).
Nevertheless, the results based on country grouping
indicate significant differences in the pattern of ratings
between the U.S. (Figures 1a and 2a), European high
masculinity/individualism countries (Figures 1c and 2c),
and European low masculinity/individualism countries
(Figures 1b and 2b). First, as indicated above, the U.S.
differs significantly from European countries, particularly
in that both self and other ratings are simultaneously
important in their relationship with performance. Second,
for the European countries, only other ratings are
important (i.e., there are no significant effects for self or
self-squared); however, the pattern of results differs by
country grouping and differs somewhat depending on
whether the other ratings are from subordinates or peers.

r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005 Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005

36 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
For self–subordinate agreement, the difference between
high and low masculinity/individualism countries in
Europe is primarily as a result of the nonlinearity of
subordinate ratings. In high masculinity European coun-
tries, subordinate ratings are significantly and linearly
related to performance. However, in low masculinity
European countries, subordinate ratings are related to
performance in a nonlinear manner (and the effect is
significantly different from other country groupings). In
the case of low masculinity/individualism countries, the
relationship between other ratings and performance is such
that at mid- to high levels of other ratings, performance
differences are small, but performance ratings decrease
more rapidly as other ratings become lower.
For self–peer analyses, results indicated that the primary
difference between high and low masculinity/individualism
countries in Europe was in the strength of the relationship
between peer ratings and performance, with peer ratings
more strongly related to performance in high masculinity/
individualism countries. Further, while the relationship
between peer ratings and performance was nonlinear in
both high and low masculinity/individualism countries, the
nature of the relationship differs slightly. In low masculi-
nity/individualism countries, the ‘‘curve’’ begins closer to
the midpoint of the scale such that those with mid- to high
ratings have similar performance, whereas in high mascu-
linity/individualism countries, the ‘‘curve’’ begins at a much
higher rating point, indicating that only at very high levels
of leadership behaviors are distinctions in performance
minimal.
Summary
Taken together, the results indicate that there are differ-
ences between countries based on cultural values and that
the U.S. differs significantly from other countries, support-
ing Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2, and 3. In particular, the
differences between the U.S. and the European countries
are based on the relative role of self and other ratings, with
self–other agreement being important for the U.S. while
other ratings are most important in European coun-
tries. Further, differences between countries based on mas-
culinity–femininity/individualism were observed in the
strength and nonlinearity of the relationship between other
ratings and performance.
In the U.S., simultaneous consideration of both self and
subordinate ratings is important for predicting perfor-
mance ratings. Agreement between self and other at high
levels was better than agreement at low levels and
agreement was generally better than over- or underestima-
tion. Over- and underestimation were not related to
performance in the European high nor low masculinity/
individualism countries, although they were in the U.S.
This provides some support for Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 5a, and
5b only for the U.S. but not for the European countries.
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
In low masculinity/individualism European countries
(France and Denmark), other ratings were related to
performance and the nonlinear results indicated that the
positive relationship between others ratings of leader
behavior and performance ratings becomes flatter at higher
levels of other ratings and drops sharply as others give
lower ratings. For example, if subordinates rate a leader’s
behavior as moderate to high (e.g., above 3.5 on a 5-point
scale,) performance is high. However, if subordinates rate
the leader low, as those ratings become progressively lower,
performance also becomes progressively lower. That is, in
low masculinity/individualism countries there is little
distinction in terms of performance between those who
are moderate to good, but lower ratings are strongly related
to poorer performance.
In high masculinity/individualism European countries,
when examining self–subordinate relationships, subordi-
nate ratings were significantly related to performance in a
linear manner. That is, as ratings become lower, perfor-
mance ratings become lower in a linear fashion. However,
for peer ratings, a nonlinear relationship with performance
was observed such that performance ratings drop off
steeply as peer ratings become progressively lower. The
strength of the relationship of peer ratings of leader
behavior with performance was significantly stronger in
high masculinity/individualism countries than low mascu-
linity/individualism countries.
These results indicate that the U.S. and European
countries differed significantly. In the U.S., self-ratings
relative to other ratings are important in relation to
performance, whereas in Europe, other ratings are the
predominant influence in relation to performance, and self-
ratings relative to other ratings play an insignificant role.
Discussion
Overall, there was much similarity among countries in the
relationships between self-ratings and performance and
between other ratings and performance across countries. In
all country groupings, peer and subordinate ratings were
more highly correlated with each other than self-ratings
were with either group. Additionally, in all countries, self-
ratings were higher than subordinate or peer ratings. These
results suggest that how behaviors are viewed and their
relationship with supervisory ratings of performance show
some similar patterns across countries. However, the role
of self-ratings is not the same across countries and this is
particularly evident in examining relationships between
self–other agreement and performance ratings.
The polynomial regression approach used here is helpful
in understanding the complexities in the patterns of
relationship between self and other ratings across coun-
tries. The results from this study support earlier findings
that self–other differences are related to performance in the
U.S. and extend this work by showing that alternative
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
patterns of self–other agreement occur in other countries.
Using a different sample and different leadership and
performance measures, findings for the current U.S. sample
replicate those of Atwater et al. (1998). Specifically, in the
U.S., the patterns of agreement and performance are
similar for subordinates and peers. Both self and other
(peer and subordinate) ratings are relevant in combination.
Agreement at high levels is related to higher performance
than agreement at low levels. Agreement is generally better
than disagreement, that is, managers receive higher
performance ratings when they agree with their subordi-
nates that their performance is good, and overestimation is
related to lower performance than underestimation.
In the U.S., much theory has been offered (e.g., Atwater
& Yammarino, 1997; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993;
Yammarino & Atwater, 1997) to explain why a compar-
ison of self-ratings with those of others is important for
predicting performance ratings, effectiveness, and perfor-
mance outcomes. Further, in recent years, a great deal of
work from practitioners has focused on these same issues
(e.g., Bracken, Timmreck, & Church, 2001; Hazucha,
Hezlett, & Schneider, 1993; Tornow & London, 1998).
The basic underlying assumption across this work is that
how a manager views his or her performance relative to
how others (e.g., peers or subordinates) view his or her
performance will have implications for the manager’s
leadership behaviors, relationships with subordinates and
peers, and ultimately his or her performance. While some
early research in this area showed inconsistent and often
conflicting results, in recent years, a few studies have used
more sophisticated and appropriate methodologies for
studying self–other agreement (e.g., Atwater et al., 1998;
Johnson & Ferstl, 1999). Using larger U.S. samples and
polynomial regression procedures, this more recent re-
search has revealed patterns of self–other agreement
relationships very similar to the ones found in this study
for the U.S. – namely that simultaneous consideration of
both self and other ratings is important for examining
relationships with performance measures. Over-, under-
rating, and being in agreement are all relevant concepts.
Clearly, in the U.S., self–awareness, as operationalized by
self–other agreement, is relevant to performance. Over-
rating which may represent a degree of arrogance, is related
to lower performance as is underestimation.
In contrast to the U.S., findings for the European
countries indicated that self–other agreement was not very
important. Rather, others’ ratings of leadership behaviors
(subordinate and peer) alone were most strongly related to
the performance measure, and self–other comparisons did
not add significant explanatory power. These findings were
unexpected, and it is not clear why we failed to show
stronger self–other agreement effects in the European
countries. It is possible that masculinity is not as important
to the self–other agreement effect as the extreme individu-
alism and independence found in the U.S. The competi-
tiveness and self-focus may contribute to individuals in the
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
37
U.S. constantly striving to be better than their peers; thus,
knowing how they are perceived becomes important to
their success.
There seems to be an implicit understanding among
employees in many U.S. organizations that their opinions
should be valued, and that managers should be aware of
how they are perceived. U.S. organizations often bombard
employees with surveys assessing their opinions on a
variety of topics, including their job satisfaction and
preferences for human resource practices and initiatives
(e.g., flextime). Because employees are encouraged to
provide their opinions, they may come to expect that
managers should understand how they perceive the
manager’s behavior, and the manager should align his or
her own perceptions accordingly. As such, self–other
agreement may be more relevant to performance in the
U.S. than elsewhere. It is also possible that the high degree
of attention paid to self–other comparisons in 360-degree
feedback processes (which are prevalent in the U.S.) may
have sensitized U.S. managers and employees to the
importance of self–other agreement.
Along similar lines, although we recognize that power
distance is largely similar across the countries in our study
(Adler, 2002; Hofstede, 1980), perhaps the social distance
between managers and subordinates is lower in the U.S.
Thus, greater awareness of how one is viewed by
subordinates becomes more of an expectation.
Nevertheless, several interesting differences between
countries were revealed. For example, the relationship
between peer ratings and performance was nonlinear in
France and Denmark. In France and Denmark, perfor-
mance ratings were relatively flat at higher levels of
subordinate ratings but dropped sharply at lower levels
of subordinate ratings. This pattern of nonlinear effects
was not observed for most of the other countries. One
possible explanation is that in relatively lower individua-
listic countries that are low on masculinity, such as France
and Denmark, leveling is the norm, and hence, the flatter
relationship between ratings and performance at higher
levels may reflect, in part, this leveling or avoidance of
competition among the managers who are viewed as more
successful. Alternatively, in countries high on masculinity
such as the U.K. and Germany, where assertiveness and
competition are valued, one would not expect to see such a
leveling effect. That is, being rated even a small amount
better than another is relevant. Our findings support this
interpretation, particularly for self–subordinate compar-
isons, in that for masculine countries, the relationship
between other ratings and performance was linear.
Generally, the findings for self–peer ratings were similar
to those for self and subordinates’ ratings, although in some
cases the results were more pronounced. For example,
performance ratings decreased more dramatically as peer
ratings of leadership became lower when compared with
the decrease in performance ratings when subordinate
ratings became lower. Overall, peer ratings were more
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
38 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
highly related to performance than subordinate ratings,
particularly in countries high on masculinity. Perhaps,
supervisors and peers have more in common in their
judgments and perspective of a manager than do super-
visors and subordinates.
Limitations
A number of limitations of this research should be noted.
First, the translation–retranslation process may have
contributed to the differences in slopes found in the various
countries. However, this would not explain the differences
found between the U.S. and U.K.
Second, the one-item rating of performance is a
limitation. The study would have benefited from a more
objective or multi-item measure. Third, it is possible that
perceptions of competence and what constitutes compe-
tence may vary across cultures, or there may be response
biases that influence ratings in the different cultures (such
as leniency or harshness). However, if rating styles vary by
culture because of societal values, it is likely that all rater
groups (peers, subordinates) would have the same biases.
Thus, we might expect mean differences, but not necessa-
rily relational differences across sources. The mean
performance ratings did not differ significantly between
any of the country groupings. Similarly, the correlations
between self, other, and performance ratings are very
similar across the different countries. Thus, while bosses’
perceptions of what constitutes competence may have
varied across cultures, the rating patterns do not suggest
wide variability in response patterns. A fourth limitation
is the cross-sectional nature of the data. As is the case
with most studies of this nature, longitudinal data would
be preferable. Finally, while we placed a great deal of
emphasis on Hofstede’s dimensions, and there is support
for using them for cultural comparisons, they have come
under criticism for being overly general and based on what
could be a biased sample (Schwartz, 1994). It would be
interesting in future research to explore alternative cultural
value perspectives.
Future Research and Implications
In addition to exploring the impact of differing cultural
dimensions independently as an explanation for the
different results across countries and across ratings sources,
a more fruitful approach might be to investigate the profile
or configuration of cultural values across countries. For
example, there may be other cultural values or differences
that work in combination and that could explain differ-
ences by country. It should be noted that such a profile
comparison was not possible here because the countries
studied were similar in terms of many of Hofstede’s
dimensions.
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
Differences that we found in the correlations among
rating sources and performance across cultures suggest that
an additional avenue for future research would be to focus
on differential perceptions about the peer relations and
superior–subordinate relations. For example, different
perceptions about the trustworthiness of peer ratings, the
usefulness of alignment between self and subordinate
perceptions of behavior, or appropriateness of feedback
from subordinates or peers might explain some of the
differences we found across cultures.
This study just begins to scratch the surface in terms of
extending the work on feedback and self–other agreement
cross-culturally. How might self–other agreement and
feedback processes work in countries such as Japan, China,
or Brazil? For example, as noted above, each of the
countries in our sample scored above the median on
individualism. How might self–other agreement relate to
performance in a collectivist country? Also, we should
consider the possibility that self–other agreement results
are influenced by the rating biases of self and other raters.
In collectivist countries, raters may hesitate to provide
discriminating ratings and may rate themselves and all
others very similarly. This certainly could impact the results
of self–other agreement on performance.
The results of our study have implications for the use of
feedback processes such as 360-degree feedback when
applied across cultures. Studies have demonstrated that
feedback does alter self-ratings; over-raters lower their self-
ratings and under-raters raise their self-ratings following
feedback (cf. Smither, London, Vasilopoulos, Reilly, Mill-
sap, & Salveminim, 1995). Other research (e.g., Johnson &
Ferstl, 1999) has demonstrated that over-raters tended to
improve their performance after upward feedback. We can
speculate that this would be the case in other countries, and
that over time, stronger self–other agreement relationships
with performance may be demonstrated.
This study also has implications for multi-national
management. Our results suggest that we cannot apply
Western management practices outside the U.S. in a
cavalier manner and expect those processes to have
comparable results. The differences in effects between the
U.S. and the various European countries that we studied
suggest that we must exercise caution when applying U.S.-
based findings to a global context. Factors that are
important for performance outcomes in the U.S. may have
no relationship with performance, or even a negative
influence on performance, outside the U.S.
We believe that the results of our study have broadened
our understanding of self–other agreement. Clearly, future
research in countries outside the U.S. would continue to
enhance our understanding of self–other agreement and
cultural values. It is our belief that this study will also
prompt researchers and practitioners to carefully consider
the cross-cultural implications of their research and
personnel practices, particularly the implementation of
multi-source feedback.
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
SELF–OTHER AGREEMENT
Notes
1. Correlations in Table 1 contain a mixture of correla-
tions across levels: unaggregated (self-manager), single-
aggregated (self–subordinate and self–peer) and double-
aggregated (subordinate–peer) correlations. Given our
theoretical interest in examining cross-level relation-
ships in subsequent analyses, this aggregation is appro-
priate. However, single- and double-aggregation have
differential effects on correlations and readers are
referred to Scullen (1997) for explication in interpreting
these conceptually different types of relationships.
2. Detailed results of this analysis are available from the
author.
3. Full results of the analyses comparing the U.S. with
European countries are available from the author.
References
Adler, N.J. (1991) International dimensions of organizational
behavior (2nd Edn.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College
Publishing.
Adler, N.J. (2002) International dimensions of organizational
behavior (4th Edn.). Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College
Publishing.
Ashford, S. (1989) Self-assessments in organizations: A literature
review and integrative model. In L.L. Cummings and B.M. Staw
(Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (vol. 11, pp.
133–174). Greenwich CT: JAI Press.
Atwater, L., Ostroff, C., Yammarino, F. and Fleenor, J. (1998) Self–
other agreement: Does it really matter? Personnel Psychology,
51, 577–598.
Atwater, L., Roush, P. and Fischthal, A. (1995) The influence of
upward feedback on self and follower ratings of leadership.
Personnel Psychology, 48, 35–60.
Atwater, L. and Yammarino, F. (1992) Does self–other agreement on
leadership perceptions moderate the validity of leadership and
performance predictions. Personnel Psychology, 45, 141–164.
Atwater, L. and Yammarino, F. (1997) Self–other rating agreement:
A review and model. Research in Personnel and Human
Resource Management, 15, 121–174.
Bass, B. and Yammarino, F. (1991) Congruence of self and others’
leadership ratings of naval officers for understanding successful
performance. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 40,
437–454.
Bond, M.H. and Forgas, J.P. (1984) Linking person perception to
behavior intention across cultures: The role of cultural
collectivism. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 15,
337–352.
Bracken, D., Timmreck, C. and Church, A. (2001) The handbook of
multi-source feedback. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Carver, C. and Scheier, M. (1981) Attention and self-regulation: A
control theory approach to human behavior. New York:
Springer.
Church, A. (1997) Managerial self-awareness in high-performing
individuals in organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology,
82(2), 281–292.
Clark, L.A. (1987) Mutual relevance of mainstream and cross-
cultural psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychol-
ogy, 55, 461–470.
Dorfman, P.W. (1996) International and cross-cultural leadership
research. In J. Punnett and B.J. Shenkar (Eds.), Handbook for
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005
39
international management research (pp. 267–349). Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Edwards, J. (1994) The study of congruence in organizational
behavior research: Critique and proposed alternative. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, 683–689.
Edwards, J. and Parry, M. (1993) On the use of polynomial
regression equations as an alternative to difference scores in
organizational research. Academy of Management Journal, 36,
1577–1613.
Fleenor, J., McCauley, C. and Brutus, S. (1996) Self–other rating
agreement and leader effectiveness. Leadership Quarterly, 7,
487–506.
Gabrenya, W.K., Wang, Y.E. and Latane, B. (1985) Social loafing on
an optimizing task: Cross cultural differences among Chinese
and Americans. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 16,
223–242.
Harris, M. and Schaubroeck, J. (1988) A meta-analysis of self–
supervisor self–peer and peer–supervisor ratings. Personnel
Psychology, 41, 43–61.
Hazucha, J.F., Hezlett, S.A. and Schneider, R.J. (1993) The impact
of 360-degree feedback on management skills development.
Human Resource Management, 32, 325–351.
Hezlett, S.A., Ronnkvist, A.M., Holt, K.E. and Hazucha, J.F. (1997)
The PROFILORR technical summary. Minneapolis, MN:
Personnel Decisions International.
Hofstede, G. (1980) Culture’s consequences: International differ-
ences in work-related values. London: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1993) Cultural constraints in management theories.
Academy of Management Executive, 7(1), 81–94.
Hofstede, G. (1998) Masculinity and femininity. London: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture’s consequences: Comparing values,
behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Ruiz-Quintanilla, S.A., Dorfman, P.W.,
Javidan, M., Dickson, M. and Gupta, V. (1999) Cultural
influences on leadership and organizations: Project Globe.
Advances in Global Leadership, 1, 171–233.
Johnson, J.W. and Ferstl, K.L. (1999) The effects of inter-rater and
self–other agreement on performance improvement following
upward feedback. Personnel Psychology, 52, 271–303.
Kim, U., Triandis, H., Kagitcibasi, C., Choi, S. and Yoon, G. (1994)
Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method and applica-
tions. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Leung, K. (1988) Theoretical advances in justice behavior: Some
cross-cultural inputs. In M.H. Bond (Ed.), The cross-cultural
challenge to social psychology (pp. 218–229). Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Mabe, P. and West, S. (1982) Validity of self-evaluation of ability:
A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 67,
280–296.
Markus, H. and Kitayama, S. (1991) Culture and the self:
Implications for cognition, emotion and motivation. Psycholo-
gical Review, 98(2), 224–253.
McCall, M. and Lombardo, M. (1983) Off the track: Why and how
successful executives get derailed (Technical Report No. 21).
Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership.
McCaulley, C. and Lombardo, M. (1990) Benchmarks: An
instrument for diagnosing managerial strengths and weak-
nesses. In K.D. Clark and M.S. Clark (Eds.), Measures of
leadership (pp. 535–545). West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library
of America.
Megerian, L.E. and Sosik, J.J. (1996) An affair of the heart:
Emotional intelligence and transformational leadership. The
Journal of Leadership Studies, 3(3), 31–48.
Morrison, T. (1994) Kiss, bow, or shake hands: How to do business
in 60 countries. Holbrook, MA: Bob Adams, Inc.
Volume 13 Number 1 March 2005
40 LEANNE ATWATER, DAVID WALDMAN, CHERI OSTROFF, CHET ROBIE AND KARIN M. JOHNSON
Oyserman, D., Coon, H. and Kemmelmeier, M. (2002) Rethinking
individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assum-
ptions and meta analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128(1), 3–72.
Paulhaus, D. (1986) Self-deception and impression management in
test responses. In A. Angleitner and J. Wiggins (Eds.),
Perspectives in interactional psychology. NY: Plenum.
Sabath, A.M. (1999) International business etiquette. Franklin
Lakes, NJ: Career Press.
Sackheim, H. (1983) Self-deception, self-esteem and depression:
The adaptive value of lying to oneself. In J. Masling (Ed.),
Empirical studies of psychoanalytic theories (pp. 101–157).
Hillsdale, NJ: Earlbaum.
Schwartz, H. (1994) Beyond individualism/collectivism. In U. Kim,
H. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S. Choi and G. Yoon (Eds.),
Individualism and collectivism: theory, method and applica-
tions. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Scullen, S.E. (1997) When ratings from one source have been
averaged, but ratings from another source have not: Problems
and solutions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 880–888.
Smircich, L. and Chesser, R. (1981) Superiors’ and subordinates’
perceptions of performance: Beyond disagreement. Academy of
Management Journal, 24, 198–205.
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
Smither, J., London, M., Vasilopoulos, N., Reilly, R., Millsap, R. and
Salveminim, N. (1995) An examination of the effects of an upward
feedback program over time. Personnel Psychology, 48, 1–33.
Taylor, S. and Brown, J. (1988) Illusion and well-being: A social
psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological
Bulletin, 103, 193–210.
Tornow, W. and London, M. (1998) Maximizing the value of 360
degree feedback. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Van Velsor, E. and Leslie, J.B. (1991) Feedback to managers: Vol. 1
A guide to evaluating multi-rater feedback instruments. Green-
sboro NC: Center for Creative Leadership.
Van Velsor, E., Taylor, S. and Leslie, J. (1993) An examination of the
relationships among self-perception accuracy, self-awareness,
gender and leader effectiveness. Human Resource Management
Journal, 32, 249–264.
Warr, P. (1987) The Meaning of Working. London: Harcourt, Brace
Jovanovich.
Yammarino, F. and Atwater, L. (1993) Understanding self-percep-
tion accuracy: Implications for human resources management.
Human Resource Management Journal, 32, 231–247.
Yammarino, F. and Atwater, L. (1997) Do managers see them-
selves as others see them? Organizational Dynamics, 25,
35–44.
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005