Petitioner Compendium

A.K. Gopalan vs The State Of Madras.Union Of ...
on 19 May, 1950
It was argued that article 19 and article 21 should be read together as implementing each other.
Article 19 gave substantive rights to citizens while article 21 prescribed that no person can be
deprived of his life and personal liberty except by procedure established by law. Even so, on a true
construction of article 19, it seems to me that both preventive and punitive detention are outside the
scope of article 19. In order to appreciate the true scope of article 19 it is useful to read it by itself
and then to consider how far the other articles in Part HI affect or control its meaning. It is the first
article under the caption "Right to Freedom ." It gives the rights mentioned in 19 (1) (a) to
(g) to all citizens of India. These rights read by themselves and apart from the controls found in
clauses (2) to (6) of the same article, specify the different general rights which a free citizen in a
democratic country ordinarily has. Having specified those rights, each of them is considered
separately from the point of view of a similar right in the other citizens, and also after taking into
consideration the principle that individual liberty must give way, to the extent it is necessary, when
the good or safety of the people generally is concerned. Thus the right to freedom of speech and
expression is given by 19 (1) (a). But clause (2) provides that such right shall not prevent the
operation of a law which relates to libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter
which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to
overthrow, the State. Clause (2) thus only emphasizes that while the individual citizen has a free
right of speech or expression, he cannot be permitted to use the same to the detriment of a similar
right in another citizen or to the detriment of the State. Thus, all laws of libel, slander, contempt of
Court or laws in respect of matters which offend against decency or morality are reaffirmed to be
operative in spite of this individual right of the citizen to freedom of speech and expression. Simi-
larly; that right is also subject to laws which prevent undermining the security of the State or against
activities which tend to overthrow the State. A similar analysis of clauses f3) and (4) shows similar
restrictions imposed on similar grounds. In the same way clause (5) also permits reasonable
restrictions in the exercise of the right to freedom of movement throughout the territory of India,
the right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India or the right to acquire, hold and
dispose of property, being imposed by law provided such reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
such right are in the interest of the general' public. The Constitution further provides by the same
clause that similar reasonable restrictions could be put on the exercise of those rights for the
protection of the interest of a Scheduled Tribe. This is obviously to prevent an argument being
advanced that while such restriction could be put in the interest of general public, the Constitution
did not provide for the imposition of such restriction to protect the interests of a smaller group of
people only. Reading article 19 in that way as a whole the only concept appears to be that the
specified rights of a free citizen arc thus controlled by what the framers of the Constitution thought
were necessary restrictions in the interest of the rest of the citizens. Reading article 19 in that way
it appears to me that the concept of the right to move freely throughout the territory of India is an
entirely different concept from the right to "personal liberty" contemplated by article 21. "Person- al
liberty" covers many more rights in one sense and has a restricted meaning in another sense. For
instance, while the right to move or reside may be covered by the expression ,'personal liberty" the
right to freedom of speech (mentioned in article 19 (1) (a)) or the right to acquire, hold or dispose
of property (mentioned in 19 (1) (f)) cannot be considered a part of the personal liberty of a citizen.
They form part of the liberty of a citizen but the limitation imposed by the word "personal"leads
me to believe that those rights are not covered by the expression personal liberty. So read there is no
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1857950/ 15

Arun Ghosh vs State Of West Bengal on 2 December, 1969
from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order was not justified. In support of this submission
reference is made to three cases of this Court: Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar ; Pushkar
Mukherjee and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Shyamal Chakraborty v. The Commissioner of
Police, Calcuta and Anr. . In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case this Court pointed out the difference
between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and
its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public
order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a
specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished, from acts directed against
individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public
tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality
which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for
instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the
community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another
case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community.
This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life
and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large Sections of the
community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public
order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from
another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a
hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the
management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the
friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take
another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to
colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are
afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different
from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its affect upon the public tranquillity
there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a
disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs
the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he
can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions
which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the
question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner
likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of
the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the
latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as meaning something more than
ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petition No. 179 of 1968 drew a
line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which
affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from minor breaches of peace which
do not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy between public and private crimes. The analogy
is useful but not to be pushed too far. A large number of acts directed against persons or individuals
may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's(1) case examples were given
by Sarkar, and Hidayatullah, JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently
law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the
harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the

Ashok Kumar vs Delhi Administration & Ors on 5 May, 1982
period of five days. [711 F]

(ii) The law is that the detaining authority must, as
soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practicable, communicate to
the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has
been made. That period has been specified by section 8 of
the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[712 D]
In the instant case, the petitioner was served with the
grounds of detention within a period of two days i.e. within
the period allowed by section 8 of the Act and that was "as
soon as practicable." The order of detention is therefore
not rendered invalid merely because the grounds of detention
were furnished two days later. [712 E-F]
(iii) In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 1 S.C.C.
271 this Court has not laid down that the detaining
authority making an order of detention under sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) of
section 3 of the Act or the authority
approving of the same, must specify the period of detention
in the order. [714 B]
2. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of detention
must necessarily vary according to the exigencies of each
case i.e. the nature of the prejudicial activity complained
of. It is not that the period of detention must in all
circumstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as
laid down in section 13 of the Act. [714 E]
3.(i) The true distinction between the areas of 'public
order' and 'law and order' lies not in the nature or quality
of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon
society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law
and order' and 'public order' is a fine one but this does
not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in
nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances
might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect
specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of
'law and order' while in another it might affect 'public
order'. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of
its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to
disturb the even
709
tempo of the life of the community which make it prejudicial
to the 'maintenance of public order.' [715 C-E]
(ii) Preventive detention is devised to afford
protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for
having done something but to intercept before he does it and
to prevent him from doing. Justification for such detention
is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal
conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It
follows that any preventive measures, even if they involve
some restraint or hardship upon individuals, do not partake
in any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way
of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. [715 F-G]
(iii) The Executive can take recourse to its power of

Ashok Kumar vs Delhi Administration & Ors on 5 May, 1982
period of five days. [711 F]

(ii) The law is that the detaining authority must, as
soon as may be, i.e. as soon as practicable, communicate to
the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has
been made. That period has been specified by section 8 of
the Act to mean a period ranging from five to ten days
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[712 D]
In the instant case, the petitioner was served with the
grounds of detention within a period of two days i.e. within
the period allowed by section 8 of the Act and that was "as
soon as practicable." The order of detention is therefore
not rendered invalid merely because the grounds of detention
were furnished two days later. [712 E-F]
(iii) In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 1 S.C.C.
271 this Court has not laid down that the detaining
authority making an order of detention under sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) of
section 3 of the Act or the authority
approving of the same, must specify the period of detention
in the order. [714 B]
2. Under the scheme of the Act, the period of detention
must necessarily vary according to the exigencies of each
case i.e. the nature of the prejudicial activity complained
of. It is not that the period of detention must in all
circumstances extend to the maximum period of 12 months as
laid down in section 13 of the Act. [714 E]
3.(i) The true distinction between the areas of 'public
order' and 'law and order' lies not in the nature or quality
of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon
society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law
and order' and 'public order' is a fine one but this does
not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in
nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances
might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect
specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of
'law and order' while in another it might affect 'public
order'. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of
its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to
disturb the even
709
tempo of the life of the community which make it prejudicial
to the 'maintenance of public order.' [715 C-E]
(ii) Preventive detention is devised to afford
protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for
having done something but to intercept before he does it and
to prevent him from doing. Justification for such detention
is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal
conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. It
follows that any preventive measures, even if they involve
some restraint or hardship upon individuals, do not partake
in any way of the nature of punishment, but are taken by way
of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. [715 F-G]
(iii) The Executive can take recourse to its power of

Athiest Society Of India, ... vs Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh on 4 August, 1992
Andhra High Court

Athiest Society Of India, ... vs Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh on 4 August, 1992
Equivalent citations: AIR 1992 AP 310
Bench: J E Prasad
ORDER
1. The petitioner-Athiest Society of India, Nalgonda District Branch, prays for issuance of a writ of
Mandamus, directing the respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh, to instruct all the concerned
Heads of Departments to prohibit the practice of religious performance of worship al the State
functions, such as, during the laying of foundation stones for large, and small projects and
inauguration of State buildings or Institutions and exhibiting religious symbols, like Photos or Idols
in the State Offices or its subordinate offices.
2. The deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, claims to be the Secretary of the
Athiest Society of India, Nalgonda District Branch. The grievance of the petitioner is that the
respondent is not following the secular objectives of the State, as enshrined in the Constitution of
India and is practically encouraging religious sentiments by permitting performance of rituals, such
as, breaking of coconuts, performing poojas and chanting of Mantras or Sutras of different religions
at the time of laying foundations and inauguration of small and large Projects and State buildings
and Institutions. It is further averred that public bodies, such as, Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation, are freely exhibiting religious symbols in the bus-stations, as well as in the
buses. The petitioner asserts that due to such practices, permitted and encouraged by the
Government and the Road Transport Corporation, the religious sentiments of the people are roused,
leading to communal tensions, resulting in the people quarrelling among themselves and involving
in communal riots, and massacres in various parts of the State. The further assertion of the
petitioner is that the respondent itself is indirectly encouraging religious feelings for the reasons
best known to the Government, by having poojas and other types of ceremonies of a particular
religion to be performed in public functions. Such religious rituals at State functions are being
shown in Television as well as other public media, including the films exhibited by A.P. State Film
Development Corporation in cinema theatres. Apart from encouraging religious sentiments, such
acts involve waste of public money and will lead people on lines contrary to scientific temper. The
petitioner submitted a representation dated 2-12-1991 to the respondent to discontinue these
religious performances at State functions etc., but there was no response to the said representation
in spite of a number of agitations and representations being made.
3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh, the

allegation that the State is not following the secular objectives enshrined in the Constitution of
India, and that the State is encouraging the Departments and other Undertaking to follow religious
practices, is denied. It is stated that no rules are framed or circulars issued directing the
performance of any such rituals. The State is neither preaching nor encouraging to practice religion
in any manner. The understanding of the petitioner of the meaning of the word 'secular' is not
correct. Arts. 25 to 30 of the Constitution of India, guarantee the freedom of religion and faith to all
citizens and the State cannot interfere with their faith and religion. The petitioner-society has no
faith in any religion and God, which itself may be called a 'particular faith', and the petitioner cannot

B. Archana Reddy And Ors. vs State Of A.P., Rep. By Its ... on 7 November, 2005
before undertaking any revision of the Backward Classes List and they do not reflect formation of
opinion as to adequacy of representation of Muslim Community in the service of the State and
directed the Government to reconstitute the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes to
examine the matter;
And whereas, the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh observed that the Muslims as a group are
entitled to affirmative action/social reservations within the Constitutional dispensation, provided
they are identified as a socially and educationally backward class for the purpose of Article 15(4) and
Backward Class of citizens for the purpose of Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India and providing
social reservation to the Muslim Community or selections or groups among them in no manner
militate against secularism which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution;
And whereas, the High Court held that the creamy layer among the Muslim community are not
entitled to the benefits of social reservation;
And whereas the Andhra Pradesh Commission for Backward Classes found that the entire Muslim
Community is socially, educationally and economically backward and therefore steps shall be taken
for providing reservation to the members of the Muslim Community for improving their social,
educational and economic conditions;
And whereas, the said commission held that Muslims are not adequately represented in State
employment;
And whereas, the Commission further recommended that provision be made for providing 5%
reservation to Muslim Community in all educational institutions and public services in the State.
And whereas, the existing reservation provided to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
Backward classes is at 46%.
And whereas, the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India in W.P. (C) No. 97/1991 dated
16-11-1992 held that reservation under Clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India shall not
exceed 50% of the appointments or posts barring certain extraordinary situations;
And whereas, the commission also considered that the percentage of population of Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes in the state is exceeding 68% of the total population
and the Muslim population in the State of Andhra Pradesh is 9.2% of total population and further
having regard to the fact that the existing Backward Classes have not attained the levels of
advancement warranting a revision of existing reservations and felt that in the extraordinary
situation prevalent in the State providing total reservations of 51% may be considered by the
Government.
And whereas, the Backward Classes Commission also recommended that the creamy layer from
among the Muslim community would however have to be excluded from the benefits of
recommended reservation by adopting the criteria laid down by the Government of India.

B.M. Sukumar Shetty, Managing ... vs State By Its Secretary, Revenue ... on 9 September, 2005
16. Sri A.G. Holla, Sri S.P. Shankar, Sri Udaya Holla, Sri M.R. Achar, learned Senior Counsels and
Sri Padubidri Raghavendra Rao, Sri Krishna Bhat, Sri Gopala Hegde, Sri P.M. Jalisatgi, Sri
Paneendra, Sri Suman, Sri KM. Natarai, Sri Subash B. Adi, Sri Chandrakanth Ariga, Sri Keshava
Bhat and Sri Malla Reddy, learned Counsels for the petitioners addressed the arguments and other
Counsels adopted the same. The arguments on the side of petitioners in brief are that the impugned
Act, is in violation of Articles 14, 19, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that
under Article 26 every religious denomination shall have the right to establish, maintain manage
religious institution. But under the impugned Act, this right is taken away. Supreme Court of India
in Shri Admar Mutt's case directed the State Government to enact a comprehensive legislation for
temples and Mutts in Karnataka. But under the impugned Act in Section 1 of the Mutts, temples
attached to Mutts and other religious institution run by Hindu Religious denomination are excluded
from the application of the Act and as such the impugned Act is contrary to the directions of the
Supreme Court in Shri Admar Mutt's case.
17. The secular activity of any temple, Mutt or any other religious or charitable institution are same.
Under the impugned Act, certain religious institutions are excluded and therefore the impugned Act
is, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and seems to be
for extraneous considerations. It is contended that by legislating the impugned Act, the State is
dividing the Hindu Community. The definition of Hindu under the impugned Act in Section 2(16)
does not include a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh. Under Article 25 Explanation II of the Constitution says
Hindu shall be construed as including Sikh, Jaina or Budhist. Therefore, it is contended that the
impugned Act is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
18. It is contended that in Sections 9 to 16 of the impugned Act, the power to appoint, suspend and
dismiss an Archak is specified. In further prescribes, qualification, age limit for appointment and
retirement etc., and the same is not practicable. The Archakas are treated as public servants for the
above mentioned purposes but they are not provided with monetary and other benefits that are
enjoyed by a public or civil servant. Without abolishing the hereditary rights of Archakas the
impugned Act, is arbitrary and illegal. It is contended that under Section 17 of the Act, a common
pool fund is created and it is made compulsory that the notified institution shall contribute five per
cent of their gross annual income and the same is tax and not fee. The State Government cannot
impose tax. Alternatively, it is contended that if the contribution is taken as fee then there is no
correlation to the fee contributed to the common pool fund and the services rendered to the notified
institutions. Hence the creation of common pool fund and contribution to it is opposed to doctrine
of quid pro quo.
19. It is further contended that under Section 20 of the Act, an Advisory Committee is constituted.
One of the functions of this Advisory Committee is to tender advise to the Committee of
management of a temple on the disputes relating to observance of religious practices and therefore
the same is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. It is contended that under Section 23 of the
Act, the petitioners' institutions are notified without hearing them and in violation of principles of
natural justice. Some of the petitioners contend that the provisions of the Act, are not applicable to
them, but then the Government had notified them under Section 23. Few petitioners contend that
under the previous enactments their temples are not included but arbitrarily the Government

Balwant Singh And Anr vs State Of Punjab on 1 March, 1995
Explanation 1 - The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.
Explanation 2 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a

view to obtain their alteration by Lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred,
contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.
Explanation 3 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the

Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not
constitute an offence tinder this Section."
A plain reading of the above Section would show that its application would be attracted only when
the accused brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards the Government established by law in India, by words either written or spoken
or visible signs or representations etc. Keeping in view the prosecution evidence that the slogans as
noticed above were raised a couple of times only by the appellant and that neither the slogans
evoked a response from any other person of the Sikh community or reaction from people of other
communities, we find it difficult to hold that upon the raising of such casual slogans, a couple of
times without any other act whatsoever the charge of sedition can be founded. It is not the
prosecution case that the appellants were either leading a procession or were otherwise raising the
slogans with the intention to incite people to create disorder or that the slogans in fact created any
law and order problem. It does not appear to us that the police should have attached much
significance to the casual slogans raised by two appellants, a couple of times and read to much into
them. The prosecution has admitted that no disturbance, whatsoever, was caused by the raising of
the slogans by the appellants and that inspite of the fact that the appellants raised the slogans a
couple of times, the people, in general, were un-affected and carried on with their normal activities.
The casual raising of the Slogans, once or twice by two individuals alone cannot be said to be aimed
at exciting or attempt to excite hatred or disaffection towards the Government as established by law
in India, Section 124A IPC, would in the facts and circumstances of the case have no application
whatsoever and would not be attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.
In so far as the offence under Section 153A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for
promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or
feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities. In our opinion only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or
intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or effect public tranquility, that
the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case
unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order or of
public order or peace and tranquility in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while
raising slogans on account of the activities of the appellants. The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153 A IPC and the
prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution
has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the
provisions of Section 153A IPC, by their raising causally the three slogans a couple of times. The

Bharti Airtel Ltd vs Union Of India on 14 May, 2015
lose the 900 MHz spectrum which is won by two or more other bidders. If an incumbent operator
wins back the 900 MHz spectrum but at a very high price, it will seriously limit its ability to invest
viz. given the indebtedness of most TSPs and the availability of just a limited amount of resources,
whatever extra is paid for spectrum, in effect, reduces the amount available for investment in the
LSA. The second possibility is that the incumbent loses the spectrum. The implications here are
even graver. There will be immediate discontinuation of service in the LSA. And a huge loss in terms
of the value of investment already made in that LSA.
2.8 Once services are discontinued, and a new entrant(s) come into the LSA, they will need time to
roll-out services. This will obviously pose problems for consumers. Moreover, if existing consumers
port out under Mobile Number Portability (MNP) to another TSP in the same LSA, then, in effect,
the auction would have led to a consolidation of market power (dominance) of that TSP. (Leave
aside the fact that it effectively deprives consumers of choice of service provider).
2.9 What is more, there are potential spillover effects to other sectors. Given the larger indebtedness
of many TSPs to public sector banks (and private sector banks), an exit from an LSA raises the
prospect that some part of that TSPs debt could become a Non-Performing Asset (NPA). So, what
the Government gains in terms of higher prices of spectrum because of short supply, may also lead
to large NPAs of public sector banks which will ultimately require Government budgetary support
viz. the socialization of public costs.
2.10 to sum up; there is a very real risk that bidding could lead to an escalation of auction prices far
beyond any reasonable value. Further, even if the incumbents win back the spectrum, there will be
serious limit to the investment ability of incumbents. And, if an incumbent operator loses out to a
new entrant (or, another licensee), the discontinuation of services would pose problems for
consumers leave aside the losses on capital investment made by the incumbent TSP in the LSA. [14]
11 Functions of Authority (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885
, the functions of the Authority shall be to
(a) make recommendations, either suo motu or on a request from the licensor, on the following
matters, namely: -
(i) need and timing for introduction of new service provider;
(ii) terms and conditions of licence to a service provider;
(iii) revocation of licence for non-compliance of terms and conditions of licence;
(iv) measures to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in the operation of

telecommunication services so as to facilitate growth in such services;
(v) technological improvements in the services provided by the service providers;

Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors vs State Of Kerala & Ors on 11 August, 1986
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the said

right. Art. 25(1) guarantees to all persons freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and
propagate religion, subject to order, morality and health
and to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Art. 51-A(a) of the Constitution enjoins a dub on every
citizen of India "to abide by the Constitution and respect
its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the
National Anthem". [526G-H; 527C]
520
2.2 While on the one hand,
Art. 25(1) itself expressly
subjects the right guaranteed by it to public order,
morality and health and to the other provisions of Part III,
on the other hand, the State is also given the liberty to
make a law to regulate or restrict any economic, financial,
political or other secular activity which may be associated
with religious practice and to provide for social welfare
and reform, even if such regulation, restriction or
provision affects the right guaranteed by Art. 25(1).
Therefore, whenever the Fundamental Right to freedom of
conscience and to profess, practise and propagate religion
is invoked, the act complained of as offending the
Fundamental Right must be examined to discover whether such
act is to protect public order, morality and health, whether
it is to give effect to the other provisions of Part III of
the Constitution or whether it is authorised by a law made
to regulate or restrict any economic, financial political or
secular activity which may be associated with religious
practise or to provide for social welfare and reform. [531G-
H; 532A-B]
2.3 Any law which may be made under clauses 2 to 6 of
Art. 19 to regulate the exercise of the right to the
freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) to (e) and (g) must be
'a law' having statutory force and not a mere executive or
departmental instructions. [529E-F]
The two circulars on which the Department, in the
instant case, has placed reliance have no statutory basis
and are mere departmental instructions. They cannot,
therefore, form the foundation of any action aimed at
denying to citizens Fundamental Right under Art. 19(1)(a).
Further it is not possible to hold that the two circulars
were issued 'in the interest of the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relation with foreign states, public order, decency or
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence' and if not so issued, they cannot
again be invoked to deny a citizen's Fundamental Right under
Art. 19(1)(a). If the two circulars are to be so interpreted
as to compel each and every pupil to join in the singing of
the National Anthem despite his genuine, conscientious
religious objection, then such compulsion would clearly
contravene the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) and Art.
25(1). [530C-E; 529C]

Central Inland Water ... vs Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr on 6 April, 1986
^
HELD : 1.1 The word "State" has different meanings
depending upon the context in which it is used. The
expression "The State" when used in Parts III & IV of the
Constitution is not confined to only the federating States
or the Union of India or even to both. By the express terms
of Article 12, the expression "the State" includes : (i) the
Government of India; (ii) Parliament of India; (iii) the
Government of each of the States which constitute the Union
of India; (iv) the Legislature of each of the States which
constitute the Union of India; (v) all local authorities
within the territory of India; (vi) all local authorities
under the control of the Government of India; (vii) all
other authorities within the
284
territory of India; and (viii) all other authorities under
the control of the Government of India. [306 D; 309 A-B]
1.2 Where an interpretation clause defines a word to
mean a particular thing, the definition is explanatory and
prima facie restrictive and whenever an interpretation
clause defines a term to include something the definition is
extensive. While an explanatory and restrictive definition
confines the meaning of the word defined to what is stated
in the interpretation clause, so that wherever the word
defined is used in the particular statute in which that
interpretation clause occurs, it will bear only that meaning
unless where, as is usually provided, the subject or context
otherwise requires an extensive definition expands or
extends the meaning of the word defined to include within it
what would otherwise not have been comprehended in it when
the word defined is used in its ordinary sense. Article 12
uses the word "includes", it thus extends the meaning of the
expression "the State" so as to include within it also what
otherwise may not have been comprehended by that expression
when used in its ordinary legal sense. [310 F-H; 311 A-B]
1.3 The definition of the expression "the State" in
Article 12, is however, for the purposes of Parts III and IV
of the Constitution, whose contents cleary show that the
expression "the State" in Article 12 as also in Article 36
is not confined to its ordinary and constitutional sense as
extended by the inclusive portion of Article 12 but is used
in the concept of the State in relation to the Fundamental
Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the
Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of
the Constitution which principles are declared by Article 37
to be fundamental to the governance of the country and
enjoins upon the State to apply making laws. [311 C-E]
1.4 Article 298 of the Constitution expands the
executive power of the Union of India and of each of the
States which collectively constitute the Union to carry on
any trade or business. By extending the executive power of
the Union and of each of the States to the carrying on of
any trade or business Article 298 does not, however, convert

Commissioner Of Police And Ors vs Smt. C. Anita on 23 August, 2004
Supreme Court of India

Commissioner Of Police And Ors vs Smt. C. Anita on 23 August, 2004
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, C.K. Thakker
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 922 of 2004
PETITIONER:
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE AND ORS.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. C. ANITA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/08/2004
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT 2004 Supp(3) SCR 701 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT,
J. : Leave granted.
The State of Andhra Pradesh calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashing the order of detention dated 15.7.2003 passed by the
Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City (in short the 'Commissioner') directing detention of
Chinnaboina Shankar @ C. Shankar (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu'). The order of detention
was passed in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-
Grabbers Act, 1986 (in short the 'Act'). Wife of the detenu Smt. C. Anita filed a habeas corpus writ
application before the Andhra Pradesh High Court questioning legality of the order of detention.
The primary stand taken in the writ petition was that the alleged acts as highlighted in the grounds
of detention by no stretch of imagination can be called to affect public tranquility and/or be
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was submitted that the incidents to which
reference was made in the grounds of detention allegedly took place long back and there was no live
link to warrant the order of detention. The High Court held that though there was proximity with
the incident highlighted in the order of detention there was nothing to show that those acts were
affecting maintenance of public order. It was further held that even if the detenu was held to be a
goonda and land grabber that was not sufficient to warrant preventive detention. Accordingly the
order of detention was quashed.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court's approach is clearly erroneous.
The grounds of detention not only referred to the two specific instances but also clearly indicated as
to how nearly 30 cases were instituted against the detenu and the adverse effect of his activities
which created a sense of terror affecting public tranquility. Reference was made to paragraph 3 of
the order of detention which according to learned counsel was sufficient to show as to in what
manner the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

D.S. Nakara & Others vs Union Of India on 17 December, 1982
regard to all pensioners.

166
Counsel for respondents contended that a classification
based on the date of retirement is valid for the purpose of
granting pensionary benefits; that the specified date is an
integral part of the scheme of liberalisation and the
Government would never have enforced the scheme devoid of
the date; that the doctrine of severability cannot be
invoked to sever the specified date from the scheme as it
would have the effect of enlarging the class of pensioners
covered by the scheme and when the legislature has expressly
defined the class to which the legislation applies it would
be outside the judicial function to enlarge the class; that
there is not a single case where the court has included some
category within the scope of provisions of a law to maintain
its constitutionality; that since the scheme of
liberalisation has financial implications, the Court cannot
make it retroactive; that if more persons divided the
available cake the residue falling to the share of each,
especially to the share of those who are not before the
court would become far less and therefore no relief could be
given to the petitioners that pension is always correlated
to the date of retirement and the court cannot change the
date of retirement and impose fresh commutation benefit
which may burden the exchequer to the tune of Rs. 233
crores; and that the third petitioner has no locus standi in
the case.
Allowing the petitions,
^
HELD: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It is
attracted where equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis. The principle underlying the guarantee is
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same
situation and there should be no discrimination between one
person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the
legislation their position is substantially the same.
Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. The
classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from those that are left out of the group
and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. In
other words, there ought to be causal connection between the
basis of classification and the object of the statute. The
doctrine of classification was evolved by the Court for the
purpose of sustaining a legislation or State action designed
to help weaker sections of the society. Legislative and
executive action may accordingly be sustained by the court
if the State satisfies the twin tests of reasonable

Dongh Lian Kham & Anr. vs Union Of India & Anr. on 21 December, 2015
passed by the Division Bench, petitioner No.1 was released on 18.08.2015 and relying on the
aforesaid order of the Division Bench, petitioner No.2 also was released on 24.08.2015 from the
detention centre.
10. The wife of petitioner No.1 thereafter moved another application namely Crl.M.A No.12342/2015
for modification of the order dated 06.08.2015, reference of which has been made in earlier
paragraph seeking a direction to the respondents not to deport the petitioner No.1. However, such
an application was withdrawn with the permission and liberty to move another substantial petition
seeking the aforesaid relief.
11. Hence, the present petition.
12. Mr.Colin Gonsalves, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted
that the petitioners are mandate refugees and not economic migrants in India and, therefore, they
have legitimate reasons for being persecuted in their home country because of their hailing from
ethnic and religious minority community.
13. Thus a specific prayer was made on behalf of the petitioners that they be not repatriated to their
country of origin as they are not posing any threat to national security and if deported, they would
be subjected to inhuman treatment by the Junta Government in their country. It has been further
submitted that UNHCR identifies persons as mandate refugees only after thorough investigation
regarding the status of a refugee and in the past it has been a standard practice of the Union of India
to grant Asylum to the refugees who are certified by UNHCR. Mr.Colin Gonsalves, learned Senior
Advocate submitted that though a foreign national does not have a Fundamental Right to settle in a
different country but certain rights are provided to a foreign national also under the Constitution.
He has referred to the observation of the Supreme Court in National Human Rights Commission vs.
State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr., (1996) 1 SCC 742 wherein it was held that the Constitution of
India confers certain rights on every human being and certain other rights on citizens. No person
could be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law.
The State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human being, be he a citizen or otherwise.
A direction was given by the Supreme Court to the State to ensure the safety of 65,000 Chakma
refugees in the light of "Quit India" threat notices served upon them by the All Arunachal Pradesh
Students Union.
14. Mr.Gonsalves contends that a refugee's right of not being expelled from one state to another,
especially to one where his or her life or liberty would be threatened is in accord with the principle of
"non-refoulement". Non refoulement is accepted by the customary International Law and municipal
law of nations and by now it has attained widespread international recognition.
15. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 to which India is a signatory
declares that everyone has a right to seek and enjoy in other countries, asylum from persecution and
that such right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non political
crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of United Nations.

Dr Christo Thomas Philip vs Union Of India & Ors on 8 January, 2019
"25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to
profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the
State from making any law -
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity
which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus Explanation I -
The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession
of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II - In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as

including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and
the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly."
43. It is clear from the plain language of Article 25 that all persons are equally entitled to freedom of
conscience and have the right to profess, practice and propagate religion. Article 25 is not restricted
to the citizens of this country but is available to all persons.
44. In the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. vs. the Commercial Tax Officer,
Visakhapatnam and Ors : AIR 1963 SC 1811, the Supreme Court had explained while certain
fundamental rights are available only to citizens of India, the Constitution also provides for certain
other rights to be available to any person. The relevant observations made by the Court are set out
below:-
"5. Before dealing with the arguments at the Bar, it is convenient to set out the
relevant provisions of the Constitution. Part III of the Constitution deals with
Fundamental Rights. Some fundamental rights are available to "any person", whereas
other fundamental rights can be available one to "all citizens". "Equality before the
law" or "equal protection of the laws" within the territory of India is available to any
person (Art.
14). The protection against the enforcement of ex-post- facto laws or against
double-jeopardy or against compulsion of self-incrimination is available to all
persons (Art. 20); so is the protection of life and personal liberty under Art. 21 and
protection against arrest and detention in certain ceases, under Art. 22. Similarly,
freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion is
guaranteed to all persons. Under Art. 27, no person shall be compelled to pay any
taxes for the promotion and maintenance of any particular religious denomination.

Dr. Saurabh Choudhary And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 May, 2004
"As is evident from Section 151-A, the Board is empowered to issue orders or instructions in order to
ensure uniformity in the classification of goods or with respect to levy of duty. The need to issue
such instructions arises when there is a doubt or ambiguity in relation to those matters. The
possibility of varying views being taken by the customs officials while administering the Act may
bring about uncertainty and confusion. In order to avoid this situation, Section 151-A has been
enacted on the same lines as Section 37A of the Central Excise Act. The apparent need to issue such
circulars is felt when there is no authoritative pronouncement of the Court on the subject. Once the
relevant issue is decided by the Court at the highest level, the very basis and substratum of the
circular disappears. The law laid down by this Court will ensure uniformity in the decisions at all
levels. By an express constitutional provisions, the law declared by the Supreme Court is made
binding on all the courts within the territory of India (vide Article 141). Proprio vigore the law is
binding on all the tribunals and authorities. Can it be said that even after the law is declared by the
Supreme Court the adjudicating authority should still give effect to the circular issued by the Board
ignoring the legal position laid down by this Court? Even after the legal position is settled by the
highest court of the land, should the Customs Authority continue to give primacy to the circular of
the Board? Should Section 151-A be taken to such extremities? Was it enacted for such purpose?
Does it not amount to transgression of constitutional mandate while adhering to a statutory
mandate? Even after the reason and rationale underlying the circular disappears, is it obligatory to
continue to follow the circular? These are the questions which puzzle me and these are the
conclusions which follow if the observations of this Court in the two cases of Dhiren Chemical
Industries are taken to their logical conclusion."
36. Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful whether a Constitution Bench can modify a judgment
rendered by a different Constitution Bench even in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India
must be applied at the time of rendition of the judgment and not thereafter. After a judgment is
rendered the Court can only exercise its power of review, if it intends to take a different view from
the one rendered in the main judgment. Review of the judgment cannot be granted in the garb of a
clarification [See Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Urban and Ors. - ].
37. Furthermore, an order of review or modification of a judgment should not also ordinarily be
passed at the behest of the applicants who are not parties to the writ petition. Union of India and the
States, on the other hand, were parties to the writ petition. They in terms of Article 141 as well as
Article 144 of the Constitution of India were bound to implement the judgment. They had enough
time to do so. If they had taken any other decision, it would be its own peril. Meritorious students
cannot be permitted to suffer therefore.
38. We must notice that it is not a case of the Union of India that the judgment in Saurabh Chaudri
(supra) cannot be given effect to even at this stage. If it can be given effect to the court should not
issue a direction which would run contrary to the ratio laid down by this Court in the main
judgment, particularly when the examinations had been held much after the rendition of the
judgment. Asking the court to apply the judgment of this Court with prospective effect would
amount to asking for a review and, thus, the same cannot be permitted to be achieved by filing an
application for clarification.

Faheema Shirin.R.K vs State Of Kerala on 19 September, 2019
respondent sent a WhatsApp message informing that those who do not abide by the rules would
have to vacate the hostel. The petitioner claims that she thereupon approached the Principal on
03.07.2019 and submitted Ext.P2 letter requesting to relax the restrictions. Thereupon, Ext.P3 letter
was obtained from her in writing to the effect that she was not willing to abide by the new rule
restricting usage of phone between 6 p.m to 10 p.m. Thereupon her parents were asked to meet the
Principal on 05.07.2019; the 4th respondent informed them that the petitioner has to vacate the
hostel as she refused to abide by the rules; Ext.P4 memo dated 05.07.2019 was issued to her
directing her to vacate the hostel immediately; respondents 4 to 6 convened a meeting of the hostel
inmates on 08.07.2019 when the students were informed about the action taken against the
petitioner based on her request to relax the rules and that the inmates were asked to give in writing
their willingness to abide by the restrictions when all the hostel inmates except the petitioner
submitted such willingness; on 11.07.2019, Ext.P5 notice was issued to the petitioner directing her to
vacate the hostel within 12 hours; on 15.07.2019, the petitioner submitted Ext.P6 leave letter for the
period from 12.7.2019 on 15.7.2019, as it was not possible for her to attend the classes since she had
to travel nearly 150 km every day; when the petitioner reached the hostel on 15.7.2019 to vacate her
room, it was seen locked and the hostel authorities did not allow her to take her belongings.
2. It is stated that the change in duration of the restriction for use of mobile phone was stated to be
effected based on the request of some of the parents. According to the petitioner, she or her parents
were never notified of any hostel meeting or PTA meeting before the implementation of the rules. It
is also her case that such restrictions are imposed only in the girls hostel and therefore it amounts to
discrimination based on gender, in violation of Clause 5 of Ext.P8 guidelines issued by UGC, which
prohibits gender discrimination. It is also stated that the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher
Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2012 mandates the college authorities to take appropriate
measures to safeguard the interests of the students without subjecting them to discrimination based
on gender, caste, creed, religion, language etc. Therefore, according to her, the restrictions are
arbitrary and it impairs the quality of education accessible to female students and it hampers their
potential. It is also stated that such restrictions amount to violation of the principles embodied in
the Conventions on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 ("CEDAW")
and the Beijing Declaration along with Universal Declaration of Human Rights under which State
parties are to take appropriate measures to prevent discrimination of all forms against women. It is
also her contention that such restrictions are imposed when the State Government is exploring the
possibility of digital learning even from the school level, as evident from Ext.P10 Facebook post of
the Minister for Education. It is stated that the Education Department has introduced QR Code in
text books enabling the students to scan it and read the lessons and allied topics and watch the
videos in their mobile smart phones or tablets. It is stated that on account of the expulsion, the
study time of the petitioner is reduced compulsorily because of the time involved for travel. It is also
her case that she is denied her right to acquire knowledge through internet and that by prohibiting
the use of mobile phone, she is deprived of the access to the source of knowledge to her detriment
which will affect the quality of her education. It is claimed that the right to access internet forms a
part of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the restrictions
imposed do not come within reasonable restrictions covered by Article 19(2) of the Constitution of
India.

Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union ... on 13 January, 1981
is inhibited by Article may be total or partially neither

any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be
partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation
that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be
permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivation is not
an act which is complete once and for all: it is a
continuing act and so long as it lasts, it must be in
accordance with procedure established by law. Therefore any
act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of
any limb or faculty of a person either permanently or even
temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.
[528 D, G-H, 529 A]
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 1 SCR
232, followed.
Munn v. Illinois [1877] 94 US 133, referred to.
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 2 SCR 557,
applied.
(6) The right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the
bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition,
clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and
mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. The
magnitude and content of the components of this right would
depend upon the extent of the economic development of the
country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the
right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to
carry on such functions and activities as constitute the
bare minimum expression of the human self. Every act which
offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute
deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would
have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just
procedure established by law which stands the test of other
fundamental rights. Therefore, any form of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human
dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and
it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless
it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, but no
law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such
torture or cruelty, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever
stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it
would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being
violative of Article 14 and 21. [529 B-F]
(7) There is implicit in Article 21 the right to
protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of
the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This right to live which is comprehended within the broad
connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged
according to procedure established by law and therefore,
when a person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is
bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is

Good Year India Limited And Anr. vs The State Of Haryana And Anr. on 11 December, 1996
Judges Bench referred to the decisions of this Court in Goodryear India Limited v. State of Haryana,
53 STC 163, Bata India Limited v. State of Haryana, 54 STC 226 and Desh Raj Pushap Kumar Gulati
v. State of Punjab, 58 STC 393 and clearly disagreed with the views expressed by Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in Good Year India's case. The three Judges Bench also held that
Mukerian Papers Limited v. State of Punjab (supra) in which the Section 4-B of the Punjab General
Sales Tax Act, 1948 came up for interpretation was decided simply on the basis of the decision in
Good Year India's case and the decision rendered in State of Tamil Nadu v. Kandaswami, (1975) 36
STC 191 was not considered by the Supreme Court.
6. Validity of Section 4-B of the Punjab Act was again examined alongwith similar provisions of
Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act, Kerala Sales Tax Act and West Bengal Sales Tax Act in Devi Dass Gopal
Krishan Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Anr., JT 1994(3) S.C. 239. It was argued on behalf of the
dealers that Hotel Balaji's case (supra) was not correctly decided and in view of the apparent conflict
of opinion between Mukerian Papers Ltd. v. State of Punjab (supra) on the one hand and Hotel
Balaji and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. (supra) on the other hand, the question should
be referred to a larger bench. This plea was rejected by a Bench of three Judges which consisted of
M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J., A.M. Ahmadi and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ., two of whom (M.N.
Venkatachaliah, as he then was and A.M. Ahmadi, JJ.) were members of the Bench which decided
Mukerian Papers' case. The Apex Court observed that correctness of Goodyear India's case was not
questioned in Mukerian Papers' case and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Bench to affirm or
dissent from the decision in Goodyear India's case. The Court proceeded to reiterate the views
expressed in Hotel Balaji's case and held that the approach adopted in Goodyear India does not
accord with the scheme, intendment and language of the relevant provisions of the Haryana and
Bombay Acts and cannot be accepted. On the same very reasoning, the Apex Cou. upheld the validity
of Section 4-B by observing that it is in substance similar to Section 9(l)(b) of the Haryana General
Sales Tax Act. Similar provisions of Section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu, Act, Section 5-A of the Kerala Act
and Section 4(6)(11) of the Bengal Finances (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and Section 4(2)(I) of the West
Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 have been held to be intra vires to the powers of the State Legislature.
7. Since the decision of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) has been rendered after
considering, almost all the earlier decisions rendered by the Apex Court and Ranganathan, J. was a
member of the Bench which decided Goodyear India's case as well as Hotel Balaji's case, it will be
useful to refer to the observations made by S. Ranganathan, J. in Hotel Balaji's case :-
"I am quite conscious that the conclusion I have expressed here as to the vires of the provisions
impugned is contrary to the conclusion I reached in Goodyear (1990) 76 STC 71 (SC) (1990) 2 SCC
71 on somewhat analogous provisions. I need not, for the purposes of the present cases, express any
final conclusion as to whether the conclusion in Goodyear (1990) 76 STC 71 (SC); (1990) 2 SCC 71
was rightly reached in the context of the provisions of the statutes there considered or would need a
second look and fresh consideration in the context of what has been said here. But, I should not, I
think, hesitate to accept the point of view now presented to us which appeals to me as more realistic,
appropriate and preferable, particularly when I see that the view one way or the other would affect
the validity of a large number of similar legislations all over India, merely because it may not be
consistent with the view I took in Good-year (1990) 76 STC 71 (SC); (1990) 2 SCC 71. Consistency,

Hans Muller Of Nurenburg vs Superintendent, Presidency ... on 23 February, 1955
what is done to its subjects in a foreign land. Therefore, legislation that confers jurisdiction upon
Governments in this country to deprive foreigners of their liberty cannot but be a matter that will
bring the Union into relation with foreign States, particularly when there is no public hearing and no
trial in the ordinary courts of the land. But in this particular case, the relation is even more direct,
for the provision here is for detention with a view to making arrangements for a foreigner's
expulsion from India. A foreign State has a very deep interest in knowing where and how its subjects
can be forcibly expelled against their will. The legislative competence of Parliament to deal with this
question is, we think, clear; and this covers not only section 3(1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act
but also the Foreigners Act, 1946 (Act XXXI of 1946) in so far as it deals with the powers of
expulsion and the right of the Central Government to restrict the movements of foreigners in India
and prescribe the place of their residence and the ambit of their movements in the land.
The learned Attorney-General sought to base the legislative competence upon other Entries as well
and claimed that Parliament is not confined to Entry 9 in List I and Entry 3 in List III (the only
Entries that touch directly on preventive detention). He claimed, for example, that laws for the
preventive detention of foreigners can also be based upon Entry 17 in List I which relates to aliens
and Entry 19 which relates to expulsion from India; and also upon the portions of Entries 9 in List I
and 3 in List III that deal with the "security of India" and the "security of the State" and the
"maintenance of public order", provided always that they comply with articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution, We express no opinion about this as we can uphold the portion of the Statute that is
impugned here on the narrower ground we have set out above.
The next question is whether the limitations imposed on this power by articles 21 and 22 have been
observed. Article 21 guarantees the protection of personal liberty to citizen and foreigner alike. No
person can be deprived of his personal liberty "except according to procedure established by law",
and article 22 prescribes the minimum that the procedure established by law must provide. There
can be no arrest or detention without the person being produced before the nearest magistrate
within twenty four hours, excluding the time necessary for the journey, etc., nor can he be detained
beyond that period without the authority of a magistrate. The only exceptions are (1) enemy aliens
and (2) "any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention".
There are further limitations, but they were not invoked except that the learned Attorney-General
explained that the unrestricted power given by section 4(1) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (a
pre-constitution measure) to confine and detain foreigners became invalid on the passing of the
Constitution because of articles 21 and 22. Therefore, to bring this part of the law into line with the
Constitution, section 3 (1) (b) of the Preventive Detention Act was enacted. It was more convenient
to insert new provisions about the confinement and detention of foreigners in the Preventive
Detention Act rather than amend the Foreigners Act because the Preventive Detention Act was a
comprehensive Act dealing with preventive detention and was framed with the limitations of articles
21 and 22 in view.
It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that section 3(1)(b) of the Preventive Detention Act is'-not
reasonably related to the purpose of the Act, namely, "preventive detention". It was argued that
preventive detention can only be for the purpose of prevent-

I. C. Golaknath & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Anrs.(With ... on 27 February, 1967
cannot also be aeCePted- It may be.Parliament seeks to amend the Constitution for political reasons
but the court in denying that power will not be deciding a political question; it will only be holding
that Parliament has no power to armed Particular articles of the Constitution for any purpose
whatsoever, be it political or otherwise. [804 E-G]
(vi) If power to abridge the fundamental rights is denied to Parliament revolution is not a necessary
result. The existence of an all comprehensive power cannot prevent revolution if there is chaos in
the country brought about by misrule or abuse of power. Such considerations are out of place in
construing the provisions of the Constitution by a Court of law. [816 B-C]
(vii) While-ordinarily @ Court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions it is its duty in the
constitutional field to correct itself as early as possible, for otherwise the future progress of the
country and happiness of the people will be at stake. As it was clear that the decision in Sankari
Prasad's case was wrong, it was pre-eminently a typical case where this Court should overrule it. The
longer it held the field the greater the scope for erosion of fundamental rights. As it contained the
seeds of destruction of the cherished rights of the people, the sooner it was overruled the better for
the country. [816 G-H] The Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer Stale of West Bengal v.The
Corporation at Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R., 170 relied on.
(viii) The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, inasmuch as it takes away or abridges
fundamental rights was beyond 'the amending power of Parliament and void because of
contravention of Art. 13(2). But having regard to the history of this and earlier amendment to the
Constitution, their effect on the social and economic affairs of the country and the chaotic situation
that may be brought about by the sudden withdrawl at this stage of the amendments from the
Constitution it was undesirable to give retroactivity of this decision. The present was therefore a fit
case for the application of the doctrine of "prospective. overruling, evolved by the courts in the
United States of America. [805 E; 807 E, G; 808 C-D] Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil &
Ref. Co. (1932) 287 U.S. 358: 77 L. Ed. 360, Chicot County Drainage v. Baxter State Bank, (1940)
308 U.S. 371, Griffin v. Illionis, (1956) 351 U.S. 12, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 : 193 L. Ed. 872,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 : 6 L. Ed. (2nd Edn.) 1081 and Link letter v. Walker, (1965) 381 U.S.
618, referred to.
(ix), The doctrine of "prospective overruling" is a modern doctrine suitable for a fast moving society.
It does not do away with the doctrine of state decision but confines it to past transactions. While in
Strict theory it may be said that the doctrine 'involves the making of law, *hat the court really does is
to declare the law but refuse to give retroactivity to it. It is really a pragmatic solution reconciling the
two conflicting doctrines, namely, that a court finds the law and that it does make law It finds law
but restricts its operation to the future. It enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by
correcting, its errors without disturbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By the
application of this doctrine the past may be preserved and the future protected. [913 A-C; 814 E- F]
Our Constitution does not expressly of by necessary implication speak against the doctrine of
prospective overruling. Articles 32, 141 and 142 are designedly made comprehensive to enable the
Supreme Court to declare law and to give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary to do
complete justice. The expression 'declared' in Art. 141 is wider than the words 'found or made'. The

In The High Court Of Jammu And ... vs District Magistrate (Air 1982 Sc ...
Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench

In The High Court Of Jammu And ... vs District Magistrate (Air 1982 Sc ...
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT SRINAGAR

HCP No. 254 of 2010
IA No. 201 of 2010
Adil Ahmad Misger
Petitioners
State of J&K and others
Respondents
! Mr. Mir Shafaqat Hussain, Advocate
^ Mr. Shabir Ahmad, Advocate
Honble Mr. Justice Hasnain Massodi, Judge

Date: / 12 /2010
: J U D G M E N T:
Challenge in this petition is to order No.DMS/PSA/20/ 2009 dated 11th June 2010, of District
Magistrate, Srinagar respondent No.2 herein, whereby one Shri Adil Ahmad Misger son of
Siraj-ud-din Misger resident of Ganie Mohalla, Nowhatta, Srinagar (herein after referred to as
detenue ) has been placed under preventive detention. The petitioner is mother of detenue and
thus interested in his life and liberty and competent to maintain the petition.
The petitioner s case, as set out in the petition, is that the detenue was, without any cause or
justification, apprehended and detention order No.DMS/ PSA/20/2009 dated 11th June 2010, was
slapped upon the detenue. The respondents are stated to have ignored to provide material, relied
upon by Detaining Authority to order detention and thus deprived detenue of his Constitutional and
Statutory rights. Grounds of Detention are stated to be vague, non-existent and unfounded. The
respondents have, in their Counter Affidavit, disputed the averments made in the petition and
insisted that the activities of detenue are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is
pleaded that the detention order and grounds of detention were handed over to the detenue at the
time of execution of detention warrant and same were read over and explained to the detenue. The
detention order is said to have been approved by the Government vide No.Home/PB-V/1183 dated
17th June 2010 and also by the State Advisory Board. The Learned Government Advocate has made
available detention record to lend support to the case set up in counter affidavit.
Heard, perused and considered.
The Detention Order is liable to be quashed for the following reasons:-
1. The Detention order makes mention of material record such as dossier and other connecting
documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority while making the detention order. The
Indian Express Newspapers ... vs Union Of India & Ors. Etc. Etc on 6 December, 1984
other freedoms. During their struggle for freedom they were moved by the American Bill of Rights
containing the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America which
guarnteed the freedom of the press. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his historic resolution containing
the aims and objects of the Constitution to be enacted by the Constituent Assembly said that the
Constitutions should guarantee and secure to all the people of India among others freedom of
thought and expression. He also stated elsewhere that "I would rather have a completely free press
with all the dangers involved in the wrong use of that freedom than a suppressed or regulated press"
(See D.R. Mankekar: The Press under Pressure (1973) p. 25). The Constituent Assembly and its
various committees and sub-committees considered freedom of speech and expression which
included freedom of press also as a precious right. The Preamble to the Constitution says that it is
intended to secure to all citizens among others liberty of thought, expression, and belief. It is
significant that in the kinds of restrictions that may be imposed on the freedom of speech and
expression any reasonable restriction impossible in the public interest is not one enumerated in
clause (2) of Article 19. In Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras and Brij Bhushan's case (supra)
this Court firmly expressed its view that there could not be any kind of restriction on the freedom of
speech and expression other than those mentioned in Article 19(2) and thereby made it clear that
there could not be any interference with that freedom in the name of public interest. Even when
clause (2) of Article 19 was subsequently substituted under the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951 by a new clause which permitted the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of
speech and expression in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence, Parliament did not choose to include a clause
enabling the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the public interest.
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 declares very one has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers'.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 reads:
"Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, through any other
media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in Paragraph 2 of this Article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain & Anr on 7 November, 1975
11. The third feature in the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act is that in the Ninth Schedule
to the Constitution after Entry 86 and before the explanation several Entries Nos. 87 to 124 inclusive
are inserted. The Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Representation of the People
(Amendment) Act, 1974 and the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 are mentioned in Entry 87.
12. The respondent contends that the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974 and the
Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 referred to as the Amendment Acts, 1974 and 1975 do not
enjoy constitutional immunity because these Acts destroy or damage basic structure or basic
features.
13. In view of the challenge by the respondent to the constitutional validity of the Amendment Acts,
1974 and 1975, notice was given to the Attorney General.
14. The appeals were to be heard on August 11, 1975. In view of the Constitutional (Thirty-ninth
Amendment) Act, 1975 which came into existence on August 10, 1975 the hearing was adjourned till
August 25, 1975.
15. The constitutional validity of clause (4) of Article 329A falls for consideration. Clause (4) of
Article 329A is challenged on two grounds. First, it destroys or damages the basic features or basic
structure of the Constitution. Reliance is placed in support of the contention on the majority view of
seven learned Judges in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala.
16. It should be stated here that the hearing has proceeded on the assumption that it is not necessary
to challenge the majority view in Kesavananda Bharati's case (supra). The contentions of the
respondent are these : First, under Article 368 only general principles governing the organs of the
State and the basic principles can be laid down. An amendment of the Constitution does not
contemplate any decision in respect of individual cases. Clause (4) of Article 329A is said to be
exercise of a purely judicial power which is not included in the constituent power conferred by
Article 368.
17. Second, the control over the result of the elections and on the question whether the election of
any person is valid or invalid is vested in the Judiciary under the provisions of Article 329 and
Article 136. The jurisdiction of judicial determination is taken away, and, therefore, the democratic
character of the Constitution is destroyed.
18. Third, the amendment destroys and abrogates the principle of equality. It is said that there is no
rational basis for differentiation between persons holding high offices and other persons elected to
Parliament.
19. Fourth, the rule of law is the basis for democracy and judicial review. The fourth clause makes
the provisions of Part VI of the Representation of the People Act inapplicable to the election of the
Prime Minister and the Speaker.

J.Gurunathan @ Guru vs The District Magistrate And on 18 November, 2008
a Fundamental Right by the Constitution, has erupted law and order problem in the State, with the
other party people protesting against such callous and criminal speech made by the petitioner since
at most of the places, the effigies of the petitioner were burnt, Government buses were attacked and
damaged at many places in Ariyalur and Perambalur Districts, creating panic and fear among
general public, further leading to clashes between the supporters of both the parties. It is also seen
that on the news spreading to other places, it has caused hindrance to the normalcy of life and even
tempo of the society. By delivering such a speech, the petitioner let loose a wave of terror of such
greater intensity and magnitude that the even tempo of the life of the community and the general
public of Ariyalur and Perambalur Districts and neighbouring areas was put in extreme peril and
severe jeopardy, the people of the surrounding areas were panic stricken and the normalcy of life of
the community was seriously affected and a feeling of dismay and insecurity prevailed in Ariyalur
and Perambalur Districts and the neighbouring districts. The documents available from pages 16 to
42 of the paper book will support this and would show that the violence has spread to other places
affecting the normalcy of life and the even tempo of the society.
12. The entire reading of the speech delivered by the petitioner would depict a sorrowful picture as
to where we are heading to. The Freedom Movement of India was carried forward by the Father of
the Nation and other National Leaders with the spirit and sole aim of freeing Mother India from the
clutches of foreign rule and in the process many inspirational speeches were delivered by them,
which have inspired the people to fight for the freedom of the country from the hands of a foreigner,
that too in a non-violent manner and by resorting only to non-cooperation movements. But, now, as
could be seen from the case on hand, the so-called leaders, instead of being inspirational and role
models to others, are indulging in delivering instigating and provoking speeches to wage war against
the fellow country men by resorting to caste politics, which would shake the Unity of the Nation. The
important characteristic of our country is Unity in Diversity. The people with many religions, beliefs
and languages are living under one roof in the country with a sense of brotherhood, which should
not be allowed to be broken or shaken by anybody for their self interestedness or invented purposes.
13. Casteism is the root cause of many law and order problems in the country. The petitioner, who is
an Ex.MLA, even in his affidavit has proudly stated that he belongs to a particular community as if
he is indebted to be loyal only for the caste people that too at the cost of peace and harmony of the
country and the safety and liberty of other people. This ill-culture of promoting casteism, to achieve
self goals, at the cost of safety and security of other people and posing threat to the Unity and
integrity of the country should not be encouraged.
14. If a man accused of a criminal activity is arrested by the law implementing agency, the legal
courses of action are very well open to him and for his supporters. But, by conducting meetings of
protest, with a view to provoke people to wage war against the persons whom they are suspecting to
be the causes for the arrest of the said accused, that too posing serious threat to the lives and limbs
and even the personal liberties of such people is heinous and should be dealt with iron hands. With
these, we shall now proceed to deal with the other arguments advanced on either side.
15. In the case on hand, the alleged occurrence took place on 6.1.2008 and the impugned order of
detention came to be passed on 10.7.2008. Therefore, on the part of the petitioner, the learned

J.Gurunathan @ Guru vs The District Magistrate And on 18 November, 2008
a Fundamental Right by the Constitution, has erupted law and order problem in the State, with the
other party people protesting against such callous and criminal speech made by the petitioner since
at most of the places, the effigies of the petitioner were burnt, Government buses were attacked and
damaged at many places in Ariyalur and Perambalur Districts, creating panic and fear among
general public, further leading to clashes between the supporters of both the parties. It is also seen
that on the news spreading to other places, it has caused hindrance to the normalcy of life and even
tempo of the society. By delivering such a speech, the petitioner let loose a wave of terror of such
greater intensity and magnitude that the even tempo of the life of the community and the general
public of Ariyalur and Perambalur Districts and neighbouring areas was put in extreme peril and
severe jeopardy, the people of the surrounding areas were panic stricken and the normalcy of life of
the community was seriously affected and a feeling of dismay and insecurity prevailed in Ariyalur
and Perambalur Districts and the neighbouring districts. The documents available from pages 16 to
42 of the paper book will support this and would show that the violence has spread to other places
affecting the normalcy of life and the even tempo of the society.
12. The entire reading of the speech delivered by the petitioner would depict a sorrowful picture as
to where we are heading to. The Freedom Movement of India was carried forward by the Father of
the Nation and other National Leaders with the spirit and sole aim of freeing Mother India from the
clutches of foreign rule and in the process many inspirational speeches were delivered by them,
which have inspired the people to fight for the freedom of the country from the hands of a foreigner,
that too in a non-violent manner and by resorting only to non-cooperation movements. But, now, as
could be seen from the case on hand, the so-called leaders, instead of being inspirational and role
models to others, are indulging in delivering instigating and provoking speeches to wage war against
the fellow country men by resorting to caste politics, which would shake the Unity of the Nation. The
important characteristic of our country is Unity in Diversity. The people with many religions, beliefs
and languages are living under one roof in the country with a sense of brotherhood, which should
not be allowed to be broken or shaken by anybody for their self interestedness or invented purposes.
13. Casteism is the root cause of many law and order problems in the country. The petitioner, who is
an Ex.MLA, even in his affidavit has proudly stated that he belongs to a particular community as if
he is indebted to be loyal only for the caste people that too at the cost of peace and harmony of the
country and the safety and liberty of other people. This ill-culture of promoting casteism, to achieve
self goals, at the cost of safety and security of other people and posing threat to the Unity and
integrity of the country should not be encouraged.
14. If a man accused of a criminal activity is arrested by the law implementing agency, the legal
courses of action are very well open to him and for his supporters. But, by conducting meetings of
protest, with a view to provoke people to wage war against the persons whom they are suspecting to
be the causes for the arrest of the said accused, that too posing serious threat to the lives and limbs
and even the personal liberties of such people is heinous and should be dealt with iron hands. With
these, we shall now proceed to deal with the other arguments advanced on either side.
15. In the case on hand, the alleged occurrence took place on 6.1.2008 and the impugned order of
detention came to be passed on 10.7.2008. Therefore, on the part of the petitioner, the learned

Javed & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors on 30 July, 2003
Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub-section by the Director against any member
without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
Act No.11 of 1994 was enacted with various objectives based on past experience and in view of the
shortcomings noticed in the implementation of preceding laws and also to bring the legislation in
conformity with Part IX of the Constitution of India relating to 'The Panchayats' added by the
Seventy-third Amendment. One of the objectives set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is
to disqualify persons for election of Panchayats at each level, having more than 2 children after one
year of the date of commencement of this Act, to popularize Family Welfare/Family Planning
Programme (Vide Clause (m) of Para 4 of SOR).
Placed in plain words the provision disqualifies a person having more than two living children from
holding the specified offices in Panchayats. The enforcement of disqualification is postponed for a
period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Act. A person having more than two
children upto the expiry of one year of the commencement of the Act is not disqualified. This
postponement for one year takes care of any conception on or around the commencement of the Act,
the normal period of gestation being nine months. If a woman has conceived at the commencement
of the Act then any one of such couples would not be disqualified. Though not disqualified on the
date of election if any person holding any of the said offices incurs a disqualification by giving birth
to a child one year after the commencement of the Act he becomes subject to disqualification and is
disabled from continuing to hold the office. The disability is incurred by the birth of a child which
results in increasing the number of living children, including the additional child born one year after
the commencement of the Act, to a figure more than two. If the factum is disputed the Director is
entrusted with the duty of holding an enquiry and declaring the office vacant. The decision of the
Director is subject to appeal to the Government. The Director has to afford a reasonable opportunity
of being heard to the holder of office sought to be disqualified. These safeguards satisfy the
requirements of natural justice. Several persons (who are the writ petitioners or appellants in this
batch of matters) have been disqualified or proceeded against for disqualifying either from
contesting the elections for, or from continuing in, the office of Panchas/Sarpanchas in view of their
having incurred the disqualification as provided by Section 175(1)(q) or Section 177(1) read with
Section 175(1)(q) of the Act. The grounds for challenging the constitutional validity of the abovesaid
provision are very many, couched differently in different writ petitions. We have heard all the
learned counsel representing the different petitioners/appellants. As agreed to at the Bar, the
grounds of challenge can be categorized into five :- (i) that the provision is arbitrary and hence
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;
(ii) that the disqualification does not serve the purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation; (iii)
that the provision is discriminatory; (iv) that the provision adversely affects the liberty of leading
personal life in all its freedom and having as many children as one chooses to have and hence is
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution; and (v) that the provision interferes with freedom of
religion and hence violates Article 25 of the Constitution.
The State of Haryana has defended its legislation on all counts. We have also heard the learned
Standing Counsel for the State. On notice, Sh. Soli J. Sorabji, the learned Attorney General for India,

Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018
89) The petitioners have sought to build their case on the aforesaid parameters of privacy and have
submitted that this right of privacy, which is now recognised as a fundamental right, stands violated
by the very fabric contained in the scheme of Aadhaar. It is sought to be highlighted that the data
which is collected by the State, particularly with the authentication of each transaction entered into
by an individual, can be assimilated to construct a profile of such an individual and it particularly
violates informational privacy. No doubt, there can be reasonable restrictions on this right, which is
conceded by the petitioners. It is, however, argued that right to privacy cannot be impinged without
a just, fair and reasonable law. Therefore, in the first instance, any intrusion into the privacy of a
person has to be backed by a law. Further, such a law, to be valid, has to pass the test of legitimate
aim which it should serve and also proportionality i.e. proportionate to the need for such
interference. Not only this, the law in question must also provide procedural guarantees against
abuse of such interference.
90) At the same time, it can also be deduced from the reading of the aforesaid judgment that the
reasonable expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the
private zone to the public arena. Further, privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the
individual is in a public place. For example, if a person was to post on Facebook vital information
about himself, the same being in public domain, he would not be entitled to claim privacy right. This
aspect is highlighted by some of the Honble Judges as under:
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.:
297. What, then, does privacy postulate? Privacy postulates the reservation of a private space for the
individual, described as the right to be let alone. The concept is founded on the autonomy of the
individual. The ability of an individual to make choices lies at the core of the human personality. The
notion of privacy enables the individual to assert and control the human element which is
inseparable from the personality of the individual. The inviolable nature of the human personality is
manifested in the ability to make decisions on matters intimate to human life. The autonomy of the
individual is associated over matters which can be kept private. These are concerns over which there
is a legitimate expectation of privacy. The body and the mind are inseparable elements of the human
personality. The integrity of the body and the sanctity of the mind can exist on the foundation that
each individual possesses an inalienable ability and right to preserve a private space in which the
human personality can develop. Without the ability to make choices, the inviolability of the
personality would be in doubt. Recognising a zone of privacy is but an acknowledgment that each
individual must be entitled to chart and pursue the course of development of personality. Hence
privacy is a postulate of human dignity itself. Thoughts and behavioural patterns which are intimate
to an individual are entitled to a zone of privacy where one is free of social expectations. In that zone
of privacy, an individual is not judged by others. Privacy enables each individual to take crucial
decisions which find expression in the human personality. It enables individuals to preserve their
beliefs, thoughts, expressions, ideas, ideologies, preferences and choices against societal demands of
homogeneity. Privacy is an intrinsic recognition of heterogeneity, of the right of the individual to be
different and to stand against the tide of conformity in creating a zone of solitude. Privacy protects
the individual from the searching glare of publicity in matters which are personal to his or her life.
Privacy attaches to the person and not to the place where it is associated. Privacy constitutes the

K.K. Saravana Babu vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 22 August, 2008
on the basis of an appraisal of the material placed by the sponsoring authority.
13. Mr. Iyer further submitted that the detention order does not constitute an infringement of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the detenu under Articles 19, 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution of
India. Mr. Iyer contended that the detenu is a slum grabber and involved in crime No. 70/2006
under sections 420, 465, 468 read with 471 and 120(B) IPC and crime No. 364/2007 under sections
420, 465, 466, 467, 468 read with 471 and 120(B) IPC and that, keeping in mind the seriousness of
the offence of land grabbing, the detaining authority was justified in passing the detention order.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully gone through the
record of the case.
15. This court on several occasions examined the concepts of "law and order" and "public Order".
Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a Constitution Bench of this court in Brij
Bhushan & Another v. The State of Delhi (1950) SCR 605 dealt with a case pertaining to public
order. The court observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public
tranquillity".
16. Another celebrated Constitution Bench judgment of this court is in the case of Romesh Thappar
v. The State of Madras (1950) SCR 594. In this case, Romesh Thappar, a printer, publisher and
editor of weekly journal in English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay was
detained under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The detention order was
challenged directly in the Supreme Court of India by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution. The allegation was that the detenu circulated documents to disturb the public
tranquillity and to create disturbance of public order and tranquillity.
17. The court observed:-
"... `Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of
tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of
internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established .... ... it
must be taken that `public safety' is used as a part of the wider concept of public
order ..... "
18. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a
Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Others
(1966) 1 SCR 709. In this judgment, Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined
the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:
"....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some?
The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because
the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to
public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two
drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be

K.K. Saravana Babu vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 22 August, 2008
on the basis of an appraisal of the material placed by the sponsoring authority.
13. Mr. Iyer further submitted that the detention order does not constitute an infringement of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the detenu under Articles 19, 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution of
India. Mr. Iyer contended that the detenu is a slum grabber and involved in crime No. 70/2006
under sections 420, 465, 468 read with 471 and 120(B) IPC and crime No. 364/2007 under sections
420, 465, 466, 467, 468 read with 471 and 120(B) IPC and that, keeping in mind the seriousness of
the offence of land grabbing, the detaining authority was justified in passing the detention order.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully gone through the
record of the case.
15. This court on several occasions examined the concepts of "law and order" and "public Order".
Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a Constitution Bench of this court in Brij
Bhushan & Another v. The State of Delhi (1950) SCR 605 dealt with a case pertaining to public
order. The court observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public
tranquillity".
16. Another celebrated Constitution Bench judgment of this court is in the case of Romesh Thappar
v. The State of Madras (1950) SCR 594. In this case, Romesh Thappar, a printer, publisher and
editor of weekly journal in English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay was
detained under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The detention order was
challenged directly in the Supreme Court of India by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution. The allegation was that the detenu circulated documents to disturb the public
tranquillity and to create disturbance of public order and tranquillity.
17. The court observed:-
"... `Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of
tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of
internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established .... ... it
must be taken that `public safety' is used as a part of the wider concept of public
order ..... "
18. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a
Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Others
(1966) 1 SCR 709. In this judgment, Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined
the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:
"....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some?
The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because
the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to
public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two
drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be

Karam Singh vs Hardayal Singh And Ors. on 8 August, 1979
pre-requisites is satisfied from the perusal of the complaint and the other evidence on the record.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge has assumed these facts which do not spell out of the
allegations in the complaint. At this stage, the Court is to look into the allegations in the complaint
filed by the complainant. The complaint prima facie shows that the respondents and their
companions opened fire on the Jatha people without any provocation as soon as they came out of
the premises of the Gurdwara. They came out of the Gurdwara premises on the assurance that no
harm would be done to them. In consequence of this assurance, the Jatha people came out of the
Gurdwara and as soon as they came out, the respondents and their companions opened fire
indiscriminately as a result of which 5/6 persons died on the spot and 2/3 persons died
subsequently in the hospital and many of them received serious injuries. Unlawful assembly is
defined in Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code, which is reproduced as under:
141. An assembly of five or more persons is designated an 'unlawful assembly' if the common object
of the persons composing that assembly is-
First- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government
or Parliament or the legislature of any State. or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power
of such public servant; or Second- To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
Third- To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth- By means of
criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person to take or obtain possession of any property,
or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other
incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed
right; or Fifth- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do
what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
From the reading of this provision, it is evident that an assembly would be unlawful if five or more
persons have a common object to overawe, by criminal force or show of criminal force, the Central
or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or any public servant in the
exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or to resist the execution of any law or of any
legal process; or to commit any mischief or criminal trespass or other offence; or by criminal force
or by show of it to any person to take a forcible possession of any property or to deprive any person
of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in
possession or enjoyment, or by criminal force or show of criminal force to compel any person to do
what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. From the
allegations in the complaint, as I have observed earlier, the Jatha which had come after doing a
social service in the Gurdwara near Anandpur Sahib did not constitute an unlawful assembly. The
Jatha had stayed in the Gurdwara Parivar Vichhora Sahib for the night. It was a cold night. Since
adequate quilts were not provided to them, so there was some altercation in the morning with the
Sewadar of that Gur-dwara. Except that, nothing happened at the Gurdwara and the Jatha people
started peacefully towards their destination and it was when they were on their way that the
respondents along with other companions intervened and wanted them to go to the police station
for which they had no lawful authority at the time. Even if they had such a legal authority, the
allegations in the complaint show that there was no need to use force. The leader of the Jatha, Sant
Chanan Singh, volunteered that they may be arrested. But in spite of this, the respondents and their

Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on 24 April, 1973
features, basic elements and fundamental principles of the Constitution. Likewise, Parliament is
construed by the Constitution 24th Amendment Act to be authorised to damage or destroy the
essence of all or any of the fundamental rights. Therefore, the amendment must be illegal and
invalid.
921. In the alternative it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if the Constitution 24th
Amendment is valid it can be only on a reading down of the amended provisions of Article 13 and
368 which reading would preserve the original inherent and implied limitations. Even after the
Constitution 24th Amendment Act Parliament will have no power to alter or destroy the essential
features of the Constitution and secondly, fundamental rights are among the essential features of the
Constitution and, therefore, the essence of any of the fundamental rights cannot be altered or
destroyed or damaged even when they are sought to be abridged.
922. The Attorney General stressed the background in which Article 368 was enacted by the
Constituent Assembly to show that any limitation on the amending power was never in controversy.
The only controversy was regarding the degree of flexibility of an amendment of all the provisions of
the Constitution. Our Constitution has adopted three methods of amendment of the Constitution.
Certain provisions of the Constitution may be amended by a simple majority in Parliament. Others
may be amended by two-thirds majority. The third category relates to provisions where
amendments must be ratified by one half of the States. This scheme strikes a good balance by
protecting the rights of the States while leaving the remainder of the Constitution easy to amend. Of
the three ways of amending the Constitution two are laid down in Article 368 itself and the third is
provided for in about 24 other Articles.
923. The Constitutional Adviser incorporated in his draft Constitution prepared by him in October,
1947 a recommendation contained in the supplementary Report of the Union Constitution
Committee. Following the recommendation of the Advisory Committee he included a proviso that
the provisions in the Constitution relating to the reservation of seats for the Muslims, the Scheduled
Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Indian Christians and the Sikhs, either in the Federal Parliament
or in any Provincial Legislature, should not be amended before the expiry of ten years from the
commencement of the Constitution.
924. The Drafting Committee in February, 1948 considered the provisions for amendment. It made
three material changes in the provisions made by the Constitution Adviser. First, the Committee
framed a self contained and independent Article regarding the reservation of seats in the legislatures
for minorities. These provisions could not be amended for a period of ten years and would then
cease to have effect unless continued in operation by an amendment of the Constitution. The second
proposed change gave a limited power of initiating Constitutional amendments to the State
legislatures. This power related to two matters. These were the methods of choosing Governors and
the establishment or abolition of Legislative Councils in the States. The third amendment suggested
was that changes in any of the legislative lists (not merely federal List) should receive ratification of
at least one half of the Provincial legislatures and one third of the legislatures of Indian States.

Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi And ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12 October, 1998
This certificate is valid for a period of one year.
Sumbul Rizui Khan Associate Protection Officer For UNHCR Chief of Mission Identical certificate
has been issued in case of second petitioner Taer AI Mansoori.
REPLY:
2. A counter affidavit has been filed by Miss Usha Rani, Section Officer in Foreigner Division in the
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at New Delhi. An objection has been taken with
respect to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioners have no
constitutional or fundamental rights to file the present petition as they have entered in the territory
of Union of India without any valid travel documents. It is also submitted that the powers under the
Foreigners Act, 1946 especially under Section 3(2)(c) and (d) has been entrusted to the State
Government. This power includes the power to deportation, movements, residence of foreign
nationals staying illegality in India. With respect to the condition in Iraq, it is stated that the present
situation in Iraq is substantially improved and there is no war like situation. It is also stated that
many such Iraqis are returning from India to Iraq. It is further stated that, in compliance of the
directions of this Court dated 22nd May 1998 based on refugee certificate issued by UNHCR, the
petitioners have been handed over to UNHCR and they have been accorded extension upto 30th
December 1998 i.e. till Iraqi Embassy, New Delhi issue necessary travel documents for the purpose
of sending the present petitioners to Iraq. It is further stated that the petitioners cannot be given
permanent status of Indian Citizen on account of several administrative exigencies and from the
point of view of National Security, which cannot be disclosed before this Court on the ground of
National Security.
CONTENTIONS :
3. It is contended by Mr. Bhushan Oza, learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners
though foreign nationals, their fundamental rights to life and liberty are guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. Apart from that, this right is also guaranteed under Article 3 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is binding on India. Further, under Article 3 of the
convention against torture, a state party to convention is prohibited to expel, return or extradite a
person to another State, where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture. He place reliance upon the decision of the apex Court in case of
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India reported in (1997) 3 SCC 433. He also relied on
some unreported decisions of the Various High Courts. It is further submitted that the Central
Government has power to exempt an individual . foreigner or a class or a description of foreigners
from the application of Foreigners Act, as provided under Section 3-A of the Foreigners Act. It is
submitted that India has given shelter to the refugees like Tibetans, Srilankans, Afghans and
Chakmas. Learned counsel has also contended that Article 51 of the Constitution extends the
principle of the rules of natural justice with regard to refugees being followed i.e. the refugees should
not be expelled or forcibly returned in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
their life or freedom would be threatened on account of various grounds such as membership of a
particular social group or a political opinion. The principle of "Non Refoulement" is the principle

Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi And ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 12 October, 1998
which prevents all such expulsion or forcible return of refugees and should be followed by the
central Government in accordance with Article 51 of the Constitution. With reference to the
improvement of the condition in Iraq, it is submitted that the same is not correct.
4. On the other hand, Mr. B. T. Rao, learned Additional Central Government Counsel submits that
our country has not signed the treaties and conventions referred by the petitioners and as such, the
same are not binding. With respect to the powers of exemption under Section 3(A) of the Foreigners
Act, it is submitted that the same applies only to the citizens of Commonwealth countries. The
petitioners are of Iraq origin and that country being not commonwealth country, the provision of
section 3(A) of the Foreigners Act is not attracted. It is emphasized by the learned Additional
Central Government counsel that the influx of refugees has become a serious problem to the country
which is also threatening its security. So far as the fundamental rights are concerned, it is submitted
that the foreign nationals have no fundamental right of residence in India. It is also submitted by
Mr. B. T. Rao, learned counsel that the powers under Section 3(2) has been delegated to the State
Government. Thus, the appropriate action is required to be taken by the State Government. Mr. Rao
has also disputed the genuineness of the photostat copy of the report of the UNHCR produced by the
petitioners.
5. So far as the State Government is concerned, in spite of notice, it has exhibited unconcern
attitude.
REFUGEES AND U.N.O.:
6. Refugee problem is a global problem. A successive stream of humanitarian crises has high
lightened the plight of the victims, as well as the threat, that large scale population movements pose
to regional security, stability and prosperity. Host countries are reluctant to keep doors open for
refugees. Since 1947, some about 35 -40 million people have moved across the border in the Indian
Sub Continent. India opened boundary for Tibetians, Sri Lankans Chakmas, Afgans and others. The
Government of India has seen the refugees problem from a broader perspective, derived from its
ancient cultural heritage. Reminding the Indian ethos and the humanitarian thrust, Buddha to
Gandhi, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, has given message as Chairman, ICHLR, in these words:
The Indian perception is informed by a profound regard for person-hood and a deep commitment to
prevent suffering. Ancient India's cultural vision has recognised this veneration for the individual.
The Manusmrithi deals elaborately with Dharma even amidst the clash of arms. The deeper springs
of humanitarian law distinguished the people of India by the very fact that Dharma Yudha or the
humanitarian regulation of warfare, is in the very blood of Indian history. Cosmic compassion and
ecological empathy flow from the abundant reservoir of Bud-dha's teachings whose mission was the
search for an end to human sorrow or Dukha. 'Emperor Ashoka" renounced war as he beheld
slaughter in the battle-field. In the Mahabharatha and Ramayaiia, the great epics of India, we find
inviolable rules of ethics and kindness to be observed even by warring rulers in battle-fields. One
may conclude that the Indian Constitution, in enacting fundamental duties in Article 51-A has cast
on every citizen the duty to promote harmony among all the peoples of India, to have compassion
for living creatures and to develop humanism and abjure violence. Thus, humanitarian legality and

Madhu Limaye & Anr vs Ved Murti & Ors on 28 October, 1970
for examination of the petitioners without summoning any

witnesses in support of the information.
On the question of the validity of the detention,
HELD : Under the scheme of the Code the Magistrate can only
as for an interim bond if he could not complete the inquiry.
The expression 'pending completion of the inquiry' in s.
117(3) postulates commencement of the inquiry, which means,
commencing of the trial according to summons procedure. The
Magistrate cannot postpone the case and hear nobody and yet
ask for the interim bond. [749 C-D]
In the present case, if interim bonds were required from the
petition the Magistrate ought to have entered upon the
inquire and satisfied hi self, at least prima facie, about
the truth of the information in relation to the alleged
facts. Without making any such inquiry the Magistrate could
not require them to be detained in custody. Therefore, the
proceeding for asking interim bond and the remand to custody
were completely illegal. [750 C]
Sections 91 and 344 of the Code do not apply to persons like
the petitioners who were brought before court under the
provisions of Ch. VIII of the Code. [749 F]
Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, [1971] 2
71 S.C.R., followed.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 307 of 1970. Petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner appeared in person.
K. Raiendra Chaudhuri and Pratap Singh, for petitioner No.2. L., M. Singhvi and O. P. Rana, for the
respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Hidayatullah, C.J.-This is a combined
petition by Madhu Limaye, M.P. a leader of the Samyukta Socialist Party of India and Ram Adhar
Giri, Secretary of the same party in the District of Varanasi. This petition was heard along with Writ
Petition No. 77 if 1970, filed earlier by Madhu Limaye, because both these petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Section 144 and Chapter VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By, an Order
passed unanimously by a Special Bench of 7 Judges (of which we were also members) on that part of
the arguments, the petitioners stand concluded on the constitutional points raised by them. The
Special Bench holds that section 144 and the provisions of Chapter VIll of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, when properly construed, are constitutional and valid. Applying the construction which
is elaborately indicated in that order we proceed to examine the petition.
The case of the petitioners is that on August 3, 1970 one of them (Madhu Limnaye) arrived at
Varanasi Airport from Cal- cutta and Ram Adhar Giri and others went there to receive him. The two
petitioners named here and one Narendra Shastri were arrested by the police at a level crossing
when they were proceeding by car to the city. According to the petitioners they were not told the
rounds of their arrest but were taken to Varanasi Police Station and afterwards to the City
Magistrate's Court. On the way the Police Officers showed them the report made by the Police to the

Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978
R 1990 SC1480 (109)

R 1991 SC 101 (31,32,34,65,157,223,239,257,2
RF 1991 SC 345 (6)
RF 1991 SC 564 (4)
RF 1992 SC 1 (133)
D 1992 SC1020 (23,28)
RF 1992 SC1701 (21,26,27,28)
F 1992 SC1858 (19)
ACT:
Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and
21--Personal liberty--Whether right to go abroad is part of
personal liberty--Whether a law which Complies with Article
21 has still to meet the challenge of Article 19--Nature
and ambit of Article 14--Judging validity with reference to
direct and inevitable effect--Whether the right under
Article 19(1) (a) has any geographical limitation.
Passports Act, 1967-Ss. 3,5,6,10(3)(c), 10(5)--Whether
s.10(3)(c) is violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (a) (b) &
21--Grounds for refusing to grant passport--Whether the
power to impound passport arbitrary--"in general public
interest" if vague.
Principles of Natural Justice--Whether applies only to quasi
judicial orders or applies to administrative orders
affecting rights of citizens--When statute silent whether
can be implied--Duty to act judicially whether can be spelt
out--In urgent cases whether principles of natural justice
can apply.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was issued a passport on June 1, 1976 under
the Passport Act, 1967. On the 4th of July 1977, the
petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from the
Regional Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her that it
was decided by the Government of India to impound her
passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public interest".
The petitioner was required to surrender her passport within
7 days from the receipt of that letter. The petitioner
immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport
Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of
reasons for making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply
was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs on 6th July 1977 stating inter alia that the
Government decided "in the interest of the general public"
not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for the
making of the order. The petitioner thereupon filed the
present Writ Petition challenging action of the Government
in- impounding her passport and declining to give reasons
for doing so. The Act was enacted on 24-4-67 in view of the
decision of this Court in Satwant Singg Sawhney's case. The

Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 31 July, 1980
Government. That can most effectively be achieved, without

calling a democracy by any other name, by a total denial of
social, economic and political justice to the people, by
emasculating liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship and by abjuring commitment to the magnificent
ideal of a society of equals. The power to destroy is not a
power to amend. [240C-E]
Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending
power on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the
exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into
an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one
of the basic features of Indian Constitution and therefore,
the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed. In other
words, Parliament cannot, under Article 368, expand its
amending power so as to acquire for itself the right to
repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic
and essential features. The donee of a limited power cannot
by the exercise of that power convert the limited power into
an unlimited one. [240E- G]
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain , [1976] 2 SCR
347, followed.
(2) The newly introduced clause (4) of Article 368 is
equally unconstitutional and void because clauses (4) and
(5) are inter-linked. While clause (5) purports to remove
all limitations on the amending power, clause (4) deprives
the courts of their power to call in question any amendment
of the Constitution. [241E-F]
Indian Constitution is founded on a nice balance of
power among the three wings of the State namely, the
Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. It is the
function of the Judges, may their duty, to pronounce upon
the validity of laws. If courts are totally deprived of that
power, the fundamental rights conferred upon the people will
become a mere adornment because rights without remedies are
as writ in water. A controlled Constitution will then become
uncontrolled. Clause (4) of Article 368 totally deprives the
citizens of one of the most valuable modes of redress which
is guaranteed by Article 32. The conferment of the right to
destroy the identity of the Constitution coupled with the
provision that no court of law shall pronounce upon the
validity of such destruction is a transparent case of
transgression of the limitations on the amending power.
[241H, 242A]
If a constitutional amendment cannot be pronounced to
be invalid even if it destroys the basic structure of the
Constitution, a law passed in pursuance of such an amendment
will be beyond the pale of judicial review because it will
receive the protection of the constitutional amendment which
the courts will be powerless to strike down. Article 13 of
Constitution will then become a dead letter because even
ordinary laws will escape the scrutiny of the courts on the
ground that they are passed on the strength of a
constitutional amendment which is not open to challenge.

Motiram Ghelabhai (Dead) Through ... vs Jagan Nagar (Dead) Through Lrs And ... on 28 February, 1985
Counsel for the appellant-defendant however, faintly urged before us that his client would be
entitled to the protection of s. 12(1 ) of the Act, (which has been held to be retrospective in
operation) independently of and irrespective of whether his case was covered by the proviso to s. 50
read with the latter part thereof or not. It is impossible to accept this contention for the simple
reason that 8. 12(1) of the Act would unquestionably be a general provision whereas the proviso to s.
50 read with the new paragraph added thereto, which has now been held to be an independent
provision enacting substantive law in itself and which expressly deals with pending matters (suits
and other proceedings in contradistinction with execution proceedings and appeals) would be a
special provision contained in the Act and obviously under the normal rule of interpretation the
special provision must prevail over the general and therefore if a case is covered by the special
provision the general provision will not be attracted to it The Contention has therefore to be
rejected-
Before parting with the case we would like to point out that Chandrasingh Manibhai's case (supra)
was also a case dealing (1) 53 Bom. L.R- 319 with an appeal (arising out of a decree passed on a date
prior to the coming into force of the 1947 Act in a suit filed under the Transfer of Property Act)
which was pending at the relevant date and the question was whether on the principle that the
appeal was in the nature of a rehearing of the suit the same should be decided in accordance with
the provisions of the 1947 Act which had come into force during its pendency and this Court took the
view that having regard to the proviso to s. 50 as it originally stood the Act was given retrospective
operation only to a limited extent and execution proceedings and appeals were excluded from this
effect and were to be governed by the law in force at the time when the decrees were passed and
therefore, the tenant was not entitled to the protection of the 1947 Act and was liable to be evicted.
Really speaking this decision had concluded the point raised before us in the present appeal- But
since in Shah Bhojraj's case (supra) a distinction was made between sub- sec. (1) of s. 12 on the one
hand and sub-secs. (2) and (3) on the other and it was held that the former provision was
retrospective in operation and the latter prospective, Counsel for the appellant-defendant made
valiant attempt to brings his client's case within the purview of s. 12(1) by putting forward the
plausible contention that his case was not covered by the proviso to s. 50 read with the separate
paragraph added thereto at all on the ground that the said proviso together with the new separate
paragraph added thereto was not an independent provision enacting any substantive law therein but
was linked with the main provision contained in s. 50 and had been introduced merely with a view
to qualify or create an exception to what is contained in the main provision but that attempt has
failed in view of our conclusion on the true nature and scope of the said proviso read with the Dew
separate paragraph added to it.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to
costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

Mr. Louis De Raedt & Ors vs Union Of India And Ors on 24 July, 1991
8. Lastly, Mr. Verghese contended that in no event the Superintendent of Police who signed the
impugned order, i.e. Annexure, IV, is authorised to direct deportation of the petitioner.
9. There is no force in the argument of Mr. Verghese thai for the sole reason that the petitioner has
been staying in this country for more than a decade before the commencement of the
Constitution, he must be deemed to have acquired his domicile in this country and consequently the
Indian citizenship. Although it is impossible to lay down an absolute definition of domicile, as was
stated in Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain, [1955] 1 SCR 697 it is fully established that an
intention to reside for ever in a country where one has taken up his residence is an essential
constituent element for the existence of domicile in that country. Domicile has been described in
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, Volume 8, Paragraph 42 1) as the legal relationship
between individual and a territory with a distinctive legal system which invokes that system as his
personal law. Every person must have a personal law, and accordingly every one must have a
domicile. He receives at birth a domicile of origin which remains his domicile, wherever he goes,
unless and until he acquires a new domicile. The new domicile, acquired subsequently, is generally
called a domicile of choice. The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth and for
acquisition of a domicile of choice one of the necessary conditions is the intention to remain there
permanently. The domicile of origin is retained and cannot be divested until the acquisition of the
domicile of choice. By merely leaving his country, even permanently, one will not, in the eye of law,
lose his domicile until he acquires a new one. This aspect was discussed in Central Bank of India v.
Ram Narain (supra) where it was pointed out that if a person leaves the country of his origin with
undoubted intention of never returning to it again, nevertheless his domicile of origin adheres to
him until he actually settles with the requisite intention in some other country. The position was
summed in Halsbury thus:
"He may have his home in one country, but be deemed to be domiciled in another."
Thus the proposition that the domicile of origin is retained until the acquisition of a domicile of
choice is well established and does not admit of any exception.
10. For the acquisition of a domicile of choice, it must he shown that the person concerned had a
certain state of mind, the animus manendi. If he claims that he acquired a new domicile at a
particular time, he must prove that he had formed the intention of making his permanent home in
the country of residence and of continuing to reside there permanently. Resi- dence alone,
unaccompanied by this state of mind, is insuf- ficient.
11. Coming to the facts of the present cases the question which has to be answered is whether at the
commencement of the Constitution of India the petitioners had an intention of staying here
permanently. The burden to prove such an intention lies on them. Far from establishing the case
which is now pressed before us, the available materials on the record leave no room for doubt that
the petitioners did not have such intention. At best it can be said that they were incertain about their
permanent home. During the relevant period very significant and vital political and social changes
were taking place in this country, and those who were able to make up their mind to adopt this
country as their own, took appropriate legal steps. So far the three petitioners are concerned, they

Naga People'S Movement, Of Human ... vs Union Of India on 27 November, 1997
disturbance and on the President being satisfied that a situation has arisen where the Government
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with provisions of the Constitution. A proclamation
under Article 356 has serious consequences affecting the executive as well as the legislative powers
of the State concerned. By issuing such a proclamation the President assumes to himself all or any of
the functions o the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by
the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State and
declares that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority
of parliament. Having regard to the drastic nature of the consequences flowing from a proclamation
under Article 356 it is required to be approved by both Houses of Parliament within a prescribed
period and it can be continued only with the approval of both Houses of Parliament and it cannot
remain in force for more than three years. The provisions of the Central Act have been enacted to
enable the Central Government to discharge the obligation imposed on it under Article 355 of the
Constitution and to prevent the situation arising due to internal disturbance assuming such
seriousness as to require invoking the drastic provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution. The
Central Act does not confer of the Union the executive and legislative powers of the States in respect
of which a declaration has been made under Section 3. It only enables the personnel of armed forces
of the Union to exercise the power conferred under Section 4 in the event of a notification declaring
an area to be a disturbed area being issued under Section 3. Having regard to the powers that are
conferred under Section 4, we are unable to appreciate how the enactment of the Central Act can be
equated with the exercise of the power under Article 356 of the Constitution.
As regards the submission that the Central Act is a colourable legislation and a fraud on the
Constitution, it may be mentioned that as far back as in 1954 this Court in K.C. Gajapati Narayan
Deo & Anr. v. The State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1, had said:-
"It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not
involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The
whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular
legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular
law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if
the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all.
Whether a statute is constitutional or not it thus always a question of power."
[pp. 10, 11] The same view was reiterated in R.S. Joshi, S.T.O.
Gujarat Etc. Etc. v Ajit Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad & Anr. Etc. Etc., 1978 (1) SCR 338, decided by a
Special Bench of Seven Judges in the following observations:-
"In the jurisprudence of power, colourable exercise of or fraud on legislative power

or, more frightfully, fraud on the Constitution, are expressions which merely mean
that the legislature is incompetent to enact a particular law, although the label of
competency is stuck on it, an d then it is colourable legislation. It is very important to
notice that if the legislature is competent to pass the particular law, the motives
which impel it to pass the law are really irrelevant. To put it more relevantly to the

National Human Rights Commission vs State Of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr on 9 January, 1996
Supreme Court of India

National Human Rights Commission vs State Of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr on 9 January, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 1234, 1996 SCC (1) 742
Author: A A.M.
Bench: Ahmadi A.M. (Cj)
PETITIONER:
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH & ANR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/01/1996
BENCH:
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
BENCH:
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
SEN, S.C. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 1234 1996 SCC (1) 742
JT 1996 (1) 163 1996 SCALE (1)155
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T AHMADI, CJI This public interest petition, being a writ petition under Article 32
of the Constitution, has been filed by the National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter called
"NHRC") and seeks to enforce the rights, under Article 21 of the Constitution, of about 65,000
Chakma/Hajong tribals (hereinafter called "Chakmas"). It is alleged that these Chakmas, settled
mainly in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, are being persecuted by sections of the citizens of
Arunachal Pradesh. The first respondent is the State of Arunachal Pradesh and the second
respondent is the State of Arunachal Pradesh and the second respondent is the Union of India.
The NHRC has been set up under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (No.10 of 1994). Section
18 of this Act empowers the NHRC to approach this Court in appropriate cases.
The factual matrix of the case may now be referred to. A large number of Chakmas from erstwhile
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were displaced by the Kaptai Hydel Power Project in 1964. They

Olga Tellis & Ors vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & ... on 10 July, 1985
action on the part of public authorities will be in

violation of their fundamental rights. How far the argument
regarding the existence and scope of the right claimed by
the petitioners is well-founded is
55
another matter- But, the argument has to be examined despite
the concession. [78 C-D]
Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi
(1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to.
2.1 The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article
21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that
life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example,
by the imposition and execution of the death sentence,
except according to procedure established by law. That is
but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important
facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no
person can live without the means of living, that is, the
means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part of the constitutional right to live, the
easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would
be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of
abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life
of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would
make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation
would not have to be in accordance with the procedure
established by law, if the right to livelihood is not
regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone
makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes like
livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the
right to life. [79 F-H, 80 A-B]
2.2 The principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41
must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding
and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental
rights. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure
to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the
right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the
right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.
The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to
provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the
citizens. But, any person who is deprived of his right to
livelihood except according to just and fair procedure
established by law, can challenge the deprivation as
offending the right to life conferred by Article 21. [80 G-
H, 81 A]
Munn v. Illinois [1877] 94 US 113 and Kharak Singh v.
The State of U.P. [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332 referred to.
In Re: Sant Ram (1960) 3 S.C.R. 499, distinguished.
56
2.3 In a matter like the one in which the future of
half of the city's population is at stake, the Court must
consult authentic empirical data compiled by agencies,
official and non-official. It is by that process that the
core of the problem can be reached and a satisfactory

Pathumma And Others vs State Of Kerala And Others on 16 January, 1978
social reforms for the uptiftment of the backward and the

weaker sections and for the improvement of the lot of the
poor. The Court will interfere only when the statute is
clearly violative of the fundamental right or when the Act
is beyond the legislative competence. Courts have
recognised that there is always a presumption in favour of
the constitutionality of a statute and the onus to prove its
invalidity lies on the party assailing the Act. [544 A-B]
Jyoti Prashad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory
of Delhi (1962) 2 SCR 125 and Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors v.
The State of Bihar (1959) SCR 629 referred to.
(e) The object of the Act being removal of agricultural
indebtedness and reduction of one of the important causes of
poverty, is undoubtedly in public interest and the
restriction must be presumed to be reasonable. [545 B-C]
(b) By a long line of decisions this Court has laid down
seteral tests and guidelines for judging the reasonableness
of restrictions. They are :
(i) Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles constitute
the "conscience" of the Constitution. The purpose of the
latter is to fix certain social and economic goals for
immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social
revolution. The Constitution aims at bringing about a
synthesis between funda.mental rights and directive
principles by giving to the former a place of pride and to
the latter a place of permanence. [545 F-G]
5 3 9
Fatechand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra etc.
(1977) 2 SCR 828, His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala (1973) Supp. SCR 1,
State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC
310 and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbattgwala
(1957) SCR 874 at 921 referred to.
In the instant case the object of the Act being to eradicate
rural indebtedness and thereby secure the common good, of
the people living in object poverty, clearly fulfils the
directives in Arts. 38 and 39(b) of the Constitution. There
is no conflict between the directives and the restrictions
sought to be placed by the Act. [545 E-F, 547 A]
(ii)The restrictions must not be arbitrary or excessive in
nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of
the general public. What is required is that the
legislature should take intelligent care in choosing I
course which is dictated by reason and good conscience so as
to strike a just balance between the freedom contained in
Art. 19(1)(f) and the social control permitted by cll. (5)
and (6) of that Article. [547 B-E]
Chintamman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1950) SCR 759
at 763 and Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (1954) SCR 803 at 811-12 referred
to.
(iii)No abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can
be laid down which can be of universal application and the

Police Commissioner & Ors. vs Yash Pal Sharma on 30 September, 2008
protestors. When Bal Kishan, Defendant No.2, who was the Incharge of the police
party, entered the witness box, as DW-5, he stated that the police force wanted to
stop them (protestors) with the help of cane shields. The cane charge was admitted in
the written statement, whereas, at the time of evidence, it was stated that the
protestors were simply stopped with the help of can-shields and they had suffered
injuries in stampede. Thus, in view of the vacillating stand of the defendants in the
written statement and during evidence, it would be difficult to place any reliance
thereon."
12. Thereafter, the learned ADJ proceeded to discuss the evidence of the plaintiff and concluded as
under :-
"29.....Thus, it is established from overwhelming evidence on record that the plaintiff

had suffered injuries during lathi charge once, outside gate No.2 of Patiala House
courts and secondly, inside the Patiala House Courts complex, when he was trying to
save Shri J.P. Dixit, Advocate."
13. The next logical step taken by the learned ADJ was to address himself the question as to
whether, in using the force in which the plaintiff has sustained the injuries, the amount of force used
was reasonable. He referred to Rule 14.56of Punjab Police Rules, as applicable to the Delhi Police, as
per which the police can use force against the crowd in accordance with the provisions of Section 127
and 129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 129 of the Code). Object
of this Rule is to use the force to quell a disturbance of the peace or disperse an assembly which
threatens such disturbance and has either refused to disperse or shows a determination not to
disperse. This rule also commands that no ulterior objects, such as punitive or repressive effect,
shall be taken into consideration while making use of force. Taking note of Section 129 of the Code
in this context, the learned ADJ was of the opinion that the force is to be used only when such an
assembly does not disperse or conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination not to
disperse. In that course, force can be used by the Executive Magistrate or Police Officer for the
purpose of dispersing such assembly.
14. Applying the principle on the facts of the case, the learned ADJ returned the findings that: (a) It
was established on record that the protestors were totally unarmed and peaceful, even when such an
assembly of protestors had become an unlawful assembly because of promulgation of orders under
Section 144 of the Code. (b) The defendants failed to show that this assembly was commanded to
disperse or that they had refused to disperse. (c) Even if it is assumed that they were asked to
disperse and they refused to do so, it was totally unlawful on the part of police to use the force to the
extent it was used by them against the plaintiff and others. (d) The trial court opined that as this
assembly had committed an offence under Section 188 of the IPC for violating the orders
promulgated under Section 144 of the Code, they could have been arrested for committing this
offence. Instead of doing so, resorting to lathi charge was illegal, more so when the use of force was
excessive, inasmuch as, the defendants had failed to prove that use of force was necessary, legal and
just.

Ram Singh And Ors. vs The State Of Delhi And Anr. on 6 April, 1951
executive authorities from confidential sources and it would not be practicable in all such cases to
have a record made of the speeches delivered. To hold that article 22(5) requires that, wherever
detention is grounded on alleged prejudicial speeches, the detaining authority should indicate to the
person detained the passages which it regards as objectionable would rob the provisions of the Act
of much of their usefulness in the very class of cases where those provisions were doubtless
primarily intended to be used and where their use would be most legitimate. In the case of these
petitioners, no doubt, the speeches are said to have been made at public meetings, and it is not
suggested on behalf of the respondents, that no record was made of the speeches, so that the details
asked for could have been furnished. The omission to do so, for which no reason is disclosed in these
proceedings, is regrettable, as it has given rise to avoidable grievance and complaint. The authorities
who feel impelled in discharge of their duty to issue orders of detention will do well to bear in mind
the following remarks of the Chief Justice in the case referred to above :
"In numerous cases that have been brought to out notice, we have found that there has been quite
an unnecessary obscurity on the part of the detaining authority in stating the grounds for the other.
Instead of giving the information with reasonable details, there is deliberate attempt to use the
minimum number of words in the communication conveying the grounds of detention. In our
opinion, this attitude is quite deplorable".
10. This, however, does not affect our conclusion in these cases that the grounds communicated to
the petitioners contain sufficient particulars to enable them to make their representations to the
authority concerned, and that the requirements of article 22(5) have thus been complied with.
11. It is also urged that the orders of detention were bad because they did not specify the period
during which the petitioners were to be under detention. This point is now concluded against the
petitioners by the decision of this Court in Ujager Singh v. The State of Punjab [Petition No. 149 of
1950] and Jagjit Singh v. The State of Punjab [Petition No. 167 of 1950] where it was pointed out
that as section 12 of the Act itself prescribed a maximum period of one year for detention
thereunder, such orders could not be said to be of indefinite duration and unlawful on that ground.
12. Lastly, it was said that the petitioners were prominent members of a political organisation which
was opposed to the ideals and policies of the party in power, and that the orders of detention were
made "for the collateral purpose of stifling effective political opposition and legitimate criticism of
the policies pursued by the Congress Party and had nothing to do with the maintenance of public
order". Allegations of made fide conduct are easy to make but not always as easy to prove. The
District Magistrate has, in his affidavit filed in these proceedings, stated that, from the materials
placed before him by persons experienced in investigating matters of this kind, he was satisfied that
it was necessary to detain the petitioners with a view to preventing them from acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and he has emphatically repudiated the purpose and
motive imputed to him. We have thus allegations on the one side and denial on the other, and the
petitioners made no attempt to discharge the burden, which undoubtedly lay upon them, to prove
that the District Magistrate acted mala fide in issuing the orders of detention.
13. The petitions are dismissed.

Ramesh Prasad Singh vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 4 November, 1977
subjects in their final B.Sc. Engineering Examination also

were not equally qualified; (iii) that they had no right to
maintain the writ petition; and (iv) that there was no
question of any breach or violation of the guarantee of
equality of opportunity contained in Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution.
Allowing the appeal, the Court,
HELD : (1) The process of rule making is a protracted and
complicated one involving consultation with various
authorities and compliance with mani fold formalities.
Exigencies of administration at times require immediate
creation of service or posts and any procrastination in that
behalf cannot but prove detrimental to the proper and
efficient functioning of public departments. In such like
situations, the authorities concerned would have the power
to appoint or terminate administrative personnel under the
general power of administration vested in them. In the
absence of rules, qualifications for a post can validly be
laid down in the self same executive order creating the
service or post and filling it tip according to those
qualifications. [792 A-D]
B. N. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. [1966] 3
SCR 682 and T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem & Anr. [1961] 1 SCR
750 at 764, followed.
(2)The doctrine of equality before law and equal
protection of laws and equality of opportunity in the matter
of employment and promotion enshrined in Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution which is intended to advance justice by
avoiding discrimination is attracted only when equals are
treated as unequals or where unequals are treated as equals.
The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules
should be made applicable in spite of differences in their
circumstances and conditions. Although Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution forbid hostile discrimination, they do
not forbid reasonable classification and equality of
opportunity in matters of promotion means equality as
between members of the same class of employees and not equal
between members of separate independent classes. Though the
concept of equal protection and equal opportunity
undoubtedly permeate the whole spectrum of. an individual's
employment from appointment through promotion and termina-
tion to the payment of gratuity and pension, it has an
inherent limitation arising from the very nature of
constitutional guarantee. Equality is for equals, that is,
who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal
treatment but the guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution cannot be carried beyond the point which
is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. [792
H. 793 A-D]
Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1971] 2 SCC
188; AIR 1971 SC 1801; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union
of India & Ors. [1950] SCR 869 at 911 and All India Station
Masters' & Assistant Station Masters' Association & Ors. v.

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State Of Bombay And ... on 18 March, 1954
acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law.
This means that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws
validly enacted but here again it should be remembered that under article 26 (d), it is the religious
denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with
any law which the State may validly impose. A law, which takes away the right of administration
altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would
amount to violation of the right which is guaranteed by article 26
(d) of the Constitution.
The moot point for consideration, therefore, is where is the line to be drawn between what are
matters of religion and what are not ? Our Constitution-makers have made no attempt to define
what 'religion' is and it is certainly not possible to frame an exhaustive definition of the word
'religion' which would be applicable to all classes of persons. As has been indicated in the Madras
case referred to above, the definition of religion given by Fields J. in the American case of Davis v.
Beason(1), does not seem to us adequate or precise. "The term 'religion"', thus observed the learned
Judge in the case mentioned above, "has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator and
to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and character and of obedience to His Will.
It is often confounded with cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from
the latter". it may be noted that 'religion' is not necessarily theistic and in fact there are well known
religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do nor believe in the existence of God or of any
Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs -and doctrines
which are regarded by those who profess that religion to be conducive to their spiritual well being,
but it would not be correct to say, as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court, that matters of religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and
religious belief. A religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression
in acts as well. We may quote in this connection the observations of Latham C. J. of the High Court
of Australia in the case of Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth(2), where the extent of
protection given to religious freedom by section 116 of the Australian Constitution came up for
consideration. (1)133 U.S. 33 (2) 67 C.L.R, 116, 124.
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion. that, though the civil
Government should not interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with
any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the principle of freedom
of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as relevant to the
interpretation of section 116. The section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and
therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are
done in the exercise of religion. Thus the section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It
protects also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of religion., In our opinion, as we have
already said in the Madras case, these observations apply fully to the provision regarding religious
freedom that is embodied in our Constitution.
Religious practices or performances of acts, in pursuance of religious belief are as much apart of
religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion

Ravi Kumar Atheist vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 16 September, 2019
Punjab-Haryana High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP No.15648 of 2019
Date of Decision : 16.09.2019
Ravi Kumar Atheist

....Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and others

...Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE TEJINDER SINGH DHINDSA

...
Present : Mr.Ashok Goel, Advocate for the petitioner.
TEJINDER SINGH DHINDSA, J.(ORAL) Pleadings on record would show that Naib Tehsildar,
Tohana, District Fatehabad issued a certificate dated 29.04.2019 (Annexure P-5) certifying that the
petitioner herein is an Atheist and does not belong to any caste, religion and does not believe in God.
Challenge in the instant petition is to a subsequent communication dated 04.05.2019 (Annexure

P-6) and in terms of which the earlier certificate issued at Annexure P-5 has been cancelled.
Counsel would submit that even though the petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Caste category but
he does not wish to derive any benefit of reservation under the Constitution and wishes to promote a
casteless society. It is submitted that all human beings are equal at birth and relying on caste and
religion in India only promotes hatred and division amongst people. Further urges that on the basis
of caste and religion, there is disparity in society and which is against 1 of 3 the directive principles
of the Constitution of India and a welfare state. It is argued that as per Article 25 of the Constitution
of India every Indian citizen has a right to practice and propagate a religion of his own choice and a
citizen cannot be forced to follow any particular religion. Under such circumstances it is argued that
the petitioner is vested with the right to be issued a certificate to him in the nature of no caste, no
religion and no God.
Having heard learned counsel at length this Court is of the view that no intervention in the matter is
called for.
Undoubtedly, the freedom of conscience under Article 25 of the Constitution encompasses in itself a
freedom to an individual to take a view that he does not belong to any religion. The freedom
conferred by Article 25 of the Constitution would also include a right of an individual to claim that
he is an 'Atheist'. Just as a freedom of conscience confers a fundamental right to a citizen to
entertain a particular religious belief, it equally confers a right on any other individual/citizen to

express an opinion that he does not belong to any religion.
The petitioner proclaims himself to be an Atheist. As per averments made in the petition he does not
believe in any religion and does not profess any. It is further projected that even though he
otherwise belongs to a Scheduled Caste category, he does not wish to derive any benefit on account
of reservation provided for such scheduled caste category. Such view would be well within the
domain and right of the petitioner. No authority can impose upon the 2 of 3 petitioner to profess any
particular religion or for him to believe in God. Even if he chooses not to do so that would be his
fundamental right. Be that as it may, if the petitioner has chosen a path of an Atheist and not to
believe in any caste, class, there would be no requirement in law for him to be issued a certificate to
such effect. Even if any such certificate had been issued by the Naib Tehsildar concerned and the
same having subsequently been cancelled, it would be of no consequence.
Counsel during the course of arguments has not adverted to any provision in law whereby the
respondent authorities are obligated to issue such a certificate. There are no such averments in such
regard in the petition.
Counsel has not been able to demonstrate before this Court the prejudice, if any, that the petitioner
would suffer on account of non-issuance of certificate of the nature that is prayed for.
No Mandamus as such can be issued to direct the respondent authorities to issue to the petitioner a
certificate of no caste, no religion and no God.
Petition dismissed.
16.09.2019 (TEJINDER SINGH DHINDSA)

dss JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes

Whether reportable No
3 of 3

Re-Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt ... vs Home Secretary And Ors on 23 February, 2012
Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate, specially empowered in this behalf, to
direct any person to abstain from doing a certain act or to take action as directed, where sufficient
ground for proceeding under this Section exists and immediate prevention and/or speedy remedy is
desirable. By virtue of Section 144A Cr.P.C., which itself was introduced by Act 25 of 2005, the
District Magistrate has been empowered to pass an order prohibiting, in any area within the local
limits of his jurisdiction, the carrying of arms in any procession or the organizing or holding of any
mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place, where it is necessary for him to do so for
the preservation of public peace, public safety or maintenance of the public order. Section 144
Cr.P.C, therefore, empowers an executive authority, backed by these provisions, to impose
reasonable restrictions vis-`-vis the fundamental rights. The provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C.
provide for a complete mechanism to be followed by the Magistrate concerned and also specify the
limitation of time till when such an order may remain in force. It also prescribes the circumstances
that are required to be taken into consideration by the said authority while passing an order under
Section 144 Cr.P.C.
37. In Babu Lal Parate (supra) where this Court was concerned with the contention raised on behalf
of the union of workers that the order passed in anticipation by the Magistrate under Section 144
Cr.P.C. was an encroachment on their rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), it was held that the
provisions of the Section, which commit the power in this regard to a Magistrate belonging to any of
the classes referred to therein cannot be regarded as unreasonable. While examining the law in force
in the United States, the Court further held that an anticipatory action of the kind permissible under
Section 144 Cr.P.C. is not impermissible within the ambit of clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19. Public
order has to be maintained at all times, particularly prior to any event and, therefore, it is competent
for the legislature to pass a law permitting the appropriate authority to take anticipatory action or to
place anticipatory restrictions upon particular kind of acts in an emergency for the purpose of
maintaining public order.
38. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate and Ors. [AIR 1971 SC 2481], a
Constitution Bench of this Court took the following view:
"24. The procedure to be followed is next stated. Under Sub-section (2) if time does
not permit or the order cannot be served, it can be made ex parte. Under Sub-section
(3) the order may be directed to a particular individual or to the public generally
when frequenting or visiting a particular place.
Under sub-section (4) the Magistrate may either suo motu or on an application by an aggrieved
person, rescind or alter the order whether his own or by a Magistrate subordinate to him or made by
his predecessor in Office. Under Sub-section (5) where the magistrate is moved by a person
aggrieved he must hear him so that he may show cause against the order and if the Magistrate
rejects wholly or in part the application, he must record his reasons in writing. This sub-section is
mandatory. An order by the Magistrate does not remain in force after two months from the making
thereof but the State Government may, however, extend the period by a notification in the Gazette
but, only in cases of danger to human life, health or safety or where there is a likelihood of a riot or
an affray. But the second portion of the sub-section was declared violative of Article 19 in State of

Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras on 26 May, 1950
part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross Roads an English weekly published at Bombay."
The petitioner claims that the said order contravenes the fundamental right of the petitioner to
freedom of See the headnote to Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, p. 605 infra.
speech and expression conferred on him by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges
the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right aforesaid. The
Advocate-General of Madras appearing on be half of the respondents raised a preliminary objection,
not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32, but to the
petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first instance. He contended that, as
a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High Court at Madras which
under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He cited
criminal revision petitions under section 435 of the Crimi- nal Procedure Code, applications for bail
and applications for transfer under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code as instances where,
concurrent jurisdiction having been given in certain matters to the High Court and the Court of a
lower grade, a rule of practice has been established that a party should proceed first to the latter
Court for relief before resorting to the High Court. He referred to Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad
Sinha (1) where such a rule of practice was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our
attention also to certain American decisions Urquhart v. Brown (2) and Hooney v. Kolohan (3) as
showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial
remedies remained open to the appli- cant in Federal and State Courts should be exhausted before
the remedy in the Supreme Court---be it habeas corpus or certiorari-- would be allowed. We are of
opinion that neither the instances mentioned by the learned Advocate General nor the American
decisions referred to by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of the Indian
Constitution. That article does not merely confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the (1)
I.L.R. 56 All. 158. (2) 205 U. S. 179. (3) 294 U.S. 103.
High Courts, to issue certain writs for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any
other purpose, as part of its general jurisdiction. In that case it would have been more appropriately
placed among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction. Article 32 provides a "guaranteed"
remedy for the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental
right by being included in Part 1II. This Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of
fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to
entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights. No similar provision
is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the American
decisions are in point. Turning now to the merits, there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and
expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom
of circulation. "Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication.
Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value ": Ex parte Jackson(1). See also
LoveIl v. City of Griffin(s). It is therefore perfectly clear that the order of the Gov- ernment of
Madras would be a violation of the petitioner's fundamental right under article 19 (1) (a), unless
section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act under which it was made is saved by the reservations mentioned
in clause (2) of article 19 which (omitting immaterial words regarding laws relating to libel, slander,

S.R. Bommai vs Union Of India on 11 March, 1994
Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 during the last 41 years of the Republic, that is up to
1991, indicates the frequency of user of Article 356(1). It appears from the summary table given in
the tabular form (Appendix IV) that on 82 occasions the President's Rule in States have been
imposed by invoking or resorting to Article 356(1) and on 13 occasions the President's Rule have
been imposed in Union Territories including erstwhile Union Territories which have become States
under Section 51 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. All total up to 95 times, of which
on 23 occasions the assemblies were dissolved on the advice of the Chief Ministers/or due to their
resignations. It may be recalled that on 18 occasions the assemblies suspended were subsequently
revived. The above statistics does not include the Proclamations which are presently under
challenge before us. We may hasten to add that the Proclamations were made on different occasions
on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the Central Government belonging to different political
complexions. Some of the States, dissolved valiantly fought, honorably bled and pathetically lost
their legal battle.
8. Since my learned brothers have elaborately dealt with the constitutional provisions relating to the
issue of the Proclamation and as I am in agreement with the reasoning given by B.P. Jeevan Reddy,
J., it is not necessary for me to make further discussion on this matter except saying that I am of the
firm opinion that the power under Article 356 should be used very sparingly and only when
President is fully satisfied that a situation has arisen where the Government of the State cannot be
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, the frequent use of this
power and its exercise are likely to disturb the constitutional balance. Further if the Proclamation is
freely made, then the Chief Minister of every State who has to discharge his constitutional functions
will be in perpetual fear of the axe of Proclamation falling on him because he will not be sure
whether he will remain in power or not and consequently he has to stand up every time from his seat
without properly discharging his constitutional obligations and achieving the desired target in the
interest of the State.
9. All the matters are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
AHMADI, J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the views expressed by my esteemed colleagues
P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ. and while I am largely in agreement with
the 'conclusions' recorded by K. Ramaswamy, J., I would like to briefly indicate the area of my
agreement.
11. In a country geographically vast, inhabited by over 850 million people belonging to different
religions, castes and creeds, majority of them living in villages under different social orders and in
abject poverty, with a constant tug of war between the organised and the unorganised sectors, It is
not Surprising that problems crop up time and again requiring strong and at times drastic State
action to preserve the unity and integrity of the country. Notwithstanding- these problems arising
from time to time on account of class conflicts, religious intolerance and socioeconomic imbalances,
the fact remains that India has a reasonably stable democracy. The resilience of our Republic to face
these challenges one after another has proved the peoples' faith in the political philosophy of
socialism, secularism and democracy enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution. Yet, the fact
remains that the nation has had from time to time with increasing frequency to combat upheavals

Santokh Singh vs Delhi Administration on 20 February, 1973
considered in each case in the light of the nature of the right infringed, the purpose of the
restriction, the extent and the nature of the mischief required to be suppressed 'and the prevailing
social and other conditions at the time. There can be no abstract standard or general pattern of
reasonableness. Our Constitution provides reasonably precise, 'general guidance in this matter. It
would thus be misleading to construe it in the light of American decisions given in different context.
(Section 9 of the Act is, in, our view, plainly within the legislative competence of the Punjab
Legislature and it would be for the court in which the appellant is being tried to decide as to how far
the appellant's speech is covered by this section. Shri Agarwal made a strenuous effort to persuade
us to construe the offending portion of the speech as reproduced in the judgment of the High Court
and express our opinion whether- or not the charge against him has been lawfully framed. The
charge reads as under :
"That you, on or about the 9th day of October, 1968 at 4.30 to 5.55 p.m. near the
Railway Pathak- in the area of Delhi Cantt. made a speech at a public meeting
organised by Delhi Defence employees in which you (1) [1959] S.C.R. 12.
demanded or caused incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State

or the maintenance of public order and therein committed an offence punishable I
under section 9 of the P.S. Act and within my cognizance."
The appellant, it may be pointed out, had approached the sessions Court on revision to have this
charge quashed. That court apparently did not agree with the appellant. He then approached the
High Court on revision where also he failed. The impugned judgment of the High Court does not
show any serious legal infirmity resulting in failure, of justice which should induce this Court to
interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The submission that.at this Court has already granted
special leave we: must decide the question of the legality of the charge on the merits has not
appealed to us. Even at the final hearing of an appeal by special leave this Court has to apply the
same test which is attracted at the preliminary stage, when the leave to appeal is asked for. After
leave the scope of the appeal is not enlarged and even at that stage the appellant cannot as of right
claim adjudication on the merits 'if this Court feels that there is no grave injustice done to the
appellant as a result of any serious legal, infirmity. We are unable find any such infirmity in the
impugned judgment. The additional factor against our interference in this case in the interlocutory
character of the order sought to be quashed. We have, however, no doubt that the learned
Magistrate trying the appellant's case will deal with all the points raised before him oil the merits
with,out being, influenced by the tentative view expressed by the High Court which the appellant
himself invited. We also hope that this case which relates to a speech said to have been delivered in
October, 1968 and in, which the prosecution was initiated as far back as January, 1969 when the
charge was put into court, would be disposed of with due dispatch and without avoidable delay. This
appeal fails and is dismissed.
S.B.W. Appeal dismissed.

Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The immediate cause for
concern in these petitions is Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. This Section
was not in the Act as originally enacted, but came into force by virtue of an Amendment Act of 2009
with effect from 27.10.2009. Since all the arguments raised by several counsel for the petitioners
deal with the unconstitutionality of this Section it is set out hereinbelow:
"66-A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.-Any person
who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance,
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will,
persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or
inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such
messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
with fine.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message"
means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer
system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio,
video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message."[1]
2. A related challenge is also made to Section 69A introduced by the same amendment which reads
as follows:-
"69-A. Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any
computer resource.-(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised by
it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty
and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or
public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to
above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by
order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or
cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored
or hosted in any computer resource.
(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be
carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be
punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable
to fine."

Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & ... on 28 March, 1958
a law will cover all matters which may properly be regarded as ancillary to such inquiries. The words
" for the purposes of " indicate that the scope of the inquiry is not necessarily limited to the
particular or specific matters enumerated in any of the entries in the list concerned but may extend
to inquiries into collateral matters which may be necessary for the purpose, legislative or otherwise,
of those particular matters. We are unable, therefore,to hold that the Inquiry which may be set up by
a law made under these two entries is, in its scope or ambit, limited to future legislative purposes
only.
Learned counsel then takes us through the different heads of inquiry enumerated in the notification
and urges that the inquiry is neither for any legislative nor for any administrative purpose, but is a
clear usurpation of the functions of the judiciary. The argument is that Parliament in authorising the
appointment of a Commission and the Government in appointing this Commission have arrogated
to themselves judicial powers which do not, in the very nature of things, belong to their respective
domains which must be purely legislative and executive respectively. It is contended that Parliament
cannot convert itself into a court except for the rare cases of dealing with breaches of its own
privileges for which it may punish the delinquent by committal for contempt or of proceedings by
way of impeachment. It cannot, it is urged, undertake to inquire or investigate into alleged
individual wrongs or private disputes nor can it bring the supposed culprit to book or gather
materials for the purpose of initiating proceedings, civil or criminal, against him, because such
inquiry or investigation is clearly not in aid of legislation. It is argued that if a criminal prosecution
is to be launched, the preliminary investigation must be held under the Code of Criminal Procedure
and it should not be open to any legislature to start investigation on its own and thereby to deprive
the citizen of the normal protection afforded to him by the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. This line of reasoning also found favour with the High Court which, after considering the
provisions of the Act and the eleven heads of inquiry enumerated in the notification, came to the
conclusion that the last portion of el. (10) beginning with the words " and the action " and ending
with the words ',in future cases" were ultra vires the Act and that the Government was not
competent to require the Commission to hold any inquiry or make any report with regard to the
matters covered by that portion of cl. (10), for such inquiry or. report amounts to a usurpation of the
judicial powers of the Union or the State as the case may be.
While we find ourselves in partial agreement with the actual conclusion of the High Court on this
point, we are, with great respect, unable to accept the line of reasoning advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioners, which has been accepted by the High Court for more reasons than one. In the
first place neither Parliament nor the Government has itself undertaken any inquiry at all.
Parliament has made a law with respect to inquiry and has left it to the appropriate Government to
set up a Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in s. 3 of the Act. The
Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this
Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has
undertaken to hold any inquiry. In the second place the conclusion that the last portion of cl. (10) is
bad because it signifies that Parliament or the Government had usurped the functions of the
judiciary appears to us, with respect, to be inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in a later part
of the judgment that as the Commission can only make recommendations which are not enforceable
proprio vigore there can be no question of usurpation of judicial functions. As has been stated by the

Silver Cloud Tea Factory And ... vs Union Of India And Another on 21 December, 1993
Government. There has been excessive delegation in this respect. The esgislative subject is
distribution of the produce of controlled commodity. In the matter of distribution of such
commodity S. 30(1) and (2) relate to fixation of price. Sub-section (3) of Section 30 relates to
prohibition of disposal of the product and direction to dispose of the product and direction to
disposet of product in a particular manner respectively. There is absolute prohibition and also an
absolute direction contemplated therein. But such absolute prohibition and direction will come into
play in certain 'circumstances under certain conditions. The language of Section 30(3) is clear in this
behalf. Certain circumstances and conditions contemplated therein are left undefined to be
legislated upon. This is an essential legislative function which cannot be delegated. In this
submission Section 30 of the Tea Act 29 of 1953 and in particular S. 30(3), (a)(b) and (c) suffer from
excessive delegation and are therefore void. Even otherwise S. 30 suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness. S. 30(3) contemplates the prohibition of the disposal of the product of a controlled
industry. It also contemplates to a direction to dispose of such product to a person or a class of
persons. Such prohibition and the direction could however come into operation only under certain
circumstances and under certain conditions. The prohibition is contemplated to be absolute under
certain circumstances. Similarly, the direction to dispose of the produce in a particular manner is
also absolute under certain circumstances. But the law as re-
gards what are the circumstances is left in-definitely and vague and is liable to be used in an
4. In writ petition 1443 of 1986, the 1st appellant challenged the validity of the Control Ord
reasons :
(a) Clause 17 of the Control Order provides that every registered manufacturer in the States of
Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala shall sell not less than 70% or such higher percentage
as may be specified from time to time by the Board, of tea manufactured by him in a year through
public tea auctions in India, held under the Control Order or suspices of organisers of tea auction
licenced to do so under the provisions of Order. The proviso to clause 17 enables the registering
authority second respondent to relax any of the provisions of the Order. The provision in clause 17
that every registered manufacturer shall sell 70% of his produce at the public auction contains a
prohibition that no manufacturer shall sell 70% (now 75%) of his produce otherwise than at the
public auction. The balance of 25% does not take away the effect of the prohibition contained under
clause 17. The right of a manufacturer to deal with his goods in a manner conducive to public
interest outside the public auction has been hit at and the manufacturer's right so to do is deprived
of. This provision in clause 17 is in excess of the power delegated to the Government under Section
30(3) of the Act.
(b) Under Section 30(3)(a) of the Act, the direction has to be issued in such circumstances and
under such conditions as may be prescribed in the order. The order is silent about such
circumstances and also the conditions under which such prohibition should operate. What is
contemplated under Section 30(3)(a) is a situation which is abnormal and transient in nature and
not perpetual. What is sought to be done under the Control Order is not for a temporary period but

St. Stephen'S College vs University Of Delhi on 6 December, 1991
follows Zones North : Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab Haryana, Rajasthan, Bihar,
Bengal and Delhi 40 per centSouth : Orissa, Andhra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka Pondicherry,
Goa, Andaman and Nicobar 30 per cent West : Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh 10 per cent
North West : Assam, Arunachal, Mizoram Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura and Sikkim 20
per cent (2) Scheduled Caste students who qualify the Entrance Test and old students will be
adjusted in each of the respective quota and zones first (3) In each of the categories only those who
have qualified in the entrance test will be considered and admitted strictly in order of merit within
each list (4) Disciplinary action - Any student who was a disciplinary action taken against him/her
will not be admitted to any course in this Institute (5) Not less than 25 per cent of the enrollment
shall be women students."
15. The students who have been denied admission by this Institute filed writ petitions under Article
226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court challenging the reservation and admission of
Church sponsored Christian students. The High Court has allowed the writ petitions declaring that
the policy of reservation for Christian students is contrary to the equality guaranteed to citizens
under Article 29(2) of the Constitution
16. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the Institute be obtaining certificate under
Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution has preferred Civil Appeal Nos. 1831-41 of 1989. Civil Appeal
Nos. 1786 of 1989 and 2829 of 1989 are by some of the students. They are connected appeals against
the same judgment of the Allahabad High Court Question of Law
17. A great many questions were debated before us in the course of hearing. The important issues
can be grouped under three main heads First : Whether St. Stephen's College is a minority - run
institution ?Second : Whether St. Stephen's College as minority institution is bound by the
University circulars dated June 5, 1980 and June 9, 1980 directing that the College shall admit
students on the basis of merit of the percentage of marks secured by the students in the qualifying
examinations ?
Third : Whether St. Stephen's College and the Allahabad Agricultural Institute are entitled to accord
preference to or reserve seats for students of their own community and whether such preference or
reservation would be invalid under Article 29(2) of the Constitution ?
18. The first two questions are relevant only to St. Stephen's College and they do not arise in the case
of Allahabad agricultural Institute since there is no dispute as to the minority character of that
Institute. There is also no grievance by the U.P. University with the procedure of selection of
candidates followed by the Instituted. The third question, of course, is relevant to common problems
of both the institutions
19. We may take up these questions in turn, but before doing so, we may briefly refer to some of the
cases where similar problem came up for consideration
20. In State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society ( 1955 (1) SCR 568 : 1954 AIR(SC) 561) the
concerned school known as Bernes High School at Deolali in Nasik District in the State of Bombay

State Of Bihar And Ors. vs Oswal Chemicals And Fertilizers ... on 12 April, 2001
nature of evil that was sought to be remedied by such law. The ratio of the harm caused to individual
dtizen by the proposed remedy to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general
public. It will also be necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint caused by the
law is more than was necessary in the interests of the general public.
19. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of
U.P. , wherein it has been held that the fundamental right to carry on trade and business guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(g) must yield to the common good. The Court must balance the individual's
rights of freedom of trade and the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce as against the
national interest and a reasonable restriction can be imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right.
The test of reasonable restriction should be applied to each individual Statute and no abstract
standard, or a general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable in all cases. The
restriction which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of
reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed under Article
19(1)(g) and the social control permitted under Clause (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting
in that quality, however, such restrictions or social must be made by law or order having a statutory
force and not by a mere executive or departmental instructions (See Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of
Kerala, ).
20. Thus, the fundamental right of trade and business is not absolute and the law permits a social
control under Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. However, such restrictions should be
reasonable and in public interest and to decide the question as to whether the particular Statute is
reasonable or not relevant factors; such as evil sought to be remedied, the benefit available to the
public and other relevant factors have to be considered.
21. The law is well settled by catena of judgments of the Apex Court that restrictions to the freedom
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution must be by a law or order having statutory force and
not by executive instructions.
22. The first question for consideration is as to whether directions contained in the letter dated
17-12-1998 are the directions issued under Section 3 of the Act or not? Nothing has been brought on
behalf of the appellant-State to show that the Central Government by a notified order has delegated
the power to the Director of Agriculture or the Registering Authority to issue any direction under the
Control Order. In that view of the matter, the said directions cannot be said to have been issued
under the Act. In absence of any delegation, the Registering authority has no power to issue any
such directions under Section 3 of the Act.
23. Next question for consideration is as to whether the Registering authority has power under the
Control Order to issue any such order or not? Under the Control Order, the Registering authority
has power to grant or refuse Certificate of Registration in Form 'B' and the terms and conditions of
Form 'B' have already been enumerated above. The Registering authority power to suspend and
cancel the Certificate of Registration on two grounds as mentioned above. The relevant ground for
the purpose of this case is Clause 31 (1 )(b) of the Control Order, which provides that the registration
may be cancelled on the ground of contravention or non-fulfillment of any of the provisions of the

State Of Karnataka vs B. Padmanabha Beliya And Others on 28 February, 1991
the mob refused to disperse, the order to fire may be given. If the officer in command of the party is
of the opinion that it will suffice if only one or two files fire, he will give orders accordingly,
specifying the files that are to fire. Under no circumstance should a warning shot be fired in the air,
nor should the fire be directed over the heads of the crowd. Aim should be kept low and directed
against the most threatening part of the crowd. The Police Officer below the rank of a Station House
Officer has no power to disperse an assembly himself, but he may arrest any person without warrant
for being a member of the unlawful assembly. Riot flags should be taken when Armed Reserve are
called out in apprehension of disturbances and, before firing or any other means of dispersal is
resorted to, should be hoisted before the mob in a position in which the inscriptions on them are
clearly visible.
12. These are some of the salutary instructions given to the police officers and men who are called
upon to control riotous mobs and to disperse them. Section 129 of the Cr.P.C. makes it amply clear
that only an Executive Magistrate or Officer in charge of a Police Station or in the absence of such
Officer in charge, any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector has the power to
command an unlawful assembly to disperse, it is clear from these various safeguards against
reckless use of force that officers with some responsibility should command use of force including
one of firing to disperse an unlawful assembly. Though the second defendant swears that he was
present at the spot, he has clearly stated that he never gave orders for firing. To that extent he clearly
abdicated his responsibility if at all there was necessity to open fire. It may also be that when he did
not order firing, circumstances did not warrant opening of fire at all. Similarly, though a large
number of witnesses for the appellant have deposed about the presence of the Executive Magistrate,
the Executive Magistrate himself did not issue any orders for firing perhaps for the same reason that
such an extreme course was not called for under the circumstances. Therefore, the conclusion that
emerges from the omission on the part of these two responsible officers to issue orders for firing is
either that they did not think it necessary that firing should be resorted to or they were not present
at all to issue necessary orders for the dispersal of the unlawful assembly. In either case, it is
patently clear that opening of fire only by the D.A.R. police was not in obedience of any lawful orders
given by the competent police officers or the Executive Magistrate.
13. This takes us to the most material point, viz., whether this act could be considered as an "act of
State" meaning thereby an "act referable to the delegation of the sovereign power of the State." The
trial Court has referred to the two decisions cited on behalf of the appellant in this behalf and
distinguished the facts of those cases with the facts of the instant case. The case of State v. Dattamal,
has a direct bearing inasmuch as that was also a case of loss of life and property as a result of police
firing ordered to quell riots. As rightly observed by the trial Court, the evidence clearly showed that
the District Magistrate was personally present at the spot and took decision to order firing and
accordingly, firing was done by the police. However, in so doing, it was found that the police
exceeded the limit in firing in another direction and also in addition to the direction in which the
firing was ordered, it was held that though the men who opened fire exceeded the limit, that was in
exercise of the sovereign power of the State, because the firing was ordered by the District
Magistrate who had the power to order firing. Similarly, in the case of State v. Chironji Lal, , Section
30 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Act, 1961, came up for consideration before the High Court and
Section 30 authorised the policemen to regulate the procession and it was held that the loss caused

The Kerala Public Service ... vs State Information Commission on 9 March, 2011
Judgment "CR"
Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan, J.
1.These writ petitions raise the question of applicability of the Right to Information Act, 2005,
hereinafter referred to as the "RTI Act" to the Kerala Public Service Commission, hereinafter, "PSC",
for short. These matters are referred to the Division Bench noticing an apparent conflict between the
decisions of this Court in Public Information Officer, University of Calicut and another v. State
Information Commission[2010(1) KHC 2], for short, "UNICAL", and Treesa Irish v. Central Public
Information Officer[2010(3) KLT 965], "TREESA", for short.
2.The PSC challenges different decisions of the State Information Commission, "SIC", for short,
overruling its stand that information with the PSC cannot be accessed under the RTI Act and that
the answer scripts, marks awarded, including interview marks and other details touching the
process of examination and interview cannot be made available, except to the extent provisions are
made for such access by the regulations and decisions of the PSC.
3.In support of the writ petitions, Adv. Alexander Thomas, the learned standing counsel for the PSC
argued that the substantive source of the right to information is the constitutional provision in
Article 19(1)(a) and hence, what is not available as part of that right cannot be treated as available
under the RTI Act. He argued that RTI Act applies only to the extent of the concept of "information"
as deducible from Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and not beyond. He, therefore, said that if a
particular information would fall beyond the pale of Article 19(1)(a), the same would not be
accessible under the RTI Act. Making reference to the decisions of this Court in Thalapalam Service
Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Union of India[2009(2) KLT 507] (Thalapalam I), Thalapalam Service
Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Union of India[2009(3) KLT 1001] (Thalapalam II) and S.N.College v.
State of Kerala[2010(1) KLT 691](S.N.College), it was argued that it has been held in those cases that
the concept of information under RTI Act is with reference to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. He
accordingly argued that beyond that, the provisions of the RTI Act cannot be extended. He said that
this restrictive approach has to be applied since it has been held by the Apex Court in Maharashtra
State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar
Sheth[(1984)4 SCC 27], hereinafter, Paritosh, that in terms of the Constitution, there is no right to
information, including as regards answer scripts. He said that the law laid by the Apex Court in that
regard is also that if such right is recognized, it would lead to acceding to a further right to demand
revaluation and such situation would necessarily lead to uncertainty, lack of finality and
administrative inconvenience to the examining bodies. He also pointed out that even in terms of the
Constitution, principles of secrecy and public interest immunity would stand to advise that
information in relation to PSC, in particular, matters relating to examinations, ought not to be
released as information, invoking the provisions of the RTI Act. He also made reference to Secy.,
W.B.Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das[(2007)8 SCC 242], Pramod Kumar
Srivastava v. Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission[(2004)6 SCC 714], Board of Secondary
Education v. Pravas Ranjan Panda[(2004) 13 SCC 383], H.P.Public Service Commission v Mukesh
Thakur[(2010)6 SCC 759], Sidhik v. State of Kerala[2010(1) KLT 113] and the decision of the Apex
Court in Kerala Public Service Commission v. Narayanan Kunchumbidukka [Civil Appeal No.461 of

The State Of Gujarat And Another vs Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., ... on 26 March, 1974
article. 19 should remain operative even after the Constitution came into. force as regards
non-citizens and a post-Constitution law which takes away or abridges them should not be operative
as respects noncitizens. The fact that pre-Constitution law was valid when enacted can afford no
reason why it should remain operative as respects noncitizens after the Constitution came into force
as it became void on account of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part 111. Therefore, the real
reason why it remains operative as against non- citizens is that it is void only to the extent of its
inconsistency with the rights conferred under Article 19 and that its voidness is, therefore, confined
to citizens, as, ex hypothesis the law became inconsistent with their fundamental rights alone. If that
be so, we see no reason why a post-Constitution law which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by article 19 should not be operative in regard to non-citizens as it is void only to the
extent of the contravention of the rights conferred on citizens, namely, those under article 19.
Article 13(2) is an injunction to the 'state' not to pass any law which takes away or abridges the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III and the consequence of the contravention of the injunction
is that the law would be void to the extent of the contravention. The expression 'to the extent of the
contravention' in the sub-article can only mean, to the extent of the contravention of the rights
conferred under that part. Rights do not exist in vacuum. They must always inhere in some person
whether natural or juridical and, under Part It, they inhere even in fluctuating bodies like a
linguistic or religious minorities or denominations. And, when the sub-article says that the law
would be void "to the extent of the contravention", it can only mean to the extent of the
contravention of the rights conferred on persons, minorities or denominations, as the case may be.
Just as a pre-Constitution law taking away or abridging the fundamental rights under article 19
remains operative after the Constitution came into force as respects non-citizens as it is not
inconsistent with their fundamental rights, so also a post-Constitution law offending article 19,
remains operative as against non- citizens as it is not in contravention of any of their fundamental
rights. The same scheme permeates both,, the sub-articles, namely, to make the law void in article
13(1) to the extent of the inconsistency with the fundamental rights, and in article 13(2) to the extent
of the contravention of those rights. In other words, the voidness is not in rem but to the extent only
of inconsistency or contravention, as the case may be of the rights conferred under Part 111.
Therefore, when article 13(2) uses the expression 'void', it can only mean, void as against persons
whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law. The law might be 'still-born' so far as
the persons, entities or denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged, but
there is no reason why the law should be void or 'still-born' as against those who have no
fundamental rights.
It is said that the expression "to the extent of the contravention" in the article means that the part of
the law which contravenes the fundamental right would alone be void and not the other parts which
do not so contravene. In other words, the argument was that the expression is intended to denote
only the part of the law that would become void and not to show that the law will be void only as
regards the persons or entities whose fundamental rights have been taken away or abridged.
The first part of the sub-article speaks of 'any law' and the second part refers to the same law by
using the same expression, namely, ,any law'. We think that the expression 'any law' occurring in the
latter part of the sub-article must necessarily refer to the same expression in the former part and

The State Of West Bengal vs Anwar All Sarkarhabib ... on 11 January, 1952
prove that, in making the law, the legislature was actuated

by a hostile or inimical intention against a particular
person or class ; nor would the operation of Art. 14 be
excluded merely because it is proved that the legislature
had no intention to discriminate, though discrimination was
the necessary consequence of the Act. The question of
intention may arise in ascertaining whether an officer acted
mala fide or not; but it cannot arise when discrimination
follows or arises on the express terms of the law itself.
(iii) The language of sec. 5 (1) clearly and unambigu-
ously vests the State Government with unrestricted discre-
tion to direct any cases or class of cases to be tried by
the Special Court, not a discretion to refer cases only when
it is of opinion that a speedier trial is necessary
286
(iv) Assuming that the preamble throws any light on the
section, the necessity of speedier trial is too vague,
uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a rational basis
for discrimination.
(v) It cannot be said that an Act does not contravene
the equality rule laid down by Art. 14 simply because it
confers unregulated discretion on officers or administrative
bodies. The true position is that if the statute itself is
not discriminatory the charge of Violation of the article
may be only against the official who administers it, but if
the statute itself makes a discrimination without any proper
or reasonable basis, it would be void for being in conflict
with Art. 14.
(vi) The notification issued under the Act in the
present case would also come within the definition of
law and could be impeached apart from the Act if it violates
Art. 14.
DAS J.--(1) Article 14 does not insist that every piece
of legislation must have universal application and it does
not take away from the State the power to classify persons
for the purposes of legislation, but the classification must
be rational, and in order to satisfy this test (i) the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differen-
tia which distinguished those that are grouped together from
others, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The
differentia which is the basis of the classification and the
object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary
is that there must be a nexus between them. But the mere
fact that the inequality has not been made with the special
intention of prejudicing a particular person or persons but
in the general interest of administration will not validate
a law if in fact it results in inequality of treatment. Nor
can the constitutionality of a statute depend on the degree
of the inequality brought about by the law.
(2) Although the preamble to an Act cannot override the
plain meaning of its operative parts, it may nevertheless
assist in ascertaining what the true meaning or implication

U.P. State Co-Operative Land ... vs Chandra Bhan Dubey And Ors on 18 December, 1998
grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of
Government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction
defeats the purpose of the article itself."
The Court also noted the observations of this Court in Praga Tools Corporation vs. Sh. C.A. Imanual
[(1969) 1 SCC 585} as under :
"It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is
imposed need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an
official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statutes under or by which the society
is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them
by the statutes authorising their undertakings. A mandamus would also lie against a company
constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities. (Cf. Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edn., Vol. II, p. 52 and onwards).
The Court then said :
"The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the
term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights as
well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority used in Article 226 are,
therefore, used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and
instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The
form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty
imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the
person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive
obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied."
And finally it said as under :
"Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be
enforce is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De
Smith states : "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one
imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law,
custom or even contract." We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of
bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should
remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide
remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found". Technicalities should
not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention
urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition."
In Air India Statutory Corporation and others vs. United Labour Union and others (1997 (9) SCC
377) this Court Speaking through a Bench of three Judges said : "The public law remedy given by
Article 226 of the Constitution is to issue not only the prerogative writs provided therein but also
any order or direction to enforce any of the fundamental rights and "for any other purpose". The

Union Of India (Uoi) (Central ... vs Students Islamic Movement Of ... on 26 March, 2002
peace and communal harmony. As pert of their anti-India propaganda SIMI has also published a
calender containing distorted and misleading historical facts about the accession of Kashmir to
India and giving an impression that Kashmiri Muslims had been suppressed and exploited for long.
SIMI has procured audio cassettes containing the speech of Mohd. Masood Azhar
(Harkat-ul-Mujahideen), who was released in exchange for the hostages of the Indian Airlines
plance, in which Azhar exhorted Muslims for "Jehad" till Kashmir is liberated. It is inter alia stated
that in the State of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, West
Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi more than 100 cases have been registered
against members of SIMI under various Sections of IPC/Cr.P.C. The reasons for banning SIMI with
immediate effect are given as under:-
(a) SIMI is in close touch with militant outfits and is supporting extremism/militancy in Punjab,
Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere;
(b) SIMI supports claims for the secession of a part of the Indian territory from the Union, supports
groups fighting for this purpose, and is thus questioning the territorial integrity of India;
(c) SIMI is working for an International Islamic Order;
(d) During Ikhwan conferences, the anti-national and militant postures of the SIMI were clearly
manifest in the speeches of the leaders who glorified Pan Islamic Fundamentalism, used derogatory
language for deities of other religions and exhorted Muslims for Jehad;
(e) SIMI has published objectionable posters and literature which are calculated to incite communal
feelings and which question the territorial integrity of India;
(f) SIMI is involved in engineering communal riots and disruptive activities in various parts of the
country;
9. Respondent No. 1-SIMI, in their reply, have denied the allegations stating that these are mala
fide, illegal, unsustainable and without jurisdiction. It is claimed that SIMI organisation was
founded on April 25, 1977 in Aligarh by educated and enlightened citizens of India. It is a Deeni
(religious) secular organization and its activities are apolitical and non-communal besides being
spiritual and religious. It believes in unity of God and unity of humankind. Till its ban, SIMI was
connected only with lawful activities. The primary objective/aim of SIMI is to guide the mankind
and to provide a practical example of putting God's guidance into practice and reconstruction of
human life according to the guidance given by God. It believes in unity of God and unity of Human
kind. Its main function is upliftment of mankind and service of human beings by carrying out social
service and by helping those affected during natural or man made calamities, without distinguishing
people on the basis of religion, caste, creed or sex. It has its own written constitution and till its ban
it was carrying on only lawful activities which were in consonance with its aims and objectives.
10. It is pleaded that SIMI is an absolutely lawful and patriotic association working for the
betterment of the lives of the people, development of the society, unity, peace and prosperity and

Union Of India And Ors vs Motion Picture Association And ... on 15 July, 1999
In Neal R Wooley, etc. v. George Maynard, [1977] 430 US 70S, the United States Supreme Court
considered a New Hampshire state (aw which compelled the state motto "Live Free or Die," to be
embossed on car licence plates. A follower of Jehovah's Witnesses objected to carrying the motto on
his car licence plate, the Court held that the state's requirement that non- commercial vehicles
licence plates be embossed with the state motto invaded First Amendment rights and could not be
justified as facilitating the identification of passenger vehicles or as promoting an appreciation of
history, individualism, arid state pride. In the more recent case of Turner Broadcasting system, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission, [1997] 512 US 622, the US Supreme Court examined
Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer protection and Competition Act of 1992 which
required cable operators to carry the signals of specified numbers based on cable system size of local
commercial television stations and local non- commercial educational television stations. On the
basis of the material brought on record after remand, the majority came to the conclusion that the
"must carry" provisions were consistent with the First Amendment, because the purpose of the
"must carry" provision was to preserve the benefits: of free over-the-air local broadcast television,
promoting widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources and promoting
fair competition in the television programme market. Breyer J. in his partly concurring judgment
balanced the restraints which such a compulsory carriage clause would impose because it would
interfere with the protected interests of the cable operators to choose their own programming,
against an important First Amendment interest in favour of the provision viz. promoting the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources to facilitate public
discussion and informed deliberation. The latter being basic democratic government purposes
which the First Amendment Seeks to achieve, they outweighed objections relating to interference
with the cable operators' right to choose their own programme.
Although the First Amendment right under the U.S. Constitution is not subject to reasonable
restraint as in Article 1.9(2), the raison de'tre of a constitutional guarantee of free speech is the
same. We have to examine whether the purpose of compulsory speech in the impugned provisions is
to promote the fundamental freedom of speech and expression and dissemination of ideas, or
whether it is to restrain this freedom, the social context of any such legislation cannot be ignored.
When a substantially significant population body is illiterate or does not have easy access to ideas or
information, it is important that all available means of communication, particularly audiovisual
communication, are utilised not just for entertainment but also for education, information,
propagation of scientific ideas and the like. The best way by which ideas can reach this large body of
uneducated people is through the entertainment channel which is watched by all-literate and
illiterate alike; To earmark a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the purpose of
showing scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news films has to be looked at
in this context of promoting dissemination of ideas, information and knowledge to the masses so
that there may be an informed debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned
provisions are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it. None of these
statutory provisions require the exhibitor to show a propaganda film or a film conveying views
which he objects to. In fact, the exhibitors have not raised any objection to the contents of the films
which they are required to show. They, however, contend that one of the important requirements for
upholding such compulsory speech in the United States is that such speech should be
content-neutral. While in the present case, the contents of the compulsory films are specified in the

Virendra vs The State Of Punjab And ... on 6 September, 1957
and New Delhi, whose admitted policy was to support the

"Save Hindi agitation". Two notifications under S. 2(1)(a)
of the impugned Act were issued against the editor, printer
and publisher of the two papers published from Jullundur by
the Home Secretary prohibiting him from printing and
publishing any matter relating to the 'Save Hindi agitation'
in the two papers for a period of two months. Two other
notifications in identical terms were issued under s. 3(1)
of the impugned Act against the other petitioner, the
editor, printer and publisher of the two papers in New Delhi
prohibiting him from bringing into the Punjab the newspapers
printed and published in. New Delhi from the date of the
publication of the notifications. Unlike S. 2(1) of the
impugned Act which provided a time-limit for the operation
of an order made thereunder as also for a representation to
be made by the aggrieved person, s. 3 of the Act made no
such provision. It was contended on behalf of the
petitioners that both the sections were ultra vires the
State Legislature inasmuch as they infringed Arts. 19(1)(a)
and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and were not saved by Arts.
19(2) and 19(6) of the Constitution. It was urged that the
sections imposed not merely restrictions but a total
prohibition against the exercise of the said fundamental
rights by prohibiting the publication of all matters
relating to the 'Save Hindi agitation' under S. 2(1)(a) and
by a complete prohibition of the entry of the two papers
into the whole of the Punjab under s. 3(1) of the Act, that
even supposing
309
that the sections merely imposed restrictions and not a
total prohibition, the restrictions were not reasonable,
that the sections gave unfettered and uncontrolled
discretion to the State Government and its delegate, that
the Act did not provide for any safeguard against an abuse
of the power, that the language of the sections being wide
enough to cover restrictions both within and cutside the
limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action
they were ultra vires the Constitution and that the
notification under S. 2(1)(a) of the Act as made would
prevent even the publication of anything against the 'Save
Hindi agitation' and should have been restricted to such
matters alone as were likely to prejudicially affect the
public order.
Held, that the restrictions imposed by S. 2(1)(a) of the
impugned Act were reasonable restrictions within the meaning
of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution and the petition directed
against the notifications issued thereunder must fail, but
since s. 3 Of the Act did not provide for any time limit for
the operation of an order made thereunder nor for a
representation by the aggrieved party to the State
Government, the restrictions imposed by it were not
reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution
and the petition directed against the notifications made

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A.K. Gopalan vs The State Of Madras.Union Of ...

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period of five days. [711 F]

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period of five days. [711 F]

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Andhra High Court

3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh, the

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Explanation 2 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a

Explanation 3 - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the

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(i) need and timing for introduction of new service provider;

(ii) terms and conditions of licence to a service provider;

(iii) revocation of licence for non-compliance of terms and conditions of licence;

(iv) measures to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in the operation of

(v) technological improvements in the services provided by the service providers;

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imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the said

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Supreme Court of India

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/08/2004

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regard to all pensioners.

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11. Hence, the present petition.

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Explanation II - In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as

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is inhibited by Article may be total or partially neither

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT SRINAGAR

Honble Mr. Justice Hasnain Massodi, Judge

Heard, perused and considered.

The Detention Order is liable to be quashed for the following reasons:-

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

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Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.:

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on the basis of an appraisal of the material placed by the sponsoring authority.

17. The court observed:-

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on the basis of an appraisal of the material placed by the sponsoring authority.

17. The court observed:-

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This certificate is valid for a period of one year.

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