IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.

MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

A.M. No. 88-7-1861, 5, October, 1988, EN BANC, (Padilla, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Administrative functions are those which involve regulation and control

over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the

promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the

legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative by the organic law of

its existence.

FACTS

Judge Manzano wrote a letter before the Supreme Court stating that the

Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte designated him as a member of the Ilocos Norte

Provincial Committee on Justice. He seeks that the SC acknowledge his appointed as

not violative of the Independence of the Judiciary pursuant to Section 12, of Article 8 of

the Constitution and is in no way of abandonment of his duties as an RTC Judge

ISSUE

WON the appointment of Judge Manzano is not a violation of the independence

of the judiciary?

RULING

YES. Pursuant to EO No. 856 creating the Commission on Justice, the aim of its

establishment is to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly of

the poor and indigent through receiving complaints against any apprehending officer

who may have found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties, and to

recommend the revision of the law whenever it is prejudicial to the proper administration

of criminal justice. The designation of Judge Manzano is clearly to make him perform

administrative functions. Pursuant to Section 12, of Article 8 of the Constitution,

members of the SC and other courts shall not be designated to any agency performing

quasi-judicial and administrative functions. Hence, the Supreme Court cannot grant the

request of Judge Manzano.

 IRON STEEL AUTHORITY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CHRISTINA

FERTILIZER CORP.

G.R. No. 102976, 25 October, 1995, THIRD DIVISION, (Feliciano, J.)

FACTS

Petitioner ISA created by PD No. 272, generally, to develop and promote the iron

and steel industry, initially for 5 years and was extended for another 10 in 1979 when it

expired. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) owned subsidiary of the National

Development Corporation—an entity wholly owned by the National Government,

embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of

an integrated steel mill in Iligan City.

Proclamation No. 2239 was issued in 1982, pursuant to the expansion,

withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land in Iligan City, and

reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. The portions of the

aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and

related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), the

Government, in the same year, direct the NSC to negotiate with MCFC, for and on

behalf of the Government. Negotiations failed.

ISSUE

WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the

expiration of ISA’s term

RULING

YES. ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated

with juridical personality. There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as

possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from

that of the government. It appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of

the RP. Other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast

in corporate form, that being said, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,

sometimes with or without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical

personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.

The Court considered ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the

RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full

panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal

personality.”

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties,

and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are

reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other

disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and

functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must

be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the

provisions of the Corporation Code.

 In this case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,

its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded

back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special

statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some

other entity or agency of the Republic. ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in

its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines

pursuant to its authority under PD 272.

The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines

and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties

involved. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be

substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA

having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by

itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT

BANK EMPLOYEES et al.

G.R. No. 120319, 6 October, 1995, EN BANC, (Romero, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms

governmental agency, or instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that either

of them is a means by which government acts, or by which a certain government

act or functioned is performed. The word instrumentality with respect to a state,

contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for

the performance of a state function.

FACTS

During a conference meeting, petitioner and respondent agreed to the

submission of their respective Position Papers. The Voluntary Arbiter received the

position paper only of the respondent. For failure of petitioner to submit its position

paper, the voluntary arbiter resolved the case by stating that petitioner has not adhered

to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ISSUE

WON the remedy of certiorari before the Supreme Court was the appropriate

remedy against the decision of the Voluntary Arbiter?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 9 of BP 129, the Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction

over decisions of instrumentalities. In the case at bar, the Voluntary Arbitrator and it

functions fall within the category of quasi-judicial instrumentality which is within the

contemplation of Section of BP 129. Otherwise stated, the decisions of the Voluntary

Arbitrator is considered a quasi-judicial instrumentality function that falls within the

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Voluntary Arbitrator no less performs a state

function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions of the

Labor Code, and he falls within the contemplation of the term instrumentality in Section

9 of BP 129
 FERNANDEZ v. STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 116418, 7 March, 1995, EN BANC, (Feliciano, J.)

FACTS

The petitioners assail the validity of Resolution 94-3710, issued in 1994, of the

Civil Service Commission and its authority to issue the same. It was signed by both

Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit (“OPIA) and Director of the

Office of the Personnel Relations (OPR) of the Commission.

ISSUE

WON Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-

3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS the OPIA to form the RDO (Research and

Development Office)

RULING

YES. The objectives sought by the Civil Service Commission in enacting

Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as “effect[ing]

changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission’s] operations and improve

delivery of service.” These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary

by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission’s functions

effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field

Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and
its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that they are

mandated to serve.

In the past, its functions had been centralized in the Head Office of the

Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the country

were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon

the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices

and the Field Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country

makes possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central

Office in Metropolitan Manila. It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was

moved by quite legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in

promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner

Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in

Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission’s Regional Office in

Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga.

 ELISEO A. SINON v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al.

G.R. No. 101251, 5 November, 1992, EN BANC, (Campos, Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The purpose of reorganization is that it is a process of restructuring the

bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set up, to make it more viable in

terms of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness and make it more responsive

to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by law. For as long as the CSC

confines itself within the limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the

prerogatives endowed to other authorities, the Court must sustain the

Commission.

FACTS

Petitioner was engaged as a Fisheries Extension Specialist in BFAR while Juana

Banan was the incumbent Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) of the Ministry of Food

and Agriculture. When the reorganization of the MAF into the Department of Agriculture,

an evaluation of employees was conducted. The first list prepared by the Placement

Committee included petitioner as one of those persons who will be appointed as MAO.

Banan filed an appeal before the DARAB against the said list, and in a resolution of the

latter, petitioner’s position was displaced and replaced by Banan.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CSC and was granted. In the appeal of

Banan against the decision of the CSC, the latter’s decision granting petitioner’s appeal

was reversed, thus affirming Banan’s appointment. In the current case, petitioner
argues that CSC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its resolution

and affirmed Banan’s appointment

ISSUE

WON the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its

decision?

RULING

NO. Citing Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656, the Placement Committee

exercised the same duty as the appointing authority itself in the judicious selection and

placement of personnel when the law empowered it to assist the appointing authority.

The same law created the Reorganization Appeals Board where people affected by the

appointment can file an appeal, which is what Banan did. The appointment that

petitioner received was not final as there is a pending appeal filed by Banan, and as

long as it is pending, petitioner cannot claim that the appointment was completed. The

fact that DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committee

only to find that petitioner is not qualified should not be taken as grave abuse of

discretion.
 BLUE BAR COCONUT PHIL. v. TANTUICO

G.R. No. L-47051, 29 July, 1988, EN BANC, (Gutierrez, Jr., J.)

FACTS

In 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a

special of coconut end-user companies—one of which is the petitioner—with respect to

their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collection and the subsidies they had.

As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only

to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman, directed the Chairman, the

Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut

Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them to collect the short levies and

overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should

the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.

ISSUE

WON the respondent COA Chairman was correct in disregarding the two

resolutions of the PCA Governing Board for being ultra vires?

RULING
 This became academic when the then President of the Philippines informed the

OSG that the Governing Board of the PCA would continue to function until the formal

organization of the new Governing Board. Following this ruling, the respondent COA

Chairman reconsidered his earlier stand and allowed the petitioners to get their subsidy

claims which he had earlier refused. In effect, the respondent COA Chairman eventually

acknowledged the validity of the two questioned PCA resolutions. Therefore, the issue

has become moot.

 MAXIMO CALALANG v. A.D. WILLIAMS et al.

G.R. No. 47800, 2 December, 1940, FIRST DIVISION, (Laurel, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make

a law to delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a

power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or

intends to make its own action depend. To deny this, would be to stop the wheels

of the government.

FACTS

Petitioner filed against respondents who are public officers on the basis of the

unconstitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 548. The assailed Act empowers the

respondents as officials of the Department of Public Works to adopt measures to

prohibited animal drawn vehicles to pass through certain roads for one year. Petitioner

argues that such Act is unconstitutional for it amounts to undue delegation of legislative

powers.

ISSUE

WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue

delegation of legislative power?

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548, it does not confer

legislative power upon the respondent public officers. The authority conferred upon
them, which authorized them to promulgate rules and regulations is not what public

policy demands, but merely to carry out the legislative policy down the National

Assembly. The authority delegated to the respondents is the authority to implement the

law created by the legislative branch.

 SOLID HOMES v. PAYAWAL

G.R. No. 84811, 29 August, 1989, FIRST DIVISION, (Cruz, J.)

FACTS

Respondent, a buyer of a certain subdivision lot, sued Solid Homes for failure to

deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes

contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD

957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.

ISSUE

WON NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award

damages

RULING

YES. SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction. In case of conflict

between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates

of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344

the special law. On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is

part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide “claims

involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit

buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.” As a result of

the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more

and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.

Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or

the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative

and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department

of the government. Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be

liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with

the legislative purpose.

 ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS et al. v. ABELARDO SUBIDO

G.R. No. L-26534, 28 November, 1969, EN BANC, (Fernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

If there be adherence to the concept that public office is a public trust, as

there ought to be, the criterion should be what public welfare demands, what

satisfies public interest. For it is axiomatic that public needs could be best

attended to by officials, about whose competency and ability there is no

question. To that overmastering requirement, personal ambition must be of

necessity yield. Discretion, if not plenary at the least sufficient, should thus be

granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the officers

concerned, primarily of department heads.

FACTS

The City of Manila Mayor Villegas picked the petitioners as commanders of the

three Manila police precincts. Respondent Commissioner expressed his disapproval of

the appointment since the petitioners do not occupy the position of Inspector First Class

which would have qualified them for the position. Hence, respondent ordered that they

should be removed from their positions.

ISSUE
 WON the Commissioner is authorized to remove petitioners from their

appointments?

RULING

NO. In Villanueva v. Ballalo, it was held that when the appointee is qualified, the

Commissioner has no choice but to attest to the appointment. In the case at bar, there

is no prescribing that petitioners should be at the rank of inspector first class of first

major in order for their appointment to be valid. Moreover, there is no law that

authorizes the Commissioner from establishing the qualifications of appointees as to

their appointment to a higher position.

 RUPERTO TAULE v. SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS AND GOV. LEANDRO

VERCELES

G.R. No. 90336, 12 August, 1991, EN BANC, (Gancayco, J.)

FACTS

The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,

composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with members,

including Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers, in

1989. The group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its

members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent the Secretary of

Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its

nullification due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. The Secretary

nullifed the election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted

to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local

Government. Taule, contested the decision contending that neither the constitution nor

the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent Secretary over election contests

involving the election of officers of the FABC and that the Constitution provides that it is

the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay

officials. ISSUE

WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the

election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils

RULING

NO. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay

officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the

law, the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with

the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a

certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the

proclamation of the results. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests

over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly

elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their

respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga

barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the

katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own

respective organization.
 JOSE A. ANGARA v. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION

G.R. No. 45081, 15 July, 1936, EN BANC, (Laurel, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an

independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election

turns, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of

partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the

National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations

regarding the manner of conducting said contests

FACTS

In 1935 petitioner and respondents ran as candidates for the position in the

National Assembly in the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner was declared as the winner as

took his oath. In December of 1935, respondent Pedro Ynsua a Motion of Protest before

the Electoral Commission against the proclamation of petitioner. Petitioner then filed a

Motion to Dismiss against Ynsuan pursuant to Resolution No. 8 issued by the National

Assembly which stated that protests against the election should be filed until December

3, and that respondent filed a protest way past the date provided.

The Motion to Dismiss was not granted by the Electoral Commission, hence,

petitioner filed before this Court. Petitioner contends that the Electoral Commission’s

authority is limited only as to the merits of elections while excluding from its jurisdiction

the power to regulate the proceedings of said elections contests which is reserved to

the legislative department.

ISSUE

WON the Electoral Commission has no authority to regulate the proceedings of

said elections?

RULING

NO. Based on the historical background on the creation of the Electoral

Commission, the power over contests relating to elections returns, and qualifications of

its members originally belonged to the legislative branch of the government. The same

authority was transferred to the Electoral Commission, and such transfer implies that

the Electoral Commission has the power to prescribe rules and regulations as to the

time and manner of filing protest. Hence, the resolution of the Electoral Commission

was within its authority, and the resolution of the National Assembly limiting the filing of

any protests against election until December 3, 1935, cannot overrule the possible rules

that the Electoral Commission might file.

The purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent

constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election turns, returns and

qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or

consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain

the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said

contests.
 PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA et al v. IAC

G.R. No. 66614, 25 January, 1988, THIRD DIVISION, (Bidin, J.)

FACTS

In 1968 a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between

CAA and MOPI over the same parcel of land, reduced again, for 25 years, without the

approval of the secretary of the Public Works and Communications (PWC). After the RP

through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) entered into a lease contract

(Contract A) with Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of land for 25 years, and another

lease contract in 1965 (Contract B and in effect a sublease) with Leveriza and Mobil Oil

Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the same parcel of land but reduced for 25 years,

Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts, the CAA sought the rescission

or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which

Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and

maintains that Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar

as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.

On the other hand, Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract with

CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C

between MOPI and CAA which should be declared void.

ISSUE
 WON the administrator of CAA had the statutory authority, without the approval

of the then secretary of the PWC, to enter into or cancel a lease contract over a real

property owned by the RP.

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court upheld CAA’s authority to enter into and cancel a

contract of lease over a property owned by the RP without the approval of the secretary

of the PWC. Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), such contract of

lease must be executed: (1) by the President of the Philippines, or (2) by an officer duly

designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested by law. It is readily apparent that

in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the

government under the third category. As provided in Section 32 of Republic Act 776, the

Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers

properties belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and it is on these properties that

the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into,

make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private

corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real

property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. The basic

principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to

special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace

only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute

prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical

application to a particular case, the one designed therefore specially should prevail.
 HONORABLE CARLOS O. FORTICH et al. v. HONORABLE RENATO C. CORONA

et al.

G.R. No. 131457, 24 April, 1998, SECOND DIVISION, (Martinez J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The orderly administration of justice requires that the

judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of

finality set by the law, rules and regulations.

FACTS

The Department of Agrarian Reform placed the land owned by Norberto

Quisumbing Management under compulsory acquisition, for its distribution to

beneficiary farmers pursuant to CARP. However, the DAR was ordered to desists from

pursuing any activities as ordered by DARAB.

The Provincial Development Council passed Resolution No. 6 which aimed to

convert the same land into an Agro-Industrial Zone to promote economic prosperity, to

which the Office of the President approved. DAR filed a motion for reconsideration

wherein the Office of the President stated that its decision to affirming the conversion is

already final and executory. This lead the DAR to file a second motion for

reconsideration. In some other time, farmers who claim to beneficiaries of the CARP in

the subject case staged a hunger strike wherein, it lead the Office of the President to

issue the subject “Win-Win” Resolution whereby only 44 hectares of the subject land will

be approved for conversion into an Agro-Industrial Zone, while the remaining 100

hectares shall be distributed to the farmer beneficiaries.

ISSUE

WON the Office of the President’s Resolution modifying its decision granting the

conversion of the land valid?

RULING

NO. Citing Section 7 Administrative Order No.18, when the Office of the

President promulgated its resolution that its first decision affirming the conversion to be

final and executory, and as no one filed a motion for reconsideration timely, the Office of

the President lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

Having no jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the

second motion for reconsideration filed by DAR which was the source of the “Win-Win”

Resolution. The act of the President to re-open the case and modify its decision which

had already become final and executory, is a gross disregard of the rules and basic

legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

 EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO

G.R. No. L-29274, 27 November, 1975, (Martin, J.)

FACTS

The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and

Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966,

pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised

Administrative Code.

He charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: To

investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,

smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which

are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper

recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the

Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the

Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena

or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the

investigation. The petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order

No. 4 paragraph 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witnesses,

administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation.

ISSUE
 WON the Agency, acting through its officials enjoys the authority to issue

subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

RULING

YES. There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by

the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City

Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of

authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando

Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the

investigations. Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of

investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable

cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.

It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or

complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is

enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose When investigative

and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may...

take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of law. In sum, it may

be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1)

within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the

information is reasonably relevant.

 GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO v. HONORABLE MANUEL C. DOMINGO et al.

G.R. No. 90591, 21 November, 1990, (Grino-Aquino, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman

as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its

jurisdiction were confined with the investigation of minor and less grave offenses

arising from or related to the duties of public office, but would exclude those

grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and

prerogative, for it is in the investigation of the latter where the need of an

independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman is the

greatest.

FACTS

Petitioner Governor Deloso attended a pre-wedding celebration in Botolan

Zambales. On his way to the said event he was allegedly ambushed. Later in the

testimonies and eyewitnesses, it was stated that it was the Governor and his men who

ambushed those people whom he accused that ambushed them. The Governor was

then charged with multiple murder of those men and the Office of the Ombudsman took

cognizance of the case. Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the

grounds that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the

case involved is not in relation with his office

ISSUE

WON the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction with the case against

Governor Deloso?

RULING

YES. Citing Sections 12 and 13 of Article 11 of the Constitution, the Court stated

that the Ombudsman has the function and power to act on cases filed in any for or

manner against public officials, and to investigate any act or omission of these officials

when such acts or omissions appear to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. The

word “illegal” act or omission is broad enough to cover any crime committed by a public

official. The Constitution does not require that the act or omission be related to be or

connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.